THE SIMPLICITY OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE
- Et primo quaeritur utrum Deus sit simplex.
- Secundo utrum in Deo sit substantia vel essentia idem quod esse.
- Tertio utrum Deus sit in aliquo genere.
- Quarto utrum bonum, iustum, sapiens et huiusmodi praedicent in Deo accidens.
- Quinto utrum nomina praedicta significent divinam substantiam.
- Sexto utrum ista nomina sint synonyma.
- Septimo utrum huiusmodi nomina dicantur de Deo et creaturis univoce, vel aequivoce.
- Octavo utrum sit aliqua relatio inter Deum et creaturam.
- Nono utrum relationes quae sunt inter Deum et creaturas, sint relativae in ipsis creaturis.
- Decimo utrum Deus realiter referatur ad creaturam, ita quod relatio ipsa sit res aliqua in Deo.
- Undecimo utrum istae relationes temporales sint in Deo secundum rationem.
- Is God Simple?
- Is God’s Essence or Substance the Same as His Existence?
- Is God Contained in a Genus?
- Do Good, Wise, Just and the like Predicate an Accident in God?
- Do These Terms Signify the Divine Essence?
- Are These Terms Synonymous?
- Are These Terms Ascribed Univocally or Equivocally to God and the Creature?
- Is There Any Relation Between God and the Creature?
- Are These Relations Between a Creature and God Really in Creatures Themselves?
- Is God Really Related to the Creature So That this Relation Be Something in God?
- Are These Temporal Relations in God as Logical Relations?
Is God Simple?
[ Sum. Th. I, Q. iii]
Et primo quaeritur utrum Deus sit simplex. Et videtur quod non. THE first point of inquiry is whether God is simple: and seemingly he is not. Ab uno enim simplici non est natum esse nisi unum: idem enim semper facit idem, secundum philosophum. Sed a Deo procedit multitudo. Ergo ipse non est simplex. 1. From one simple thing only one thing can naturally proceed: for the same always produces the same according to the Philosopher (De Gener. ii). But many things come from God. Therefore he is not simple. Praeterea, simplex si attingitur, totum attingitur. Sed Deus a beatis attingitur: quia, ut dicit Augustinus, attingere mente Deum magna est beatitudo. Si ergo sit simplex, totus attingitur a beatis. Sed quod totum attingitur, comprehenditur. Ergo Deus a beatis comprehenditur, quod est impossibile. Ergo Deus non est simplex. 2. If a simple thing is reached the whole of it is reached. Now God is reached by the blessed: for as Augustine says (De videndo Deum), “to reach God with the mind is great happiness.” If, then, God is simple he is wholly reached by the blessed. Now that which is wholly reached is comprehended. Therefore God is comprehended by, the blessed: which is impossible. Therefore God is not simple. Praeterea, idem non se habet in ratione diversarum causarum. Sed Deus se habet in ratione diversarum causarum, ut patet XI Metaph. Ergo in eo oportet esse diversa; ergo oportet eum esse compositum. 3. The same thing cannot be several kinds of cause. Now God is several kinds of cause (Metaph. xi). Therefore there must be various things in him: and consequently he is composite. Praeterea, ubicumque est aliquid et aliquid, est compositio. Sed in Deo est aliquid et aliquid, scilicet proprietas et essentia. Ergo in Deo est compositio. 4. Whatsoever contains one thing in addition to another is composite. Now in God there is one thing besides another, namely property and essence. Therefore there is composition in God. Sed dicendum, quod proprietas est idem quod essentia.- Sed contra: affirmatio et negatio non verificantur de eodem. Sed essentia divina est communicabilis tribus personis, proprietas autem est incommunicabilis. Ergo proprietas et essentia non sunt idem. 5. It will be replied that the property is the same thing as the essence. On the contrary, affirmation and negation are not true of the same. Now the divine essence is common to the three Persons, whereas the properties are incommunicable. Therefore property and essence are not the same. Praeterea, de quocumque praedicantur diversa praedicamenta, illud est compositum. Sed in divina praedicatione venit substantia et relatio, ut dicit Boetius. Ergo Deus est compositus. 6. A thing is composite if different predicaments are predicated of it. Now substance and relation are predicated of God, according to Boethius (De Trin.). Therefore God is composite. Praeterea, in qualibet re est substantia, virtus et operatio, ut dicit Dionysius; ex quo videtur quod operatio sequitur virtutem et substantiam. Sed in operationibus divinis est pluralitas. Ergo in substantia eius invenitur multitudo et compositio. 7. In everything there is substance, power and operation, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi): wherefore seemingly operation follows power and substance. Now there are several divine operations. Therefore there is plurality and composition in the divine substance. Praeterea, ubicumque invenitur multitudo formarum, ibi oportet esse compositionem. Sed in Deo invenitur multitudo formarum; quia, sicut dicit Commentator, omnes formae sunt actu in primo motore, sicut sunt in potentia in prima materia. Ergo in Deo est compositio. 8. Wherever there is plurality of forms there must be composition. Now in God there is plurality of forms, for as the Commentator says (Metaph. xi, com. 18), all forms exist actually in the first mover, even as they are potentially in primal matter. Therefore composition is in God. Praeterea, quidquid advenit alicui rei post esse completum, inest ei accidentaliter. Sed quaedam dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, sicut quod sit creator et dominus. Ergo insunt ei accidentaliter. Accidentis autem ad subiectum est aliqua compositio. Ergo in Deo est compositio. 9. Whatsoever is added to a thing that has complete being is accidental to it. Now certain things are said of God since the beginning of time, such as that he is the Creator and the Lord. Therefore these things are in him accidentally. But an accident with its subject forms a kind of composition. Therefore composition is in God. Praeterea, ubicumque sunt multae res, ibi est compositio. Sed in Deo sunt tres personae, quae sunt tres res, ut dicit Augustinus. Ergo in Deo est compositio. 10. Where there are several things there is composition. Now in God there are three persons, and there are three things according to Augustine (De Doct. Christ. i, 5). Therefore composition is in God. Sed contra. Est quod Hilarius dicit: non humano modo ex compositis est Deus, ut in eo aliud sit quod habet, et aliud sit ipse qui habet. On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trim. viii): God is not composed of several things as man is, as though what he has were distinct from him who has it. Praeterea, Boetius dicit: hoc vere unum est in quo nullus est numerus. Ubicumque autem est compositio, est aliquis numerus. Ergo Deus est absque compositione omnino simplex. Again Boethius says (De Trin.): He is truly one since there is no number in him. Now where there is composition there is number. Therefore God is incomposite and utterly simple. Respondeo. Dicendum quod Deum esse simplicem modis omnibus tenendum est. Quod quidem ad praesens tribus rationibus potest probari; quarum prima talis est: ostensum est enim in alia disputatione, omnia entia ab uno primo ente esse, quod quidem primum ens Deum dicimus. Quamvis autem in uno et eodem quod quandoque invenitur in actu, quandoque in potentia, potentia tempore prius sit actu, natura autem posterius, simpliciter tamen oportet actum esse priorem potentia, non solum natura sed tempore, eo quod omne ens in potentia reducitur in actum ab aliquo ente actu. Illud ergo ens quod omnia entia fecit esse actu, et ipsum a nullo alio est, oportet esse primum in actu, absque aliqua potentiae permixtione. Nam si esset aliquo modo in potentia, oporteret aliud ens prius esse per quod fieret actu. In omni autem composito qualicumque compositione, oportet potentiam actui commisceri. In compositis enim vel unum eorum ex quibus est compositio est in potentia ad alterum, ut materia ad formam, subiectum ad accidens, genus ad differentiam; vel saltem omnes partes sunt in potentia ad totum. Nam partes ad materiam reducuntur, totum vero ad formam, ut patet in II Physic., et sic nullum compositum potest esse actus primus. Ens autem primum, quod Deus est, oportet esse actum purum, ut ostensum est. Impossibile est ergo Deum compositum esse; unde oportet quod sit omnino simplex. Secunda ratio est quia cum compositio non sit nisi ex diversis, ipsa diversa indigent aliquo agente ad hoc quod uniantur. Non enim diversa, inquantum huiusmodi, unita sunt. Omne autem compositum habet esse, secundum quod ea, ex quibus componitur, uniuntur. Oportet ergo quod omne compositum dependeat ab aliquo priore agente. Primum ergo ens, quod Deus est, a quo sunt omnia, non potest esse compositum. Tertia ratio est, quia oportet primum ens, quod Deus est, esse perfectissimum, et per consequens optimum; non enim rerum principia imperfecta sunt, ut Pythagoras et Leucippus aestimaverunt. Optimum autem est in quo nihil est quod careat bonitate, sicut albissimum est in quo nihil nigredinis admiscetur. Hoc autem in nullo composito est possibile. Nam bonum quod resultat ex compositione partium, per quod totum est bonum, non inest alicui partium. Unde partes non sunt bonae illa bonitate quae est totius propria. Oportet ergo id quod est optimum, esse simplicissimum, et omni compositione carere. Et hanc rationem ponit philosophus et Hilarius ubi dicit, quod Deus, quia lux est, non ex obscuris coarctatur, neque quia virtus est, ex infirmis continetur. I answer that we must hold that God is altogether simple and for the nonce this may be proved by three arguments. The first is as follows. We have proved (Q. iii, A. 5) in a former discussion, that all beings proceed from a first being which we call God. Now although in one and the same thing that is at one time in act, at another time in potentiality, potentiality precedes act in time but follows it in nature: yet absolutely speaking act precedes potentiality not only in nature, but also in time, since everything that is in potentiality is made actual by some being that is in act. Accordingly the being that made all things actual, and itself proceeds from no other being, must be the first actual being without any admixture of potentiality. For were it in any way in potentiality, there would be need of another previous being to make it actual. Now in every composite of whatsoever kind of composition there must needs be a mixture of act and potentiality: because of the things whereof it is composed, either one is in potentiality to the other, as matter to form, subject to accident, genus to difference, or all the parts together are in potentiality to the whole, since parts are reducible to matter, and the whole is reducible to form (Phys. ii) so that no composite is first act. But the first being which is God must needs be pure act, as we have proved (Q. i, A. i). Therefore it is impossible that God be composite: and thus it follows that he is utterly simple. The second reason is because seeing that composition requires difference in the. component parts, these different parts require an agent to unite them together: since different things as such are not united. Now every composite has being through the union of its component parts. Therefore every composite depends on a pre-existing agent: and consequently the first being which is God, from whom all things proceed, cannot be composite. The third reason is because the first being, which is God, must needs be most perfect and consequently supremely good: since the principles of things are not imperfect, as Pythagoras and Leucippus contended. Now the supremely good is that in which there is nothing lacking in goodness, even as the supremely white is that in which there is no admixture of blackness. But this is impossible in any composite thing because the good that results from the composition of its parts, and whereby the, whole is good, is not in any single part. Wherefore the parts are not good with the goodness proper to the whole. Consequently that which is supremely good must be supremely simple and void of all composition. This argument is given by the Philosopher (Metaph. xi) and by Hilary (De Trin. vii), where he says that “God who is light is not composed of things that are dim, nor is he who is strength composed of things that are weak.” Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod intentio Aristotelis non est quod ab uno non possit procedere multitudo. Cum enim agens agat sibi simile, et effectus deficiant a repraesentatione suae causae, oportet quod illud quod in causa est unitum, in effectibus multiplicetur; sicut in virtute solis sunt quasi unum omnes formae generabilium corporum, et tamen in effectibus distinguuntur. Et exinde contingit quod per unam suam virtutem res aliqua potest inducere diversos effectus, sicut ignis per suum calorem liquefacit et coagulat, et mollificat et indurat, et comburit et denigrat. Et homo per virtutem rationis acquirit diversas scientias, et operatur diversarum artium opera; unde et multo amplius Deus per unam suam simplicem virtutem potest multa creare. Sed philosophus intendit, quod aliquid manens idem non facit diversa in diversis temporibus, si sit agens per necessitatem naturae; nisi forte per accidens hoc contingat ex diversitate materiae, vel alicuius alterius accidentis. Hoc tamen non est ad propositum. Reply to the First Objection. Aristotle does not mean that a multitude cannot proceed from one. For since an agent produces its like, and since an effect falls short of reproducing its cause, it follows that where we find unity in the cause we shall find multiplicity in the effects: thus in the sun’s power all the forms of generable bodies are, in a fashion, one, and yet they are diversified in its effects. Hence it is that by its one power a thing is able to produce various effects: thus fire by its heat liquefies and solidifies, softens and hardens, flames and blackens: and man by. the power of his reason acquires various sciences and produces various works of art. Wherefore a fortiori God by his one simple power is able to create many things. The Philosopher means then that a thing so long as it remains the same does not produce different effects at different times, if it act by natural necessity: except perhaps accidentally, through diversity of matter, or the intervention of another agent, but this is not to the point. Ad secundum dicendum, quod Deus a beatis mente attingitur totus, non tamen totaliter, quia modus cognoscibilitatis divinae excedit modum intellectus creati in infinitum; et ita intellectus creatus non potest Deum ita perfecte intelligere sicut intelligibilis est, et propter hoc non potest ipsum comprehendere. Reply to the Second Objection. God is attained by the mind of the blessed, whole but not wholly, because the mode of God’s knowableness infinitely surpasses the mode of a created intellect: and thus the created intellect cannot understand God as perfectly as he is understandable, and consequently he cannot comprehend him. Ad tertium dicendum, quod per unum et idem Deus in ratione diversarum causarum se habet: quia, per hoc quod est actus primus, est agens, et est exemplar omnium formarum, et est bonitas pura, et per consequens omnium finis. Reply to the Third Objection. By reason of one and the same thing God is considered by us as having different kinds of causality: because in that he is the first act, he is an active cause, he is the exemplar of all forms, and he is supreme goodness and consequently the final cause of all things. Ad quartum dicendum, quod proprietas et essentia in divinis non differunt re, sed ratione tantum: ipsa enim paternitas est divina essentia, ut post patebit. Reply to the Fourth Objection. Property and essence in God differ not in reality but only logically: for paternity itself is the divine essence, as we shall show further on (Q. viii, A. i). Ad quintum dicendum, quod de eo quod est idem re et differens ratione, nihil prohibet contradictoria praedicari, ut dicit philosophus, sicut patet quod idem punctum re, differens ratione, est principium et finis; et secundum quod est principium, non est finis, et e contrario. Unde cum essentia et proprietas sint idem re et differant ratione, nihil prohibet quin unum sit communicabile et aliud incommunicabile. Reply to the Fifth Objection. As the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, 3), nothing prevents contradictory statements being verified about one same thing from different points of view: thus the same identical point from different aspects is the beginning and end (of a line): and considered as the beginning it is not the end and vice versa. Wherefore since essence and property are the same in reality but differ logically, nothing prevents the one being common and the other incommunicable. Ad sextum dicendum, quod absoluta et relativa in divinis non differunt secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem, ut dictum est; et ideo ex hoc nulla compositio relinquitur. Reply to the Sixth Objection. In God the absolute and the relative do not differ really, but only logically as stated above: wherefore we cannot infer that there is composition in him. Ad septimum dicendum, quod operatio Dei potest considerari vel ex parte operantis vel ex parte operati. Si ex parte operantis, sic in Deo non est nisi una operatio, quae est sua essentia: non enim agit res per actionem aliquam quae sit media inter Deum et suum velle, quae sunt ipsius esse. Si vero ex parte operati, sic sunt diversae operationes, ipsum factum, sed per suum intelligere et diversi effectus divinae operationis. Hoc autem compositionem in ipso non inducit. Reply to the Seventh Objection. God’s operation may be considered from the point of view either of the operator or of the work done. If we consider it on the part of the operator, then in God there is but one operation and this is in his essence: for he produces his effects not by an action that is between him and the thing done, but by his intelligence and will which are his very being. If, however, we consider God’s operation on the part of the work done, then there are various operations, and various effects of the divine operation: but this does not argue composition in him. Ad octavum dicendum, quod forma effectus invenitur aliter in agente naturali, et aliter in agente per artem. In agente namque per naturam, invenitur forma effectus secundum quod agens in sua natura assimilat sibi effectum, eo quod omne agens agit sibi simile. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter: quando enim effectus perfecte assimilatur agenti, utpote adaequans agentis virtutem, tunc forma effectus est in agente secundum eamdem rationem, ut patet in agentibus univocis, ut cum ignis generat ignem; quando vero effectus non perfecte assimilatur agenti, utpote non adaequans agentis virtutem, tunc forma effectus est in agente non secundum eamdem rationem, sed sublimiori modo; ut patet in agentibus aequivocis, ut cum sol generat ignem. In agentibus autem per artem, formae effectuum praeexistunt secundum eamdem rationem, non autem eodem modo essendi, nam in effectibus habent esse materiale, in mente vero artificis habent esse intelligibile. Cum autem in intellectu dicatur esse aliquid sicut id quod intelligitur, et sicut species qua intelligitur, formae artis sunt in mente artificis sicut id quo intelligitur. Nam ex hoc quod artifex concipit formam artificiati, producit eam in materia. Utroque autem modo formae rerum sunt in Deo: cum enim ipse agit res per intellectum, non est sine actione naturae. In inferioribus autem artificibus ars agit virtute extraneae naturae, qua utitur ut instrumento, sicut figulus igne ad coquendum laterem. Sed ars divina non utitur exteriori natura ad agendum, sed virtute propriae naturae facit suum effectum. Formae ergo rerum sunt in natura divina ut in virtute operativa, non secundum eamdem rationem, cum nullus effectus virtutem illam adaequet. Unde sunt ibi ut unum omnes formae quae in effectibus multiplicantur; et sic nulla provenit inde compositio. Similiter in intellectu eius sunt multa intellecta per unum et idem, quod est sua essentia. Quod autem per unum intelligantur multa, non inducit compositionem intelligentis; unde nec ex hac parte sequitur compositio in Deo. Reply to the Eighth Objection. The form of the effect has a different mode of being in the natural agent and the agent by art. The form of the effect is in the natural agent inasmuch as the agent produces an effect of like nature, since every agent produces its like. Now this happens in two ways. When the effect bears a perfect likeness to the agent, as proportionate to the agent’s power, then the form of the effect is in the agent in the same degree: thus it is in univocal agents, for instance fire generates fire. When, however, the effect is not perfectly likened to the agent, as being improportionate to the agent’s power, then the form of the effect is not in the same degree in the agent but in a higher degree: this is the case in equivocal agents, for instance the sun generates fire. On the other hand in agents by art, the form of the effect pre-exists in the same degree,but not in the same mode of being: because in the effect the form has material being, whereas in the mind of the craftsman it has intelligible being. Now whereas a thing may be in the intellect as the thing which we understand, and as the species whereby we understand, art-forms are in the intellect as that whereby we understand: because it is through conceiving the form of his art-work that the craftsman produces that work in matter. Accordingly the forms of things are in God in both ways. Because while his action in reference to things is from his intellect, it is not without the action of nature. But whereas here below the craftsman’s art acts by virtue of an extraneous nature which it employs as an instrument, as a brick maker uses fire to bake his bricks: on the other hand God’s art employs no extraneous nature in its action, but produces its effect by virtue of his own nature. Hence the forms of things are in the divine nature as in the power that produces them, but not according to the same degree, since no effect is equal to that power. Consequently all forms that are manifold in his effects are in his power as one thing, so that their multiplicity argues no composition in him. Likewise in his intellect there are many things understood through one thing which is his essence. Now it is no proof of composition in one who understands that he understand many things by one: wherefore neither from this point of view does it follow that there is composition in God. Ad nonum dicendum, quod relationes quae dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, non sunt in ipso realiter, sed solum secundum rationem. Ibi enim est realis relatio ubi realiter aliquid dependet ab altero, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid. Et propter hoc scientiae est realis relatio ad scibile, non autem e converso, sed secundum rationem tantum, ut patet per philosophum. Et ideo cum Deus ab altero nullo dependeat, sed e converso omnia ab ipso dependeant, in rebus aliis sunt relationes ad Deum reales, in ipso autem ad res secundum rationem tantum, prout intellectus non potest intelligere relationem huius ad illud, nisi e converso intelligat relationem illius ad hoc. Reply to the Ninth Objection. Relations that are ascribed to God in time, are in him not really but only logically: because real relation is where one thing really depends on another either simply or in a certain respect. Hence knowledge bears a real relation to what is knowable, whereas the relation of the thing knowable to knowledge is only logical according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 20). Since then God depends on no other being, but on the contrary all things depend on him, other things bear a real relation to God, while his relation to them is only logical, for the reason that our intelligence is unable to understand that A is related to B without conceiving a corresponding relation of B to A. Ad decimum dicendum, quod pluralitas personarum nullam compositionem in Deo inducit. Personae enim dupliciter possunt considerari. Uno modo secundum quod comparantur ad essentiam, cum qua sunt idem re; et sic patet quod non relinquitur aliqua compositio. Alio vero modo secundum quod comparantur ad invicem; et sic comparantur ut distinctae, non adunatae. Et propter hoc nec ex hac parte potest esse compositio, nam omnis compositio est unio. Reply to the Tenth Objection. Plurality of Persons does not argue composition in God. The Persons may be considered in two ways. First, in reference to the Essence with which they are identical: so that there is no composition here. Secondly, in reference to one another, and thus they are regarded as mutually distinct not as united together: wherefore from this point of view again there is no composition: since every composition implies union.
Is God’s Essence Or Substance the Same As His Existence?
[ Sum. Th. I, Q. iii, AA. 3, 4]
Secundo quaeritur utrum in Deo sit substantia vel essentia idem quod esse. Et videtur quod non. THE second point of inquiry is whether God’s essence or substance is the same as his existence: and seemingly it is not. Dicit enim Damascenus, in I Lib. Orth. fidei: quoniam quidem Deus est, manifestum est nobis; quid vero sit secundum substantiam et naturam, incomprehensibile est omnino et ignotum. Non autem potest esse idem notum et ignotum. Ergo non est idem esse Dei et substantia vel essentia eius. 1. Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. i, 1, 3): “That God is, is evident to us; but what he is in substance and nature is utterly incomprehensible and unknown.” Now the same thing cannot be both known and unknown. Therefore God’s existence is not the same as his substance or essence. Sed diceretur, quod etiam ipsum esse Dei ignotum est nobis quid sit, sicut et eius substantia. —Sed contra: duae quaestiones diversae sunt, an est, et quid est; ad quarum unam respondere scimus, ad aliam vero non, ut etiam ex praedicta auctoritate patet. Ergo id quod respondet ad an est de Deo, et quod respondet ad quid est, non est idem; sed ad an est respondet esse; ad quid est, substantia vel natura. 2. But it will be replied that God’s existence is unknown to us even as his substance, as regards what it is. —On the contrary, these two questions are different, Is he? and What is he? and we know the answer to the former, but not the answer to the latter, as evinced from the authority quoted. Therefore that which in God corresponds to the question Is he? is not the same as that which corresponds to the question What is he? and existence corresponds to the former question and substance or nature corresponds to the latter. Sed dicendum, quod esse Dei cognoscitur non per se ipsum, sed per similitudinem creaturae. —Sed contra: in creatura est esse et substantia vel natura; et cum utrumque habeat a Deo, secundum utrumque Deo assimilatur, eo quod agens agit sibi simile. Si ergo esse Dei cognoscitur per similitudinem esse creati, oportet quod eius substantia cognoscatur per similitudinem substantiae creatae: et sic de Deo sciremus non solum quoniam est, sed quid est. 3. Again it will be replied that God’s existence is known not in itself but through its likeness in creatures. —On the contrary, in the creature there is existence and substance or nature, and since it has both from God it is likened to God in both, because an agent produces its like. If then God’s existence is known through the likeness of created existence, it follows that his substance is known through the likeness of created substance: and thus we would know not only that God is but also what he is. Praeterea, unumquodque dicitur differre ab altero per suam substantiam. Per id autem quod est omnibus commune, nihil ab altero differt; unde et philosophus dicit, quod ens non debet poni in definitione, quia per hoc, definitum a nullo distingueretur. Ergo nullius rei ab aliis distinctae substantia est ipsum esse, cum sit omnibus commune. Sed Deus est res ab omnibus aliis rebus distincta. Ergo suum esse non est sua substantia. 4. A thing is said to differ from another by reason of its substance: nor can one thing differ from another by reason of that which is common to all things: wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 3) that being should not be placed in a definition, since it would not differentiate the thing defined from another. Consequently the substance of a thing that is distinct from other things cannot be its being, since being is common to all things. Now God is something distinct from all other things. Therefore his being is not his substance. Praeterea, non sunt diversae res nisi quarum est diversum esse. Sed esse huius rei non est diversum ab esse alterius in quantum est esse, sed in quantum est in tali vel in tali natura. Si ergo aliquod esse sit, quod non sit in aliqua natura, quae differat ab ipso esse, hoc non erit diversum ab aliquo alio esse. Et ita sequitur, si divina substantia est eius esse, quod ipse sit esse cuilibet commune. 5. Things are not distinct if they have not a distinct being. Now the being of A is not distinct from B’s being considered as being but considered as in this or that nature. Hence a being that is in a nature that is not distinct from its being will not be distinct from any other being: and thus it will follow, if God’s substance is his being, that he is the common being of all things. Praeterea, ens cui non fit additio, est ens omnibus commune. Sed si Deus sit ipsum suum esse, erit ens cui non fit additio. Ergo erit commune; et ita praedicabitur de unoquoque, et erit Deus mixtus rebus omnibus; quod est haereticum, et contra philosophum dicentem in Lib. de causis, quod causa prima regit omnes res praeterquam quod commisceatur cum eis. 6. Being to which no addition can be made is being common to all things. Now if God is his own being no additions can be made to his being; and then his being will be common to all. Consequently he can be predicated of everything, and will enter into the composition of everything: which is heretical and contrary to the statement of the Philosopher who says (De Causis, prop. xx) that the first cause rules all things without being mingled with them. Praeterea, ei quod est omnino simplex, non convenit aliquid in concretione dictum. Esse autem huiusmodi est: sic enim videtur se habere esse ad essentiam sicut album ad albedinem. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur quod divina substantia sit esse. 7. Nothing that implies concretion should be said of a thing that is utterly simple. Now such is existence: for it would seem that existence is to essence as whiteness is to the white thing. Therefore we should not say that God’s substance is his existence. Praeterea, Boetius dicit: omne quod est participat eo quod est esse, ut sit; alio vero participat ut aliquid sit. Sed Deus est. Ergo praeter esse suum est in eo aliquid aliud quo habet ut aliquid sit. 8. Boethius says (De Hebdom.): Whatsoever has being participates of that which is being, and thus has being; and participates of something else, and thus it is this or that thing. Now God has being. Therefore, besides his being, there is something else in him whereby he is a particular thing. Praeterea, Deo, qui est perfectissimus, id quod est imperfectissimum non est attribuendum. Sed esse est imperfectissimum, sicut prima materia: sicut enim materia prima determinatur per omnes formas, ita esse, cum sit imperfectissimum, determinari habet per omnia propria praedicamenta. Ergo sicut materia prima non est in Deo, ita nec esse debet divinae substantiae attribui. 9. That which is most imperfect should not be ascribed to God who is most perfect. Now existence is most imperfect like primal matter: for just as primal matter may be determined by any form, so being, inasmuch as it is most imperfect, may be determinated by all the proper predicaments. Therefore as primal matter is not in God, so neither should existence be an attribute of the divine substance. Praeterea, id quod significatur per modum effectus, non convenit substantiae primae, quae non habet principium. Sed esse est huiusmodi: nam omne ens per principia suae essentiae habet esse. Ergo substantia Dei inconvenienter dicitur quod sit ipsum esse. 10. That which signifies something as an effect should not be ascribed to the first substance which has no beginning. Now such is existence, for every being has existence through its essential principles. Therefore it is unfitting to say that God’s substance is its own existence. Praeterea, omnis propositio est per se nota, in qua idem de ipso praedicatur. Sed si substantia Dei sit ipsum suum esse, idem erit in subiecto et praedicato, cum dicitur, Deus est. Ergo erit propositio per se nota: quod videtur esse falsum, cum sit demonstrabilis. Non ergo ipsum esse Dei est substantia. 11. A proposition is self-evident wherein a thing is predicated of itself. But if God’s substance is its own existence, the subject and predicate will be identical in the proposition, God exists. Wherefore it will be a self-evident proposition; yet this is not true seemingly, since it can be demonstrated. Therefore God’s existence is not his substance. Sed contra. Est quod Hilarius dicit in Lib. de Trinit.: esse non est accidens Deo, sed subsistens veritas. Id autem quod est subsistens, est rei substantia. Ergo esse Dei est eius substantia. On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. vii): In God existence is not an accident but subsisting truth. Now that which is subsisting is the substance of a thing. Therefore God’s existence is his substance. Praeterea, Rabbi Moyses dicit, quod Deus est ens non in essentia, et vivens non in vita, et est potens non in potentia, et sapiens non in sapientia. Ergo in Deo non est aliud essentia quam suum esse. Again, Rabbi Moses says that “God is a being but not in an essence, is living but not with life, is powerful but not with power, wise but not with wisdom.” Therefore in God essence is not distinct from existence. Praeterea, unaquaeque res proprie denominatur a sua quidditate: nomen enim proprie significat substantiam et quidditatem, ut habetur IV Metaphys. Sed hoc nomen quid est, est inter cetera magis proprium nomen Dei, ut patet Exod. IV. Cum ergo hoc nomen imponatur ab hoc quod est esse, videtur quod ipsum esse Dei sit sua substantia. Again, a thing is properly denominated from what it is since the name of a thing denotes its essence and quiddity (Metaph. iv). Now of all God’s names He who is (Exod. iv) is the most appropriate to him. Hence as this name, is given to him in respect of his existence, it would seem that God’s very existence is his essence. Respondeo. Dicendum quod in Deo non est aliud esse et sua substantia. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod, cum aliquae causae effectus diversos producentes communicant in uno effectu, praeter diversos effectus, oportet quod illud commune producant ex virtute alicuius superioris causae cuius illud est proprius effectus. Et hoc ideo quia, cum proprius effectus producatur ab aliqua causa secundum suam propriam naturam vel formam, diversae causae habentes diversas naturas et formas oportet quod habeant proprios effectus diversos. Unde si in aliquo uno effectu conveniunt, ille non est proprius alicuius earum, sed alicuius superioris, in cuius virtute agunt; sicut patet quod diversa complexionata conveniunt in calefaciendo, ut piper, et zinziber, et similia, quamvis unumquodque eorum habeat suum proprium effectum diversum ab effectu alterius. Unde effectum communem oportet reducere in priorem causam cuius sit proprius, scilicet in ignem. Similiter in motibus caelestibus, sphaerae planetarum singulae habent proprios motus, et cum hoc habent unum communem, quem oportet esse proprium alicuius sphaerae superioris omnes revolventis secundum motum diurnum. Omnes autem causae creatae communicant in uno effectu qui est esse, licet singulae proprios effectus habeant, in quibus distinguuntur. Calor enim facit calidum esse, et aedificator facit domum esse. Conveniunt ergo in hoc quod causant esse, sed differunt in hoc quod ignis causat ignem, et aedificator causat domum. Oportet ergo esse aliquam causam superiorem omnibus cuius virtute omnia causent esse, et eius esse sit proprius effectus. Et haec causa est Deus. Proprius autem effectus cuiuslibet causae procedit ab ipsa secundum similitudinem suae naturae. Oportet ergo quod hoc quod est esse, sit substantia vel natura Dei. Et propter hoc dicitur in Lib. de causis, quod intelligentia non dat esse nisi in quantum est divina, et quod primus effectus est esse, et non est ante ipsum creatum aliquid. I answer that in God there is no distinction between existence and essence. In order to make this clear we must observe that when several causes producing various effects produce one effect in common in addition to their various effects, they must needs produce this common effect by virtue of some higher cause to which this effect properly belongs. The reason for this is that since a proper effect is produced by a particular cause in respect of its, proper nature or form, different causes having different natures and forms must needs have their respective different proper effects: so that if they have one effect in common, this is not the proper effect of any one of them, but of some higher cause by whose virtue they act: thus pepper, ginger and the like which differ in characteristics have the common effect of producing heat; yet each one has its peculiar effect differing from the effects of the others. Hence we must trace their common effect to a higher cause, namely fire to whom that effect properly belongs. Likewise in the heavenly movements each planet has its peculiar movement, and besides this they have all a common movement which must be the proper movement of some higher sphere that causes them all to revolve with the daily movement. Now all created causes have one common effect which is being, although each one has its peculiar effect whereby they are differentiated: thus heat makes a thing to be hot, and a builder gives being to a house. Accordingly they have this in common that they cause being, but they differ in that fire causes fire, and a builder causes a house. There must therefore be some cause higher than all other by virtue of which they all cause being and whose proper cause is being: and this cause is God, Now the proper effect of any cause proceeds therefrom in likeness to its nature. Therefore being must be the essence or nature of God. For this reason it is stated in De Causis (prop. ix) that none but a divine intelligence gives being, and that being is the first of all effects, and that nothing was created before it. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ens et esse dicitur dupliciter, ut patet V Metaph. Quandoque enim significat essentiam rei, sive actum essendi; quandoque vero significat veritatem propositionis, etiam in his quae esse non habent: sicut dicimus quod caecitas est, quia verum est hominem esse caecum. Cum ergo dicat Damascenus, quod esse Dei est nobis manifestum, accipitur esse Dei secundo modo, et non primo. Primo enim modo est idem esse Dei quod est substantia: et sicut eius substantia est ignota, ita et esse. Secundo autem modo scimus quoniam Deus est, quoniam hanc propositionem in intellectu nostro concipimus ex effectibus ipsius. Reply to the First Objection. ‘Being’ and ‘is’ maybe taken in two ways (Metaph. x, 13, 14). Sometimes they signify the essence of a thing and the act of being, and sometimes they denote the truth of a proposition even in things that have no being: thus we say that blindness is because it is true that a man is blind. Accordingly when Damascene says that God’s existence is evident to us, the existence of God is taken in the second sense and not the first. For in the first sense God’s existence is the same as his essence, and as his essence is unknown so also is his existence. In the second sense we know that God is, because we conceive this proposition in our mind from his effects. Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum et tertium. This suffices for the Replies to the Second and Third Objections. Ad quartum dicendum, quod esse divinum, quod est eius substantia, non est esse commune, sed est esse distinctum a quolibet alio esse. Unde per ipsum suum esse Deus differt a quolibet alio ente. Reply to the Fourth Objection. God’s being which is his essence is not universal being, but being distinct from all other being: so that by his very being God is distinct from every other being. Ad quintum dicendum, quod sicut dicitur in libro de causis, ipsum esse Dei distinguitur et individuatur a quolibet alio esse, per hoc ipsum quod est esse per se subsistens, et non adveniens alicui naturae quae sit aliud ab ipso esse. Omne autem aliud esse quod non est subsistens, oportet quod individuetur per naturam et substantiam quae in tali esse subsistit. Et in eis verum est quod esse huius est aliud ab esse illius, per hoc quod est alterius naturae; sicut si esset unus calor per se existens sine materia vel subiecto, ex hoc ipso ab omni alio calore distingueretur: licet calores in subiecto existentes non distinguantur nisi per subiecta. Reply to the Fifth Objection. As stated in De Causis (prop. iv) God’s being is individualised and distinct from every other being by the very fact that it is self-subsistent being, and is not something additional to a nature that is distinct from its being. Now every other being that is not subsistent must be individualised by the nature and essence that subsists in that being: and of such beings it is true that the being of A is distinct from the being of B by the fact that it is the being of another nature: even so if there were one heat existing of itself without matter or subject, by that very fact it would be distinct from every other heat, just as heats existing in a subject are not differentiated otherwise than by their subjects. Ad sextum dicendum, quod ens commune est cui non fit additio, de cuius tamen ratione non est ut ei additio fieri non possit; sed esse divinum est esse cui non fit additio, et de eius ratione est ut ei additio fieri non possit; unde divinum esse non est esse commune. Sicut et animali communi non fit additio, in sua ratione, rationalis differentiae; non tamen est de ratione eius quod ei additio fieri non possit; hoc enim est de ratione animalis irrationalis, quae est species animalis. Reply to the Sixth Objection. Being to which no addition is made is universal being, though the possibility of addition thereto is not incompatible with the notion of universal being: whereas the divine being is being to which no addition can be made and this enters into the very notion of the divine being: wherefore the divine being is not universal being. Thus by adding the difference rational to animal in general we do not add anything to the notion of animal in general: and yet it is not incompatible with the idea of animal in general that an addition to it be possible: for this enters into the notion of irrational animal which is a species of animal. Ad septimum dicendum, quod modus significandi in dictionibus quae a nobis rebus imponuntur sequitur modum intelligendi; dictiones enim significant intellectuum conceptiones, ut dicitur in principio Periher. Intellectus autem noster hoc modo intelligit esse quo modo invenitur in rebus inferioribus a quibus scientiam capit, in quibus esse non est subsistens, sed inhaerens. Ratio autem invenit quod aliquod esse subsistens sit: et ideo licet hoc quod dicunt esse, significetur per modum concreationis, tamen intellectus attribuens esse Deo transcendit modum significandi, attribuens Deo id quod significatur, non autem modum significandi. Reply to the Seventh Objection. The mode of signification of the names we give things is consequent upon our mode of understanding: for names signify the concepts of our intellect (Peri Herm. i). Now our intellect understands, being according to the mode in which it finds it in things here below from which it gathers its knowledge, and wherein being is not subsistent but inherent. Now our reason tells us that there is a self-subsistent being: wherefore although the term being has a signification by way of concretion, yet our intellect in ascribing being to God soars above the mode of its signification, and ascribes to God the thing signified, but not the mode of signification. Ad octavum dicendum, quod dictum Boetii intelligitur de illis quibus esse competit per participationem, non per essentiam; quod enim per essentiam suam est, si vim locutionis attendamus, magis debet dici quod est ipsum esse, quam sit id quod est. Reply to the Eighth Objection. The saying of Boethius refers to things that have being by participation and not by their essence: since that which has being by its essence, if we stress the terms’ should be described as being itself rather than as that which has being. Ad nonum dicendum, quod hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum: quod ex hoc patet quia actus est semper perfectio potentia. Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur. Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu: sed hoc quod habet esse, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum. Nec intelligendum est, quod ei quod dico esse, aliquid addatur quod sit eo formalius, ipsum determinans, sicut actus potentiam: esse enim quod huiusmodi est, est aliud secundum essentiam ab eo cui additur determinandum. Nihil autem potest addi ad esse quod sit extraneum ab ipso, cum ab eo nihil sit extraneum nisi non-ens, quod non potest esse nec forma nec materia. Unde non sic determinatur esse per aliud sicut potentia per actum, sed magis sicut actus per potentiam. Nam et in definitione formarum ponuntur propriae materiae loco differentiae, sicut cum dicitur quod anima est actus corporis physici organici. Et per hunc modum, hoc esse ab illo esse distinguitur, in quantum est talis vel talis naturae. Et per hoc dicit Dionysius, quod licet viventia sint nobiliora quam existentia, tamen esse est nobilius quam vivere: viventia enim non tantum habent vitam, sed cum vita simul habent et esse. Reply to the Ninth Objection. Being, as we understand it here, signifies the highest perfection of all: and the proof is that act is always more perfect than potentiality. Now no signate form is understood to be in act unless it be supposed to have being. Thus we may take human nature or fiery nature as existing potentially in matter, or as existing in the power of an agent, or even as in the mind: but when it has being it becomes actually existent. Wherefore it is clear that being as we understand it here is the actuality of all acts, and therefore the perfection of all perfections. Nor may we think that being, in this sense, can have anything added to it that is more formal and determines it as act determines potentiality: because being in this latter sense is essentially distinct from that to which it is added and whereby it is determined. But nothing that is outside the range of being can be added to being: for nothing is outside its range except non-being, which can be neither form nor matter. Hence being is not determined by something else as potentiality by act but rather as act by potentiality: since in defining a form we include its proper matter instead of the difference: thus we define a soul as the act of an organic physical body. Accordingly this being is distinct from that being inasmuch as it is the being of this or that nature. For this reason Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that though things having life excel those that merely have being, yet being excels life, since living things have not only life but also being. Ad decimum dicendum, quod secundum ordinem agentium est ordo finium, ita quod primo agenti respondet finis ultimus, et proportionaliter per ordinem alii fines aliis agentibus. Si enim considerentur rector civitatis et dux exercitus et unus singularis miles, constat quod rector civitatis est prior in ordine agentium, ad cuius imperium dux exercitus ad bellum procedit; et sub eo est miles, qui secundum ordinationem ducis exercitus manibus pugnat. Finis autem militis est prosternere hostem; quod ulterius ordinatur ad victoriam exercitus, quod est finis ducis; et hoc ulterius ordinatur ad bonum statum civitatis vel regni, quod est finis rectoris et regis. Esse ergo quod est proprius effectus et finis in operatione primi agentis oportet quod teneat locum ultimi finis. Finis autem licet sit primum in intentione, est tamen postremum in operatione, et est effectus aliarum causarum. Et ideo ipsum esse creatum, quod est proprius effectus respondens primo agenti, causatur ex aliis principiis, quamvis esse primum causans sit primum principium. Reply to the Tenth Objection’. The order of agents follows the order of ends, in that the last end corresponds to the first agent and in due proportion other ends to other agents in their order. Take, for example, the ruler of a state, the commander of the army and a private soldier: the ruler is clearly the first in the order of agents; at whose orders the commander goes forth to the war; and under him is the private soldier who engages in hand-to-hand combat at the orders of his commander. Now the end of the, private soldier is to overthrow his opponent, and this is directed yet further to the victory of the army, which is the end of the commander-in-chief; and this again is directed to the welfare of the state or kingdom, which is the end of the ruler or king. Accordingly being which is the proper effect and end of the operation of the first agent must occupy the position of last end. Now although the end is first in the intention, it is last in execution, and is the effect of other causes. Therefore created being, which is the proper effect corresponding to the first agent, is caused from other principles, and yet the first cause of being is the first principle of all. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod aliqua propositio est per se nota de se, quae tamen huic vel illi non est per se nota; quando scilicet praedicatum est de ratione subiecti, et tamen ratio subiecti est alicui ignota; sicut si aliquis nesciret quid est totum, non esset ei nota ista propositio per se, omne totum est maius sua parte; huiusmodi enim propositiones fiunt notae cognitis terminis, ut dicitur I posteriorum. Haec autem propositio, Deus est, quantum est de se, est per se nota, quia idem est in subiecto et praedicato; sed quantum ad nos non est per se nota, quia quid est Deus nescimus: unde apud nos demonstratione indiget, non autem apud illos qui Dei essentiam vident. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. A proposition may be self-evident in itself and yet not self-evident to this or that individual; when, to wit, the predicate belongs to the definition of the subject, which definition is unknown to him: thus if he knew not what is a whole, he would not know this proposition, A whole is greater than its part. The reason is that such propositions become known when their terms are known (Poster. Anal. i). Now this proposition, God is, is in itself self-evident, since the same idea is expressed in both subject and predicate: but with regard to us it is not self-evident, because we know not what God is: so that for us it needs to be proved, though not for those who see God in his essence.
Is God Contained in A Genus?
[ Sum. Th. I, Q. iii, A. 5]
Tertio quaeritur utrum Deus sit in aliquo genere. Et videtur quod sic. THE third point of inquiry is whether God is contained in a genus: and seemingly he is. Dicit enim Damascenus: substantia in divinis significat communem speciem similium specie personarum; hypostasis autem demonstrat individuum, scilicet patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum, Petrum et Paulum. Comparatur ergo Deus ad patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum sicut species ad individua. Sed ubicumque est invenire speciem et individuum, ibi est invenire genus: quia species constituitur ex genere et differentia. Ergo videtur quod Deus sit in aliquo genere. 1. Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4): Substance inn God denotes the common species of the three Persons like in species: hypostasis signifies an individual, for instance the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, Peter or Paul. Thus God is compared to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit as a species to individuals. Now wherever there is a species with individuals, there is a genus: since the species is composed of genus and difference. Therefore seemingly God is contained in a genus. Praeterea, quaecumque sunt et nullo modo differunt, sunt penitus eadem. Sed Deus non est idem rebus aliis. Ergo aliquo modo differt ab eis. Omne autem quod ab alio differt, aliqua differentia ab eo differt. Ergo in Deo est aliqua differentia, qua differt a rebus aliis. Non autem accidentalis, cum in Deo nullum sit accidens, ut Boetius dicit in Lib. de Trin. Omnis autem substantialis differentia est alicuius generis divisiva. Ergo Deus est in aliquo genere. 2. Things which are in no way different are identical. But God is not identical with other things: therefore in some way he is different from them. Now that which is different from something else differs therefrom by some difference. Therefore there is a difference in God, whereby he differs from other things. But it is not an accidental difference, since nothing in God is accidental, as Boethius says (De Trin.). And every substantial difference makes a division of a genus. Therefore God is contained in a genus. Praeterea, idem dicitur genere et specie et numero, ut habetur I Topic., cap. VI. Ergo et diversum similiter: nam si multipliciter dicitur unum oppositorum, et reliquum. Aut ergo Deus est diversus a creatura numero tantum vel numero et specie tantum; et sic, sequitur quod, cum creatura in genere conveniat, et sic erit in genere. Si autem genere a creatura differat, oportebit etiam quod sit in aliquo alio genere quam creatura: nam diversitas ex multitudine causatur, et sic diversitas generis multitudinem generum requirit. Ergo quolibet modo dicatur, oportet quod Deus sit in genere. 3. Things may be the same either in genus, or in species, or in individual (Topic. i, 6). Therefore things may also differ in these ways, since if one of two opposites admits of multiplicity, the other does so too. Therefore God is distinct from a creature either in individual only, or in number and species, in which case he will be in the same genus as the creature, and consequently will be contained in a genus: or he will differ from the creature in genus, and then he will be in another genus from the creature: because diversity results from numbers, so that difference of genus implies a number of genera. Therefore in any case God must be contained in a genus. Praeterea, cuicumque convenit ratio generis substantiae, est in genere. Sed ratio substantiae est per se existere, quod maxime convenit Deo. Ergo Deus est in genere substantiae. 4. Anything to which the generic difference of substance applies belongs to the genus (of substance). Now the generic difference of substance is self-subsistence, which is most applicable to God. Therefore God is in the genus of substance. Praeterea, omne quod definitur, oportet quod sit in genere. Sed Deus definitur: dicitur enim quod est actus purus. Ergo Deus est in aliquo genere. 5. Anything that can be defined must be in a genus. Now God can be defined, for he is said to be pure act. Therefore God is contained in a genus. Praeterea, omne quod praedicatur de alio in eo quod quid, et est in plus, vel se habet ad ipsum sicut species, vel sicut genus. Sed omnia quae praedicantur de Deo, praedicantur in eo quod quid: nam omnia praedicamenta, cum in divinam praedicationem venerint, in substantiam vertuntur, ut dicit Boetius: patet etiam quod non soli Deo conveniunt, sed etiam aliis; et ita sunt in plus. Ergo vel comparantur ad Deum sicut species ad individuum vel sicut genus ad speciem; et utrolibet modo oportet Deum esse in genere. 6. Whatsoever is predicated of another essentially and of other things besides, is compared to that thing either as its species or as its genus. Now all things predicated of God are predicated of him essentially, since all the predicaments when applied to God refer to his essence, as Boethius says (De Trin.). And it is clear that they are applicable not only to God but to other things besides. Therefore they are compared to God either as the species to the individual, or as the genus to its species, and in either case God must be contained in a genus. Praeterea, unumquodque mensuratur minimo sui generis, ut dicitur X Metaph. Sed, sicut dicit Commentator ibidem, id quo mensurantur omnes substantiae, est Deus. Ergo Deus est in eodem genere cum aliis substantiis. 7. A thing is measured by a measure of its own genus (Metaph. x). Now according to the Commentator (ibid.) God is the measure of all substances. Therefore God is in the same genus as other substances. Sed contra. Omne quod est in genere, addit aliquid supra genus, et per consequens est compositum. Sed Deus est omnino simplex. Ergo non est in genere. On the contrary whatsoever is contained in a genus contains something in addition to the genus, and therefore is composite. But God is utterly simple. Therefore he is not contained in a genus. Praeterea, omne quod est in genere, potest definiri, vel sub aliquo definito comprehendi. Sed Deus cum sit infinitus, non est huiusmodi. Ergo non est in genere. Moreover, whatsover is contained in a genus can be defined, or else comprised under something that is defined. But this cannot apply to God since he is infinite. Therefore he is not in a genus. Respondeo. Dicendum quod Deus non est in genere: quod quidem ad praesens tribus rationibus ostendi potest: primo quidem, quia nihil ponitur in genere secundum esse suum, sed ratione quidditatis suae; quod ex hoc patet, quia esse uniuscuiusque est ei proprium, et distinctum ab esse cuiuslibet alterius rei; sed ratio substantiae potest esse communis: propter hoc etiam philosophus dicit, quod ens non est genus. Deus autem est ipsum suum esse: unde non potest esse in genere. I answer that God is not contained in a genus, and for the nonce this may be proved by three arguments. The first argument is that nothing is assigned to a genus by reason of its being but by reason of its quiddity; and this is clear from the fact that the being of a thing is proper to that thing and distinct from the being of anything else: whereas the essence may be common. Hence the Philosopher (Metaph. ii, 3) says that being is not a genus. Now God is Being itself: wherefore he cannot be in a genus. Secunda ratio est, quia quamvis materia non sit genus, nec forma sit differentia, tamen ratio generis sumitur ex materia, et ratio differentiae sumitur ex forma: sicut patet quod in homine natura sensibilis ex qua sumitur ratio animalis, est materialis respectu rationis, ex qua sumitur differentia rationalis. Nam animal est quod habet naturam sensitivam; rationale autem quod rationem habet. Unde in omni eo quod est in genere, oportet esse compositionem materiae et formae, vel actus et potentiae; quod quidem in Deo esse non potest, qui est actus purus, ut ostensum est. Unde relinquitur quod non potest esse in genere. The second reason is that although matter is not a genus nor form a difference, nevertheless the notion of the genus is taken from the matter, and the notion of the difference from the form: for instance, in man the sensible nature whence he derives his animality is material in relation to his reason whence derives the difference of rationality. For an animal is that which has a sensitive nature, and a rational being is one that has reason. Hence in everything that is contained in a genus there must be composition of matter and form, or of act and potentiality: and this cannot be in God who is pure act as we have shown (A. 1). Therefore he cannot be in a genus. Tertia ratio est, quia, cum Deus sit simpliciter perfectus, comprehendit in se perfectionem omnium generum: haec enim est ratio simpliciter perfecti, ut dicitur V Metaph. Quod autem est in aliquo genere, determinatur ad ea quae sunt illius generis; et ita Deus non potest esse in aliquo genere: sic enim non esset infinitae essentiae, nec absolutae perfectionis, sed eius essentia et perfectio limitaretur sub ratione alicuius generis determinati. The third reason is that as God is simply perfect he contains the perfections of all genera: for this is what is meant by being simply perfect (Metaph. v). Now that which is contained in a genus is confined within the limits of that genus. Wherefore God cannot be in a genus: for in that case his essence would not be infinite nor absolutely perfect, but his essence and perfection would be confined within the limits of a definite genus. Ex hoc ulterius patet quod Deus non est species, nec individuum, nec habet differentiam, nec definitionem: nam omnis definitio est ex genere et specie; unde nec de ipso demonstratio fieri potest nisi per effectum, cum demonstrationis propter quid medium sit definitio. Hence it is also evident that God is neither a species nor an individual, nor is there difference in him. Nor can he be defined, since every definition is taken from the genus and species. Wherefore neither can we demonstrate anything about him save from his effects, since the middle proposition of an a priori demonstration is a definition. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Damascenus loquitur similitudinarie, et non secundum proprietatem: habet enim nomen Dei, quod est Deus, similitudinem ad speciem in hoc quod de pluribus numero distinctis substantialiter praedicatur; non tamen species proprie dici potest, quia species non est aliquid unum numero pluribus commune, sed ratione solum; substantia vero divina una numero, est communis tribus personis: unde pater et filius et spiritus sanctus sunt unus Deus, non autem Petrus et Paulus et Marcus sunt unus homo. Reply to the First Objection. Damascene uses the word species metaphorically and not in the strict sense. God’s name (i.e. God) is like a species in that it is predicated essentially of several distinct individuals: but it cannot be called a species strictly speaking, since a species is not identically the same in each individual but only logically: whereas the same identical divine essence is common to the three Persons: wherefore Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one God, but Peter, Paul and Mark are not one man. Ad secundum dicendum, quod differens et diversum differunt, ut philosophus dicit. Nam diversum absolute dicitur quod non est idem; differens vero dicitur ad aliquid: nam omne differens aliquo differt. Si ergo proprie accipiamus hoc nomen differens, sic propositio ista est falsa: quaecumque sunt et nullo modo differunt, sunt eadem. Si autem hoc nomen differens large sumatur, sic est vera; et sic ista est concedenda, quod Deus a rebus aliis differat. Non tamen sequitur quod aliqua differentia differat, sed quod differat ab aliis per suam substantiam: hoc enim necesse est in primis et simplicibus dici. Homo enim differt ab asino, rationali differentia; rationale autem ulterius non differt ab asino aliqua differentia (quia sic esset abire in infinitum), sed se ipso. Reply to the Second Objection. A distinction is to be noted between difference and diversity according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x). Diversity is absolute and is applied to things which are not the same: whereas difference is relative, since that which is different differs in a certain respect. Accordingly if we take the term different strictly, it is not true that things which are in no way different are the same: but if we take the term different in a broad sense it is true: and in this sense we grant that God differs from other things. It does not follow, however, that he differs by reason of a difference, but that he differs from other things by reason of his essence: for this must needs be the case in first principles and simple things. Thus man differs from a donkey by the difference of rationality: but rationality is not distinguished from a donkey by a still further difference (since thus there would be no end to the process), for it differs therefrom by itself. Ad tertium dicendum, quod Deus dicitur diversus genere ab aliis creaturis, non quasi in alio genere existens, sed omnino existens extra genus. Reply to the Third Objection. God is said to be diverse in genus from the creature, not as though he were contained in another genus, but because he is altogether outside a genus. Ad quartum dicendum, quod ens per se non est definitio substantiae, ut Avicenna dicit. Ens enim non potest esse alicuius genus, ut probat philosophus, cum nihil possit addi ad ens quod non participet ipsum; differentia vero non debet participare genus. Sed si substantia possit habere definitionem, non obstante quod est genus generalissimum, erit eius definitio: quod substantia est res cuius quidditati debetur esse non in aliquo. Et sic non conveniet definitio substantiae Deo, qui non habet quidditatem suam praeter suum esse. Unde Deus non est in genere substantiae, sed est supra omnem substantiam. Reply to the Fourth Objection. According to Avicenna (Metaph. iii, 8) substance is not rightly defined as a self-subsistent being: for being cannot be the genus of a thing according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii, 3), because nothing can be added to being that has not a share of being, and a difference should not be a part of the genus. If, however, substance can be defined notwithstanding that it is the most universal of genera, its definition will be a thing whose quiddity is competent to have being not in a subject. Hence the definition of substance cannot be applied to God, whose quiddity is not distinct from his being. Wherefore God is not contained in the genus of substance but is above all substance. Ad quintum dicendum, quod Deus definiri non potest. Omne enim quod definitur, in intellectu definientis comprehenditur; Deus autem est incomprehensibilis ab intellectu; unde cum dicitur quod Deus est actus purus, haec non est definitio eius. Reply to the Fifth Objection. God cannot be defined: because whatsoever is defined is comprehended by the intellect of him that defines it; and God is incomprehensible to the intellect. Hence it is not a definition of God when we say that he is pure act. Ad sextum dicendum, quod ad rationem generis requiritur quod univoce praedicetur. Nihil autem de Deo potest et creaturis univoce praedicari, ut infra patebit. Unde licet ea quae de Deo dicuntur, praedicentur de ipso substantialiter, nihilominus tamen non praedicantur de ipso ut genus. Reply to the Sixth Objection. It is essential to a genus that it be predicated univocally. Now nothing can be predicated univocally of God and the creature, as we shall prove further on (A. 7). Hence although things predicated of God are predicated of him substantially they are not predicated of him generically. Ad septimum dicendum, quod licet Deus non pertineat ad genus substantiae quasi in genere contentum,- sicut species vel individuum sub genere continentur, —potest tamen dici quod sit in genere substantiae per reductionem, sicut principium, et sicut punctum est in genere quantitatis continuae, et unitas in genere numeri; et per hunc modum est mensura substantiarum omnium, sicut unitas numerorum. Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although God does not belong to the genus of substance as contained in a genus, as a species or an individual is contained in a genus: yet we may say that he is in the genus of substance by reduction as its principle, even as a point is in the genus of continuous quantity, and unity in the genus of number. In this way he is the measure of all substances, as unity is the measure of all numbers.
Do ‘Good,’ Wise,’ ‘Just’ and the Like Predicate An Accident in God?
[ Sum. Th. I, Q. iii, A. 6: xiii, 6]
Quarto quaeritur utrum bonum, sapiens, iustum et huiusmodi, praedicent de Deo accidens. Et videtur quod sic. THE fourth point of inquiry is whether good, wise, just and the like predicate an accident in God: and it would appear that they do. Quod enim praedicatur de aliquo non significans substantiam, sed illud quod naturam assequitur, praedicat accidens. Sed Damascenus dicit, quod bonum et iustum et sanctum, dicta de Deo, assequuntur naturam, non autem ipsam substantiam significant. Praedicant ergo de Deo accidens. 1. A predicate that signifies not the substance but something consequent upon the nature of a thing is an accidental predicate. Now Damascene (De Fide Orthod.) says that good, just and holy when said of God, are consequent to his nature and do not signify his essence. Therefore they predicate an accident in God. Sed dicebatur, quod Damascenus loquitur quantum ad modum significandi. —Sed contra, modus significandi qui sequitur rationem generis, oportet quod ad rem referatur: genus enim praedicatum significat substantiam subiecti, cum praedicetur in eo quod quid. Sed praedictis nominibus competit significare per modum assequentis naturam ratione generis: sunt enim in genere qualitatis, quae secundum propriam rationem ad subiectum respectum habet, nam qualitas est secundum quam quales dicimur. Ergo oportet quod iste modus significandi referatur ad rem, ut scilicet ea quae per praedicta nomina significantur, sint assequentia naturam eius de quo praedicantur, et per consequens accidentia. 2. But it was replied that Damascene is referring to the mode of signification of these terms. —On the contrary, a mode of signification that results from the generic nature must have a real foundation: since when the predicate of a proposition is a genus it denotes the substance of the subject, for it is an essential predication. Now the mode of signification of the terms in question is consequent upon the nature in respect of the genus: for they are in the genus of quality, which by its very nature bears a relation to the subject: for a quality is whereby we are disposed in this or that way (quales). Therefore this mode of signification must be based on a reality; in other words the things signified by these words are consequent upon the nature of the thing of which they are predicated and therefore accidents. Sed dicendum, quod ista nomina non praedicantur de Deo quantum ad genus suum, quod est qualitas; non enim proprie dicuntur de Deo nomina a nobis imposita. —Sed contra, a quocumque removetur genus, falso praedicatur de eo species: quod enim non est animal, falso dicitur homo. Si ergo genus praedictorum, quod est qualitas, non praedicatur de Deo, praedicta nomina non solum praedicabuntur improprie, sed falso de Deo, et ita erit falsum quod dicitur, quod Deus est iustus, vel quod Deus est sanctus; quod est inconveniens. Ergo oportet dicere, quod praedicta nomina in Deo praedicent accidens. 3. But it will be said that these terms are not predicated of God in reference to their genus, which is quality; because the expressions we apply to God are not to be taken in their strict sense. —On the contrary, the species is falsely predicated of that which is not included in the genus: thus if a thing is not an animal it is untrue to say that it is a man. If then the genus of the aforesaid, which is quality, is not predicated of God, these terms will be not only improperly but also falsely predicated of God: and consequently it will be untrue to say that God is just or holy: and this cannot be admitted. Therefore we must conclude that these terms are predicated of God accidentally. Praeterea. Philosophus dicit, quod id quod vere est, id est substantia, nulli accidit. Ergo eadem ratione, quod secundum se est accidens, ubique est accidens. Sed iustitia et sapientia et huiusmodi sunt per se accidentia. Ergo et in Deo sunt accidentia. 4. According to the Philosopher (Phys. i, 2) that which really has being, namely substance, is never an accident: wherefore in like manner a per se accident is always. an accident. Now justice, wisdom and the like are per se accidents. Therefore in God also they are accidents. Praeterea, omnia quae sunt in rebus creatis, exemplantur a Deo, qui est forma exemplaris omnium. Sed sapientia, iustitia et huiusmodi, in rebus creatis sunt accidentia. Ergo et in Deo sunt accidentia. 1 5. Whatsoever we find in created things is copied from God who is the exemplary form of all things. Now wisdom, justice and so on are accidents in creatures. Therefore they are accidents in God. Praeterea, ubicumque est quantitas et qualitas, ibi est accidens. Sed in Deo videtur esse quantitas et qualitas: est enim in Deo similitudo et aequalitas; dicimus enim filium similem patri et aequalem. Similitudo autem causatur ex uno in qualitate, aequalitas ex uno in quantitate. Ergo in Deo est accidens. 6. Wherever there is quantity and quality there is accident. Now in God, seemingly, there is quantity and quality: because in him there is likeness and equality: thus we say that the Son is like and equal to the Father: and likeness is oneness in quality, and equality is oneness in quantity. Therefore there are accidents in God. Praeterea, unumquodque mensuratur primo sui generis. Sed Deus non solum est mensura substantiarum, sed omnium accidentium, quia ipse est creator et substantiae et accidentis. Ergo in Deo non tantum est substantia, sed accidens. 7. A thing is measured by the first of its genus. Now God is the measure not only of substances but also of all accidents, since he is the creator of both substance and accident. Therefore in God there is not only substance but also accidents. Praeterea, illud sine quo potest aliquid intelligi, accidentaliter de eo praedicatur. Ex hoc enim probat Porphyrius separabilia quaedam accidentia esse, quia potest intelligi corvus albus, et Aethiops nitens candore. Sed Deus potest intelligi sine bono, ut patet per Boetium. Ergo bonum significat accidens in Deo, et eadem ratione alia. 8. If A can be understood apart from B, B is accidental to A. Thus Porphyry (Praedic. cap. de accidente) proves that things which are separable are accidents, since we can conceive a white crow, and a white Ethiopian. Now it is possible to conceive God apart from goodness, according to Boethius; (De Hebd.). Therefore goodness denotes an accident in God, and for the same reason the others. Praeterea, in significatione nominis duo est considerare: scilicet id a quo imponitur, et id cui imponitur. Quantum ad utrumque autem hoc nomen sapientia videtur accidens significare; imponitur enim ab eo quod est facere sapientem, quod videtur actio esse sapientiae; id autem a quo imponitur, est qualitas quaedam. Ergo omnibus modis hoc nomen et alia similia significant accidens in eo de quo praedicantur; et ita in Deo est aliquod accidens. 9. Two things should be considered in the meaning of a name, namely that from which it is taken and the thing to which it is given: and in both respects this term ‘wisdom’ would appear to denote an accident. For it is taken from the fact that it makes a man wise, which seemingly is the act of wisdom; while the thing to which it is given is a quality. Therefore in every respect this and similar terms signify an accident in the subject of which they are predicated: and therefore it is an accident in God. Sed contra. Est quod Boetius dicit, quod Deus, cum sit forma simplex, subiectum esse non potest. Omne autem accidens est in subiecto. Ergo in Deo non potest esse aliquod accidens. On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that God, inasmuch as he is a simple form, cannot be a subject. Now every accident is in a subject. Therefore there can be no accident in God. Praeterea, omne accidens habet dependentiam ab alio. Sed nihil tale potest esse in Deo, quia quod dependet ab alio, oportet esse causatum; Deus autem est causa prima nullo modo causata. Ergo in Deo accidens esse non potest. Moreover every accident is dependent on something else. But no such thing can be in God, since that which is dependent must have a cause: and God is the first cause and has no cause whatsoever. Therefore no accidents can be in God. Praeterea, Rabbi Moyses dicit, quod huiusmodi nomina non significant in Deo intentiones additas supra eius substantiam. Omne enim accidens significat intentionem additam supra substantiam sui subiecti. Ergo praedicta nomina non significant accidens in Deo. Again, Rabbi Moses says that in God suchlike terms do not signify tendencies in addition to his substance. Now every accident denotes a tendency in addition to the substance of its subject. Therefore these terms do not denote accidents in God. Praeterea, accidens est quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem. Sed hoc in Deo esse non potest, cum ipse sit immutabilis ut probatur a philosopho. Ergo in Deo accidens esse non potest. Again, an accident is something that can be present or absent without the destruction of its subject. But this is impossible in God, since he is unchangeable, as proved by the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 5). Therefore accidents cannot be in God. Respondeo. Dicendum quod, absque omni dubitatione, tenendum est quod in Deo nullum sit accidens; quod quidem ad praesens potest ostendi tribus rationibus. I answer that without any doubt whatever we must hold that there are no accidents in God. For our present purpose it will suffice to prove this by three arguments. Prima ratio est, quia nulli naturae vel essentiae vel formae aliquid extraneum adiungitur, licet id quod habet naturam vel formam vel essentiam, possit aliquid extraneum in se habere; humanitas enim non recipit in se nisi quod est de ratione humanitatis. Quod ex hoc patet, quia in definitionibus quae essentiam rerum significant quodlibet additum vel subtractum variat speciem, sicut etiam in numeris, ut dicit philosophus. Homo autem qui habet humanitatem, potest aliquid aliud habere quod non sit de ratione humanitatis, sicut albedinem et huiusmodi, quae non insunt humanitati, sed homini. In qualibet autem creatura invenitur differentia habentis et habiti. In creaturis namque compositis invenitur duplex differentia, quia ipsum suppositum sive individuum habet naturam speciei, sicut homo humanitatem, et habet ulterius esse: homo enim nec est humanitas nec esse suum; unde homini potest inesse aliquod accidens, non autem ipsi humanitati vel eius esse. In substantiis vero simplicibus est una tantum differentia, scilicet essentiae et esse. In Angelis enim quodlibet suppositum est sua natura: quidditas enim simplicis est ipsum simplex, ut dicit Avicenna; non est autem suum esse; unde ipsa quidditas est in suo esse subsistens. Unde in huiusmodi substantiis potest inveniri aliquod accidens intelligibile, non autem materiale. In Deo autem nulla est differentia habentis et habiti, vel participantis et participati; immo ipse est et sua natura et suum esse; et ideo nihil alienum vel accidentale potest ei inesse. Et hanc rationem videtur tangere Boetius, dicens: id quod est, habere potest aliquod praeterquam quod ipsum est; ipsum vero esse, nihil aliud praeter se habet admixtum. The first argument is that no nature, essence or form can receive the addition of something extraneous: although that which has a nature, form or essence can receive something extraneous thereto, thus humanity contains nothing but what belongs intrinsically to humanity. This is clear from the fact that if anything be added to or subtracted from definitions which indicate the essence of a thing, the species is changed, as is the case with numbers, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. viii). Man, however, who has humanity, can have something else which is not contained in the notion of humanity, such as whiteness and the like which are not humanity but in the man. Now in every creature there is a distinction between the one who has a thing and the thing which he has. In composite creatures there is a twofold difference; since the supposit or individual has the nature of its species —thus a man has humanity—and also has being: for a man is neither humanity nor is he his own being. Wherefore a man can have an accident, but his humanity or his being cannot. In simple substances there is only one difference, that namely between essence and existence. Thus in the angels every supposit is his own nature, since the quiddity of a simple being is the simple being itself according to Avicenna (Metaph. v), but it is not its own being, so that the quiddity subsists in its own being. In these substances therefore there can be an intelligible but not a material accident. On the other hand in God there is no distinction between haver and the thing had, or between participator. and the thing participated: indeed he is both his own nature and his own being, wherefore nothing in him can be adventitious or accidental. This argument is apparently indicated by Boethius (De Hebd.) when he says: “That which has being can have something in addition to its being: but that which is being, has nothing besides itself.” Secunda ratio est quod, cum accidens sit extrinsecum ab essentia subiecti, et diversa non coniungantur nisi per aliquam causam, oportet, si accidens Deo adveniat, quod hoc sit ab aliqua causa. Non autem potest esse ex aliqua causa extrinseca, quia sequeretur quod illa causa extrinseca ageret in Deum, et esset prior eo, sicut movens moto, et faciens facto. Sic enim causatur accidens in aliquo subiecto ab extrinseco in quantum exterius agens agit in subiectum in quo causatur accidens. Similiter etiam non potest esse ex causa intrinseca, sicut est per se in accidentibus, quae habent causam in subiecto. Subiectum enim non potest esse causa accidentis ex eodem ex quo suscipit accidens, quia nulla potentia movet se ad actum. Unde oportet quod ex alio sit susceptivum accidentis, et ex alio sit causa accidentis, et sic est compositum; sicut ista quae recipiunt accidens per naturam materiae, et causant accidens per naturam formae. Ostensum autem est supra, Deum non esse compositum. Unde impossibile est quod sit in eo accidens. The second reason is that since an accident is extraneous to the essence of its subject, and things that are diverse are not united together save by some cause, it follows, if any accident accrue to God, that this is due to some cause. It cannot, however, be due to some extrinsic cause, since it would follow that this extrinsic cause acts on God, and is previous to him, even as the mover precedes that Which is moved and the maker that which is made: for an accident is produced in a subject by an extrinsic cause acting on the subject in which the accident is produced. Again it cannot be due to an intrinsic cause as happens with per se accidents whose cause is in their subject. For a subject cannot both cause and receive an accident on the same count, since no power moves itself into action: wherefore it must receive the accident on one count, and cause it on another, and thus it will be composite: thus certain things receive an accident on account of their matter, and cause it on account of the nature of their form. Now we have shown (A. i) that God is not composite. Therefore no accident can possibly be in him. Tertia ratio est, quia accidens comparatur ad subiectum sicut actus ad potentiam, cum sit quaedam forma ipsius. Unde cum Deus sit actus purus absque alicuius potentiae permixtione, non potest esse accidentis subiectum. The third argument is that accident is compared to subject as act to potentiality, since it is a kind of form thereof. Wherefore since God is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, he cannot be the subject of an accident. Sic ergo patet ex praehabitis quod in Deo non est compositio materiae et formae, et quarumcumque partium substantialium, nec generis et differentiae, nec subiecti et accidentis; patet etiam quod praedicta nomina in Deo non praedicant accidens. Accordingly from the foregoing we conclude that in God there is not composition of matter and form or of any essential parts, nor of genus and difference, nor of subject and accidents: and that the aforesaid terms do not predicate an accident in God. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Damascenus loquitur de istis nominibus non quantum ad id quod praedicant de Deo, sed quantum ad id a quo imponuntur ad significandum. Imponuntur enim a nobis ad significandum ex formis accidentalibus quibusdam, in creaturis repertis. Vult enim ex hoc probare quod per nomina dicta de Deo non notificatur nobis eius substantia. Reply to the First Objection. Damascene is speaking of these names not as to what they predicate of God, but as to the reason why we predicate them of him. For we take these terms on account of their signification from certain accidental forms that we observe in creatures. In fact from this it is his intention to show that the expressions employed by us in speaking of God do not signify his essence. Ad secundum dicendum, quod licet bonitatis humanae et sapientiae et iustitiae, qualitas sit genus; non tamen est genus eorum secundum quod de Deo praedicantur, eo quod qualitas, in quantum huiusmodi, dicitur ens eo quod inhaeret aliqualiter subiecto. Sapientia autem et iustitia non ex hoc nominantur, sed magis ex aliqua perfectione vel ex aliquo actu; unde talia veniunt in divinam praedicationem secundum rationem differentiae et non secundum rationem generis. Et propter hoc Augustinus dicit: intelligamus quantum possumus sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum. Unde non oportet quod modus iste qui est assequi naturam, inveniatur in Deo. Reply to the Second Objection. Although quality is the genus of human goodness, wisdom and justice, it is not their genus if we take them as predicated of God, because quality as such is a being forasmuch as it qualifies the subject in which it is. But wisdom and justice are denominated not from this but rather from a certain perfection or act: wherefore such things are predicated of God by reason of their difference and not of their genus. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. v, i): As far as we can, let us conceive goodness that is not a quality, and greatness that is not a quantity.—Wherefore we cannot conclude that such things are consequent to God’s nature. Ad tertium dicendum, quod si bonum et iustum univoce de Deo praedicarentur, sequeretur quod falsa esset praedicatio, remoto genere. Nihil autem de Deo creatura univoce praedicatur, ut infra ostendetur; unde ratio non sequitur. Reply to the Third Objection. If good and just were predicated of God univocally, it would indeed follow that their predication is false if we do not predicate their genus of him: but as we shall show further on (A. 7) nothing is predicated univocally of God and the creature. Ad quartum dicendum, quod sapientia, quae est accidens, in Deo non est; sed sapientia alia non univoce dicta; et propter hoc ratio non sequitur. Reply to the Fourth Objection. The wisdom that is an accident is not in God: his is another wisdom not univocally so called: hence the argument does not prove. Ad quintum dicendum quod exemplata non semper repraesentant perfecte exemplar; unde quandoque quod est in exemplari deficienter et imperfecte invenitur in exemplato; et praecipue in his quae exemplantur a Deo, qui est exemplar omnem creaturae proportionem excedens. Reply to the Fifth Objection. The exemplate is not always a perfect reproduction of the exemplar; so that sometimes the exemplate reproduces defectively and imperfectly that which is in the exemplar: especially is this the case in exemplates that are taken from God who is an exemplar surpassing all proportion of the creature. Ad sextum dicendum, quod similitudo et aequalitas in Deo dicuntur non quia sit ibi qualitas vel quantitas, sed quia de eo dicimus quaedam quae apud nos significant qualitatem vel quantitatem, cum dicimus Deum magnum et sapientem et huiusmodi, et cetera. Reply to the Sixth Objection. Likeness and equality are ascribed to God not as though there were quality and quantity in him, but because we ascribe to him certain things which imply quality and quantity in us: for instance, when we say that God is great, wise, and so forth. Ad septimum dicendum, quod accidentia non dicuntur entia nisi per relationem ad substantiam tamquam ad primum ens; unde non oportet quod accidentia mensurentur uno primo quod est accidens, sed uno primo quod est substantia. Reply to the Seventh Objection. Accidents are not beings save in relation to substance as the first being: wherefore we infer that accidents are measured by some first thing that is not an accident, but a substance. Ad octavum dicendum, quod omne illud sine quo res aliqua potest intelligi secundum suam substantiam intellecta, habet rationem accidentis: non enim potest esse quod non intelligatur id quod est de substantia rei, re secundum suam substantiam intellecta; sicut quod intelligatur quid est homo, et non intelligatur quid est animal. Deum autem nos non videmus hic per essentiam, sed consideramus eum ex eius effectibus. Unde nihil prohibet considerare ipsum ex effectu essendi, et non considerare ex effectu bonitatis; sic enim loquitur Boetius. Sciendum tamen quod licet nos intelligamus aliqualiter Deum, non intelligendo eius bonitatem, non tamen possumus intelligere Deum intelligendo eum non esse bonum, sicut nec hominem intelligendo eum non esse animal: hoc enim removeret substantiam Dei, quae est bonitas. Sancti vero in patria qui vident Deum per essentiam, videndo Deum, vident eius bonitatem. Reply to the Eighth Objection. If we understand a thing in its essence then it is true that anything which does not enter into that consideration is accidental: since given that we understand it in its essence, we must needs understand whatsoever pertains to its essence; thus if we understand what a man is, we must needs understand what is an animal. Here, however, we do not see God in his essence, but consider him in his effects. Wherefore nothing prevents us from considering him in his effect that is being, without considering him in his effect that is goodness; and this is what Boethius intends to say. Yet it must be observed that although we may understand God somewhat without understanding his goodness; we cannot understand God and understand that he is not good—thus we cannot understand man and understand that he is not an animal—for this would be to deny God’s essence which is goodness. On the other hand the saints in heaven who see God in his essence, by seeing God see his goodness. Ad nonum dicendum, quod hoc nomen sapientia verificatur de Deo quantum ad illud a quo imponitur nomen. Non autem imponitur nomen ab hoc quod est sapientem facere, sed ab hoc quod est sapientialia intellectualiter habere. Scientia enim, in quantum scientia, refertur ad scibile; sed in quantum est accidens vel forma, refertur ad scientem. Hoc autem quod est sapientialia habere, est accidentale homini, non autem Deo. Reply to the Ninth Objection. The term wisdom in its application to God is true as regards that from which it is taken. It is not taken, however, from the fact that it makes a man wise, but from its being a habit perfecting the intellect. For knowledge as such is referred to the thing known, whereas as an accident it is referred to the knower: and the possession of wisdom is accidental to man but not to God.
Do These Terms Signify the Divine Essence?
[ Sum. Th. I, Q. xiii, A. 12]
Quinto quaeritur utrum praedicta nomina significent divinam substantiam. Et videtur quod non. THE fifth point of inquiry is whether these terms signify the divine essence: and seemingly they do not. Dicit enim Damascenus IV libro: oportet singulum eorum quae in Deo dicuntur, non quid est secundum substantiam significare existimare; sed quod non est ostendere, aut habitudinem quamdam, aut aliquid eorum a quibus separatur, aut aliquid eorum quae assequuntur naturam aut operationem. Esse autem quod substantialiter de aliquo praedicatur significat quid est substantia eius. Praedicta ergo nomina non praedicantur substantialiter de Deo, tamquam eius substantiam significantia. 1. Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. i, 4): We must not think that the terms we employ in speaking of God denote what he is in his substance: rather do they indicate what he is not, or some kind of relationship, or something to be excluded from him, or else such things as are consequent to his nature or action. Now the being that is predicated of a thing substantially denotes what that thing’s substance is. Therefore these terms are not predicated of God substantially as indicating his essence. Praeterea, nullum nomen quod significat substantiam alicuius rei, vere potest de eo negari. Dicit enim Dionysius, quod in divinis negationes sunt verae, affirmationes vero incompactae. Ergo talia nomina non significant substantiam divinam. 2. No term that signifies the essence of a thing can truly be denied of that thing. For Dionysius says (Col. Hier. ii) that “negations about God are true, but affirmations are vague.” Therefore these terms do not signify God’s essence. Praeterea, haec nomina significant processus divinae bonitatis in res, sicut dicit Dionysius. Sed bonitates a Deo procedentes non sunt ipsa divina substantia. Ergo huiusmodi nomina non significant divinam substantiam. 3. According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) these expressions signify the outpouring of divine goodness into things. But God does not pour out his substance on things. Therefore such expressions do not signify the divine essence. Praeterea, Origenes dicit quod Deus dicitur sapiens quia sapientia nos implet. Hoc autem non significat divinam substantiam, sed effectum. Ergo praedicta nomina non significant divinam substantiam. 4. Origen says that God is called wise because he fills us with wisdom, Now this denotes not the divine essence but a divine effect. Therefore these terms do not signify the divine essence. Praeterea, in Lib. de causis dicitur quod causa prima non nominatur nisi nomine causati primi, quod est intelligentia. Cum autem causa nominatur nomine sui causati, non est praedicatio per essentiam, sed per causam. Ergo nomina quae de Deo dicuntur, non praedicantur de Deo substantialiter, sed causaliter tantum. 5. The first cause is denominated only from its first effect (De Causis, prop. xvi) which is the intelligence. Now when a cause is denominated from its effect, the predication connotes not the essence but the cause. Therefore expressions that are ascribed to God do not predicate his essence but his causality. Praeterea, nomina significant conceptiones intellectuum, ut patet per philosophum. Sed nos divinam substantiam intelligere non possumus: non enim scimus de eo quid est, sed quoniam est, ut dicit Damascenus. Ergo non possumus eum nominare aliquo nomine, nec significare eius substantiam. 6. Words signify the concepts of the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). Now we are unable to understand the divine essence; since as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) we know not what he is but that he is. Therefore we cannot give him a name nor employ words to express his essence. Praeterea, omnia divinam bonitatem participant, ut patet per Dionysium. Sed non omnia participant eius substantiam, quae est solum in tribus personis. Ergo divina bonitas non significat eius substantiam. 7. According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) all things participate of the divine goodness. But all do not participate of the divine essence which is only in the three Persons. Therefore God’s goodness does not denote his essence. Praeterea, Deum cognoscere non possumus nisi ex similitudine creaturae, quia, ut dicit apostolus, Rom. I, 20, invisibilia Dei a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur. Sed secundum quod ipsum cognoscimus, ita ipsum nominamus. Ergo non nominamus ipsum nisi ex similitudine creaturarum. Sed quando aliquid nominatur ex similitudine alterius, nomen illud non praedicatur de ipso substantialiter, sed metaphorice: quod per hoc patet quod per posterius de Deo dicitur, et per prius de eo a quo sumitur similitudo; cum tamen quod significat substantiam alicuius primo de eo praedicetur. 8. We cannot know God except from his likeness in creatures: thus the Apostle says (Rom. i, 20) that the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made. Now we name him according as we know him. Therefore we do not name him except from his likeness in creatures. But when we name a thing from its likeness to another, such a name is predicated of it not essentially but metaphorically: inasmuch, as it is said secondly of God and first of the thing whence the simile is taken: whereas that which signifies the essence of a thing is said of that thing first. Praeterea, secundum philosophum, significare substantiam est significare hoc, et nihil aliud. Si ergo hoc nomen bonum significat substantiam divinam, nihil erit in substantia divina quod non hoc nomine significetur, sicut etiam nihil est in substantia humana quod non significetur hoc nomine homo. Sed hoc nomen bonum non significat sapientiam. Ergo sapientia non erit substantia divina, et pari ratione nec omnia alia; ergo non potest esse quod huiusmodi omnia nomina significent divinam substantiam. 9. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii) that which signifies the essence, denotes that and nothing else. Wherefore if this word good signifies the divine essence, there win be nothing in the divine essence that is not signified thereby: even so there is nothing in the essence of man that is not signified by this word man. But this word good does not signify wisdom: so that wisdom will not be the divine essence, and for the same reason neither will the other terms. Therefore all these words cannot possibly signify the divine essence. Praeterea, sicut quantitas est causa aequalitatis, et similitudinis qualitas, ita et substantia identitatis. Si ergo omnia huiusmodi nomina significent substantiam Dei, secundum ea non attenderetur vel aequalitas vel similitudo, sed magis identitas; et ita creatura dicetur idem Deo, ex hoc quod eius sapientiam vel bonitatem imitatur, vel aliquid huiusmodi; quod est inconveniens. 10. As quantity is the cause of equality, and quality the cause of likeness, so is essence the cause of identity. If then all these expressions signify God’s essence, they would no longer indicate equality or likeness but rather identity between God and us: so that a creature might be identified with God from the fact that it imitates his wisdom, goodness and so forth: and this is absurd. Praeterea, in Deo, qui est principium totius naturae, nihil potest esse contra naturam; nec ipse etiam aliquid contra naturam facit, sicut habetur in Glossa Rom. XI (Ord. super illud: contra naturam insertus es). Hoc autem est contra naturam quod accidens sit substantia. Cum ergo sapientia, iustitia et huiusmodi secundum se sint accidentia, non potest esse quod in Deo sint substantia. li. Nothing can be contrary to nature in God who is the source of all nature: nor does he anything contrary to nature according to the (ordinary) gloss on Romans xi, 24: Contrary to nature thou wert grafted. Now it is contrary to nature that an accident be substance. Since then wisdom, justice and the like are per se accidents, they cannot be substance in God. Praeterea, cum dicitur Deus bonus, iste terminus est complexus. Nulla autem esset complexio, si bonitas Dei esset ipsa eius substantia. Ergo non videtur quod bonum significet divinam substantiam; et eadem ratione nec alia similia nomina. 12. When we say that God is good, good is a complex term. But there would be no complexity if God’s goodness were his very substance. Therefore seemingly good does not denote God’s substance; and the same reason applies to all similar expressions. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit quod Deus omnem formam nostri intellectus subterfugit, et ideo intellectui permixtus esse non potest. Hoc autem non esset, si ista nomina significarent divinam substantiam, quia Deus corresponderet formae nostri intellectus. Ergo huiusmodi nomina non significant divinam substantiam. 13. Augustine says that God eludes every conception of our intelligence, so that it cannot grasp him. But this would not be so if these terms signified the divine essence, since God would correspond to a conception of our intellect. Therefore they do not signify the divine essence. Praeterea, Dionysius dicit quod optime homo Deo unitur in cognoscendo quod cognoscens de ipso nihil cognoscit. Hoc autem non esset, si ista quae concipit et significat, essent divina substantia. Ergo idem quod prius. 14. Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. i) that man is best united to God by realising that in knowing God he knows nothing about him. But this would not be so if these ideas and expressions of man’s reflected God’s very essence. Therefore the same conclusion follows as before. Sed contra. Est quod Augustinus dicit: Deo est hoc esse quod est fortem esse, vel sapientem esse; et si quid de illa simplicitate dixeris quae eius substantiam significat. Ergo omnia huiusmodi significant divinam substantiam. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 7): In God to be is to be mighty, or wise; such is his simplicity that whatsoever you may say of him is his essence. Praeterea, Boetius dicit, quod cum quis alia praedicamenta praeter relationem in divinam vertit praedicationem, cuncta mutantur in substantiam; sicut iustus, etsi qualitatem significare videatur, significat tamen substantiam, et similiter magnus, et huiusmodi alia. Again, Boethius says (De Trin.) that under whatsoever predicament, except relation, we predicate things of God they all refer to his essence: thus although just apparently indicates a quality, it signifies his essence: the same applies to great and so forth. Praeterea, omne quod dicitur per participationem, reducitur ad aliquid per se et essentialiter dictum. Sed praedicta nomina de creaturis dicuntur per participationem. Ergo cum reducantur in Deum sicut in causam primam, oportet quod de Deo dicantur essentialiter; et ita sequitur quod significent eius substantiam. Again all things that are ascribed to another by way of participation presuppose one to whom they are ascribed per se and essentially. Now these expressions are applied to creatures by way of participation. Since then they are reduced to God as their first cause, it follows that they are said of God essentially, and thus it follows that they signify his essence. Respondeo. Dicendum quod: quidam posuerunt, quod ista nomina dicta de Deo, non significant divinam substantiam, quod maxime expresse dicit Rabbi Moyses. Dicit autem, huiusmodi nomina de Deo dupliciter esse intelligenda: uno modo per similitudinem effectus, ut dicatur Deus sapiens non quia sapientia aliquid sit in ipso, sed quia ad modum sapientis in suis effectibus operatur, ordinando scilicet unumquodque ad debitum finem; et similiter dicitur vivens in quantum ad modum viventis operatur, quasi ex se ipso agens. Alio modo per modum negationis; ut per hoc quod dicimus Deum esse viventem, non significemus vitam in eo aliquid esse, sed removeamus a Deo illum modum essendi quo res inanimatae existunt. Similiter cum dicimus Deum intelligentem, non intelligimus significare intellectum aliquid in ipso esse, sed removemus a Deo illum modum essendi quo bruta existunt; et sic de aliis. Uterque autem modus videtur esse insufficiens et inconveniens. Primus quidem duplici ratione: quarum prima est, quia secundum expositionem nulla differentia esset inter hoc quod dicitur, Deus est sapiens et Deus est iratus, vel Deus ignis est. Dicitur enim iratus quia operatur ad modum irati dum punit: hoc enim homines irati facere consueverunt. Dicitur etiam ignis, quia operatur ad modum ignis dum purgat, quod ignis suo modo facit. Hoc autem est contra positionem sanctorum et prophetarum loquentium de Deo, qui quaedam de Deo probant, et quaedam ab eo removent; probant enim eum esse vivum, sapientem et huiusmodi, et non esse corpus, neque passionibus subiectum. Secundum autem praedictam opinionem omnia de Deo pari ratione possent dici et removeri, non magis haec quam illa. Secunda ratio, quia cum secundum fidem nostram ponamus creaturam non semper fuisse, quod et ipse concedit, sequeretur quod non possemus dicere fuisse sapientem vel bonum antequam creaturae essent. Constat enim quod antequam creaturae essent, nihil in effectibus operabatur, nec ad modum boni nec ad modum sapientis. Hoc autem omnino sanae fidei repugnat: nisi forte dicere velit quod ante creaturas sapiens dici poterat, non quia operaretur ut sapiens, sed quia poterat ut sapiens operari. Et sic sequeretur quod aliquid existens in Deo per hoc significetur, et sit per consequens substantia, cum quidquid est in Deo sit sua substantia. Secundus autem modus eadem ratione videtur esse inconveniens. Non enim est aliquod nomen alicuius speciei per quod non removeatur aliquis modus qui Deo non competit. In nomine enim cuiuslibet speciei includitur significatio differentiae, per quam excluditur alia species quae contra eam dividitur: sicut in nomine leonis includitur haec differentia quae est quadrupes, per quam leo differt ab ave. Si ergo praedicationes de Deo non essent introductae nisi ad removendum, sicut dicimus Deum esse viventem,- quia non habet esse ad modum inanimatorum, ut ipse dicit - ita possemus dicere Deum esse leonem, quia non habet esse ad modum avis. Et praeterea intellectus negationis semper fundatur in aliqua affirmatione: quod ex hoc patet quia omnis negativa per affirmativam probatur; unde nisi intellectus humanus aliquid de Deo affirmative cognosceret, nihil de Deo posset negare. Non autem cognosceret, si nihil quod de Deo dicit, de eo verificaretur affirmative. Et ideo, secundum sententiam Dionysii, dicendum est, quod huiusmodi nomina significant divinam substantiam, quamvis deficienter et imperfecte: quod sic patet. I answer that some have maintained, and Rabbi Moses most emphatically, that these terms when predicated of God do not signify the divine essence. He says in effect that these expressions are to be taken in reference to God in two ways. First, as indicating a likeness of effect: and that God is said to be wise, not that wisdom is something in him, but because in his effects he acts like a wise man, namely by directing each one to its due end; again that he is said to be a living God inasmuch as he acts like a living being, in that he acts of himself. Secondly, by way of negation: so that when we say God lives we do not mean that life is something in him, but that God has not that mode of existence which is in things inanimate. Likewise when we say that God is an intelligent being, we do not mean that intelligence is really in him, but that he has not that mode of existence whereby dumb animals exist: and so on. In either case, however, this explanation is apparently insufficient and objectionable. The first, for two reasons. First, because according to this explanation there, would be no difference in saying God is wise, or God is angry or God is a fire: since he is said to be angry because he acts like an angry man by punishing; for angry men are wont to act thus. Also he is said to be a fire, because he acts like fire when he cleanses, and fire does this in his own way. Now this is contrary to the view taken by the saints and prophets in speaking of God: since certain things they affirm of him and deny others: for they assert that he is living, wise and the like, and deny that he is a body or subject to passions. But in the opinion we are discussing anything may be said or denied of God with equal reason. The second reason is that since, as our faith teaches and as he also grants, creatures have not’ always existed, it follows that we could not say that God was wise or good before the existence of creatures. For it is evident that before creatures existed he did nothing as regards his effects, neither as good nor as wise. Now this is altogether contrary to sound faith: unless perhaps he meant to say that before the existence of creatures God would be called wise, not that he worked as being wise, but because he could do so: and then it would follow that wisdom denotes something in God and consequently is his essence, since whatsoever is in. God is his essence. The second explanation appears likewise to be unsatisfactory: because there is not a specific term that does not exclude from God some mode of being that is unbecoming to him. For every specific term includes the difference whereby the opposite species is excluded: thus the term lion includes the difference quadruped which differentiates a lion from a bird. Accordingly if predicates about God were employed merely for the purpose of exclusion, just as we say that God is living because, according to him (Rabbi Moses), God has not being in the same way as inanimate creatures: even so might we say that God is a lion because he has not the mode of being of a bird. Moreover the idea of negation is always based on an affirmation: as evinced by the fact that every negative proposition is proved by an affirmative: wherefore unless the human mind knew something positively about God, it would be unable to deny anything about him. And it would know nothing if nothing that it affirmed about God were positively verified about him. Hence following Dionysius (Div. Nom. xiii) we must hold that these terms signify the divine essence, albeit defectively and imperfectly: the proof of which is as follows. Cum omne agens agat in quantum actu est, et per consequens agat aliqualiter simile, oportet formam facti aliquo modo esse in agente: diversimode tamen: quia quando effectus adaequat virtutem agentis, oportet quod secundum eamdem rationem sit illa forma in faciente et in facto; tunc enim faciens et factum coincidunt in idem specie, quod contingit in omnibus univocis: homo enim generat hominem, et ignis ignem. Quando vero effectus non adaequat virtutem agentis, forma non est secundum eamdem rationem in agente et facto, sed in agente eminentius; secundum enim quod est in agente habet agens virtutem ad producendum effectum. Unde si tota virtus agentis non exprimitur in facto, relinquitur quod modus quo forma est in agente excedit modum quo est in facto. Et hoc videmus in omnibus agentibus aequivocis, sicut cum sol generat ignem. Constat autem quod nullus effectus adaequat virtutem primi agentis, quod Deus est; alias ab una virtute ipsius non procederet nisi unus effectus. Sed cum ex eius una virtute inveniamus multos et varios effectus procedere, ostenditur nobis quod quilibet eius effectus deficit a virtute agentis. Nulla ergo forma alicuius effectus divini est per eamdem rationem, qua est in effectu in Deo: nihilominus oportet quod sit ibi per quemdam modum altiorem; et inde est quod omnes formae quae sunt in diversis effectibus distinctae et divisae ad invicem, in eo uniuntur sicut in una virtute communi, sicut etiam omnes formae per virtutem solis in istis inferioribus productae, sunt in sole secundum unicam eius virtutem, cui omnia generata per actionem solis secundum suas formas similantur. Et similiter perfectiones rerum creatarum assimilantur Deo secundum unicam et simplicem essentiam eius. Intellectus autem noster cum a rebus creatis cognitionem accipiat, informatur similitudinibus perfectionum in creaturis inventarum, sicut sapientiae, virtutis, bonitatis et huiusmodi. Unde sicut res creatae per suas perfectiones aliqualiter, —licet deficienter— Deo assimilantur, ita et intellectus noster harum perfectionum speciebus informatur. Quandocumque autem intellectus per suam formam intelligibilem alicui rei assimilatur, tunc illud quod concipit et enuntiat secundum illam intelligibilem speciem verificatur de re illa cui per suam speciem similatur: nam scientia est assimilatio intellectus ad rem scitam. Unde oportet quod illa quae intellectus, harum specierum perfectionibus informatus, de Deo cogitat vel enuntiat, in Deo vero existant, qui unicuique praedictarum specierum respondet sicut illud cui omnes similes sunt. Si autem huiusmodi intelligibilis species nostri intellectus divinam essentiam adaequaret in assimilando, ipsam comprehenderet, et ipsa conceptio intellectus esset perfecta Dei ratio, sicut animal gressibile bipes est perfecta ratio hominis. Non autem perfecte divinam essentiam assimilat species praedicta, ut dictum est; et ideo licet huiusmodi nomina, quae intellectus ex talibus conceptionibus Deo attribuit, significent id quod est divina substantia, non tamen perfecte ipsam significant secundum quod est, sed secundum quod a nobis intelligitur. Since every agent acts inasmuch as it is actual and consequently produces its like, the form of the thing produced must in some manner be in the agent: in different ways, however. When the effect is proportionate to the power of the agent, this form must be of the same kind in the maker and the thing made: for then maker and thing made are of the same species, and this is the case in all univocal causes: thus man begets a man, and fire generates fire. When, however, the effect is improportionate to the power of the cause, the form is not of the same kind in both maker and thing made, but is in the agent in a more eminent way. Because according as the form is in the agent, the latter has the power to produce the effect: so that if the whole power of the agent is not reflected in the thing made, it follows that the form is in the maker in a more eminent way than in the thing made. This is the case in all equivocal agents, for instance when the sun generates fire. Now it is plain that no effect equals the power of the first agent which is God, else only one effect would proceed from his one power. But seeing that from his one power many and various effects proceed, it is evident that every effect of his falls short of the power of its cause. Consequently no form of a divine effect is in the effect in the same degree as in God: and yet they must needs be in him in a more eminent way. Wherefore all forms which in the various effects are distinct and different from one another are united in him as in one common power: even so all the forms produced by the power of the sun in this lower world are in the sun in respect of its one power, to which all things generated by the sun’s action are assimilated as regards their forms. In like manner the perfections of creatures are assimilated to God in respect of his one simple essence. Since then our intellect takes its knowledge from creatures, it is informed with the likenesses of perfections observed in creatures, namely of wisdom, power, goodness and so forth. Wherefore just as creatures by their perfections are somewhat, albeit deficiently, like God, even so our intellect is informed with the species of these perfections. Now whenever an intellect is by its intelligible form assimilated to a thing, that which it conceives and affirms in accordance with that intelligible species is true of that thing to which it is assimilated by its species: inasmuch as knowledge is assimilation of the mind to the thing known. Hence it follows that whatsoever the intellect informed with the species of these perfections conceives or asserts about God, truly exists in God who corresponds to each one of these species inasmuch as they are all like him. Now if such an intelligible species of our intellect were equal to God in its likeness to him, our intellect would comprehend him, and the intellect’s conception would be a perfect definition of God, just as a walking animal biped is a perfect definition of a man. However, this species does not perfectly reflect the divine essence, as stated above, and therefore although these terms which our intellect attributes to God from such conceptions signify the divine essence, they do not signify it perfectly as it exists in itself, but as it is conceived by us. Sic ergo dicendum est, quod quodlibet istorum nominum significat divinam substantiam, non tamen quasi comprehendens ipsam, sed imperfecte: et propter hoc, nomen qui est, maxime Deo competit, quia non determinat aliquam formam Deo, sed significat esse indeterminate. Et hoc est quod dicit Damascenus, quod hoc nomen qui est, significat substantiae pelagus infinitum. Haec autem solutio confirmatur per verba Dionysii, qui dicit, quod quia divinitas omnia simpliciter et incircumfinite in seipsa existentia praeaccipit, ex diversis convenienter laudatur et nominatur. Simpliciter dicit, quia perfectiones quae in creaturis sunt secundum diversas formas, Deo attribuuntur secundum simplicem eius essentiam: incircumfinite dicit, ad ostendendum quod nulla perfectio in creaturis inventa divinam essentiam comprehendit, ut sic intellectus sub ratione illius perfectionis in seipso Deum definiat. Confirmatur etiam per hoc quod habetur V Metaph., quod simpliciter perfectum est quod habet in se perfectiones omnium generum; quod Commentator ibidem de Deo exponit. Accordingly we conclude that each of these terms signifies the divine essence, not comprehensively but imperfectly. Wherefore this name He Who Is is most becoming to God, since it does not ascribe any particular form to God, but signifies being without any limitation. This is the meaning of Damascene (De Fide Orthod. i, 12) when he says that the name He Who Is denotes “a boundless sea of substance.” This solution of the question is confirmed by the words of Dionysius (Div. Nom. i): Since all things are comprised in the Godhead simply and without limit, it is fitting that he should be praised and named on account of them all. Simply because the perfections which are in creatures by reason of various forms are ascribed to God in reference to his simple essence: without limit, because no perfection found in creatures is equal to the divine essence, so as to enable the mind under the head of that perfection to define God as he is in himself. A further confirmation may be found in Metaph. v, where it is stated that the simply perfect is that which contains the perfections of all genera: which words the Commentator expounds as referring to God. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Damascenus intelligit, quod huiusmodi nomina non significant quid est Deus, quasi eius substantiam definiendo et comprehendendo; unde et subiungit quod hoc nomen qui est, quod indefinite significat Dei substantiam, propriissime Deo attribuitur. Reply to the First Objection. Damascene means to say that these expressions do not signify what God is by defining and including his essence as it were: wherefore he goes on to say that this name He Who Is which denotes God’s essence indefinitely is most becomingly ascribed to God. Ad secundum dicendum, quod ita Dionysius dicit negationes horum nominum esse veras de Deo quod tamen non asserit affirmationes esse falsas et incompactas: quantum enim ad rem significatam, Deo vere attribuuntur, quae in eo aliquo modo est, ut iam ostensum est; sed quantum ad modum quem significant de Deo negari possunt: quodlibet enim istorum nominum significat aliquam formam definitam, et sic Deo non attribuuntur, ut dictum est. Et ideo absolute de Deo possunt negari, quia ei non conveniunt per modum qui significatur: modus enim significatus est secundum quod sunt in intellectu nostro, ut dictum est; Deo autem conveniunt sublimiori modo; unde affirmatio incompacta dicitur quasi non omnino convenienter coniuncta propter diversum modum. Et ideo, secundum doctrinam Dionysii, tripliciter ista de Deo dicuntur. Primo quidem affirmative, ut dicamus, Deus est sapiens; quod quidem de eo oportet dicere propter hoc quod est in eo similitudo sapientiae ab ipso fluentis: quia tamen non est in Deo sapientia qualem nos intelligimus et nominamus, potest vere negari, ut dicatur, Deus non est sapiens. Rursum quia sapientia non negatur de Deo quia ipse deficiat a sapientia, sed quia supereminentius est in ipso quam dicatur aut intelligatur, ideo oportet dicere quod Deus sit supersapiens. Et sic per istum triplicem modum loquendi secundum quem dicitur Deus sapiens, perfecte Dionysius dat intelligere qualiter ista Deo attribuantur. Reply to the Second Objection. Although Dionysius says that there is truth in denying these expressions of God he does not say that there is untruth in affirming them, but that their signification is vague: because as regards the thing signified they are truly ascribed to God, since in a way it is in him, as we have shown. But as regards their mode of signification they can be denied of God, since each of these terms denotes a definite form, and in this way they are not ascribed to God as we have already stated. Wherefore absolutely speaking they can be denied of God, because they are not becoming to him in the way signified: since this mode is according to the way in which they are in our intellect, as already stated, whereas they are becoming to God in a more eminent way. For this reason the affirmation of them is described as vague as being not altogether fitting on account of the difference of mode. Hence, according to the teaching of Dionysius (Myst. Theol. i; Coel. Hier. ii; Div. Nom. ii, iii), these terms are applied to God in three ways. First, affirmatively: for instance, God is wise: since we must needs say this of God because in him there is a likeness to the wisdom that derives from him.—Nevertheless seeing that wisdom in God is not such as that which we understand and name, it can be truly denied, so that we may say: God is not wise.—Again, since wisdom is not denied of God as though he were lacking in wisdom, but because in him it transcends the wisdom e indicate and name, we ought to say that God is super-wise. Accordingly Dionysius explains perfectly by these three ways of ascribing wisdom to God, how these expressions are to be applied to God. Ad tertium dicendum, quod ista nomina dicuntur significare divinos processus, quia primo sunt imposita ad significandum istas processiones secundum quod sunt in creaturis et ab earum similitudine intellectus noster manuducitur ut huiusmodi Deo eminentiori modo attribuat. Reply to the Third Objection. These expressions are said to denote the divine outpourings, because they are first employed to signify these outpourings as existing in creatures, while from the likeness thereof to God the human mind is led to ascribe the same expressions to God in a higher degree. Ad quartum dicendum, quod verbum Origenis non est intelligendum quod hoc intendimus significare cum dicimus, Deus est sapiens, quod Deus est causa sapientiae, sed quia ex sapientia quam causat, intellectus noster manuducitur ut sibi sapientiam supereminenter attribuat, ut dictum est. Reply to the Fourth Objection. The saying of Origen does not mean that when we say God is wise, the sense is that God is the cause of wisdom; but that as we have explained from the wisdom which he causes our intellect is led to ascribe supereminent wisdom to God. Ad quintum dicendum quod, cum dicitur Deus intelligens, nominatur nomine sui causati: quia nomen quod sui causati substantiam significat, sibi non definite attribui potest, secundum quem modum nomen significat; et sic hoc nomen quamvis ei aliquo modo conveniat, non tamen convenit ei ut nomen eius, quia id quod significat nomen, est definitio; causato vero convenit ut nomen eius. Reply to the Fifth Objection. When we say that God is intelligence, we name him after his effect. But a name that signifies the essence of his effect cannot be applied to him definitively in the same way as it signifies that essence. Wherefore this name, although it is applicable to him in a way, is not applicable as his name: since that which a name signifies is the definition. On the other hand it is applicable to the effect as its name. Ad sextum dicendum, quod ratio illa probat quod Deus non potest nominari nomine substantiam ipsius definiente vel comprehendente vel adaequante: sic enim de Deo ignoramus quid est. Reply to the Sixth Objection. This argument proves that we cannot give God a name that defines or includes or equals his essence since we do not know to that extent what God is. Ad septimum dicendum quod, sicut omnia participant Dei bonitatem, —non eamdem numero, sed per similitudinem— ita participant per similitudinem esse Dei. Sed in hoc differt: nam bonitas importat habitudinem alicuius causae, est enim bonum diffusivum sui; essentia autem significatur in eo in quo est, ut quiescens. Reply to the Seventh Objection. just as all things participate in God’s goodness not in identity but in likeness thereto so also do they participate in a likeness of God’s being. But there is a difference: for goodness implies the relationship of cause, since good is self-diffusive: whereas being connotes mere existence and quiescence. Ad octavum dicendum, quod in effectu invenitur aliquid per quod assimilatur suae causae, et aliquid per quod a sua causa differt: quod quidem convenit ei vel ex materia vel ex aliquo huiusmodi, sicut patet in latere indurato per ignem. Nam in hoc quod lutum calefiat ab igne, igni similatur; in hoc vero quod calefactum ingrossetur et induretur differt ab igne; sed habet hoc ex materiae conditione. Si ergo id in quo later igni similatur, de igne dicatur, proprie dicetur de eo, et eminentius et per prius. Ignis enim est calidior quam later, et iterum eminentius: nam later est calidus quasi calefactus, ignis autem naturaliter. Si vero id in quo later ab igne differt, dicamus de igne, falsum erit; et nomen huiusmodi conditionem in suo intellectu habens, de igne non poterit dici nisi metaphorice. Falsum est enim ignem, qui est subtilissimum corporum, grossum dici. Durus autem dici potest propter violentiam actionis, et non facilem potentiam passionis. Similiter consideranda sunt in creaturis quaedam secundum quae Deo similantur, quae quantum ad rem significatam, nullam imperfectionem important, sicut esse, vivere et intelligere et huiusmodi; et ista proprie dicuntur de Deo, immo per prius de ipso et eminentius quam de creaturis. Quaedam vero sunt secundum quae creatura differt a Deo, consequentia ipsam prout est ex nihilo, sicut potentialitas, privatio, motus et alia huiusmodi: et ista sunt falsa de Deo. Et quaecumque nomina in sui intellectu conditiones huiusmodi claudunt, de Deo dici non possunt nisi metaphorice, sicut leo, lapis et huiusmodi, propter hoc quod in sui definitione habent materiam. Dicuntur autem huiusmodi metaphorice de Deo propter similitudinem effectus. Reply to the Eighth Objection. An effect includes something whereby it is like its cause, and something whereby it differs therefrom: and this by reason of its matter or something of the kind. Take for example a brick hardened by fire: the clay is heated by the fire and thus becomes like the fire: then it is condensed and hardened, and this is due to the nature of the material. Accordingly if we ascribe to the fire that wherein the brick is likened to it, it will be ascribed to it properly in a more eminent degree and with priority: because fire is hotter than the brick: and it is hot in a more eminent way, since the brick is hot by being made hot, while the fire is hot by nature. On the other hand if we ascribe to the fire that wherein the brick differs from the fire, it will be untrue, and any term that signifies this condition of dissimilarity cannot be said of fire unless metaphorically. Thus it is false to say that fire, the most subtle of bodies, is dense. It can, however, be described as hard on account of the violence of its action, and the difficulty to quench it. Accordingly in creatures there are certain perfections whereby they are likened to God, and which as regards the thing signified do not denote any imperfection, such as being, life, understanding and so forth: and these are ascribed to God properly, in fact they are ascribed to him first and in a more eminent way than to creatures. And there are in creatures certain perfections wherein they differ from God, and which the creature owes to its being made from nothing, such as potentiality, privation, movement and the like. These are falsely ascribed to God: and whatsoever terms imply suchlike conditions cannot be ascribed to God otherwise than metaphorically, for instance lion, stone and so on, inasmuch as matter is included in their definition. They are, however, ascribed to him metaphorically by reason of a likeness in their effects. Ad nonum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de eo quod significat substantiam definitive vel circumscriptive. Sic autem nullum istorum nominum substantiam Dei significat, ut dictum est. Reply to the Ninth Objection. This argument considers that which signifies substance definitively and comprehensively: but none of these expressions denote the divine essence thus, as stated above. Ad decimum dicendum, quod quamvis huiusmodi perfectiones in Deo sint ipsa divina substantia, tamen in creatura non sunt substantiales praedictae divinae perfectiones, ideo secundum eas creaturae non dicuntur Deo eadem, sed similes. Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although these perfections; in God are his very substance, they are not the very substance of the creature, wherefore in their respect the creature is not said to be the same as God but like him. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod hoc esset contra naturam, si sapientia eiusdem rationis cum ea quae est accidens, in Deo esset: hoc autem non est verum, ut ex praedictis patet. Nec tamen auctoritas inducta est ad propositum: nihil enim contra naturam Deus facit in se ipso, quia in se ipso nihil facit. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. It would be contrary to nature if wisdom in God were of the same kind as that which is an accident: but this is not the case as we have already stated. Nor is the authority quoted to the point: for God makes nothing against nature in himself, because he makes nothing in himself. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod complexio huius termini, cum dicitur Deus bonus, non refertur ad aliquam compositionem quae sit in Deo, sed ad compositionem quae est in intellectu nostro. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. When we say God is good, this term good is complex not as reflecting any composition in God, but on account of the composition in our intellect. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod Deus subterfugit formam intellectus nostri quasi omnem formam intellectus nostri excedens; non autem ita quod intellectus noster secundum nullam formam intelligibilem Deo assimiletur. Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. God eludes the conception of our intellect because he transcends all that our mind conceives of him; but not so that our intellect is in no intelligible way likened to him. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod ex quo intellectus noster divinam substantiam non adaequat, hoc ipsum quod est Dei substantia remanet, nostrum intellectum excedens, et ita a nobis ignoratur: et propter hoc illud est ultimum cognitionis humanae de Deo quod sciat se Deum nescire, in quantum cognoscit, illud quod Deus est, omne ipsum quod de eo intelligimus, excedere. Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. It is because human intelligence is not equal to the divine essence that this same divine essence surpasses our intelligence and is unknown to us: wherefore man reaches the highest point of his knowledge about God when he knows that he knows him not, inasmuch as he knows that that which is God transcends whatsoever he conceives of him.
Are These Terms Synonymous?
[ Sum. Th. I, Q. xiii, A. 4: C.G. I, 35]
Sexto quaeritur utrum ista nomina sint synonyma. Et videtur quod sic. THE sixth point of inquiry is whether these terms are synonymous: and apparently they are. Synonyma enim nomina dicuntur quae omnino idem significant. Sed omnia ista nomina de Deo dicta significant idem: quia significant divinam substantiam, quae est omnino simplex et una, ut ostensum est. Ergo omnia ista nomina sunt synonyma. 1. Synonyms are terms that have exactly the same meaning. Now all these terms when applied to God signify the same thing: for they denote the divine essence, which is altogether simple and one, as we have proved. Therefore, these terms are all synonymous. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit quod in divinis omnia sunt unum, praeter ingenerationem, generationem et processionem. Sed nomina significantia unum sunt synonyma. Ergo omnia nomina dicta de Deo, praeter ea quae significant proprietates personales, sunt synonyma. 2. Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i. ii) that in God A things are one except ingenerability, generation and procession. Now terms that signify the same are synonymous. Therefore all the terms applied to God, except those that signify personal properties are synonyms. Praeterea, quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, sibi invicem sunt eadem. Sed sapientia in Deo est idem quod sua substantia; similiter voluntas et potentia. Ergo sapientia, potentia et voluntas in Deo omnino sunt idem, et sic sequitur quod ista nomina sunt synonyma. 3. Things that are identical with one and the same thing are identical with one another. Now in God wisdom is identical with his substance, and so also are his will and his power. Wherefore in God wisdom, power and will are absolutely the same thing: and thus these terms are synonymous. Sed dicendum, quod ista nomina significant unum secundum rem, significant tamen rationes diversas, et ideo non sunt synonyma. —Sed contra: ratio cui non respondet aliquid in re, falsa est et vana. Sed si rationes horum nominum sint multae, et res est una, videtur quod rationes istae sint vanae et falsae. 4. It will be replied that these terms signify one thing indeed, but from different points of view, and therefore are not synonyms.—On the contrary a point of view that has no objective reality is untrue and futile: so that if there are many such points of view, while the thing itself is only one, it would seem that these points of view are futile and false. Sed dicendum, quod rationes istae non sunt vanae, cum eis aliquid respondeat quod est in Deo. —Sed contra, secundum hoc res creatae Deo assimilantur secundum quod ab ipso processerunt per similitudinem idealem. Sed pluralitas idearum vel rationum idealium non attenditur secundum respectus ad creaturas: nam ipse Deus secundum unam suam essentiam est idea omnium. Ergo nec rationes nominum quae de Deo dicimus, ex similitudine creaturarum, habent aliquid respondens ex parte divinae substantiae. 5. But someone will reply that these points of view are not futile, since something in God corresponds to them.—On the contrary creatures are likened to God inasmuch as they were made by him in likeness to his idea. Now plurality of ideas or points of view does not connote a plurality of relations in God to the creature: since by his essence he is the idea of all things. Neither then does anything in the divine essence correspond to the points of view from which we describe God from his likeness to his creatures. Praeterea, illud quod est maxime unum non potest esse radix et fundamentum multitudinis. Sed divina essentia est maxime una. Ergo rationes praedictorum nominum non possunt in divina substantia fundari vel radicari. 6. That which is supremely one cannot be the root and foundation of multitude. Now the divine essence is supremely one. Therefore it cannot be the root and foundation of the different points of view of these expressions. Praeterea, distinctio relationum quae realiter sunt in Deo, facit pluralitatem personarum. Si ergo istis rationibus communibus attributorum aliquid responderet in Deo, etiam secundum multitudinem attributorum esset in Deo multitudo personarum; et sic essent in Deo plures personae quam tres; quod est haereticum: et ita videtur quod penitus ista nomina sint synonyma. 7. Difference of relations that are really in God, causes a distinction of Persons. If then something in God corresponds to the mutual relations of the attributes there would be a number of persons corresponding to the number of attributes: and thus there would be more than three persons in God which is heretical. Wherefore seemingly these expressions are altogether synonymous. Sed contra. Nomina synonyma sibi invicem adiuncta nugationem inducunt sicut si diceretur, vestis et indumentum. Si ergo ista nomina sint synonyma, erit nugatio, cum Deus dicitur bonus, Deus sapiens: quod est falsum. On the contrary it is futile to put words together that are synonymous, for instance, clothes and garments. If then these words are synonymous it will be futile to say God is good, God is wise: but this is not so. Praeterea, quicumque negat unum synonymorum de aliquo, negat et reliquum. Sed aliqui negaverunt eius potentiam qui non negaverunt eius scientiam vel bonitatem. Ergo ista nomina non sunt synonyma. Again, to deny one synonym about anything is to deny the others. Yet some have denied God’s power without denying his knowledge or goodness. Therefore these words are not synonymous. Praeterea, hoc patet per Commentatorem XI Metaph., qui dicit, quod haec nomina dicta de Deo non sunt synonyma. Again, this is proved from the Commentator who says (Metaph. xi) that these expressions when applied to God are not synonymous. Respondeo. Dicendum quod ab omnibus intelligentibus communiter dicitur, quod haec nomina non sunt synonyma. Quod quidem facile esset sustinere secundum illos qui dicebant haec nomina non significare divinam substantiam, sed intentiones quasdam additas essentiales, aut modos operandi in effectibus, vel etiam creaturarum negationes. Sed supposito quod haec nomina significent divinam substantiam, sicut supra ostensum est, quaestio videtur maiorem difficultatem continere: quia sic invenitur unum et idem simplex significatum per omnia ista nomina, quod est divina substantia. Sed sciendum quod significatio nominis non immediate refertur ad rem, sed mediante intellectu: sunt enim voces notae earum quae sunt in anima passionum, et ipsae intellectus conceptiones sunt rerum similitudines, ut patet per philosophum in principio Periherm. I answer that all those who have considered the question are agreed in saying that these terms are not synonymous. This view offers no difficulty to those who held that these expressions signify not God’s essence, but certain notions added to his essence, or modes of the divine action in its effects, or the denial of what they signify in creatures. But given that they signify the divine essence, as we have proved (A. 5), the question would seem to present considerable difficulty: since then we have all these terms with one simple signification, namely the divine essence. But it must be observed that the signification of a term does not refer to the thing immediately but through the medium of the mind: because words are the tokens of the soul’s impressions, and the conceptions of the mind. are images of things, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i). Quod ergo aliqua nomina non sint synonyma, potest impediri vel ex parte rerum significatarum, vel ex parte rationum intellectarum per nomina, ad quas significandas nomina imponuntur. Horum ergo nominum quae de Deo dicuntur, synonyma impediri non possunt per diversitatem rerum significatarum secundum praehabita, sed solum per rationes nominum quae sequuntur conceptiones intellectuum. Et ideo dicit Commentator XI metaphysicorum, quod multiplicitas in Deo est solum secundum differentiam in intellectu, et non in esse, quod nos dicimus unum secundum rem, et multa secundum rationem. Istae autem diversae rationes in intellectu nostro existentes, non possunt tales rationes esse quibus nihil respondeat ex parte rei: ea enim quorum sunt istae rationes, intellectus noster Deo attribuit. Unde si nihil esset in Deo vel secundum ipsum vel secundum eius effectum, quod his rationibus responderet, intellectus esset falsus in attribuendo, et omnes propositiones huiusmodi attributiones significantes; quod est inconveniens. Sunt autem quaedam rationes quibus in re intellecta nihil respondet; sed ea quorum sunt huiusmodi rationes, intellectus non attribuit rebus prout in se ipsis sunt, sed solum prout intellectae sunt; sicut patet in ratione generis et speciei, et aliarum intentionum intellectualium: nam nihil est in rebus quae sunt extra animam, cuius similitudo sit ratio generis vel speciei. Nec tamen intellectus est falsus: quia ea quorum sunt istae rationes, scilicet genus et species, non attribuit rebus secundum quod sunt extra animam, sed solum secundum quod sunt in intellectu. Ex hoc enim quod intellectus in se ipsum reflectitur, sicut intelligit res existentes extra animam, ita intelligit eas esse intellectas: et sic, sicut est quaedam conceptio intellectus vel ratio, —cui respondet res ipsa quae est extra animam— ita est quaedam conceptio vel ratio, cui respondet res intellecta secundum quod huiusmodi; sicut rationi hominis vel conceptioni hominis respondet res extra animam; rationi vero vel conceptioni generis aut speciei, respondet solum res intellecta. Non autem est possibile huiusmodi esse rationes horum nominum quae de Deo dicuntur: quia sic intellectus non attribueret ea Deo secundum quod in se est, sed secundum quod intelligitur; quod patet esse falsum: esset enim sensus, cum dicitur Deus est bonus, quod Deus sic intelligitur non autem quod sit. Now terms may be hindered from being synonymous either by reason of the things signified, or on the part of the notion conveyed by the term and to signify which the term is employed. Wherefore the terms which are applied to God cannot be hindered from being synonymous by reason of their signifying different things, according to what has been said above, but only by the various aspects consequent to the conception of the mind. Hence the Commentator (Metaph. xi) says that multiplicity in God is, only according to differences in the intellect and not in being, and we express the same when we say that he is one in reality and many things logically. Now these various aspects which are in our mind cannot be such that nothing corresponds to them on the part of the thing: since the things which these aspects regard are ascribed to God by the mind. Wherefore if there were nothing in God, either in himself or in his effect, corresponding to these points of view, the intellect would be in error in attributing them to him, and all propositions expressive of such attributions would be false; which is inadmissible. Now there are certain aspects to which nothing corresponds in the thing understood: but the things thus conceived the mind does not attribute to things as they are in themselves, but only as they are understood: for example, the aspect of genus or species and other intellectual ‘intentions’; since in the things themselves that are outside the mind there is nothing that is a likeness of the notion of genus or species. And yet the intellect is not in error: for the things reflected by these notions, namely genus and species, are not attributed by the intellect to things as existing outside the mind but only as existing therein. Because just as the intellect understands things existing outside the mind, so does it, by reflecting on itself, understand that it understands them: wherefore just as the intellect has a conception or notion to which the thing as existing outside the mind corresponds, so has it a conception or notion to which the thing corresponds as,understood: for instance, to the notion or conception of a man there corresponds the thing outside the mind, while nothing but the thing as understood corresponds to the notion or conception of the genus or species. But it is impossible that such be the meaning of these expressions that are applied to God: for in that case the intellect would not attribute them to him as he is in himself but as he is understood: and this is plainly false; for when we say God is good, the sense would be that we think him to be so, but that he is not so in reality. Et ideo dicunt quidam, quod istis diversis rationibus nominum respondent diversa connotata, quae sunt diversi Dei effectus: volunt enim quod cum dicitur, Deus est bonus, significetur eius essentia cum aliquo effectu connotato, ut sit sensus, Deus est et bonitatem causat: sicut diversitas harum rationum causatur ex diversitate effectuum. Sed hoc non videtur conveniens: quia cum effectus a causa secundum similitudinem procedat, prius oportet intelligere causam aliqualem quam effectus tales. Non ergo sapiens dicitur Deus quoniam sapientiam causet, sed quia est sapiens, ideo sapientiam causat. Unde Augustinus dicit, quod quia Deus est bonus, sumus; et in quantum sumus, boni sumus. Et praeterea secundum hoc sequeretur quod huiusmodi nomina per prius dicerentur de creatura quam de creatore; sicut sanitas prius dicitur de sano quam de sanativo, quod sanum dicitur ea ratione, quia sanitatem causat. Item si nihil aliud intelligitur, cum dicitur Deus est bonus nisi Deus est et est bonitatis causator: sequeretur quod eadem ratione omnia nomina effectuum divinorum de eo possent praedicari, ut diceretur, Deus est caelum, quia caelum causat. Et iterum si hoc dicatur de causalitate in actu, patet esse falsum: quia secundum hoc non possumus dicere quod Deus ab aeterno fuerit bonus vel sapiens vel aliquid huiusmodi: non enim ab aeterno fuit causa in actu. Si autem hoc intelligatur de causalitate secundum virtutem,- ut dicatur bonus quia est et habet virtutem bonitatem infundendi,- tunc oportebit dicere, quod hoc nomen bonum significat illam virtutem. Sed illa virtus est quaedam supereminens similitudo sui effectus, sicut et quaelibet virtus agentis aequivoci. Unde sequeretur quod intellectus concipiens bonitatem, assimilaretur ad id quod est in Deo et quod est Deus. Et sic rationi vel conceptioni bonitatis respondet aliquid quod est in Deo et quod est Deus. Accordingly some hold that the meanings of these terms connote various corresponding divine effects: for they maintain that when we say God is good, we indicate God’s essence together with a connoted effect, the sense being God is and causes goodness, so that the difference in these attributions arises from the difference in his effects. But this does not seem right: because seeing that an effect proceeds in likeness to its cause, we must needs understand a cause to be such before its effects are such. Wherefore God is not called wise because he is the cause of wisdom: but because he is wise, therefore does he cause wisdom. Hence Augustine says (De Doct. Christ. ii, 32) that because God is good, therefore we exist, and inasmuch as we exist we are good. Moreover according to this view it would follow that these expressions are attributed to the creature before the Creator: just as health is attributed first to a healthy man and afterwards to that which gives health, since the latter is called healthy through being a cause of health.—Again if when we say God is good we mean nothing more than God is and is the cause of goodness, it would follow that we could equally predicate of him the names of all the divine effects, for instance, that God is heaven since he is the cause of heaven. —Again this is clearly false if it refer to actual causality: because then we could not say that God was good, wise or the like from eternity, for he did not cause things actually from eternity. If on the other hand it refer to virtual causality, so that God be called good because he is and has the power to infuse goodness; then we shall have to say that the term good signifies that power. Now that power is a supereminent likeness of its effect even as the power of any equivocal agent. Thus it would follow that the intellect in conceiving goodness is like that which is in God and is God: so that something that is in God and that is God corresponds to the notion or conception of goodness. Et ideo dicendum est quod omnes istae multae rationes et diversae habent aliquid respondens in ipso Deo, cuius omnes istae conceptiones intellectus sunt similitudines. Constat enim quod unius formae non potest esse nisi una similitudo secundum speciem, quae sit eiusdem rationis cum ea; possunt tamen esse diversae similitudines imperfectae, quarum quaelibet a perfecta formae repraesentatione deficiat. Cum ergo, ut ex superioribus patet, conceptiones perfectionum in creaturis inventarum, sint imperfectae similitudines et non eiusdem rationis cum ipsa divina essentia, nihil prohibet quin ipsa una essentia omnibus praedictis conceptionibus respondeat, quasi per eas imperfecte repraesentata. Et sic omnes rationes sunt quidem in intellectu nostro sicut in subiecto: sed in Deo sunt ut in radice verificante has conceptiones. Nam non essent verae conceptiones intellectus quas habet de re aliqua, nisi per viam similitudinis illis conceptionibus res illa responderet. Diversitatis ergo vel multiplicitatis nominum causa est ex parte intellectus nostri, qui non potest pertingere ad illam Dei essentiam videndam secundum quod est, sed videt eam per multas similitudines eius deficientes, in creaturis quasi in speculo resultantes. Unde si ipsam essentiam videret, non indigeret pluribus nominibus, nec indigeret pluribus conceptionibus. We must say then that all these many and diverse notions correspond to something in God of which they are likenesses. For it is plain that one form can have but one specific likeness proportionate to it: while there can be many imperfect likenesses, each one of which falls short of a perfect representation of the form. Since then, as we have proved above, the ideas we conceive of the perfections; we observe in creatures are imperfect and improportionate likenesses of the divine essence, nothing prevents the same one essence from corresponding to all these ideas, as being imperfectly represented thereby. So that all these conceptions are in the mind as their subject, but in God, as the foundation of their truth. For the idea that the intellect has of a thing is not true unless that thing corresponds to the idea by its likeness to it. Accordingly the cause of difference or multiplicity in these expressions is on the part of the intellect, which is unable to compass the vision of that divine essence in itself, but sees it through many faulty likenesses thereof which are reflected by creatures as by a mirror. Whereof if it saw that very essence, it would not need to use many terms, nor would it need many conceptions. Et propter hoc, Dei verbum, quod est perfecta conceptio ipsius, non est nisi unum; propter hoc dicitur Zach. XIV, 9: in die illa erit dominus unus et erit nomen eius unum, quando ipsa Dei essentia videbitur et non colligetur Dei cognitio ex creaturis. ‘For this reason God’s Word, which is his perfect concept, is but one: wherefore it is written (Zach. xiv, 9): In that day there shall be one Lord, and his name will be one —when God’s very essence will be seen, and knowledge of God will not be gathered from creatures. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod licet ista nomina significent unam rem, multis tamen rationibus, ut dictum est; et propter hoc non sunt synonyma. Reply to the First Objection. These terms signify one thing indeed, but under different aspects, as stated above: hence they are not synonyms Ad secundum dicendum, quod Damascenus intelligit quod in divinis omnia sunt unum secundum rem, praeter proprietates personales quae realem personarum distinctionem constituunt; tamen non excludit quin ea quae de Deo dicuntur, ratione differant. Reply to the Second Objection. Damascene means that in God all things are one in reality except the personal properties which constitute a real distinction of Persons: but he does not deny a logical difference in the terms that are attributed to God. Ad tertium per hoc patet responsio: quia sicut bonitas et sapientia sunt unum secundum rem cum divina essentia, ita et ad invicem; cum tamen rationes horum nominum differant, ut dictum est. The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has just been said: because as wisdom and goodness are in reality the same as the divine essence, so are they identical with each other: and yet they differ logically, as stated. Ad quartum dicendum, quod iam patet ex praedictis quod licet Deus sit omnino unus, tamen istae multae conceptiones vel rationes non sunt falsae, quia omnibus eis respondet una et eadem res imperfecte per eas repraesentata. Essent autem falsae, si nihil eis responderet. Reply to the Fourth Objection. It has already been explained that though God is absolutely one, yet these many concepts or notions are not false, because to all of them one and the same thing corresponds albeit imperfectly represented by them: but they would be false if nothing corresponded to them. Ad quintum dicendum, quod cum omnimoda unitas sit ex parte Dei, et multiplicitas ex parte creaturarum, sicut oportet quod in Deo intelligente plures creaturas sit una forma intelligibilis per essentiam, et multi respectus ad diversas creaturas; ita in intellectu nostro ex multiplicitate creaturarum in Deum ascendente, oportet quod sint multae species habentes relationes ad unum Deum. Reply to the Fifth Objection. Since in God there is absolute unity, and multiplicity in creatures, just as God understands many creatures by one intelligible species which is his essence, while there is a manifold relationship of God to creatures: even so in our intellect which mounts up to God from the multiplicity of creatures, there must be many species having relations to one God. Ad sextum dicendum, quod istae rationes non fundantur in divina essentia sicut in subiecto, sed sicut in causa veritatis, vel sicut in repraesentato per omnes; quod eius simplicitati non derogat. Reply to the Sixth Objection. These different aspects are founded on the divine essence not as their subject but as on the source of truth, or as on that which is represented by all of them: and this is not in conflict with God’s simplicity. Ad septimum dicendum, quod paternitas et filiatio habent oppositionem ad invicem; et ideo exigunt realem distinctionem suppositorum: non autem bonitas et sapientia. Reply to the Seventh Objection. Paternity and Sonship are mutually opposed: so that they require a real distinction of supposits: whereas goodness and wisdom are not opposite to each other.
Are These Terms Ascribed Univocally Or Equivocally to God and the Creature?
[ Sum. Th. I, Q. xiii, A. 5: C.G. I, xxxii seqq.]
Septimo quaeritur utrum huiusmodi nomina dicantur de Deo et creaturis univoce vel aequivoce. Et videtur quod univoce. THE seventh point of inquiry is whether these terms are attributed to God and creatures univocally or equivocally. [And it seems univocally.] Mensura enim et mensuratum sunt unius rationis. Sed divina bonitas est mensura omnis bonitatis creaturae, et eius sapientia omnis sapientiae. Ergo univoce dicuntur de Deo et creatura. 1. Measure and the thing measured must be in the same genus. Now God’s goodness is the measure of all created goodness, and the same applies to his wisdom. Therefore they are said of creatures univocally. Praeterea, similia sunt quae communicant in forma. Sed creatura potest Deo similari; quod patet Genes. I, 26: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. Ergo creaturae ad Deum est aliqua communicatio in forma. De omnibus autem communicantibus in forma potest aliquid univoce praedicari. Ergo de Deo et creatura potest aliquid praedicari univoce. 2. Things are like which have a common form. Now the creature can be likened to God, according to Genesis i, 26, Let us make man to our own image and likeness. Therefore there is a community of form between God and the creature. Now something can be predicated univocally of things that have a common form. Therefore something can be predicated univocally of God and the creature. Praeterea, maius et minus non diversificant speciem. Sed cum creatura dicatur bona et Deus bonus, in hoc videtur differre quod Deus est melior omni creatura. Ergo bonitas Dei et creaturae non diversificatur secundum speciem; et sic univoce bonum praedicatur de Deo et creatura. 3. More or less makes no difference in the species. Now whereas God is called good and the creature also is called good, the difference seems to be that God is better than the creature. Therefore goodness in God and the creature is of the same species and consequently is predicated univocally of both. Praeterea, inter ea quae sunt diversorum generum non potest esse comparatio, sicut philosophus probat: non enim comparabilis est velocitas alterationis velocitati motus localis. Sed inter Deum et creaturam attenditur aliqua comparatio: dicitur enim quod Deus est summe bonus, et creatura est bona. Ergo Deus et creatura sunt unius generis, et ita aliquid de eis potest univoce praedicari. 4. There is no comparison possible between things of different genera, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vii), thus we cannot compare the speed of alteration with the speed of local movement. But we compare God to the creature: thus we say that God is supremely good, and that the creature is good. Therefore God, and the creature are in the same genus and consequently something can be predicated of them univocally. Praeterea, nihil cognoscitur nisi per speciem unius rationis; non enim albedo quae est in pariete per speciem quae est in oculo cognosceretur, nisi esset unius rationis. Sed Deus per suam bonitatem cognoscit omnia entia, et sic de aliis. Ergo bonitas Dei et creaturae sunt unius rationis, et sic univoce bonum de Deo et creatura praedicatur. 5. Nothing can be known except through a homogeneous species: thus whiteness in a wall would not be known by its image in the eye unless the two were homogeneous. Now God by his goodness knows all beings, and so forth. Therefore God’s goodness and the creature’s are homogeneous: and consequently good is predicated univocally of God and the creature. Praeterea, domus quae est in mente artificis et domus quae est in materia, sunt unius rationis. Sed omnes creaturae processerunt a Deo sicut artificiata ab artifice. Ergo bonitas quae est in Deo, est unius rationis cum bonitate quae est in creatura; et sic idem quod prius. 6. The house that the builder has in his mind and the material house are homogeneous. Now all creatures came from God as a work proceeds from the craftsman. Therefore goodness that is in God is homogeneous with the goodness that is in the creature: wherefore we come to the same conclusion as before. Praeterea, omne agens aequivocum reducitur ad aliquid univocum. Ergo primum agens, quod Deus est, oportet esse univocum. Sed de agente univoco et effectu eius proprio aliquid univoce praedicatur. Ergo de Deo et creatura praedicatur aliquid univoce. 7. Every equivocal agent is reduced to something univocal. Therefore the first agent which is God must be univocal. Now something is predicated univocally of a univocal agent and its proper effect. Therefore something is predicated univocally of God and the creature. Sed contra. Est quod philosophus dicit, quod aeterno et temporali nihil est commune nisi nomen. Sed Deus est aeternus, et creaturae temporales. Ergo Deo et creaturis nihil potest esse commune nisi nomen; et sic praedicantur aequivoce pure nomina de Deo et creaturis. 1. On the contrary the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 7) that nothing except in name is common to the eternal and the temporal. Now God is eternal and creatures temporal. Therefore nothing but a name can be common to God and creatures: and consequently these terms are predicated equivocally of God and the creature. Praeterea, cum genus sit prima pars definitionis, ablato genere removetur significata ratio per nomen; unde si aliquod nomen imponatur ad significandum id quod est in alio, erit nomen aequivocum. Sed sapientia dicta de creatura est in genere qualitatis. Cum ergo sapientia dicta de Deo non sit qualitas, ut supra ostensum est, videtur quod hoc nomen sapientia aequivoce praedicetur de Deo et creaturis. 2. Since the genus is the first part of a definition, a difference of genus causes equivocation: so that if a term be employed to signify something in different genera it will be equivocal. Now wisdom as attributed to a creature is in the genus of quality: wherefore seeing that it is not a quality in God, as we have shown, it would seem that this word wisdom is predicated equivocally of God and his creatures. Praeterea, ubi nulla est similitudo, ibi non potest aliquid communiter praedicari, nisi aequivoce. Sed inter creaturam et Deum nulla est similitudo; dicitur enim Is., XL, 18: cui ergo similem fecistis Deum? Ergo videtur quod nihil possit praedicari univoce de Deo et creaturis. 3. Nothing can be predicated except equivocally of things that are in no way alike. Now there is no likeness between creatures and God: for it is written (Isa. xl, 18): To whom then have you likened God? Therefore seemingly nothing can be predicated univocally of God and creatures. Sed dicendum, quod licet Deus non possit dici similis creaturae, creatura tamen potest dici similis Deo. —Sed contra est quod dicitur Psal. LXXXII, 2: Deus, quis similis erit tibi? Quasi dicat, nullus. 4. But it will be replied that although God cannot be said to be like a creature, a creature can be said to be like God. —On the contrary, it is written (Ps. lxxxii, 2): O God, who shall be like to thee? as if to say: None . Praeterea, secundum accidens non potest esse aliquid simile substantiae. Sed sapientia in creatura est accidens, in Deo autem est substantia. Ergo homo non potest divinae sapientiae similari per suam sapientiam. 5. A thing cannot be like a substance in respect of an accident. Now wisdom in a creature is an accident, and in God is the substance. Therefore man cannot be like God by his wisdom. Praeterea, cum in creatura aliud sit esse, et aliud sit forma vel natura, per formam vel naturam nihil similatur ei quod est esse. Sed ista nomina praedicata de creaturis significant aliquam naturam vel formam: Deus autem est hoc ipsum quod est suum esse. Ergo per huiusmodi quae dicuntur de creatura, non potest creatura Deo similari; et sic idem quod prius. 6. Since in a creature being is distinct from form or nature, nothing can be like being itself by its form or nature. Now these terms when predicated of a creature signify a form or nature: while God is his own very being. Therefore a creature cannot be like God by these things that are predicated of a creature: and thus the same conclusion follows as before. Praeterea, magis differt Deus a creatura quam numerus ab albedine. Sed stultum est dicere numerum similari albedini, aut e converso. Ergo stultius est dici, quod aliqua creatura sit similis Deo; et sic idem quod prius. 7. God differs more from a creature than number from whiteness. But it is absurd to liken a number to whiteness or vice versa. Therefore still more absurd is it to liken a creature to God: and again the same conclusion follows. Praeterea, quaecumque similantur ad invicem, in aliquo uno conveniunt; quae vero in uno conveniunt, sunt transmutabilia invicem. Deus autem est omnino intransmutabilis. Ergo non potest esse aliqua similitudo inter Deum et creaturam. 8. Things that are like have some one thing in common: and things that have one thing in common have a common predicate. But nothing whatever can be predicated in common with God. Therefore there can be no likeness between God and the creature. Respondeo. Dicendum quod impossibile est aliquid univoce praedicari de Deo et creatura; quod ex hoc patet: nam omnis effectus agentis univoci adaequat virtutem agentis. Nulla autem creatura, cum sit finita, potest adaequare virtutem primi agentis, cum sit infinita. Unde impossibile est quod similitudo Dei univoce in creatura recipiatur. Item patet quod, etsi una sit ratio formae existentis in agente et in effectu, diversus tamen modus existendi impedit univocam praedicationem; licet enim eadem sit ratio domus quae sit in materia et domus quae est in mente artificis,- quia unum est ratio alterius,- non tamen domus univoce de utraque praedicatur, propter hoc quod species domus in materia habet esse materiale, in mente vero artificis immateriale. Dato ergo per impossibile quod eiusdem rationis sit bonitas in Deo et creatura, non tamen bonum univoce de Deo praedicaretur; cum quod in Deo est immaterialiter et simpliciter, in creatura sit materialiter et multipliciter. Et praeterea ens non dicitur univoce de substantia et accidente, propter hoc quod substantia est ens tamquam per se habens esse, accidens vero tamquam cuius esse est inesse. Ex quo patet quod diversa habitudo ad esse impedit univocam praedicationem entis. Deus autem alio modo se habet ad esse quam aliqua alia creatura; nam ipse est suum esse, quod nulli alii creaturae competit. Unde nullo modo univoce de Deo creatura dicitur; et per consequens nec aliquid aliorum praedicabilium inter quae est ipsum primum ens. Existente enim diversitate in primo, oportet in aliis diversitatem inveniri; unde de substantia et accidente nihil univoce praedicatur. I answer that it is impossible for anything to be predicated univocally of God and a creature: this is made plain as follows. Every effect of an univocal agent is adequate to the agent’s power: and no creature, being finite, can be adequate to the power of the first agent which is infinite. Wherefore it is impossible for a creature to receive a likeness to God univocally. Again it is clear that although the form in the agent and the form in the effect have a common ratio, the fact that they have different modes of existence precludes their univocal predication: thus though the material house is of the same type as the house in the mind of the builder, since the one is the type of the other; nevertheless house cannot be univocally predicated of both, because the form of the material house has its being in matter, whereas in the builder’s mind it has immaterial being. Hence granted the impossibility that goodness in God and in the creature be of the same kind, nevertheless good would not be predicated of God univocally: since that which in God is immaterial and simple, is in the creature material and manifold. Moreover being is not predicated univocally of substance and accident, because substance is a being as subsisting in itself, while accident is that whose being is to be in something else. Wherefore it is evident that a different relation to being precludes an univocal predication of being. Now God’s relation to being is different from that of any creature’s: for he is his own being, which cannot be said of any creature. Hence in no way can it be predicated univocally of God and a creature, and consequently neither can any of the other predicables among which is included even the first, being: for if there be diversity in the first, there must be diversity in the others: wherefore nothing is predicated univocally of substance and accident. Quidam autem aliter dixerunt, quod de Deo et creatura nihil praedicatur analogice, sed aequivoce pure. Et huius opinionis est Rabbi Moyses, ut ex suis dictis patet. Ista autem opinio non potest esse vera: quia in pure aequivocis, quae philosophus nominat a casu aequivoca, non dicitur aliquid de uno per respectum ad alterum. Omnia autem quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis, dicuntur de Deo secundum aliquem respectum ad creaturas, vel e contrario, sicut patet per omnes opiniones positas de expositione divinorum nominum. Unde impossibile est quod sit pura aequivocatio. Item, cum omnis cognitio nostra de Deo ex creaturis sumatur, si non erit convenientia nisi in nomine tantum, nihil de Deo sciremus nisi nomina tantum vana, quibus res non subesset. Sequeretur etiam quod omnes demonstrationes a philosophis datae de Deo, essent sophisticae; verbi gratia, si dicatur, quod omne quod est in potentia, reducitur ad actum per ens actu,- et ex hoc concluderetur quod Deus esset ens actu, cum per ipsum omnia in esse educantur,- erit fallacia aequivocationis; et sic de omnibus aliis. Et praeterea oportet causatum esse aliqualiter simile causae; unde oportet de causato et causa nihil pure aequivoce praedicari, sicut sanum de medicina et animali. Others, however, took a different view, and held that nothing is predicated of God and a creature by analogy but by pure equivocation. This is the opinion of Rabbi Moses, as appears from his writings. This opinion, however, is false, because in all purely equivocal terms which the Philosopher calls equivocal by chance, a term is predicated of a thing without any respect to something else: whereas all things predicated of God and creatures are predicated of God with a certain respect to creatures or vice versa, and this is clearly admitted in all the aforesaid explanations of the divine names. Wherefore they cannot be pure equivocations. Again, since all our knowledge of God is taken from creatures, if the agreement were purely nominal, we should know nothing about God except empty expressions to which nothing corresponds in reality. Moreover, it would follow that all the proofs advanced about God by philosophers are sophisms: for instance, if one were to argue that whatsoever is in potentiality is reduced to actuality by something actual and that therefore God is actual being, since all things are brought into being by him, there will be a fallacy of equivocation; and similarly in all other arguments. And again the effect must in some way be like its cause, wherefore nothing is predicated equivocally of cause and effect; for instance, health of medicine and an animal. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod de Deo et creatura nihil praedicetur univoce; non tamen ea quae communiter praedicantur, pure aequivoce praedicantur, sed analogice. Huius autem praedicationis duplex est modus. Unus quo aliquid praedicatur de duobus per respectum ad aliquod tertium, sicut ens de qualitate et quantitate per respectum ad substantiam. Alius modus est quo aliquid praedicatur de duobus per respectum unius ad alterum, sicut ens de substantia et quantitate. In primo autem modo praedicationis oportet esse aliquid prius duobus, ad quod ambo respectum habent, sicut substantia ad quantitatem et qualitatem; in secundo autem non, sed necesse est unum esse prius altero. Et ideo cum Deo nihil sit prius, sed ipse sit prior creatura, competit in divina praedicatione secundus modus analogiae, et non primus. We must accordingly take a different view and hold that nothing is predicated univocally of God and the creature: but that those things which are attributed to them in common are predicated not equivocally but analogically. Now this kind of predication is twofold. The first is when one thing is predicated of two with respect to a third: thus being is predicated of quantity and quality with respect to substance. The other is when a thing is predicated of two by reason of a relationship between these two: thus being is predicated of substance and quantity. In the first kind of predication the two things must be preceded by something to which each of them bears some relation: thus substance has a respect to quantity and quality: whereas in the second kind of predication this is not necessary, but one of the two must precede the other. Wherefore since nothing precedes God, but he precedes the creature, the second kind of analogical predication is applicable to him but not the first. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de mensura cui mensuratum potest coaequari vel commensurari; talis autem mensura non est Deus, cum in infinitum omnia excedat per ipsum mensurata. Reply to the First Objection. This argument avails in the case of a measure to which the thing measured can be equal or commensurate: but God is not a measure of this kind since he infinitely surpasses all that is measured by him. Ad secundum dicendum, quod similitudo creaturae ad Deum deficit a similitudine univocorum in duobus. Primo, quia non est per participationem unius formae, sicut duo calida secundum participationem unius caloris; hoc enim quod de Deo et creaturis dicitur, praedicatur de Deo per essentiam, de creatura vero per participationem; ut sic talis similitudo creaturae ad Deum intelligatur, qualis est calidi ad calorem, non qualis calidi ad calidius. Secundo, quia ipsa forma in creatura participata deficit a ratione eius quod Deus est, sicut calor ignis deficit a ratione virtutis solaris, per quam calorem generat. Reply to the Second Objection. The likeness of the creature to God falls short of univocal. likeness in two respects. First it does not arise from the participation of one form, as two hot things are like by participation of one heat: because what is affirmed, of God and creatures is predicated of him essentially, but of creatures, by participation: so that a creature’s likeness to God is as that of a hot thing to heat, not of a hot thing to one that is hotter. Secondly, because this very form of which the creature participates falls short of the nature of the thing which is God just as the heat of fire falls short of the nature of the sun’s power whereby it produces heat. Ad tertium dicendum, quod magis et minus tripliciter potest considerari, et sic praedicari. Uno modo secundum solam quantitatem participati; sicut nix dicitur albior pariete, quia perfectior est albedo in nive quam in pariete, sed tamen unius rationis; unde talis diversitas secundum magis et minus non diversificat speciem. Alio modo secundum quod unum participatur, et aliud per essentiam dicitur; sicut diceremus, quod bonitas est melior quam bonum. Tertio modo secundum quod modo eminentiori competit idem aliquid uni quam alteri, sicut calor soli quam igni; et hi duo modi impediunt unitatem speciei et univocam praedicationem; et secundum hoc aliquid praedicatur magis et minus de Deo et creatura, ut ex dictis patet. Reply to the Third Objection. More and less may be considered from three points of view, and predicated accordingly. First when it is only a question of the quantity of the thing participated: thus snow is said to be whiter than the wall, because whiteness is more perfect in the snow than in the wall, and yet it is of the same nature: and consequently such a difference of more or less does not cause a difference of species. Secondly when the one is predicated participatively and the other essentially: thus we might say that goodness is better than a good thing. Thirdly when the one same term is ascribed to one thing in a more eminent degree than to another, for instance, heat to the sun than to fire. These last two modes of more and less are incompatible with unity of species and univocal predication: and it is thus that a thing is predicated more and less of God and creatures, as already explained. Ad quartum dicendum, quod Deus non comparatur creaturis in hoc quod dicitur melior, vel summum bonum, quasi participans naturam eiusdem generis cum creaturis, sicut species generis alicuius, sed quasi principium generis. Reply to the Fourth Objection. When we say that God is better or that he is the sovereign good we compare him to creatures not as though he participated of the same generic, nature as creatures, like the species of a genus; but as the principle of a genus. Ad quintum dicendum, quod quanto species intelligibilis eminentior est in aliquo, tanto ex ea relinquitur perfectior cognitio; sicut ex specie lapidis in intellectu quam in sensu. Unde per hoc Deus perfectissime potest cognoscere res per suam essentiam, inquantum sua essentia est supereminens similitudo rerum, et non adaequata. Reply to the Fifth Objection. Inasmuch as an intelligible species has a higher mode of existence, the knowledge arising therefrom is the more perfect: for instance, the knowledge arising from the image of a stone in the mind is more perfect than that which results from the species in the senses. Hence God is able to know things most perfectly in his essence, inasmuch as in his essence is the supereminent but not homogeneous likeness of things. Ad sextum dicendum, quod inter creaturam et Deum est duplex similitudo. Una creaturae ad intellectum divinum: et sic forma intellecta per Deum est unius rationis cum re intellecta, licet non habeat eumdem modum essendi; quia forma intellecta est tantum in intellectu, forma autem creaturae est etiam in re. Alio modo secundum quod ipsa divina essentia est omnium rerum similitudo superexcellens, et non unius rationis. Et ex hoc modo similitudinis contingit quod bonum et huiusmodi praedicantur communiter de Deo et creaturis, non autem ex primo. Non enim haec est ratio Dei cum dicitur, Deus est bonus, quia bonitatem creaturae intelligit; cum iam ex dictis pateat quod nec etiam domus quae est in mente artificis cum domo quae est in materia univoce dicatur domus. Reply to the Sixth Objection. There is a twofold likeness between God and creatures. One is the likeness of the creature to the divine mind, and thus the form understood by God and the thing itself are homogeneous, although they have not the same mode of being, since the form understood is only in the mind, while the form of the creature is in the thing. There is another likeness inasmuch as the divine essence itself is the supereminent but not homogeneous likeness of all things. It is by reason of this latter likeness that good and the like are predicated in common of God and creatures: but not by reason of the former, because when we say God is good we do not mean to define him from the fact that he understands the creature’s goodness, since it has already been observed that not even the house in the mind of the builder is called a house in the same sense as the house in being. Ad septimum dicendum, quod agens aequivocum oportet esse prius quam agens univocum, quia agens univocum non habet causalitatem super totam speciem, alias esset causa sui ipsius, sed solum super aliquod individuum speciei; agens autem aequivocum habet causalitatem super totam speciem; unde oportet primum agens esse aequivocum. Reply to the Seventh Objection. The equivocal agent must precede the univocal: because the latter’s causality does not extend to the whole species (else it were its own cause) but only to an individual member of the species. But the equivocal agent’s causality extends to the entire species: and consequently the first agent must be an equivocal agent. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum, quod philosophus loquitur de communitate naturaliter et non logice. Ea vero quae habent diversum modum essendi, non communicant in aliquo secundum esse quod considerat naturalis; possunt tamen communicare in aliqua intentione quam considerat logicus. Et praeterea etiam secundum naturalem corpus elementare et caeleste non sunt unius generis; sed secundum logicum sunt. Nihilominus tamen philosophus non intendit excludere analogicam communitatem, sed solum univocam. Vult enim ostendere quod corruptibile et incorruptibile non communicant in genere. 1. Reply to the First Argument on the contrary side. The Philosopher refers to things that are common physically, not logically. Now things that have a different mode of existence have nothing in common in respect of that being which is considered by the physicist, but they may have some common ‘intention’ that the logician may consider. Moreover, even from the physicist’s point of view the elemental and the heavenly body are not in the same genus: but in the view of the logician they are. However, the Philosopher does not mean to exclude analogical but only univocal community: since he wishes to prove that the corruptible and the incorruptible have not a common genus. Ad secundum dicendum, quod licet diversitas generis tollat univocationem, non tamen tollit analogiam. Quod sic patet. Sanum enim, secundum quod dicitur de urina, est in genere signi; secundum vero quod dicitur de medicina, est in genere causae. 2. Difference of genus excludes univocation but not analogy. In proof of this, healthy is applied to urine in the genus of sign, but to medicine in the genus of cause. Ad tertium dicendum, quod Deus nullo modo dicitur esse similis creaturae, sed e contrario, quia, ut dicit Dionysius, in causa et causatis non recipimus similitudinis conversionem, sed solum in coordinatis; homo enim non dicitur similis suae imagini, sed e contrario, propter hoc quod forma illa secundum quam attenditur similitudo, per prius est in homine quam in imagine. Et ideo Deum creaturis similem non dicimus, sed e contrario. 3. In no sense is God said to be like the creature, but contrariwise: for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. x), “likeness is not reciprocated between cause and effect, but only in coordinates”: thus a man is not said to be like his statue, but vice versa, the reason being that the form wherein the likeness consists is in the man before it is in the statue. Hence we do not say that God is like his creatures but vice versa. Ad quartum dicendum, quod cum dicitur, nulla creatura est similis Deo, ut eodem cap. dicit Dionysius, hoc intelligendum est secundum quod causata minus habent a sua causa, ab ipsa incomparabiliter deficientia. Quod non est intelligendum secundum quantitatem participati, sed aliis duobus modis, sicut supra dictum est. 4. According to Dionysius (ibid.) when it is said that no creature is like God this is to be understood as referring to effects which are imperfect and beyond all comparison fall short of their cause: nor does this refer to the quantity of the thing participated but to the other two modes, as explained above (Reply to Third Objection). Ad quintum dicendum, quod secundum accidens non potest esse aliquid simile substantiae, similitudine quae attenditur secundum formam unius rationis, sed secundum similitudinem quae est inter causatum et causam, nihil prohibet. Nam primam substantiam oportet esse causam omnium accidentium. 5. A thing cannot be like substance in respect of an accident, so that the likeness regard a form of the same kind: but there may be the likeness that is between cause and effect: since the first substance must needs be the cause of all accidents. Et similiter dicendum ad sextum. 6. The Sixth Argument is answered in like manner. Ad septimum dicendum, quod albedo nec est in genere numeri, nec est principium generis; et ideo nulla similitudo unius ad alterum attenditur. Deus autem est principium omnis generis; et ideo ei omnia aliqualiter similantur. 7. Whiteness is not in the genus of number, nor is it the principle of a genus: wherefore they do not admit of comparison. Whereas God is the principle of every genus, and consequently all things are somewhat likened to him. Ad octavum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de his quae communicant in genere vel in materia; qualis conditio non est Dei ad creaturas. 8. This argument refers to things that have a common genus or matter: which does not apply to God and the creature.
Is There Any Relation Between God and the Creature?
[ Sum. Th. I, Q. xiii, A. 7: Q. xxviii, A. 4: Q. xxxii, A. 2]
Octavo quaeritur utrum sit aliqua relatio inter Deum et creaturam. Et videtur quod non. THE eighth point of inquiry is whether there be any relation between God and the creature: and it would seem that there is none. Relativa enim sunt simul, secundum philosophum. Sed creatura non potest simul esse cum Deo: Deus enim omnibus modis est prior creatura. Ergo nulla relatio potest esse inter creaturam et Deum. 1. According to the Philosopher (De Praedic. v) relatives are simultaneous. But creatures cannot be simultaneous with God: since in every way he precedes creatures Therefore there cannot be any relation between God and a creature. Praeterea, inter quaecumque est aliqua relatio, est etiam eorum aliqua ad invicem comparatio. Sed inter Deum et creaturam non est comparatio; ea enim quae non sunt unius generis, non sunt comparabilia, sicut numerus et linea. Ergo non est aliqua relatio inter Deum et creaturam. 2. Things that are related can be compared in some way. But there is no comparison between God and a creature: since things that differ in genus are not comparable with one another, for instance, a number and a line. Therefore there is no relation between God and a creature. Praeterea, in quocumque genere est unum relativorum, est etiam aliud. Sed Deus non est in eodem genere cum creatura. Ergo non possunt relative ad invicem dici. 3. Relative and co-relative. belong to the same genus. But God is not in the game genus as the creature. Therefore we cannot predicate a relation between them. Praeterea, creatura non potest esse opposita creatori: quia oppositum non est causa sui oppositi. Sed relativa ad invicem opponuntur. Ergo non potest esse relatio inter creaturam et Deum. 4. A creature cannot be in opposition to the Creator: because one opposite is not the cause of the other. Now relatives are in opposition to each other. Therefore there cannot be a relation between a creature and God. Praeterea, de quocumque aliquid de novo incipit dici, aliquo modo potest dici factum. Ergo sequitur, si aliquid relative ad creaturam de Deo dicitur, quod Deus aliquo modo sit factus; quod est impossibile, cum ipse sit immutabilis. 5. Anything of which something new can be predicated, may be said in a sense to become. Consequently if something be said of God in relation to the creature, it follows that in a sense God becomes: which is impossible, seeing that he is unchangeable. Praeterea, omne quod praedicatur de aliquo, praedicatur de eo aut per se aut per accidens. Sed ea quae important relationem ad creaturam, non praedicantur de Deo per se, quia huiusmodi praedicata ex necessitate et semper praedicantur; nec iterum per accidens. Ergo nullo modo aliqua talia relativa de Deo praedicari possunt. 6. Whatsoever is predicated of a thing is predicated either essentially or accidentally. Now expressions that denote relation to creatures are not predicated of God essentially, since essential predicates are predicated necessarily and always: nor are they predicated accidentally. Therefore such relations can nowise be predicated of God. Sed contra, est quod Augustinus dicit, quod creator relative dicitur ad creaturam, sicut dominus ad servum. On the contrary Augustine says (De Trin. v,.13) that the Creator is related to the creature as the master to his servant. Respondeo. Dicendum quod relatio in hoc differt a quantitate et qualitate: quia quantitas et qualitas sunt quaedam accidentia in subiecto remanentia; relatio autem non significat, ut Boetius dicit, ut in subiecto manens, sed ut in transitu quodam ad aliud; unde et Porretani dixerunt, relationes non esse inhaerentes, sed assistentes, quod aliqualiter verum est, ut posterius ostendetur. Quod autem attribuitur alicui ut ab eo in aliud procedens non facit compositionem cum eo, sicut nec actio cum agente. Et propter hoc etiam probat philosophus V Phys., quod in ad aliquid non potest esse motus: quia, sine aliqua mutatione eius quod ad aliud refertur, potest relatio desinere ex sola mutatione alterius, sicut etiam de actione patet, quod non est motus secundum actionem nisi metaphorice et improprie; sicut exiens de otio in actum mutari dicimus, quod non esset si relatio vel actio significaret aliquid in subiecto manens. Ex hoc autem apparet quod non est contra rationem simplicitatis alicuius multitudo relationum quae est inter ipsum et alia; immo quanto simplicius est tanto concomitantur ipsum plures relationes. Quanto enim aliquid est simplicius, tanto virtus (eius) est minus limitata, unde ad plura se extendit sua causalitas. Et ideo in libro de causis dicitur, quod omnis virtus unita plus est infinita quam virtus multiplicata. Oportet autem intelligi aliquam relationem inter principium et ea quae a principio sunt, non solum quidem relationem originis, secundum quod principiata oriuntur a principio, sed etiam relationem diversitatis: quia oportet effectum a causa distingui, cum nihil sit causa sui ipsius. Et ideo ad summam Dei simplicitatem consequitur quod infinitae habitudines sive relationes existant inter creaturas et ipsum, secundum quod ipse creaturas producit a seipso diversas, aliqualiter tamen sibi assimilatas. I answer that relation differs from quantity and quality in that quantity and quality are accidents residing in the subject, whereas relation, as Boethius says (De Trin.), signifies something not as adhering to a subject but as passing from it to something else: wherefore de la Porrée said that relations are not adherent but assistant, which is true in a sense as we shall show further on. Now when a thing is attributed to someone as proceeding from him to another this does not argue composition between them, as neither does action imply composition with the agent. And for this reason the Philosopher proves (Phys. v) that there can be no movement in relation: since without any change in the thing that is related to another, the relation can cease for the sole reason that this other is changed. Thus it is clear with regard to action that there is no movement in respect of action except metaphorically and improperly speaking, just as we say that one who passes from inaction into action is changed: and this, would not be the case if relation or action signified something abiding in the subject. Hence it is evident that it is not incompatible with a thing’s simplicity to have many relations towards other things: indeed the more simple a thing is the greater the number of its concomitant relations: since its power is so much the less limited and consequently its causality so much the more extended. Wherefore it is stated in De Causis (prop. xvii) that a united force is less confined than a distributed force. Now we must needs admit a relation between a principle and the things which proceed from it; and not only a relation of origin inasmuch as a result springs from its source, but also a relation of distinction, seeing that an effect must needs be distinct from its cause, for nothing is its own cause. Accordingly from God’s supreme simplicity there results an infinite number of respects or relations between creatures and him, inasmuch as he produced creatures distinct from himself and yet somewhat likened to him. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa relativa sunt simul natura quae pari ratione mutuo referuntur, sicut pater ad filium, dominus ad servum, duplum ad dimidium. Illa vero relativa in quibus non est eadem ratio referendi ex utraque parte, non sunt simul natura, sed alterum est prius naturaliter, sicut etiam philosophus dicit, de sensu et sensibili, scientia et scibili. Et sic patet quod non oportet quod Deus et creatura sint simul natura, cum non sit eadem ratio referendi ex utraque parte. Nihilominus autem non est necesse in illis etiam relativis quae sunt simul natura, quod subiecta sint naturaliter simul sed relationes solae. Reply to the First Objection. Those relatives are naturally simultaneous which have the same reason for their mutual relationship, for instance, father and son, master and servant, double and half. But when there is not the same reason on either side for referring one thing to another, then relatives are not naturally simultaneous, but one naturally precedes the other: as the Philosopher states with regard to sense and the sensible object, knowledge and the thing knowable (De Praed. v). Wherefore it clearly does not follow that God and the creature are naturally simultaneous, since there is not the same reason on either side for one being referred to the other. It is not necessary, however, even in relatives that are naturally simultaneous that the subjects be naturally simultaneous, but only the relations. Ad secundum dicendum, quod non omnium est comparatio quorum est relatio ad invicem, sed solum illorum quorum est relatio secundum unam quantitatem vel qualitatem, ut ex hoc possit unum altero dici maius aut melius, vel albius vel aliquid huiusmodi. Relationum autem diversitates possunt ad invicem referri etiam quae diversorum generum sunt: ea enim quae diversorum generum sunt, sunt ad invicem diversa. Nihilominus tamen quamvis Deus in eodem genere non sit cum creatura sicut contentum sub genere, est tamen in omnibus generibus sicut principium generis: et ex hoc potest esse aliqua relatio inter creaturam et Deum sicut inter principiata et principium. Reply to the Second Objection. Not all the things that are related can be compared to each other,. but only those that are related in respect of one quantity or quality, so that one may be described as greater, better, whiter and so on than the other. But different relations can be compared to each other even if they belong to different genera: since things that differ generically differ from one another. And yet although God is not in the same genus as the creature as a thing contained in a genus, he is nevertheless in every genus as the principle of the genus: and for this reason there can be relation between the creature and God as between effect and principle. Ad tertium dicendum, quod non oportet subiecta relationum esse unius generis, sed solum relationes ipsas; ut patet in hoc quod quantitas a quidditate diversa dicitur. Et tamen, ut dictum est, non est eadem ratio de Deo et creaturis, sicut de his quae sunt in diversis generibus ad invicem nullo modo coordinata. Reply to the Third Objection. The subjects of things mutually related need not be in the same genus, but only the things themselves that are thus related: thus quantity is said to be distinct from quiddity. And yet as we have already said it is not the same with God and creatures as with things differing generically and nowise co-ordinated to one another. Ad quartum dicendum, quod oppositio relationis in duobus differt ab aliis oppositionibus: quorum primum est quod in aliis oppositis unum dicitur alteri opponi, in quantum ipsum removet: negatio enim removet affirmationem, et secundum hoc ei opponitur; oppositio vero privationis et habitus et contrarietatis includit oppositionem contradictionis, ut IV Metaph. dicitur. Non autem est hoc in relativis. Non enim per hoc opponitur filius patri quod ipsum removeat, sed propter rationem habitudinis ad ipsum. Et ex hoc causatur secunda differentia, quia in aliis oppositis semper alterum est imperfectum; quod accidit ratione negationis quae includitur in privatione et altero contrariorum. Hoc autem in relativis non oportet, immo utrumque considerari potest ut perfectum, sicut patet maxime in relativis aequiparantiae, et in relativis originis, ut aequale, simile, pater et filius. Et ideo relatio magis potest attribui Deo quam aliae oppositiones. Ratione quidem primae differentiae potest attendi oppositio relationis inter creaturam et Deum, non autem alia oppositio,- cum ex Deo sit magis creaturarum positio quam earum remotio; est tamen aliqua habitudo, creaturarum ad Deum. Ratione vero secundae differentiae est in ipsis divinis personis (in quibus nihil imperfectum esse potest) oppositio relationi, et non alia, ut posterius, apparebit. Reply to the Fourth Objection. Relative opposition differs in two ways from other kinds of opposition. First in the latter one thing is said to be opposite to another inasmuch as it excludes it,—as negation excludes affirmation,—and in this respect is opposed to it: and opposition of privation and habit, and of contrariety includes opposition of contradiction (Metaph. iv). But it is not thus with things that are opposed relatively. For son is not opposed to father by excluding him, but on account of the nature of his relationship to him. Hence follows the second difference: because in other kinds of opposition one of the opposites is always imperfect by reason of the negation attaching to privation and one of the contraries. But this is not necessarily so in relative opposition, indeed it is possible to consider both relatives as perfect, as is especially evident in equiparent relatives and in relatives of origin, for instance, things that are equal to or like one another, father and son. Wherefore relation is more attributable to God than other kinds of opposition. By reason of the first difference relative opposition may be observed between the creature and God, but not any other kind: seeing that it is owing to God that creatures are affirmed rather than excluded; and yet creatures have a certain relationship to God. By reason of the second difference, in the divine Persons (in whom there can be no imperfection) there can be relative opposition and no other, as we shall show further on (Q. viii). Ad quintum dicendum, quod cum fieri sit proprie mutari, non est secundum relationem nisi per accidens, scilicet mutato eo ad quod consequitur relatio: ita nec fieri. Corpus enim mutatum secundum quantitatem fit aequale, non quod mutatio per se aequalitatem respiciat, sed per accidens se habet ad ipsam. Et tamen non oportet, ad hoc quod de aliquo relatio aliqua de novo dicatur, quod aliqua mutatio in ipso fiat, sed sufficit quod fiat mutatio in aliquo extremorum: causa enim habitudinis inter duos est aliquid inhaerens utrique. Unde ex quacumque parte fiat mutatio illius quod habitudinem causabat, tollitur habitudo quae est inter utrumque. Et secundum hoc, per hoc quod in creatura aliqua mutatio fit, aliqua relatio de Deo incipit dici. Unde ipse non potest dici factus,- nisi metaphorice,- quia se habet ad similitudinem facti, in quantum de Deo aliquid novum dicitur. Et sic dicimus: domine, refugium factus es nobis. Reply to the Fifth Objection. To become is to be changed properly speaking: wherefore just as a thing is not changed in respect of a relation except accidentally, to wit through a change in the thing to which the relation is consequent, so neither is a thing said to become in respect of a relation, except accidentally. Thus a body through a change in its quantity becomes equal (to another), yet the change is not essentially connected with equality but is related thereto accidentally. And yet a thing does not need to be changed in order that a relation begin to be predicated of it but it suffices that a change occur in one of the extremes since the cause of relationship between two is something inherent in both. Consequently from whichever extreme a change is wrought in that which caused the relationship, the relationship between them ceases. Accordingly from the fact that a change is wrought in the creature, a relation begins ‘to be attributed to God. Hence he cannot be said to become except metaphorically; inasmuch as he is like a thing that becomes, through something new that is said about him: thus we say (Ps. lxxxix, i) : Lord, thou art become our refuge. Ad sextum dicendum, quod huiusmodi relationes cum Deo dici incipiant propter mutationem in creatura factam, patet quod causa quare de Deo dicantur, est ex parte creaturae, et per accidens de Deo dicuntur. Non quidem accidens quod in Deo sit, ut Augustinus dicit, sed secundum aliquid extra ipsum existens, quod ad ipsum accidentaliter comparatur. Non enim esse Dei a creatura dependet, sicut nec esse aedificatoris a domo. Unde sicut accidit aedificatori quod domus sit, ita Deo quod creatura. Omne enim dicimus per accidens se habere ad aliquid, sine quo illud esse potest. Reply to the Sixth Objection. When these relations begin to be ascribed to God on account of some change wrought in creatures, it is evident that the cause of their being attributed to him is on the part of the creature, and that they are predicated of God accidentally. But as Augustine says this does not imply an accident in God, but refers to something outside him and compared to him accidentally: for God’s existence does not depend on creatures as neither does the builder’s existence depend on the house: wherefore just as it is accidental to the builder that the house exists, so is it accidental to God that the creature exists. For we say that anything without which a thing can exist is accidental to it.
Are These Relations Between A Creature and God Really in Creatures Themselves?
Nono quaeritur utrum huiusmodi relationes, quae sunt inter creaturas et Deum, sint realiter in ipsis creaturis. Et videtur quod non. THE ninth point of inquiry is whether these relations between creatures and God are in creatures themselves: and it would seem that they are not. Aliquae enim relationes inveniuntur in quibus ex nulla parte relatio aliquid realiter ponit, sicut Avicenna dicit de relatione quae est inter ens et non ens. Sed nulla extrema relationis magis ad invicem distant quam Deus et creatura. Ergo ista relatio non ponit aliquid realiter ex parte neutra. 1. There are certain relations which posit nothing real on either side; as Avicenna says (Metaph. iv, 10) of the relation between entity and non-entity. Now no relatives are further apart than God and the creature. Therefore this relation posits nothing real on our side. Praeterea, omne illud negandum est ad quod sequitur processus in infinitum. Sed si in creatura relatio ad Deum sit res aliqua, erit procedere in infinitum: relatio enim illa aliquid creatum erit, si est res quaedam; et ita erit alia relatio ipsius ad Deum pari ratione, et sic in infinitum. Non ergo ponendum est quod in creatura ad Deum relatio sit res aliqua. 2. We must not assert anything that leads to an indefinite process. Now if relation to God is something real in a creature, we shall have to go on indefinitely: since that relation will be a creature, if it be something real, and therefore will likewise bear a relation to God, and so on indefinitely. Therefore we must not assert that relation to God is something real in a creature. Praeterea, nihil refertur nisi ad determinatum et unum; unde duplum non refertur ad quodlibet, sed ad dimidium, et pater ad filium, et sic de aliis. Oportet ergo secundum differentiam eorum quae referuntur, esse differentias eorum ad quae fit relatio. Sed Deus est unum ens simpliciter. Ergo non potest ad ipsum fieri relatio omnium creaturarum, aliqua relatione reali. 3. Nothing has a relation except to one definite thing (Metaph. iv): thus double is not related to anything but half; and father is not related except to son, and so on. Therefore there must be correspondence between the things that are related and those to which they are related. Now God is simply one being. Therefore there can be no real relation in creatures to him. Praeterea, secundum hoc, creatura refertur ad Deum secundum quod ab ipso procedit. Sed creatura procedit a Deo secundum ipsam substantiam. Ergo secundum suam substantiam refertur ad Deum, et non secundum aliquam relationem supervenientem. 4. The creature is related to God inasmuch as it proceeds from him. Now the creature proceeds from God as to its very substance. Therefore it is related to God by its substance and not by an additional relation. Praeterea, relatio est aliquid medium inter extrema relationis. Sed nihil potest esse realiter medium inter Deum et creaturam immediate a Deo creatam. Ergo relatio ad Deum non est aliqua res in creatura. 5. A relation is a kind of mean between the related extremes. But there can be no real mean between God and the creature which is created by him immediately. Therefore relation to God is nothing real in the creature. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, quod si omnia apparentia essent vera, res sequeretur opinionem nostram et sensum. Sed constat quod omnes creaturae sequuntur aestimationem, sive scientiam, sui creatoris. Ergo creaturae omnes substantialiter referuntur ad Deum, et non per aliquam relationem inhaerentem. 6. The Philosopher (Metaph. iv) says that if the reality of things depended on our opinion and perception, whatsoever we perceive would be real. Now it is clear that all creatures are dependent on the perception or knowledge of their Creator. Therefore all creatures are referred to God by their substance and not by an inherent relation. Praeterea, inter quae est maior distantia, minus videtur esse relatio. Sed est maior distantia creaturae ad Deum quam unius creaturae ad aliam. Non est autem relatio creaturae ad creaturam res aliqua, ut videtur, nam cum non sit substantia, oportet quod sit accidens; et ita, quod subiecto insit, et quod ab eo removeri non possit sine mutatione subiecti: cuius contrarium supra de relatione est dictum. Ergo nec relatio creaturae ad Deum est res aliqua. 7. It would seem that the more things are distant from one another the less are they related. Now there is a greater distance between the creature and God than between one creature and another. But seemingly the relation between one creature and another is nothing real: for since it is not a substance, it must he an accident and consequently must be in a subject, and therefore cannot be removed therefrom without the subject being changed: and yet we have asserted the contrary to be the case with relations. Therefore the creature’s relation to God is nothing real. Praeterea, sicut ens creatum distat a non ente in infinitum, ita etiam a Deo in infinitum distat. Sed inter ens creatum et non ens purum, non est aliqua relatio, ut Avicenna dicit. Ergo nec inter ens creatum et ens increatum. 8. just as a created being is infinitely distant from nonbeing, so also is it infinitely distant from God. But there is no relation between created being and absolute non-being, according to Avicenna (Metaph. iv, 10). Neither therefore is there a relation between created being and uncreated being. Sed contra. Est quod Augustinus dicit: quod temporaliter dici incipit Deus quod antea non dicebatur, manifestum est relative dici, non tamen secundum accidens Dei, quod ei aliquid acciderit; sed plane secundum accidens eius ad quod Deus incipit dici relative. Sed accidens res aliqua in subiecto est. Ergo relatio ad Deum est res aliqua in creatura. On the contrary Augustine says (De Trin. v, 16): It is evident that whatever begins to be Predicated of God whereas it was not Predicated of him before is said of him relatively: relatively, that is, not to an accident in God (as if something had accrued to him), but, without doubt, to an accident in the thing in relation to which God begins to be predicated. Now an accident is something real in its subject. Therefore relation to God is something in the creature. Praeterea, omne quod refertur ad aliquid per sui mutationem realiter refertur ad ipsum. Sed creatura refertur ad Deum per sui mutationem. Ergo realiter refertur ad Deum. Again, whatsoever is related to a thing through being changed is really related thereto. Now the creature is related to God through being changed. Therefore it is really related to God. Respondeo. Dicendum quod relatio ad Deum est aliqua res in creatura. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod sicut dicit Commentator in XI Metaph., quia relatio est debilioris esse inter omnia praedicamenta, ideo putaverunt quidam eam esse ex secundis intellectibus. Prima enim intellecta sunt res extra animam, in quae primo intellectus intelligenda fertur. Secunda autem intellecta dicuntur intentiones consequentes modum intelligendi: hoc enim secundo intellectus intelligit in quantum reflectitur supra se ipsum, intelligens se intelligere et modum quo intelligit. Secundum ergo hanc positionem sequeretur quod relatio non sit in rebus extra animam, sed in solo intellectu, sicut intentio generis et speciei, et secundarum substantiarum. Hoc autem esse non potest. In nullo enim praedicamento ponitur aliquid nisi res extra animam existens. Nam ens rationis dividitur contra ens divisum per decem praedicamenta ut patet V Metaph. Si autem relatio non esset in rebus extra animam non poneretur ad aliquid unum genus praedicamenti. Et praeterea perfectio et bonum quae sunt in rebus extra animam, non solum attenditur secundum aliquid absolute inhaerens rebus, sed etiam secundum ordinem unius rei ad aliam, sicut etiam in ordine partium exercitus, bonum exercitus consistit: huic enim ordini comparat philosophus ordinem universi. Oportet ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quemdam esse; hic autem ordo relatio quaedam est. Unde oportet in rebus ipsis relationes quasdam esse, secundum quas unum ad alterum ordinatur. Ordinatur autem una res ad aliam vel secundum quantitatem, vel secundum virtutem activam seu passivam. Ex his enim solum duobus attenditur aliquid in uno, respectu extrinseci. I answer that relation to God is something real in the creature. To make this clear we must observe that as the Commentator says (Metaph. xi, text. 19), seeing that of all the predicaments relation has the least stability, some have thought that it should be reckoned among the predicables because the predicaments (prima intellecta) have an objective reality and are the first things to be understood by the intellect: whereas the predicables (secunda intellecta) are certain ‘intentions’ consequent to our mode of understanding: inasmuch as by a second act the intellect reflects on itself, and knows both the fact that it understands and the manner of its understanding. According then to this view it would follow that relation has no objective reality, but exists only in the mind, even as the notion of genus or species and of second substances. But this is impossible: because nothing is assigned to a predicament unless it has objective reality: since logical being is divided against the being that is divided by the ten predicaments (Metaph. v). Now if relation had no objective reality, it would not be placed among the predicaments. Moreover the perfection and goodness that are in things outside the mind are ascribed not only to something absolute and inherent to things but also to the order between one thing and another: thus the good of an army consists in the mutual ordering of its parts, to which good the Philosopher (Metaph. x) compares the good of the universe. Consequently there must be order in things themselves, and this order is a kind of relation. Wherefore there must be relations in things themselves, whereby one is ordered to another. Now one thing is ordered to another either as to quantity or as to active or passive power: for on these two counts alone can we find in a thin something whereby we compare it with another. Mensuratur enim aliquid non solum a quantitate intrinseca, sed etiam ab extrinseca. Per virtutem etiam activam unumquodque agit in alterum et per passivam patitur ab altero; per substantiam autem et qualitatem ordinatur aliquid ad seipsum tantum, non ad alterum, nisi per accidens; scilicet secundum quod qualitas,- vel forma substantialis aut materia,- habet rationem virtutis activae vel passivae, et secundum quod in eis consideratur aliqua ratio quantitatis, prout unum in substantia facit idem, et unum in qualitate simile, et numerus, sive multitudo, dissimile et diversum in eisdem, et dissimile secundum quod aliquid magis vel minus altero consideratur: sic enim albius aliquid altero dicitur. Et propter hoc philosophus in V Metaph. species assignans relationis, quasdam ponit ex quantitate causatas, quasdam vero ex actione et passione. Sic ergo oportet quod res habentes ordinem ad aliquid, realiter referantur ad ipsum, et quod in eis aliqua res sit relatio. Omnes autem creaturae ordinantur ad Deum et sicut ad principium et sicut ad finem, nam ordo qui est partium universi ad invicem, est per ordinem qui est totius universi ad Deum; sicut ordo qui est inter partes exercitus, est propter ordinem exercitus ad ducem, ut patet XII Metaph. Unde oportet quod creaturae realiter referantur ad Deum, et quod ipsa relatio sit res quaedam in creatura. For a thing is measured not only by its intrinsic quantity but also in reference to an extrinsic quantity. And again by its active power one thing acts on another, and by its passive power is acted on by another: while by its substance and quality a thing is ordered to itself alone and not to another, except accidentally: namely inasmuch as a quality, substantial form or matter is a kind of active or passive power, and forasmuch as one may ascribe to them a certain kind of quantity: thus one thing produces the same in substance; and one thing produces its like in quality; and number or multitude causes dissimilarity and diversity in the same things; and dissimilarity in that one thing is considered as being more or less so and so than another, thus one thing is said to be whiter than another. Hence the Philosopher (Metaph. v) in giving the species of relations, says that some are based on quantity and some on action and passion. Accordingly things that are ordered to something must be really related to it, and this relation must be some real thing in them. Now all creatures are ordered to God both as to their beginning and as to their end: since the order of the parts of the universe to one another results from the order of the whole universe to God: even as the mutual order of the parts of an army is on account of the order of the whole army to its commander (Metaph. xii). Therefore creatures are really related to God, and this relation is something real in the creature. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc quod aliqua relatio est inter creaturas ad invicem quae in neutro extremorum aliquid ponat, non est propter creaturarum distantiam, sed propter hoc quod aliqua relatio non attenditur secundum ordinem aliquem qui sit in rebus, sed secundum ordinem qui est in intellectu tantum; quod non potest dici de ordine creaturarum ad Deum. Reply to the First Objection. That between one creature and another there is a relation which posits nothing in either extreme is not due to the distance between them, but to the fact that certain relations are based not on any order in things, but on an order which is only in our intellect: but this does not apply to the order of creatures to God. Ad secundum dicendum, quod relationes ipsae non referuntur ad aliud per aliam relationem sed per se ipsas, quia essentialiter relationes sunt. Non autem est simile de his quae habent substantiam absolutam; unde non sequitur processus in infinitum. Reply to the Second Objection. The relations themselves are not related to something else by any further relation but by themselves because their very essence is relative. It is not the same with things whose essence is absolute, so that this does not lead to an indefinite process. Ad tertium dicendum, quod philosophus ibidem concludit, quod si omnia referantur ad optimum, oportet infinitum specie esse optimum. Et sic ad id quod est infinitum specie, nihil prohibet infinita referri. Tale autem est Deus, cum perfectio suae substantiae ad nullum genus determinetur, ut supra habitum est. Et propter hoc nihil prohibet infinitas creaturas ad Deum referri. Reply to the Third Objection. The Philosopher concludes (ibid.) that if all things are related to the supreme good, the supreme good must be infinite by nature: and accordingly an infinite number of things can be related to that which is infinite by nature. Such is God, since the perfection of his essence is not confined to any genus, as we have stated above. For this reason an infinite number of creatures can be related to God. Ad quartum dicendum, quod creatura refertur ad Deum secundum suam substantiam, sicut secundum causam relationis; secundum vero relationem ipsam formaliter; sicut aliquid dicitur simile secundum qualitatem causaliter, secundum similitudinem formaliter: ex hoc enim creatura similis denominatur. Reply to the Fourth Objection. The creature is related to God by its essence as cause of that relation, and by that same relation, formally: thus a thing is said to be like in quality, causally; and by its likeness, formally: and for this reason the creature is said to be like God. Ad quintum dicendum, quod cum dicitur creatura immediate a Deo procedere, excluditur causa media creans, non tamen excluditur mediata realis habitudo, quae naturaliter sequitur ad productionem creaturae; sicut aequalitas sequitur productionem quantitatis indeterminate, ita habitudo realis naturaliter sequitur ad productionem substantiae creatae. Reply to the Fifth Objection. When it is said that the creature proceeds from God immediately, we exclude an intermediate creative cause, but not the intermediate real relationship which arises naturally from the creature’s production, even as equality results immediately from quantity: thus a real relation follows naturally the production of created substance. Ad sextum dicendum, quod creaturae sequuntur Dei scientiam sicut effectus causam, non sicut propriam rationem essendi, ut sic nihil aliud sit creaturam esse quam a Deo sciri. Hoc autem modo ponebant, dicentes omnia apparentia esse vera, et rem sequi opinionem et sensum, ut scilicet unicuique hoc esset esse quod ab alio sentiri vel opinari. Reply to the Sixth Objection. Creatures depend on God’s knowledge as an effect depends on its cause, and not as though their very existence consisted in that knowledge, so that for a creature to exist would mean nothing else but that it is known by God. This was the view of those who contended that whatsoever is perceived is real, and that the reality of things depends on’ our thoughts and perception, so that to exist would be nothing but to be an object of perception or thought. Ad septimum dicendum, quod ipsa relatio quae nihil est aliud quam ordo unius creaturae ad aliam, aliud habet in quantum est accidens et aliud in quantum est relatio vel ordo. In quantum enim accidens est, habet quod sit in subiecto, non autem in quantum est relatio vel ordo; sed solum quod ad aliud sit quasi in aliud transiens, et quodammodo rei relatae assistens. Et ita relatio est aliquid inhaerens, licet non ex hoc ipso quod est relatio; sicut et actio ex hoc quod est actio, consideratur ut ab agente; in quantum vero est accidens, consideratur ut in subiecto agente. Et ideo nihil prohibet quod esse desinat huiusmodi accidens sine mutatione eius in quo est, quia sua ratio non perficitur prout est in ipso subiecto, sed prout transit in aliud; quo sublato, ratio huius accidentis tollitur quidem quantum ad actum, sed manet quantum ad causam; sicut et subtracta materia, tollitur calefactio, licet maneat calefactionis causa. Reply to the Seventh Objection. The very relation that is nothing but the order between one creature and another may be considered as an accident, or as a relation. Considered as an accident it is something adhering to a subject; but not considered as a relation or order, for then it is mere towardness, something passing as it were from one thing to another and assisting that which is related. Accordingly a relation is something inherent, but not because it is a relation: thus action as action is considered as issuing from the agent; but, as an accident, is considered as inherent to the active subject. Wherefore nothing prevents such an accident from ceasing to exist without ‘any change in its subject, because it is not essentially complete through its existence in its subject but through transition into something else: and if this be removed the essence of this accident is removed as regards the action, but remains as regards its cause: even so, if the matter be removed, the heating is removed, although the cause of heating remain. Ad octavum dicendum, quod ens creatum non habet ordinem ad non ens, habet autem ordinem ad ens increatum; et ideo non est simile. Reply to the Eighth Objection. There is no order between created being and non-being, but there is between created and uncreated being, hence the comparison fails.
Is God Really Related to the Creature So That this Relation Be Something in God?
Decimo quaeritur utrum Deus realiter referatur ad creaturam, ita quod ipsa relatio sit res aliqua in Deo. Et videtur quod sic. THE tenth point of inquiry is whether God be really related to the creature so that this relation be something in God and seemingly the answer should be in the affirmative. Movens enim realiter refertur ad motum; unde philosophus, V Metaph., ponit relationem moventis et moti ut species praedicamenti relationis. Sed Deus comparatur ad creaturam ut movens ad motum. Ergo refertur realiter ad creaturam. 1. There is a real relation in the mover to that which it moves: wherefore the Philosopher (Metaph. v) reckons the relation between mover and moved to be a species of the predicament relation. Now God is compared to the creature as mover to that which is moved. Therefore he is really related to the creature. Sed diceretur, quod movet creaturas sine sui mutatione; et ideo non realiter refertur ad rem motam. —Sed contra, unum, relative oppositorum, non est causa quod alterum dicatur de eodem: non enim propter hoc aliquid est duplum, quia est dimidium; nec ideo Deus est pater, quia est filius. Si ergo movens et motum relative dicuntur, non ideo relatio moventis est in aliquo, quia est in eo relatio moti. Quod ergo Deus non movetur non impedit quin realiter referatur ut movens ad motum. 2. It will be replied that he moves creatures without any change in himself; wherefore he is not really related to the thing moved. On the contrary, the presence of one of two relative opposites in a thing is not a reason for attributing the other to the. same thing: thus a thing is not double because it is a half, nor is God Father because he is Son. Accordingly if mover and moved are mutually related, it does not follow that where there is the relation of mover there must be the relation of moved. Hence that God is not moved does not hinder him from having the relation of mover to moved. Praeterea, sicut pater dat esse filio, ita creator dat esse creaturae. Sed pater realiter refertur ad filium. Ergo et creator ad creaturam. 3. As the father gives being to the son so does the Creator give being to the creature’ But the father is really related to the son. Therefore the Creator is also really related to the creature. Praeterea, ea quae proprie dicuntur de Deo et non metaphorice, rem significatam ponunt in Deo. Sed inter ista nomina commemorat Dionysius hoc nomen dominus. Ergo res significata per hoc nomen dominus, realiter est in Deo. Haec autem est relatio ad creaturam. Ergo, et cetera. 4. Terms that are predicated of God properly and not metaphorically indicate the thing signified as being in God; and among terms of this kind Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) reckons Lord. Wherefore the thing signified by this word Lord is really in God. But it is a relation to the creature. Therefore, etc. Praeterea, scientia realiter refertur ad scibile, ut patet V Metaph. Sed Deus comparatur ad res creatas ut sciens ad scitum. Ergo in Deo est aliqua relatio ad creaturam. 5. Knowledge relates to the thing knowable (Metaph. v). Now God is compared to creatures as known to the thing known. Therefore in God there is a relation to creatures. Praeterea, illud quod movetur, semper habet realem relationem ad movens. Sed voluntas comparatur ad volitum ut ad movens motum: nam appetibile est movens non motum; appetitus, movens motum, ut dicitur XII Metaph. Cum ergo Deus velit res esse, videtur quod realiter referatur ad creaturam. 6. The thing moved always bears a relation to its mover. Now the will is compared to the thing willed as the thing moved to its mover: because the appetible object is a mover that is not moved,(Metaph. x ii). Since then it is God’s will that things exist, for he hath dome all things whatsoever he would (Ps. cxiii, ii), it would seem that he is really related to the creature. Praeterea, si Deus ad creaturas non referatur, non videtur esse alia ratio, nisi quia a creaturis non dependet, et quia creaturas excedit. Sed similiter corpora caelestia a corporibus elementaribus non dependent, et ea quasi improportionaliter excedunt. Ergo secundum hoc sequeretur quod nulla esset realis relatio corporum superiorum ad inferiora. 7. If God is not related to creatures, the only reason would seem to be that he is not dependent on them and is far above them. But the heavenly bodies likewise are independent of elemental bodies and surpass them almost out of all proportion. Wherefore it would follow that there is no real relation in the higher bodies to the lower world. Praeterea, omnis denominatio est a forma. Forma autem est aliquid inhaerens ei cuius est. Cum ergo Deus nominetur a relationibus ad creaturam, videtur quod ipsae relationes aliquid sint in Deo. 8. All names are taken from forms: and forms are something inherent to the things whereto they belong. Since then God is named from his relation to creatures, it would seem that these relations are something in God. Praeterea, proportio, quaedam relatio realis est, sicut duplum ad dimidium; sed aliqua proportio videtur esse Dei ad creaturam, cum inter movens et motum oporteat esse proportionem. Ergo videtur quod Deus ad creaturam realiter referatur. 9. Proportion—for instance that of double to half—is a real relation. Now seemingly there is a proportion in God to the creature: since there must be proportion between mover and the thing moved. Therefore it would seem that God is really related to creatures. Praeterea, cum intellectus sit rerum similitudines, et voces sint signa rerum, ut dicit philosophus, aliter ordinantur ista apud discipulum, et aliter apud doctorem. Doctor enim incipit a rebus in quibus scientiam accipit in suo intellectu, cuius conceptiones voces signant; discipulus autem incipit a vocibus per quas in conceptiones intellectus magistri pervenit; et ab eis in rerum cognitionem. Oportet autem quod huiusmodi quae de relationibus praedictis dicuntur, ab aliquo doctore sint prius accepta. Ergo apud eum huiusmodi nomina relativa consequuntur conceptiones intellectus sui, quae consequuntur rem; et ita videtur quod huiusmodi relationes sint reales. 10. Whereas understanding is an image of the thing (understood), and words are signs of things, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), these two are ordered differently in disciple and teacher. The teacher begins with the things whence he has gathered the knowledge in his intellect, and expresses that knowledge in words, while the disciple begins with the words through which he arrives at the ideas in the intellect of the teacher, and thence at the knowledge of things. Now whatsoever is said about these relations must first of all come to the knowledge of a teacher. Consequently with him these relative terms correspond to the ideas in his intellect and these ideas correspond to an objective reality: wherefore seemingly these relations are real. Praeterea, huiusmodi relativa quae de Deo dicuntur ex tempore, aut sunt relativa secundum esse, aut secundum dici. Si sunt relativa secundum dici, in neutro extremorum aliquid ponunt realiter. Hoc autem est falsum, secundum praedicta: nam in creatura relata ad Deum realiter existunt. Relinquitur ergo quod sunt relativa secundum esse; et ita videtur quod in utroque extremorum aliquid ponant realiter. 11. These relative terms which are predicated of God in time signify relations that are either predicamental (secundum esse) or transcendental (secundum dici). If their relativity is transcendental they posit nothing real in either extreme. But according to what has been said this is false, since they really exist in the’creature as related to God. Therefore they signify predicamental relation, and consequently they posit something real in both extremes. Praeterea, haec est natura relativorum, quod posito uno ponitur aliud, et uno interempto aliud interimitur. Si igitur in creatura est aliqua realis relatio, oportet quod in Deo relatio ad creaturam sit realis. 12. It is in the nature of relatives that given one the other follows, and if one be removed the other is also removed. If then there is a real relation in the creature, there must be in God a real relation to the creature. Sed contra. Est quod Augustinus dicit, V de Trin.: manifestum est Deum relative dici secundum accidens eius ad quod dici Deus aliquid incipit relative. Ergo videtur quod istae relationes dicantur de Deo, non secundum aliquid quod in ipso sit, sed secundum aliquid quod extra ipsum est; et ita nihil realiter in ipso ponunt. On the contrary Augustine says (De Trin. v, 16): “It is clear that whatsoever is said of God relatively is an accident in the thing to which God begins to be referred.” Hence it would seem that these relations are attributed to God not by reason of something in him but on account of something outside him: so that they posit nothing real in him. Praeterea, sicut scibile est mensura scientiae, ita Deus est mensura omnium rerum, ut Commentator dicit, X Metaph. Sed scibile non refertur ad scientiam per relationem quae in ipso realiter sit, sed potius per relationem scientiae ad ipsum, ut patet per philosophum, V Metaph. Ergo videtur quod nec Deus dicatur relative ad creaturam propter aliquam relationem quae sit realiter in eo. Again, as the knowable thing is the measure of knowledge, so is God the measure of all things, as the Commentator says (Metaph. x). Now the knowable thing is not referred to knowledge by a real relation existing in it, but rather by the relation of knowledge to it, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v). Therefore seemingly neither is God related to the creature by a real relation in him. Praeterea, Dionysius dicit: in causis et causatis non recipimus conversionem similitudinis: nam effectus dicitur similis causae, non autem e contrario. Eadem autem ratio videtur de relatione similitudinis et de aliis relationibus. Ergo videtur quod nec quantum ad alias relationes fiat conversio a Deo ad creaturam: ut quia creatura realiter refertur ad Deum, Deus realiter referatur ad creaturam. Again, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): “Likeness is not reciprocal between cause and effect, for an effect is said to be like its cause and not vice versa.” Now the same would seem to apply to other relations as to that of likeness. Therefore,seemingly neither is there reciprocity in the relations between God and the creature, and we cannot argue that because the creature is really related to God, therefore is God really related to the creature. Respondeo. Dicendum quod relationes, quae dicuntur de Deo ad creaturam, non sunt realiter in ipso. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod cum relatio realis consistat in ordine unius rei ad rem aliam, ut dictum est; in illis tantum mutua realis relatio invenitur in quibus ex utraque parte est eadem ratio ordinis unius ad alterum: quod quidem invenitur in omnibus relationibus consequentibus quantitatem. Nam cum quantitatis ratio sit ab omni sensibili abstracta, eiusdem rationis est quantitas in omnibus naturalibus corporibus. Et pari ratione qua unum habentium quantitatem realiter refertur ad alterum, et aliud ad ipsum. Habet autem una quantitas absolute considerata ad aliam ordinem secundum rationem mensurae et mensurati, et secundum nomen totius et partis, et aliorum huiusmodi quae quantitatem consequuntur. I answer that the relations whereby we refer God to creatures are not really in God. To make this clear we must observe that since a real relation consists in the order of one thing to another, as already stated, a real relation is mutual in those things alone wherein on either side there is the same reason for mutual order: and this apples to all relations consequent to quantity. For since the notion of quantity is independent of all objects of sense, it is the same in all corporeal natures. And for the same reason that a quantitative thing A is really related to the quantitative thing B, B is really related to A. Now between one quantity, considered absolutely, and another there is the order deriving from measure and thing measured, under the name of whole and part and other such things that result from quantity. In relationibus autem quae consequuntur actionem et passionem, sive virtutem activam et passivam, non est semper motus ordo ex utraque parte. Oportet namque id quod semper habet rationem patientis et moti, sive causati, ordinem habere ad agens vel movens, cum semper effectus a causa perficiatur, et ab ea dependeat: unde ordinatur ad ipsam sicut ad suum perfectivum. Agentia autem, sive moventia, vel etiam causae, aliquando habent ordinem ad patientia vel mota vel causata, in quantum scilicet in ipso effectu vel passione vel motu inductis, attenditur quoddam bonum et perfectio moventis vel agentis; On the other hand in relations arising from action and passion or active and passive power there is not always order of movement on both sides. Because that which has the nature of being patient, moved or caused must always have an order to the agent or mover, seeing that the effect is always perfected by its cause and dependent thereon: so that it is ordered to it as the cause of its perfection. Now agents, whether movers or causes, sometimes have an order to their respective patients, whether moved or caused, inasmuch, to wit, as the good or perfection of the mover or agent is to be found in the effect, patient or thing moved. sicut maxime patet in agentibus univocis quae per actionem suae speciei similitudinem inducunt, et per consequens esse perpetuum quod est possibile, conservant. Patet hoc etiam idem in omnibus aliis quae mota movent vel agunt vel causant; nam ex ipso suo motu ordinantur ad effectus producendos; et similiter in omnibus in quibus quodcumque bonum causae provenit ex effectu. Quaedam vero sunt ad quae quidem alia ordinantur, et non e converso, quia sunt omnino extrinseca ab illo genere actionum vel virtutum quas consequitur talis ordo; sicut patet quod scientia refertur ad scibile, quia sciens, per actum intelligibilem, ordinem habet ad rem scitam quae est extra animam. Ipsa vero res quae est extra animam, omnino non attingitur a tali actu, cum actus intellectus non sit transiens in exteriorem materiam mutandam; unde et ipsa res quae est extra animam, omnino est extra genus intelligibile. This is especially evident in univocal agents which by their action produce their like in species, and consequently perpetuate their species as far as this is possible. This is also evident in all other things which move, act or cause through themselves being moved; because by their very movement they are ordered to produce effects; and again in all those things where any good accrues to the cause from its effect. And there are some things to which others are ordered but not vice versa, because they are wholly foreign to that genus of actions or power from which that order arises: thus knowledge has a relation to the thing known, because the knower by an intelligible act has an order to the thing known which is outside the soul. Whereas the thing itself that is outside the soul is not touched by that act, inasmuch as the act of the intellect does not pass into exterior matter by changing it; so that the thing which is outside the soul is wholly outside the genus of intelligible things. Et propter hoc relatio quae consequitur actum intellectus, non potest esse in ea. Et similis ratio est de sensu et sensibili: licet enim sensibile immutet organum sensus in sua actione, et propter hoc habeat relationem ad ipsum —sicut et alia agentia naturalia ad ea quae patiuntur ab eis— alteratio tamen organi non perficit sensum in actu, sed perficitur per actum virtutis sensitivae: cuius sensibile quod est extra animam, omnino est expers. Similiter homo comparatur ad columnam ut dexter, ratione virtutis motivae quae est in homine, secundum quam competit ei dextrum et sinistrum, ante et retro, sursum et deorsum. Et ideo huiusmodi relationes in homine vel animali reales sunt, non autem in re quae tali virtute caret. Similiter nummus est extra genus illius actionis per quam fit pretium; quae est conventio inter aliquos homines facta: homo etiam est extra genus artificialium actionum, per quas sibi imago constituitur. Et ideo nec homo habet relationem realem ad suam imaginem, nec nummus ad pretium, sed e contrario. Deus autem non agit per actionem mediam, quae intelligatur a Deo procedens, et in creaturam terminata: sed sua actio est sua substantia, et quidquid in ea est, est omnino extra genus esse creati, per quod creatura refertur ad Deum. Nec iterum aliquod bonum accrescit creatori ex creaturae productione, unde sua actio est maxime liberalis, ut Avicenna dicit. Patet etiam quod non movetur ad hoc quod agat, sed absque omni sua mutatione mutabilia facit. Unde relinquitur quod in eo non est aliqua relatio realis ad creaturam, licet sit relatio creaturae ad ipsum, sicut effectus ad causam. For this reason the relation which arises from the act of the mind cannot be in that thing. The same applies to sense and the sensible object: for although the sensible object by its own action affects the organ of sense, and consequently bears a relation to it, just as other natural agents have a relation to the things on which they act, nevertheless it is not the alteration of the organ that perfects the act of perception, but the act of the sensitive power; to which act the sensible object outside the soul is altogether foreign. In like manner a man who stands to the right of a pillar bears a corresponding relation to the pillar by reason of his motive power whereby he is competent to be to the right or to the left, before or behind, above or below. Wherefore such-like relations in man or animal are real, but not in the thing which lacks that power. In like manner again money is external to the action whereby prices are fixed, which action is a convention between certain persons: and man is outside the genus of those actions whereby the artist produces his image. Hence there is not a real relation either in a man to his image, or in money to the price, but vice versa. Now God does not work by an intermediary action to be regarded as issuing from God and terminating in the creature: but his action is his substance and is wholly outside the genus of created being whereby the creature is related to him. Nor again does any good accrue to the creator from the production of the creature: wherefore his action is supremely liberal as Avicenna says (Metaph. viii, 7). It is also evident that he is not moved to act, and that without any change in himself he makes all changeable things. It follows then that there is no real relation in him to creatures, although creatures are really related to him, as effects to their cause. In hoc autem deficit multipliciter Rabbi, qui voluit probare quod non esset relatio inter Deum et creaturam, quia cum Deus non sit corpus, non habet relationem ad tempus nec ad locum. Consideravit enim solam relationem quae consequitur quantitatem, non eam quae consequitur actionem et passionem. In this matter Rabbi Moses erred in many ways, for he wished to prove that there is no relation between God and the creature, because seeing that God is not a body he has no relation to time or place. Thus he considered only the relation which results from quantity and not that which arises from action and passion. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod movens et agens naturale movet et agit actione vel motu medio, qui est inter movens et motum, agens et passum. Unde oportet quod saltem in hoc medio conveniant agens et patiens, movens et motum. Et sic agens, in quantum est agens, non est extraneum a genere patientis in quantum est patiens. Unde utriusque est realis ordo unius ad alterum, et praecipue cum ipsa actio media sit quaedam perfectio propria agentis; et per consequens id ad quod terminatur actio, est bonum eius. Hoc autem in Deo non contingit, ut dictum est; et ideo non est simile. Reply to the First Objection. The natural mover or agent moves and acts by an intermediary movement or action that is between the mover and the thing moved: between the agent and the patient: wherefore in this intermediary, at least agent and patient, mover and thing moved must come together. Wherefore the agent as such is not outside the genus of the patient as such: and consequently each has a real relation to the other, especially seeing that this intermediary action is a perfection proper to the agent so that the term of that action is a perfection of the agent. This does not apply to God, as stated above: and thus the comparison fails. Ad secundum dicendum, quod hoc quod movens movetur, non est causa quare relatio moventis in eo sit realiter, sed signum quoddam. Ex hoc enim apparet quod aliquo modo coincidit in genus moti, ex quo et ipsum movet motum; et iterum apparet quod ipsum ad quod movetur, sit quoddam bonum eius, ex quo ad hoc per suum motum ordinatur. Reply to the Second Objection. The fact that the mover is moved is not the cause of its relation of mover being a real relation, but a sign thereof. For the fact that it moves through being moved shows that from one point of view it belongs to the same genus as the thing moved; and again from the fact that by its movement it is moved to a certain end it follows that this end is its good. Ad tertium dicendum, quod pater dat esse filio sui generis, cum sit agens univocum; non autem tale esse dat Deus creaturae; et ideo non est simile. Reply to the Third Objection. The father, being an univocal agent gives the nature of his own genus to his son: but God does not thus give being to the creature: hence the comparison fails. Ad quartum dicendum, quod hoc nomen, dominus, tria in suo intellectu includit: scilicet, potentiam coercendi subditos, et ordinem ad subditos qui consequitur talem potestatem, et terminationem ordinis subditorum ad dominum; in uno enim relativo est intellectus alterius relativi. Salvatur ergo huius significatio nominis in Deo quantum ad primum et tertium, non autem quantum ad secundum. Unde Ambrosius dicit, quod hoc nomen, dominus, nomen est potestatis; et Boetius dicit, quod dominium est potestas quaedam qua servus coercetur. Reply to the Fourth Objection. The denomination lord comprises three things in its signification: namely, first, power to compel subjects; secondly, arising from that power, relation to those subjects; thirdly, a relation in those subjects to their lord, since one relative implies the other. Accordingly the term lord retains its meaning in God as regards the first and third, but not the second. Hence Ambrose (De Fide i, i) says that this name lord is a name of power, and Boethius says that dominion is the power of compelling slaves. Ad quintum dicendum, quod scientia Dei aliter comparatur ad res quam scientia nostra; comparatur enim ad eas sicut et causa et mensura. Tales enim res sunt secundum veritatem, quales Deus sua scientia eas ordinavit. Ipsae autem res sunt causa et mensura scientiae nostrae. Unde sicut et scientia nostra refertur ad res realiter, et non e contrario: ita res referuntur realiter ad scientiam Dei, et non e contrario. Vel dicendum, quod Deus intelligit res alias intelligendo se; unde relatio divinae scientiae non est ad res directe, sed ad ipsam divinam essentiam. Reply to the Fifth Objection. God’s knowledge has not the same relation to things as ours has: since it is related to them as their cause and measure, inasmuch as things are true so far as by his knowledge God ordained them. On the other hand things are the cause and measure of our knowledge. Wherefore just as our knowledge bears a real relation to things and not vice versa, so are things really related to God’s knowledge and not vice versa. Or we may reply that God understands other things by understanding himself, wherefore his knowledge is related directly not to things but to the divine essence. Ad sextum dicendum, quod appetibile quod movet appetitum, est finis; ea vero quae sunt ad finem non movent appetitum nisi ratione finis. Finis autem divinae voluntatis non est aliquid aliud quam divina bonitas. Unde non sequitur quod res aliae comparentur ad divinam voluntatem sicut movens ad motum. Reply to the Sixth Objection. The appetible object that moves the appetite is the end, and the means do not move the appetite save on account of the end. Now the end of the divine will is nothing else than the divine goodness. Hence it does not follow that other things bear the same relation to the divine will as the mover does to that which it moves. Ad septimum dicendum, quod corpora caelestia referuntur realiter ad inferiora secundum relationes consequentes quantitatem, propter hoc quod est eadem ratio quantitatis in utrisque; et iterum quantum ad relationes consequentes virtutem activam et passivam, quia movent mota per actionem mediam quae non est eorum substantia, cum aliquod bonum ipsorum attendatur in hoc quod sunt inferiorum causa. Reply to the Seventh Objection. The heavenly bodies are related to the lower bodies by real relations arising from quantity, inasmuch as on either side there is quantity of the same kind; and again by real relations arising from action and passion, because the action whereby being themselves moved they move other things is intermediary and is not their very substance, since by being a cause of lower things they obtain a certain good. Ad octavum dicendum est, quod illud a quo aliquid denominatur, non oportet quod sit semper forma secundum rei naturam, sed sufficit quod significetur per modum formae, grammatice loquendo. Denominatur enim homo ab actione et ab indumento, et ab aliis huiusmodi, quae realiter non sunt formae. Reply to the Eighth Objection. That from which a thing is denominated need not always be its natural form, and it suffices for it to be expressed, grammatically speaking, by way of a form: thus a man is denominated from an action, his apparel and the like which are not really forms. Ad nonum dicendum, quod si proportio intelligatur aliquis determinatus excessus, nulla est Dei ad creaturam proportio. Si autem per proportionem intelligatur habitudo sola, sic patet quod est inter creatorem et creaturam; in creatura quidem realiter, non autem in creatore. Reply to the Ninth Objection. If by proportion is meant a definite excess, then there is no proportion in God to the creature. But if proportion stands for relation alone, then there is relation between the Creator and the creature: in the latter really, but not in the former. Ad decimum dicendum, quod licet doctor incipiat a rebus, tamen alio modo recipiuntur rerum conceptiones in mente doctoris quam sint in natura rei, quia unumquodque recipitur in altero per modum recipientis: patet enim quod conceptiones in mente doctoris sunt immaterialiter, et materialiter in natura. Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although the teacher begins with things, the ideas of things are received by the teacher’s mind otherwise than in nature, because that which is received into another follows the mode of the recipient: and it is plain that ideas are in the teacher’s mind immaterially, but materially in nature. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod distinctio ista relativorum secundum esse et secundum dici, nihil facit ad hoc quod sit relatio realis. Quaedam enim sunt relativa secundum esse quae non sunt realia, sicut dextrum et sinistrum in columna; et quaedam sunt relativa secundum dici, quae tamen important relationes reales, sicut patet de scientia et sensu. Dicuntur enim relativa secundum esse, quando nomina sunt imposita ad significandas ipsas relationes; relativa vero secundum dici, quando nomina sunt imposita ad significandas qualitates vel aliquid huiusmodi principaliter, ad quae tamen consequuntur relationes. Nec quantum ad hoc differt, utrum sint relationes reales vel rationis tantum. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. This distinction between predicamental and transcendental relatives does not prove the relations in question to be real. Certain predicamental relative terms do not signify a real relation, for instance, right and left as ascribed to a pillar: and some transcendental relative terms signify real relations, for instance, knowledge and sensation. Because relatives are said to be predicamental when terms are employed to signify the relations themselves, while they are said to be transcendental when thee terms are employed to signify qualities or something of the kind primarily, from which relations arise. Nor as regards the question at issue does it matter whether they be real or logical relations. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod licet posito uno relativorum ponatur aliud, non tamen oportet quod eodem modo ponatur utrumque, sed sufficit quod unum ponatur secundum rem, et aliud secundum rationem. Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Although given one relative the other follows, this does not imply that both are posited in the same way: and it suffices that one be real and the other logical.
Are These Temporal Relations in God As Logical I Relations?
Undecimo quaeritur utrum istae relationes temporales sint in Deo secundum rationem. Et videtur quod non. THE eleventh point of inquiry is whether these temporal relations are in God as logical relations: and it would seem that they are not.
[ Sum. Th. I, Q. xiii, A. 7, ad i.]
Ratio enim cui non respondet res, est cassa et vana, sicut Boetius dicit. Sed istae relationes non sunt in Deo secundum rem ut ex praedictis patet. Esset ergo ratio cassa et vana, si essent in Deo secundum rationem. 1. An idea to which nothing real corresponds is idle and vain, according to Boethius (Super Proem. Poyphyr. in Praedicab.). Now these relations are not really in God, as proved above. Therefore it is vain and idle for the reason to attribute them to him. Praeterea, quae sunt secundum rationem tantum, non attribuuntur rebus nisi secundum quod sunt in intellectu, sicut genus et species et ordo. Sed huiusmodi relationes temporales non attribuuntur Deo secundum quod est in intellectu nostro tantum: sic enim nihil esset dictu, Deus est dominus, quoniam Deus intelligitur creaturis praeesse; quod patet esse falsum. Ergo huiusmodi relationes non sunt secundum rationem in Deo. 2. That which has only a logical existence is not ascribed to things except according as they are in the mind, for instance genus, species and order. Now these temporal relations are not ascribed to God according as he is only in our mind, since if they were, then, to say that God is Lord because we understand him to reign over creatures would have no objective reality, which is clearly false. Therefore these relations are not in God as logical relations. Praeterea, hoc nomen, dominus, relationem significat, cum sit relativum secundum esse. Sed Deus est dominus non secundum rationem tantum. Ergo nec huiusmodi relationes sunt in Deo secundum rationem tantum. 3. This name Lord signifies a relation since it is a predicamental relative. But Lordship is not merely a logical relation in God. Therefore neither are these relations in God only logical. Praeterea, nullo intellectu creato existente, Deus adhuc esset dominus et creator. Non autem essent res rationis nullo intellectu creato existente. Ergo dominus et creator et huiusmodi non important relationes rationis tantum. 4. If there were no created intelligence God would still be Lord and Creator. But there would be no logical relations if there were no created intelligence. Therefore God and Lord and the like do not denote merely logical relations. Praeterea, id quod est secundum rationem nostram tantum, non fuit ab aeterno. Sed aliquae relationes Dei ad creaturam fuerunt ab aeterno, sicut relationes importatae in nomine scientiae et praedestinationis. Ergo huiusmodi relationes non sunt in Deo secundum rationem tantum. 5. That which has existence in our mind only has not existed from eternity. Now some of God’s relations to the creature have been from eternity, such as the relations implied in the terms knowledge and predestination. Therefore such are not merely logical relations in God. Sed contra, est quod nomina significant rationes, sive intellectus, ut dicitur in principio Periher. Constat autem ista nomina relative dici. Ergo oportet huiusmodi relationes secundum rationem esse. On the contrary, names signify ideas or concepts (Peri Herm. i). Now it is plain that these names are relative terms. Therefore these relations must be logical. Respondeo. Dicendum quod sicut realis relatio consistit in ordine rei ad rem, ita relatio rationis consistit in ordine intellectuum; quod quidem dupliciter potest contingere: I answer that just as a real relation consists in order between thing and thing, so a logical relation is the order of thought to thought; and this may occur in two ways. uno modo secundum quod iste ordo est adinventus per intellectum, et attributus ei quod relative dicitur; et huiusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuuntur ab intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio generis et speciei: has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando ordinem eius quod est in intellectu ad res quae sunt extra, vel etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem. First, when the order is discovered by the mind and attributed to that which is expressed in a relative term. Such are the relations attributed by the mind to the things understood as such, for instance, the relations of genus and species: for the mind discovers these relations by observing the order between that which is in the mind and that which is outside the mind, or again the order between one idea and another. Alio modo secundum quod huiusmodi relationes consequuntur modum intelligendi, videlicet quod intellectus intelligit aliquid in ordine ad aliud; licet illum ordinem intellectus non adinveniat, sed magis ex quadam necessitate consequatur modum intelligendi. Et huiusmodi relationes intellectus non attribuit ei quod est in intellectu, sed ei quod est in re. Et hoc quidem contingit secundum quod aliqua non habentia secundum se ordinem, ordinate intelliguntur; licet intellectus non intelligat ea habere ordinem, quia sic esset falsus. Ad hoc autem quod aliqua habeant ordinem, oportet quod utrumque sit ens, et utrumque distinctum (quia eiusdem ad seipsum non est ordo) et utrumque ordinabile ad aliud. Quandoque autem intellectus accipit aliqua duo ut entia, quorum alterum tantum vel neutrum est ens: sicut cum accipit duo futura, vel unum praesens et aliud futurum, et intelligit unum cum ordine ad aliud, dicens alterum esse prius altero; unde istae relationes sunt rationis tantum, utpote modum intelligendi consequentes. Quandoque vero accipit unum ut duo, et intelligit ea cum quodam ordine: sicut cum dicitur aliquid esse idem sibi; et sic talis relatio est rationis tantum. Quandoque vero accipit aliqua duo ut ordinabilia ad invicem, inter quae non est ordo medius, immo alterum ipsorum essentialiter est ordo: sicut cum dicit relationem accidere subiecto; unde talis relatio relationis ad quodcumque aliud rationis est tantum. Quandoque vero accipit aliquid cum ordine ad aliud, in quantum est terminus ordinis alterius ad ipsum, licet ipsum non ordinetur ad aliud: sicut accipiendo scibile ut terminum ordinis scientiae ad ipsum; et sic cum quodam ordine ad scientiam, nomen scibilis relative significat; et est relatio rationis tantum. Et similiter aliqua nomina relativa Deo attribuit intellectus noster, in quantum accipit Deum ut terminum relationum creaturarum ad ipsum; unde huiusmodi relationes sunt rationis tantum. Secondly, when these relations arise from the mode of understanding, namely when the mind understands one thing in its relation to another, although that relation is not discovered by the intellect but follows by a kind of necessity its mode of understanding. Such relations are attributed by the intellect not to that which is in the intellect but to that which has objective reality. This happens forasmuch as certain things not mutually related are understood in relation to one another, although the mind does not understand them to be related, for in that case it would be in error. Now in order that two things be related they must each have existence, be distinct from each other (for nothing bears a relation to itself), and be referable to the other. Now the mind sometimes conceives two things as having,existence, whereas one or neither of them is a being: as when it considers two futures, or one present and one future, and considers one in relation to the other by placing one before the other; wherefore such relations are purely logical since they arise from the mode of understanding. And sometimes the mind considers one thing as though it were two, and considers them in the light of a certain relationship: as when a thing is said to be identical with itself, and such a relation is purely logical. Sometimes the mind considers two things as referable to each other, whereas there is no relation between them, in fact one of them is itself essentially a relation: as when a relation is said to be accidental to its subject, wherefore such a logical relation has merely a logical relationship to anything else. Again the mind sometimes considers something in relation to another inasmuch as it is the term of the relationship of another thing to it, and yet itself is not related to the other: as when it considers something knowable as terminating the relationship of knowledge to it; and thus it imputes to the thing knowable a certain relation to knowledge, and such a relation is purely logical. In like manner our mind attributes to God certain relative terms, inasmuch as it considers God as the term of the creature’s relation to him: wherefore such relations are purely logical. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in huiusmodi relationibus aliquid respondet ex parte rei, scilicet relatio creaturae ad Deum. Sicut enim scibile dicitur relative, non quia ipsum referatur ad scientiam, sed quia scientia referatur ad ipsum, ut habetur V Metaph., ita Deus dicitur relative, quia creaturae referuntur ad ipsum. Reply to the First Objection. In these relations there is something objective corresponding to them, namely the relation of the creature to God. For just as a thing is said to be knowable relatively, not in reference to knowledge but because knowledge refers to it (Metaph. v), even so God is spoken of relatively because creatures are related to him. Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de illis relationibus rationis quae sunt per rationem inventae, et rebus in intellectu existentibus attributae. Tales autem non sunt relationes istae, sed consequentes modum intelligendi. Reply to the Second Objection. This argument considers those relations that are discovered by reason and attributed to things that are in the mind. The relations in question, however, are not of this kind but arise from the mode of understanding. Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut aliquis est idem sibi realiter, et non solum secundum rationem, licet relatio sit secundum rationem tantum, propter hoc quod relationis causa est realis, scilicet unitas substantiae quam intellectus sub relatione intelligit: ita potestas coercendi subditos est in Deo realiter, quam intellectus intelligit in ordine ad subditos propter ordinem subditorum ad ipsum; et propter hoc dicitur dominus realiter, licet relatio sit rationis tantum. Et eodem modo apparet quod dominus esset, nullo existente intellectu. Reply to the Third Objection. just as a man is identical with himself really and not only logically (although such a relation is merely logical) inasmuch as the cause of the relation is real, namely substantial identity, which the mind considers in the light of a relation: even so the power to compel subjects is in God really, and our mind considers it in relation to the subjects on account of the subjects’ relation to God: and thus he is called Lord really, although in him the relation is merely logical. For the same reason it is evident that he would be Lord even if there were no created mind in existence. Unde patet solutio ad quartum. Hence the Reply to the Fourth Objection is clear. Ad quintum dicendum, quod relatio scientiae Dei ad creaturam non est primo et per se, ut dictum est prius, sed ad essentiam creatoris, per quam Deus omnia scit. Reply to the Fifth Objection. As stated above God’s knowledge is related essentially not to the creature but to the essence of the Creator whereby God knows all things.