QUESTION V
OF THE PRESERVATION OF THINGS BY GOD

  1. Et primo quaeritur utrum res conserventur in esse a Deo, an etiam circumscripta omni Dei actione, per se in esse remaneant.
  2. Secundo utrum Deus possit alicui creaturae communicare quod per se in esse conservetur absque Deo.
  3. Tertio utrum Deus possit creaturam in nihilum redigere.
  4. Quarto utrum aliqua creatura in nihilum sit redigenda, vel etiam in nihilum redigatur.
  5. Quinto utrum motus caeli quandoque deficiat.
  6. Sexto utrum sciri possit ab homine quando motus caeli finiatur.
  7. Septimo utrum cessante motu caeli elementa remaneant.
  8. Octavo utrum cessante motu caeli remaneat actio et passio in elementis.
  9. Nono utrum plantae et animalia bruta et corpora mineralia remaneant post finem mundi.
  10. Decimo utrum corpora humana remaneant, motu caeli cessante.
  1. Are Things Preserved in Their Being by God?
  2. Can God Enable a Creature to Keep Itself in Existence by Itself and Without God’s Assistance?
  3. Can God Annihilate a Creature?
  4. Is There a Creature That Ought to Be or Actually Is Annihilated?
  5. Will the Heavenly Movement Cease at Any Time?
  6. Can Any Man Know When the Movement of the Heavens Will Cease?
  7. Will the Elements Remain When the Heavens Cease to Be in Motion?
  8. Will Action and Passion Remain in the Elements after the Heavens Have Ceased to Be in Motion?
  9. Will Plants, Animals and Minerals Remain after the End of the World?
  10. Will Human Bodies Remain after the Heavenly Movement Has Ceased?
Q. V:
ARTICLE I
Are Things Preserved in Their Being by God?

[ III Contra Gent. lxv, lxvii, xliv. Sum. Th. I, Q. civ. A. I]
Et primo quaeritur utrum res conserventur in esse a Deo, an etiam circumscripta omni Dei actione, per se in esse remaneant. Et videtur quod sic. THE question at issue is about the preservation of things in their being by God: and the first point of inquiry is whether they continue to exist independently of all divine action: and seemingly they do.
Dicitur enim Deut. XXXII, 4: Dei perfecta sunt opera. Ex hoc sic arguitur. Perfectum est cui nihil deest, secundum philosophum. Ei autem aliquid deest ad suum esse quod non potest esse nisi aliquo exteriori agente. Ergo huiusmodi perfectum non est; Dei ergo talia opera non sunt. 1. It is written (Deut. xxxii, 4): God’s works are Perfect. Accordingly it is argued thus. A perfect thing is that which lacks nothing, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii). Now a thing lacks something in its very being if it cannot exist without the assistance of an external agent. Such a thing therefore is not perfect, and consequently the works of God are not such.
Sed dicebat, quod opera Dei non sunt perfecta simpliciter, sed secundum suam naturam.- Sed contra, perfectum secundum suam naturam est quod habet illud cuius sua natura est capax. Sed quidquid habet totum illud cuius sua natura est capax, potest remanere in esse, omni Dei conservatione exteriori cessante. Ergo si creaturae aliquae sunt perfectae secundum suam naturam, possunt remanere in esse, Deo non conservante. Probatio mediae. Deus conservando res, aliquid agit: propter quod dicitur Ioan. V, 17: pater meus usque modo operatur, et ego operor, ut dicit Augustinus. Agente autem aliquid operante, effectus aliquid recipit. Ergo quamdiu Deus conservat res, semper res conservatae aliquid a Deo recipiunt: quamdiu ergo res conservatione indiget, nondum totum habet cuius est capax. 2. It may be said that God’s works are not simply perfect but only in regard to their nature.—On the contrary a thing is perfect as to its nature if it has all that its nature is capable of having. Now whatsoever has all that its nature is capable of having, is able to continue in existence, even if God cease to preserve it from without. If then some creatures are perfect in their nature they can continue to exist without God keeping them in existence. The minor premise is proved thus. The preservation of things is a work of God: hence is is said Jo. v. 17): My Father works even till now, and I work (cf. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. x): and when an agent works, the effect receives something. Wherefore as long as God preserves things the things preserved receive something from God, and thus whatsoever needs to be preserved has not all that it is capable of having.
Praeterea, unumquodque non est perfectum nisi perficiat hoc ad quod est. Sed principia ad hoc sunt, ut rem in esse conservent. Si ergo principia creata rerum non possunt rem in esse tenere, sequitur ea esse imperfecta, et ita non esse Dei opera: quod est absurdum. 3. A thing is not perfect unless it fulfils its purpose. Now the principles of a thing are intended for the purpose of preserving the being thereof. If then the created principles of things are unable to keep things in existence, it follows that they are imperfect, and are not God’s works: which is absurd.
Praeterea, Deus est causa rerum sicut efficiens. Sed cessante actione causae efficientis, remanet effectus; sicut cessante actione aedificatoris, remanet domus, et cessante actione ignis generantis, adhuc remanet ignis generatus. Ergo et cessante omni Dei actione, adhuc possunt creaturae in esse remanere. 4. God is the efficient cause of things. Now the effect remains when the action of the efficient cause ceases: thus the builder ceases to act yet the house remains; the flame that caused the fire may cease to bum yet the fire caused by it continues. Therefore even if God’s actions cease altogether, creatures can continue to exist.
Sed dicebat, quod agentia inferiora sunt causa fiendi et non essendi; unde esse effectuum remanet remota actione causarum fieri. Deus autem est causa rebus non solum fiendi, sed essendi. Unde esse rerum remanere non potest, divina actione cessante.- Sed contra, omnis res generata habet esse per suam formam. Si ergo causae inferiores generantes non sunt causae essendi, non erunt causae formarum; et ita formae quae sunt in materia, non sunt a formis quae sunt in materia secundum sententiam philosophi, qui dicit, forma quae est in his carnibus et ossibus, est a forma quae est in his carnibus et ossibus: sed sequitur quod formae in materia sint a formis sine materia, secundum sententiam Platonis, vel a datore formarum, secundum sententiam Avicennae. 5. But someone will say that lower agents are the causes of things becoming but not of their existence: so that the existence of an effect remains when the causes of its becoming have been removed: whereas God is the cause of things not only in their becoming but also in their being. Wherefore things cannot continue to exist if the divine action ceases. On the contrary every thing generated has being by its form. If then the lower generating causes do not cause existence, they will not be causes of forms: and consequently forms that are in matter are not produced by forms in matter, which is contrary to the opinion of the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 8) who asserts that a form which is in this or that flesh and bones is produced by a form that is in this or that flesh and bones: and it will follow that forms in matter are produced by forms outside matter, which was Plato’s view, or by the giver of forms, as Avicenna contended (Metaph. ix, 4, 5).
Praeterea, ea quorum esse est in fieri, non possunt remanere cessante actione agentis, ut patet de motu et de agone, et similibus; illa vero quorum esse est in facto esse, possunt remanere etiam agentibus remotis. Unde Augustinus dicit: praesente lumine non factus est aer lucidus, sed fit; quia si factus esset, non fieret; sed absente lumine lucidus remaneret. Multae autem creaturae sunt quorum esse non est in fieri, sed in facto esse; ut patet de Angelis, et de corporibus etiam omnibus. Ergo, cessante actione Dei agentis, creaturae possunt remanere in esse. 6. Things whose being is as yet in the state of becoming cannot continue after the agent has ceased to act, as instanced in movement, fire and the like, whereas those in actual existence can continue even after the agent has been removed. Hence Augustine (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) says: By the presence of light the air is not made (permanently) lightsome, but is being made lightsome, for if it had been made (permanently) lightsome, it would not continue to be made lightsome, and if the light were removed it would remain, lightsome.” Now there are many creatures whose being is not in a state of becoming but of actual existence, such as the angels and all bodies. Therefore creatures can remain in existence after God has ceased to act.
Praeterea, causae inferiores generantes sunt rebus generatis causae essendi, ut supra probatum est; non tamen sicut causae principales et primae, sed sicut causae secundae. Causa autem prima essendi, quae Deus est, rebus generatis non dat principium essendi, nisi mediantibus causis secundis praedictis. Ergo nec permanentiam in esse, quia eadem res per idem habet esse et in esse conservatur. Sed esse generatorum conservatur ex ipsis principiis essentialibus generatorum, cessantibus causis secundis agentibus. Ergo etiam cessante causa prima agente, quae Deus est. 7. Lower generating causes, as proved above, cause the existence of the things they generate; not, however, as principle and first, but as second causes. Now the first cause of existence which is God, does not give the things he produces the beginning of existence except through the second causes mentioned above. Wherefore neither does he give them continuance of existence, since one and the same thing derives both being and continuance of being from the same cause. Wherefore things generated are kept in existence by their essential principles, when second active causes have ceased: and consequently even when the first cause, namely God, withdraws his activity.
Praeterea, si res aliqua deficit esse, aut hoc est propter materiam, aut propter hoc quod est ex nihilo. Materia autem non est causa corruptionis nisi secundum quod est subiecta contrarietati; non autem in omnibus creaturis est materia contrarietati subiecta. Ergo illa in quibus non est materia contrarietati subiecta, sicut sunt corpora caelestia et Angeli, non possunt deficere ratione materiae, nec iterum ratione eius quod sunt ex nihilo, quia ex nihilo nihil sequitur et nihilum nihil agit, et ita non corrumpit. Ergo cessante omni actione divina, huiusmodi res esse non deficerent. 8. If a thing cease to exist this is either by reason of its matter or because it is produced from nothing. But matter is not a cause of corruption except through being subject to contrariety; and there is not in all creatures matter subject to contrariety. Hence those things in which there is no matter subject to contrariety, such as the heavenly bodies and angels, cannot cease to exist by reason of matter. Nor can they cease to exist through being produced from nothing since from nothing nothing comes, and nothing has no action, and consequently does not cause a thing to be corrupted. Therefore if all divine action were to cease, such things would not cease to exist.
Praeterea, forma incipit esse in materia in instanti quod est ultimum factionis, in quo res non est in fieri, sed in facto esse. Sed secundum Avicennae sententiam, formae rerum generatarum infunduntur in materia ab intelligentia agente, quae est datrix formarum. Ergo illa intelligentia est causa essendi, non tantum fiendi; et ita per actionem eius res possunt conservari in esse, etiam circumscripta Dei conservatione. 9. The form begins to be in matter in the last instant of a thing’s becoming when it is no longer in the state of becoming but of actual existence. Now in Avicenna’s opinion (Metaph. ix, 4, 5) the forms of generated things are inserted in matter by an active intelligence which is the giver of forms. Wherefore that intelligence is the cause of being and not only of becoming so that by its action things can be kept in existence apart from God’s action.
Praeterea, etiam forma substantialis est causa essendi. Si ergo causae essendi sunt quae conservant res in esse, ipsa forma rei sufficit ad hoc quod res in esse conservetur. 10. The substantial form also is a cause of existence so that if the cause of a thing’s existence also keeps it in existence, it follows that the form of a thing suffices to keep it in existence.
Praeterea, res conservantur in esse per materiam, in quantum sustinet formam. Sed materia, secundum philosophum, est ingenita et incorruptibilis, et ita non est causata ab aliqua causa; et sic remanet, omni actione causae efficientis remota. Ergo adhuc res poterunt conservari in esse, cessante actione primae causae efficientis, scilicet Dei. 11. A thing is kept in existence by its matter inasmuch as this upholds the form. Now according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, 82: De Coelo et Mundo, i, 20) matter is ungenerated and incorruptible., so that it is not produced by a cause, and, therefore remains even when all action of an efficient cause ceases. Wherefore it will be possible for things to remain in existence after the action of the, first efficient cause, namely God, has ceased.
Praeterea, Eccli. XXXIII, 15: dicitur: intuere in omnia opera altissimi: duo contra duo, unum contra unum. Sed inter opera altissimi invenitur aliquid quod indiget Dei conservatione. Ergo etiam invenitur inter opera Dei eius oppositum, scilicet quod non indiget Dei conservatione. 12. It is written (Ecclus. xxxiii, 15): Look upon all the works of the most High. Two and two, and one against another. Now some of God’s works need his action to keep them in existence. Therefore as against these there must be some of God’s works which do not need to be kept in existence by him.
Praeterea, appetitus naturalis non potest esse cassus et vanus. Sed quaelibet res naturaliter conservationem sui esse appetit. Potest ergo res per se ipsam conservari in esse; alias appetitus naturalis esset vanus. 13. The natural appetite cannot be null and void. Now everything has a natural appetence for the preservation of Its existence. Wherefore a thing is able of itself to remain in existence, else its natural appetite would be frustrated.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod Deus fecit singula bona, simul autem omnia valde bona: propter quod dicitur Genes. I, 31: vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Ipsa ergo creaturarum universitas est valde bona et optima; optimi enim est optima adducere, secundum Platonem in Timaeo. Sed melius est quod non indiget aliquo exteriori ad sui conservationem, eo quod indiget. Ergo universitas creaturarum non indiget aliquo exteriori conservante. 14. Augustine says (Enchir. x) that God makes each thing good, and all things together very good; for which reason it is written (Gen. i, 31): God saw all the things that he had made and they were very good. Accordingly the universe of creatures is very good and the best of all since best produces best according to Plato (Tim.). Now it. is better not to need another thing for one’s preservation in existence, than to need another for that purpose. Therefore the universe of creatures needs no other to keep it in existence.
Praeterea, beatitudo est aliquid creatum in natura beatorum. Sed beatitudo est status omnium bonorum congregatione perfectus, ut Boetius dicit; quod non esset, nisi in se includeret sui conservationem, quod est unum de maxime bonis. Ergo aliquid creatum est quod per se ipsum potest conservari in esse. 15. Heavenly bliss is something created in the nature of the blessed. Now heavenly bliss is a state rendered perfect by the accumulation of all goods according to Boethius (De Consol. iii, 2): and this must needs include continuance in existence, which is one of the greatest goods. Therefore there is a creature that can of itself remain in existence.
Praeterea, dicit Augustinus, quod Deus ita administrat res sua providentia, quod tamen sinit eas agere proprios motus. Sed proprius motus naturae ex nihilo existentis est ut in nihilum tendat. Ergo dominus permittit naturam quae est ex nihilo, in nihilum tendere. Non ergo conservat res in esse. 16. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei vii, 30) that God so governs things by his providence that he allows them to exercise their own movements. Now the proper movement of nature since it proceeds from nothing is to return to nothing. Therefore God allows the nature that comes from nothing to return to nothing: and consequently he does not keep things in existence.
Praeterea, recipiens quod est contrarium recepto, non conservat receptum, sed magis ipsum destruit. Videmus enim quod quae recipiuntur ab agentibus naturalibus per violentiam in suis contrariis, remanent ad horam, cessante actione naturalium agentium; sicut calor remanet in aqua calefacta, cessante actione ignis, ad horam. Effectus autem Dei non recipiuntur in aliquo contrario, sed in nihilo; quia ipse est auctor totius substantiae rei. Ergo multo magis remanebunt divini effectus vel ad horam, divina actione cessante. 17. A recipient that is contrary to what it has received does not preserve it but destroys it. Thus we observe that when a natural agency produces in a subject an effect by violence, this effect remains for a time in the subject opposed to it, after the natural agent has ceased to act: thus after the fire has ceased to act, heat remains in the water heated, but only for a time. Now God’s effects are received not in a contrary but in nothing, since he is the author of the whole substance of a thing. Much more then will the divine effects remain, be it only for a time, after God’s action has ceased.
Praeterea, forma est principium cognoscendi, operandi et essendi. Sed forma absque exteriori adminiculo potest esse operandi principium et cognoscendi. Ergo et essendi; et ita cessante omni Dei actione res per formam potest conservari in esse. Form is the principle of knowledge, operation and existence. Now a form without assistance from without can be a principle of operation and knowledge. Therefore It can also be a principle of existence, so that after all divine action has ceased, things can be kept in existence by their forms.
Sed contra. Est quod dicitur Hebr. I, 3: portans omnia verbo virtutis suae; ubi dicit Glossa: sicut ab eo creata sunt, ita per eum immutabilia conservantur. On the contrary it is written (Heb. i, 8): Upholding all things by, the word of his power: and the gloss remarks “Even as all things were created by him, so by him are they preserved unchangeable.”
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit: creatoris potentia et omnipotentis virtus causa subsistendi est omni creaturae; quae virtus ab eis quae creata sunt regendis si aliquando cessaret, simul et illorum cessaret species, omnisque natura concideret. Et infra. Mundus nec in ictu oculi stare poterit, si ei Deus regimen suum subtraxerit. Again, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): “The might of the Creator and the Power of the Almighty is the cause of existence in every creature; and if the ruling power of God were withdrawn from his creatures, their form would at once cease and all nature would collapse;” and further on: “The world would not stand for one instant, if God withdrew his support.”
Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, quod omnia in nihilum deciderent, nisi ea manus omnipotentis contineret. Again, Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 37) that all things would fall into nothingness were they not upheld by the hand of the Almighty.
Praeterea, in Lib. de causis, dicitur: omnis intelligentiae fixio, id est permanentia et essentia, est per bonitatem quae est causa prima. Multo ergo fortius aliae creaturae non figuntur in esse nisi per Deum. Again, in the book De Causis (prop. ix) it is said: “Every intelligence derives its immobility” i.e. stability and essence, “from that goodness which is the first cause.” A fortiori therefore, other creatures are not stabilised in existence save by God.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod absque omni dubio concedendum est, quod res conservantur in esse a Deo, et quod in momento in nihilum redigerentur, cum a Deo desererentur. Cuius ratio hinc accipi potest. Effectum enim a sua causa dependere oportet. Hoc enim est de ratione effectus et causae: quod quidem in causis formalibus et materialibus manifeste apparet. Quocumque enim materiali vel formali principio subtracto, res statim esse desinit, cum huiusmodi principia intrent essentiam rei. Idem autem iudicium oportet esse de causis efficientibus, et formalibus vel materialibus. Nam efficiens est causa rei secundum quod formam inducit, vel materiam disponit. Unde eadem dependentia rei est ad efficiens, et ad materiam et formam, cum per unum eorum ab altero dependeat. De finalibus autem causis oportet etiam idem esse iudicium quod de causa efficiente. Nam finis non est causa, nisi secundum quod movet efficientem ad agendum; non enim est primum in esse, sed in intentione solum. Unde et ubi non est actio, non est causa finalis, ut patet in III Metaph. Secundum hoc ergo esse rei factae dependet a causa efficiente secundum quod dependet ab ipsa forma rei factae. Est autem aliquod efficiens a quo forma rei factae non dependet per se et secundum rationem formae, sed solum per accidens: sicut forma ignis generati ab igne generante, per se quidem, et secundum rationem suae speciei non dependet, cum in ordine rerum eumdem gradum teneat, nec forma ignis aliter sit in generato quam in generante; sed distinguitur ab ea solum divisione materiali, prout scilicet est in alia materia. Unde cum igni generato sua forma sit ab aliqua causa, oportet ipsam formam dependere ab altiori principio, quod sit causa ipsius formae per se et secundum propriam speciei rationem. Cum autem esse formae in materia, per se loquendo, nullum motum vel mutationem implicet, nisi forte per accidens; omne autem corpus non agat nisi motum, ut philosophus probat, necesse est quod principium ex quo per se dependet forma, sit aliquod principium incorporeum; per actionem enim alicuius principii dependet effectus a causa agente. Et si aliquod principium corporeum est per aliquem modum causa formae, hoc habet in quantum agit virtute principii incorporei, quasi eius instrumentum; quod quidem necessarium est ad hoc quod forma esse incipiat, in quantum forma non incipit esse nisi in materia; non enim materia quocumque modo se habens potest subesse formae, quia proprium actum in propria materia oportet esse. Cum ergo est materia in dispositione quae non competit formae alicui, non potest a principio incorporeo, a quo forma dependet per se, eam consequi immediate; unde oportet quod sit aliquid transmutans materiam; et hoc est aliquod agens corporeum, cuius est agere movendo. Et hoc quidem agit in virtute principii incorporei, et eius actio determinatur ad hanc formam, secundum quod talis forma est in eo, actu (sicut in agentibus univocis) vel virtute (sicut in agentibus aequivocis). Sic igitur huiusmodi inferiora agentia corporalia, non sunt formarum principia in rebus factis, nisi quantum potest se extendere causalitas transmutationis, cum non agant nisi transmutando, ut dictum est; hoc autem est in quantum disponunt materiam, et educunt formam de potentia materiae. Quantum igitur ad hoc, formae generatorum dependent a generantibus naturaliter, quod educuntur de potentia materiae, non autem quantum ad esse absolutum. Unde et remota actione generantis, cessat eductio de potentia in actum quod est fieri generatorum; non autem cessant ipsae formae, secundum quas generata habent esse. Et inde est quod esse rerum generatarum manet, sed non fieri, cessante actione generantis. Si quae autem formae sunt non in materia, ut sunt substantiae intellectuales, vel in materia nullo modo indisposita ad formam, ut est in corporibus caelestibus, in quibus non sunt contrariae dispositiones; harum principium esse non potest nisi agens incorporeum, quod non agit per motum; nec dependent ab aliquo secundum fieri a quo non dependeant secundum esse. Sicut igitur cessante actione causae efficientis, quae agit per motum, in ipso instanti cessat fieri rerum generatarum, ita cessante actione agentis incorporei, cessat ipsum esse rerum ab eo creatarum. Hoc autem agens incorporeum, a quo omnia creantur, et corporalia et incorporalia, Deus est, sicut in alia quaestione ostensum est, a quo non solum sunt formae rerum, sed etiam materiae. Et quantum ad propositum non differt utrum immediate, vel quodam ordine, ut quidam philosophi posuerunt. Unde sequitur quod divina operatione cessante, omnes res eodem momento in nihilum deciderent, sicut auctoritatibus est probatum in argumentis sed contra. I answer that without any doubt whatever it must be admitted that things are preserved in existence by God, and that they would instantly be reduced to nothing were God to abandon them. The proof of this may be expressed as follows. An effect must needs depend on its cause. This is part of the very nature of cause and effect; and is evidenced in formal and material causes, seeing that on the removal of any of its material or formal principles, a thing at once ceases to exist, because such principles enter into its essence., The statement applies to efficient causes even as to formal and material causes: since the efficient cause produces a thing by inducing the form or disposing the matter. Hence a thing depends equally on its efficient cause, its matter and its form since through the one it depends on the other. As to final causes the same is to be said of them as of efficient causes: because the end is a cause only for as much as it moves the efficient cause to act, since it comes first not in existence but in the intention. Consequently there is no action where there is no final cause (Metaph. iii, 2). Accordingly the existence of a thing made depends on its efficient cause inasmuch as it depends on the form of the thing made. Now there can be an efficient cause on which the form of the thing made does not depend directly and considered as a form, but only indirectly: thus the form of a generated fire does not depend on the generating fire directly and by reason of its species, seeing that it occupies the same degree in the order of things, and the form of fire is in the same way in both the generated and in the generating fire, and is distinguished therefrom only by a material distinction, through being seated in another matter. Hence since the generated fire has its form from some cause, this same form must depend on some higher principle, that is the cause of that form directly and in respect of its very species. Now seeing that properly speaking the existence of a form in matter implies no movement or change except accidentally, and since no bodies act unless moved, as the Philosopher shows, it follows of necessity that the principle on which the form depends directly must be something incorporeal, for the effect depends on its active cause through the action of a principle. And if a corporeal principle be in some way the cause of a form, this is due to its acting by virtue of an incorporeal principle and as its instrument. In fact this is necessary in order that the form begin to exist, inasmuch as it does not begin to exist otherwise than in matter: because matter cannot be subject of a form unless it have a particular disposition, since the proper act should be in its proper matter. When, therefore, matter is in a disposition unsuitable to a particular form, it cannot directly receive that form from an incorporeal principle on which the form directly depends, so that there is need for something to.transmute the matter: and this will be a corporeal agent whose action consists in moving something. This corporeal agent acts by virtue of the incorporeal principal, and its action terminates in this or that form, inasmuch as this or that form is in the corporeal agent either actually (as in universal agents) or virtually (as in equivocal agents). Accordingly these lower corporeal agents are not the cause of the forms in things made, except to the extent of their causality in trans-muting matter, since they do not act except by transmuting, as stated above (Q. iii, AA. 7, 8): and this is by transmuting matter and educing the form from the potentiality of matter. Hence the form of the thing generated depends naturally on the generator in so far as it is educed from the potentiality of matter, but not as to its absolute existence. And, therefore, when the act of the generator ceases, the eduction of the form from potentiality into actual being, that is the becoming of the thing generated, ceases, whereas the form itself whereby the thing generated has its existence, does not cease. Hence it is that the existence of the thing generated, but not its becoming, remains after the action of the generator has ceased. On the other hand, forms that do not exist in matter, such as intellectual substances, or that exist in matter nowise indisposed to the form, such as the heavenly bodies wherein there are no contrary dispositions, must proceed from a principle that is an incorporeal agent that acts not by movement, nor do they depend on something for their. becoming without depending on it also for their being. Wherefore just as when the action of their efficient cause which acts by movement ceases, at that very instant the becoming of the thing generated ceases, even so when the action of an incorporeal agent ceases, the very existence of things created by it ceases. Now this incorporeal agent by whom all things, both corporeal and incorporeal are created, is God, as we have proved above (Q. iii, AA. 5, 6, 8), from whom things derive not only their form but also their matter. And as to the question at issue it makes no difference whether they were all made by him immediately, or in a certain order as certain philosophers have maintained. We conclude then that with the cessation of the divine operation, at the same instant all things would fall into nothingness, as we have proved by the authorities quoted in the arguments On the contrary.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod creaturae Dei sunt perfectae in sua natura et in suo ordine; sed inter alia quae ad earum perfectionem requiruntur, hoc etiam est quod a Deo contineantur in esse. Reply to the First Objection. God’s creatures are perfect in their nature and order: and their perfection requires among other things that they be kept in existence by God.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod Deus non alia operatione producit res in esse et eas in esse conservat. Ipsum enim esse rerum permanentium non est divisibile nisi per accidens, prout alicui motui subiacet; secundum se autem est in instanti. Unde operatio Dei quae est per se causa quod res sit, non est alia secundum quod facit principium essendi et essendi continuationem. Reply to the Second Objection. God does not create things by one action and preserve them by another. The existence of permanent things is not divisible except accidentally In so far as it is subject to some kind of movement: and in itself is in an instant. Hence God’s action which is the direct cause of a thing’s existence is not distinct as the principle of its being and as the principle of its continuance in being.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod, quamdiu principia essentialia rerum sunt, tamdiu res conservantur in esse; sed et ipsa rerum principia esse desinerent, divina actione cessante. Reply to the Third Objection. As long as the essential principles of a thing remain, so long does that thing continue to exist: but those very principles would cease to be, were the divine action to cease.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod huiusmodi inferiora agentia sunt causa rerum quantum ad earum fieri, non quantum ad esse rerum per se loquendo. Deus autem per se est causa essendi: et ideo non est simile. Unde Augustinus dicit: non enim sicut structuram cum fabricaverit quis abscedit, atque illo cessante et abscedente stat opus eius; ita mundus vel in ictu oculi stare poterit, si ei Deus regimen suum subtraxerit. Reply to the Fourth Objection. These lower agents cause a thing as to its becoming, but not as to its existence properly speaking: whereas God is the direct cause of existence: wherefore the comparison fails. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): “When a man is building a house and goes away, the building remains after he has ceased to work and gone: whereas the world would not stand for a single instant if God withdrew his support.”
Ad quintum dicendum, quod cum agentia corporalia non agant nisi transmutando, —nihil autem transmutetur nisi ratione materiae, —causalitas agentium corporalium non potest se extendere nisi ad ea quae aliquo modo sunt in materia. Et quia Platonici et Avicenna non ponebant formas de potentia materiae educi, ideo cogebantur dicere quod agentia naturalia disponebant tantum materiam; inductio autem formae erat a principio separato. Si autem ponamus formas substantiales educi de potentia materiae, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, agentia naturalia non solum erunt causae dispositionum materiae, sed etiam formarum substantialium; quantum ad hoc dumtaxat quod de potentia educuntur in actum, ut dictum est, et per consequens sunt essendi principia quantum ad inchoationem ad esse, et non quantum ad ipsum esse absolute. Reply to the Fifth Objection. Inasmuch as corporeal agents do not act except by transmuting, and as nothing is transmuted except by reason of matter, the causality of corporeal agents cannot extend beyond things that in some way are in matter. The Platonists together with Avicenna through denying the eduction of forms from matter were obliged to hold that natural agents merely dispose matter, and that the form is induced by a principle that is separate from matter. On the other hand if with Aristotle we hold substantial forms to be educed from the potentiality of matter, natural agents will dispose not only matter but also the substantial form, only, however, in regard to its eduction from the potentiality of matter into actual existence, as stated above (Q. iii, AA. 9, 11): so that they will be principles of existence as considered in its inchoation but not as considered absolutely.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod formarum quae incipiunt actu esse in materia per actionem corporalis agentis, quaedam producuntur secundum perfectam rationem speciei et secundum perfectum esse in materia, sicut et forma generantis, eo quod in materia non remanent contraria principia, et huiusmodi formae remanent post actionem generantis, usque ad tempus corruptionis. Quaedam vero formae producuntur quidem secundum perfectam rationem speciei, non autem secundum perfectum esse in materia, sicut calor qui est in aqua calefacta, habet perfectam speciem caloris, non tamen perfectum esse, quod est ex applicatione formae ad materiam, eo quod in materia remanet forma contraria tali qualitati. Et huiusmodi formae possunt ad modicum remanere post actionem agentis; sed prohibentur diu permanere a contrario principio, quod est in materia. Quaedam vero producuntur in materia et secundum imperfectam speciem et secundum imperfectum esse, sicut lumen in aere a corpore lucido. Non enim lumen est in aere sicut quaedam forma naturalis perfecta prout est in corpore lucido, sed magis per modum intentionis. Unde sicut similitudo hominis non manet in speculo nisi quamdiu est oppositum homini, ita nec lumen in aere, nisi apud praesentiam corporis lucidi: huiusmodi enim intentiones dependent a formis naturalibus corporum per se, et non solum per accidens; et ideo esse eorum non manet cessante actione agentium. Huiusmodi ergo propter imperfectionem sui esse, dicuntur esse in fieri; sed creaturae perfectae non dicuntur esse in fieri propter sui esse imperfectionem, quamvis actio Dei earum factionis indeficienter permaneat. Reply to the Sixth Objection. Some of the forms that begin to exist in matter through the action of a corporeal agent are when produced perfect both in their specific nature and in their being in matter, like the form of their generator: the reason being that the matter does not retain contrary principles: and such forms remain after the action of their generator, until the time of their corruption. Other forms however when produced are perfect in their specific nature, but have not perfect being in matter: thus heat in hot water has the perfect species of heat, but not perfect being which depends on the hold that the form has on the matter, inasmuch as the matter retains the form that is contrary to the quality of heat. Forms of this description can remain for a short time after the action of the agent, but are prevented from remaining for long by the contrary principle that is in the matter. Again other forms when produced in matter are imperfect both in species and in being: as for instance light which is produced in the air by a luminous body: for light in the air is not a perfect natural form as light in the luminous body, but rather after the manner of an intention. Hence just as a man’s likeness does not remain in a mirror save as long as the mirror is in front of him, even so neither does light remain in the air when the luminous body is no longer present. For these intentional beings depend on the natural forms of bodies directly and not only accidentally, so that they no longer remain in existence after the action of the agent has ceased. Wherefore suchlike things are said to be in a state of becoming on account of the imperfection of their being, whereas perfect creatures are not said to be in a state of becoming although they have an imperfect being, and God Who made them never ceases to uphold them.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod actio corporalis agentis non se extendit ultra motum, et ideo est instrumentum primi agentis in eductione formarum de potentia in actum, quae est per motum; non autem in conservatione earum, nisi quatenus ex aliquo motu dispositiones in materia retinentur, quibus materia fit propria formae: sic enim per motum corporum caelestium inferiora conservantur in esse. Reply to the Seventh Objection. The action of a corporeal agent does not extend beyond movement, so that it is the instrument of the first agent in the eduction of forms from potentiality to actuality which education is by movement: but not in their preservation, except in so far as through some kind of movement matter is made to retain the disposition which renders it appropriate to the form: it is thus in fact that the lower bodies are kept in existence through the movement of the heavenly bodies.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod creatura deficeret divina actione cessante, non propter contrarium quod sit in materia, quia ipsum etiam cum materia cessaret: sed propter hoc quod creatura est ex nihilo; non propter hoc quod nihilum aliquid ageret ad corruptionem, sed non ageret ad conservationem. Reply to the Eighth Objection. If the divine action were to cease, the creature also would cease to exist, not through the presence of a contrary in its matter, since that would cease to exist~ at the same time as the matter, but because the creature is made from nothing: and yet not in the sense that nothingness conduces actually to the corruption of the creatures, but that it does not act for its preservation.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod ipse dator formarum si ponatur aliquid aliud praeter Deum, secundum sententiam Avicennae, oportet quod et ipsum deficeret cessante actione Dei, quae est sua causa. Reply to the Ninth Objection. Even the giver of forms, if we suppose with Avicenna that it is something apart from God, must cease to exist if God who is its cause cease to act.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod etiam praedicta actione cessante, forma deficeret, unde non posset esse essendi principium. Reply to the Tenth Objection. The form also would cease to exist if the aforesaid action were to cease, so that it could no longer be a principle of existence.
Ad decimumprimum dicendum, quod materia dicitur ingenita quia non procedit in esse per generationem: ex hoc tamen non removetur quin a Deo sit; cum omne imperfectum oporteat a perfecto originem trahere. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Matter is said to be ungenerated because it is not produced by generation: but this does not exclude its being produced by God, seeing that every imperfect thing must needs originate from a perfect one.
Ad decimumsecundum dicendum, quod non oportet inter opera Dei, uno contradictorie oppositorum invento, aliud inveniri (sic enim esset inter ea aliquid increatum cum sit ibi aliquid creatum) quamvis hoc verum sit de aliis oppositis. Ea vero de quibus est obiectio, sunt contradictorie opposita; unde ratio non sequitur. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. In God’s works the presence of one contradictory does not argue the presence of its opposite (for then it would follow that since some of his works are created, there must be some that are not created) although this is true if we apply it to other kinds of opposition. But the things to which the objection refers are in contradictory opposition to each other; wherefore the argument does not prove.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod licet quaelibet res naturaliter appetat sui conservationem, non tamen quod a se conservetur, sed a sua causa. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. It is true that everything has a natural desire to be kept in existence, not however by its own action but by its cause.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod universitas creaturarum non est optima simpliciter, sed in genere creatorum; unde nihil prohibet ea aliquid melius esse. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The universe of creatures is the best, not simply, but in the genus of created things so that nothing prevents something from being better.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod inter bona quorum congregatione status beatitudinis perficitur, principium est coniunctio ad suam causam; cum ipsa Dei fruitio sit creaturae rationalis beatitudo. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. The goods, the accumulation of which makes the state of beatitude perfect, have their source in the creature’s union with its cause: since the beatitude of the rational creature consists in enjoying God.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod tendere in nihilum non est proprie motus naturae, qui semper est in bonum, sed est ipsius defectus; unde ratio falsum supponebat. Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. Properly speaking tendency to nothingness is not a movement of nature, which always has a tendency to the good; but it is a defect of nature that it tends to nothingness, so that the argument is based on a false supposition.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod illius impressionis violentae agens violentum est causa secundum fieri, et non simpliciter secundum esse, ut ex dictis patet: unde cessante actione agentis, potest ad tempus remanere, sed non diu propter eius imperfectionem. Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. A violent agent that produces a violent impression is the cause of that impression as to its becoming and not simply as to its being, as explained above (ad 6). Wherefore as soon as the agent ceases to act the impression may last for a time but not for long on account of its imperfection.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod sicut forma non potest esse principium essendi, nisi aliquo priori principio praesupposito, ita nec operandi, cum Deus in qualibet re operetur, ut in alia quaestione, ostensum est; nec etiam cognoscendi, cum omnis cognitio a lumine increato derivetur. Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. just as a form cannot be a principle of existence, unless we presuppose some previous principle, even so neither can it be a principle of operation since God works in everything as we have shown above (Q. iii, A. 6): nor again of knowledge, since all knowledge derives from the uncreated fight.
Q. V:
ARTICLE II
Can God Enable A Creature to Keep Itself in Existence by Itself and Without God’s Assistance?
Secundo quaeritur utrum Deus possit alicui creaturae communicare quod per se in esse conservetur absque Deo. Et videtur quod sic. THE second point of inquiry is whether God can make a creature able of itself to keep itself in existence independently of God, and seemingly he can do so.
Creare enim est maius quam per se in esse conservari. Sed creare potuit creaturae communicari, ut Magister dicit in V dist., IV Sentent. Ergo et per se in esse conservari. 1. To create is more than to keep oneself in existence. Now a creature could have received the power to create according to the Master (Sent. v, 4). Therefore it could have received the power to keep itself in existence.
Praeterea, plus est in potestate rerum et Dei, quam in potestate intellectus nostri. Sed intellectus noster potest intelligere creaturam absque Deo. Ergo multo fortius Deus potest creaturae dare ut per se conservetur in esse. 2. The power of God over things surpasses the power of our intellect. Now our intellect can understand a creature apart from God. Much more therefore can God make a creature able of itself to keep itself in existence.
Praeterea, aliqua creatura est ad imaginem Dei, ut patet Genesis I, 26. Sed secundum Hilarium imago est rei ad rem coaequandam indiscreta et unita similitudo; et sic imago adaequare potest id cuius est imago. Cum ergo Deus nullo exteriori conservante indigeat, videtur quod hoc potuit creaturae communicare. 3. There is a creature made to God’s image (Gen. i, 26). Now according to Hilary (De Synod.) an image is the undivided and united likeness of one thing adequately representing another: so that an image can be adequate to the thing of which it is the image. Seeing then that God needs no other to keep him in existence, it would seem that he could communicate this to a creature.
Praeterea, quanto agens est perfectius, tanto potest perfectiorem effectum producere. Sed agentia naturalia possunt effectus facere qui conserventur in esse sine agentibus. Ergo multo fortius Deus potest hoc facere. 4. The more perfect the agent the more perfect an effect can it produce. Now natural agents can produce effects which are able to remain in existence without their causes. Therefore a fortiori God can do this.
Sed contra. Deus non potest aliquid facere in diminutionem suae auctoritatis. Hoc autem suo dominio praeiudicaret, si aliquid absque ipsius conservatione posset esse. Ergo Deus hoc facere non potest. On the contrary God can do nothing that is prejudicial to his own authority: and it would be prejudicial to his dominion if anything could exist without his upholding it. Therefore God cannot do this.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod ad omnipotentiam Dei non pertinet quod possit facere duo contradictoria esse simul. In hoc autem quod dicitur quod Deus faciat aliquid quod eius conservatione non indigeat, contradictio implicatur. Iam enim ostensum est quod omnis effectus a sua causa dependet, secundum quod est eius causa. In hoc ergo quod dicitur, quod Dei conservatione non indigeat, ponitur non esse creatum a Deo; in hoc quod dicitur, quod Deus faciat ipsum, ponitur esse creatum. Sicut ergo contradictionem implicaret, Deum facere aliquid quod non esset creatum ab eo, ita si quis diceret Deum facere aliquid quod eius conservatione non indigeret. Unde utrumque pari ratione Deus non potest. I answer that God’s omnipotence does not imply that he can make two contradictories true at the same time. Now the statement that God can produce a thing which does not need to be upheld by him involves a contradiction. For we have already proved that every effect depends on its cause in so far as it is its cause. Accordingly the statement that a thing needs not God to uphold its existence implies that it is not created by God: while the statement that such a thing is produced by God implies that it is created by him. Wherefore just as it would involve a contradiction to say that God produced a thing that was not created by him, even so it would involve a contradiction were one to say that God made a thing that did not need to be kept in existence by him. Wherefore God is equally unable to do either.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum creare sit aliquid causare; non indigere autem alterius conservatione, non sit nisi eius quod causam non habet: manifestum est quod maius est non indigere conservari ab alio quam creare; sicut maius est causam non habere quam causam esse; licet et hoc non sit usquequaque verum, quod creare creaturae sit communicabile, secundum quod est actus primi agentis, ut in alia quaestione 3, dictum est. Reply to the First Objection. Since to create is to be the cause of something, and only that which has no cause needs not to be kept in existence by another, it is clear that not to need to be kept in existence by another is more than to create: even as to have no cause is more than to be a cause. Moreover it is not altogether true that the power of creating is communicable to a creature, seeing that it is the act of the first agent as we have shown above (Q. iii, A. 4).
Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis intellectus possit intelligere creaturam non intelligendo Deum, non tamen potest intelligere creaturam non conservari in esse a Deo; hoc enim implicat contradictionem, sicut et creaturam non esse creatam a Deo, ut dictum est. Reply to the Second Objection. Although the intellect is able to understand a creature without understanding God, it cannot understand a creature not being kept in existence by God, since this involves a contradiction, as if one were to say that a creature is not created by God, as stated above (Q. iii, A. 5).
Ad tertium dicendum, quod aequalitas non est de ratione imaginis absolute, sed perfectae; qualis Dei imago non est creatura, sed filius; unde ratio non sequitur. Reply to the Third Objection. Equality is essential to an image, not absolutely speaking but of a perfect image: such an image of God is not a creature but the Son of God; wherefore the argument proves nothing.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod responsio patet per ea quae dicta sunt in praecedenti. The Reply to the Fourth Objection may be gathered from what has been already said in the preceding answer.
Q. V:
ARTICLE III
Can God Annihilate A Creature?

[ Sum. Th. I, Q. civ, A. 3]
Tertio quaeritur utrum Deus possit creaturam in nihilum redigere. Et videtur quod non. THE third point of inquiry is whether God can annihilate a creature: and seemingly he cannot.
Dicit enim Augustinus in Lib. LXXXIII quaestionum, quod Deus non est causa tendendi in non esse. Hoc autem esset, si creaturam annihilaret. Ergo Deus non potest creaturam in nihilum redigere. 1. Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 2) that God does not cause things to tend to non-existence. But this would be the case were he to annihilate a creature. Therefore God cannot annihilate a creature.
Praeterea, creaturae corruptibiles, quae inter ceteras sunt debilioris esse, non desinunt esse nisi per actionem alicuius causae agentis, sicut ignis corrumpitur aliquo contrario agente in ipsum. Multo minus igitur aliae creaturae possunt desinere nisi per aliquam actionem. Si ergo Deus aliquam creaturam annihilaret, hoc non fieret nisi per aliquam actionem. Per actionem autem hoc fieri est impossibile. Nam omnis actio sicut est ab ente actu, ita in ens actu terminatur, cum oporteat factum esse simile facienti. Actio autem qua aliquid ens actu constituitur, non omnino in nihilum redigit. Ergo Deus non potest aliquid annihilare. 2. Corruptible creatures whose existence is more unstable than that of others, do not cease to exist save through the action of some active cause: thus fire is extinguished by some counteracting agency. Much less therefore can other creatures cease to exist otherwise than through some agency. If then God were to annihilate a creature, this would not be except through some kind of action. But this cannot be done through an action: since every action, proceeding as it does from an actual being, must terminate in an actual being, because every maker produces its like. Now an action whereby an actual being is produced in no way annihilates. Therefore God cannot annihilate a thing.
Praeterea, omne quod est per accidens, reducitur ad id quod est per se. Sed a nulla causa agente est defectus et corruptio nisi per accidens, cum nihil operetur nisi intendens ad bonum, ut Dionysius dicit: unde et ignis corrumpens aquam, non intendit privationem formae aquae, sed formam propriam in materiam introducere. Ergo non potest ab aliquo agente causari aliquis defectus, quin simul aliqua perfectio constituatur. Ubi autem aliqua perfectio constituitur, ibi non est annihilatio. Ergo Deus non potest aliquid annihilare. 3. Whatsoever happens accidentally must be traced to something that is intended directly. Now no active cause produces imperfection and corruption save accidentally, since nothing acts without intending a good, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv): thus the purpose of fire in destroying water is not to deprive the water of its form, but to introduce its own form into the matter. Wherefore imperfection cannot be caused by an agent, without some perfection being caused at the same time. Now where a perfection is produced there is not annihilation. Therefore God cannot annihilate a thing.
Praeterea, nihil agit nisi propter finem. Finis enim est quod movet efficientem. Finis autem divinae actionis est eius bonitas: quod quidem esse potest in rerum productione, per quam res similitudines divinae bonitatis consequuntur: non autem in annihilatione, per quam annihilatum omnino a Dei similitudine recederet. Ergo Deus non potest aliquid annihilare. 4. Nothing acts except for an end: since the end moves the effective cause. Now the end of God’s action is his own goodness: and this is indeed obtained by his producing things, so that they are made in likeness to their producer, but not by his annihilating them, since thereby they would be utterly deprived of that likeness. Therefore God cannot annihilate a thing.
Praeterea, manente causa, necesse est permanere causatum. Si enim non est necesse, possibile erit causatum esse et non esse posita causa; et sic indigebitur alio quo causatum ad esse determinetur; et ita causa sufficiens non erit ad esse causati. Sed Deus est sufficiens causa rerum. Ergo Deo manente necesse est res in esse manere. Sed Deus non potest facere quin ipse in esse maneat. Ergo non potest creaturas reducere in non esse. 5. So long as the cause remains its effect must needs remain also: because if this were not necessary, it would be possible, given a cause, for its effect to be or not to be and then it would need something else to determine its being and thus the cause would not suffice for the existence of its effect. But God is the sufficient cause of things. Therefore as long as God exists things must needs remain in existence. Now God cannot prevent his own remaining in existence. Therefore he cannot reduce creatures to non-existence.
Sed dicebatur, quod Deus non erit causa in actu, cum creaturae erunt annihilatae.- Sed contra, divina actio est eius esse; unde et Augustinus, vult quod in quantum Deus est, nos simus. Suum autem esse nunquam ei advenit. Ergo nunquam desinit esse in sua actione; et ita semper erit causa in actu. 6. It will be said that God would not be the actual cause if things were to be annihilated.—On the contrary, God’s action is his being, wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32) that God’s existence is the reason of our existence. Now his existence was never new to him. Therefore lie never ceases to act, and will always be an actual cause.
Praeterea, Deus non potest facere contra communes animi conceptiones, sicut quod totum non sit maius sua parte. Communis autem animi conceptio est apud sapientes, animas rationales perpetuas esse. Ergo Deus non potest facere quod in nihilum redigantur. 7. God cannot act against common sense, e.g. he cannot make the whole larger than its part. Now all wise men are agreed that the rational soul is immortal. Therefore God cannot cause it to be annihilated.
Praeterea, Commentator dicit in XI Metaph., quod id quod est in se possibile esse et non esse, non potest necessitatem essendi ab alio acquirere. Quaecumque ergo creaturae habent necessitatem essendi, in eis non est possibilitas ad esse et non esse. Huiusmodi autem sunt omnia incorruptibilia, ut sunt substantiae incorporeae et corpora caelestia. Ergo omnibus his non est possibilitas ad non esse. Si ergo sibi relinquantur, divina actione subtracta, non deficient in non esse; et sic Deus non videtur quod possit ea annihilare. 8. The Commentator says (Metaph. xi, com. 41) that if a thing in itself can either be or not be, nothing else can make it be of necessity. Wherefore whatsoever creatures have being of necessity do not admit of the intrinsic possibility of being or of not being. Now such are all incorruptible things, e.g. incorporeal substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore in none of these is there the possibility of not being: so that if they be left to themselves through God withdrawing his action from them, they will not cease to exist and thus seemingly God cannot annihilate them.
Praeterea, quod recipitur in aliquo, non tollit potentiam recipientis; sed potest eam perficere. Si ergo aliquid sit possibilitatem habens ad non esse, nihil in eo receptum hanc possibilitatem ei auferre poterit. Ergo quod est in se possibile non esse, non poterit ab aliquo necessitatem essendi acquirere. 9. The thing received does not remove the potentiality of the recipient; but it may perfect it. If then there exist a thing which potentially does not exist, it cannot receive anything that will remove this potentiality: and consequently a thing that in itself contains the possibility of not existing, cannot receive from anything else the necessity of existing.
Praeterea, ea secundum quae aliqua genere diversificantur, sunt de essentia rei; nam genus pars definitionis est. Secundum autem corruptibile et incorruptibile aliqua genere differunt, ut patet in X Metaph. Ergo sempiternitas et incorruptibilitas est de essentia rei. Deus autem non potest alicui rei auferre quod est de essentia eius; non enim potest facere quod homo existens homo, non sit animal. Ergo non potest rebus incorruptibilibus sempiternitatem auferre; et ita non potest ea ad nihilum redigere. 10. Whatever causes a generic difference belongs to the essence of things, for the genus is part of a thing’s definition. Now certain things differ generically in the point of being corruptible or incorruptible (Metaph. x, 10). Therefore everlastingness or incorruptibility is part of such things’ essence. Now God cannot deprive a thing of what is essential to it, thus he cannot make a man not to be an animal and yet remain a man. Therefore he cannot cause incorruptible things not to last for ever, and thus e cannot reduce them to nothing.
Praeterea, corruptibile nunquam potest mutari ut fiat incorruptibile secundum suam naturam; nam incorruptibilitas corporum resurgentium non est naturae sed gloriae; et hoc ideo est, quia corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt genere, ut dictum est. Si autem quod est in se possibile non esse, ab aliquo necessitatem essendi posset acquirere, corruptibile posset in incorruptibilitatem mutari. Ergo impossibile est esse aliquid quod in se sit possibile non esse, et acquirat necessitatem ab alio; et sic idem quod prius. 11. A corruptible thing can never be changed so as to become naturally incorruptible (for the incorruptibility of bodies rising from the dead is a gift not of nature but of glory) and the reason for this is that corruptible and incorruptible differ generically, as stated above. Now if a thing which has an intrinsic possibility not to exist, could be made by something else to exist of necessity, a corruptible thing might be changed into an incorruptible one. Therefore a thing which has an intrinsic possibility not to exist cannot possibly acquire necessity of existing from another: and so we come to the same conclusion as above.
Praeterea, si creaturae non habent necessitatem nisi secundum quod dependent a Deo, a Deo autem dependent secundum quod Deus est earum causa; non habebunt necessitatem nisi per modum qui competit causalitati qua Deus eorum causa est. Deus autem est rerum causa non per necessitatem, sed per voluntatem, ut est in alia quaestione, ostensum. Sic ergo erit necessitas in rebus sicut in his quae a voluntate causantur. Ea autem quae sunt a voluntate, non simpliciter et absolute sunt necessaria, sed solum necessitate conditionata, eo quod voluntas non necessario determinatur ad unum effectum. Ergo sequitur quod in rebus nihil est necessarium absolute, sed solum sub conditione; sicut est necesse Socratem moveri, si currit; vel ambulare, si vult, nullo impedimento existente. Ex quo videtur sequi quod nihil sit in creaturis simpliciter incorruptibile, sed omnia sint corruptibilia; quod est inconveniens. 12. If creatures have no necessity of existing except in so far as they depend on God, and if they depend on God in so far as he is their cause, their necessity of existing must correspond to the mode of causality whereby God is their cause. Now God is the cause of things not of necessity but by his will, as we have proved above (Q. iii, A. 15). Therefore necessity in things will be such as it is in things that are produced by the will. Now things effected by the will are not necessary simply and absolutely: their necessity is only conditional, inasmuch as the will is not determined by necessity, to one particular effect. It follows then that in things nothing is absolutely necessary, but only conditionally —even as it is necessary that Socrates move if he runs; or walk if he wishes to walk and is not prevented from so doing. Whence it would seem to follow that no creature is simply incorruptible, and that all are corruptible: which cannot be admitted.
Praeterea, sicut Deus est summum bonum, ita est perfectissimum ens. Sed in quantum est summum bonum, ei convenit quod non possit esse causa mali culpae. Ergo in quantum est perfectissimum ens, non ei competit quod possit esse causa annihilationis rerum. 13. Just as God is the sovereign good so is he the most perfect being. Now inasmuch as he is the sovereign good, it is unbecoming to him to be the cause of the evil of sin. Therefore inasmuch as he is the most perfect being it is unbecoming to him to cause things to be annihilated.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod Deus est adeo bonus quod nunquam permitteret aliquid mali fieri, nisi esset adeo potens quod de quolibet malo posset elicere aliquod bonum. Sed si creaturae annihilarentur, nullum bonum inde eliceretur. Ergo Deus non potest hoc permittere quod creaturae in nihilum decidant. 14. Augustine says (Enchir. xi) that God is so good that he would never allow evil to be done, were he not so powerful that he can produce a good from any evil whatsoever. But no good would result if creatures were to be annihilated. Therefore God cannot allow creatures to return to nothingness.
Praeterea, non minor distantia est in nihilum de ente, quam de nihilo in esse. Sed reducere aliquid de nihilo in esse, est potentiae infinitae, propter distantiam infinitam. Ergo reducere de esse in nihil, non est nisi potentiae infinitae. Nulla autem creatura habet potentiam infinitam. Ergo subtracta actione creatoris, creatura non poterit in nihilum reduci. Quo quidem solo modo dicebatur Deus res posse annihilare, scilicet per suae actionis subtractionem. Nullo ergo modo Deus potest creaturas in nihilum redigere. 15. The distance from nothing to being is no less than from being to nothing. Now it belongs to an infinite power to produce a being from nothing on account of the infinite distance. Therefore only an infinite power can reduce a being to nothing. But no creature has infinite power. Hence if we take away the action of the Creator, a creature cannot be reduced to nothing: and yet only on the supposition that God’s action be removed was it said that he can annihilate things. Therefore nowise can God reduce creatures to nothing.
Sed contra. Est quod Origenes dicit in periarchon: quod datum est, auferri atque recedere potest. Sed esse, datum est creaturae a Deo. Ergo potest auferri; et sic Deus potest creaturas in nihilum redigere. On the contrary Origen says (Peri Archon): That which was given can be taken away and lost. Now creatures were given existence by God. Therefore it can be taken from them: so that God can reduce them to nothing.
Praeterea, illud quod dependet ex simplici Dei voluntate, potest, etiam, Deo volente, cessare. Sed totum esse creaturae dependet ex simplici Dei voluntate; cum Deus per suam voluntatem sit causa rerum, et non per naturae necessitatem. Ergo, Deo volente, possunt creaturae in nihilum redigi. Again, that which depends on God’s simple will, can also cease if it be God’s will. Now the creature’s whole being depends on God’s simple will, since he is the cause of things by his will and not by natural necessity. Therefore if it be his will creatures can be annihilated.
Praeterea, Deus non est plus debitor creaturis postquam esse incoeperunt, quam antequam esse inciperent. Sed antequam creaturae inciperent, absque omni praeiudicio suae bonitatis poterat cessare ad hoc quod esse creaturis communicaret, quia sua bonitas in nullo a creaturis dependet. Ergo Deus potest absque praeiudicio suae bonitatis suam actionem a rebus creatis subtrahere; quo posito in nihilum deciderent, ut in praecedenti articulo ostensum est. Potest ergo Deus res annihilare. Again, God is not more indebted to creatures after they begin to exist than he was before they began to exist. Now, before they came into existence, he could, without prejudice to his goodness, abstain from bringing them into being, since his goodness nowise depends on creatures. Therefore without prejudice to his goodness God can withdraw his action from creatures, with the result as proved above (A. 2) that they would cease to exist. Therefore God can annihilate creatures.
Praeterea, eadem actione Deus res in esse produxit et eas in esse conservat, ut supra ostensum est. Sed Deus potuit res in esse non producere. Ergo eadem ratione potest eas annihilare. Again, as we have proved (A. 1) God, by the same action, produces and upholds things. Now God was able not to produce creatures. Therefore he can likewise abstain from upholding them:,and thus he can annihilate them.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod in rebus a Deo factis dicitur aliquid esse possibile dupliciter. Uno modo per potentiam agentis tantum; sicut antequam mundus fieret, possibile fuit mundum fore, non per potentiam creaturae, quae nulla erat, sed solum per potentiam Dei, qui mundum in esse producere poterat. Alio modo per potentiam quae est in rebus factis; sicut possibile est corpus compositum corrumpi. Si ergo loquamur de possibilitate ad non esse ex parte rerum factarum, dupliciter circa hoc aliqui opinati sunt. Avicenna namque posuit, quod quaelibet res praeter Deum habebat in se possibilitatem ad esse et non esse. Cum enim esse sit praeter essentiam cuiuslibet rei creatae, ipsa natura rei creatae per se considerata, possibilis est ad esse; necessitatem vero essendi non habet nisi ab alio, cuius natura est suum esse, et per consequens est per se necesse esse, et hoc Deus est. Commentator vero contrarium ponit, scilicet quod quaedam res creatae sunt in quarum natura non est possibilitas ad non esse, quia quod in sua natura habet possibilitatem ad non esse, non potest ab extrinseco acquirere sempiternitatem, ut scilicet sit per naturam suam sempiternum. Et haec quidem positio videtur rationabilior. Potentia enim ad esse et non esse non convenit alicui nisi ratione materiae, quae est pura potentia. Materia etiam, cum non possit esse sine forma, non potest esse in potentia ad non esse, nisi quatenus existens sub una forma, est in potentia ad aliam formam. Dupliciter ergo potest contingere quod in natura alicuius rei non sit possibilitas ad non esse. Uno modo per hoc quod res illa sit forma tantum subsistens in esse suo, sicut substantiae incorporeae, quae sunt penitus immateriales. Si enim forma ex hoc quod inest materiae, est principium essendi in rebus materialibus, nec res materialis potest non esse nisi per separationem formae; ubi ipsa forma in esse suo subsistit nullo modo poterit non esse; sicut nec esse potest a se ipso separari. Alio modo per hoc quod in materia non sit potentia ad aliam formam, sed tota materiae possibilitas ad unam formam terminetur; sicut est in corporibus caelestibus, in quibus non est formarum contrarietas. Illae ergo solae res in sua natura possibilitatem habent ad non esse, in quibus est materia contrarietati subiecta. Aliis vero rebus secundum suam naturam competit necessitas essendi, possibilitate non essendi ab earum natura sublata. Nec tamen per hoc removetur quin necessitas essendi sit eis a Deo, quia unum necessarium alterius causa esse potest, ut dicitur in V Metaphysic. Ipsius enim naturae creatae cui competit sempiternitas, causa est Deus. In illis etiam rebus in quibus est possibilitas ad non esse, materia permanet; formae vero sicut ex potentia materiae educuntur in actum in rerum generatione, ita in corruptione de actu reducuntur in hoc quod sint in potentia. Unde relinquitur quod in tota natura creata non est aliqua potentia, per quam sit aliquid possibile tendere in nihilum. I answer that things made by God may be said to be possible to, him in two ways. First with regard to the power of the agent alone: thus before the world was made, it was possible for the world to exist, not by a possibility inherent to the creature, which did not exist, but only by the power of God, who was able to bring the world into being. Secondly in respect of a possibility inherent to the thing made: thus it is possible for a composite body to be corrupted. Accordingly if we consider the possibility of non-existence in reference to things made, there have been two opinions on this point. Avicenna (Metaph. viii, 6) held that all things except God have in themselves a possibility of being and of non-being. Because seeing that being is something besides the essence of a created thing, the very nature of a creature considered in itself has a possibility of being, while it only has necessity of being from another whose nature is its being, and which therefore by its nature exists of necessity; and this is God. On the other hand the Commentator (Metaph. xi, text. 41: and De Subst. Orb.) holds a contrary opinion, to wit that certain things were created in whose nature there is no possibility of non-being inasmuch as a thing that has in its nature a possibility of non-being, cannot acquire everlastingness from without, so as to become by its very nature everlasting. The latter opinion would seem more reasonable. Because possibility of being and non-being does not belong to a thing save by reason of its matter which is pure potentiality. And matter since it cannot exist without a form cannot have a potentiality in respect of non-being, save as, while existing under some form it retains the possibility of receiving another form. Accordingly it may happen in two ways, that a thing’s nature does not include the possibility of non-being. First, because that thing is a pure form subsistent in its own being, such as incorporeal substances which are entirely immaterial. For if a form through being in matter is the principle of existence in material things, and a material thing cannot cease to exist save by losing its form, it follows that when a form subsists by itself it can nowise cease to exist, even as neither can existence be separated from itself. Secondly, because the matter has no potentiality in respect of another form, and the whole of its potentiality is determined by one form: such are the heavenly bodies in which there is no contrariety of forms. Accordingly a possibility of non-being is in the nature of those things alone whose matter is subject to contrariety of forms: whereas it belongs to other things by their nature to exist of necessity, all possibility of nonexistence being removed from their nature. And yet this does not imply that their necessity of existence is not from God: since one necessity may cause another (Metaph. v). For the created nature to which everlastingness belongs is produced by God. Moreover in those things which contain a possibility of non-being the matter remains, while the forms change: thus, when things are generated, they are educed from potentiality into actuality by generation even as, when they are corrupted, they are reduced from actuality so as to return to a state of potentiality. It follows then that in all created natures there is no such potentiality whereby a thing is made to have the possibility of tending to nonexistence.
Si autem recurramus ad potentiam Dei facientis, sic considerandum est, quod dupliciter dicitur aliquid Deo esse impossibile: uno modo quod est secundum se impossibile, quod quia non natum est alicui potentiae subiici; sicut sunt illa quae contradictionem implicant. Alio modo ex eo quod est necessitas ad oppositum; quod quidem dupliciter contingit in aliquo agente. Uno modo ex parte potentiae activae naturalis, quae terminatur ad unum tantum sicut potentia calidi ad calefaciendum; et hoc modo Deus pater necessario generat filium, et non potest non generare. Alio modo ex parte finis ultimi in quem quaelibet res de necessitate tendit; sicut et homo de necessitate vult beatitudinem, et impossibile est eum velle miseriam; et similiter Deus vult de necessitate suam bonitatem, et impossibile est eum velle illa cum quibus sua bonitas esse non potest; sicut dicimus quod impossibile est Deum mentiri aut velle mentiri. Creaturas autem simpliciter non esse, non est in se impossibile quasi contradictionem implicans, alias ab aeterno fuissent. Et hoc ideo est, quia non sunt suum esse, ut sic cum dicitur, creatura non est omnino, oppositum praedicati includatur in definitione, ut si dicatur, homo non est animal rationale: huiusmodi enim contradictionem implicant, et sunt secundum se impossibilia. Similiter Deus non producit creaturas ex necessitate naturae ut sic potentia Dei determinetur ad esse creaturae, ut in alia quaestione, est probatum. Similiter etiam nec bonitas Dei a creaturis dependet, ut sine creaturis esse non possit: quia per creaturas nihil bonitati divinae adiungitur. Relinquitur ergo quod non est impossibile Deum res ad non esse reducere; cum non sit necessarium eum rebus esse praebere, nisi ex suppositione suae ordinationis et praescientiae, quia sic ordinavit et praescivit, ut res in perpetuum in esse teneret. If on the other hand we consider the power of God the Maker of things, we must observe that a thing is said to be impossible to God in two ways. First, because it is impossible in itself, in that by its very nature it is outside the scope of any power whatsoever: such are things that involve a contradiction. Secondly, because the opposite of that thing is necessary: and this occurs in two ways with respect to an agent. First on the part of a natural active power that is confined to one effect: thus the power of a hot thing is confined to heating:, in this way God the Father begot the Son necessarily and cannot but beget him. Secondly, on the part of the ultimate end to which everything tends of necessity: thus man necessarily desires happiness and cannot possibly desire to be unhappy: and likewise God necessarily wills his goodness, and cannot possibly will things that are incompatible with it: for example we say that God cannot lie or wish to he. Now the simple non-existence of creatures is not in itself impossible as involving a contradiction (else they had existed from eternity: and the reason of this is that they are not their own being): thus in the statement, The creature does not exist at all, the predicate is not in conflict with the definition of the subject, whereas it is in the sentence, Man is not a rational animal: for sentences of the latter kind imply a contradiction and are impossible in themselves. Likewise God did not produce creatures by natural necessity, as though his power were determined to the existence of creatures, as we have proved above (A. 3). Likewise God’s goodness does not depend on creatures, as though it could not be without them: seeing that it gains nothing by them. It remains then that it is not impossible for God to reduce things to nothing: since he is not under the necessity of giving them being, except on the presupposition of his decree and fore-knowledge, in that he decreed and foresaw that he would keep things in existence for ever.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod si creaturas Deus in nihilum redigeret, non esset causa tendendi in non esse; hoc enim non contingeret per hoc quod ipse causaret non esse in rebus, sed per hoc quod desineret rebus dare esse. Reply to the First Objection. If God were to reduce creatures to nothing, he would not be the cause of their tendency to non-existence: because it would result not from his causing non-existence in them, but from his ceasing ‘to give them existence.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod res corruptibiles desinunt esse per hoc quod earum materia aliam formam recipit, cum qua forma prior stare non potest; et ideo ad earum corruptionem requiritur actio alicuius agentis, per quam forma nova educatur de potentia in actum. Sed si Deus res in nihilum redigeret, non esset ibi necessaria aliqua actio, sed solum hoc quod desisteret ab actione qua rebus tribuit esse; sicut absentia actionis solis illuminantis causat lucis privationem in aere. Reply to the Second Objection. Corruptible things cease to exist, in so far as their matter receives another form, with which its previous form was incompatible: wherefore their corruption requires the action of a certain agent, whereby the new form is educed from its potential state into actual existence. Whereas if God were to annihilate a thing, there would be no need for any action, and it would suffice if God were to Withdraw the action whereby he gives things existence: thus the absence of the sun’s action in enlightening the air causes the absence of light in the air.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet, si Deus agendo, res annihilare posset; quod quidem non est; sed magis ab actione desistendo, ut dictum est. Reply to the Third Objection. This argument would avail, if God could by some action annihilate things: but this is not so, rather would it be by ceasing from action.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod ubi non est actio, non est necessarium finem requirere. Sed quia ipsum desistere ab actione non potest esse in Deo, nisi per suam voluntatem, quae non est nisi finis, posset in ipsa annihilatione rerum finis aliquis inveniri; ut sicut in productione rerum, finis est manifestatio copiae divinae bonitatis, ita in rerum annihilatione finis esse potest sufficientia suae bonitatis, quae in tantum est sibi sufficiens, ut nullo exteriori indigeat. Reply to the Fourth Objection. Where there is no action we need not require an end. But seeing that even cessation from action cannot be in God save by his will, and that the will’s object is the end, it might be possible to ascribe an end even in the annihilation of things: so that as in the production of things, the end was the manifestation of God’s abundant goodness, so in the annihilation of things the end could be the sufficiency of his goodness, seeing that it is so self-sufficing as to need nothing from without.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod effectus a causa sequitur, et est secundum modum causae; unde effectus voluntatem consequentes, tunc a voluntate procedunt quando voluntas statuit esse procedendum; non autem de necessitate quando voluntas est. Et ideo, quia creaturae procedunt a Deo per voluntatem, tunc esse habent cum Deus vult eas esse; non de necessitate, quandocumque Dei voluntas est; alias ab aeterno fuissent. Reply to the Fifth Objection. The effect both follows its cause and derives its mode from the cause; wherefore effects consequent upon an act of the will, proceed from the will at the time appointed by the will; and not necessarily as soon as the will has decreed their existence. And thus since creatures proceed from God by his will, they come into being when it is God’s will that they should be, not of necessity or simultaneously with God’s will, otherwise they would have existed from eternity.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod in actione Dei qua res producit, duo est considerare: scilicet ipsam substantiam operationis, et ordinem ad effectum. Substantia quidem operationis, cum sit divina essentia, aeterna est, nec potest non esse; ordo autem ad effectum, dependet ex voluntate divina: ex qualibet enim actione facientis non sequitur effectus nisi secundum exigentiam principii actionis; secundum enim modum caloris ignis calefacit. Unde cum principium factorum a Deo sit voluntas, secundum hoc in actione divina est ordo ad effectum, prout voluntas determinat. Et ideo quamvis actio Dei cessare non possit secundum suam substantiam, ordo tamen ad effectum cessare posset, si Deus vellet. Reply to the Sixth Objection. The action whereby God made things may be considered from a twofold point of view: it may be considered in its substance and in its relation to its effect. The substance of that action since it is the divine essence is eternal and cannot but be; whereas the relation to its effect depends on the divine will: because every action of a maker produces its effect according to the exigency of the principle of that action: thus fire imparts heat according to the measure of its own heat. Hence seeing that God’s will is the principle of the things made by him, his action bears a relation to his effects according as his will determines. Hence though God’s action cannot cease in its substance, its relation to his effects might cease, if he so willed.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod communis animi conceptio dicitur illa cuius oppositum contradictionem includit; sicut, omne totum est maius sua parte; quia non esse maius sua parte est contra rationem totius. Sic autem animam rationalem non esse, non est communis animi conceptio, ut ex dictis patet; sed naturam animae rationalis non esse corruptibilem, haec est communis animi conceptio. Si autem Deus animam rationalem in nihilum redigeret, hoc non esset per aliquam potentiam ad non esse quae sit in natura animae rationalis, ut dictum est. Reply to the Seventh Objection. A principle of common sense is one whose opposite involves a contradiction, for instance, A whole is greater than its part, because it is contrary to the definition of a whole that it be not greater than its part. Now it is not contrary to common sense that a rational soul cease to exist, as we have already made clear: but it is in common sense that the nature of the rational soul be incorruptible. Wherefore if God were to reduce a human soul to nothing this would not be through the soul’s having some inherent possibility of non-existence, as stated above.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod illud in cuius natura est possibilitas ad non esse, non recipit necessitatem essendi ab alio, ita quod ei competat secundum naturam, quia hoc implicaret contradictionem, scilicet quod natura posset non esse et quod haberet necessitatem essendi; sed quod habeat incorruptibilitatem ex gratia vel gloria, hoc non prohibetur. Sicut corpus Adae fuit quodammodo incorruptibile per gratiam innocentiae, et corpora resurgentium erunt incorruptibilia per gloriam, per virtutem animae suo principio adhaerentis. Non tamen removetur quin ipsa natura in qua non est possibilitas ad non esse habeat necessitatem essendi ab alio; cum quidquid perfectionis habet, sit ei ab alio; unde cessante actione suae causae, deficeret, non propter potentiam ad non esse quae in ipso sit, sed propter potestatem quae est in Deo ad non dandum esse. Reply to the Eighth Objection. A thing whose nature contains the possibility of non-existence does not acquire from an external source the necessity of being so that this necessity be contained in its nature, since this would involve a contradiction, to wit the possibility of a nature’s nonexistence together with the necessity of its existence; but there is nothing to prevent its acquiring incorruptibility by grace or glory. Thus by virtue of the union of the soul with its principle Adam’s body was in a way incorruptible through the grace attached to the state of innocence, and the bodies of the risen dead will be incorruptible by the grace belonging to the state of glory. On the other hand a nature which does not include the possibility of non-existence is not prevented from acquiring from another source the necessity of existence, since whatsoever perfection it has, it has received it from another: wherefore if its cause withdraw its action, it would cease to exist, not on account of its inherent potentiality to non-existence, but on account of God’s power to cease giving existence.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod in illis quae sunt per naturam incorruptibilia, non praeintelligitur potentia ad non esse quae tollatur per aliquid a Deo receptum, secundum quod obiectio procedebat; et hoc ex dictis patet. Sed in illis quae sunt incorruptibilia per gratiam, subest possibilitas ad non esse in ipsa natura; quae tamen totaliter reprimitur per gratiam ex virtute Dei. Reply to the Ninth Objection. It has been sufficiently shown that things which are incorruptible by nature are not to be supposed, as the objection supposes, to have at first a potentiality to non-existence which potentiality is removed by something received from God: whereas in things which are incorruptible by grace, there underlies in their nature a possibility of non-existence, which however is entirely voided by grace through the power of God.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod si Deus creaturas incorruptibiles in nihilum redigeret, ab earum conservatione cessando, non propter hoc sempiternitatem a natura separaret, quasi remaneret natura non sempiterna; sed tota natura deficeret influxu causae cessante. Reply to the Tenth Objection. If by ceasing to uphold them God were to reduce incorruptible creatures to nothing, he would not by so doing deprive their nature of its everlastingness, so that it would remain without being everlasting: but their whole nature would cease to exist through their cause ceasing to exercise its influence over them.
Ad decimumprimum dicendum, quod corruptibile per naturam non potest mutari ut fiat per naturam incorruptibile, nec e converso, quamvis illud quod est per naturam corruptibile, possit per gloriam supervenientem perpetuum fieri. Non tamen ex hoc oportet ponere aliqua corruptibilia fieri per naturam incorruptibilia, quia esse desinerent causa non cessante. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. That which is by nature corruptible cannot be changed so as to become naturally incorruptible, and vice versa: although that which is corruptible by nature can be made to last for ever by the superaddition of glory. Yet it does not follow that certain corruptible things become naturally incorruptible, since were their cause to withdraw they would cease to exist.
Ad decimumsecundum dicendum, quod licet creaturae incorruptibiles ex Dei voluntate dependeant, quae potest eis esse praebere et non praebere; consequuntur tamen ex divina voluntate absolutam necessitatem essendi, in quantum in tali natura causantur, in qua non sit possibilitas ad non esse; talia enim sunt cuncta creata, qualia Deus esse ea voluit, ut Hilarius dicit in libro de synodis. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Although incorruptible creatures depend on God’s will, which can either give or not give them existence, nevertheless by that same will they are gifted with the absolute necessity of existence, in so far as they are created in a nature wherein there is no potentiality to non-existence: because every creature is such as God willed it to be, as Hilary says (De Synod).
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod Deus licet possit creaturas redigere in nihilum, non tamen potest facere quod eis manentibus, ipse non sit earum causa: est autem earum causa, et sicut efficiens, et sicut finis. Sicut ergo Deus non potest facere quod creatura in esse manens ab eo non sit, ita non potest facere quod ad eius bonitatem non ordinetur. Unde, cum malum culpae privet ordinem qui est in ipsum sicut in finem, eo quod est aversio ab incommutabili bono, Deus non potest esse causa mali culpae, quamvis potest esse causa annihilationis, omnino a conservatione cessando. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Although God is able to reduce creatures to nothing, he cannot as long as they continue to exist, cease to be the cause of their existence. Now he is their cause both efficient and final. Accordingly just as he cannot cause an existing creature not to owe its existence to him, even so he cannot cause that creature not to be ordered to his goodness. Wherefore since the evil of sin removes the order of which he is the end, inasmuch as sin is aversion from the highest good; it follows that God cannot be the cause of the evil of sin, although he can be the cause of annihilation, by ceasing altogether to uphold a creature.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de malo culpae; et si loqueretur etiam de malo poenae, annihilatio tamen rerum nullum malum est: quia omne malum fundatur in bono, cum sit privatio, ut Augustinus dicit. Unde sicut ante rerum creationem malum non erat, ita nec malum esset, si omnia Deus annihilaret. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Augustine is speaking of the evil of sin: and even if he were referring to penal evil, the annihilation of things would be no evil, because every evil since it is a privation is based upon good, as Augustine says (Enchir. xi). Hence just as there was no evil before things were created, so neither would there be any evil were God to annihilate all things.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod in nulla creatura est virtus quae possit vel de nihilo aliquid facere vel aliquid in nihilum redigere. Quod autem creaturae in nihilum redigerentur divina conservatione cessante, hoc non esset per aliquam actionem creaturae, sed per eius defectum, ut ex praedictis patet. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. No creature has the power either of making something from nothing or of reducing a thing to nothing. The fact that if God ceased to uphold creatures they would return to nothing is not due to a creature’s action but to its defect, as stated above.
Q. V:
ARTICLE IV
Is There A Creature That Ought to Be Or Actually is Annihilated?
Quarto quaeritur utrum aliqua creatura in nihilum sit redigenda, vel etiam in nihilum redigatur. Et videtur quod sic. THE third point of inquiry is whether any creature is to be annihilated, or is actually annihilated: and seemingly the answer should be in the affirmative.
Sicut enim potentia finita non potest movere tempore infinito, ita nec per potentiam finitam potest aliquid esse tempore infinito. Sed omnis potentia corporis est finita, ut probatur in VIII Phys. Ergo in nullo corpore est potentia, ut possit durare tempore infinito. Quaedam autem corpora sunt quae non possunt corrumpi, eo quod non habent contrarium, sicut corpora caelestia. Ergo necesse est quod quandoque in nihilum redigantur. 1. just as a finite power cannot move in an infinite time, even so by no finite power can a thing exist for an infinite time. Now all corporeal power is finite (Phys. viii). Therefore no body has the power to exist for an infinite time. But there are bodies that cannot be corrupted, because nothing is contrary to them, like the heavenly bodies. Therefore at some time they must of necessity be annihilated.
Praeterea, illud quod est propter aliquem finem adipiscendum, habito fine, ulterius eo non indigetur; sicut patet de navi, quae necessaria est mare transeuntibus, non autem iam transito mari. Sed creatura corporalis creata est propter spiritualem, ut per eam iuvetur ad suum finem consequendum. Cum ergo creatura spiritualis erit in suo fine ultimo constituta, corporali ulterius non indigebit. Cum ergo nihil sit superfluum in operibus Dei, videtur quod in ultimo rerum fine omnis creatura corporalis deficiet. 2. That which is directed to the attainment of an end is no longer needed where the end has been reached: thus a ship is necessary that we may cross the sea, but we no longer need it after crossing the ocean. Now corporeal creatures were made for the sake of the spiritual creature, in order to help it to reach its end. When therefore the spiritual creatures arrive at their ultimate end they no longer need corporeal creatures: and since there is nothing superfluous in God’s works it would seem that at the last end of all things every corporeal creature will cease to exist.
Praeterea, nihil quod est per accidens, est infinitum. Sed esse est cuilibet creaturae per accidens, ut Avicenna dicit: unde et Hilarius Deum a creatura distinguens, dicit: esse non est accidens Deo. Ergo nulla creatura in infinitum durabit; et sic omnes creaturae quandoque deficient. 3. Nothing accidental is infinite. Now existence is accidental to the creature according to Avicenna (Metaph. viii, 4); wherefore Hilary (De Trin. vii) distinguishes God from his creatures by stating that there is no accident in God. Therefore no creature will last for ever, and all creatures will at some time be reduced to nothing.
Praeterea, finis debet respondere principio. Sed creaturae principium sumpserunt postquam nihil erat praeter Deum. Ergo adhuc creaturae reducentur in finem, quod omnino nihil erit. 4. The end should correspond to the beginning. Now creatures had their beginning after nothing had existed but God. Therefore creatures will return to an end wherein there will be absolutely nothing in existence.
Praeterea, quod non habet virtutem ut sit semper, non potest in perpetuum durare. Sed illud quod non semper fuit, non habet virtutem ut sit semper. Ergo quod non semper fuit, non potest in perpetuum durare. Sed creaturae non semper fuerunt. Ergo non possunt in perpetuum durare; et sic quandoque in nihilum redigentur. 5. That which has no power to exist always, cannot endure for ever. And that which has not always been has no power to exist always. Therefore that which was not always cannot endure for ever. But creatures were not always. Therefore they cannot last for ever, and thus they will at length be annihilated.
Praeterea, iustitia requirit hoc, ut propter ingratitudinem aliquis beneficio accepto vel suscepto privetur. Sed per peccatum mortale homo ingratus est inventus. Ergo iustitia hoc exigit ut omnibus beneficiis Dei privetur, inter quae etiam est ipsum esse. Iudicium autem Dei de peccatoribus erit iustum, secundum apostolum, Rom. II, 2. Ergo in nihilum redigentur. 6. Justice requires, if a man is ungrateful for a benefit bestowed or acquired, that he should be deprived of it. Now by committing mortal sin man proved himself ungrateful. Therefore justice demands that he be deprived of all the benefits he has received from God, among which is his very existence: also God’s judgement on sinners will be just according to the Apostle (Rom. ii, 2). Therefore they win be annihilated.
Praeterea, ad hoc est quod dicitur Ierem. X, 24: corripe me, domine; verumtamen in iudicio, et non in furore tuo, ne forte ad nihilum redigas me. 7. The words of Jeremiah are to the point (x, 24): Correct me O Lord, and yet with judgement and not in thy fury, lest thou bring me to nothing.
Sed diceretur, quod Deus semper punit citra condignum, propter misericordiam, quae in Dei iudicio iustitiae admiscetur; et sic Deus non totaliter peccatores a participatione suorum beneficiorum excludet.- Sed contra, in hoc homini misericordia non praestatur quod sibi detur aliquid quod melius esset ei non habere. Sed damnato in Inferno melius esset non esse quam sic esse; quod patet per id quod dicitur Matth. XXVI, 24 de Iuda: melius erat ei si natus non fuisset homo ille. Ergo ad misericordiam Dei non pertinet quod damnatos conservet in esse. 8. It will be said perhaps that God’s punishments are even less severe than what is deserved, on account of his mercy which in his judgements is always mingled with justice: so that God does not exclude sinners entirely from a share in his benefits.—On the contrary, mercy is not shown to man by granting him what it were better for him not to have: and it were better for the damned not to be at all than to be thus, as evidenced by the words about Judas (Matt. xxvi, 24): It were better for him had that man not been born, Therefore it is no part of God’s mercy that the damned be kept in existence.
Praeterea, illa quae non habent materiam partem sui, corrumpuntur omnino, idest totaliter, cum esse desinunt, sicut sunt accidentia. Haec autem frequenter esse desinunt. Ergo aliqua in nihilum rediguntur. 9. Things that have no matter in their composition are altogether, i.e. utterly destroyed when they disappear (Metaph. iii): for instance accidents. Now accidents frequently disappear. Therefore some things are reduced to nothing.
Praeterea, philosophus in VI Physic. argumentatur, quod si continuum est ex indivisibilibus, necesse est quod indivisibilia dividantur. Ex quo potest accipi quod unumquodque resolvitur in ea ex quibus est. Sed omnes creaturae sunt ex nihilo. Ergo omnes in nihilum quandoque redigentur. 10. The Philosopher (Phys. vi) argues that if a continuous quantity is composed of indivisible parts, it must be resolved into indivisible parts. Whence we may infer that everything is resolved into the elements from which it is produced. Now all creatures are produced from nothing. Therefore all at some time will be resolved into nothing.
Praeterea, II Petr. III, 10, dicitur: caeli magno impetu transient. Sed non possunt transire per corruptionem in aliquod aliud corpus, cum non habeant contrarium. Ergo transibunt in nihilum. 11. It is written (2 Pet. iii, 10): The heavens shall pass away with great violence. But they cannot pass away by corruption so as to be changed into some other body, since they have no contrary. Therefore they will pass away into nothing.
Praeterea, ad idem est quod dicitur in Ps. ci, 26: opera manuum tuarum sunt caeli, ipsi peribunt; et Luc. XXI, 33, dicitur: caelum et terra transibunt. 12. Again to the point are the words of Psalm ci, 26, 27: The heavens are the works of thy hands: they shall perish, and of Luke xxi, 63: Heaven and earth shall Pass away.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccle. I, 4: terra autem in aeternum stat. Praeterea, Eccle. III, 14, dicitur: didici quod omnia opera quae fecit Deus perseverent in aeternum. Ergo creaturae in nihilum non redigentur. On the contrary it is written (Eccles. i, 4): The earth stands for ever: and again (ibid. iii, 14): I have learned that all the works which God hath made continue for ever. Therefore creatures will not be annihilated.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod universitas creaturarum nunquam in nihilum redigetur. Et quamvis creaturae corruptibiles non semper fuerint, in perpetuum tamen secundum suam substantiam durabunt; licet a quibusdam positum fuerit, quod omnes creaturae corruptibiles in ultima rerum consummatione deficient in non esse; quod quidem Origeni ascribitur, qui tamen hoc non videtur dicere, nisi aliorum opinionem recitando. I answer that the created universe will never be annihilated. And notwithstanding that corporeal creatures have not always existed they will last nevertheless for ever as to their substance: although it has been maintained by some that at the final consummation all corruptible creatures will be reduced to nothing, an opinion that has been ascribed to Origen, who however apparently does not assert it as his own but rather as a view held by others.
Huius tamen rationem sumere possumus ex duobus. Primo quidem ex divina voluntate, ex qua creaturarum esse dependet. Voluntas enim Dei, quamvis, absolute considerata, ad opposita se in creaturis habeat, eo quod non magis ad unum quam ad alterum obligatur; ex suppositione tamen facta aliquam necessitatem habet. Sicut enim in creaturis aliquid quod se ad opposita habet, necessarium creditur positione aliqua facta, ut Socratem possibile est sedere et non sedere; necessarium tamen est eum sedere, cum sedet; ita voluntas divina, quae, quantum est de se, potest velle aliquid et eius oppositum, ut Petrum salvare, vel non, non potest velle Petrum non salvare, dum vult Petrum salvare. Et quia eius voluntas immutabilis est, si ponitur aliquando eum aliquid velle, necessarium est ex suppositione illud eum semper velle, licet non sit necessarium ut velit quod sit semper, quod vult esse aliquando. Quicumque autem vult aliquid propter se ipsum, vult ut illud sit semper, ex hoc ipso quod illud propter se vult. Quod enim aliquis vult quandoque esse et postmodum non esse, vult esse ut aliquid aliud perficiat; quo perfecto, eo non indiget quod propter illud perficiendum volebat. Deus autem creaturarum universitatem vult propter se ipsam, licet et propter se ipsum eam vult esse; haec enim duo non repugnant. Vult enim Deus ut creaturae sint propter eius bonitatem, ut eam scilicet suo modo imitentur et repraesentent; quod quidem faciunt in quantum ab ea esse habent, et in suis naturis subsistunt. Unde idem est dictu, quod Deus omnia propter se ipsum fecit, et quod creaturas fecerit propter earum esse, quod dicitur Sap. I, 14: creavit enim ut essent omnia. Unde ex hoc ipso quod Deus creaturas instituit, patet quod voluit eas semper durare; cuius oppositum propter eius immobilitatem nunquam continget. In support of this solution to the question we may argue from a twofold source. First from the divine will, on which the existence of creatures depends. Although considered in itself God’s will about creatures is indifferent to opposite things, since it is not more bound to one alternative than to another, yet it is necessitated in a way of speaking through the granting of a supposition. For even as in creatures that which is indifferent to opposite things is necessitated through a supposition being made (thus it is possible for Socrates to sit or not to sit, but while he sits, it is necessary that he sit), so too the divine will which, considered in itself, can will either a certain thing or its opposite—for instance, to save or not to save Peter cannot will not to save Peter so long as he wills to save him. And whereas God’s will is unchangeable, if it be supposed that he wills a certain thing at some time, on that supposition it is necessary that he will it always, although it is not necessarily if he will a thing to last for a time, that he also will it to last for ever. Now he who wills a thing for its own sake, wills it to last for ever, for the very reason that he wills it for itself: because if he wills a thing to exist for a time, and afterwards not to exist, he wills that thing to exist for the perfection of something else, and when this latter is perfected, he no longer wills the thing that lie only willed that this other thing might be made perfect. Now God wills the created universe for its own sake, although he wills its existence for his own sake: for these two are not incompatible with each other. Because God wills creatures to exist for his goodness’ sake, namely that they may imitate and reflect it; which they do inasmuch as from it they derive their being, and subsist in their respective natures. Consequently it amounts to the same whether we say that God made all things for himself according to the text of Proverbs xvi, 4, The Lord hath made all things for himself, or that he made creatures that they might exist, according to Wisdom, i, 14, He created all things that they might be. Wherefore from the very fact that God made creatures it is to be inferred that he willed them to last for ever, and seeing that his will is unchangeable the opposite will never happen.
Secundo ex ipsa rerum natura; sic enim Deus unamquamque naturam instituit, ut ei non auferat suam proprietatem; unde dicitur Rom. XI, 24, in Glossa quod Deus, qui est naturarum conditor, contra naturas non agit, etsi aliquando in argumentum fidei in rebus creatis aliquid supra naturam operetur. Rerum autem immaterialium, quae contrarietate carent, proprietas naturalis est earum sempiternitas; quia in eis non est potentia ad non esse, ut supra ostensum est. Unde sicut igni non aufert naturalem inclinationem, qua sursum tendit, ita non aufert rebus praedictis sempiternitatem, ut eas in nihilum redigat. Secondly, from the very nature of things. God fashioned each nature in such a way as not to deprive it of its property. Hence on the words of Romans xi, 24, Contrary to nature thou wert grafted, a gloss says that God who is the author of nature does not act contrary to nature, although at times in support of the faith he performs in creatures works that surpass nature. Now it is a natural property of those immaterial things which have no contrary that they last for ever, since in them there is no potentiality to non-existence, as we have shown above. Thus even as he does not deprive fire of its natural inclination to rise, so neither does he deprive the aforesaid things of their everlastingness by reducing them to nothing.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, secundum Commentatorem XI Metaph., quod licet omnis potentia quae est in corpore, sit finita, non tamen oportet quod in quolibet corpore sit potentia finita ad esse, quia in corporibus corruptibilibus per naturam, non est potentia ad esse, nec finita nec infinita, sed ad moveri tantum. Sed haec solutio non videtur valere: quia potentia ad esse non solum accipitur secundum modum potentiae passivae, quae est ex parte materiae, sed etiam secundum modum potentiae activae, quae est ex parte formae, quae in rebus incorruptibilibus deesse non potest. Nam quantum unicuique inest de forma, tantum inest ei de virtute essendi; unde et in I caeli et mundi philosophus vult quod quaedam habeant virtutem et potentiam ut semper sint. Et ideo aliter dicendum, quod ex infinitate temporis non ostenditur habere infinitatem nisi illud quod tempore mensuratur vel per se, sicut motus, vel per accidens, sicut esse rerum quae motui subiacent, quae aliqua periodo motus durant, ultra quam durare non possunt. Esse autem corporis caelestis nullo modo attingitur nec a tempore nec a motu, cum sit omnino invariabile. Unde ex hoc quod caelum est tempore infinito, esse eius nullam infinitatem habet, sicut omnino extra continuitatem temporis existens; propter quod a theologis dicitur mensurari aevo. Unde non requiritur in caelo aliqua virtus infinita ad hoc quod sit semper. Reply to the First Objection. According to the Commentator (Metaph. xi, comm. 41) although all potentiality residing in a body is finite it does not follow that every body has a finite potentiality to exist: seeing that bodies that are actually corruptible have no potentiality, finite or infinite, to exist but only to be moved. This solution however apparently does not solve the difficulty. Potentiality to exist may be taken not only in the sense of a passive potentiality that is on the side of matter, but also in the sense of an active power which is on the part of the form which cannot be lacking to incorruptible things: because power of existence is proportionate to the degree in which a form is in a thing: wherefore the Philosopher (De Coelo et Mundo, i) holds that certain things have the virtue and power to last for ever. Accordingly we reply otherwise as follows. From the fact that a thing lasts for an infinite time we cannot infer that it has an infinite potentiality to exist, unless it be itself measured by time either directly, as movement, or indirectly, as the existence of things that are subject to movement, and are for a certain period of time, beyond which they cannot last. Now the existence of a heavenly body is not affected by time or movement, since it is utterly unchangeable. Wherefore from the fact that the heaven lasts for an infinite time, it does not acquire infinity of existence, seeing that it is altogether outside the continuance of time: for which reason theologians say that it is measured by eviternity. Therefore the heaven does not require an infinite power in order to last for ever.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut una pars exercitus ordinatur et ad aliam et ad ducem, ita corporalis creatura ordinatur et ad perfectionem spiritualis creaturae iuvandam, et ad divinam bonitatem repraesentandam; quod semper faciet, licet primum cesset. Reply to the Second Objection. just as one part of an army is related both to another part and to the commander-in-chief, so too the corporeal creature is directed both to assist in the perfecting of the spiritual, and to reflect the divine goodness. The latter it will do for ever, though it cease to do the former.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod esse non dicitur accidens quod sit in genere accidentis, si loquamur de esse substantiae (est enim actus essentiae), sed per quamdam similitudinem: quia non est pars essentiae, sicut nec accidens. Si tamen esset in genere accidentis, nihil prohiberet quin in infinitum duraret: per se enim accidentia ex necessitate suis substantiis insunt; unde et nihil prohibet ea in perpetuum inesse. Sed accidentia quae per accidens insunt subiectis, nullo modo in perpetuum durant secundum naturam. Huiusmodi autem esse non potest ipsum esse rei substantiale, cum sit essentiae actus. Reply to the Third Objection. If we speak of substantial existence, then existence is not described as an accident as though it were in the genus of accident (for it is the act of an essence) but by a kind of similitude, inasmuch as like an accident it is not part of the essence. And yet even if it were in the genus of accident nothing prevents it from lasting for ever, seeing that proper accidents are of necessity in their respective substances, so that nothing hinders them from being in them for ever. On the other hand accidents that adhere to their subjects accidentally are nowise everlasting by nature: but the substantial existence of a thing cannot be an accident of this kind, because it is the act of its essence.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod antequam res essent, non erat aliqua natura cuius proprietas esset ipsa sempiternitas, sicut est aliqua natura rebus iam creatis. Et praeterea hoc ipsum potuit esse ad aliquam perfectionem creaturae spiritualis quod res non semper fuerint, quia per hoc Deus expresse rerum causa ostenditur. Nulla autem utilitas sequeretur si omnia in nihilum redigerentur. Et ideo non est simile de principio et fine. Reply to the Fourth Objection. Before things existed, there was no nature having everlastingness as a property, as there was when things had been created. Moreover it would conduce to a certain perfection of the spiritual creature that things did not always exist, since this is a distinct proof that God is the cause of things: whereas no good would result if all things were annihilated. Hence the comparison fails between the beginning and the end.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod illa quae semper durabunt, habent virtutem ut sint semper: hanc tamen virtutem non semper habuerunt, et ideo non semper fuerunt. Reply to the Fifth Objection. Those things that will last for ever have the power to last for ever; but they did not always have this power, wherefore they did not always exist.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod licet Deus, de iustitia, creaturae contra se peccanti posset esse subtrahere, et eam in nihilum redigere, tamen convenientior iustitia est ut eam in esse reservet ad poenam: et hoc propter duo. Primo, quia illa iustitia non haberet aliquid misericordiae admixtum, cum nihil remaneret cui posset misericordia adhiberi: dicitur autem in Psal. XXIV, 10, quod universae viae domini misericordia et veritas. Secundo, quia ista iustitia congruentius respondet culpae in duobus. In uno quidem, quia in culpa voluntas contra Deum agit, non autem natura quae ordinem sibi a Deo inditum servat; et ideo talis debet esse poena quae voluntatem affligat, naturae nocendo, qua voluntas abutitur. Si autem creatura omnino in nihilum redigeretur, esset tantum nocumentum naturae, et non afflictio voluntatis. In altero vero, quia cum in peccato duo sint, scilicet aversio ab incommutabili bono et conversio ad bonum commutabile, conversio post se aversionem trahit: nullus enim peccans intendit a Deo averti, sed quaerit frui temporali bono, cum quo simul Deo frui non potest. Unde cum poena damni aversioni culpae respondeat, conversioni vero eius poena sensus pro actuali culpa, conveniens est ut poena damni non sit sine poena sensus. Si autem in nihilum creatura redigeretur, esset quidem poena damni aeterna, sed non remaneret poena sensus. Reply to the Sixth Objection. Although in justice God could deprive of existence and annihilate a creature that sins against him, yet it is a more becoming justice that he keep it in existence to punish it: and this for two reasons. First, because in the former case justice would have no admixture of mercy, since nothing would remain to which he might show mercy: and yet it is written (Ps. xxiv, 10) that all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth. Secondly, because in the second case justice is more in proportion with sin, and this in two respects. In the first place, when a sin is committed the will rebels against God, whereas nature does not, but observes the order assigned to it by God: so that the punishment should be such as to afflict the will by hurting the nature which the will had abused: whereas if the creature were utterly annihilated, nature would be hurt indeed, but the will would not be afflicted. In the second place, seeing that sin contains two things, aversion from the incommutable good, and conversion to transient good, aversion results from conversion, since no sinner intends to turn away from God, but seeks the enjoyment of a temporal good which is incompatible with the enjoyment of evil. Wherefore as the pain of loss corresponds to the aversion of sin, while the pain of sense corresponding to the conversion is inflicted for the actual sin, it is fitting that the pain of loss should not be without the pain of sense: whereas if the creature were annihilated there would be eternal pain of loss, but the pain of sense would cease.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod iudicium de quo propheta mentionem facit, praedictam consecutionem, congruentiam vel operationem poenae ad culpam importat. Furor enim a quo liberari petit, misericordiae temperamentum excludit. Reply to the Seventh Objection. The judgement mentioned by the prophet signifies the infliction of a congruous punishment in proportion to sin, as explained above: and the fury from which he prays to be delivered is that which excludes the moderation of mercy.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur melius vel propter praesentiam magis boni, et sic melius est damnato esse quam non esse; vel propter absentiam mali: quia etiam carere malo, in rationem boni cadit, secundum philosophum. Et secundum hoc intelligitur verbum domini inductum. Reply to the Eighth Objection. A thing is said to be better either because it includes a greater good, and thus it is better for the damned to exist than not to exist: or because it excludes an evil, since even absence of evil is reckoned a good by the Philosopher (Ethic. v., 8). The words of our Lord quoted are to be taken in the latter sense.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod formae et accidentia etsi non habeant materiam partem sui ex qua sint, habent tamen materiam in qua sunt et de cuius potentia educuntur; unde et cum esse desinunt, non omnino annihilantur, sed remanent in potentia materiae, sicut prius. Reply to the Ninth Objection. Although forms and accidents have no matter in their composition, they have matter in which they exist and from the potentiality of which they are educed: wherefore when they cease to be, they are not utterly annihilated, but remain in the potentiality of matter as before.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod sicut creaturae sunt ex nihilo, ita in nihilum sunt redigibiles, si Deo placeret. Reply to the Tenth Objection. Even as creatures are made from nothing, so are they reducible to nothing, if so it pleased God.
Ad undecimum et duodecimum dicendum, quod auctoritates illae non sunt intelligendae hoc modo quod substantia mundi pereat, sed figura, ut apostolus dicit I ad Cor. VII, 31. Reply to the Eleventh and Twelfth Objections. The sense of the passages quoted is not that the substance of the world will perish, but that its outward appearance will vanish according to the Apostle (1 Cor. vii, 31).
Q. V:
ARTICLE V
Will the Heavenly Movement Cease At Any Time?

[ Sum. Th. Suppl., Q. xci, A. 2]
Quinto quaeritur utrum motus caeli quandoque deficiat. Et videtur quod non. THE fifth point of inquiry is whether the movement of the heavens will cease at any time: and seemingly it will not.
Dicitur enim Gen. VIII, 22: cunctis diebus terrae, sementis et messis, frigus et aestus, aestas et hiems, nox et dies non requiescent. Haec autem omnia ex motu caeli proveniunt. Ergo motus caeli non requiescet quamdiu terra erit. Terra autem in aeternum stat, ut dicitur Eccle. I, 4. Ergo et motus caeli in aeternum erit. 1. It is written (Gen. viii, 22) : All the days of the earth, seed time and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, night and day, shall not cease. Now all these result from the movement of the heavens. Therefore as long as the earth remains the movement of the heavens will continue. But the earth will stand for ever (Eccles. i, 4). Therefore the movement of the heavens will also last for ever.
Sed diceretur quod intelligitur de terra prout servit homini secundum praesentem statum, quo per seminationem et messem homo fructus ex ea colligit ad sustentationem vitae animalis, non autem prout terra serviet homini iam glorificato, in aeternum durans ad maiorem bonorum iucunditatem.- Sed contra dicitur Ierem. XXXI, 35: haec dicit dominus qui dat solem in lumine diei, ordinem lunae et stellarum in lumine noctis; qui turbat mare, et sonant fluctus eius: dominus exercituum nomen eius. Si defecerint leges istae coram me, tunc et semen Israel deficiet ut non sit coram me gens semper. Non autem intelligitur de Israel carnali, qui iam per sui dispersionem gens dici non potest. Unde oportet quod intelligatur de Israel spirituali, qui tunc maxime coram Deo gens erit, cum per essentiam Deum videbit. Ergo in statu beatitudinis leges praemissae, quae motum caeli sequuntur non cessabunt; et sic neque per consequens motus caeli. 2. It might be said that the passage quoted refers to the earth as serving man in his present state of life, wherein by sowing and reaping he gathers a harvest for the support of his animal life; but not as serving him in the state of glory, when it will last for ever for the greater enjoyment of the good.—On the contrary it is written (Jer. xxxi, 35, 36): Thus says the Lord who gives the sun for the light of the day, the order of the moon and of the stars for the light of the night, who stirs up the sea and the waves thereof roar, the Lord of hosts is his name. If these ordinances shall fail before me: then also the seed of Israel shall fail so as not to be a nation before me for ever. Now this does not refer to Israel in the flesh, seeing that by reason of their dispersion they can no longer be called a nation. Wherefore it must refer to the spiritual Israel, who will be in the truest sense a nation before the Lord, when they shall see God in his essence. Therefore in the state of beatitude the laws aforesaid which are consequent upon the movement of the heavens, will not cease, and consequently neither will the movement of the heavens.
Praeterea, quaecumque necessitatem ex priori necessario habent, sunt necessaria absolute, ut patet per philosophum in II Physic., sicut mors animalis, quae necessaria est propter materiae necessitatem. Operationes autem rerum incorruptibilium, inter quas motum caeli oportet ponere, sunt propter substantias eorum quorum sunt operationes, et sic necessitatem ex priori habere videntur; cum e converso sit in corruptibilibus, quorum substantiae sunt propter earum operationes; unde ex posteriori necessitatem habent, ut Commentator ibidem dicit. Ergo motus caeli necessitate absoluta necessarius est, et ita nunquam cessabit. 3. According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii) anything that is rendered necessary by something that is already necessary, is itself absolutely necessary; thus an animal’s death is necessary being necessitated by matter. Now the operations of incorruptible things, among which we must reckon the heavenly movement, are for the sake of the substances of those things whose operations they are, so that apparently they are rendered necessary by something that is already necessary; while the contrary obtains in corruptible things, whose substance is for the sake of their operations, so that their necessity depends on something subsequent to them, as the Commentator remarks (ibid.) therefore the heavenly movement is necessary absolutely and so it will never cease.
Praeterea, finis motus caeli est ut caelum per motum assimiletur Deo in quantum exit de potentia in actum per situum renovationem, quos successive actualiter acquirit; unumquodque enim secundum hoc Deo, qui est purus actus, assimilatur, quod actu est. Iste autem finis cessaret cessante motu. Cum motus ergo non cesset nisi obtento fine propter quem est, nunquam motus caeli cessabit. 4. The end of the heavenly movement is that the heavens by their movement may be likened to God, inasmuch as they pass from potentiality to actuality by coming into new positions, which they actually acquire successively: inasmuch as a thing is so far like God, who is pure act, as it is itself actual. Now this end would cease if movement were to cease: so that, since movement does not cease unless the end which is its purpose is obtained, the movement of the heavens will never cease.
Sed dicebatur, quod motus caeli non est propter hunc finem, sed ad complendum numerum electorum, quo completo, motus caeli quiescet. —Sed contra, nihil est propter se vilius, eo quod finis est nobilior his quae sunt ad finem, cum finis sit causa bonitatis in his quae sunt ad finem. Sed caelum, cum sit incorruptibile, est nobilius quam generabilia et corruptibilia. Ergo non potest dici, quod motus caeli sit propter aliquam generationem in istis inferioribus, per quam tamen numerus electorum posset compleri. 5. It might be said that the heavenly movement is not for this end, but for the completion of the number of the elect, and that when this is complete the heavens will cease to be moved.—On the contrary nothing is for the sake of that which is of less account, because the end is of more account than the means, for it is the cause of goodness in the means. Now the heavens, inasmuch as they are incorruptible, are of more account than things subject to generation and corruption. Wherefore it is not to be said that the movement of the heavens is for the sake of some generation in this lower world, whereby nevertheless the number of the elect might be made complete.
Sed dicebatur, quod motus caeli non est propter generationem electorum sicut propter generalem finem, sed sicut propter finem secundarium.- Sed contra, habito fine secundario, non quiescit quod propter finem motus movetur. Si ergo generatio, per quam completur numerus electorum est secundarius finis motus caeli, eo habito non quiescet adhuc caelum. 6. Yet it might be said that the movement of the heavens is not for the generation of the elect as its principal end, but as its secondary end.—On the contrary that which is put in motion in order to secure the end of the movement continues in motion even when a secondary end has been obtained. If then generation whereby the number of the elect is made complete is a secondary end of the celestial movement, this movement does not cease when that number is reached.
Praeterea, omne quod est in potentia, est imperfectum, nisi ad actum reducatur. Deus autem in mundi consummatione non dimittet aliquid imperfectum. Cum ergo potentia quae est in caelo ad ubi, non reducatur in actum nisi per motum, videtur quod motus caeli etiam in mundi consummatione non quiescet. 7. All that is in potentiality is imperfect until it is made actual. Now in the consummation of the world, God will not leave anything imperfect. Since then the heaven’s potentiality to ubiety is not actualised otherwise than by movement, it would seem that the heavenly movement will not cease even at the consummation of the world.
Praeterea, si causae alicuius effectus sunt incorruptibiles et semper eodem modo se habentes, et effectus ipse est sempiternus. Sed omnes causae motus caeli sunt incorruptibiles et semper eodem modo se habentes; sive accipiamus causam moventem, sive ipsum mobile. Ergo motus caeli in sempiternum durabit. 8. If the causes of a certain effect be incorruptible and invariable the effect will be everlasting. Now all the causes of the celestial movement are incorruptible and invariable, whether we refer to the moving cause or to the thing itself that is moved. Therefore the movement of heaven will last for ever.
Praeterea, illud quod est sempiternitatis susceptivum, nunquam a Deo sua sempiternitate privabitur, ut patet in Angelo, anima rationali, et substantia caeli. Sed motus caeli est susceptivus sempiternitatis (solum enim motum circularem contingit esse perpetuum), ut probatur in VIII Physic.; ergo motus caeli in perpetuum durabit, sicut et alia quae nata sunt esse sempiterna. 9. That which is receptive of everlastingness will never be deprived of its everlastingness by God, as instanced in angels, the rational soul and the substance of heaven. Now the heavenly movement is susceptive of everlastingness, since circular movement alone can last for ever according to the Philosopher (Phys. viii). Therefore the movement of heaven will last for ever, like other things that have a natural aptitude to be everlasting.
Praeterea, si motus caeli quiescet, aut quiescet in instanti aut in tempore. Si in instanti, contingit simul idem quiescere et moveri: quia cum in toto tempore praecedenti moveretur, oportet dicere quod in quolibet ipsius temporis in quo natum est moveri caelum, moveretur. In instanti autem signato in quo datum est caelum quiescere, natum est caelum moveri, cum motus et quies circa idem sint: hoc autem instans est aliquid temporis praecedentis, cum sit terminus eius. Ergo in eo moveretur. Et datum erat quod in eo quiescebat. Ergo simul in eodem instanti quiescet et movebitur; quod est impossibile. Si autem quiescit in tempore, ergo tempus erit post motum caeli. Sed tempus non est sine motu caeli, ergo motus caeli erit postquam esse desierit, quod est impossibile. 10. If heaven cease to be moved this cessation will either be in an instant or in time. If in an instant, it will follow that a thing is at rest and in motion at the same time: because seeing that it was in motion during the whole of the preceding time, we must agree that it was in motion at any given instant of that time. Now in this given instant in which it was stated that heaven was at rest, it was natural to the heaven to be in motion, since rest and motion apply to the same subject: and this instant belongs to the preceding time inasmuch as it is its term. Therefore heaven would be moved in that instant. Yet it was agreed that it was at rest therein. Therefore in the same instant it would be at rest and in motion, which is impossible. On the other hand if this cessation be in time, it follows that there will be time after the celestial movement. But there is no time without movement of heaven: wherefore the heavenly movement will continue after it has ceased, and this again is impossible.
Praeterea, si motus caeli aliquando deficiat, oportet quod tempus deficiat, quod est numerus eius, ut patet in IV Physic. Sed impossibile est tempus deficere, ergo impossibile est motum caeli deficere. Probatio mediae. Omne quod semper est in sui principio et sui fine, nunquam coepit esse, nec unquam deficiet, eo quod unumquodque est post suum principium et ante finem suum. Sed nihil est accipere temporis nisi instans, quod est principium futuri et finis praeteriti; et sic tempus semper est in sui principio et fine. Ergo tempus nunquam deficiet. 11. If the heavenly movement is ever to cease, it follows that time which is its measure will cease also (Phys. iv). But time cannot cease: therefore the celestial movement cannot cease. Proof of the minor premise:—Anything that is always in its beginning and its end, never began and will never cease, because everything is subsequent to its beginning and previous to its end. Now the only thing we can seize on in time is an instant, and this is the beginning of the future and the end of the past: so that time is ever in’its beginning and end. Therefore time will never cease.
Praeterea, motus caeli est naturalis caelo, sicut et motus gravium et levium est eis naturalis, ut patet in I caeli et Mun. Hoc autem differt, quod corpora elementaria non moventur naturaliter nisi cum sunt extra suum ubi, caelum autem movetur etiam in suo ubi existens; ex quibus accidi potest quod sicut se habet corpus elementare ad motum suum naturalem, cum est extra suum ubi, ita se habet caelum ad motum suum naturalem, cum est in suo ubi. Corpus enim elementare, cum est extra suum ubi, non quiescit nisi per violentiam. Ergo et caelum non potest quiescere nisi quies sit violenta; quod quidem est inconveniens. Cum enim nullum violentum possit esse perpetuum, sequeretur quod illa quies caeli non esset perpetua; sed quandoque iterum caelum moveri inciperet; quod est fabulosum. Ergo non est dicendum, quod motus caeli aliquando quiescat. 12. The celestial movement is natural to heaven, as their respective movements are to heavy and light bodies (De Coelo i). There is this difference, however, that elemental bodies exercise their natural movement only when they are outside their proper place, whereas the heaven is moved even while it is in its proper place. Whence we may infer that the relation of an elemental body to its natural movement when it is outside its proper place is like the relation of the heaven to its natural movement when it is in its proper place. Now an elemental body when outside its proper place does not rest unless it be forced. Therefore the heavenly body cannot rest unless it be forced. But this is inadmissible. For since nothing violent can endure for ever, it would follow that this heavenly rest does not last for ever,’and that at length the heavens would begin again to be moved, which is ridiculous. Therefore we must not say that the heavenly movement will cease at some time.
Praeterea, eorum quae sibi succedunt, oportet esse aliquem ordinem et proportionem. Finiti autem ad infinitum non est aliqua proportio. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur, quod caelum finito tempore sit motum, et postmodum infinito tempore quiescat: quod tamen oportet dicere, si motus caeli incepit et finietur, et nunquam reincipiat. 13. Things that succeed one another should have some kind of order and mutual proportion. But there is no proportion between the finite and the infinite. Therefore it is unreasonable to assert that heaven is moved for a finite time, and afterwards is at rest for an infinite period: and yet this must be said if the heavenly movement began and will end and will never begin again.
Praeterea, quanto aliquid Deo assimilatur secundum nobiliorem actum, tanto nobilior est assimilatio; sicut nobilior est assimilatio hominis ad Deum quae est secundum animam rationalem, quam animalis bruti, quae est secundum animam sensibilem. Actus autem secundus nobilior est quam actus primus, sicut consideratio quam scientia. Ergo assimilatio qua caelum assimilatur Deo secundum actum secundum, qui est causare inferiora, est nobilior quam assimilatio secundum claritatem, quae est actus primus. Si ergo in mundi consummatione partes principales mundi meliorabuntur, videtur quod caelum non desinet moveri, aliqua maiori claritate repletum. 14. The more excellent likeness to God is that which is in respect of a more excellent act: thus man’s likeness to God by reason of his rational soul is more excellent than that of a dumb animal, which is by reason of its sensitive soul. Now the second act is more excellent than the first; thus consideration is better than knowledge. Therefore the heaven’s likeness to God in respect of its second act which is to cause things in this lower world is more excellent than its likeness in respect of brightness which is its first act. If then in the consummation of the world the chief parts of the world will be bettered, it would seem that the heaven will not cease to be moved when it is filled with a greater brightness.
Praeterea, magnitudo et motus et tempus se consequuntur quantum ad divisionem et finitatem vel infinitatem, ut probatur in VI Phys. Sed in magnitudine circulari non est principium neque finis. Ergo nec in motu circulari poterit esse aliquis finis; et sic, cum motus caeli sit circularis, videtur quod nunquam finietur. 15. Magnitude, movement and time are in sequence to one another in respect of division and finitude or infinitude (Phys. vi, text. 18, 37, 38, 39). Now there is neither beginning nor end in a circular magnitude. Therefore neither is there any end in a circular movement: so that the heavenly movement being circular it would seem that it will never have an end.
Sed dicebat, quod licet motus circularis nunquam secundum suam naturam finiatur, tamen divina voluntate finietur. —Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit: cum de mundi institutione agitur, non quaeritur quid Deus possit facere, sed quod rerum natura patiatur ut fiat. Consummatio autem mundi, eius institutioni respondet, sicut finis principio. Ergo nec in his quae pertinent ad finem mundi, recurrendum est ad Dei voluntatem, sed ad rerum naturam. 16. It might be replied to the last objection that although a circular movement may have no end considered in its nature, it will have an end by the will of God.—On the contrary Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii): In discussing the origin of the world, we do not ask what God can do, but what the nature of things allows of being done. Now the consummation of the world corresponds to its origin, as the end corresponds to the beginning. Therefore in discussing the end of the world we must not have recourse to the divine will, but to the nature of things.
Praeterea, sol per suam praesentiam lumen et diem in istis inferioribus causat, per absentiam vero tenebras et noctem. Sed non potest esse sol praesens utrique hemisphaerio, nisi per motum. Ergo si motus caeli quiescat, semper sua praesentia in una parte mundi causabit diem, et in alia noctem, cui sol semper erit absens; et sic illa pars non erit meliorata, sed deteriorata, in mundi consummatione. 17. The sun by its presence causes light and day in this lower world, and by its absence it produces darkness and night. Now the sun cannot be present in both hemispheres except by movement. Therefore if the heavenly movement cease, the sun by its presence will make it to be always day in one part of the world, and in the other part by being always absent it will cause a continual night: so that the latter part will not be bettered but will be worse off in the consummation of the world.
Praeterea, illud quod aequaliter se habet ad duo, aut utrique adhaeret aut neutri. Sed sol aequaliter se habet quantum est de sua natura ad quodlibet ubi caeli. Ergo vel erit in quolibet, aut in nullo. Sed non potest esse in nullo, quia omne corpus sensibile alicubi est. Ergo oportet quod sit in quolibet. Sed hoc non potest esse, nisi per motus successionem. Ergo semper movebitur. 18. That which is indifferent to two things will either cling to both or to neither. Now the sun so far as its nature is concerned is indifferent to any particular position in the heavens. Therefore it will either occupy everyone or none. But it cannot occupy none, since every sensible body is somewhere. Therefore it must occupy them all: and this is impossible except by successive movement. Therefore it will always be in movement.
Praeterea, in mundi consummatione a nullo tolletur sua perfectio quod tunc remanebit, quia res quae remanebunt in illo statu non deteriorabuntur, sed meliorabuntur. Motus autem est perfectio ipsius caeli; quod patet ex hoc quia motus est entelechia mobilis in quantum huiusmodi, ut dicitur in II Phys.: et iterum, ut dicitur in II caeli et mundi, caelum per motum perfectam bonitatem consequitur. Ergo in mundi consummatione caelum motu non carebit. 19. At the end of the world none of the things that will remain will lose their perfection, inasmuch as they will not be worse off in that state but will be bettered. Now movement is a perfection of the heavens: because movement is the perfection of the thing moved as such (Phys. ii. text. 16) and because by movement the heavens acquire perfect goodness (De cxl. ii, text. 66). Therefore at the end of the world the heavens will not cease to be moved.
Praeterea, corpus aliquod nunquam attinget ad gradum naturae spiritualis. Hoc autem ad naturam spiritualem pertinet quod bonitatem perfectam sine motu habeat, ut patet in II caeli et mundi. Nunquam ergo caelum, si moveri desinat, perfectam bonitatem habebit; quod est contra rationem consummationis mundi. 20. No body ever attains to the degree of a spiritual nature. Now it belongs to a spiritual nature to have perfect goodness without movement (De Coel. et Mund. ii, text. 62 seqq.). Wherefore the heaven will never attain to perfect goodness if its movement ceases: and this is contrary to the nature of the world’s consummation.
Praeterea, nihil tollitur nisi per suum contrarium. Motui autem caeli nihil est contrarium, ut probatur in I caeli et mundi. Ergo motus caeli nunquam quiescet. 21. Nothing is removed except by its contrary. Now there, is nothing contrary to the heavenly movement (De Coel. et Mund. i, text 10, 15). Therefore the heavenly movement will never cease.
Sed contra. Est quod dicitur Apoc. X, vers. 5: Angelus quem vidi stantem super mare et super terram, levavit manum suam et iuravit per viventem in saecula saeculorum (...): quia tempus amplius non erit. Tempus autem erit quamdiu motus caeli erit. Ergo motus caeli aliquando esse desinet. On the contrary it is written (Apoc. x, 5, 6): The angel whom I saw standing upon the sea and upon the earth lifted up his hand to heaven, and he swore by him that he lives for ever and ever.... that time shall be no longer. Now time will endure as long as the heavens are moved. Therefore at some time the heavens will cease to be moved.
Praeterea, dicitur Iob XIV, 12: homo, cum dormierit, non resurget, donec atteratur caelum; non evigilabit, nec consurget de somno suo. Caelum autem non potest intelligi quod atteratur secundum substantiam, quia semper remanebit, ut prius probatum est. Ergo quando resurrectio mortuorum erit, caelum atteretur quantum ad motum, qui cessabit. Again it is written (Job xiv. 12) : Man when he is fallen asleep shall not rise again till the heavens be broken; he shall not awake nor rise up out of his sleep. Now we must not understand that the heavens will be broken in their substance, because this will always remain, as proved above. Therefore when the dead shall rise again, the heavens will be broken in the sense that their movement will cease.
Praeterea, Rom. VIII, 22, super illud: omnis creatura ingemiscit, et parturit usque adhuc, dicit Glossa Ambrosii: omnia elementa cum labore sua explent officia, sicut sol et luna non sine labore statuta sibi implent spatia; quod est causa nostri: unde quiescent nobis assumptis. Ergo in resurrectione sanctorum motus corporum caelestium quiescent. Again, commenting on Rom. viii, 22, Every creature groans and travails even until now, a gloss of Ambrose says: All the elements labour to fulfill their various duties; thus the sun and moon, not without toil, run their appointed courses. This they do for our benefit: so that when we are removed hence, they will rest. Therefore at the resurrection of the saints the movements of the heavenly bodies will cease.
Praeterea, Isidorus dicit: post iudicium sol laboris sui mercedem recipiet, et non veniet ad occasum nec sol nec luna; quod non potest esse, si caelum moveatur, ergo tunc caelum non movebitur. Again, Isidore (De Ord. Creatur.) writes: After the judgement the sun will receive the reward of his labour, thenceforward neither sun nor moon shall set: which is impossible as long as the heavens are in motion. Therefore the heavens win then cease to be moved.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod secundum documenta sanctorum ponimus motum caeli quandoque cessaturum; quamvis hoc magis fide teneatur quam ratione demonstrari possit. Ut autem manifestum esse possit in quo huius quaestionis pendeat difficultas, attendendum est quod motus caeli non hoc modo est naturalis caelesti corpori sicut motus elementaris corporis est sibi naturalis; habet enim huiusmodi motus in mobili principium, non solum materiale et receptivum, sed etiam formale et activum. Formam enim ipsius elementaris corporis sequitur talis motus, sicut et aliae naturales proprietates ex essentialibus principiis consequuntur; unde in eis generans dicitur esse movens in quantum dat formam quam consequitur motus. Sic autem in corpore caelesti dici non potest. Cum enim natura semper in unum tendat determinate, non se habens ad multa, impossibile est quod aliqua natura inclinet ad motum secundum se ipsum, eo quod in quolibet motu difformitas quaedam est, in quantum non eodem modo se habet quod movetur; uniformitas vero mobilis est contra motus rationem. Unde natura nunquam inclinat ad motum propter movere, sed propter aliquid determinatum quod ex motu consequitur; sicut natura gravis inclinat ad quietem in medio, et per consequens inclinat ad motum qui est deorsum, secundum quod tali motu in talem locum pervenitur. Caelum autem non pervenit suo motu in aliquod ubi, ad quod per suam naturam inclinetur, quia quodlibet ubi est principium et finis motus; unde non potest esse suus motus naturalis quasi sequens aliquam inclinationem naturalis virtutis inhaerentis, sicut sursum ferri est motus naturalis ignis. Dicitur autem motus circularis esse naturalis caelo, in quantum in sua natura habet aptitudinem ad talem motum; et sic in seipso habet principium talis motus passivum; activum autem principium motus est aliqua substantia separata, ut Deus vel intelligentia vel anima, ut quidam ponunt; quantum enim ad praesentem quaestionem nihil differt. Ratio ergo permanentiae motus non potest sumi ex natura aliqua caelestis corporis, ex qua tantum est aptitudo ad motum; sed oportet eam sumere ex principio activo separato. Et quia agens omne propter finem agit, oportet considerare quis est finis motus caeli; si namque fini eius congruat quod motus aliquando terminetur, caelum quandoque quiescet; si autem fini eius non competat quies, motus eius erit sempiternus; non enim potest esse quod motus deficiat ex mutatione causae moventis, cum voluntas Dei sit immutabilis sicut etiam natura; et per eam immobilitatem consequantur, si quae sunt causae mediae moventes. I answer that following the teaching of holy men we hold that at some time the celestial movement will cease, although this be a matter of faith rather than of demonstration by reason. In order to make clear wherein this question offers difficulty, it must be observed that the heavenly movement, is not natural to the heavenly body in the same way as the elemental body’s movement is natural to the elemental body. The latter movement has in the thing movable its principle not only material and receptive but also formal and active: because the form of the elemental body follows that movement, even as other natural properties result from essential principles: wherefore in these things the generator is said to be the mover inasmuch as it gives the form that results from the movement. But this does not apply to a heavenly body. Because as nature ever tends to one definite effect through not being indifferent to many, it is impossible that any nature tend to movement as such, since, in every movement there is a certain absence of uniformity, inasmuch as the thing moved passes from one mode of being to another, and uniformity in the thing moved is contrary to the definition of movement. In consequence nature never inclines to movement for the sake of movement, but for the sake of some definite result to be obtained by movement: thus a heavy body is inclined by nature to rest in the centre, wherefore it, tends to a downward motion, for the reason that by such a movement it will reach that place. On the other hand the heaven by its movement does not reach a ‘whereabouts’ to which it is inclined by nature, because every ‘whereabouts’ is the beginning and end of a movement: so that its natural movement cannot result, so to say, from a tendency of a natural inherent power, in the same way as the natural movement of fire has an upward tendency. Now circular movement is said to be natural to the heaven, in so far as it has a natural aptitude for that kind of movement, so that it contains in itself the passive principle of that movement, while the active principle of this movement is some separate substance, such as God, or an intelligence, or a soul according to some; as to which of these it may be it matters not to the question at issue. Accordingly no argument for the permanence of this movement can be taken from the nature of a heavenly body wherein there is only aptitude for movement: and we seek one from a separate active principle. And seeing that every agent acts for an end, we must consider what is the end of the heaven’s movement: because if this end be such as to require that this movement should cease at some time, then the heavens will at length cease to be moved; while if rest is inconsistent with that end, then its movement will last for ever: for it cannot be said that it will cease through a change in its moving cause, since God’s will like his nature is unchangeable, and through it whatever intermediate causes produce the heavenly movement may have become unchangeable likewise.
In hac autem consideratione tria oportet vitare: quorum primum est, ne dicamus caelum moveri propter ipsum motum; sicut dicebatur caelum esse propter ipsum esse, in quo Deo assimilatur. Motus enim, ex ipsa sui ratione, repugnat ne possit poni finis, eo quod motus est in aliud tendens; unde non habet rationem finis, sed magis eius quod est ad finem. Cui etiam attestatur quod est actus imperfectus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Finis autem est ultima perfectio. Secundum est, ut non ponatur motus caeli esse propter aliquid vilius; nam cum finis sit unde ratio sumitur, oportet finem praeeminere his quae sunt ad finem. Potest autem contingere quod vilior sit terminus operationis rei nobilioris; non autem ut sit finis intentionis: sicut securitas rustici est terminus quidam, ad quem operatio regis gubernantis terminatur; non tamen regimen regis est ordinatum ad huius rustici securitatem sicut in finem sed in aliquid melius, scilicet in bonum commune. Unde non potest dici, quod generatio istorum inferiorum sit finis motus caeli, etsi sit effectus vel terminus, quia et caelum his inferioribus praeeminet, et motus eius motibus et mutationibus horum. Tertium est, ut non ponatur finis motus caeli aliquid infinitum, quia, ut dicitur in II Metaphys., qui ponit infinitum in causa finali destruit finem et naturam boni. Pertingere enim quod infinitum est, impossibile est. Nihil autem movetur ad id quod impossibile est ipsum consequi, ut dicitur in I caeli et mundi. Unde non potest dici, quod finis motus caeli sit ut consequatur in actu ubi ad quod est in potentia, licet hoc Avicenna dicere videatur. Hoc enim impossibile est consequi, cum infinitum sit; quia dum in uno ubi fit in actu, erit in potentia ad aliud ubi, in quo prius actu existebat. Now in making this observation three things must be avoided. In the first place we must not say that the heaven is moved for the sake of being moved: as we have said that it exists for the sake of existing, wherein it is like God. The reason is that movement by its very nature cannot be regarded in the light of an end, since it is a tendency to something else: so that it answers to the definition of means rather than of an end. This is confirmed by the fact that movement is the act of that which is imperfect (De Anima iii, 7; Phys. iii): while the end is the ultimate perfection.—Secondly, we must not say that the heavenly movement is for the sake of something less excellent than the heavens: because since the end specifies the means it ought to be more worthy than the means. Now the action of a more noble agent may happen to terminate in a less noble effect, but not as the end intended by that action: thus the safety of a peasant is an end secured by the king’s government, yet the king’s government does not seek that peasant’s safety as its end, for it seeks something better, namely the common good. Consequently it cannot be admitted that the generation of beings in this lower world is the end of the heavenly movement, although it is its effect and term: since both heaven itself is more excellent than this lower world, and its movement than the movements and changes that take place here below.—Thirdly, we must not suppose the end of the heaven’s movement to be something indefinite, since to take the indefinite as a final cause is to destroy the end and the very nature of good (Metaph. ii). Because it is impossible to reach the indefinite; and nothing is moved to that which it cannot obtain (De Coelo et Mundo, i). Wherefore it cannot be said that the end of the celestial movement is to attain to that for which it has no potentiality: although Avicenna would seem to say so. But this it cannot possibly obtain: since while it is actually in one position it is in its previous position potentially.
Oportet ergo finem motus caeli ponere aliquid quod caelum per motum consequi possit, quod sit aliud a motu, et eo nobilius. Wherefore we must assign as the end of the heavenly movement something that the heaven can obtain by its movement, that is distinct from its movement and more excellent.
Hoc autem dupliciter potest poni. Uno modo ut ponatur finis motus caeli aliquid in ipso caelo, quod simul cum motu existit; et secundum hoc a quibusdam philosophis ponitur, quod similitudo ad Deum in causando est finis motus caeli; quod quidem fit ipso motu durante; unde secundum hoc non convenit quod motus caeli deficiat, quia deficiente motu, finis ex motu proveniens cessaret. Alio modo potest poni finis motus caeli aliquid extra caelum, ad quod pervenitur per motum caeli; quo cessante illud potest remanere: et haec est nostra positio. Ponimus enim quod motus caeli est propter implendum numerum electorum. Anima namque rationalis quolibet corpore nobilior est, et ipso caelo. Unde nullum est inconveniens, si ponatur finis motus caeli multiplicatio rationalium animarum: non autem in infinitum, quia hoc per motum caeli provenire non posset; et sic moveretur ad aliquid quod consequi non potest; unde relinquitur quod determinata multitudo animarum rationalium sit finis motus caeli. Unde ea habita motus caeli cessabit. This admits of a twofold solution. The first is that we assign as the end of the heavenly movement something in the heavens themselves and coexistent with movement. With this in view some philosophers held that the end of the heavenly movement is its likeness to God in causing, which takes place during the movement. In this view it is not becoming for this movement to cease, since were it to cease the end resulting from the movement would cease also. The second solution is that we assign as the end of the heavenly movement something outside heaven that is obtained by that movement, and which can remain when that movement ceases: and this is the view that we adopt. We hold then that the movement of the heavens is for the completion of the number of the elect. For the rational soul is more excellent than any body whatsoever, even than the heavens: wherefore there is nothing unreasonable in supposing that the end of the heavenly movement is the multiplication of rational souls; not indeed indefinitely, since this could not result from the movement of the heavens; and it could in that case be moved to something that it could not obtain. Therefore it is a definite number of souls that is the end of the heavenly movement: and when this is reached the movement will cease.
Licet autem utraque positionum praedictarum possit rationabiliter sustineri, tamen secunda, quae fidei est, videtur esse probabilior propter tres rationes. Primo quidem, quia nihil differt dicere finem alicuius esse assimilationem ad Deum secundum aliquid, et illud secundum quod assimilatio attenditur; sicut supra dictum est, quod finis rerum posset dici vel ipsa assimilatio divinae bonitatis, vel esse rerum, secundum quod res Deo assimilantur. Idem ergo est dictu, finem motus caeli esse assimilari Deo in causando et causare. Causare autem non potest esse finis, cum sit operatio habens operatum et tendens in aliud: huiusmodi enim operationibus meliora sunt operata, ut dicitur in principio Ethic.; unde huiusmodi factiones non possunt esse fines agentium, cum non sint perfectiones facientium, sed magis factorum; unde et ipsa facta sunt magis fines, ut patet IX Metaph., et in I Ethic. Ipsa autem operata non sunt fines, cum sint viliora caelo, ut supra dictum est. Unde relinquitur non convenienter dici, quod finis motus caeli sit assimilari ad Deum in causando. Secundo vero, quia cum caelum moveatur in ipso existente sola aptitudine ad motum, principio vero activo existente extra, ut dictum est; movetur et agit sicut instrumentum haec est enim dispositio instrumenti, ut patet in artificialibus, nam in securi est sola aptitudo ad talem motum; principium autem motus in artifice est. Unde et secundum philosophos, quod movet motum, movet ut instrumentum. In actione autem quae est per instrumentum, non potest esse finis aliquis in ipso instrumento nisi per accidens, in quantum instrumentum accipitur ut artificiatum et non ut instrumentum; unde non est probabile quod finis motus caeli sit aliqua perfectio ipsius, sed magis aliquid extra ipsum. Tertio, quia si similitudo ad Deum in causando est finis motus caeli, praecipue attenditur haec similitudo secundum causalitatem eius quod a Deo immediate causatur, scilicet animae rationalis, ad cuius causalitatem concurrit caelum et per motum suum materiam disponendo. Et ideo probabilius est quod finis motus caeli sit numerus electorum quam assimilatio ad Deum in causalitate generationis et corruptionis, secundum quod philosophi ponunt. Et ideo concedimus quod motus caeli completo numero electorum finietur. Now though either of these views can be upheld, the second, which is of faith, seems the more probable, and this for three reasons. First because it differs not whether we say that a certain thing’s end is its likeness to God in some particular respect, or the thing itself with this likeness: just as we have said above that the end of things may be said to be either their being made like to God’s goodness, or their nature as likened to God. Wherefore to say that the end of things is to be like God in causing is the same as to say that their end is to cause. Now to cause cannot be an end since it is an operation which implies an effect and tends to something else. Moreover in operations of this kind the effect is better than the operation (Ethic. i, i), so that suchlike operations cannot be the end of the operator, for they do not perfect the maker but the thing made: and thus the thing made is more correctly the end (Metaph. ix: Ethic. i, i). Now the things that are produced by the heavenly movement cannot be the end of that movement since they are less excellent than the heavens, as stated above. Wherefore it is unreasonable to hold that the end of the heavenly movement is likeness to God in causing. Secondly, since the heavenly movement is produced by an external active principle, while the heavens themselves have merely the natural aptitude for that movement, as stated above, it follows that the heavens are moved and act as an instrument: for such is the disposition of an instrument, as may be seen in the productions of art: thus the axe has nothing more than the aptitude for its particular movement, while the principle of this movement is in the craftsman. Hence as philosophers say, that which moves through being itself moved, moves as an instrument. Now in the instrumental action there cannot be an end in the instrument save accidentally in so far as the instrument is considered as a thing made and not as an instrument. Consequently it is not probable that the end of the heavenly movement is a perfection of the heavens: rather is it something outside the heavens.—Thirdly, if likeness to God in causing is the end of the heavenly movement, this likeness will be found chiefly in the production of that which is produced by God immediately, to wit the rational soul: to the production of which the heavenly movement conduces by disposing the matter. So that it is more probable that the end of the heavenly movement is the number of the elect than a likeness to God in causing generation and corruption as the philosophers say. For this reason we grant that the heavens will cease to be in motion when the number of the elect is complete.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod loquitur de duratione terrae secundum quod est transmutationi subiecta; sic enim in ea seminatur et metitur. Tali autem statu terrae durante motus caeli non cessabit. Reply to the First Objection. The text refers to the duration of the earth as subject to change: for it is thus that it receives the seed and gives the harvest. So long as the earth is in that state the heavens will not cease to be in motion.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod auctoritas illa non est intelligenda de Israel carnali, sed de Israel spirituali; non tamen secundum quod est in patria coram Deo, contemplando ipsum per speciem, sed secundum quod est in via coram Deo per fidem; ut sic idem sit quod dicitur hic, et quod dominus discipulis loquens ait, Matth. XXVIII, 20: ecce ego vobiscum sum usque ad consummationem saeculi Reply to the Second Objection. The text quoted refers not to the carnal but to the spiritual Israel: not indeed as in God’s presence by seeing him face to face in his heavenly home, but as a wayfarer in the presence of God by faith. Hence the words of the text resemble those of our Lord to his disciples (Matt. xxviii, 20) : Behold I am with you... until the consummation of the world.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod haec praepositio propter denotat causam; unde quandoque denotat causam finalem, quae est posterior in esse; quandoque autem materialem vel efficientem, quae sunt prior. Cum autem dicitur in rebus incorruptibilibus, actus sunt propter agentia, ly propter non denotat causam finalem, sed causam efficientem, ex qua est necessitas ibi, et non ex fine. Motus ergo caeli si comparetur ad ipsum mobile, non habet ex eo necessitatem sicut ex causa efficiente, ut ostensum est; habet autem hanc necessitatem ex movente. Quod, quia est voluntarie movens, secundum hoc necessitatem in motu inducit secundum quod determinatum est per ordinem sapientiae divinae, et non ad moveri semper. Reply to the Third Objection. The preposition propter (for the sake of) indicates a cause: sometimes it indicates a final cause which comes into being afterwards, and sometimes it indicates a material or efficient cause, which precedes. Now when it is stated that in incorruptible things acts are for the sake of the agents, ‘for the sake of’ indicates not the final but the efficient cause on account of which, and not of the end, there is necessity in those actions. Accordingly the celestial movement, if we refer it to that which is in motion, is not necessitated thereby as by its efficient cause, as we have proved, but it is necessitated by its mover: which being a voluntary mover necessitates the movement according as it is determined by the order of divine wisdom, and not so that it last for ever.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod assimilari Deo secundum hoc quod actu acquirit successive diversos situs ad quos prius erat in potentia, non potest esse finis motus caeli: tum quia hoc infinitum est, ut supra ostensum est; tum quia sicut ex una parte per motum acceditur ad divinam similitudinem, per hoc quod situs qui erant in potentia, fiunt actu; ita ab alia parte receditur a divina similitudine per hoc quod situs qui erant in actu, fiunt in potentia. Reply to the Fourth Objection. The end of the heaven’s movement cannot consist in its becoming like God by actually reaching to various successive positions which previously it occupied potentially: both because this is indefinite, as we have shown, and because while on the one hand it becomes like God by reaching positions actually which it occupied before potentially, on the other hand it becomes less like God by the fact that positions previously actual become potential.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod licet generabilia et corruptibilia sint viliora caelo, tamen animae rationales sunt corpore caeli nobiliores, quae tamen a Deo producuntur ad esse in materia disposita per motum caeli. Reply to the Fifth Objection. Although things subject to. generation and corruption are inferior to the heavens, the rational soul is superior to the heavenly body: and yet the former is produced by God into being in matter dispersed by the heavenly movement.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod completio numeri electorum, secundum doctrinam fidei non ponitur secundarius finis motus caeli, sed principalis, licet non ultimus, quia finis ultimus uniuscuiusque rei est bonitas divina, in quantum creaturae quoquomodo ad eam pertingunt vel per similitudinem vel per debitum famulatum. Reply to the Sixth Objection. According to the teaching of faith the completion of the number of the elect is not the secondary but the principal end of the heaven’s movement. It is not, however, its ultimate end because the ultimate end of everything is the divine goodness, inasmuch as creatures in some way attain thereto either by likeness or by rendering the service they owe God.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod res non dicitur esse imperfecta, quacumque potentia in ipsa non reducta ad actum, sed solum quando per reductionem in actum res suum consequitur complementum. Non enim homo qui est in potentia ut sit in India, imperfectus erit, si ibi non fuerit; sed imperfectus dicitur, si scientia vel virtute careat, qua natus est perfici. Caelum autem non perficitur per locum, sicut corpora inferiora, quae in proprio ubi conservantur. Unde licet potentia qua potest esse in aliquo ubi, nunquam reducatur ad actum, non tamen sequitur quod sit imperfectum. Nam si secundum se consideretur, non maior est sibi perfectio quod sit in uno situ quam in alio, sed indifferenter se habet ad omnia ubi, cum ad quodlibet moveatur naturaliter. Ipsa autem indifferentia magis inducit ad quietem quam ad perpetuitatem motus, nisi consideretur voluntas moventis et intendentis finem; sicut etiam quidam philosophi assignaverunt causam quietis terrae in medio, propter indifferentiam eius, respectu cuiuslibet partis circumferentiae caeli. Reply to the Seventh Objection. It is not true that a thing is to be described as imperfect by reason of any potentiality therein that has not been given actuality: this is true only when actuality makes the thing complete. A man is not imperfect because being potentially in India he is not actually there: but he will be imperfect if he lack knowledge or virtue which are his natural perfections. Now heaven is not perfected by its position as these lower bodies which are preserved by occupying their proper positions. Wherefore although its potentiality to be in this or that position be never given actuality, it does not follow that it is imperfect. In fact if we consider heaven in itself it does not acquire greater perfection by being in one position than by being in another: it is indifferent to all positions, since it is moved naturally to any one. Now this indifference conduces to rest rather than to perpetual movement, unless we take into account the will of Him who moves it and intends its end. Thus certain philosophers explained the earth’s rest in the centre by assigning as its cause the equidistance of the centre to each part of the heaven’s circumference.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod licet causae motus caeli omnes sint sempiternae, tamen movens, ex quo necessitas eius dependet, movet per voluntatem et non est necessarium quod semper moveat, sed secundum quod exigit ratio finis. Reply to the Eighth Objection. Though all the causes of the celestial movement are everlasting, nevertheless the mover on whom its necessity depends, moves by his will: nor is it necessary that he move it for ever, but only according to the exigency of the end.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod alio modo caelum est secundum suam naturam capax sempiternitatis motus et sui esse. Nam suum esse dependet ex principiis suae naturae, ex quibus consequitur necessitas essendi, cum non sit in eis possibilitas ad non esse, ut prius ostensum est; suus autem motus in natura eius non habet nisi aptitudinem; necessitatem vero habet ex movente. Unde etiam secundum Commentatorem, sempiternitas essendi in caelo est ex principiis suae naturae, non autem sempiternitas motus, sed ab extrinseco. Unde etiam secundum eos qui dicunt motum nunquam deficere, causa durationis motus caeli et eius sempiternitatis, est voluntas divina; quamvis eius immobilitas non de necessitate concludere possit sempiternitatem motus caeli, ut ipsi volunt. Non enim est mobilis voluntas, si velit quod diversa sibi invicem succedant secundum quod exigit finis quem immobiliter vult. Et ideo potius est inquirenda ratio sempiternitatis motus ex fine quam ex immobilitate moventis. Reply to the Ninth Objection. The heaven’s capacity of perpetual movement is not to be confused with its capacity of existing for ever. Its existence depends on its natural principles, from which it acquires the necessity of existing, in that they exclude the possibility of non-existence, as we have shown above: whereas its nature does not include perpetual movement but only an aptitude thereto, and the necessity of that movement being perpetual depends on its mover. Hence also according to the Commentator (Metaph. ii: De Subst. Orb.) the, heaven has everlasting movement which it receives from an intrinsic principle. Wherefore even those who hold that this movement will never cease, say that the cause of its duration and everlastingness is God’s will. And yet the unchangeableness of God’s will does not, as they contend, necessarily prove the everlastingness of the celestial movement: because his win is not shown to be changeable if he wish different things to succeed one another according to the exigency of the end which he wills unchangeably. We must, therefore, Seek the reason for an everlasting movement in the end rather than in the unchangeableness of the mover.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod motus caeli terminabitur in instanti, in quo quidem neque erit motus neque quies, sed terminus motus et principium quietis. Quies autem sequens non erit in tempore; nam quies non mensuratur a tempore primo, sed secundario, ut dicitur in IV Phys.; unde si sit quies alicuius corporis, quae nulli motui subiiciatur, non mensurabitur tempore. Quamvis, si in hoc fiat vis, possit dici, quod erit post motum in caelo immobilitas quaedam, etsi non quies. Reply to the Tenth Objection. The heavenly movement will end in an instant: and in that instant there will be neither movement nor rest, but the end of movement and the beginning of rest. The subsequent rest will not be in time, because rest is measured by time not directly, but indirectly (Phys. iv): so that the rest of a body not subject to any kind of movement is in no way measured by time. Yet, not to draw the line too fine, one might say that after movement there will be not rest but a certain immobility in the heavens.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod sicut motus caeli deficiet, ita et tempus deficiet, ut per auctoritatem Apocalypsis inductam apparet. Ultimum autem nunc totius temporis erit quidem finis praeteriti non autem principium futuri. Quod enim nunc simul sit et finis praeteriti et principium futuri, habet in quantum sequitur motum circularem continuum, cuius quodlibet signum indivisibile est principium et finis respectu diversorum. Unde si motus cesset, sicut erit aliquod ultimum indivisibile in motu, ita et in tempore. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Even as the celestial movement will cease, so also will time be no more, as appears from the text quoted from the Apocalypse. The last instant of all time will indeed be the end of the past, but not the beginning of the future: because that an instant be at once both the end of the past and the beginning of the future obtains in a continuous circular movement in which every point is both beginning and end in respect of different parts. Hence if the celestial movement cease, just as there will be an ultimate indivisible point of movement, so will there be of time.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod motus caeli, ut dictum est, non est naturalis propter activam inclinationem formalis principii in corpore caelesti ad talem motum, sicut est in elementis; unde non sequitur, si caelum quiescit, quod eius quies sit violenta. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. We have already said that it is not on account of an active inclination of its formal principle to such a movement that the heaven’s movement is natural, as in the case of the elements: so that it does not follow, if the heavens cease to be in motion, that their rest is therefore violent.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod si motus caeli non esset propter aliquid aliud tunc oporteret attendere proportionem eius ad quietem sequentem, si non sempiternus poneretur; sed quia est ordinatus ad alium finem; eius proportio attenditur in ordine ad finem, et non in ordine ad quietem sequentem: ut intelligamus quod Deus ex nihilo universas creaturas in esse producens, primam universi perfectionem, quae consistit in partibus essentialibus universi, et diversis speciebus, per seipsum instituit. Ad ultimam vero perfectionem, quae erit ex consummatione ordinis beatorum, ordinavit diversos motus et operationes creaturarum: quosdam quidem naturales, sicut motum caeli et operationes elementorum, per quas materia praeparatur ad susceptionem animae rationalis; quosdam vero voluntarios, sicut Angelorum ministeria, qui mittuntur propter eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis. Unde hac consummatione habita, et immutabiliter permanente, quae ad eam ordinabuntur, in perpetuum cessabunt. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. If the celestial movement were not for the sake of something else, we should expect to find some kind of proportion between that movement, and the subsequent rest, in the supposition that the movement is not everlasting. But whereas it is ordinated to another end, this proportion must be referred to the end and not to the subsequent rest. Accordingly we are to understand that God in bringing all creatures into being out of nothing, himself instituted the first perfection of the universe, consisting in the principal parts thereof, and the various species of things: and that in order to give it its final perfection, consisting in the completion of the ranks of the blessed, he ordained the various movements and operations of creatures, some of which are natural, for instance, the movement of the heavens and the activities of the elements, whereby matter is prepared to receive rational souls, while others are voluntary such as the ministrations of the angels who are sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation. Wherefore when this consummation has been attained to remain for ever without change, those things that were ordained thereto will cease for ever.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod obiectio illa procedit de actu secundo, qui est operatio manens in operante, quae est finis operantis, et per consequens excellentior quam forma operantis. Actus autem secundus, qui est actio tendens in aliquod factum, non est finis agentis, nec nobilior quam eius forma; nisi ipsa facta sint nobiliora facientibus, sicut artificiata sunt nobiliora artificialibus instrumentis, ut eorum fines. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. This argument takes into consideration the second act that is an operation abiding in the operator and is the end of the operator and therefore excels the form of the operator. But the second act which is an action tending to something made is not the end of the agent, nor does it excel the agent’s form, unless the thing made excel that which makes it, as things produced by act excel the instruments as being the ends of the latter.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod licet in circulari magnitudine non sit principium vel finis in actu, potest tamen designari principium vel finis in ea per inclinationem vel terminationem motus alicuius. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. It is true that there is no actual beginning or end in a circular magnitude, yet it is possible to indicate a beginning or end therein in respect of an inception or termination of some kind of movement.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod in mundi principio natura instituebatur: et ideo in his quae ad principium spectant, non oportet naturae proprietatem praetermittere; in mundi autem fine naturae operatio consequitur finem a Deo sibi institutum: unde oportet ibi recurrere ad voluntatem Dei, quae talem finem instituit. Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. At the beginning of the world nature was being established; wherefore in discussing its beginning we must not omit what is proper to nature. On the other hand at the end of the world the operation of nature will attain the end appointed by God: wherefore in discussing it we must have recourse to God’s will which determined that end.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod licet caelo quiescente semper sit futurus sol ex una parte terrae non tamen ex alia parte terrae erunt omnino tenebrae et obscuritas, propter claritatem quae a Deo elementis tradetur. Unde habetur Apoc. XXI, 23, quod civitas non eget sole neque luna nam claritas Dei illuminavit eam. Si tamen sit amplior claritas ex illa parte terrae quae fuit inhabitata a sanctis, nullum inconveniens sequitur. Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. When the heavens cease to be in motion, although the sun will always remain to the one side of the earth, there will not be utter darkness and gloom on the other side, because God will give brightness to the elements. Hence it is written (Apoc. xii, 23): The city hath no need of the sun nor of the moon... for the glory of God hath enlightened it. And no inconsistency will follow if the part which was inhabited by the Saints receive a greater light.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod quamvis caelum aequaliter se habeat ad quemlibet situm sibi possibilem, non tamen motus est propter acquisitionem situs, sed propter aliquid aliud: unde in quocumque situ remaneat, impleto eo ad quod erat, nihil differt. Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. Though the heaven is indifferent to any position that is possible to it, its movement is not for the purpose of obtaining a position but for something else: wherefore in whatever position it remains, it matters not so long as its movement has achieved its purpose.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod motus etsi sit actus mobilis, est tamen actus imperfectus. Unde per hoc quod motus aufertur, non potest concludi quod simpliciter perfectio auferatur, et praecipue si per motum mobili nihil acquiratur. Quod autem philosophus dicit, quod acquirit perfectam bonitatem per motum, loquitur secundum primam dictarum opinionum de fine motus caeli, qui competit ad sempiternitatem motus. Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. Although movement is the act of that which is moved it is the act of that which is imperfect. Hence if a thing is deprived of movement we must not infer that it is deprived of a perfection simply, especially if it acquires nothing by its movement. When the Philosopher says that by movement heaven acquires perfect goodness, he is expressing himself according to the first of the above-mentioned opinions about the end of the celestial movement, which end is consistent with the movement being everlasting.
Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod perfectio spiritualis naturae est ut possit esse causa aliorum sine suo motu; quod caelum nunquam acquiret. Nec tamen propter hoc deteriorabitur, cum finis suus non sit in causando alia, ut dictum est. Reply to the Twentieth Objection. The perfection of a spiritual nature is that it can be the cause of other things without being moved itself, a perfection to which the heavens can never attain. Nevertheless the heavens will not for this reason be worse off than before, inasmuch as their end does not consist in causing other things, as stated above.
Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum, quod motus caeli non quiescet propter aliquod contrarium, sed propter voluntatem moventis tantum. Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. The heavens will cease to be in motion not on account of anything contrary to their movement, but solely on account of the will of their mover.
Q. V:
ARTICLE VI
Can Any Man Know When the Movement of the Heavens Will Cease?

[ Sum. Th. Suppl, Q. lxxxviii, A. 3]
Sexto quaeritur utrum possit sciri ab homine quando motus caeli finiatur. Et videtur quod sic. THE sixth point of inquiry is whether man can know when the movement of the heavens will cease: and it would seem that this is impossible.
Quia, secundum Augustinum in fine de Civit. Dei, sexta aetas currit ab adventu Christi usque ad finem mundi. Sed scitur quantum praecedentes aetates duraverunt. Ergo sciri potest quantum ista aetas durare debet per comparationem ad alias; et ita potest sciri quando motus caeli finietur. 1. According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei) the sixth age is from the coming of Christ to the end of the world. Now it is known how long the previous ages lasted. Therefore it is possible to know how long this age is to last, by comparing it with the others, and thus we can tell when the movement of the heavens will cease.
Praeterea, finis uniuscuiusque rei respondet suo principio. Sed principium mundi scitum est per revelationem, ex qua Moyses dixit: in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Ergo et finis mundi sciri potest per revelationem in Scripturis traditam. 2. The end of everything corresponds to its beginning. Now the beginning of the world has been known by revelation ever since Moses wrote: In the beginning God created heaven and earth. Therefore it is possible to know about the end of the world by revelation delivered to us in the Scriptures.
Praeterea, causa incertitudinis mundi ponitur esse, ut homo semper sit in sollecitudinem de suo statu. Sed ad hanc sollecitudinem habendam sufficit mortis incertitudo. Ergo non fuit necessarium, incertum esse defectum mundi; nisi forte propter illos quorum temporibus finis mundi erit. 3. It is said that the reason for our uncertainty about the end of the world is that, man may ever be solicitous for the state of his soul. But the uncertainty about his death is enough to ensure that solicitude on his part. Therefore there was no need for uncertainty about the end of the world, except perhaps for the sake of those in whose lifetime the end of the world will come.
Praeterea, dicitur aliquibus propria mors esse revelata, sicut patet de beato Martino. Dicit autem Augustinus in epistola ad Orosium, quod talis unusquisque in iudicio comparebit, qualis fuit in morte: et sic eadem ratio est occultandi mortem et occultandi diem iudicii. Ergo et dies iudicii, qua ad omnes pertinet, debuit in Scriptura sacra, quae omnes instruit, revelatus fuisse. 4. It is related of some that they received a revelation of their approaching death, the Blessed Martin for instance. And Augustine says (Ep. ad Oros.) that each one will appear at the judgement as he was in death: so that there is the same reason fox concealing the day of one’s death as for hiding the day of judgement. Consequently the day of judgement which concerns all should have been revealed in the Scriptures whereby all are taught.
Praeterea, signum ordinatur ad aliquid cognoscendum. In Evangeliis autem ponuntur aliqua signa adventus domini, qui erit in fine mundi, ut patet Matth. XXIV, 24 sq. et Luc. XXI, 9 sq. et similiter ab apostolis, ut patet I ad Tim. IV, 1, sq. et II ad Tim. III, 2 sq., et II ad Thess. II, 3 sq. Ergo videtur quod possit sciri tempus adventus domini, et finis mundi. 5. A sign is intended for the purpose of making something known. Now certain signs of the Lord’s coming at the end of the world are given in the Gospels (Matt. xxiv, Luke xxi) and by the Apostle (1 Tim. iv, 2 Tim. iii, 2 Thess. ii). Therefore seemingly it is possible to know the time of the Lord’s coming and of the end of the world.
Praeterea, nullus hic reprehenditur vel punitur pro eo quod non est in sua potestate. Sed aliqui reprehenduntur in Scriptura et puniuntur pro eo quod tempora non cognoscunt; unde dominus, Matth. XVI, 4, ad Pharisaeos: faciem caeli diiudicare nostis, signum autem istud non potestis scire? Et Lucae XIX, 44: non relinquent in te lapidem super lapidem, eo quod non cognoveris tempus visitationis tuae; et Ierem. VIII, 7: milvus in caelo cognovit tempus suum; turtur et hirundo et ciconia custodierunt tempus adventus sui; populus autem meus non cognovit iudicium domini. Ergo possibile est sciri diem iudicii, vel tempus finis mundi. 6. No man is reproved or punished here below for what does not he in his power. Now in Scripture some are reproved and punished for ignorance of the times. Thus our Lord spoke to the Pharisees (Matt. xvi, 3): You know how to discern the face of the sky: and can you not know the signs of the times? and (Luke xix, 44) he says: They shall not leave in thee a stone upon a stone, because thou hast not known the time of thy visitation. Again (Jerem. viii, 7): The kite in the air hath known her time: the turtle, the swallow and the stork have observed the time of their coming, but my People have not known the judgement of the Lord. Therefore the day of judgement or the time of the end of the world can be known.
Praeterea, in secundo adventu, Christus magis manifeste veniet quam in primo; tunc enim videbit eum omnis populus, et qui eum pupugerunt, ut habetur Apoc. I, 7. Sed primus adventus praenuntiatus fuit in Scriptura futurus etiam quantum ad determinatum tempus, ut patet Dan. IX, 24-27. Ergo videtur quod et secundus adventus debuerit in Scripturis praenuntiari quantum ad certum tempus. 7. At his second coming Christ will appear more manifestly than at his first: since then every eye shall see him, and they also who pierced him (Apoc. i, 7). Now his first coming was foretold in Scripture even as to the exact time of its happening (Dan. ix). Therefore one would think that his second coming also should have been foretold as to its precise date.
Praeterea, homo dicitur minor mundus, quia in se maioris mundi similitudinem gerit. Sed finis vitae humanae potest praesciri determinate. Ergo et finis mundi potest praesciri. 8. Man is said to be a little world because he bears a likeness to the greater world. Now the end of a human life can be definitely foreseen. Therefore the end of the world can be foreknown.
Praeterea, magnum et parvum, diuturnum et breve, relative dicuntur de uno per comparationem ad aliud. Sed tempus illud quod est ab adventu Christi usque ad finem mundi, dicitur esse breve, ut patet I Corinth. VII, 29: tempus breve est; et eiusdem X, 11: nos sumus in quos fines saeculorum devenerunt; et I Ioan. II, 18: novissima hora est. Ergo hoc dicitur per comparationem ad tempus praecedens. Ergo saltem hoc videtur sciri posse, quod multo brevius est tempus ab adventu Christi usque ad finem mundi quam a principio mundi usque ad Christum. 9. Great and small, long and short are relative terms whereby one thing is compared to another. Now the time from Christ’s coming until the end of the world is described as being short, according to 1 Corinthians, vii, 29, Time is short, and again (ibid. x, ii), Upon whom the ends of the world are come, and (1 Jo. ii, 18), It is the last hour. Therefore this is said in comparison with the preceding time: and consequently at least it can be known that the time between Christ’s coming and the end of the world is much shorter than from the beginning of the world to the coming of Christ.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in libro de civitate Dei, quod ignis ille qui exuret faciem terrae in fine mundi, erit ex conflagratione omnium ignium mundanorum. Sed potest sciri a considerantibus motum caeli, usque ad quantum tempus ipsa corpora caelestia, quae sunt nata generare calorem in istis inferioribus, erunt in situ efficacissimo ad hoc implendum; ut sic per concursum actionis caelestium corporum et inferiorum ignium, universalis illa conflagratio fiat. Ergo potest sciri quando erit finis mundi. 10. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei, xx, 16) that fire which will consume the surface of the earth at the end of the world will be caused by a conflagration of all the fires of the world. Now by observing the movement of the heavens it is possible to know how long it will take the heavenly bodies, which are the natural generators of heat in this lower world, to be in the most favourable position to bring about this result, so that this universal conflagration be effected by the concurrent action of the heavenly bodies and the, fires of the lower world. Therefore it is possible to know when the end of the world will be.
Sed contra. Est quod dicitur Matth. cap. XXIV, 36: de die illa et hora nemo scit, neque Angeli caelorum. On the contrary it is said (Matt. xxiv, 36): Of that day and hour no one knows, no not the angels of heaven.
Praeterea, si aliquid deberet aliquibus hominibus revelari, praecipue revelatum fuisset quaerentibus apostolis, qui doctores totius mundi instituebantur. Eis autem de finali adventu domini quaerentibus responsum est, Act. I, 7: non est vestrum nosse tempora vel momenta, quae pater posuit in sua potestate. Ergo multo minus est aliis revelatum. Again, if this were to be revealed to anyone, especially should it have been revealed to the Apostles, who were appointed to teach the whole world. Yet when they asked about the final coming of the Lord they received the following answer (Act. i, 7): It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in his own power. Much less then was it revealed to others.
Praeterea, credere veritati et revelationi acceptae in Scriptura non prohibemur. Sed apostolus, II ad Thess. II, 2, prohibet credere quocumque modo annuntiantibus, quasi instet dominus. Ergo illi qui nituntur tempus diei domini denuntiare, sunt tamquam seductores cavendi. Nam et ibidem subditur: nemo vos seducat ullo modo. Again, We are not forbidden to believe the revelation which we have received in the Scriptures. Now the Apostle (2 Thess. ii, 2) forbids us to believe any sort of announcement as if the day of the Lord were at hand. Therefore we must beware of the impostors who endeavour to foretell the time of the day of the Lord: hence he goes on to say: Let no man deceive you by any means.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in epistola ad Hesychium: quaero utrum sic saltem possit definiri tempus adventus, ut eum adventurum esse dicamus intra istos, verbi gratia, vel centum annos, vel quodlibet seu maioris numeri, seu minoris annorum. Hoc autem omnino ignorantes sumus. Ergo non potest sciri quocumque numero annorum dato, vel decem millium, vel viginti millium, vel duorum, vel trium, utrum infra illud tempus finis mundi futurus sit. Again, Augustine says (Ad Hesych. ep. cxcix): “Can we, I ask you, define the time of his coming, in such a way that at least we can say that he will come within, for instance, the next hundred years, or within any number of years greater or less?” But we are entirely ignorant about this. Therefore we cannot know whether the end of the world will be within any given number of years, whether ten thousand or twenty thousand, or two or three.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod tempus determinatum finis mundi omnino nescitur, nisi a solo Deo et ab homine Christo. Cuius ratio est, quia duplex est modus quo possumus praescire futura: scilicet, per cognitionem naturalem, et per revelationem. Naturali quidem cognitione aliqua futura praenoscimus per causas quas praesentes videmus, ex quibus futuros expectamus effectus: vel per certitudinem scientiae, si sint causae quas de necessitate sequitur effectus, vel per coniecturam, si sint causae ad quas sequitur effectus ut in pluribus, sicut astrologus praescit eclypsim futuram, et medicus mortem futuram. Hoc autem modo non potest praecognosci tempus determinate finis mundi, quia causa motus caeli et cessationis eius non est alia quam divina voluntas, ut prius ostensum est; quam quidem causam naturaliter cognoscere non possumus. Alia vero quorum causa est motus caeli vel quaecumque alia causa sensibilis, possunt naturali cognitione praecognosci, sicut particularis destructio alicuius partis terrae, quae prius fuit habitabilis, et postea fit inhabitabilis. Per revelationem vero licet sciri possit, si Deus vellet revelare, non tamen congruum esset quod revelaretur nisi homini Christo. Et hoc propter tres rationes. Primo quidem, quia finis mundi non erit nisi completo numero electorum; cuius completio est quasi quaedam executio totius divinae praedestinationis; unde non competit revelationem fieri de fine mundi nisi ei cui fit revelatio de tota praedestinatione divina, scilicet homini Christo, per quem tota divina praedestinatio humani generis quodammodo adimpletur. Unde dicitur Ioan. V, 20: pater diligit filium, et omnia demonstrat ei quae ipse facit. Secundo, quia per hoc quod ignoratur quamdiu iste status mundi durare debeat, utrum ad modicum vel ad magnum tempus, habentur res huius mundi quasi statim transiturae; unde dicitur I Cor. VII, 31: qui utuntur hoc mundo, sint tamquam non utantur; praeterit enim figura huius mundi. Tertio, ut homines semper sint parati ad Dei iudicium expectandum, dum omnino determinatum tempus nescitur; unde dicitur Matth. XXIV, 42: vigilate, quia nescitis qua hora dominus vester venturus sit. Et ideo, ut dicit Augustinus, ille qui dicit se ignorare quando dominus sit venturus, utrum ad breve tempus vel ad magnum evangelicae sententiae concordat. Inter duos autem qui scire se dicunt, periculosius errat qui dicit in proxime Christum venturum, vel finem mundi instare, quia haec potest esse occasio ut omnino desperaretur esse futurum, si tunc non erit quando futurum esse praedicitur. I answer that the exact time of the end of the world is utterly unknown, except to God and to Christ as man, The reason of this is that there are two ways in which we can know the future, by natural knowledge and by revelation. By natural knowledge we foresee certain future events in their causes which we see present, and from which we look forward to their effects—either with the certainty of science if the causes be such as to produce their effects of necessity, or by conjecture, if the causes be such as to produce their effects in the majority of cases, as an astronomer foresees a future eclipse, and a physician future death. In this way it is impossible to foreknow the exact time of the end of the world, because the cause of the heaven’s movement and its cessation is no other but the will of God, as we have shown; and we cannot by our natural powers know that cause. Other results of the heaven’s movement or of any other sensible cause can be foreknown by natural knowledge, such as the destruction of some particular part of the earth, which was hitherto inhabitable and afterwards becomes uninhabitable. By revelation however, though it be possible for it to be known if such were God’s will, it is not becoming that it should be revealed except to Christ as man: and this for three reasons. First, because the world will not come to an end until the number of the elect is complete, which completion is as it were the fulfilment of the whole of divine predestination; wherefore it is not fitting that the end of the world should be revealed except to him who has received the revelation of the whole of divine predestination, that is to Christ as man, through whom the whole predestination of the human race is in a manner fulfilled. Wherefore it is said (Jo. v, 20) : The Father loves the Son and shows him all things which himself doth.—Secondly, because through our not knowing how long the present state of the world will last, whether for a short or for a long time, we look upon the things of this world as though they were soon to pass away: wherefore it is said (1 Cor. vii, 3 1) They that use this world (let them be) as if they used it not, for the fashion of this world passes away.—Thirdly that men may ever be prompt to look forward to God’s judgement, through being in utter ignorance of its exact time, wherefore it is written (Mt. xxiv, 42): Watch... because you know not what hour your Lord will come. Hence, as Augustine says (Ad Hesych. ep. cxcix) he who says that he knows not when the Lord will come whether after a short or after a long time is in agreement with the words of the Gospel. And of two who say that they know, his is the more dangerous statement who says that Christ will come soon or that the end of the world is at hand, since this might occasion men to disbelieve in the end of the world if it fails to happen when it was foretold.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut dicit Augustinus, ultima aetas mundi comparatur ultimae aetati hominis, quae determinato numero annorum non definitur, sicut aliae aetates definiuntur; sed quandoque tantum durat quantum omnes aliae, vel etiam amplius; unde et ista aetas ultima mundi non potest determinato annorum vel generationum numero definiri. Reply to the First Objection. As Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 57)) the last age of the world corresponds to the last stage in a man’s life, which does not last for a fixed number of years as the other stages do, but lasts sometimes as long as all the others together, and even longer. Wherefore the last age of the world cannot be assigned a fixed number of years or generations.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod revelatio principii mundi utilis erat ad manifestandum Deum esse omnium causam; sed sciri tempus determinatum finis mundi, ad nihil esset utile, sed magis nocivum; et ideo non est simile. Reply to the Second Objection. The revelation of the world’s beginning was useful in showing that God is the cause of all things. But harm rather than good would result from knowledge of the end of the world: so that the comparison fails.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod homo naturaliter non solum de se ipso sollicitatur, sed etiam de statu communitatis cuius est pars, sicut vel domus vel civitatis, aut etiam totius orbis; et ideo utrumque fuit necessarium ad hominis cautelam occultari, et finem propriae vitae, et finem totius mundi. Reply to the Third Objection. Man is naturally solicitous not only for himself but also for the good estate of the community whereof he is a part, for instance, of the household, or city or even of the whole world. Consequently in order that man might be on his guard there was need for both things to be hidden from him, the end of his own life and the end of the world.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod revelatio finis vitae propriae, est quaedam particularis revelatio; revelatio vero finis totius mundi dependet ex revelatione totius divinae praedestinationis; et ideo non est simile. Reply to the Fourth Objection. The revelation of the end of one’s own life is a particular revelation, while the revelation of the end of the whole world is connected with the revelation of the whole of divine predestination: so that the comparison fails.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod illa signa posita sunt ad manifestandum quod quandoque mundus finietur; non autem ad manifestandum determinatum tempus quando finietur, ponuntur enim inter illa signa, aliqua quae quasi a mundi exordio fuerunt, sicut quod surget gens contra gentem, et quod terraemotus erit per loca; sed instante mundi fine haec abundantius evenient. Quae autem sit ista mensura horum signorum quae circa finem mundi erit, manifestum nobis esse non potest. Reply to the Fifth Objection. These signs were given in order to declare the future end of the world at some time, but not the exact date of its end. Thus among those signs there are some that have been seen almost from the beginning of the world, for instance, that nation shall rise against nation and that there will be earthquakes in places, although these things will happen more frequently towards the end of the world; but in what measure, we cannot know.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod illa reprehensio domini pertinet ad eos qui determinatum tempus primi adventus non cognoverunt; non autem ad eos qui ignorant tempus determinatum secundi adventus. Reply to the Sixth Objection. This reproof of our Lord refers to those who knew not the time of his first coming, but not to those who are in ignorance of the time of his second coming.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod primus adventus Christi nobis viam ad merendum parabat per fidem et alias virtutes; et ideo ex parte nostra requirebatur primi adventus notitia, ut credendo in eum qui venerat, per eius gratiam mereri possemus. In secundo autem adventu praemia redduntur pro meritis; et sic ex parte nostra non requiretur quid agamus aut quid cognoscamus, sed quid recipiamus; unde non oportet praecognoscere determinate tempus illius adventus. Dicitur autem ille adventus manifestus: non quia manifeste praecognoscatur, sed quia manifestus erit cum fuerit praesens. Reply to the Seventh Objection. Christ’s first coming opened to us the way to merit by faith and the other virtues: hence on our part it was necessary for us to have knowledge of his first coming, so that by believing in him who was come we might obtain merit through his grace. But in his second coming rewards will be given according to merit, so that on our part it will be a question not of action or of knowledge but of receiving: wherefore there is no need for us to know the exact time of that coming. However, this day is said to be manifest, not as though it were clearly foreknown, but because it will be manifest when it comes.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod corporalis hominis vita ex aliquibus prioribus et corporalibus causis dependet, ex quibus circa finem eius aliquid prognosticari potest; non autem ita est de toto mundo; et ideo quantum ad hoc non est simile, licet in aliquibus homo, qui dicitur minor mundus, similitudinem maioris mundi obtineat. Reply to the Eighth Objection. The life of man’s body depends on certain things already existing and of the material order, whence it is possible to have some fore-knowledge of his coming end. It is not thus with the whole world: wherefore in this particular there is no comparison, although there are certain points in which man the lesser world is like the greater world.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod verba illa quae videntur in Scripturis ad brevitatem temporis pertinere, vel etiam ad finis propinquitatem, non tam sunt ad quantitatem temporis referenda quam ad status mundi dispositionem. Non enim legi evangelicae alius status succedit, quae ad perfectum adduxit; sicut ipsa successit legi veteri, et lex vetus legi naturae. Reply to the Ninth Objection. These words of Scripture that would seem to indicate shortness of time or nearness of the end, are not so much to be referred to the amount of time as to a certain disposition of the present state of the world. For no other state will succeed that of the Law of the Gospel which has brought things to perfection, and succeeded the Old Law as the Old Law succeeded the Law of Nature.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod illa conflagratio ignium mundanorum non creditur esse futura ex aliqua naturali causa, ut sic per considerationem caelestis motus, eius tempus possit praesciri; sed proveniet ex imperio divinae voluntatis. Reply to the Tenth Objection. This conflagration of the world-fires is not supposed to be the outcome of some natural cause, so that it be possible by observing the movement of the heavens to foresee when it will happen: but it will take place at the bidding of God’s will.
Q. V:
ARTICLE VII
Will the Elements Remain When the Heavens Cease to Be in Motion?

[ Sum. Th. Suppl., Q. lxxiv, A. 5, Q. xci, A. 4]
Septimo quaeritur utrum cessante motu caeli, elementa remaneant. Et videtur quod non. THE seventh point of inquiry is whether the elements will remain when the heavens cease to be in motion, and seemingly they will not.
Dicitur enim II Petri, cap. III, 7, quod in fine mundi elementa calore solventur. Quod autem dissolvitur, non manet. Ergo elementa non manebunt. 1. It is written (2 Pet. iii, 10, 12) that at the end of the world the elements shall melt with heal. Now when a thing is melted it remains no more. Therefore the elements will not remain.
Sed dicebat, quod manebunt secundum substantiam; sed non manebunt secundum qualitates activas et passivas.- Sed contra, manente causa, remanet effectus. Sed principia essentialia sunt causa propriorum accidentium. Cum ergo qualitates activae et passivae sint propria elementorum accidentia, videtur quod principiis essentialibus manentibus, sine quibus substantia esse non potest, etiam qualitates activae maneant. 2. But, it will be. said, they will remain in substance, though not as to their active and passive qualities.—On the contrary, if the cause remains the effect remains. Now essential principles cause the proper accidents. Since then the active and passive qualities are the proper accidents of the elements, it would seem, as long as the essential principles remain, without which the substance cannot exist, that the active qualities must also remain.
Praeterea, accidens inseparabile nunquam actu a subiecto separatur. Sed calidum est accidens inseparabile ignis. Ergo non potest ignis remanere quin in eo calor remaneat; et eadem ratione de aliis elementis. 3. An inseparable accident is never actually separated from its subject. Now heat is an accident inseparable from fire. Therefore fire cannot remain without retaining heat and the same applies to the other elements.
Sed dicebat, quod divina virtute hoc fiet, quod elementa sine qualitatibus activis et passivis remanebunt, licet hoc per naturam esse non possit.- Sed contra, sicut in mundi principio fuit naturae institutio, ita in mundi fine erit naturae consummatio. Sed in principio mundi, ut Augustinus dicit, non sufficit dicere quid Deus possit facere, sed quid habeat rerum natura. Ergo et hoc etiam in fine mundi attendendum est. 4. But, it will be said, this will be done by the power of God, so that the elements will remain without their active and passive qualities, though is impossible naturally.—On the contrary, as nature was established at the beginning of the world, so will it be consummated at the end of the world. Now, in speaking of the beginning of the world, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii) we must consider not what God can do but what nature requires. Therefore this is also to be considered in discussing the end of the world.
Praeterea, qualitates activae et passivae sunt in omnibus elementis. Dicit autem Glossa Bedae super auctoritate Petri, superius inducta, quod ignis ille qui erit in fine mundi, duo elementa ex toto assumet, duo autem alia in meliorem speciem commutabit. Non ergo potest intelligi elementorum solutio quantum ad qualitates activas et passivas, quia sic non tantum duo dicerentur assumenda. 5. Active and passive qualities are in all the elements. And a gloss of Bede on the text of Peter quoted above says that the fire which will be kindled at the end of the world will entirely engulf two of the elements, and will restore the others to a better fashion. Therefore the destruction of the elements cannot refer to their active and passive qualities, since in that case it would not be said that only two elements would be consumed.
Sed dicebat, quod in duobus elementis, scilicet igne et aqua, praecipue vigent qualitates activae, sicut calidum et frigidum; et ideo haec duo prae aliis assumenda dicuntur.- Sed contra, in fine mundi elementa meliorabuntur. Sed, secundum Augustinum, agens honorabilius est patiente. Ergo magis deberent remanere elementa in quibus vigent qualitates activae quam in quibus vigent qualitates passivae. 6. But, it will be said, the active qualities, to wit heat and cold, are most prominent in two elements, fire and water, and for this reason these two are stated to be absorbed. On the contrary at the end of the world the elements will be bettered, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Now the agent is more noble than the patient. Therefore those elements should remain in which active qualities are prominent, rather than those which betray passive qualities.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod ad patiendum humor et humus, ad faciendum aer et ignis aptitudinem praebent. Ergo si propter virtutem activam aliqua elementa assumenda dicuntur, videtur quod hoc non debeat intelligi de igne et aqua, sed magis de igne et aere. 7. Augustine (Super Gen. iii, 10) says that water and earth are passive, while fire and air are active. Therefore if certain elements are to be absorbed on account of their active power, it would seem that these should be fire and air rather than earth and water.
Praeterea, sicut naturales qualitates elementorum sunt calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum, ita grave et leve. Si ergo qualitates illae non remanent in elementis, nec gravitas et levitas remanebit in eis. Per naturam autem gravitatis et levitatis, elementa loca sua naturalia sortiuntur. Si ergo qualitates elementorum non remanent post finem mundi, non remanebit in eis situs distinctus, ut terra sit deorsum, et ignis sursum. 8. Heavy and light are natural qualities of the elements just as hot and cold, wet and dry. If then the latter qualities do not remain in the elements, neither do the former. Now it is by reason of the nature of heaviness and lightness that the elements have their natural places: so that if the elemental qualities do not remain after the end of the world, they will have no special place, so that the earth be below and fire up above.
Praeterea, elementa facta sunt propter hominem, in beatitudinem tendentem. Sed habito fine, cessant ea quae ad finem sunt. Ergo homine totaliter iam in beatitudine collocato (quod erit in fine mundi), elementa cessabunt. 9. The elements were made for the use of man on his road to beatitude. Now the means cease when the end has been obtained. Therefore the elements will cease to exist when, at the end of the world, man will have obtained his final reward in heaven.
Praeterea, materia est propter formam, quam per generationem acquirit. Elementa autem comparantur ad omnia alia corpora mixta sicut materia. Ergo cum generatio mixtorum post finem mundi cesset, videtur quod elementa non maneant. 10. Matter is for the sake of the form that it acquires by generation. Now the elements are as matter in relation to all mixed bodies. Since then there will be no further generation of mixed bodies after the end of the world, it would seem that the elements will not remain.
Praeterea, Luc. XXI, 33, super illud: caelum et terra transibunt, dicit Glossa: deposita priori forma. Cum ergo esse sit a forma, videtur quod elementa in fine mundi esse desinant. 11. On Luke xxi, 33, Heaven and earth shall pass away, the (interlinear) gloss adds, “having cast aside their previous form.” Since then the form gives being, it would seem that the elements will no longer exist after the end of the world.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum corruptibile et incorruptibile non sunt unius generis; et eadem ratione mutabile et immutabile. Si ergo aliquid de mutabilitate in immutabilitatem mutetur, videtur quod in genere suae naturae non remaneat. Elementa autem mutabuntur de mutabilitate in immutabilitatem, ut patet per Glossam quae super illud Matth. cap. V, 18: donec transeat caelum et terra, etc., dicit: donec transeat a mutabilitate ad immutabilitatem. Ergo ista natura elementorum non remanebit. 12. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. x) corruptible and incorruptible are not included in the same genus, and similarly therefore neither are mutable and immutable. If then a thing be transformed from mutability to immutability, it would seem that it no longer remains in its natural genus. Now the elements will be changed from mutability to immutability because the (interlinear) gloss on Matthew v, 18, Till heaven and earth pass, says: “Till they pass from mutability to immutability.” Therefore the elements will not retain their present nature.
Praeterea, haec dispositio, quam modo habent elementa, est naturalis. Si ergo ista remota aliam accipient, illa erit eis innaturalis. Sed quod est innaturale et violentum, non potest esse perpetuum, ut patet per philosophum in Lib. caeli et mundi. Ergo illa dispositio non posset in perpetuum remanere in elementis; sed iterum ad hanc dispositionem reverterentur: quod videtur esse inconveniens. Ergo ipsa elementa secundum substantiam cessabunt, non autem eorum dispositio, substantia manente. 13. The present disposition of the elements is natural: hence if this disposition be removed so as to give place to another, this will be unnatural to them. Now that which is unnatural and violent cannot last for ever, according to the Philosopher (De Coelo el Mundo, ii: iii). Consequently this latter disposition cannot remain for ever in the elements, and they would return to the former, which would seem inadmissible. Therefore the elements in their substance will cease to exist, and not only their disposition, their substance remaining.
Praeterea, illud solum potest esse incorruptibile et ingenerabile quod totam materiam suam sub forma habet ad quam est in potentia, sicut patet de corporibus caelestibus. Hoc autem elementis non competit: quia materia quae est sub forma unius elementi, est in potentia ad formam alterius. Ergo elementa non possunt esse incorruptibilia, et ita non possunt in perpetuum manere. 14. That alone can be incorruptible and ingenerable whose entire matter underlies the form for which it has a potentiality: as instanced in the heavenly bodies. Now this cannot apply to the elements: because the matter that underlies the form of one element has a potentiality for the form of another. Therefore the elements cannot be incorruptible, and consequently cannot last for ever.
Praeterea, illud quod non habet virtutem ut sit semper, non potest in perpetuum manere. Sed elementa, cum sint corruptibilia, non habent virtutem ut sint semper. Ergo non possunt in perpetuum remanere, motu caeli cessante. 15. That which has no power to exist for ever cannot be everlasting. Now the elements have no power to exist for ever, because they are corruptible. Therefore they cannot last for ever when the heavens cease to be in motion.
Sed dicebat, quod elementa sunt incorruptibilia secundum totum, licet sint corruptibilia secundum partem. —Sed contra, hoc competit elementis per motum caeli, in quantum una pars elementi corrumpitur, et alia generatur; sic enim ipsius elementi totalitas conservatur. Motu ergo caeli cessante, non poterit assignari causa incorruptionis in toto elemento. 16. But, it will be said, the elements are incorruptible as a whole, though they be corruptible in their parts.—On the contrary it is on account of the movement of the heavens that one part of an element is destroyed and another generated: for it is thus that the element is preserved as a whole. Hence when the heavenly movement ceases there will be no longer an assignable cause for the preservation of the whole element.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit quod motus caeli est ut vita quaedam natura existentibus omnibus; et Rabbi Moyses dicit, quod motus caeli in universo est sicut motus cordis in animali, a quo dependet vita totius animalis. Cessante autem motu cordis, omnes partes animalis dissolvuntur. Ergo cessante motu caeli omnes partes universi peribunt; et ita elementa non remanebunt. 17. The Philosopher says (Phys. viii) that the movement of the heavens is the source of life to all things in nature; and Rabbi Moses says that the heavenly movement is to the universe what the beating of the heart is to the animal, in that the fife of the whole animal depends thereon. Now when the heart ceases to beat, all the parts of the animal cease to live. Therefore when the heavens cease to move, all the parts of the universe will perish, and thus the elements will not remain.
Praeterea, esse cuiuslibet est a sua forma. Sed motus caeli est causa formarum in istis inferioribus: quod patet ex hoc quod nihil in inferioribus agit ad speciem nisi ex virtute motus caeli, ut philosophi dicunt; ergo cessante motu caeli, elementa esse desinent formis eorum destructis. 18. Everything has its being from its form. Now the heavenly movement is the cause of forms in this lower world: and this is proved from the statement of philosophers who assert that nothing here below acts for the production of a species except by virtue of the heaven’s movement. Therefore when this ceases, the elements will cease to exist, since their forms will be destroyed.
Praeterea, apud praesentiam solis elementa superiora vincunt semper inferiora, sicut accidit in aestate propter caloris fortificationem; sed apud solis absentiam e converso. Motu autem caeli cessante, sol semper ex una parte praesens erit, et ex alia parte absens. Ergo ex una parte totaliter destruentur elementa frigida, et ex alia elementa calida, et sic elementa non remanebunt motu caeli cessante. 19. At the presence of the sun the higher elements always overcome the lower, as happens in summer on account of the strength of the heat: whereas at the absence of the sun the opposite happens. Now when the heavens cease to be in motion, the sun will always be on one side of the earth, and absent from the other. Therefore on the one side the cold elements will be entirely destroyed, and the hot on the other side: so that the elements will not remain when the heavenly movement ceases.
Sed contra. Est quod ad Rom. VIII, 20 super illud: vanitati creatura etc. dicit Glossa Ambrosii: omnia elementa, sua cum labore explent officia: unde quiescent nobis assumptis. Quiescere autem non est nisi existentis. Ergo elementa in fine mundi remanebunt. On the contrary a gloss of Ambrose on Romans viii, 20, The creature was made subject to vanity, says: “All the elements labour to fulfill their offices... wherefore they will rest when we are taken up to heaven.” Now only that which exists can be said to rest. Therefore the elements will remain at the end of the world.
Praeterea, elementa facta sunt ad divinam bonitatem manifestandam. Sed tunc maxime oportebit divinam bonitatem manifestari, quando res ultimam consummationem accipient. Ergo in fine mundi elementa remanebunt. Again, the elements were made for the manifestation of the divine goodness: and then most of all will there be need to manifest the divine goodness when all things will receive their final consummation. Therefore the elements will remain at the end of the world.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod apud omnes communiter dicitur, quod elementa quodammodo manebunt et quodammodo transibunt. Sed in modo manendi et transeundi est diversa opinio. I answer that all are agreed in holding that the elements in some way will remain, and in some fashion pass away: but opinions differ as to the manner of remaining and passing away.
Quidam enim dixerunt quod omnia elementa manebunt quantum ad materiam, sed quaedam nobiliorem formam accipient, scilicet aqua et ignis, quae accipient formam caeli; ut sic tria elementa possint dici caelum, aer scilicet (qui ex sua natura habet ut caelum quandoque in Scripturis dicatur) et aqua et ignis, quae formam caeli assument: ut sic intelligatur verificari quod dicitur Apoc. XXI, vers. 1: vidi caelum novum et terram novam, sub caeli nomine tribus comprehensis, scilicet igne, aere et aqua. Sed ista positio est impossibilis. Elementa enim non sunt in potentia ad formam caeli, eo quod forma caeli contrarium non habet, et sub forma caeli sit tota materia quae est in potentia ad ipsam. Sic enim caelum esset generabile et corruptibile; quod philosophus ostendit esse falsum. Ratio etiam, qua hoc asseritur, frivola est: quia in Scriptura, sicut Basilius in Hexameron dicit, per extrema, media intelliguntur, ut Genes. I, 1, cum dicitur: in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Nam per creationem caeli et terrae etiam elementa media intelliguntur. Quandoque etiam sub terrae nomine omnia inferiora comprehenduntur, ut patet in Psalm. CXLVIII, 7: laudate dominum de terra; et postea subditur: ignis, grando, et cetera. Unde nihil prohibet dicere, quod per innovationem caeli et terrae Scriptura innovationem etiam mediorum elementorum intellexit, vel quod sub nomine terrae omnia elementa comprehendat. Some have maintained that all the elements will remain as regards their matter, but that some will receive a higher form, namely water and fire, which will receive the form of the heavens. Thus it will be possible to give the name of heaven to three of the elements, namely to air (which by reason of its nature is sometimes called the heaven in Scripture) and to water and fire which will assume the form of the heavens. Hereby would be verified the words of Apocalypse xxi, i, I saw a new heaven and a new earth, because heaven would include the three elements, fire, air and water. However this view is impossible: because the elements are not in potentiality to receive the form of the heaven, inasmuch as the latter has no contrary, and all the matter that has a potentiality for the heavens’ form underlies that form. Moreover it would follow that the heavens could be generated and corrupted: which the Philosopher proves to be false (De Coelo et Mundo, i). Again the argument in support of this view is frivolous: because as Basil says (Hom. in Hexaem.) “Scripture in mentioning the extremes includes those that come between.” Thus when we read (Gen. i, i) that In the beginning God created heaven and earth, the creation of heaven and earth includes the intermediate elements. Moreover sometimes all the lower things are comprised in the word earth. Thus in Psalm cxlvii, 7, the words Praise the Lord from the earth are succeeded by these, Fire, hail, etc. Hence there is no reason why we should not say that by the renewal of heaven and earth Scripture intended also the renewal of the intermediate elements, or that earth includes all the elements.
Et ideo alii dicunt, quod omnia elementa manebunt secundum substantiam non solum quantum ad materiam, sed etiam quantum ad formas substantiales. Sicut enim, secundum opinionem Avicennae, remanent formae substantiales elementorum in mixto, qualitatibus activis et passivis non remanentibus in suis excellentiis, sed ad medium redactis, ita possibile erit quod in ultimo statu mundi absque praedictis qualitatibus remaneant elementa; cui videtur consonare quod Augustinus dicit: in illa conflagratione mundana, elementorum corruptibilium qualitates, quae corporibus nostris congruebant, ardendo penitus interibunt, atque ipsa substantia eas qualitates habebit quae corporibus immortalibus mirabili mutatione convenient. Sed hoc non videtur rationabiliter dictum. Primo quidem, quia cum qualitates activae et passivae sint per se elementorum accidentia, oportet quod a principiis essentialibus causentur; unde non potest esse quod principiis essentialibus manentibus in elementis praedictis, qualitates deficiant, nisi per violentiam; quod non potest esse diuturnum. Et ideo nec opinio Avicennae videtur esse probabilis, quod formae elementorum actu maneant in mixto; sed solum virtute, ut philosophus dicit; quia oporteret quod diversorum elementorum formae, in diversis partibus materiae conservarentur; quod non esset, nisi essent etiam situ distinctae; et sic non esset vera commixtio, sed solum secundum sensum; et tamen in mixto impediuntur qualitates unius elementi per qualitates alterius; quod non potest dici in mundi consummatione ubi omnino cessabit violentia. Secundo autem, quia cum qualitates activae et passivae sint de integritate naturae elementorum, sequeretur quod elementa imperfecta remanerent; unde auctoritas Augustini inducta non loquitur de qualitatibus activis et passivis, sed de dispositionibus eorum quae generantur et corrumpuntur et alterantur. Wherefore others hold that all the elements will remain as to their substance, not only in respect of their matter but also as regards their substantial forms. For just as, in the opinion of Avicenna, the elemental forms remain in a mixed body, while their active and passive qualities remain not in full force but reduced to a mean; so will it be possible in the last state of the world for these elements to remain without these qualities. This would seem in agreement with what Augustine says (De Civit. Dei xvi): In this world-conflagration the qualities of the corruptible elements that were suitable to our bodies will be entirely destroyed by fire, and the elemental substance wig have those qualities which by a wondrous change will be suitable to immortal bodies. But this does not seem a reasonable view. First because, since the active and passive qualities are proper accidents of the elements, they must needs be caused by the essential principles of the latter, so that as long as the essential principles remain, it is impossible for these qualities to cease, save by violence, in which case they would not cease for long. Wherefore neither does the opinion of Avicenna seem probable, when he asserts that the elements retain their forms actually in a mixed body although they do retain them but only virtually as the Philosopher says: since it would follow that the various elemental forms remain in the various parts of matter. Now this would not happen unless they were also distinct as to position, so that the mixture would not be real but only apparent. Moreover in a mixed body the qualities of one element counteract the qualities of another: and this cannot apply to the final consummation of the world, when all violence win cease.—Secondly because, since the active and passive qualities belong to the integrity of the elements’ nature, it would follow that the elements will remain in a state of imperfection. Hence Augustine in the passage quoted refers not to the active and passive qualities, but to the dispositions of things subject to generation, corruption and alteration.
Et ideo videtur dicendum, quod elementa in sua substantia remanebunt, et etiam in suis qualitatibus naturalibus; sed mutuae generationes et corruptiones et alterationes cessabunt; per huiusmodi enim elementa ordinantur ad completionem numeri electorum, sicut et caelum per motum suum; sed substantiae elementorum manebunt, sicut et substantia caeli. Cum enim universum in perpetuum remaneat, ut supra ostensum est, oportet quod ea quae sunt de perfectione universi, primo et per se remaneant. Hoc autem competit elementis, cum sint essentiales partes universi ipsius, ut philosophus probat. Si enim est corpus circulare, oportet esse centrum ipsius, quod est terra. Posita autem terra, quae est simpliciter gravis, utpote in medio constituta, oportet ponere contrarium eius, scilicet ignem, qui sit simpliciter levis; quia si unum contrariorum est in una natura, et reliquum. Suppositis autem extremis, necesse est poni et media; unde oportet ponere aerem et aquam, quae sunt ad ignem quidem levia, ad terram autem gravia, quorum unum est propinquius terrae. Unde ex ipso situ universi patet quod elementa sunt essentiales partes universi. Quod patet esse manifestum, ordine causarum et effectuum considerato. Nam sicut caelum est universale activum eorum quae generantur, ita elementa sunt eorumdem universalis materia. Unde ad perfectionem universi requiritur quod elementa secundum suam substantiam maneant; et ad hoc etiam habent ex sui natura aptitudinem. Corruptio autem aliter accidit in corporibus mixtis et elementis; in corporibus enim mixtis inest corruptionis activum principium, propter hoc quod sunt ex contrariis composita; in elementis vero, quae contrarium exterius habent, ipsa autem non sunt ex contrariis composita, non inest principium corruptionis activum, sed passivum tantum, in quantum habent materiam cui inest aptitudo ad aliam formam qua privantur. Et ab hoc principio generatio et corruptio in elementis sunt motus vel mutationes naturales; et non propter principium activum ut dicit Commentator. Sicut ergo quia corpus caeleste principium sui motus activum habet extra, potest esse quod eius motus cesset ipso manente, absque violentia, ut supra dictum est; ita potest esse ut corruptio elementorum cesset eorum substantiis manentibus, exteriori corruptivo cessante, quod oportet reducere in motum caeli sicut in primum generationis et corruptionis principium. Seemingly then the question is best solved by saying that the elements will remain in their substance with their natural qualities, but that generation, corruption and alteration. resulting from their action on one another will cease, because it is by means of these that the elements are ordinated to the completion of the number of the elect, even as the heaven by means of its movement. The substance, however, of the elements will remain even as the substance of heaven. The reason is that since the universe win remain for ever, as we have proved already, it follows that whatsoever belongs to the perfection of the universe must remain as to its substance. Now this applies to the elements inasmuch as they are essential parts of the universe, as the Philosopher proves (De Coelo et Mundo, ii). For if the universe is a circular body it must have a centre, and this is the earth: and given the earth which is heavy absolutely as occupying the centre, there must be its contrary namely fire which is light absolutely: because if one contrary exists in nature, the other must exist also. Now given the extremes, we must posit the middle: wherefore we must posit air and water, which are heavy in comparison with, fire, and light in comparison with earth: one of which is nearer to the earth than the other. Hence from the very conformation of the universe it is evident that the elements are essential parts thereof.—This is also made clear if we consider the order of causes to their effects. Thus even as heaven it the universal active cause of things that are generated, so the elements are their universal matter. Hence the perfection of the universe requires that the elements remain in their substance. Moreover by their very nature they have an aptitude to remain thus. The reason is that corruption occurs in mixed bodies otherwise than in the elements. Mixed bodies contain within themselves the active Principle of corruption, through being composed of contraries: whereas the elements have an outside contrary but are not composed of contraries, wherefore they do not contain an active principle of corruption, but only a passive principle, inasmuch as their matter has an aptitude to receive another form than that which they actually have. It is due to this principle that generation and corruption in the elements are natural movements or changes, and not to any active principle as the Commentator says (Phys. ii). Accordingly even as it is possible for the movement of a heavenly body to cease without suffering violence, while the body itself remains, because the active principle of its movement is external to it, as stated above; so too is it possible that the elements cease to be corrupted and remain in their substance, when the external cause of their corruption ceases, which cause must be reduced to the heavenly movement which is the first principle of generation and corruption.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa elementorum solutio non est referenda ad destructionem substantiae elementorum, sed ad elementorum purgationem, quae erit per ignem, qui faciem iudicis praecedet. Post illam autem purgationem remanebunt elementa secundum substantiam et naturales qualitates, ut dictum est. Reply to the First Objection. This melting of the elements does not mean that their substance will be destroyed but that they will be refined by the fire which will go before the face of the judge. After being thus refined the elements will remain in their substance and natural qualities, as we have stated.
Unde secundum et tertium concedimus. The Second and Third Objections are granted.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod in mundi principio instituta est natura corporum secundum quod ordinatur ad generationem et corruptionem, per quam numerus electorum completur. In mundi autem consummatione remanebit substantia elementorum secundum quod est ad perfectionem universi. Unde non oportet omnia inesse elementis in illo finali statu quae oportuit habere in mundi principio. Reply to the Fourth Objection. At the beginning of the world the nature of bodies was established in accordance with its being ordained to generation and corruption, whereby the number of the elect is made complete. But at the end of the world the. substance. of the elements will remain as being ordained to the perfection of the universe. Consequently there will be no need in that final state for the elements to retain all that they needed at the beginning of the world.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod Glossa Bedae non est intelligenda quod hoc modo duo elementa secundum substantiam destruantur; sed secundum statum mutationis, quae praecipue in duobus elementis apparet: scilicet in aere et aqua, de quibus quidam praedictam Glossam intelligunt; quamvis secundum alios intelligatur de igne et aqua in quibus vigent qualitates activae. Reply to the Fifth Objection. Bede’s gloss does not mean that two elements will be thus destroyed in their substance, but that they will be changed in their state. This is especially evident in the case of two elements, namely air and water to which according to some the gloss refers: although others take it to refer to fire and water in which the active qualities are most prominent.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod actio magis dependet ab agente quam a patiente, ex hoc ipso quod agens est honorabilius patiente; unde destructio mutationis in elementis et mutuae actionis, convenientius exprimitur per subtractionem activorum quam per subtractionem passivorum. Reply to the Sixth Objection. Action depends on the agent rather than on the patient for the simple reason that the agent ranks above the patient. Hence when the elements will no longer be subject to change and mutual reaction, it is more fitting to describe this as a withdrawal of active forces rather than of passive qualities.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod si consideretur actio et passio in elementis secundum principia substantialia, sic verum est quod Augustinus dicit loc. cit. quod ad patiendum humor et humus aptitudinem praebent, ad agendum ignis et aer; quia ignis et aer habent plus de forma, quae est actionis principium; de materia vero terra et aqua, quae est principium patiendi. Si vero consideretur secundum qualitates activas et passivas, quae sunt immediata principia actionis, sic ignis et aqua sunt magis activa, aer et terra magis passiva. Reply to the Seventh Objection. If we consider action and passion in the elements with respect to the essential principles it is true, as Augustine says, that water and earth are passive, while fire and air are active, because fire and air have more of form which is the principle of action, and earth and water have more of matter which is the principle of passivity. But if we consider them with respect to active and passive qualities which are the immediate principles of action, then fire and water are more active, while earth and air are more passive.
Octavum concedimus. The Eighth Objection is granted.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod elementa, quantum ad sui mutationem, facta sunt propter hominem in beatitudinem tendentem; sed quantum ad suam substantiam, sunt facta et propter perfectionem universi et propter substantiam ipsius hominis, quae ex elementis constituitur. Reply to the Ninth Objection. The elements considered in their mutability were made for man on his way to heaven; but in the point of their substance, they were made both for the perfection of the universe, and for the substance of man which is composed of them.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod in mundi consummatione non cessabunt omnia mixta, quia corpora humana remanebunt. Unde decens est, si partes eorum remanent in corpore hominis qui est minor mundus, quod ipsa tota remaneant in mundo maiori. Reply to the Tenth Objection. At the end of the world not all mixed bodies will cease to exist since human bodies will remain. It is therefore fitting, if some of the elements remain in the body of man who is the lesser world, that they should all remain in the greater world.
Ad decimumprimum dicendum, quod forma, quam elementa deponent, est ipsa mutabilitas, non forma quae sit principium essendi. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The form to be cast aside by the elements is their mutability, and not that form which is their principle of existence.
Ad decimumsecundum dicendum, quod mutabilis dispositio tolletur ab elementis, quia mutatio in eis non erit; non quod naturam mutabilem amittant. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. The elements will lose their changeable disposition, because they will cease to be changed; but they will not lose their changeable nature.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod dispositio istorum elementorum, secundum quam generantur et corrumpuntur et mutantur, est eis naturalis, motu caeli manente: non autem postquam motus caeli cessaverit. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The elements disposition to generation, corruption and change is natural to them as long as the heavens continue to be in motion, but it will not be so after this movement has ceased.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod ratio illa probat quod in elementis est principium corruptionis materiale, non autem activum; unde non sequitur mutatio, motu caeli subtracto, qui est principium mutationis. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. This argument proves that in the elements there is a material, but not an active, principle of corruption: hence they undergo no change, when the heavenly movement ceases which is the cause of their being changed.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod elementum sicut non habet virtutem ut sit semper, propter hoc quod potest ab exteriori corrumpi, ita non habet virtutem ut quandoque deficiat, nisi materialem, ut dictum est. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. just as an element has no power to last for ever, inasmuch as it can be destroyed by an extrinsic agent, even so it has none but a material principle of corruption, as stated above.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod elementa sunt incorruptibilia secundum totum, partibus generatis et corruptis, quamdiu motus caeli durat; sed motu caeli cessante, erit in eis alia incorruptionis causa, quia scilicet non possunt corrumpi nisi ab extrinseco; corruptivum autem extrinsecum, deficiente motu caeli, cessabit. Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. As long as the heavens continue to be in motion the elements as a whole are incorruptible, while here and there they are generated or destroyed. When, however, the heavens cease to be in motion there will be another cause of their incorruptibility, namely that whereas they cannot be destroyed save by an extrinsic cause, when the heavenly movement ceases, that extrinsic cause will cease also.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod motus caeli est ut vita quaedam omnibus rebus naturalibus secundum statum mutationis, qui in consummatione mundi tolletur. Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. The heaven’s movement gives life to all nature in its state of mutability which will cease at the end of the world.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod licet eductio formarum de potentia in actum dependeat ex motu caeli, tamen eorum conservatio dependet a principiis altioribus, ut dictum est. Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. Although the eduction of forms from matter depends on the celestial movement, their preservation depends on higher causes as already explained.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod sol est causa caliditatis per motum, ut philosophus dicit: unde cessante motu tollitur corruptionis causa in elementis, quae est per superexcedentiam caloris. Reply to the Twentieth Objection. The sun causes heat by movement according to the Philosopher (De Coelo et Mundo, ii), wherefore when movement ceases there win no longer be a cause of corruption in the elements, which results from excess of heat.
Q. V:
ARTICLE VIII
Will Action and Passion Remain in the Elements After the Heavens Have Ceased to Be in Motion?
Octavo quaeritur utrum cessante motu caeli, remaneat actio et passio in elementis. Et videtur quod sic. THE eighth point of inquiry is whether action and passion will remain in the elements after the heavens have ceased to be in motion: and seemingly they will.
Potentiae enim naturales sunt determinatae ad unum; unde virtus ignis, cum sit naturalis potentia, se habet tantum ad calefaciendum, non autem ad non calefaciendum. Sed in illa mundi consummatione remanebit virtus ignis et aliorum elementorum, ut prius dictum est, art. praec. Ergo impossibile est quin ignis et alia elementa agant. 1. Natural forces are confined to one effect: thus the power of fire, being a natural force, is adapted for heating, and not for not heating. Now, as we have said before (A. 7), at the end of the world fire and other elements will retain their powers. Therefore it will be impossible for fire and the other elements not to be active.
Praeterea, sicut dicit philosophus, ad hoc quod fiat mutua actio et passio, requiritur quod agens et patiens sint similia secundum materiam, et dissimilia secundum formam. Hoc autem erit in elementis cessante motu caeli, quia eorum substantiae manebunt, principiis essentialibus non mutatis. Ergo erit actio et passio in elementis, motu caeli cessante. 2. As the Philosopher says (De Gener. Anim. i) mutual action and passion require the agent and patient to be alike in matter and unlike in form. Now when the heavens cease to be moved, this will be the case, since their substance will remain, and their essential principles will be unchanged. Therefore after the cessation of the heavenly movement there will be action and passion in the elements.
Praeterea, causa actionis et passionis in elementis est ex hoc quod in materia elementi semper est appetitus ad aliam formam, licet materia per unam formam sit perfecta. Sed iste appetitus in materia remanebit, etiam motu caeli cessante, non enim una forma elementi poterit totam potentiam materiae implere. Ergo in illa mundi consummatione remanebit actio et passio in elementis. 3. The cause of action and passion in the elements is that in the elemental matter there is ever an appetence for another form, although by the one form it is perfected. Now matter will retain this appetence even after the heavens have ceased to be moved; inasmuch as the whole potentiality of matter will not be fulfilled by one form. Therefore action and passion will remain in the elements at the end of the world.
Praeterea, illud quod est de perfectione elementi non aufertur ei. Hoc autem est de perfectione uniuscuiusque entis, quod agat sibi simile: diffusio enim ipsius esse derivatur a primo bono in omnia entia. Ergo videtur quod elementa in illa consummatione agent sibi simile; et sic erit in eis actio et passio. 4. That which belongs to the perfection of an element will not be taken from it. Now it belongs to the perfection of everything to produce its like, because diffusion of being derives from the sovereign good to all beings. Therefore seemingly after the end of the world the elements will produce their like: and thus action and passion will be in them.
Praeterea, sicut proprium est ignis esse calidum, ita etiam proprium eius est calefacere; sicut enim calor derivatur a principiis essentialibus ignis, ita calefactio derivatur a calore. Si ergo in illa rerum consummatione ignis et eius calor remanebit, videtur quod etiam calefactio remanebit. 5. just as it is proper to fire to be hot, so is it proper to fire to heat: because as heat results from the essential principles of fire, so heating results from heat. If then at the end of the world fire and its heat remain, it would seem that it will continue to heat.
Praeterea, omnia corpora naturalia se tangentia aliquo modo se alterant, ut patet in I de Generat. Sed elementa in illo statu mundi se tangent. Ergo se invicem alterabunt, et ita erit ibi actio et passio. 6. All bodies in contact with one another, in some way alter one another (De Gener. Anim. i). Now in that state of the world the elements will be in contact with one another. Therefore they will alter one another: and thus there will be action and passion.
Praeterea, in illa mundi consummatione erit lux lunae sicut lux solis, et lux solis erit septempliciter. Sed modo sol et luna sua luce illuminant corpora inferiora. Ergo multo fortius tunc illuminabunt; et ita remanebit aliqua actio et passio in istis inferioribus, nam medium illuminatum illuminabit ultimum. 7. At the end of the world the light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold (Isa. xxx, 26). But the sun and moon by their light illumine the lower bodies now: wherefore a fortiori will they then illumine them: so that there will remain some kind of action and passion in this lower world, since light will be reflected from the nearest bodies to the furthest.
Praeterea, sancti videbunt visu corporeo res huius mundi. Sed visio non potest esse sine actione et passione, quia visus patitur a visibili. Ergo erit actio et passio etiam motu caeli cessante. 8. The saints with their eyes will see the things of this world. Now things cannot be seen unless there be action and passion, because the organ of sight is passive to the visible object. Therefore there will be action and passion even after the cessation of the heavenly movement.
Sed contra. Remota causa, removetur effectus. Sed motus caeli est causa actionis et passionis in istis inferioribus, secundum doctrinam philosophi. Ergo remoto motu caeli, removebitur actio et passio in istis inferioribus. On the contrary if the cause be removed the effect is removed also. Now the heavenly movement is the cause of action and passion in these corporeal things according to the Philosopher’s teaching (Metaph. i: De Coelo ii). Therefore after the cessation of the heaven’s movement, there will be no more action and passion in this lower world.
Praeterea, actio et passio in rebus corporalibus sine motu esse non potest. Remoto autem primo motu, qui est motus caeli, ut probatur in VIII Physic., oportet posteriores motus cessare. Remoto ergo motu caeli, non erit actio et passio in istis inferioribus. Again, there can be no action and passion in bodies without movement. But if the first movement which is that of heaven (Phys. viii) cease, all subsequent movements will cease also. Therefore with the cessation of the celestial movement, action and passion will cease in this lower world.
Respondeo. Dicendum quod, sicut habetur in libro de causis, quando causa prima retrahit actionem suam a causato, oportet etiam quod causa secunda retrahat actionem suam ab eodem, eo quod causa secunda habet hoc ipsum quod agit, per actionem causae primae, in cuius virtute agit. Cum autem omne agens agat secundum quod est in actu, oportet secundum hoc accipere ordinem causarum agentium, secundum quod est ordo earum in actualitate. Corpora autem inferiora minus habent de actualitate quam corpora caelestia, nam in corporibus inferioribus non est tota potentialitas completa per actum, eo quod materia substans uni formae remanet in potentia ad formam aliam; quod non est in corporibus caelestibus, nam materia corporis caelestis non est in potentia ad aliam formam; unde sua potentialitas tota est terminata per formam quam habet. Substantiae vero separatae sunt perfectiores in actualitate quam etiam corpora caelestia, quia non sunt compositae ex materia et forma, sed sunt formae quaedam subsistentes; quae tamen deficiunt ab actualitate Dei, qui est suum esse, quod de aliis substantiis separatis non contingit; sicut etiam videmus quod elementa etiam se superant invicem secundum gradum actualitatis, eo quod aqua habet plus de specie quam terra, aer quam aqua, et ignis quam aer; ita etiam est in corporibus caelestibus, et in substantiis separatis. Elementa ergo agunt in virtute corporum caelestium et corpora caelestia agunt in virtute substantiarum separatarum; unde cessante actione substantiae separatae, oportet quod cesset actio corporis caelestis; et ea cessante oportet quod cesset actio corporis elementaris. I answer that according to the book De Causis when the first cause withdraws its action from the effect, the second cause must needs withdraw its action therefrom, inasmuch as the second cause acts only by reason of the action of the first cause by virtue of which it acts. And since every agent acts for as much as it is actual, the order of active causes will be according to the order of their actuality. Now the lower bodies are less actual than the heavenly bodies, because their potentiality is not made wholly complete by act, inasmuch as their matter underlying one form retains a potentiality to another form. This does not obtain in the heavenly bodies, since their matter has no potentiality to another form, so that their potentiality is wholly terminated by the form that they have. Again, the separate substances have yet more perfect actuality than even the heavenly bodies, because they are not composed of matter and form, but are subsistent forms, falling short however of God’s actuality who is his own being, which does not apply to other separate substances. Thus it is to be observed that as the elements also surpass one another in their degrees of actuality, water being more specific than earth, air more than water, and fire more than air, even so is it in the heavenly bodies and in separate substances. Accordingly the elements act by virtue of the heavenly bodies, and the heavenly bodies by virtue of separate substances: so that when the separate substances cease to act, the action of the heavenly body must cease also, and when this ceases the action of the elemental body must also cease.
Sed sciendum quod corpus habet duplicem actionem: unam quidem secundum proprietatem corporis, ut scilicet agat per motum (hoc enim proprium est corporis, ut motum moveat et agat); aliam autem actionem habet, secundum quod attingit ad ordinem substantiarum separatarum, et participat aliquid de modo ipsarum; sicut naturae inferiores consueverunt aliquid participare de proprietate naturae superioris, ut apparet in quibusdam animalibus, quae participant aliquam similitudinem prudentiae, quae propria est hominum. Haec autem est actio corporis, quae non est ad transmutationem materiae, sed ad quamdam diffusionem similitudinis formae in medio secundum similitudinem spiritualis intentionis quae recipitur de re in sensu vel intellectu, et hoc modo sol illuminat aerem, et color speciem suam multiplicat in medio. Uterque autem modus actionis in istis inferioribus causatur ex corporibus caelestibus. Nam et ignis suo calore transmutat materiam, ex virtute corporis caelestis; et corpora visibilia multiplicant suas species in medio, virtute luminis, cuius fons est in caelesti corpore. Unde si actio utraque corporis caelestis cessaret, nulla actio in istis inferioribus remaneret. Sed cessante motu caeli, cessabit prima actio, sed non secunda; et ideo cessante motu caeli, erit quidem actio in istis inferioribus illuminationis et immutationis medii a sensibilibus; non autem erit actio per quam transmutatur materia, quam sequitur generatio et corruptio. It must be observed however that a body has a twofold action: one according to a property of a body, inasmuch as it acts by movement (for it is proper to a body that it be moved so as to move and act), the other by attaining to the order of separate substances and receiving a share in their mode of operation: thus lower natures are wont to share in a property of a higher nature, for instance certain animals share in a certain likeness to prudence which is proper to man. This latter action of a body does not aim at the transformation of matter, but at communicating a certain likeness to its form to the ‘medium,’ which may be compared to the spiritual ‘intention’ which things impress on the senses or intelligence: thus the air receives the light of the sun, and the ‘medium’ receives a reflection of coloured images. Now both these actions are caused here below by the heavenly bodies. Thus fire by its heat transforms matter by virtue of a heavenly body; and visible bodies reflect their images in the medium by the power of light, the source whereof is in a heavenly body. Hence if both these actions on the part of a heavenly body were to cease, no action would remain in this lower world. But if the heavens were to cease to be in motion, the first action would cease, but not the second: and consequently when the heavenly movement ceases, in this lower world the action whereby the ‘medium’ is illumined and affected by sensible things will continue, but not the action whereby matter is transformed and which results in generation and corruption.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtus ignis semper est determinata ad calefaciendum, praesuppositis tamen causis prioribus quae ad actionem ignis requiruntur. Reply to the First Objection. The power of fire is indeed confined to heating, but on the presupposition of those prior causes that are required for fire to act.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod similitudo secundum materiam et contrarietas formae non sufficit in istis inferioribus ad passionem et actionem, nisi motu caeli praesupposito, in cuius virtute agunt omnes inferiores activae potentiae. Reply to the Second Objection. Likeness in matter and contrariety of form are not sufficient for action and passion in this lower world, unless the heavenly movement be presupposed by virtue of which all the lower active powers act.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod materia non sufficit ad actionem, nisi principium activum ponatur. Unde appetitus materiae non sufficienter probat actionem in elementis, motu caeli subtracto, a quo est primum principium actionis. Reply to the Third Objection. Matter is not sufficient for action without an active principle. Wherefore the appetence of matter is not a sufficient proof of action in the elements, without the heavenly movement which is the first principle of action.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod inferiora nunquam attingunt ad gradum perfectionis superiorum. Hoc autem est de ratione perfectionis supremi agentis, quod sua perfectio sibi sufficiat ad agendum alio agente remoto; unde hoc inferioribus agentibus attribui non potest. Reply to the Fourth Objection. Things of lower degree never attain to the perfection of their superiors. Now it is the exclusive perfection of the Supreme Agent that he is so perfect that he can act without the aid of any other agent: and consequently this can never be the case with inferior agents.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod ignis est proprium calefacere, supposito quod habeat aliquam actionem; sed eius actio dependet ab alio, ut dictum est. Reply to the Fifth Objection. Provided that fire acts then it is true that its proper action is to heat; yet its action is dependent on something else, as already stated.
Et similiter ad sextum dicendum, quod tactus non sufficit in elementis ad agendum, nisi motu caeli supposito. The same solution applies to the Sixth Objection: inasmuch as for the elements to act, contact is not enough unless we presuppose the movement of the heavens.
Alia duo concedimus: nam procedunt de actionibus quibus materia non transmutatur, sed species quodammodo multiplicatur per modum intentionis spiritualis. We grant the two remaining arguments, since they do not apply to actions whereby matter is transformed, but to actions whereby species are multiplied by a kind of spiritual intention.
Q. V:
ARTICLE IX
Will Plants, Animals and Minerals Remain After the End of the World?

[ Sum, Th. Suppl., Q. xci, A. 5]
Nono quaeritur utrum plantae et bruta animalia et corpora mineralia remaneant post finem mundi. Et videtur quod sic. THE ninth point of inquiry is whether plants, animals and minerals will remain after the last judgement: and seemingly they will.
Habetur enim Eccle. III, 14: didici quod omnia opera Dei perseverent in aeternum. Sed corpora mineralia, plantae et bruta sunt opera Dei. Ergo in aeternum manebunt. 1. It is written (Eccles. iii, 14): I have learnt that all the works which God hath made continue for ever. Now minerals, plants and dumb animals are the works of God. Therefore they will remain for ever.
Sed dicebat, quod hoc intelligitur de istis operibus Dei quae aliquo modo habent ordinem ad incorruptionem, sicut elementa quae sunt incorruptibilia secundum totum, licet secundum partem corrumpantur.- Sed contra, sicut elementa sunt incorruptibilia secundum totum, licet secundum partem corrumpantur, ita praedictae res sunt incorruptibiles secundum speciem, licet secundum individua corrumpantur. Ergo videtur quod praedictae etiam res in aeternum remaneant. 2. It might be said that these words refer to those of God’s works which in some way are ordained to incorruption: for instance the elements, though corruptible in part are incorruptible as a whole.—On the contrary, as the elements are incorruptible as a whole, while corruptible in part, so the things mentioned are incorruptible in the species, although the individuals are corruptible. Therefore it would seem that those things also remain for ever.
Praeterea, impossibile est quod intentio naturae frustretur, cum naturae intentio sit ex hoc quod natura a Deo in finem dirigitur. Sed natura intendit per generationem et corruptionem perpetuitatem speciei servare. Ergo nisi praedicta secundum speciem conserventur, frustrabitur naturae intentio; quod est impossibile, ut dictum est. 3. The intention of nature cannot be frustrated, because nature’s intention consists in its being guided to its end by God. Now by generation and corruption nature intends to assure the perpetuity of the species. Therefore, unless these things be preserved in their species, nature’s intention will be abortive: and this is impossible, as stated.
Praeterea, decor universi pertinebit ad gloriam beatorum; unde dicitur a sanctis, quod in maiorem beatorum gloriam elementa mundi in statum meliorem reformabuntur. Sed plantae, mineralia et bruta animalia pertinent ad decorem universi. Ergo non subtrahentur in illa ultima consummatione beatorum. 4. The beauty of the universe will belong to the glory of the blessed, for which reason holy men say that for the greater glory of the blessed the elements of the world will be raised to a better state. Now plants, minerals and dumb animals belong to the beauty of the universe. Therefore they will not be utterly destroyed in the state of perfect bliss.
Praeterea, Rom. I, 20, dicitur quod invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur inter quae etiam facta, plantae et animalia numerari possunt. Sed in illo statu perfectae beatitudinis necessarium est homini invisibilia Dei cognoscere. Ergo indecens erit quod praedicta Dei opera de medio subtrahantur. 5. It is written (Rom. i, 20) : The invisible things of God ... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: and among these things may be reckoned plants and animals. Now in that state of perfect bliss it will be necessary for man to see the invisible things of God. Therefore it is unfitting that those works of God be destroyed.
Praeterea, Apoc. XXII, 2, dicitur: ex utraque parte fluminis lignum afferens fructus duodecim. Ergo cum ibi loquatur de ultima consummatione beatitudinis sanctorum, videtur quod in illo statu plantae remaneant. 6. it is written (Apoc. xxii, 2) : On both sides of the river was the tree... bearing twelve fruits. Since then the text refers to the consummate bliss of the saints in heaven, it would seem that in that state the plants will remain.
Praeterea, ab esse divino omnibus entibus inest desiderium perpetuitatis, in quantum assimilantur primo enti, quod est perpetuum. Quod autem inest rebus ex similitudine divini esse, non auferetur ab eis in ultima consummatione. Ergo remanebunt plantae et animalia perpetua, saltem secundum speciem. 7. From the divine being all beings derive the desire to exist for ever, in so far as they are likened to the first being which is everlasting. Now that which things derive through their likeness to the divine being will not be taken from them in the final consummation. Therefore plants and animals will remain for ever, at least in their species.
Praeterea, in ultimo statu consummationis rerum non auferetur a rebus id quod ad rerum perfectionem pertinet. Sed opus ornatus est consummatio quaedam creationis. Cum ergo animalia ad opus ornatus pertineant, videtur quod non desinant esse in illo mundi ultimo statu. 8. In that final state of universal consummation things will not be deprived of that which pertains to their perfection. Now the work of adornment was a kind of consummation of the work of creation. Wherefore since animals belong to the work of adornment, it would seem that they will not cease to exist in that final state of the world.
Praeterea, sicut elementa servierunt homini in statu viae, ita et animalia et plantae. Sed elementa remanebunt. Ergo et animalia et plantae; et sic non videtur quod cessent. 9. Animals and plants no less than the elements are of use to man in his state as wayfarer. Now the elements will remain’. Therefore animals and plants will also, and consequently they will not cease to exist.
Praeterea, quanto aliquid magis participat de proprietate primi perpetui, quod est Deus, tanto magis videtur esse perpetuum. Sed animalia et plantae plus participant de proprietatibus Dei quam elementa, quia elementa sunt tantum existentia, plantae autem etiam vivunt, animalia vero etiam super haec cognoscunt. Ergo magis debent in perpetuum remanere animalia et plantae quam elementa. 10. The more a thing shares in a property of the first everlasting being namely God, the more seemingly is it also everlasting. Now plants and animals have a greater share than the elements in the divine properties: inasmuch as the elements have only existence, whereas plants have life, and animals in addition to this have knowledge. Therefore animals and plants should last for ever rather than the elements.
Praeterea, effectus divinae sapientiae est, ut Dionysius dicit, quod supremum inferioris naturae coniungatur infimo naturae superioris. Hoc autem non erit si animalia et plantae desinant esse, quia elementa in nullo attingunt ad perfectionem humanam, ad quam attingunt quodammodo quaedam animalia; ad animalia vero appropinquant plantae; ad plantas vero corpora mineralia, quae immediate post elementa sequuntur. Ergo in illo mundi fine, cum non debeat illud amoveri quod pertinet ad ostensionem divinae sapientiae, videtur quod animalia et plantae cessare non debeant. 11. As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) it is an effect of divine wisdom that the lower nature at its highest point is in conjunction with the lowest point of the higher nature. Now this will not be true if animals and plants cease to exist, because in no point do the elements attain to human perfection, whereas certain animals do in a measure: and plants come near to animals, and minerals which are immediately above the elements approach to the plants. Therefore at the end of the world, seeing that nothing should be destroyed belonging to the order of divine wisdom, it would seem that animals and plants should not cease to exist.
Praeterea, si in creatione mundi animalia et plantae non fuissent productae, non fuisset mundus perfectus. Sed maior erit perfectio mundi ultima quam prima. Ergo videtur quod omnino animalia et plantae remaneant. 12. If when the world was created animals and plants had not been produced, the world would not have been perfect. But the world will be more perfect in the end than at the beginning. Therefore seemingly all animals and plants will remain.
Praeterea, quaedam corpora mineralia et quaedam animalia bruta in poenam damnatorum deputantur, sicut in Psal. X, 7: ignis, sulphur et spiritus procellarum pars calicis eorum; et Isa. LXIV, 24: vermis eorum non morietur, et ignis non extinguetur. Poenae autem damnatorum erunt perpetuae. Ergo videtur quod animalia et corpora mineralia in aeternum remaneant. 13. Certain minerals and dumb animals are appointed for the punishment of the damned: for instance (Ps. X, 7): Fire, brimstone and storms of wind shall be the portion of their cup, and (Isa. lxvi, 24) : Their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be quenched. Now the punishment of the damned will be everlasting. Therefore seemingly animals and minerals will remain for ever.
Praeterea, in ipsis elementis sunt rationes seminales corporum mixtorum et animalium et plantarum, ut Augustinus dicit. Hae autem rationes frustra essent, nisi praedicta ex eis orirentur. Cum ergo in illa mundi consummatione elementa remaneant et per consequens rationes seminales in eis, nec aliquid in operibus Dei sit frustra, videtur quod animalia et plantae in illa mundi novitate remaneant. 14. The elements contain the germs of mixed bodies, animals and plants according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8, 9). Now these germs would be to no purpose if these things were not produced from them. Since then at the end of the world the elements will remain and consequently the germs they contain, and seeing that none of God’s works are frustrated, it would seem that animals and plants will remain when the world is renewed.
Praeterea, ultima mundi purgatio erit per actionem ignis. Sed quaedam mineralia sunt ita fortis compositionis, quod nec ab igne consumuntur, sicut patet de auro. Ergo videtur quod ad minus illa post illum ignem remaneant. 15. The final cleansing of the world will be by the action of fire. But some minerals are of such strong composition that they are not consumed by fire, gold for instance. Therefore one would think that these at least will remain after that fire.
Praeterea, universale est semper. Sed universale non est nisi in singularibus. Ergo videtur quod cuiuslibet universalis singularia semper erunt; ergo et bruta animalia et plantae et corpora mineralia semper erunt. 16. The universal is everlasting: yet it does not exist save in individuals. Therefore it would seem that the individuals of every universal will last for ever: and consequently dumb animals, plants and minerals will always exist.
Sed contra. Est quod Origenes dicit: non est opinandum venire ad finem illum animalia, vel pecora, vel bestias terrae, sed nec ligna, nec lapides. On the contrary Origen says (Peri Archon): We must not think that animals whether tame or wild, or trees or rocks will reach that final state.
Praeterea, animalia et plantae ad vitam animalem hominis ordinantur: unde dicitur Genes. IX, 3: quasi olera virentia dedi vobis omnem carnem. Sed vita animalis hominis cessabit. Ergo et animalia et plantae cessabunt. Again, animals and plants are ordained for man’s animal life: hence it is written (Gen. ix, 31): Even as the green herbs have I delivered all things for your meat. But man’s animal life will come to an end. Therefore animals and plants will also cease to exist.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod in illa mundi innovatione nullum corpus mixtum remanebit praeter corpus humanum. Ad huius autem rationem sumendam, procedendum est ordine quem docet philosophus, ut scilicet prius consideretur causa finalis, et postmodum principia materialia et formalia et causae moventes. Finis autem mineralium corporum et plantarum et animalium duplex potest considerari: primus quidem completio universi, ad quam omnes partes universi ordinantur sicut in finem; ad quem quidem finem res praedictae non ordinantur sicut per se et essentialiter de perfectione universi existentes, cum nihil in eis existat quod non inveniatur in principalibus partibus mundi (quae sunt corpora caelestia et elementa) sicut in principiis activis et materialibus. Unde res praedictae sunt quidam particulares effectus causarum universalium, quae sunt essentiales partes universi; et ideo de perfectione sunt universi secundum hoc tantum quod a suis causis progrediuntur, quod quidem fit per motum. Unde pertinent ad perfectionem universi sub motu existentis, non autem ad perfectionem universi simpliciter. Et ideo cessante mutabilitate universi, oportet quod praedicta cessent. Alius autem finis est homo; quia, ut philosophus in sua politica, dicit, ea quae sunt imperfecta in natura, ordinantur ad perfecta sicut ad finem: unde, sicut ibidem dicit, cum animalia habeant vitam imperfectam respectu vitae humanae, quae simpliciter perfecta est, et plantae respectu animalium; plantae sunt propter animalia, praeparatae eis in cibum a natura; animalia vero propter hominem, necessaria ei ad cibum et ad alia auxilia. Ista autem necessitas est, vita animalis hominis durante; quae quidem in illa rerum innovatione tolletur, quia corpus resurget non animale, sed spirituale, ut dicitur I Corinth. XV, 44; et ideo tunc etiam animalia et plantae cessabunt. I answer that in that renewal of the world no mixed body will remain except the human body. In support of this view we shall proceed in the order prescribed by the Philosopher (Phys. ii) namely by considering first the final cause, then the material and formal principles and lastly the moving causes. The end of minerals, plants and animals is twofold. One is the completion of the universe, to which end all the parts of the universe are ordained: yet the aforesaid things are not ordained to this end as though by their very nature and essentially they were required for the universe’s perfection, since they contain nothing that is not to be found in the principal parts of the world (namely the heavenly bodies and the elements) as their active and material principles. Consequently the things in question are particular effects of those universal causes which are essential parts of the universe, so that they belong to the perfection of the universe only in the point of their production by their causes, and this is by movement. Hence they belong to the perfection of the universe not absolutely speaking but only as long as the latter is in motion. Wherefore as soon as movement in the universe ceases these things must cease to exist.—The other end is man, because as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5) things that are imperfect in nature are ordained to those that are perfect, as their end, with the result that as he says (ibid.) since an animal’s life is imperfect as compared with a man’s which is perfect simply, and a plant’s life as compared with an animal’s: it follows that plants are for animals being prepared by nature to be the latter’s food; and animals are for man, to whom they are necessary as food and for other purposes. Now this necessity lasts as long as man’s animal life endures. But this life will cease in that final renewal of the universe, because the body will rise not natural but spiritual (1 Cor. xv, 44): hence animals and plants will also cease to exist then.
Et ad hoc idem habent aptitudinem praedictarum rerum materia et forma. Cum enim sint ex contrariis composita, habent in se ipsis principium activum corruptionis. Unde si a corruptione prohiberentur ab exteriori principio tantum, hoc esset quodammodo violentum et non conveniens perpetuitati, quia quae sunt violenta non possunt esse semper, ut patet per philosophum in libris caeli et mundi. Interius autem principium non habent quod possit a corruptione prohibere, quia eorum formae sunt per naturam corruptibiles, utpote nec per se subsistentes, sed esse habentes a materia dependens: unde non possunt in perpetuum remanere eadem numero, nec eadem specie, generatione et corruptione cessante. Again this is consistent with the matter and form of these things: for since they are composed of contrary elements, they contain within themselves an active principle of corruption. Wherefore if they were prevented from corrupting by an external, principle only, this would be in a manner violent and inconsistent with perpetuity, since that which is violent cannot last for ever according to the Philosopher (De Coelo et Mundo, i). Nor have they an internal principle to preserve them from corruption, because their forms are in themselves corruptible through not being self-subsistent but depending on matter for their being. Consequently they cannot remain for ever identically the same; nor specifically the same when generation and corruption cease.
Hoc autem idem invenitur ex consideratione causae moventis; esse enim plantarum et animalium quoddam vivere est, quod in rebus corporalibus sine motu non existit; unde animalia deficiunt cessante motu cordis, et plantae cessante nutrimento. In his autem rebus non est aliquod motus principium non dependens a primo mobili, quia ipsae animae animalium et plantarum totaliter subiiciuntur impressionibus caelestium corporum. Unde motu caeli cessante, non poterit in eis motus remanere, nec vita. Et sic patet quod in illa mundi innovatione res praedictae non poterunt remanere. The same conclusion follows from the consideration of the moving cause. In plants and animals to be is to live, and in corporeal things this cannot be without movement. Hence animals die when the heart ceases to beat, and plants when they lack nourishment. Now these things have no moving principle that is not dependent on the first movable: since the very souls of animals and plants are wholly subject to the influence of the heavenly bodies. Therefore when the heavenly movement ceases it will be impossible for them to retain movement or life. It is evident then that at the renewal of the world the aforesaid things will be unable to remain.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod omnia opera Dei in aeternum perseverant vel secundum se, vel in suis causis: sic enim et animalia et plantae remanebunt manentibus caelestibus corporibus et elementis. Reply to the First Objection. All God’s works continue for ever either in themselves or in their causes: in this way animals and plants will remain because the heavenly bodies and the elements will remain.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod perpetuitas quae est secundum speciem et non secundum numerum, est per generationem; quae, cessante motu caeli, non erit. Reply to the Second Objection. Perpetuity of species and not of the individual is secured by generation which will cease when the heavens cease to be in motion.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod intentio naturae est ad perpetuitatem in specie conservandam, durante motu caeli, per quem huiusmodi perpetuitas conservari potest. Reply to the Third Objection. Nature’s intention is to perpetuate the species as long as the heavenly movement continues whereby that perpetuity is assured.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod praedictae res faciunt ad decorem universi secundum statum mutabilitatis in mundo et animalis vitae in homine, et non aliter, ut dictum est. Reply to the Fourth Objection. The things fn question conduce to the beauty of the universe as regards the changeable state of the world, and man’s animal life, and not otherwise, as stated above.
Ad quintum dicendum quod in illa beatitudine sancti non indigebunt invisibilia Dei per creaturas conspicere, sicut in hoc statu, pro quo loquitur apostolus; sed tunc invisibilia Dei per se ipsa videbunt. Reply to the Fifth Objection. In heaven the saints will not need to see the invisible things of God in creatures as they do in the present life to which the Apostle refers: but they will see the invisible things of God in themselves.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod lignum vitae accipitur ibi metaphorice pro Christo, vel pro sapientia, de qua Proverb. cap. III, 18: lignum vitae est his qui apprehenderint eam. Reply to the Sixth Objection. The tree of life in the words quoted signifies Christ or Wisdom of whom it is written (Prov. iii, 18). She is a tree of life to them that lay hold Upon her.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod desiderium perpetuitatis est in rebus creatis ex assimilatione ad Deum; unicuique tamen secundum suum modum. Reply to the Seventh Objection. The desire to exist for ever is in creatures by reason of their likeness to God, in each one however, according to its mode.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod opus creationis per ornatum animalium et plantarum consummatur quantum ad primam mundi consummationem, quae attenditur secundum statum mutabilitatis mundi, in ordine ad complendum numerum electorum; non autem ad consummationem mundi simpliciter, ut dictum est. Reply to the Eighth Objection. As stated above, the work of creation whereby the earth was adorned with animals and plants was accomplished in reference to the first consummation of the world, wherein the world was given a state of changeableness directed to the completion of the number of the elect, but not simply in reference to the final consummation of the world.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod elementa non dicuntur remunerari secundum se, quia non secundum se aliquid meruerunt; sed dicuntur remunerari in quantum homines in eis remunerabuntur, prout scilicet eorum claritas in gloriam electorum cedet. Animalibus autem et plantis homines non indigebunt, sicut elementis, quae erunt locus quasi gloriae ipsorum; et ideo non est simile. Reply to the Ninth Objection. The elements are said to be rewarded not in themselves, because in themselves they had no merit; but because men will be rewarded in them, inasmuch as their brightness will conduce to the glory of the elect. As to plants and animals they will be of no use to man like the elements which will be as it were the place of their glory: hence the comparison fails.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod licet quantum ad vitam et cognitionem, plantae et animalia sint meliora quam elementa, tamen quantum ad simplicitatem, quae facit ad incorruptionem, sunt elementa Deo similiora. Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although plants and animals are better than the elements in respect of life and knowledge: nevertheless in respect of simplicity which conduces to incorruptibility, the elements are more like God.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod in ipso homine continuatio quaedam naturarum apparebit, in quantum in eo congregatur et natura corporis mixti et natura vegetabilium et animalium. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. In man himself there is a conjunction of natures, inasmuch as in him the nature of a mixed body is united to the nature of plants and animals.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod alia fuit perfectio mundi creati et mundi consummati, ut supra dictum est; et ideo non oportet ut sit de secunda perfectione quod fuit de prima. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. The perfection of the world at the creation was not the same as the perfection of the world at its consummation, as already stated: wherefore that which belonged to its first perfection need not belong to its second perfection.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod vermis ille qui ad poenam impiorum deputatur, non est intelligendus corporaliter, sed spiritualiter; ut per vermem stimulus suae conscientiae intelligatur, ut Augustinus dicit; et secundum eumdem modum possunt exponi si qua similia inveniantur. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The worm that is mentioned as part of the punishment of the wicked is not to be taken literally but metaphorically, and according to Augustine (De Civit. Dei, xx) signifies the remorse of their conscience. Other like expressions, if there be any, should be interpreted in the same way.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod rationes seminales quae sunt in elementis, ad effectum producendum non sufficiunt nisi motu caeli coadiuvante; et ideo motu caeli cessante non sequitur quod oporteat animalia vel plantas esse; nec tamen sequitur quod rationes seminales sint frustra, quia sunt de perfectione ipsorum elementorum. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The germs contained in the elements do not suffice to produce an effect without the aid of the heavenly movement: wherefore when the heavens cease to be in motion it does not follow that there will still be animals and plants; nor does it follow that these germs are useless, since they belong to the perfection of the elements.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod licet aliqua sint quae ad horam ab igne non consumantur, nihil tamen est quod finaliter ab igne non consumatur, si diu in igne remaneat, ut Galenus dicit; et tamen ille ignis conflagrationis mundi erit multo violentior quam iste ignis quo utimur. Nec iterum ex sola ignis actione corpora mixta in illo igne destruentur, sed etiam ex cessatione motus caeli. Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Although there are certain things that are not consumed by fire for the nonce, yet as Galen says there is nothing that fire will not consume in time, if it remain long enough in the fire: and yet the fire of that world-conflagration will be much more fierce than the fire to which we are used. Besides, the action of the fire will not be the sole cause of the destruction of mixed bodies, since there will also be the cessation of the heavenly movement.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod universale tripliciter considerari potest; et secundum quemlibet modum considerationis aliquo modo verum est quod universale est semper. Potest enim uno modo considerari natura universalis secundum quod abstrahit a quolibet esse: et sic verum est quod universale est semper, magis per remotionem causae determinantis ad aliquod tempus, quam per positionem causae perpetuitatis; de ratione enim naturae universalis non est quod sit magis hoc tempore quam illo; per quem etiam modum materia prima dicitur esse una. Alio modo potest considerari secundum esse quod habet in singularibus: et sic verum est quod est semper, quia est quandocumque est suum singulare; sicut etiam dicitur esse ubique, quia est ubicumque est suum singulare, cum tamen multa loca sint ubi sua singularia non sunt; unde nec ibi est universale. Tertio modo potest considerari secundum esse quod habet in intellectu: et sic etiam verum est quod universale est semper, praecipue in intellectu divino. Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. There are three ways of looking at the universal; and in each way it is true that the universal is after a manner everlasting. We may consider the universal in one way as apart from any kind of being: and thus it is true that the universal lasts for ever, rather by abstraction of the cause determining it to a definite duration than by assigning the cause of its perpetuity: for it does not belong to the nature of a universal to exist at one time more than at another. In this way also primal matter is said to be one. Secondly, we may consider the universal in respect of the being it has in individuals: and thus again it is true that it exists always, since whenever the individual exists its universal exists. In the same way it is said to be everywhere, because it is wherever its individual exists, even though there are many places where its individual is not: so that neither is the universal there. Thirdly, the universal may be considered in respect of the being it has in the mind: and thus again it is true that the universal is everlasting, especially in the mind of God.
Q. V:
ARTICLE X
Will Human Bodies Remain After the Heavenly Movement Has Ceased?

[ Sum. Th. 1, Q. lxxvii, A. 8]
Decimo quaeritur utrum corpora humana remaneant, motu caeli cessante. Et videtur quod non. THE tenth point of inquiry is whether human bodies will remain after the cessation of the heavenly movement: and seemingly they will not.
Quia dicitur I Cor. cap. XV, 50: caro et sanguis regnum Dei non possidebunt. Sed corpus hominis est ex carne et sanguine. Ergo in illo rerum fine humana corpora non remanebunt. 1. It is written (1 Cor. xv, 50) Flesh and blood cannot possess the Kingdom of God. Now the human body is composed of flesh and blood. Therefore at the end of the world human bodies will not remain.
Praeterea, omnis mixtio elementorum ex motu caeli causatur, cum ad mixtionem alteratio requiratur. Sed corpus humanum est corpus mixtum ex elementis. Ergo motu caeli cessante, remanere non potest. 2. All mixtures of the elements are caused by the movement of the heavens, because alteration is required in a mixture. Now the human body is a mixture of the elements. Therefore when the heavens cease to be in motion it cannot remain.
Praeterea, necessitas quae est ex materia, est necessitas absoluta, ut patet in II Physic. Sed in corpore composito ex contrariis est necessitas ad corruptionem ex ipsa materia. Ergo impossibile est quin talia corpora corrumpantur; et ita impossibile est quod remaneant post statum generationis et corruptionis. Corpora autem humana sunt huiusmodi. Ergo impossibile est quod in illo rerum fine remaneant. 3. Necessity arising from matter is absolute (Phys. ii). Now in a body composed of contrary elements there is necessity for corruption arising from the very matter. Therefore it is necessary for such bodies to be corrupted: and it is impossible for them to remain after the state of generation and corruption. Since then human bodies answer to this description, it follows that at the end of the world they cannot possibly remain.
Praeterea, homo cum brutis convenit in hoc quod habet corpus sensibile. Sed corpora sensibilia brutorum non remanebunt in illo mundi fine. Ergo nec corpora humana. 4. Man in common with dumb animals has a sensible body. Now the sensible bodies of dumb animals will not remain at the end of the world. Neither therefore will human bodies remain.
Praeterea, finis hominis est perfecta assimilatio ad Deum. Sed Deo, qui incorporeus est, magis assimilatur anima corpore absoluta, quam corpori unita. Ergo in illo statu finalis beatitudinis, animae absque corporibus erunt. 5. The end of man is a perfect assimilation to God. Now seeing that God has no body, the soul without the body is more like God than when united to the body. Therefore in the state of final beatitude the soul will be without the body.
Praeterea, ad perfectam hominis beatitudinem requiritur perfecta operatio intellectus. Sed operatio animae intellectivae a corpore absolutae est perfectior quam animae corpori unitae, quia, ut dicitur in Lib. de causis, omnis virtus unita plus est infinita quam multiplicata. Formae autem separatae in se unitae sunt: materiae vero coniunctae, quodammodo ad plura diffunduntur. Ergo in illa perfecta beatitudine animae non erunt corpori unitae. 6. Man’s perfect beatitude requires the perfect operation of his intelligence. Now the intellectual soul’s operation is more perfect when the soul is separated from the body than when it is united to it: because a united force is stronger than a divided one (De Causis). Now a separate form is self-united, while forms united to matter are as it were scattered in many directions. Therefore in the state of perfect bliss the soul will not be united to the body.
Praeterea, elementa quae sunt in mixto, appetunt naturali appetitu propria ubi. Appetitus autem naturalis non potest esse vanus; unde quod est contra naturam, non potest esse perpetuum. Non potest ergo esse quin elementa in corpore mixto existentia quandoque ad sua loca tendant, et sic corpus mixtum corrumpatur; ergo post corruptionis statum non remanebunt humana corpora, quae sunt mixta. 7. The elements that form a mixed body have a natural inclination to be in their proper places. Now a natural inclination cannot be in vain: for which reason that which is against nature cannot be everlasting. Consequently the elements in a mixed body must of necessity tend to their proper places at some time or other, so that the mixed body will be corrupted. Therefore after the state of corruption human bodies will not remain, since they are a mixture of the elements.
Praeterea, omnis motus naturalis cuiuscumque corporis a motu caeli dependet. Sed motus cordis, sine quo non potest esse humani corporis vita, est motus naturalis. Ergo cessante motu caeli remanere non poterit, et per consequens nec humani corporis vita. 8. Every natural movement of any body whatsoever depends on the movement of the heavens. Now the movement of the heart without which there can be no life in a man’s body, is a natural movement. Therefore it cannot continue when the heavens cease to be in motion, and thus man’s body will not continue to live.
Praeterea, membra humani corporis, pro maiori parte sunt ordinata ad usus competentes vitae animalis, sicut patet de venis et stomacho et huiusmodi, quae ordinatur ad nutrimentum. Animalis autem vita in homine non remanebit in illa beatitudine. Ergo nec membra corporis (alias enim frustra essent); et sic nec corpus humanum remanebit. 9. The members of a man’s body for the most part are directed to purposes befitting his animal life, as instanced in the veins, stomach and the like which are for the purpose of nourishment. Now animal life will not remain in man in the state of bliss. Therefore neither will the members of his body remain (otherwise they would be useless) and consequently not the body itself.
Sed contra. Est quod dicitur I ad Cor. cap. XV, 53: oportet corruptibile hoc induere incorruptionem. Hoc autem corruptibile, corpus est. Ergo corpus remanebit incorruptione indutum. On the contrary it is written (1 Cor, xv. 53): This corruptible must put on incorruption. Now this corruptible signifies the body. Therefore the body will remain, clothed in incorruption.
Praeterea, Philip. III, 21, dicitur: reformabit corpus humilitatis nostrae configuratum corpori claritatis suae. Sed Christus corpus quod semel in resurrectione resumpsit, nunquam deposuit nec deponet: Rom. VI, 9: Christus resurgens ex mortuis iam non moritur. Ergo et sancti in perpetuum vivent cum corporibus cum quibus resurgent; et sic humana corpora post finem mundi manebunt. Again it is written (Phil. iii, 22): Who will reform the body of our lowness made like to the body of his glory. But Christ never did and never will put aside the body which once for all he reassumed in his resurrection; according to Romans vi, 9: Christ having risen again from the dead dies no more. Therefore the saints also will live for ever with the bodies in which they rose again: and thus human bodies will remain after the end of the world,
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod sicut Augustinus dicit, Porphyrius ponebat, ad perfectam beatitudinem humanae animae, omne corpus fugiendum esse; et sic, secundum eum, anima in perfecta beatitudine existens, corpori unita esse non potest. Quam opinionem tangit Origenes in suo periarchon dicens: quosdam opinatos fuisse, sanctos corpora in resurrectione resumpta quandoque deposituros, ut sic ad Dei similitudinem in perfecta beatitudine vivant. Sed haec positio praeter hoc quod est fidei contraria, ut ex auctoritatibus inductis et pluribus aliis patere potest, etiam a ratione discordat. Non enim perfectio beatitudinis esse poterit ubi deest naturae perfectio. Cum autem animae et corporis naturalis sit unio, et substantialis, non accidentalis, non potest esse quod natura animae sit perfecta, nisi sit corpori coniuncta; et ideo anima separata a corpore, non potest ultimam perfectionem beatitudinis obtinere. Propter quod etiam dicit Augustinus in fine super Genes. ad Litt., quod animae sanctorum, ante resurrectionem, non ita perfecte fruuntur divina visione sicut postea; unde in ultima perfectione beatitudinis oportebit corpora humana esse animabus unita. Positio autem praemissa procedit secundum opinionem illorum qui dicunt: animam accidentaliter uniri corpori, sicut nautam navi, aut hominem indumento. Unde et Plato dixit quod homo est anima corpore induta, ut Gregorius Nyssenus narrat. Sed hoc stare non potest, quia sic homo non esset ens per se, sed per accidens; nec esset in genere substantiae, sed in genere accidentis, sicut hoc quod dico vestitum, et calceatum. I answer that as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) Porphyry held that the human soul in order to be perfectly happy must avoid all bodies, so that in his opinion the soul cannot be united to the body in the state of perfect bliss. Origen (Peri Archon) refers to this opinion when he says that some maintained that the saints would eventually lay aside the bodies resumed at the resurrection, so that being made like God they might live in perfect happiness. This opinion, besides being contrary to faith (as may be gathered both from the authorities quoted and from many others), is also contrary to reason. For there can be no perfect happiness where nature itself is not perfect. And since the union of soul and body is natural, besides being substantial and not accidental, the soul’s nature cannot be perfect unless it be united to the body: wherefore the soul separated from the body cannot have the ultimate perfection of beatitude. For this reason Augustine (De Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) says that the souls of the blessed do not as perfectly enjoy the sight of God before the resurrection as after: wherefore the human body will need to be united to the soul in the final state of beatitude. The above-mentioned opinion is a sequel to the position of those who hold that the soul is united to the body accidentally, as a sailor to his ship or a man to his clothes. For this reason Plato, as Gregory of Nyssa relates (De Anima x), said that man is a soul clothed with a body. But this cannot stand: for man would not be a per se being but an accidental being: nor would he be in the genus of substance but in that of accident, as being something clothed or shod.
Patet etiam quod rationes supra inductae de corporibus mixtis, non habent locum in homine, nam homo ordinatur ad perfectionem universi ut essentialis pars ipsius, cum in homine sit aliquid quod non continetur virtute nec in elementis nec in caelestibus corporibus, scilicet anima rationalis. Corpus etiam hominis ordinatur ad hominem, non secundum animalem vitam tantum, sed ad perfectionem naturae ipsius. Et quamvis corpus hominis sit ex contrariis compositum, inerit tamen principium incorruptibile, quod poterit praeservare a corruptione absque violentia, cum sit intrinsecum. Et hoc poterit esse sufficiens principium motus, motu caeli cessante, cum a motu caeli non dependeat. Moreover it is evident that the arguments given above which refer to mixed bodies, cannot apply to man: because man is ordained to the perfection of the universe as an essential part thereof, since there is in him something that is not even virtually contained either in the elements or in the heavenly bodies, namely the rational soul. Again man’s body is ordained to him, not only in his animal life but for the perfection of his nature. And although his body is composed of contrary elements it will contain an incorruptible principle, that Will be able to preserve it without violence, inasmuch as it is intrinsic to him. And it will suffice as a principle of movement when the heavenly movement ceases, since it does not depend on the latter.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod per carnem et sanguinem intelligitur corruptio carnis et sanguinis; unde in eadem auctoritate subditur: neque corruptio incorruptelam possidebit. Reply to the First Objection. Flesh and blood signify the corruption of these things, wherefore the text continues: Neither shall corruption possess incorruption.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod motus est causa mixtionis secundum fieri; sed conservatio eius est per formam substantialem, et ulterius per principia caelo altiora, ut in superioribus quaestionibus patet. Reply to the Second Objection. Movement causes mixture in the making: but its preservation comes from the substantial form, and besides, from principles yet higher than the heavens. This has been explained in previous articles.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod anima rationalis ex perfecta unione ad Deum, omnino super materiam victoriam habebit; et sic licet materia sibi relicta corruptibilis sit, tamen ex virtute animae incorruptionem sortiretur. Reply to the Third Objection. By its perfect union with God the soul will have complete sway over the body: so that although matter, if left to itself, is corruptible, it win acquire incorruption by the power of the soul.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod sensibilitas in homine est a principio incorruptibili, scilicet ab anima rationali; in brutis autem est a principio corruptibili; et ideo corpus sensibile hominis in perpetuum potest remanere, non autem corpus sensibile bruti. Reply to the Fourth Objection. In man the sensitive faculty derives from an incorruptible principle, namely the rational soul: whereas in dumb animals it derives from a corruptible principle. Wherefore man’s sensitive body can last for ever while that of the dumb animal cannot.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod anima corpori unita plus assimilatur Deo quam a corpore separata, quia perfectius habet suam naturam. Intantum enim unumquodque Deo simile est, in quantum perfectum est, licet non sit unius modi perfectio Dei et perfectio creaturae. Reply to the Fifth Objection. The soul is more like God when united to the body than when separated from it, because its nature is then more perfect. For a thing is like God forasmuch as it is perfect, although God’s perfection is not of the same kind as a creature’s.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod anima corpori unita non multiplicatur per modum formarum materialium quae sunt divisibiles divisione subiecti, sed in se remanet simplex et una; unde eius operatio non impedietur ex corporis unione, quando corpus omnino erit subiectum animae; nunc autem impeditur ex corporis unione, propter hoc quod anima non perfecte dominatur in corpus. Reply to the Sixth Objection. The human soul is not capable of being multiplied in the same way as material forms which can be divided if their subject be divided: but remains in itself in its simplicity and unity. Hence its operation will not be hindered by its union with the body when the body will be wholly subject to it. Now indeed it is hindered by its union with the body, because its power over the body is not perfect.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod appetitus naturalis elementorum tendendi in propria loca, per dominium animae in corpus retinebitur, ne dissolutio elementorum fiat, quia elementa perfectius esse habebunt in corpore hominis quam in suis locis haberent. Reply to the Seventh Objection. The elements’ natural inclination towards their proper places will be retained in the body through the power of the soul, lest the elements be destroyed: because the elements will have a more perfect place in the human body than in their own places.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod motus cordis in homine causabitur ex natura animae rationalis, quae a motu caeli non dependet; et ideo motus ille non cessabit, motu caeli cessante. Reply to the Eighth Objection. The movement of the heart will result in man from the nature of the rational soul which is independent of the celestial movement: wherefore it will not cease when that of the heavens ceases.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod omnia membra corporis remanebunt, non propter usus animalis vitae, sed propter perfectionem naturae hominis. Reply to the Ninth Objection. All the body’s members will remain, not indeed for the purposes of the animal life, but from the perfection of human nature.