Question Fifteen: Higher and Lower Reason

  1. Primo utrum intellectus et ratio sint diversae potentiae in homine.
  2. Secundo utrum ratio superior et inferior sint diversae potentiae.
  3. Tertio utrum in ratione superiori et inferiori possit esse peccatum.
  4. Quarto utrum delectatio morosa sit peccatum mortale.
  5. Quinto utrum in ratione superiori possit esse peccatum veniale.
  1. Are understanding and reason different powers in man?
  2. Are higher and lower reason different powers?
  3. Can sin exist in higher or lower reason?
  4. Is deliberate pleasure in bad thoughts (delectatio morosa), which exists in the lower part of reason through consent to the pleasure but without consent to the deed, a mortal sin?
  5. Can venial sin exist in higher reason?

ARTICLE I

The question treats of higher and lower reason,
and in the first article we ask:
Are understanding and reason different powers in man?


[ARTICLE III Sent., 35, 2, 2, sol. 1; S.T., I, 79, 8.]

Quaestio est de ratione superiori et inferiori. Et primo quaeritur utrum intellectus et ratio sint diversae potentiae in homine Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that they are, for
Dicitur enim in libro de spiritu et anima: cum ab inferioribus ad superiora ascendere volumus, prius occurrit nobis sensus, deinde imaginatio, postea ratio, postea intellectus et postea intelligentia; et in summa est sapientia, quae est ipse Deus. Sed imaginatio et sensus sunt diversae potentiae. Ergo etiam ratio et intellectus. 1. In Spirit and Soul we read: “When we want to rise from lower to higher things, first, senses come to our aid; then, imagination; then, reason; then, understanding; then, intelligence; and, in the highest place, there is wisdom, which is God Himself.” But imagination and sense are different powers. Therefore, reason and understanding are, too.
Praeterea, homo, ut dicit Gregorius, cum omni creatura convenit; ratione cuius dicitur omnis creatura. Sed id quo homo convenit cum plantis, est quaedam potentia animae, scilicet vegetativa, distincta a ratione, quae est propria potentia hominis in quantum est homo; et similiter id in quo convenit cum brutis, scilicet sensus. Ergo pari ratione id in quo convenit cum Angelis, qui sunt supra hominem, scilicet intellectus, est alia potentia a ratione, quae est propria humani generis, ut dicit Boetius in V de consolatione. 2. As Gregory says, man has something in common with every creature, and for this reason is man called all creation. However, that by which man has something in common with plants is a power of the soul, the vegetative, which is distinct from reason, the proper power of man, as man. The same is true for the senses, by which he has something in common with brute animals. Therefore, with equal reason, his understanding, which he has in common with angels, who are above man, is a power different from reason, which is proper to the human race, as Boethius says.
Praeterea, sicut sensuum propriorum acceptiones terminantur ad sensum communem, qui de eis iudicat; ita etiam rationis discursus terminatur ad intellectum, ut iudicium feratur de his de quibus ratio contulit: tunc enim de his quae ratio confert, homo iudicat, cum resolvendo ad principia devenitur, quorum est intellectus; ratione cuius ars iudicandi resolutoria nominatur. Ergo, sicut sensus communis est alia potentia a sensu proprio, ita et intellectus a ratione. 3. just as the perceptions of the proper senses terminate at the common sense, which makes judgments concerning them, so the discourse of reason terminates at understanding, so that judgment may be made about the things which reason has compared. For man judges of the things which reason compares when by analysis he reaches principles which are the objects of understanding. For this reason the art of judging is called analytical. Therefore, as common sense is a different power from proper sense, so understanding is different from reason.
Praeterea, comprehendere et iudicare sunt actus potentias diversas exigentes, ut patet in sensu proprio et communi; quorum sensus proprius comprehendit, communis autem iudicat. Sed, sicut dicitur in libro de spiritu et anima, quidquid sensus percipit, imaginatio repraesentat, cogitatio format, ingenium investigat, ratio iudicat, memoria servat, intelligentia comprehendit. Ergo ratio et intelligentia sunt diversae potentiae. 4. To comprehend and to judge are acts requiring different powers, as is clear in proper and common sense. For common sense judges about the things which proper sense perceives. But, as is said in Spirit and Soul: “Whatever sense perceives, imagination represents, thought forms, genius investigates, reason judges, memory retains, and intelligence comprehends.” Therefore, reason and intelligence are different powers.
Praeterea, sicut se habet quod est omnibus modis simplex, ad actum compositum, ita se habet illud quod est simpliciter compositum, ad actum simplicem. Sed intellectus divinus, qui est omnibus modis simplex, non habet actum aliquem compositum, sed simplicissimum. Ergo et ratio nostra, quae composita est, in quantum est collativa, non habet actum simplicem. Actus autem intellectus est simplex: est enim intelligentia indivisibilium, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo intellectus et ratio non sunt una potentia. 5. That which is simply composite relates to simple act in the same way as that which is altogether simple relates to composite act. But the divine intellect, which is simple in every way, has no composite act, but only the most simple act. Therefore, our reason, which is composite, inasmuch as it compares, does not have a simple act. But the act of understanding is simple’ “for it is understanding of things indivisible,” as is said in The Soul. Therefore, understanding and reason are not one power.
Praeterea, anima rationalis secundum philosophum in III de anima, et Commentatorem ibidem, seipsam cognoscit per aliquam similitudinem. Mens autem, in qua est imago, secundum Augustinum in IX de Trinitate se per seipsam cognoscit. Ergo ratio et mens, sive intellectus, non sunt idem. 6. According to the Commentator and the Philosopher, the rational soul knows itself through a likeness. “The mind, however, in which the image resides, knows itself through itself,” according to Augustine. Therefore, reason and mind, or understanding, are not the same.
Praeterea, potentiae diversificantur penes actus, et actus penes obiecta. Sed obiecta rationis et intellectus sunt maxime differentia: ut enim dicitur in Lib. de spiritu et anima, anima sensu percipit corpora, imaginatione corporum similitudines, ratione corporum naturas, intellectu spiritum creatum, intelligentia spiritum increatum. Maxime autem differt natura corporea a spiritu creato. Ergo intellectus et ratio sunt diversae potentiae. 7. Powers are differentiated according to acts, and acts according to objects. But the objects of reason and understanding differ very greatly. For, as is said in Spirit and Soul: “The soul perceives bodies by sense, likenesses of bodies by imagination, natures of bodies by reason, created spirit by understanding, and uncreated spirit by intelligence.” But bodily nature differs very greatly from created spirit. Therefore, understanding and reason are different powers.
Praeterea, Boetius dicit in V de consolatione: ipsum hominem aliter sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intelligentia intuetur: sensus enim figuram in subiecta materia constitutam; imaginatio vero solam sine materia iudicat figuram; ratio vero hanc quoque transcendit, speciem quoque ipsam quae in singularibus inest, universali consideratione perpendit; intelligentia vero celsior oculus existit: supergressa namque universitatis ambitum ipsam illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie intuetur. Sicut ergo imaginatio est diversa potentia a sensu, ex hoc quod imaginatio considerat formam non in materia, sensus vero in materia, constitutam; ita intelligentia, quae considerat formam absolute, est alia potentia a ratione, quae considerat formam universalem in particularibus existentem. 8. Boethius says: “Sense, imagination, reason, and intelligence each look on man in a different way. Sense sees figure embodied in given matter, whereas imagination judges of figure alone without matter. Reason, in its turn, transcends imagination, examining with general consideration the species which exists in singular things. Moreover, the eye of intelligence has a more lofty existence, for intelligence goes beyond the scope of the universe and by sheer force of mind surveys simple form itself.” Therefore, just as imagination is a power different from sense, since imagination considers form outside of matter, and sense sees it embodied in matter, so intelligence, which considers form absolutely, is a power different from reason, which studies the general form as it exists in individual things.
Praeterea, Boetius dicit in IV de consolatione: uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio; ad id quod est, id quod gignitur; ad aeternitatem tempus; ad punctum medium circulus: ita est fati series mobilis ad providentiae divinae stabilem simplicitatem. Sed constat quod providentia a fato, circulus a centro, tempus ab aeternitate, generatio ab ipso esse per essentiam differunt. Ergo et ratio ab intellectu. 9. Boethius says: “As reasoning is related to understanding, as that which is produced, to that which exists, as time to eternity, and as the circle to its center point, so the changeable series of fate is related to the stable simplicity of providence.”“ But it is plain that there is an essential difference between providence and fate, between the circle and its center, between time and eternity, and between generation and existence. Therefore, reason, too, is essentially different from understanding.
Praeterea, ut dicit Boetius in V de consolatione, ratio humani tantum generis est, sicut intelligentia sola divini. Sed id quod est divinum et humanum, non potest communicare in eadem ratione potentiae. Ergo non sunt una potentia. 10. As Boethius says: “Reason belongs to the human race alone, as intelligence belongs only to the divine.” But the divine and the human cannot both share in the one essence of power. Therefore, they are not one power.
Praeterea, secundum ordinem actuum est ordo potentiarum. Sed accipere absolute aliquid, quod videtur esse intellectus est prius quam conferre, quod pertinet ad rationem. Ergo intellectus est ratione prior. Nihil autem est prius seipso. Ergo non est eadem potentia ratio et intellectus. 11. The order of powers follows the order of acts. But to receive something absolutely, which seems to belong to understanding, is prior to comparison, which belongs to reason. Therefore, understanding is prior to reason. But nothing is prior to itself. Therefore, understanding and reason are not the same power.
Praeterea, est considerare rei entitatem absolute, et entitatem rei in hoc: quarum considerationum neutra animae humanae deest. Ergo oportet in anima humana esse duas potentias; quarum una cognoscatur entitas absoluta, quod est intellectus; et alia entitas in alio, quod videtur esse rationis, et sic idem quod prius. 12. It is one thing to consider the entity of a thing absolutely, and another to consider it as in this thing. The human soul exercises both of these considerations. Therefore, in the human soul there must be two powers, one to know the absolute entity, which is understanding, and another to know the entity in something else, which seems to be reason. We conclude as before.
Praeterea, ut dicitur in Lib. de spiritu et anima, ratio est mentis aspectus, quo bonum malumque discernit, virtutes eligit, Deumque diligit; quod ad affectum pertinere videtur, qui est alia potentia quam intellectus. Ergo et ratio est alia potentia ab intellectu. 13. In Spirit and Soul we read: “Reason is the sight of the mind by which it distinguishes good and evil, chooses virtues, and loves God.” These things seem to belong to the affections which are a different power from the understanding. Therefore, reason, too, is a different power from the understanding.
Praeterea, rationalis contra concupiscibile et irascibile distinguitur; sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis pertinent ad appetitivam. Ergo et ratio; et sic idem quod prius. 14. The rational is distinguished from the concupiscible and irascible. But the irascible and concupiscible belong to the appetites. Therefore, reason does, also. We conclude as before.
Praeterea, in III de anima philosophus dicit, quod in rationali est voluntas, quae contra intellectum distinguitur; ergo idem quod prius. 15. The Philosopher says: “The will is in the rational part.” But it is distinguished from understanding. We conclude as before.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Est quod Augustinus dicere videtur XV de Trinit. ubi dicit: pervenimus ad Dei imaginem, quod est homo, in eo quod ceteris animalibus antecellit, idest ratione vel intelligentia; et quidquid aliud de anima rationali vel intellectuali dici potest quod pertineat ad illam rem quae mens vocatur vel animus. Ex quo videtur quod rationem et intelligentiam pro eodem accipiat. l. Augustine seems to say the opposite when he says: “We arrive at the image of God, which is man, in that by which he surpasses other animals, that is, in reason or intelligence. And whatever else there is of the rational or intellectual soul can be said to belong to that thing which is called mind or mental life.” From this it seems that he takes reason and intelligence as the same thing.
Praeterea, in III super Genesim ad litteram - et habetur in Glosa Eph. IV, 23 super illud renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae - intelligamus in eo factum hominem ad imaginem Dei quo irrationabilibus animantibus antecellit. Id autem est ipsa ratio vel mens vel intelligentia vel si quo alio vocabulo commodius appellatur; ergo videtur quod ratio et intellectus secundum eum sint diversa nomina eiusdem potentiae. 2. In Augustine (and in the Gloss on Ephesians [14:23], “And be renewed in the spirit of your mind,”) we read: “We should understand that man is made in the image of God in that by which he surpasses irrational animals.” But this is reason itself, mind, intelligence, or whatever other name fits it better. Therefore, it seems that reason and understanding are for Augustine different names for the same power.
Praeterea, ut dicitur XIII de Trinitate ab Augustino, imago illius naturae qua nulla natura melior est, ibi quaerenda et invenienda est in nobis, quo etiam natura nostra nihil habet melius. Sed imago Dei est in nobis in superiori parte rationis, ut dicitur in XII et in XV de Trinitate. Ergo nulla potentia est in homine potior ratione. Intelligentia autem vel intellectus, si essent aliud a ratione, essent supra rationem; ut patet per auctoritates primo inductas Boetii, et de spiritu et anima. Ergo intellectus non est in homine alia potentia a ratione. 3. Augustine says: “The image of that nature than which no nature is better should be sought and found in us in that than which our nature, also, has nothing better.”But the image of God is in us in the higher part of reason, as is said in The Trinity. Therefore, there is no other power in man better than reason. But, if intelligence or understanding were different from reason, they would be above reason, as is clear from the citations from Boethius and Spirit and Soul mentioned above. Therefore, in man, understanding is not a different power from reason.
Praeterea, quanto aliqua potentia est immaterialior, tanto ad plura potest se extendere. Sed sensus communis, quae est virtus materialis, confert de sensibilibus propriis, ea ad invicem discernendo; habet etiam eorum cognitionem absolute; alias inter ea discernere non posset ut probatur in II de anima. Ergo multo fortius, ratio quae est magis virtus immaterialis, non solum potest conferre, sed etiam absolute accipere, quod pertinet ad intellectum; et sic intellectus et ratio non videntur esse potentiae diversae. 4. The more immaterial a power is, the more it can extend to many things. But common sense, which is a material power, institutes comparisons of proper sensibles by distinguishing them from one another, and also has knowledge of them separately. Otherwise, it would not be able to distinguish one from another, as is proved in The Soul. Therefore, it is much more certain that reason, which is a more immaterial power, can not only compare, but also perceive things separately, a function which belongs to understanding. Thus, understanding and reason do not seem to be different powers.
Praeterea, in Lib. de spiritu et anima dicitur, quod mens universorum capax, omnium rerum similitudine insignita: anima dicitur et natura esse cum quadam potentia, et naturali dignitate. Sed id quod totam animam nominat, non debet distingui ab aliqua animae potentia. Ergo mens a ratione quae est quaedam animae potentia, distingui non debet; et ita nec intellectus, quia videtur esse idem quod mens. 5. As is said in Spirit and Soul: “The mind, capable of receiving everything, and stamped with the likeness of all things, is said to be the soul and to be a nature with a certain power and natural dignity.” But that which designates the whole soul should not be distinguished from some power of the soul. Therefore, the mind, which is a power of the soul, should not be distinguished from reason. Similarly, understanding, which seems to be the same thing as mind, should not be distinguished from it.
Praeterea, in operatione animae humanae duplex compositio invenitur; una qua componit et dividit praedicatum cum subiecto, formando propositiones; alia qua componit principia cum conclusionibus conferendo. Sed in prima compositione eadem potentia animae humanae est quae ipsa simplicia apprehendit, id est praedicatum et subiectum, secundum proprias quidditates, et quae componendo propositionem format; utrumque enim intellectui possibili attribuitur in III de anima. Ergo et similiter una potentia erit quae ipsa principia accipit, quod est intellectus, et quae principia in conclusionem ordinat, quod est rationis. 6. There is a double composition in the activity of the human soul. There is one by which it joins and divides predicate and subject, by forming propositions. The other is that by which it joins by comparing principles with conclusions. In the first composition the same power of the human soul apprehends the simple things, that is, predicate and subject, through their quiddities, and forms a proposition by joining them. For both of these are attributed to the possible intellect, according to The Soul. Therefore, with like reason there will be one power which grasps principles, a function which belongs to understanding, and which orders principles to conclusions, a function which belongs to reason.
Praeterea, in Lib. de spiritu et anima dicitur: anima est spiritus intellectualis vel rationalis; ex quo videtur quod ratio sit idem quod intellectus. 7. In Spirit and Soul we read: “The soul is an intellectual or rational spirit.” From this it seems that reason is the same as understanding.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in XII de Trinitate, quod ubi primum occurrit aliquid quod non sit nobis commune et pecori, hoc ad rationem pertinet. Hoc etiam idem ad intellectum pertinet, secundum philosophum in Lib. de anima. Ergo idem est ratio et intellectus. 8. Augustine says: “As soon as something arises which is not common to us and animals, it belongs to reason.” This same thing also belongs to understanding, according to the Philosopher. Therefore, reason and understanding are the same.
Praeterea, differentia obiectorum quantum ad accidentales conditiones, non demonstrat diversitatem potentiarum. Homo enim coloratus et lapis coloratus eadem potentia sentiuntur; accidit enim sensibili in quantum est sensibile esse hominem vel lapidem. Sed obiecta quae in Lib. de spiritu et anima assignantur intellectui et rationi, scilicet spiritus creatus et natura corporea, non differunt, sed conveniunt quantum ad per se rationem cognoscibilis. Sicut enim spiritus incorporeus creatus ex hoc ipso intelligibilis est quod immaterialis est, ita etiam naturae corporeae non intelliguntur nisi in quantum a materia separantur; et sic utrumque, in quantum cognoscitur, communicat in una ratione cognoscibilis, in ratione scilicet immaterialis. Ergo ratio et intellectus non sunt diversae potentiae. 9. Difference of objects in their accidental qualities does not indicate diversity of faculties. For a colored man and a colored stone are perceived by the same sensitive faculty, since it is incidental to the sensible thing in so far as it is a sensible thing, to be a man or a stone. But the objects which are ascribed to reason and understanding in Spirit and Soul, that is, “created spirit” and “corporeal nature,” do not differ, but agree, in their essential character as object of knowledge. For, just as a created incorporeal spirit is intelligible because it is immaterial, so, too, bodily natures are objects of understanding only in so far as they are separated from matter. Thus, both of these, in so far as they are known, share in one character of cognoscibility, the character of immateriality. Therefore, reason and understanding are not different powers.
Praeterea, omnis potentia quae comparat aliqua ad invicem, oportet quod habeat utriusque absolute cognitionem; unde philosophus probat in II de anima, quod oportet in nobis esse unam potentiam quae cognoscat album et dulce, per hoc quod discernimus inter ea. Sed sicut qui discernit inter aliqua diversa, comparat ea ad invicem, ita etiam qui confert, unum alteri comparat. Ergo illius potentiae quae confert, scilicet rationis, est etiam absolute aliquid accipere; quod pertinet ad intellectum. 10. Every power that compares two things with each other must have knowledge of each separately. Hence, the Philosopher proves that in us there must be one power which knows “white and sweet” because we can distinguish between them. But, just as one who distinguishes between different things relates them to each other, so also, he who compares them relates one to the other. Therefore,, it also belongs to the power which compares, namely, reason, to know something separately, which is an activity of understanding.
Praeterea, nobilius est conferre quam conferri, sicut agere quam pati. Sed per idem est aliquid intelligibile et conferibile. Ergo et per idem est anima intelligens et conferens. Ergo ratio et intellectus sunt idem. 11. It is more noble to compare than to be compared, just as it is more noble to act than to be acted upon. But a thing is understood and compared through the same thing. Therefore, the soul, also, understands and compares through the same thing. Therefore reason and understanding are the same.
Praeterea, unus habitus non est in diversis potentiis. Sed idem habitus potest esse quo conferimus, et absolute aliquid accipimus; sicut fides, quae absolute aliquid accipit, in quantum ipsi primae veritati inhaeret; confert vero, in quantum eam in speculo creaturarum quodam quasi decursu intuetur. Ergo eadem potentia est quae confert, et absolute aliquid accipit. 12. One habit does not exist in different powers. But it is possible for us to compare and perceive something separately by the same habit. Thus, faith, which perceives a thing separately, in so far as it clings to first truth, also compares, to the extent that by a sort of reasoning it sees first truth mirrored in creatures. Therefore, it is the same power which compares and which perceives something separately.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod ad evidentiam istius quaestionis investigare oportet intellectus et rationis differentiam. Sciendum est igitur, secundum Augustinum in III de Trinit. quod, sicut est ordo quidam inter substantias corporales, ex quo quaedam aliis superiores dicuntur, et earum regitivae; ita est etiam quidam ordo inter substantias spirituales. For a clear understanding of this question we must investigate the difference between reason and understanding. We must bear in mind that, according to Augustine, just as among corporeal substances there is an orderly disposition, according to which some are said to be higher than others and have control over them, so, too, among spiritual substances there is a certain orderly disposition.
Superiorum autem et inferiorum corporum haec videtur esse differentia: quod inferiora corpora suum perfectum esse per motum consequuntur, generationis scilicet, alterationis et augmenti; ut patet in lapidibus, plantis et animalibus. Superiora vero corpora suum perfectum esse habent quantum ad substantiam, virtutem, quantitatem et figuram, absque omni motu, statim in ipso sui principio; ut patet in sole, luna et stellis. Perfectio autem spiritualis naturae in cognitione veritatis consistit. Unde sunt quaedam substantiae spirituales superiores quae sine aliquo motu vel discursu statim in prima et subita sive simplici acceptione cognitionem obtinent veritatis; sicut est in Angelis, ratione cuius deiformem intellectum habere dicuntur. Quaedam vero sunt inferiores, quae ad cognitionem veritatis perfectam pervenire non possunt nisi per quemdam motum, quo ab uno in aliud discurrunt, ut ex cognitis in incognitorum notitiam perveniant; quod est proprie animarum humanarum. Et inde est quod ipsi Angeli intellectuales substantiae dicuntur, animae vero rationales. The difference between higher and lower bodies seems to lie in this, that the lower bodies reach the perfection of their existence through the movement of generation, change, and increase. This is obvious in stones, plants, and animals. Higher bodies, however, have the perfection of their existence according to their substance, power, quantity, and figure immediately in their very beginning without any movement. This is obvious in the sun, moon, and stars. The perfection of spiritual nature, however, lies in the cognition of truth. Consequently, there are some higher spiritual substances which immediately in the beginning receive knowledge of truth without any movement or reasoning by a sudden or simple reception. This is the case with angels, and for this reason they are said to have godlike understanding. There are, also, lower spiritual substances, which can arrive at perfect knowledge of truth only through a certain movement, in which they go from one thing to another, in order to reach knowledge of things unknown through those which are known. This is proper to human souls. And this is why angels are called intellectual substances, whereas souls are called rational substances.
Intellectus enim simplicem et absolutam cognitionem designare videtur; ex hoc enim aliquis intelligere dicitur quod intus in ipsa rei essentia veritatem quodammodo legit. Ratio vero discursum quemdam designat, quo ex uno in aliud cognoscendum anima humana pertingit vel pervenit. Unde dicit Isaac in Lib. de definitionibus, quod ratiocinatio est cursus causae in causatum. Understanding seems to indicate simple and absolute knowledge. And one is said to understand (intelligere) because in some sense he reads (legit) the truth within (intus) the very essence of the thing. Reason, on the other hand, denotes a transition from one thing to another by which the human soul reaches or arrives at knowledge of something else. For this reason, Isaac says that reasoning is the progress of the cause to the thing caused.
Motus autem omnis ab immobili procedit, ut dicit Augustinus, VIII super Genes. ad litteram; motus etiam finis est quies, ut in V Physic. dicitur. Et sic motus comparatur ad quietem et ut ad principium et ut ad terminum, ita etiam et ratio comparatur ad intellectum ut motus ad quietem, et ut generatio ad esse; ut patet ex auctoritate Boetii supra inducta. Comparatur ad intellectum ut ad principium et ut ad terminum. Ut ad principium quidem, quia non posset mens humana ex uno in aliud discurrere, nisi eius discursus ab aliqua simplici acceptione veritatis inciperet, quae quidem acceptio est intellectus principiorum. Similiter etiam nec rationis discursus ad aliquid certum perveniret, nisi fieret examinatio eius quod per discursum invenitur, ad principia prima, in quae ratio resolvit. Ut sic intellectus inveniatur rationis principium quantum ad viam inveniendi, terminus vero quantum ad viam iudicandi. Now, all movement proceeds from what is at rest, as Augustine says. For rest is the term of motion, as is said in the Physics. Thus, movement is related to rest as to its source and its term, as is reason, also, which is related to understanding as movement to rest and generation to existence, as is clear from the citation from Boethius given above. It is related to understanding as to its source and its term. It is related to it as its source because the human mind could not move from one thing to another unless the movement started from some simple perception of truth, and this perception is understanding of principles. Similarly, the movement of reason would not reach anything certain unless there were an examination of that which it came upon through discursive movement of the mind. This examination proceeds to first principles, the point to which reason pursues its analysis. As a result, we find that understanding is the source of reasoning in the process of discovery and its term in that of judging.
Unde, quamvis cognitio humanae animae proprie sit per viam rationis, est tamen in ea aliqua participatio illius simplicis cognitionis quae in superioribus substantiis invenitur, ex quo etiam intellectivam vim habere dicuntur; et hoc secundum illum modum quem Dionysius, VII cap. de Divin. Nomin., assignat dicens, quod divina sapientia semper fines priorum coniungit principiis secundorum; hoc est dictu: quod inferior natura in sui summo attingit ad aliquid infimum superioris naturae. Consequently, although the knowledge proper to the human soul takes place through the process of reasoning, nevertheless, it participates to some extent in that simple knowledge which exists in higher substances, and because of which they are said to have intellective power. This is in keeping with the rule which Dionysius gives, that divine wisdom “always joins the limits of higher things to the beginnings of the lower things.” This is to say that the lower nature at its highest point reaches something of that which is lowest in the higher nature.
Et hanc quidem differentiam Angelorum et animarum Dionysius, VII cap. de Divin. Nomin., ostendit, sic dicens: ex ipsa, scilicet divina sapientia, intellectuales angelicarum mentium virtutes, simplices et bonos habent intellectus, non a divisibilibus aut sensibus, aut sermonibus diffusis congregantes divinam cognitionem; sed uniformiter intelligibilia divinorum intelligunt. Postea subiungit de animabus: propter divinam sapientiam et animae rationale habent diffusive quidem, et circulo circa existentium veritatem circumeuntes, divisibili varietate deficientes ab unitivis mentibus; sed per convolutionem multorum ad unum, sunt dignae habitae intellectibus aequalibus angelicis, in quantum animabus est proprium et possibile; quod ideo dicit, quia illud quod est superioris naturae, non potest esse in inferiori natura perfecte, sed secundum quamdam tenuem participationem; sicut in natura sensitiva non est ratio, sed aliqua rationis participatio, in quantum bruta habent quamdam prudentiam naturalem, ut patet in principio Metaphysic. Dionysius also points out this difference between angels and souls when he says: “From divine wisdom the intellectual powers of angelic minds have pure and good acts of understanding, not gathering divine knowledge from divisible things or the senses or extended discussions, but uniformly understanding the intelligible things of God. Later, he adds about souls: Therefore, because of the divine wisdom, souls have rationality, too, “but spread out, circling about the truth of existing things, by the diversity of division falling short of unitive minds. But through the reduction of many things to one by reflection souls are held worthy of acts of understanding equal to those of angels, in so far as this is proper and possible to souls.”He says this because that which belongs to a higher nature cannot exist in a lower nature perfectly, but only according to a slight participation. Thus, in sensitive nature there is not reason, but only a participation of reason inasmuch as brute animals have a kind of natural prudence, as appears plainly in the Metaphysics.
Id autem quod sic participatur, non habetur ut possessio, id est sicut aliquid perfecte subiacens potentiae habentis illud; sicut dicitur in 1 metaphysicae, quod cognitio Dei est divina, et non humana possessio. Unde ad id quod hoc modo habetur, non deputatur aliqua potentia; sicut bruta non dicuntur habere rationem aliquam, quamvis aliquid prudentiae participent: sed hoc inest eis secundum quamdam aestimationem naturalem. Similiter etiam nec in homine est una specialis potentia per quam simpliciter et absolute sine discursu cognitionem veritatis obtineat; sed talis veritatis acceptio inest sibi secundum quemdam habitum naturalem, qui dicitur intellectus principiorum. Non est igitur in homine aliqua potentia a ratione separata, quae intellectus dicatur; sed ipsa ratio intellectus dicitur ratione eius quod participat de intellectuali simplicitate, ex quo est principium et terminus in eius propria operatione. Unde etiam in Lib. de spiritu et anima proprius actus intellectus rationi attribuitur. Id autem quod est rationis proprium, ponitur ut rationis actus, ubi dicitur, quod ratio est animi aspectus, quo per seipsum verum intuetur; ratiocinatio autem est rationis inquisitio. However, what is thus shared is not held as a possession, that is, as something perfectly within the power of the one who has it. In this sense it is said in the Metaphysics that knowledge of God is a divine and not a human possession. As a result, no power is assigned for that which is held in this manner. Thus, brute animals are not said to have any reason, although they share to some degree in prudence. But this exists in them according to a natural [instinctive] judgment. Similarly, there is no one special power in man through which he gets knowledge of truth simply, absolutely, and without movement from one thing to another. Such perception of truth is in man through a natural habit, which is called understanding of principles. Accordingly, there is no power in man separate from reason which is called understanding. Rather, reason itself is called understanding because it shares in the intellectual simplicity, by reason of which it begins and through which it terminates its proper activity. For this reason, the proper act of understanding is attributed to reason in Spirit and Soul. And that which is proper to reason is given as the act of reason, where it says that reason is the sight of the soul by which it looks at the true through itself; reasoning, however, is the investigation of reason.
Dato etiam quod ad simplicem acceptionem et absolutam veritatis quae est in nobis aliqua potentia nobis proprie et perfecte competeret, non tamen esset alia potentia a ratione: quod sic patet. Quia secundum Avicennam in VI de naturalibus, diversi actus indicant potentiarum differentiam tunc tantum quando non possunt in idem principium referri; sicut in corporalibus non reducitur in idem principium, recipere et retinere, sed hoc in humidum, illud autem in siccum. Even if we conceded that it were properly and completely fitting for us to have some power for simple perception and independent knowledge of the truth which is in us, it would not be another power than reason. This is clear from what follows, for, according to Avicenna, different acts indicate a difference of powers only when they cannot be referred to the same principle. Thus, in physical things, to receive and to retain are not reduced to the same principle, but the former is referred to the wet and the latter to the dry.
Et ideo imaginatio, quae retinet formas corporales in organo corporali, est alia potentia a sensu, qui recipit praedictas formas per organum corporale. Actus autem rationis, qui est discurrere, et intellectus, qui est simpliciter apprehendere veritatem, comparantur ad invicem ut generatio ad esse, et motus ad quietem. In idem autem principium reducitur quiescere et moveri in omnibus in quibus utrumque invenitur: quia per quam naturam aliquid quiescit in loco, per eamdem movetur ad locum; sed se habent quiescens et motum ut perfectum et imperfectum. Unde et potentia discurrens et veritatem accipiens non erunt diversae, sed una; quae, in quantum perfecta est, absolute veritatem cognoscit; in quantum vero imperfecta, discursu indiget. Therefore, imagination, which retains bodily forms in a physical organ, is a different power from sense, which receives these forms through a physical organ. However, the act of reason, which is to move from one thing to another, and the act of understanding, which is to grasp truth directly, are related to each other as generation to existence and movement to rest. But to be at rest and to be moved are reduced to the same principle in all things in which both are found. For a thing is moved to a place through the same nature through which it rests in a place. And that which is at rest and that which is moved are like perfect and imperfect. Hence, the power which moves in thought from one thing to another and the power that perceives truth are not different powers, but one power which knows truth absolutely, in so far as it is perfect, and needs movement in thought from one thing to another, in so far as it is imperfect.
Unde ratio proprie accepta nullo modo potest esse alia potentia ab intellectu in nobis; sed interdum ipsa vis cogitativa, quae est potentia animae sensitivae, ratio dicitur, quia confert inter formas individuales, sicut ratio proprie dicta inter formas universales, ut dicit Commentator in III de anima. Et haec habet organum determinatum, scilicet mediam cellulam cerebri; et haec ratio absque dubio alia potentia est ab intellectu. Sed de hac ad praesens non intendimus. Consequently, in us, reason, taken strictly, can in no way be a power different from understanding. But, sometimes, the cogitative power, which is a power of the sensitive soul, is called reason, since it makes comparisons between individual forms, just as reason, properly so called, does between universal forms, as the Commentator says. This has a definite organ, the middle cell of the brain. And this reason is, without doubt, a power different from understanding. But we are not speaking of this at present.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod liber de spiritu et anima non est authenticus, nec creditur esse Augustini. Sustinendo tamen eum, potest dici quod auctor eius non intendit per illa distinguere potentias animae, sed ostendere diversos gradus quibus anima in cognoscendo proficit: ut per sensum cognoscat formas in materia; per imaginationem formas accidentales, tamen sine materia, sed cum materiae conditionibus; per rationem ipsam essentialem formam rerum materialium sine individuali materia; ex qua ulterius consurgit in habendo aliqualem cognitionem de spiritibus creatis; et sic dicitur habere intellectum, quia huiusmodi spiritus substantias penitus sine materia existentes per prius cognoscunt; et ex hoc ulterius pertingit in aliquam cognitionem ipsius Dei; et sic dicitur intelligentiam habere, quae proprie actum intellectus nominat, eo quod Deum cognoscere proprium Dei est, cuius intellectus est sua intelligentia, id est suum intelligere. 1. Spirit and Soul is not authentic and is not believed to belong to Augustine. Nevertheless, in support of what it says, one can say that in what he said the author did not intend to distinguish powers of the soul, but to show the different steps by which the soul advances in knowledge, so that through the senses it knows forms in matter, through imagination it knows accidental forms without matter, but with the conditions of matter. Through reason it knows the essential form of material things without the individual matter. From this it rises higher in the possession of some kind of knowledge of created spirits, and, thus, is said to have understanding, since spirits of this sort have prior knowledge of substances which exist entirely without matter. From this it goes even further to some knowledge of God himself, and thus is said to have intelligence, which gives the proper name of the act of understanding, since to know God is proper to God, whose understanding is His intelligence, that is, His act of understanding.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Boetius in V de consolatione, superior vis amplectitur inferiorem, inferior vero ad superiorem nullo modo consurgit: unde natura superior plene potest in id quod est inferioris naturae, non autem plene in id quod est superioris. Et ideo natura animae rationalis habet potentias ad ea quae sunt sensitivae vel vegetativae naturae, non autem ad ea quae sunt intellectualis naturae quae supra ipsam existit. 2. As Boethius says: “The higher power embraces the lower, but the lower in no way rises to the higher.” Hence, a higher nature can do fully what belongs to the lower, but it cannot perform fully what belongs to one still higher. Therefore, the nature of the rational soul has powers for the things that belong to sensitive and vegetative nature, but not for the things that belong to the intellectual nature which exists above it.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod sensus communis, cum omnia sensibilia percipiat, secundum philosophum, oportet quod in ea feratur secundum unam communem rationem, alias non haberet unum per se obiectum; sed in hanc communem obiecti rationem nullus sensuum propriorum pertingere potest. Sed in simplicem acceptionem ratio pertingit sicut ad suum terminum, ut quando discursus rationis in scientia concluditur. Unde non oportet quod in nobis intellectus sit alia potentia a ratione, sicut sensus communis a propriis. 3. Since, according to the Philosopher, common sense perceives all sensibles, it must be drawn to them according to one common character; otherwise it would not have one object of its own. None of the proper senses can attain to this common character of object. Reason, on the other hand, reaches direct understanding as its term when, for example, the movement of reason concludes at science. Consequently, it is not necessary that in us understanding be a different power from reason, as common sense differs from the proper senses.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod iudicare non est proprium rationis, per quod ab intellectu distingui possit, quia etiam intellectus iudicat hoc esse verum, illud falsum. Sed pro tanto rationi iudicium attribuitur, et comprehensio intelligentiae, quia iudicium in nobis ut communiter fit per resolutionem in principia, simplex autem veritatis comprehensio per intellectum. 4. To judge is not a property of reason through which it can be distinguished from understanding. For understanding, too, judges that this is true and that false. But judgment and the comprehension of intelligence are referred to reason to this extent, that in us judgment commonly takes place through analysis into principles, whereas direct comprehension of truth takes place through understanding.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod illud quod est omnibus modis simplex, totaliter compositione caret: sed simplicia in compositis salvantur. Et inde est quod in simplici non invenitur id quod est compositi in quantum est compositum: sicut corpus simplex non habet saporem, qui sequitur mixtionem; sed corpora mixta habent ea quae sunt simplicium corporum, licet modo imperfectiori: sicut calidum et frigidum, et leve et grave invenitur in corporibus mixtis. Et ideo in intellectu divino, qui est omnino simplex, nulla compositio invenitur. Sed ratio nostra quamvis sit composita, ex hoc quod in ipsa aliquid de natura simplicis invenitur, sicut exemplar in sua imagine, potest in aliquem actum simplicem, et in aliquem actum compositum vel prout componit praedicatum subiecto, vel prout componit principia in ordine ad conclusionem. 5. That which is altogether simple completely lacks composition. But simple things are preserved in composite things. Thus it is that what belongs to the composite, in so far as it is composite, is not found in what is simple. Accordingly, a simple body does not have taste, which follows upon mixture. But compound bodies have the things which belong to simple bodies, although in an inferior manner. Thus, hot and cold, light and heavy, are found in compound bodies. Therefore, there is no composition in the divine understanding, which is entirely simple. But our reason, although it is composite, can enter upon simple act and composite act, either as it puts subject and predicate together or joins principles in order to arrive at a conclusion, because there is something of the nature of the simple in it, as the model is in its image.
Unde eadem potentia in nobis est quae cognoscit simplices rerum quidditates, et quae format propositiones, et quae ratiocinatur: quorum ultimum proprium est rationis in quantum est ratio; alia duo possunt esse etiam intellectus, in quantum est intellectus. Unde secundum invenitur in Angelis, cum per plures species cognoscant; sed in Deo est solum primum, qui cognoscendo essentiam suam omnia intelligit, et simplicia et complexa. Therefore, in us, it is the same faculty which knows the simple quiddities of things, which forms propositions, and which reasons. The last of these is proper to reason, as reason; the other two can also belong to understanding, as understanding. Hence, the second is found in angels, since they know through many species, but only the first is in God, who understands all things, simple and composite, by knowing His own essence.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod anima quodammodo cognoscit se per seipsam, secundum quod nosse est notitiam sui apud se tenere; et quodammodo se cognoscit per speciem intelligibilis, prout cognoscere cognitionem et discretionem sui importat: et sic de eodem philosophus et Augustinus loquuntur. Unde non sequitur ratio. 6. In some sense the soul knows itself through itself, inasmuch as to know is to possess in itself knowledge of itself, and in some sense it knows itself through a species of an intelligible object, in so far as knowing implies thinking and distinguishing of self. Thus, the Philosopher and Augustine are speaking of the same thing. Hence, the conclusion does not follow.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod talis differentia obiectorum non potest potentias diversificare, eo quod est per accidentales differentias, ut in obiiciendo probatum est. Ideo autem rationis obiectum ponitur natura corporea, quia proprium humanae cognitioni est ut a sensu et phantasmate ortum habeat. Unde circa naturas rerum sensibilium primo figitur intuitus nostri intellectus, qui ratio proprie dicitur, in quantum ratio est humano generi propria. Ex hinc autem ulterius assurgit in cognoscendo spiritum creatum vel increatum, quod magis competit ei secundum quod participat aliquid de natura superiori, quam secundum id quod est sibi proprium et perfecte conveniens. 7. Such difference of objects cannot diversify faculties, because it is based on accidental differences. This has been proved above. Bodily nature is thus given as the object of reason, because it is proper to human knowledge to begin from sense and phantasm. For this reason, the gaze of our understanding, which is properly called reason, inasmuch as reason is proper to the human race, first fastens on the natures of sensible things. From this it rises higher in its knowledge of created spirit, which is more within its competence according to its participation of higher nature than according to that which is proper and perfectly fitted to it.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod Boetius vult intelligentiam et rationem esse diversas vires cognitivas, non tamen eiusdem, sed diversorum. Rationem enim vult esse hominum: et ideo dicit quod cognoscit formas universales in particularibus, quia humana cognitio proprie consistit circa formas a sensibus abstractas. Intelligentiam autem vult esse substantiarum superiorum, quae primo intuitu formas penitus immateriales apprehendunt: et ideo vult quod ratio nunquam pertingat ad id quod est intelligentiae; quia ad videndas quidditates substantiarum immaterialium secundum infirmitatem huius cognitionis pertingere non possumus. Hoc autem erit in patria, cum per gloriam erimus deiformes. 8. Boethius intends intelligence and reason to be different cognoscitive powers, not of the same subject, but of different subjects. Thus, he intends reason to belong to man, and so he says that it knows general forms existing in individual things, since human knowledge properly concerns forms drawn from the senses. Moreover, he intends intelligence to belong to higher substances, which in their first glance apprehend completely immaterial forms. Accordingly, he does not intend that reason should ever reach that which belongs to intelligence, since we can never in the weakness of this knowledge attain to sight of the quiddities of immaterial substances. However, we will do this in heaven when we will be made godlike through glory.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod prout ratio et intellectus sunt in diversis, non sunt una potentia; sed nunc quaeritur de eis prout utrumque in homine invenitur. 9. In so far as reason and understanding are in different beings, they are not the same power. But the present question concerns them in so far as both exist in man.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de actibus qui sunt diversarum potentiarum. Contingit autem unius potentiae esse diversos actus, quorum unus est alio prior; sicut intellectus possibilis actus est intelligere quod quid est, et formare propositiones. 10. This reasoning proceeds correctly for acts which belong to different powers. But one power may have different acts, one of which is before the other. Thus the act of possible intellect is to understand essence and to form propositions.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod utrumque cognoscit anima, sed per eamdem potentiam. Hoc tamen proprium esse humanae animae videtur, in quantum est rationalis, quod cognoscat entitatem in hoc. Entitatem vero absolute cognoscere magis videtur esse substantiarum superiorum, ut ex auctoritate supra inducta patet. 11. The soul knows both, but through the same power. Nevertheless, it seems proper to the human soul, as rational, to know being in this thing. But to know being simply seems to belong rather to the higher substances, as is clear from the passage cited above.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod diligere Deum et eligere virtutes attribuitur rationi, non quod sint immediate ipsius, sed in quantum ex iudicio rationis voluntas afficitur in Deum sicut in finem, et ad virtutes sicut ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Et per hunc etiam modum rationale distinguitur contra irascibile et concupiscibile: quia ad agendum inclinamur vel iudicio rationis, vel passione, quae est in irascibili vel concupiscibili. Dicitur etiam voluntas esse in ratione, in quantum est in parte animae rationali, sicut dicitur memoria esse in sensitivo, in quantum est in parte sensitiva, non quod sit eadem potentia. 12. To love God and to choose virtues are attributed to reason, not because they belong to it directly, but in so far as the will is attracted to God as its end, and to virtues as means to that end by the judgment of reason. It is in this way, too, that rational is distinguished from the irascible and the concupiscible, since we are inclined to action by the judgment of reason or by passion, which is in the irascible or concupiscible parts. The will is also said to be in reason inasmuch as it is in the rational part of the soul, just as memory is said to be in sense since it is in the sensitive part of the soul, and not because it is the same power.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad tertiumdecimum, et ad quartumdecimum. 13-14. The solution to the thirteenth and fourteenth difficulties is clear from what has been said.

Q. 15: Higher and Lower Reason

ARTICLE II

In the second article we ask:
Are higher and lower reason different powers?


[ARTICLE II Sent., 24, 2, 2; S.T., I, 79, 9.]
Secundo quaeritur utrum ratio superior et inferior sint diversae potentiae Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that they are, for
Ut enim Augustinus dicit in XIII de Trinitate, imago Trinitatis est in superiori parte rationis, non autem in inferiori. Sed imago Dei in anima consistit in tribus potentiis. Ergo inferior ratio non pertinet ad eamdem potentiam vel easdem ad quas pertinet superior; et sic videntur esse diversae potentiae. 1. As Augustine says, the image of the Trinity is in the higher part of reason, but not in the lower. But the image of God in the soul is made up of the three powers. Therefore, lower reason does not belong to the same power or powers as higher reason. Thus, they seem to be different powers.
Praeterea, cum pars ad totum dicatur, eodem modo in aliquo genere invenitur pars quo invenitur totum. Sed anima non dicitur esse totum nisi potentiale. Ergo et diversae partes animae sunt diversae potentiae. Sed ratio superior et inferior nominantur ab Augustino diversae portiones rationis. Ergo sunt diversae potentiae. 2. Since a part is taken with relation to the whole, it is in the same genus as the whole. But the soul is called only a potential (potentialis) whole. Therefore, the different parts of soul are different powers (potentiae) . But higher and lower reason are given by Augustine as different parts of reason. Therefore, they are different powers.
Praeterea, omne aeternum est necessarium, et omne mutabile et temporale est contingens, ut patet per philosophum in IX Metaph. Sed pars animae quae dicitur scientificum a philosopho in VI Ethic. circa necessaria versatur; ratiocinativum autem sive opinativum circa contingentia. Cum ergo ratio superior secundum Augustinum inhaereat aeternis, inferior vero temporalia et caduca disponat videtur quod idem sit ratiocinativum quod inferior ratio et scientificum idem quod superior. Sed scientificum et ratiocinativum sunt diversae potentiae, ut patet per philosophum, ibidem. Ergo et ratio superior et inferior sunt diversae potentiae. 3. Everything eternal is necessary and everything temporal and subject to change is contingent, as appears from the Philosopher. But the Philosopher calls scientific the part of the soul which deals with necessary things, and reasoning, or conjectural, the part which deals with contingent things. Therefore, since, according to Augustine, higher reason embraces eternal things and lower reason administers temporal and perishable things, it seems that the reasoning is the same as lower reason and the scientific is the same as higher reason. But the scientific and reasoning are different powers, as the Philosopher also clearly shows. Therefore, higher and lower reason are different powers.
Praeterea, sicut philosophus, ibidem dicit, ad ea quae sunt genere altera, oportet determinari alteras potentias animae; cum omnis potentia animae quae ad aliquod genus determinatur, determinetur ad illud propter aliquam similitudinem; et sic ipsa diversitas obiectorum secundum genus attestatur diversitati potentiarum. Sed aeternum et corruptibile sunt omnino genere altera, cum corruptibile et incorruptibile nec in genere conveniant, ut dicitur in X Metaph. Ergo ratio superior, cuius obiectum sunt res aeternae, est alia potentia a ratione inferiori, quae habet pro materia res caducas. 4. The Philosopher says that we must distinguish different powers of the soul for those things which are generically different, since every power of the soul which is limited to some genus is limited to it because of some likeness. Thus, the very diversity of objects according to genus bears witness to diversity of powers. But that which is eternal and that which is corruptible are entirely different generically, since corruptible and incorruptible do not belong to the same genus, as is said in the Metaphysics. Therefore, higher reason, whose object is eternal things is a different power from lower reason, which has perishable thing for its material object.
Praeterea, potentiae distinguuntur per actus, et actus per obiecta. Sed aliud obiectum est verum contemplabile, et bonum operabile. Ergo et alia potentia est ratio superior, quae verum contemplatur; et alia ratio inferior, quae bonum operatur. 5. Powers are distinguished through acts, and acts through objects. But truth to be contemplated is a different object from good to be done. Therefore, higher reason, which contemplates truth, is a different power from lower reason, which is occupied with the good.
Praeterea, illud quod in se non est unum, multo minus, alii comparatum, est unum. Sed superior ratio non est una potentia, sed plures, cum in ea sit imago in tribus potentiis consistens. Ergo nec potest dici quod superior et inferior ratio sint una potentia. 6. That which is not one in itself is much less one when compared with something else. But higher reason is not one power, but several, since the image which consists of the three powers exists in it. Therefore, it cannot be said that lower and higher reason are the one power.
Praeterea, ratio est simplicior quam sensus. In parte autem sensitiva non invenitur quod eadem potentia habeat diversa officia. Ergo multo minus in parte intellectiva una potentia diversa officia habere potest. Sed ratio superior et inferior per officia geminantur, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trinitate. Ergo sunt diversae potentiae. 7. Reason is more simple than sense. However, in sense we do not find that the same power has different functions. Therefore, in the intellective part one power is much less able to have different functions. But higher and lower reason “are double in their functions,” as Augustine says. Therefore, they are different powers.
Praeterea, quandocumque animae attribuuntur aliqua quae non est reducere in idem principium, oportet secundum hoc diversas potentias in anima assignare; sicut secundum recipere et retinere distinguitur imaginatio a sensu. Sed aeternum et corruptibile in eadem principia reduci non possunt; non enim sunt eadem principia corruptibilium et incorruptibilium proxima, ut probatur in XI Metaph. Ergo non eidem potentiae animae attribui debent; et sic ratio superior et inferior sunt diversae potentiae. 8. Whenever things which are not reduced to the same principle are attributed to the soul, we must assign different powers in the soul according to this difference. Thus, imagination is distinguished from sense according to reception and retention. But the eternal and the corruptible cannot be reduced to the same principle. For, as is proved the Metaphysics, the proximate principles for corruptible and incorruptible things are not the same. Therefore, they should not be attributed to the same power of the soul. Thus, higher and lower reason are different powers.
Praeterea, Augustinus in XII de Trinit. per tria quae ad peccatum hominis concurrerunt, scilicet virum, mulierem et serpentem, tria significari dicit quae sunt in nobis, scilicet rationem superiorem, et inferiorem, et sensualitatem. Sed sensualitas est alia potentia ab inferiori ratione. Ergo et ratio inferior a superiori. 9. Augustine says” that through the three that co-operated in man’s sin—man, woman, and serpent—three things in us are indicated, namely, higher and lower reason and sensuality. But sensuality is a different power from lower reason. Therefore, lower reason, too, is different from higher reason.
Praeterea, una potentia non simul potest peccare et non peccare. Sed quandoque peccat ratio inferior superiori non peccante, ut patet per Augustinum de Trinit. Ergo ratio inferior et superior non sunt una potentia. 10. One power cannot at the same time sin and not sin. But, sometimes, lower reason sins when higher reason does not, as is clear from Augustine. Therefore, lower reason and higher reason are not one power.
Praeterea, diversae perfectiones sunt diversorum perfectibilium, cum proprius actus requirat propriam potentiam. Sed habitus animae sunt perfectiones potentiarum. Ergo diversi habitus sunt diversarum potentiarum. Sed ratio superior deputatur sapientiae, secundum Augustinum; inferior autem scientiae, quae sunt diversi habitus. Ergo et ratio superior et inferior sunt diversae potentiae. 11. Different perfections belong to different subjects of perfection, since a proper act requires a proper power. But habits of the soul are perfections of its powers. Therefore, different habits belong to different powers. But, according to Augustine, higher reason is assigned for wisdom and lower reason for scientific knowledge, and these two are different habits. Therefore, higher and lower reason are different powers.
Praeterea, quaelibet potentia perficitur per suum actum. Sed diversitas aliquorum actuum inducit vel manifestat potentiarum diversitatem. Ergo et ubicumque invenitur diversitas actuum, debet iudicari diversitas potentiarum. Sed ratio superior et inferior habent diversos actus, quia per officia geminantur, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo sunt diversae potentiae. 12. Every power is perfected through its act. But diversity of acts leads to or manifests diversity of powers. Therefore, wherever there is diversity of acts, we should conclude to diversity of powers. But higher and lower reason have different acts, since “they are double in their functions,” as Augustine says. Therefore, they are different powers.
Praeterea, ratio superior et inferior magis differunt quam intellectus agens et possibilis, cum circa idem intelligibile attendatur actus agentis et possibilis; non autem actus superioris et inferioris rationis, sed circa diversa, ut dictum est. Sed agens intellectus et possibilis sunt diversae potentiae. Ergo et ratio superior et inferior. 13. Higher and lower reason differ more than the agent and the possible intellect, since we see that the act of the agent and the possible intellect concern the same intelligible thing. But, as has been said, the acts of higher and lower reason do not concern the same thing, but different things. However, the agent and the possible intellect are different powers. Therefore, higher and lower reason are, too.
Praeterea, omne quod deducitur ab aliquo, est aliud ab illo, quia nulla res est sui ipsius causa. Sed inferior ratio deducitur a superiore, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Trinit. Ergo est alia potentia a superiori. 14. Everything that is drawn from something differs from it, for nothing is its own cause. But lower reason is drawn from higher reason, as Augustine says. Therefore, it is a different power from higher reason.
Praeterea, nihil movetur a seipso, ut probatur in VII Physic. Sed ratio superior movet inferiorem, in quantum dirigit et gubernat eam. Ergo superior ratio et inferior sunt diversae potentiae. 15. Nothing is moved by itself, as is proved in the Physics.. But higher reason moves lower reason in so far as it directs and governs it. Therefore, higher and lower reason are different powers.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Diversae potentiae animae sunt diversae res. Sed ratio superior et inferior non sunt res diversae; unde dicit Augustinus, XII de Trinitate: cum disserimus de natura mentis humanae, de una quadam re disserimus; nec eam in haec duo quae commemoravimus, nisi per officia geminamus. Ergo superior et inferior ratio non sunt diversae potentiae. 1. Different powers of the soul are different things. But higher and lower reason are not different things. Consequently, Augustine says: “When we discuss the nature of the human mind, we are talking about one thing. And we divide it into the two which we have mentioned only by reason of its functions.”“ Therefore, higher and lower reason are not different powers.
Praeterea, quanto aliqua potentia est immaterialior, tanto ad plura se potest extendere. Sed ratio est immaterialior quam sensus. Eadem autem potentia sensitiva (scilicet visu) et aeterna, sive incorruptibilia vel perpetua, scilicet caelestia corpora, et corruptibilia, sicut haec inferiora, cernuntur. Ergo et eadem potentia rationis est quae aeterna contemplatur, et temporalia disponit. 2. The more immaterial a power is, the more it can extend to many things. But reason is more immaterial than sense. Yet, by the same sensitive power, sight, for example, we discern eternal things, either incorruptible or perpetual, namely the heavenly bodies, and corruptible things, as these lower things around us. Therefore, it is the same power of reason which contemplates eternal things and administers temporal things.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod ad evidentiam huius quaestionis oportet duo praecognoscere: scilicet qualiter potentiae animae distinguantur, et quomodo ratio superior et inferior differant. Ex quibus duobus tertium poterit esse notum, quod ad praesens intendimus; scilicet utrum ratio superior et inferior sint una potentia, vel diversae. Before we can explain this question we have to know two things: how powers are distinguished, and how higher and lower reason differ. From these two we will be able to clarify the third point, which is the subject of our present inquiry, namely, whether higher and lower reason are one power or different powers.
Sciendum est igitur, quod potentiarum diversitas penes actus et obiecta distinguitur. Quidam autem dicunt, hoc non esse sic intelligendum quod actuum et obiectorum diversitas sit causa diversitatis potentiarum, sed solummodo signum. Quidam vero dicunt quod diversitas obiectorum est causa diversitatis potentiarum in passivis potentiis, non autem in activis. We must bear in mind that diversity of powers is determined according to acts and objects. However, some” say that this is to be understood in the sense that diversity of acts and objects is only a sign of diversity of powers and not its cause. And others say that diversity of objects is the cause of diversity of powers in passive powers, but not in active powers.
Sed si diligenter consideretur, in utrisque potentiis inveniuntur actus et obiecta esse non solum signa diversitatis, sed aliquo modo causae. Omne enim cuius esse non est nisi propter finem aliquem, habet modum sibi determinatum ex fine ad quem ordinatur; sicut serra est huiusmodi, et quantum ad materiam et quantum ad formam, ut sit conveniens ad finem suum, qui est secare. Omnis autem potentia animae, sive activa sive passiva, ordinatur ad actum sicut ad finem, ut patet in IX Metaph.; unde unaquaeque potentia habet determinatum modum et speciem, secundum quod potest esse conveniens ad talem actum. Et ideo secundum hoc diversificatae sunt potentiae, quod diversitas actuum diversa principia requirebat a quibus elicerentur. Cum autem obiectum comparetur ad actum sicut terminus, a terminis autem specificentur actus, ut patet in V Phys., oportet quod etiam actus penes obiecta distinguantur; et ideo obiectorum diversitas, potentiarum diversitatem inducit. But, if we study the matter carefully, we find that in both types of powers acts and objects are not only signs of diversity, but in some way causes of it. For every thing which has existence only because of some end has its manner determined for it from the end to which it is ordained. Thus, a saw has this kind of form and this kind of matter in order to be suitable for its end, which is to cut. But every power of the soul, whether active or passive, is ordained to act as to its end, as is clear in the Metaphysics. Hence, every power has a definite manner and species by reason of which it can be suitable for such an act. Therefore, powers are diversified because the diversity of acts required different principles from which to elicit acts. Moreover, since object is related to act as its term, and acts are specified by their terms, as is plain in the Physics, acts must also be distinguished according to their objects. Therefore diversity of objects brings about diversity of powers.
Sed obiectorum diversitas dupliciter attendi potest: uno modo secundum naturam rerum; alio modo secundum rationes diversas obiectorum, secundum naturam rerum ut color et sapor: secundum diversam rationem obiecti, ut bonum et verum. Cum autem potentiae quae sunt actus determinatorum organorum, non possit se extendere ultra suorum organorum dispositionem (non autem potest esse organum corporale unum et idem omnibus naturis cognoscendis accommodatum); oportet de necessitate quod potentiae quae sunt organis affixae, circa quasdam naturas determinatae sint: scilicet circa naturas corporeas. Operatio enim quae per organum corporeum exercetur, non se potest extendere ultra naturam corpoream. Diversity of objects, however, can be regarded in two ways: according to the nature of things and according to the diverse intelligible character of the objects. Diversity according to the nature of things appears in color and taste; diversity according to intelligible character of object, in the good and the true. Moreover, since powers which are acts of definite organs cannot extend beyond the disposition of their organs (for one and the same physical organ cannot be suitable for knowledge of all natures), it is necessary that powers which are attached to organs be limited to certain natures, that is, to physical natures. For activity which is exercised through a physical organ cannot go beyond physical nature.
Sed cum in natura corporea inveniatur aliquid in quo omnia corpora conveniunt, aliquid vero in quo diversa corpora diversificantur; possibile erit aptari unam potentiam corpori alligatam omnibus corporibus secundum id quod commune habent; sicut imaginatio prout omnia corpora communicant in ratione quantitatis et figurae et consequentium (unde non solum ad naturalia, sed ad mathematica se extendit); sensus vero communis prout in omnibus corporibus naturalibus, ad quae solummodo se extendit, invenitur vis activa sive immutativa. However, since there is something in corporeal nature in which all bodies agree, and something in which different bodies are diversified, it will be possible to make one power attached to the body suitable for all bodies according to that which they have in common. Thus, there is imagination for all bodies in so far as they share in the character of quantity, figure, and the things which follow on these. Hence, it extends not only to physical objects, but also to mathematical objects. Similarly, there is common sense in so far as in all the physical bodies, to which alone it extends, there is a force which is active and productive of change [in the sense].
Quaedam vero potentiae aptabuntur his in quibus corpora diversificantur, secundum diversum modum immutandi; et sic est visus circa colorem, auditus circa sonum, et sic de aliis. Ex hoc igitur quod pars sensitiva animae utitur organo in operando, duo ipsam consequuntur: scilicet quod non potest ei attribui aliqua potentia respiciens obiectum commune omnibus entibus; sic enim iam transcenderet corporalia; et iterum quod possibile est inveniri in ea diversas potentias secundum diversam naturam obiectorum propter conditionem organi, quae aptari potest vel huic vel illi naturae. Some powers, however, are adapted to those aspects in which bodies are diversified by reason of a difference in the mode of producing change [in the sense]. Thus, sight relates to color, hearing to sound, and so on for the other senses. From the fact that the sensitive part of the soul uses an organ in its activity two things follow: first, a power referring to an object common to all beings cannot be attributed to it, for this would immediately transcend physical reality; second, it is possible to find in the sensitive soul powers which differ according to the different nature of the objects because of the disposition of the organ, which can be suited to this or that nature.
Illa vero pars animae quae non utitur organo corporeo in opere suo, remanet non determinata, sed quodammodo infinita, in quantum est immaterialis; et ideo eius virtus se extendit ad obiectum commune omnibus entibus. Unde obiectum intellectus dicitur esse quid quod in omnibus generibus entium invenitur. Unde etiam philosophus dicit, quod intellectus est quo est omnia facere, et quo est omnia fieri. Unde impossibile est quod in parte intellectiva distinguantur diversae potentiae ad diversas naturas obiectorum; sed solummodo secundum diversam rationem obiecti, prout, scilicet, secundum diversam rationem in unam et eamdem rem quandoque actus animae fertur. Et sic bonum et verum in parte intellectiva diversificant intellectum et voluntatem: in verum enim intelligibile fertur intellectus ut in formam, cum oporteat eo quod intelligitur, intellectum esse informatum; in bonum autem fertur (voluntas) ut in finem. But the part of the soul which does not use a physical organ in its activity does not remain limited, but is in a sense infinite, in so far as it is immaterial. Therefore, its power extends to an object common to all beings. Hence, the object of understanding is said to be “something” (quid), which is found in all classes of beings. For this reason, the Philosopher says: “Understanding is that by which one does all things and by which one becomes all things.” Consequently, it is impossible to distinguish different powers in the intellective part according to different natures of the objects. We can do so only according to the different character of the object, that is to say, in so far as the act of the soul is directed to one and the same thing according to different relations at different times. Thus, goodness and truth in the intellective part distinguish understanding and will. For understanding is directed to intelligible truth as to a form, since it must be informed by that which is understood, and [the will] is directed to goodness as to an end.
Unde et a philosopho in VI Metaphys. dicitur verum esse in mente et bonum in rebus; cum forma sit intus, et finis extra. Non eadem ratione autem finis et forma perficit: et sic bonum et verum non habent eamdem rationem obiecti. For this reason, the Philosopher says that truth is in the mind and good in things, since form is inside and end is outside. Moreover, form and end do not perfect a thing for the same reason. Thus, goodness and truth do not have the same character of object.
Sic etiam et circa intellectum agens intellectus et possibilis distinguuntur. Non enim eadem ratione est obiectum aliquid in quantum est in actu et in quantum est in potentia, aut in quantum agit et patitur: intelligibile enim actu, est obiectum intellectus possibilis agens quasi in ipsum, prout eo exit de potentia in actum; intelligibile vero in potentia est obiectum intellectus agentis, prout fit per intellectum agentem intelligibile actu. It is in this way, too, that the understanding is divided into agent and possible intellect. For something is not an object for the same reason when it is in act and when it is in potency, or when it acts or is acted upon. For what is actually intelligible is the object of possible intellect and, as it were, acts upon it so that by the actually intelligible it proceeds from potency to act. But the potentially intelligible is the object of agent intellect, in so far as by reason of the agent intellect it becomes actually intelligible.
Sic igitur patet qualiter in parte intellectiva potentiae distingui possunt. Ratio vero superior et inferior hoc modo distinguuntur. Sunt enim quaedam naturae anima rationali superiores, quaedam vero inferiores. Cum vero omne quod intelligitur, intelligatur per modum intelligentis: rerum quae sunt supra animam, intellectus est in anima rationali inferior ipsis rebus intellectis; earum vero quae sunt infra animam, inest animae intellectus superior ipsis rebus, cum in ea res ipsae nobilius esse habeant quam in seipsis. Et sic ad utrasque res diversam habitudinem habet, et ex hoc diversa sortitur officia. Secundum enim quod ad superiores naturas respicit, sive ut earum veritatem et naturam absolute contemplans, sive ut ab eis rationem et quasi exemplar operandi accipiens; superior ratio nominatur. Secundum vero quod ad inferiora convertitur vel conspicienda per contemplationem, vel per actionem disponenda, inferior ratio nominatur. Utraque autem natura, scilicet et superior et inferior, secundum communem rationem intelligibilis ab anima humana apprehenduntur; superior quidem prout est immaterialis in seipsa, inferior autem prout a materia per actum animae denudatur. Therefore, it is clear how powers can be distinguished in the intellective part. And higher and lower reason are distinguished in this way. There are certain natures higher than the rational soul, and certain natures lower. But, since everything that is understood is understood in the manner of the one understanding, in the rational soul the act of understanding things above the soul is lower than the things understood; but for things beneath the soul there is in the soul an act of understanding which is higher than the things themselves, since the things have a more noble existence in the soul than they do in themselves. Thus, the soul has a different relation to both types of things, and from this the different functions are derived. For it is called higher reason in its reference to higher natures, either as contemplating their nature and truth in themselves, or as receiving from them intelligible character and a kind of model for activity. It is called lower reason in so far as it is directed to lower things either to perceive them through contemplation or to manage them through activity. Both types of nature, however, the higher and the lower, are perceived by the human soul in their common character of intelligible, the higher in so far as it is immaterial in itself, and the lower in so far as it is divested of matter through the activity of the soul.
Unde patet quod ratio superior et inferior non nominant diversas potentias, sed unam et eamdem ad diversa diversimode comparatam. From this it is clear that higher and lower reason are not different powers, but one and the same power which is related differently to different things.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est in quaestione de mente, imago Trinitatis in anima attenditur quidem in potentiis ut in radice, sed completive in actibus potentiarum: et secundum hoc dicitur imago ad superiorem et non ad inferiorem rationem pertinere. 1. As we have said in the question on the mind, we see that the image of the Trinity in the soul is in the powers as in its root, but in its fullness it is in the acts of the powers. It is in this latter respect that the image is said to belong to higher and not to lower reason.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod pars potentiae non semper potentiam distinctam designat; sed aliquando pars potentiae accipitur secundum partem obiectorum, secundum quae virtualis quantitatis divisio attenditur; ut si aliquis possit centum libras portare, dicetur potentiae illius partem habere qui non potest portare nisi quinquaginta, cum tamen sit eadem potentia specie. Et per hunc modum superior et inferior rationis portio dicuntur rationis portiones, secundum quod feruntur in partem obiectorum quae communiter accepta ratio respicit. 2. A part of a power does not always denote a distinct power, but, sometimes, a part of a power is taken according to part of the objects in so far as the virtual division of quantity is considered. Thus, if someone can carry one hundred pounds, one who can carry only fifty pounds is said to have part of that power, although the power is specifically the same. It is in this sense that higher and lower parts are called parts of reason in so far as they are directed to part of the objects to which reason, as the term is generally used, refers.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod scientificum et rationativum vel opinativum non sunt idem quod ratio superior et inferior: quia etiam circa naturas inferiores quas respicit ratio inferior, possunt accipi necessariae considerationes, quae ad scientificum pertinent: alias physica et mathematica non essent scientiae; similiter etiam et superior ratio ad actus humanos ex libero arbitrio dependentes, et per hoc contingentes, quodammodo convertitur: alias rationi superiori non attribueretur peccatum, quod circa haec contingit. Et sic ratio superior non ex toto separatur a rationativo vel opinativo. 3. The scientific and the reasoning or conjectural parts are not the same as higher and lower reason, since we can have necessary considerations, which belong to the scientific, about lower natures with which lower reason is concerned; otherwise, Physics and Metaphysics would not be sciences. In the same way, higher reason also can in some way turn its attention to human acts, which depend on free will, and so are contingent; otherwise, sin, which occurs in such matters, would not be attributed to higher reason. Thus, higher reason is not completely distinct from the reasoning or conjectural part.
Scientificum autem et rationativum diversae quidem potentiae sunt, quia quantum ad ipsam rationem intelligibilis distinguuntur. Cum enim actus alicuius potentiae non se extendat ultra virtutem sui obiecti, omnis operatio quae non potest reduci in eamdem rationem obiecti, oportet quod sit alterius potentiae, quae habeat aliam obiecti rationem. Obiectum autem intellectus est quid, ut dicitur in III de anima: et propter hoc, actio intellectus extenditur quantum potest extendi virtus eius quod quid est. Per hanc autem statim ipsa principia prima cognita fiunt, ex quibus cognitis ulterius ratiocinando pervenitur in conclusionum notitiam: et hanc potentiam quae ipsas conclusiones in quod quid est nata est resolvere, philosophus scientificum appellat. But the scientific part and the reasoning part are different powers because they are distinguished in relation to the nature of the intelligible object. For, since the act of any power does not extend beyond the scope of its object, every activity that cannot be reduced to the same formality of its object must belong to another power, which has another characteristic object. Now, the object of understanding is “something” (quid) as is said in The Soul. For this reason, the activity of understanding extends as far as the scope of the quiddity (quod quid est) of this “something” can extend. It is through this action that one at first knows principles themselves immediately, and from knowledge of these principles, by reasoning further, one arrives at knowledge of conclusions. This power, which is naturally ordained to analyze these conclusions into the quiddity (quod quid est), the Philosopher calls scientific.
Sunt autem quaedam in quibus non est possibile talem resolutionem fieri ut perveniatur usque ad quod quid est, et hoc propter incertitudinem sui esse; sicut est in contingentibus in quantum contingentia sunt. Unde talia non cognoscuntur per quod quid est, quod erat proprium obiectum intellectus, sed per alium modum, scilicet per quamdam coniecturam de rebus illis de quibus plena certitudo haberi non potest. Unde ad hoc alia potentia requiritur. Et quia haec potentia non potest reducere rationis inquisitionem usque ad suum terminum quasi ad quietem, sed sistit in ipsa inquisitione quasi in motu, opinionem solummodo inducens de his quae inquirit; ideo quasi a termino suae operationis haec potentia ratiocinativum vel opinativum nominatur. Sed ratio superior et inferior distinguuntur penes ipsas naturas, et ideo non sunt diversae potentiae, sicut scientificum et opinativum. However, there are some things in which it is impossible to perform such an analysis and to arrive at the quiddity, because of the uncertainty of their existence. This is the case with contingent things, in so far as they are contingent. Hence, these are not known through their quiddity, which is the proper object of understanding, but in another way, namely, through a kind of conjecture about those things concerning which we cannot have certitude. For this, then, a different power is needed. And, since this faculty cannot bring the inquiry of reason to its term, as it were, to rest, but stays with the investigation, as it were, in motion, and attains no more than opinion about the objects of its inquiry, this power is, therefore, called the reasoning or the conjectural power from the term of its activity. But higher and lower reason are distinguished according to natures themselves and, therefore, are not different powers as the scientific and the conjectural are.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod obiecta scientifici et ratiocinativi sunt altera genere quantum ad proprium genus cognoscibilis, cum secundum rationem diversam genere cognoscantur. Sed res aeternae et temporales sunt diversae genere naturae; non autem quantum ad rationem cognoscibilis, secundum quam oportet similitudinem attendi inter potentiam et obiectum. 4. The objects of the scientific and the reasoning parts are generically different by reason of the proper class of objects of knowledge, since they are known according to different intelligible characters. But eternal and temporal things differ in natural genus and not in their character of object of knowledge, according to which we must look for likeness between faculty and object.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod verum contemplabile et bonum operabile ad diversas potentias pertinent, scilicet ad intellectum et voluntatem. Sed penes hoc non distinguitur ratio superior et inferior, cum utraque possit esse et speculativa et activa, quamvis ratione diversorum, ut ex dictis patet, unde ratio non sequitur. 5. Truth, which is the object of contemplation, and goodness, which is the object of activity, belong to different faculties, the understanding and the will. But higher and lower reason are not distinguished in this way, for both can be speculative and active, although by reason of different things, as has been shown above. Consequently, the conclusion does not follow.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod id quod in se multa continet, nihil prohibet esse unum cum alio in se multa continente, si eadem multa contineantur ab utroque: sicut hic acervus et haec congregatio lapidum sunt unum et idem. Et per hunc modum ratio superior et inferior sunt una potentia, quamvis utraque plures potentias quodammodo contineat; easdem enim utraque continet. Non autem dicuntur in ratione superiori esse plures potentiae, quasi in plures potentias ipsa rationis potentia dividatur; sed secundum quod voluntas sub intellectu comprehenditur: non quod sint una potentia, sed quia ex apprehensione intellectus voluntas movetur. 6. Nothing prevents that which contains many things from being one with something else which contains many things if both contain the same things. Thus, this heap and this collection of stones are one and the same thing. In this way, higher and lower reason are the same faculty, although both in a sense contain several powers, since both contain the same powers. Moreover, higher reason is not said to include several powers in the sense that the power of reason itself is divided into different powers, but in so far as the will is included in the understanding. This does not mean that the will and the understanding are one faculty, but that the will is set in motion by the perception of the understanding.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod etiam in parte sensitiva est aliqua potentia una, diversa officia habens; sicut imaginatio, cuius officium est reservare ea quae sunt accepta a sensibus, et iterum intellectui repraesentare. Tamen cum virtus, quanto est immaterialior, tanto ad plura se possit extendere, unam et eandem potentiam nihil prohiberet in parte intellectiva habere diversa officia non autem in parte sensitiva. 7. Even in the sensitive part there is one power which has different functions, as the imagination, whose function it is to retain those things which have been received from the senses and represent them again to understanding. Accordingly, since the more immaterial a power is, the more things it can extend to, there is nothing to prevent one and the same power from having diverse functions in the intellective part, but not in the sensitive part.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod quamvis aeternum et temporale non reducantur in eadem principia proxima, tamen cognitio aeterni et temporalis ad idem principium reducitur; cum secundum unam rationem immaterialitatis utrumque ab intellectu apprehendatur. 8. Although the eternal and temporal are not reduced to the same proximate principle, knowledge of the eternal and of the temporal are reduced to the same principle since both are grasped according to one character of immateriality by one who understands.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod sicut ad naturam humanam pertinebat vir et mulier, inter quos erat carnale coniugium, non autem serpens; ita ad naturam superioris rationis pertinet ratio inferior tanquam mulier, non autem sensualitas tamquam serpens, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Trin. 9. According to Augustine, as man and woman, between whom there was the carnal marriage bond, belonged to human nature and the serpent did not, so lower reason, as woman, belongs to the nature of higher reason, whereas sensuality, as the serpent, does not.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod cum peccare sit actus quidam, proprie loquendo, non est rationis neque superioris neque inferioris, sed hominis secundum hanc vel illam. Nec est inconveniens, si una potentia ad diversa comparatur, quin secundum unam habitudinem sit peccatum et non secundum alteram; sicut cum plures habitus sunt in una potentia, contingit peccare secundum actum unius habitus, et non secundum actum alterius; ut si idem sit grammaticus et geometra, et vera de lineis enuntiet, soloecismum faciendo. 10. Since sin is an act, properly speaking, it does not belong to either higher or lower reason, but to man according to the former or latter. And, if one power is related to different things, there is nothing inconsistent in having sin according to one relation and not according to the other. Thus, although several habits are in one power, it happens that one sins according to the act of one habit and not according to the act of another, for example, if the same man is grammarian and geometer, and he makes a statement containing truth about lines and also a solecism.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod quando perfectio complet perfectibile secundum totam eius capacitatem, impossibile est unius perfectibilis plures perfectiones esse in eodem ordine. Et ideo non potest esse quod materia simul perficiatur duabus formis substantialibus, quia una materia non est capax nisi unius esse substantialis. Secus autem est de accidentalibus formis, quae non perficiunt sua subiecta secundum totam eorum potentiam: unde possibile est plura accidentia esse unius perfectibilis. Et ideo etiam plures habitus esse unius potentiae possibile est, cum habitus potentiarum sint accidentales perfectiones; superveniunt enim post completae potentiae rationem. 11. When a perfection brings the perfectible thing to completion according to its full capacity, it is impossible for one perfectible thing to have several perfections; in the same order. Therefore, matter cannot receive perfection from two substantial forms at the same time, because one matter has a capacity for only one substantial nature. However, the case is different with accidental forms, which do not give perfection to their objects according to their full potency. Consequently, it is possible for one perfectible thing to have many accidents. Therefore, there can be many habits of one power, since habits are accidental perfections of powers, for they are superadded to the nature of the complete power.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod sicut dicit Avicenna in VI de naturalibus diversitas actus quandoque indicat diversitatem potentiarum, quandoque non. Quinque enim modis in actibus animae diversitas inveniri potest. Uno modo secundum fortitudinem et debilitatem, sicut opinari et credere. Alio modo secundum velocitatem et tarditatem, sicut currere et moveri. Tertio modo secundum habitum et privationem, ut quiescere et moveri. Quarto modo secundum comparationem ad contraria eiusdem generis, ut sentire album et sentire nigrum. Quinto modo quando actus sunt diversorum generum, ut apprehendere et movere, vel sentire sonum et sentire colorem. 12. As Avicenna says, diversity of act sometimes indicates diversity of powers and sometimes does not. For there can be diversity in the acts of the soul in five ways. In one, it is according to strength and weakness, as to conjecture and to believe. In the second, it is according to swiftness and slowness, as to run and to be put in motion. In the third, it is according to habit and privation, as to be at rest and to be moved. In the fourth, it is according to relation to opposites of the same genus, as to sense white and to sense black. It is in the fifth when the acts belong to different genera, as to perceive and to move, or to sense sound and to sense color.
Diversitas igitur primi et secundi modi diversitatem potentiae non indicat: quia sic oporteret tot esse potentias animae distinctas, quot gradus fortitudinis et debilitatis, vel velocitatis, vel tarditatis inveniuntur in actibus. Similiter etiam nec diversitas tertii et quarti modi, cum eiusdem potentiae sit ad utrumque oppositum comparari. Sola autem diversitas quinti modi indicat potentiae diversitatem, ut dicamus actus esse genere diversos qui in ratione obiecti non conveniunt: et secundum hoc diversitas actuum rationis superioris et inferioris diversitatem potentiae non indicat ut ex dictis patet. Accordingly, diversity of the first and second type does not manifest diversity of power, for it thus would be necessary to have as many distinct powers of soul as there are grades of strength or weakness and swiftness or slowness in acts. Similarly, diversity of the third and fourth type does not indicate diversity of power, since it belongs to the same power to occupy itself with both opposites. Hence, only diversity of the fifth type manifests diversity of power, so that we say that acts are generically different which do not agree in the character of their object. The diversity of acts of higher and lower reason does not display diversity of power in this way, as is clear from what has been said.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod agens intellectus et possibilis plus differunt quam ratio superior et inferior; cum agens intellectus et possibilis respiciant obiecta diversa formaliter etsi non materialiter. Respiciunt enim diversam rationem obiecti, quamvis utraque in eadem re intelligibili possibile sit inveniri; unum enim et idem potest esse prius intelligibile in potentia, et post intelligibile in actu. Sed ratio superior et inferior respiciunt obiecta diversa materialiter, non autem formaliter; cum respiciant diversas naturas secundum unam rationem obiecti, ut ex dictis patet. Diversitas autem formalis maior est quam materialis; et propter hoc ratio non sequitur. 13. Agent and possible intellect differ more than higher and lower reason, since agent and possible intellect refer to objects formally different, although not materially different. For they refer to a different character of object, although both can be found in the same intelligible thing. For one and the same thing can first be intelligible in potency and then intelligible in act. But higher and lower reason refer to objects materially different, but not formally different. For they refer to different natures according to one character of object, as is clear from what has been said. But formal diversity is greater than material diversity. Therefore, the conclusion does not follow.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod inferior ratio dicitur a superiori deduci, ratione eorum quae attendit inferior ratio, quae deducuntur ab his quae superior attendit: rationes enim inferiores a superioribus deducuntur. Unde nihil prohibet rationem inferiorem et superiorem esse unam potentiam; sicut videmus quod eiusdem potentiae est considerare principia subalternantis scientiae et principia subalternatae, quamvis haec ab illis deducantur. 14. Lower reason is said to be drawn from higher reason because of the things which lower reason perceives, for these are drawn from those which higher reason perceives. For lower natures are drawn from higher natures. Consequently, nothing prevents higher and lower reason from being the same power. Similarly, we see that it belongs to the same power to study the principles of a subalternating science and the principles of a subalternate science, although the latter are drawn from the former.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod pro tanto dicitur ratio superior inferiorem movere, quia inferiores rationes regulandae sunt secundum superiores; sicut etiam scientia subalternata a subalternante regulatur. 15. Higher reason is said to move lower reason to this extent, that lower natures must be ruled according to higher natures, just as a subalternate science is ruled by the subalternating science.

Q. 15: Higher and Lower Reason

ARTICLE III

In the third article we ask:
Can sin exist in higher or lower reason?


[ARTICLE II Sent., 24, 3, 1; S.T., I-II, 15, 4; 74, 7.]
Tertio quaeritur utrum in ratione superiori vel inferiori possit esse peccatum Difficulties
Et videtur quod non. It seems that it cannot, for
Quia ut dicit philosophus in III de anima, intellectus semper rectus est. Ratio autem est eadem potentia cum intellectu, ut supra habitum est. Ergo etiam ratio semper recta est, ergo in ea peccatum non est. 1. The Philosopher says: “The understanding is always correct.”, But reason is the same power as understanding, as was shown earlier. Therefore, reason is always correct. Therefore, there is no sin in it.
Praeterea, quidquid est susceptivum alicuius perfectionis, si sit susceptivum defectus, non poterit esse in eo nisi defectus oppositus illi perfectioni: quia contrariorum idem est susceptivum. Sed secundum Augustinum, XII de Trinit., propria perfectio superioris rationis est sapientia, inferioris autem scientia. Ergo in eis aliud peccatum esse non potest nisi ignorantia et stultitia. 2. If anything that is receptive of some perfection is subject to defect, only, the defect which is opposite to the perfection can exist in it, since the same thing is receptive of contraries. But, according to Augustine, wisdom is the proper perfection of higher reason, and science is the proper perfection of lower reason. Therefore, stupidity and ignorance can be the only sins in higher or lower reason.
Praeterea, secundum Augustinum omne peccatum in voluntate est. Sed ratio est alia potentia a voluntate. Ergo in ratione peccatum non est. 3. According to Augustine all sin is in the will. But reason is a different power from the will. Therefore, sin is not in reason.
Praeterea, nihil est susceptivum sui contrarii; quia contraria simul esse non possunt. Sed omne peccatum hominis est rationi contrarium, malum enim hominis est contra rationem esse, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de divinis Nomin. Ergo peccatum in ratione esse non potest. 4. Nothing is receptive of its opposite, for opposites cannot exist together. But every sin of man is contrary to reason, for the evil of man is to be contrary to reason, as Dionysius says. Therefore, sin cannot exist in reason.
Praeterea, peccatum quod circa aliquam materiam committitur, non potest attribui illi potentiae quae ad illam materiam non se extendit. Sed ratio superior habet pro materia res aeternas, non autem delectabilia carnis. Ergo peccatum quod circa delectabilia carnis committitur, nullo modo superiori rationi attribui debet, cum tamen Augustinus dicat, quod consensus in actum rationi superiori attribuitur. 5. A sin which is committed in regard to a certain subject matter cannot be attributed to the power which does not extend to that matter. But higher reason has eternal things and not delights of the flesh for its subject matter. Therefore, sins concerning pleasures of the flesh ought not in any way be attributed to higher reason, even though Augustine says that consent to an act is attributed to higher reason.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit quod superior ratio est quae superiora contemplatur et inhaeret eis, per amorem scilicet; sed ex hoc non contingit esse peccatum; ergo in superiori ratione peccatum esse non potest. 6. Augustine says that it is higher reason which contemplates higher things and clings to them, namely, through love. But sin does not result from this. Therefore, sin cannot exist in higher reason.
Praeterea, fortius non vincitur ab infirmiori. Sed ratio est fortissimum eorum quae in nobis inveniuntur. Ergo non potest vinci vel per concupiscentiam vel per iram vel aliud huiusmodi; et ita non potest in ea peccatum esse. 7. The stronger is not overcome by the weaker. But reason is the strongest of the powers which we have within us. Therefore, it cannot be overcome by concupiscence or anger or something else of that sort. Therefore, sin cannot exist in it.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Eiusdem est mereri et demereri. Sed meritum in actu rationis consistit. Ergo et demeritum. 1. Merit and demerit belong to the same thing. But merit resides in the act of reason. Therefore, so does demerit.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum, contingit peccare non solum ex passione, sed etiam ex electione. Sed electio in actu rationis consistit, cum sequatur consilium, ut dicitur in Ethic. Ergo in ratione contingit esse peccatum. 2. According to the Philosopher” sin comes not only from passion, but also from choice. But choice consists in an act of reason, since it follows deliberation, as is said in the Ethics. Therefore, there is sin in reason.
Praeterea, per rationem dirigimur et in speculabilibus et in operabilibus. Sed in speculativis contingit esse peccatum circa rationem, ut cum aliquis ratiocinando paralogizat. Ergo etiam in operativis contingit esse peccatum in ratione. 3. Through reason we are directed in speculative and in practical matters. But in speculative matters there is sin of reason, as when one is guilty of paralogism in his reasoning. Therefore, in practical matters, also, there is sin in reason.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod secundum Augustinum in XII de Trinit., peccatum quandoque est in superiori ratione, quandoque in inferiori. Ad cuius intellectum oportet duo praecognoscere: scilicet quis actus rationi attribui possit; et iterum quis superiori, et quis inferiori. According to Augustine, sin is sometimes in higher reason and sometimes in lower reason. To understand this we must first know two things: which act can be attributed to reason; also, which can be attributed to higher, and which to lower reason.
Sciendum est igitur, quod sicut est duplex apprehensiva, scilicet inferior, quae est sensitiva, et superior, quae est intellectiva vel rationalis; ita est etiam duplex appetitiva, scilicet inferior, quae vocatur sensualitas, quae dividitur per irascibilem et concupiscibilem; et superior, quae nominatur voluntas. Huiusmodi autem appetitivae duae ad suas apprehensivas quantum ad aliquid similiter se habent, quantum ad aliquid autem diversimode. Accordingly, we must bear in mind that, just as the apprehensive part is twofold, namely, the lower, which is the sensitive, and the higher, which is the intellective or reasoning part, so the appetitive part, also, is twofold, namely, the lower, which is called sense appetite and is divided into concupiscent and irascible, and the higher, which is called will. These two appetitive parts relate to the corresponding apprehensive parts similarly in some respects and differently in others.
Similiter quidem quantum ad hoc, quod in neutro appetitu potest esse aliquis motus nisi praecedente aliqua apprehensione. Appetibile enim non movet appetitum vel superiorem vel inferiorem, nisi apprehensum vel ab intellectu vel phantasia et sensu; ratione cuius non solum appetitus dicitur esse motivus, sed etiam intellectus et phantasia et sensus. They relate similarly in this, that there can be no movement in either appetite unless some apprehension precedes. For that which is desirable moves the higher or lower appetite only when perceived by understanding or imagination or sense. Because of this, not only appetite, but also understanding, imagination, and sense, are called movers.
Dissimiliter autem quantum ad hoc, quod in appetitu inferiori inest quaedam naturalis inclinatio, qua quodammodo naturaliter cogitur appetitus ut in appetibile tendat. Sed superior appetitus non determinatur ad alterum, quia superior appetitus liber est, non autem inferior. Et inde est quod motus inferioris appetitus non invenitur attribui potentiae apprehensivae, quia causa illius motus non est ex apprehensione, sed ex inclinatione appetitus; They relate differently in this, that there is a natural inclination in the lower appetite, by which it is in a way naturally forced to tend toward that which is desirable. But the higher appetite is not determined to one thing, since the higher appetite is free, whereas the lower is not. For this reason, movement of the lower appetite is not attributed to the apprehensive power, because the cause of that movement does not come from perception, but from an inclination of the appetite.
sed motus appetitus superioris attribuitur suae apprehensivae, scilicet rationi, quia superioris appetitus inclinatio vel in hoc vel in illud ex iudicio rationis causatur. Et inde est quod vires motivas distinguimus per rationalem, irascibilem, et concupiscibilem, in parte superiori nominantes quod apprehensionis est, in inferiori vero quod appetitus. Movement of the higher appetite, however, is attributed to its apprehensive faculty, reason, because the inclination of the higher appetite toward this or that is caused by a judgment of reason. Consequently, we divide the sources of movement into rational, irascible, and concupiscent. In the higher part we use the names which belong to perception and in the lower the names which belong to appetite.
Sic igitur patet quod aliquis actus rationi attribuitur dupliciter. Uno modo quia est immediate eius, utpote ab ipsa ratione elicitus, sicut conferre de agendis vel scibilibus. Alio modo quod eius est mediante voluntate, quae per eius iudicium movetur. Sicut autem motus appetitus qui consequitur iudicium rationis, rationi attribuitur; ita motus appetitus consequentis deliberationem superioris rationis, attribuitur superiori rationi; utpote cum aliquis deliberat de agendis, ex hoc quod aliquid est Deo acceptum, vel divina lege praeceptum, vel aliquo huiusmodi modo. Inferioris vero rationis erit quando motus appetitus consequitur iudicium inferioris rationis ut cum deliberatur de agendis per causas inferiores, utpote considerando turpitudinem actus, dignitatem rationis, offensam hominum, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Therefore, it is clear that an action is attributed to reason in two ways. According to one way, it is attributed to it because it belongs to it directly, inasmuch as it is elicited by reason itself, for instance, the making of a comparison about objects of activity or of knowledge. In the other way, it is attributed to it because it belongs to it mediately through the will, since the will is set in motion through its judgment. Furthermore, just as a movement of appetite which follows a judgment of reason is attributed to reason, so a movement of appetite which follows deliberation of higher reason is attributed to higher reason. This happens when one bases his deliberation about practical matters on the fact that something is acceptable to God, or prescribed by divine law, or acts in some similar way. However, the movement of appetite will belong to lower reason when it follows a judgment of lower reason, as when one decides about practical matters on the basis of lower causes, as, for instance, considering the depravity of the act, the dignity of reason, the enmity of men, or something of this sort.
Huiusmodi autem duae considerationes ordinatae sunt. Finis enim, secundum philosophum, VII Ethicorum, in operabilibus rationem principii tenet. In speculativis autem scientiis non perficitur iudicium rationis nisi quando conclusiones resolvuntur in prima principia. Unde nec in operabilibus perficietur nisi quando fiet reductio usque ad ultimum finem: tunc enim solummodo ratio ultimam sententiam de operando dabit; et haec sententia est consensus in opus. Et inde est quod consensus in actum attribuitur rationi superiori, quae finem ultimum inspicit; sed delectatio, vel delectationis complacentia, sive consensus, attribuitur ab Augustino rationi inferiori. These two types of consideration are interrelated. For, according to the Philosopher, end has the character of principle in objects of activity. But in speculative sciences the judgment of reason reaches its perfection only when conclusions are analyzed into first principles. Hence, even in objects of activity the judgment of reason is brought to perfection only when there is reference to the last end. For only then will reason give the final decision on activity. And this decision is consent to the deed. Consequently, consent to the act is attributed to higher reason, which looks to the last end. But pleasure, whether it is complacency or consent in pleasure, is attributed to lower reason by Augustine.
Quando igitur peccat aliquis consentiendo in actum malum, est peccatum in ratione superiori: quando vero per solam delectationem cum aliqua deliberatione, dicitur esse peccatum in inferiori ratione, propter hoc quod ipsa huiusmodi inferioribus disponendis immediate insistit. Sic autem dicitur esse peccatum in superiori ratione vel inferiori in quantum motus appetitivae, rationi attribuitur. Sed considerando actum proprium rationis, dicitur esse peccatum in superiori vel inferiori ratione, quando ratio superior vel inferior in propria collatione decipitur. Therefore, when one sins by giving consent to an evil act, the sin is in higher reason, but when one sins through pleasure alone with some deliberation, the sin is said to be in lower reason because the disposition of these lower things rests directly with it. Thus, sin is said to exist in higher or lower reason, in so far as the movements of appetite are attributed to reason. But, if we consider the proper act of reason, we say that sin is in the higher or lower reason when higher or lower reason is deceived in its proper act of comparison.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod secundum philosophum in III de anima, sicut sensus in propriis sensibilibus nunquam decipitur, circa sensibilia autem communia et per accidens decipi potest; ita intellectus circa proprium obiectum, scilicet quod quid est, nunquam decipitur, nisi forte per accidens; nec circa prima principia, quae statim notis terminis cognoscuntur; sed decipitur in conferendo et applicando principia communia ad particulares conclusiones; et ita contingit rationem sua rectitudine privari, et in ea esse peccatum. 1. According to the Philosopher, just as sense is never deceived in its proper sensible objects, but can be deceived concerning common and accidental sensibles, so understanding is never deceived about its proper object, quiddity, except perhaps accidentally, nor about first principles, which are known as soon as the terms are known, but is deceived in comparing and applying common principles to particular conclusions. Thus it comes about that reason loses its correctness and sin exists in it.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod sapientiae et scientiae secundum se opponuntur directe stultitia et ignorantia; sed quodammodo indirecte etiam omnia alia peccata: in quantum scilicet regimen sapientiae et scientiae, quod in agendis requiritur, per peccatum depravatur, ratione cuius omnis malus dicitur esse ignorans. 2. Stupidity and ignorance are directly opposed to wisdom and science, as such, but in a certain sense all other sins are indirectly opposed to them, in so far as the rule of wisdom and science, which is required in activity, is perverted through sin. For this reason, every evil man is called one who does not know.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod peccatum dicitur esse in voluntate non sicut in subiecto, sed sicut in causa, quia ad peccatum requiritur quod sit voluntarium; illud autem quod a voluntate causatur, rationi etiam attribuitur, ratione supradicta. 3 Sin is said to be in the will not as in a subject but as in a cause, for the thing must be voluntary to be a sin. But that which is caused by the will is also attributed to reason, for the reason mentioned above.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod peccatum hominis dicitur esse contra rationem, in quantum est contra rationem rectam, in qua peccatum esse non potest. 4. Man’s sin is said to be against reason in so far as it is against right reason, in which there can be no sin.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod ratio superior fertur in rationes aeternas directe sicut in propria obiecta; sed ab eis quodammodo reflectitur ad temporalia et caduca, prout ex illis rationibus aeternis de huiusmodi temporalibus iudicat; et sic, cum eius iudicium pervertitur circa aliquam materiam, peccatum illud rationi superiori ascribitur. 5. Higher reason is led directly to eternal essences as to its proper objects. But from them it is in some measure diverted to temporal and perishable things, inasmuch as it judges of these temporal things through the eternal essences. Thus, when its judgment about some matter is turned from its proper course, that is ascribed to higher reason.
Ad sextum dicendum quod quamvis ratio superior ad hoc sit ordinata ut aeternis inhaereat non tamen semper eis inhaeret; et sic in ea potest esse peccatum. 6. Although higher reason is ordained to this, that it cling to eternal things, it does not always cling to them. Thus, there can be sin in it.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod similem rationem Socrates faciebat, ostendere volens, quod nullum scientem contingit peccare, quia scientia, cum sit fortior, a passione non vincitur. Ad quod respondet philosophus, VII Ethic., distinguendo scientiam in universalem et particularem, et scientiam in habitu et in actu; et in habitu scientiam distinguit per hoc quod habitus potest esse solutus vel ligatus, ut in ebriosis accidit. Contingit igitur aliquem habentem scientiam universalem in actu, in particulari, circa quod est opus, non habere scientiam nisi in habitu ligato per concupiscentiam, vel aliam passionem; ut sic iudicium rationis in particulari operabili non possit informari secundum universalem scientiam. Et ita contingit errare rationem in electione; et a tali errore electionis omnis malus est ignorans, quantumcumque habeat in universali scientiam. Et per hunc etiam modum ratio ad peccatum deducitur, in quantum per concupiscentiam ligatur. 7. Socrates used a similar reasoning when he wanted to show that one who has certain knowledge does not sin, for, since certain knowledge is more powerful than passion, it is not overcome by it. In answer to this the Philosopher distinguishes certain knowledge into universal and particular, habitual and actual. And he makes a distinction in habitual certain knowledge on this basis, that a habit can be unhindered or repressed, as happens with those who are intoxicated. Accordingly, one who has universal knowledge in act may in a particular case with which a work is concerned have it only in a habit which is repressed through concupiscence or some other passion. As a result, the judgment of reason in the particular case cannot be informed according to the certain universal knowledge, and so it happens that reason errs in its choice. By reason of such an error of choice every evil man is one who does not know, however much certain knowledge in general he may have. In this way, also, reason is led to sin, inasmuch as it is repressed through concupiscence.

Q. 15: Higher and Lower Reason

ARTICLE IV

In the fourth article we ask:
Is deliberate pleasure in bad thoughts (delectatio morosa),
which exists in the lower part of reason through consent to the pleasure but without consent to the deed, a mortal sin?


[ARTICLE II Sent., 24,3, 1, & 4; Quodl., XII, 22,33; S.T., I-II, 74, 6 & 8; 88, 5, ad 2.]
Quarto quaeritur utrum delectatio morosa per consensum in delectationem in inferiori ratione existens, sine consensu in opus, sit peccatum mortale Difficulties
Et videtur quod non. It seems that it is not, for
Ut enim dicit Augustinus in Enchiridion, tunsio pectoris et oratio dominica sunt remedia contra veniale deputata. Sed consensus in delectationem sine consensu in opus, inter illa peccata computatur quibus remedium adhibetur per pectoris contunsionem et orationem dominicam; dicit enim Augustinus in XII de Trinitate: nec sane cum sola cogitatione mens oblectatur illicitis, non quidem decernens esse facienda, tenens tamen et volvens libenter quae statim ut attigerunt animum, respui debuerunt; negandum est esse peccatum; sed longe minus quam si opere statuatur implendum: et ideo de talibus quoque cogitationibus venia petenda est, pectusque percutiendum, et dicendum: dimitte nobis debita nostra, et cetera. Ergo consensus in delectationem praedictus non est peccatum mortale. 1. As Augustine says, striking the breast and [saying] the Our Father are the remedies given for venial sins. But consent to pleasure without consent to the deed is numbered among the sins for which striking the breast and [saying] the Our Father are accepted as a remedy. For Augustine says: “Now, when the mind takes pleasure in illicit things in thought alone, not, indeed, seeing them as something to be done, but still holding and gladly desiring these things which should be rejected as soon as they reach the soul, this should be considered to be a sin, but far less a sin than if it decided to carry it out in deed. Therefore, pardon should be sought for such thoughts, too, and we should strike our breasts and say: ‘Forgive us our trespasses.” Therefore, the above-mentioned consent in pleasure is not a mortal sin.
Praeterea, consensus in veniale peccatum venialis est, sicut et consensus in mortale mortalis; sed delectatio peccatum veniale est. Ergo et consensus in eam venialis erit. 2. Consent to a venial sin is venial, as consent to a mortal sin is mortal. But pleasure is a venial sin. Therefore, consent to it is venial.
Praeterea, in actu fornicationis duo invenimus propter quae malus iudicari potest: scilicet vehementiam delectationis, quae absorbet rationem; et nocumentum ex actu proveniens, scilicet incertitudo prolis, et alia huiusmodi quae consequerentur, nisi concubitus matrimonii lege ordinaretur. Non autem potest dici quod fornicatio sit peccatum mortale ratione delectationis, quia illa delectationis vehementia invenitur in actu matrimonii, qui non est peccatum. Ergo non est peccatum mortale nisi propter nocumentum quod ex actu provenit; ergo ille qui consentit in delectationem fornicationis et non in actum, non appropinquat fornicationi ex parte illa qua est peccatum mortale; et ita non videtur peccare mortaliter. 3. In the act of fornication we find two things for which it can be judged evil: the vehemence of the pleasure, which engulfs reason, and the harm coming from the act, namely, the uncertain condition of the children and other things of this sort which would result unless marital relations were regulated by law. But it cannot be said that fornication is a mortal sin by reason of the pleasure, for that intensity of pleasure exists in the marital act [in marriage], which is not a sin. Therefore, it is a mortal sin only because of the harm which comes from the act. So, one who consents to the pleasure of fornication, but not to the act, does not approach fornication under the aspect in which it is a mortal sin. Therefore, he does not seem to sin mortally.
Praeterea, non minus peccatum est homicidium quam fornicatio. Sed qui cogitat de homicidio, et delectatur, et consentit in delectationem, non peccat mortaliter; alias omnes qui delectantur in historiis bellorum audiendis, et in hanc delectationem consentirent, mortaliter peccarent, quod non videtur probabile. Ergo nec consensus in delectationem fornicationis est peccatum mortale. 4. Homicide is not less a sin than fornication. But one who thinks about homicide and takes pleasure and consents to the pleasure does not sin mortally. Otherwise, all who enjoyed hearing histories of wars, and consented to this pleasure, would sin mortally. But this does not seem probable. Therefore, consent to the pleasure of fornication is not a mortal sin.
Praeterea, cum veniale et mortale quasi in infinitum distent, quod ex distantia poenae perpenditur, veniale non potest fieri mortale. Sed delectatio quae in sola cogitatione consistit, ante consensum est venialis. Ergo consensu adveniente non potest fieri mortalis. 5. Since venial and mortal sin are almost an infinite distance apart, which is seen from the distance between the punishment, a venial sin cannot become mortal. But the pleasure which consists in thought alone before consent is venial. Therefore, it cannot become mortal when the consent is added.
Praeterea, ratio peccati mortalis in aversione a Deo consistit. Averti autem a Deo non est inferioris rationis, sed superioris, cuius est etiam converti: opposita enim eiusdem sunt; ergo peccatum mortale in inferiori ratione esse non potest, et ita consensus in delectationem, qui ab Augustino inferiori rationi adscribitur, non erit peccatum mortale. 6. The essence of mortal sin consists in turning away from God. But to turn away from God belongs not to lower reason, but to higher reason, to which, also, it belongs to turn to God. For opposites belong to the same faculty. Therefore, mortal sin cannot exist in lower reason, and so the consent to pleasure which is ascribed to lower reason by Augustine is not a mortal sin.
Praeterea, ut Augustinus in libro I contra Manichaeos dicit, si cupiditas nostra mota fuerit, quasi iam mulieri persuasum erit; sed aliquando ratio viriliter etiam commotam cupiditatem refrenat atque compescit, quod cum fit, non labimur in peccatum. Ex quo videtur accipi, quod in spirituali coniugio nobis intimo si mulier peccat, et non vir, non est peccatum. Sed quando consentitur in delectationem et non in actum, mulier peccat, et non vir, ut Augustinus dicit in XII de Trinit. Ergo consensus in delectationem non est peccatum mortale. 7. As Augustine says: “If our desire is moved, it is like a woman being persuaded, but, finally, reason manfully curbs and represses our aroused desire. When this happens, we do not fall into sin. From this, it seems, we perceive that in the spiritual marriage deep within us there is not sin if the woman sins, and the man does not. But when there is consent to pleasure and not to act, the woman sins, and not the man, as Augustine says. Therefore, consent to the pleasure is not a mortal sin.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum in X Ethic., delectatio in bonitate et malitia consequitur operationem ex qua causatur. Sed actus exterior fornicationis, qui consistit in motu corporali, alius est ab interiori, scilicet cogitatione. Ergo et delectatio quae consequitur interiorem actum, alia erit ab illa quae consequitur exteriorem. Actus autem interior ex genere suo non est peccatum mortale, sicut erat exterior. Ergo nec delectatio interior est de genere peccati mortalis; ergo videtur quod consensus in talem delectationem non sit peccatum mortale. 8. According to the Philosopher, pleasure in good and evil follows the activity by which it is caused. But the exterior act of fornication, which consists in bodily movement, is different from the interior act, namely, the thought. Therefore, pleasure which follows the interior act will be different from that which follows the external act. But the interior act is not of its nature a mortal sin, as the external act is. Therefore, the interior pleasure is not classified as a mortal sin; hence, consent to such pleasure does not seem to be a mortal sin.
Praeterea, illud solum videtur esse peccatum mortale quod lege divina prohibetur, ut patet per definitionem peccati ab Augustino datam, quod peccatum est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem Dei. Sed non invenitur lege divina prohibitus consensus in delectationem. Ergo non est peccatum mortale. 9. Only that seems to be a mortal sin which is forbidden by divine law, as is clear from the definition of sin given by Augustine: “Sin is word or deed or desire against the law of God.” But there is no law forbidding consent to pleasure. Therefore, it is not a mortal sin.
Praeterea, idem iudicium videtur esse de consensu interpretativo et de consensu expresso. Sed consensus interpretativus non videtur esse peccatum mortale, quia peccatum non transfertur in aliquam potentiam nisi per actum illius potentiae; in interpretativo autem consensu non invenitur aliquis actus rationis, quae dicitur consentire, sed sola negligentia reprimendi illicitos motus. Ergo consensus interpretativus in delectationem non est peccatum mortale; et similiter nec consensus expressus. 10. It seems that we should pass the same judgment on interpretative consent and on express consent. But interpretative consent does not seem to be mortal sin because sin is carried over to another faculty only through an act of that faculty. In interpretative consent, however, there is not any act of reason, which is said to consent, but only negligence in repressing illicit movements. Therefore, interpretative consent to pleasure is not a mortal sin, and express consent is, likewise, not a mortal sin.
Praeterea, ex hoc est aliquod peccatum mortale, ut dictum est, argum. 6, quod est contra praeceptum divinum; alias non contemneretur Deus in transgressione praecepti, et sic peccantis animus non averteretur a Deo. Sed ratio inferior non advertit rationem praecepti divini; hoc enim est officium superioris rationis, quae aeternas rationes consulit. Ergo in inferiori ratione peccatum mortale esse non potest, et sic consensus praedictus non est mortalis. 11. As has been said, an act is a mortal sin because it is against a divine precept. Otherwise, God would not be despised in the transgression of the precept, and thus the mind of the sinner would not be turned away from God. Lower reason, however, does not take the norm of the divine precept into consideration. For this is the task of higher reason, which considers eternal norms. Therefore, there can be no mortal sin in lower reason; hence, consent mentioned above is not a mortal sin.
Praeterea cum in peccato sint duo: conversio et aversio; ad conversionem aversio sequitur. Hoc enim ipso quod aliquis ad unum contrarium convertitur, ab uno avertitur. Sed ille qui consentit in delectationem et non in actum, non plene convertitur ad bonum commutabile, quia complementum in actu consistit. Ergo nec est ibi completa aversio, et ita nec est ibi mortale peccatum. 12. Since there are two elements in sin, turning toward and turning away, the turning away follows the turning toward. For, by the very fact one turns toward one contrary, he turns away from the other. But he who consents to the pleasure and not to the act does not fully turn to changeable good, since completeness is in the act. Therefore, in this there is not complete turning away; hence, no mortal sin.
Praeterea, ut dicitur in Glossa, in Princ. Hierem., Deus pronior est ad miserendum quam ad puniendum. Sed si aliquis in meditatione divinorum praeceptorum delectaretur, et in talem delectationem consentiret, dummodo non proponeret opere implere divina praecepta, non mereretur praemium. Ergo nec poenam meretur, si in delectationem peccati consentiat, dummodo non statuat opere implere. 13. As the Gloss says: “God is more inclined to be merciful than to punish.” But, if one took pleasure in meditating on divine commands and consented to such pleasure, he would not merit, as long as he did not propose to fulfill the divine commands in deed. Therefore, neither will one merit punishment if he consents to the pleasure of sin, provided that he does not decide to fulfill it in deed. Accordingly, lie does not seem to sin mortally.
Praeterea, inferior pars rationis mulieri comparatur. Sed mulier non est suae voluntatis, quia non habet potestatem sui corporis, ut apostolus dicit. Ergo nec inferior pars rationis suae voluntatis est, et ita non potest peccare. 14. The lower power of reason is compared to woman. But woman is not mistress of her will, for, as the Apostle says (1 Cor 7:4): she “does not have power over her body.” Therefore, neither is the lower part of reason master of its will; hence, it cannot sin.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Nullus damnatur nisi pro peccato mortali. Sed homo damnabitur pro consensu in delectationem: unde dicit Augustinus, XII de Trinitate: totus homo damnabitur, nisi haec quae sine voluntate operandi, sed tamen cum voluntate animum talibus oblectandi, solius cogitationis sentiuntur esse peccata, per mediatoris gratiam remittantur. Ergo consensus in delectationem est peccatum mortale. 1. No one is damned except for mortal sin. But man will be damned for consent to pleasure. Hence, Augustine says: “The whole man will be damned, unless these things which are perceived to be sins only of thought, and which exist without the will to do them, but still with the will to delight the mind with them, are remitted through the grace of the Mediator.” Therefore, consent to pleasure is a mortal sin.
Praeterea, delectatio operationis alicuius et ipsa operatio ad idem genus peccati reducuntur, sicut et operatio virtutis et delectatio in ea ad eamdem virtutem; iusti enim est et operari iusta, et delectari de iustis operibus, ut patet in I Ethicorum. Sed ipse actus fornicationis est in genere peccati mortalis. Ergo et etiam delectatio in cogitatione de fornicatione, et sic consensus in delectationem erit peccatum mortale. 2. Pleasure in an activity and the activity itself are reduced to the same genus of sin, just as the activity of a virtue and pleasure in it are reduced to the same virtue. For it belongs to the just man to perform just deeds and to take pleasure in them, as is clear in the Ethics. But the act of fornication is classified as a mortal sin. Therefore, the pleasure in the thought of fornication is, too. Therefore, consent to the pleasure will be a mortal sin.
Praeterea, si in ratione inferiori peccatum mortale esse non posset, gentiles, qui non deliberabant de actibus nisi secundum inferiores rationes, mortaliter non peccassent fornicando; vel aliquid huiusmodi faciendo, quod patet esse falsum. Ergo in inferiori ratione potest esse mortale peccatum. 3. If there could not be mortal sin in lower reason, gentiles, who consider only the lower norms of action, would not sin mortally by fornicating or doing something of the sort. This is obviously false. Therefore, there can be mortal sin in lower reason.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod eadem quaestio est qua quaeritur de delectatione morosa utrum sit peccatum mortale, et qua quaeritur de consensu in delectationem. Dubitatio enim de delectatione morosa esse non potest an sit peccatum mortale, si dicatur esse morosa a mora temporis. Certum est enim quod prolixitas temporis non potest dare actui rationem peccati mortalis, nisi aliquid aliud interveniat; cum non sit circumstantia in infinitum aggravans. Sed hoc videtur dubitabile, utrum delectatio quae dicitur morosa ex consensu rationis superveniente, mortale peccatum sit. Circa quod diversimode aliqui opinati sunt. The question whether deliberate pleasure in bad thoughts is a mortal sin and the question about consent to pleasure is the same. For there can be no doubt whether deliberate pleasure in bad thoughts is a sin, if it is called such (morosa) from duration (mora) of time. For it is certain that mere length of time cannot give an act the character of mortal sin, unless something else intervenes, since length of time is not a circumstance aggravating to infinity. But what is doubtful seems to be this: whether the pleasure which is called such because of the superadded consent of reason is a mortal sin. There have been different opinions about this.
Quidam enim dixerunt quod non est peccatum mortale, sed veniale. Quae quidem opinio dictis Augustini adversari videtur, qui ex tali consensu damnationem homini comminatur, ut patet ex verbis eius inductis. Contradicit etiam isti opinioni fere communis modernorum opinio; et videtur etiam in periculum vergere animarum, cum ex consensu in talem delectationem homo promptissime in peccatum incidere possit. For some have said that it is not a mortal sin, but venial. This opinion seems to be opposed to the words of Augustine, who threatens man with damnation because of such consent, as is clear from the passage cited. Furthermore, the almost universal opinion of moderns contradicts this [first] position, which seems, also, to tend toward danger for souls, since from consent in such pleasure a man can very readily fall into sin.
Unde alteri opinioni magis videtur assentiendum, quae ponit talem consensum esse peccatum mortale: cuius opinionis veritas hinc accipi potest. Sciendum namque est, quod sicut ad exteriorem fornicationis actum sequitur sua delectatio sensibilis, ita etiam ad actum cogitationis sequitur quaedam interior delectatio. Sed ad cogitationem duplex delectatio sequitur: una quidem ex parte ipsius cogitationis; alia vero ex parte ipsius cogitati. Delectamur enim quandoque in cogitando propter ipsam cogitationem, ex qua nobis acquiritur quaedam cognitio in actu aliquorum, quamvis illa nobis displiceant; sicut aliquis iustus cogitat de peccatis, de eis disputando vel conferendo, et in veritate huius cogitationis delectatur. Sed tunc propter ipsa cogitata delectatio sequitur, quando ipsa res cogitata affectum movet et allicit. Et hae quidem duae cogitationes in quibusdam actibus manifeste differunt, et aperte distinguuntur. Sed earum distinctio in cogitationibus de peccatis carnis magis latet, eo quod propter corruptionem concupiscibilis, ad cogitationem talium concupiscibilium statim sequitur motus in concupiscibili ex ipsis concupiscibilibus causatus. Hence, it seems that we must accept the second opinion, which makes such consent a mortal sin. The truth of this position can be seen from the following. For we must bear in mind that, just as sensible pleasure follows on the external act of fornication, so interior pleasure follows on the act of thinking. But a double pleasure follows on thought. One of these follows from the thought and the other from the thing thought of. For at times we take pleasure in thought because of the thought itself, from which we get actual knowledge of certain things, although the things displease us. Thus, a just man thinks about sins when he discusses or argues about them, and takes pleasure in the truth of this thought. But the pleasure follows because of the things thought when the thing thought about itself stirs up and attracts the affections. In some acts, these two thoughts obviously differ and are clearly distinct. But their distinction is more obscure in thoughts about sins of the flesh, because, due to the weakened condition of the concupiscible part, when there is thought of such desirable objects, there immediately follows in the concupiscible part a movement which is caused by these objects.
Delectatio igitur illa quae cogitationem sequitur ex parte ipsius cogitationis, omnino ad aliud genus reducitur quam delectatio exterioris actus. Unde talis delectatio qualiumcumque malorum cogitationem sequatur vel penitus non est peccatum, sed laudabilis delectatio, cum quis delectatur in cognitione veri; vel si sit ibi aliqua immoderantia, continebitur sub peccato curiositatis. Therefore, the pleasure which follows thought because of the thought is ascribed to an altogether different genus than the pleasure of the exterior act. Consequently, when any such pleasure follows the thought of evil things, it is either no sin at all, but a praiseworthy pleasure, as when one takes delight in the knowledge of the truth; or, if there is some lack of moderation, it is classed under the sin of curiosity.
Sed illa delectatio quae sequitur cogitationem ex parte rei cogitatae, in idem genus coincidit cum delectatione exterioris actus. Ut enim dicitur in XI Metaph., delectatio per se in actu consistit; sed spes et memoria propter actum delectabilia sunt. Unde constat quod talis delectatio secundum genus suum inordinata est eadem inordinatione qua est inordinata delectatio exterior. But the pleasure which follows thought because of the thing thought about belongs to the same class as the pleasure of the external act. For, as is said in the Metaphysics, pleasure consists essentially in the act, but the hope and memory are pleasurable because of the act. From this it is clear that such pleasure is inordinate in its genus by reason of the same disorder which makes external pleasure inordinate.
Dato igitur quod delectatio exterior sit peccati mortalis, tunc etiam interior delectatio in se et absolute considerata de genere peccati mortalis est. Quandocumque autem ratio se subiicit peccato mortali per approbationem tunc est peccatum mortale: excluditur enim a ratione rectitudo iustitiae, cum ipsa subiicitur iniquitati per approbationem. Tunc autem se subiicit huic delectationi perversae quando in eam consentit. Et haec est prima subiectio qua ei se subiicit; et ex hac subiectione consequitur quandoque ut ipsum actum inordinatum eligat propter hanc delectationem perfectius consequendam. Et quanto in plures inordinationes tendit, ad hoc quod delectationem consequatur, tanto magis in peccato progreditur. Totius tamen istius progressus prima radix erit ille consensus quo delectationem acceptavit; unde ibi peccatum mortale inchoatur. Accordingly, if the external pleasure is conceded to be mortally sinful, then the interior pleasure, considered in itself and independently, belongs to the genus of mortal sin. Moreover, mortal sin results whenever reason gives itself over to mortal sin by approving of it. For the uprightness of justice is banished from reason when it is made subject to evil by approving of it. And reason makes itself subject to this disordered pleasure when it consents to it. This is the first subjection by which it enslaves itself. Sometimes, there follows on this subjection the choice of the disordered act itself, in order to attain this pleasure more perfectly. And, the more it seeks for further disorders to obtain pleasure, the more it advances in sin. Yet the consent by which it accepted the pleasure will be the first root of that whole progression. Thus, mortal sin begins there.
Unde simpliciter concedimus, consensum in delectationem fornicationis vel alterius mortalis esse peccatum mortale. Ex quo etiam sequitur quod quidquid homo agit ex consensu talis delectationis, ad hoc ut huiusmodi delectationem nutriat et teneat, sicut sunt turpes tactus vel libidinosa oscula vel aliquid huiusmodi, totum est peccatum mortale. Consequently, we concede without reserve that consent in the pleasure of fornication or of any other mortal sin is a mortal sin. From this it also follows that whatever a man does because of consent to such pleasure with a view to fostering or holding it, such as shameful touches, or lustful kisses, or things such as these, the whole thing is a mortal sin.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus in Ench. dicit, oratio dominica et alia huiusmodi non solum ad delenda venialia peccata valent, sed etiam ad remissionem mortalium, quamvis non ita ad deletionem mortalium sicut sufficiunt ad deletionem venialium. 1. As Augustine says, [saying] the Our Father and [doing] other works of this sort have value not only to wipe out venial sins, but also for the remission of mortal sins, although they are not sufficient for the remission of mortal sins as they are for the remission of venial sins.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod delectatio illa quae consequitur cogitationem de fornicatione ex parte cogitati, est mortalis secundum suum genus; sed per accidens tantum est veniale peccatum, in quantum scilicet praevenit consensum deliberatum, in quo perficitur ratio peccati mortalis; sine quo etiamsi corpus inquinaretur per violentiam, non esset peccatum mortale: quia non potest inquinari corpus inquinatione peccati sine consensu mentis, ut dicit Lucia. Et ideo quando consensus advenit, removetur praedictum accidens, et fit peccatum mortale, sicut etiam accideret in ea quae per violentiam corrumperetur, si consentiret. 2. The pleasure that follows the pleasure in fornication because of the thing thought about is of its nature mortal, but it can be venial accidentally, in so far as it precedes deliberate assent which gives mortal sin its complete character. Without this, if the body were defiled by violence, there would not be mortal sin, for, as Lucy says, the body cannot be defiled with the defilement of sin without the consent of the mind. Therefore, when consent comes, the above-mentioned accident is withdrawn and there is mortal sin, as would happen in a woman who, if she gave consent, would be corrupted through violence.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod tota inordinatio fornicationis, undecumque contingat, redundat in delectationem quae ex ipsa causatur; unde qui huius generis delectationem approbat, mortaliter peccat. 3. The whole disorder of fornication, from whatever source it arises, flows over into the pleasure which it causes. Hence, one who approves pleasure of this sort sins mortally.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod si aliquis delectaretur in cogitatione homicidii propter ipsam rem cogitatam, hoc non esset nisi propter affectionem quam haberet ad homicidium, et ita peccaret mortaliter, sed si aliquis delectaretur in cogitatione tali propter notitiam eorum de quibus cogitat, vel propter aliquid aliud huiusmodi, non erit peccatum mortale semper, sed reducetur ad aliquod aliud genus peccati quam homicidium, scilicet ad curiositatem, vel aliquid huiusmodi. 4. If one took pleasure in the thought of murder because of the thing thought about, this would be only by reason of an inclination which he had toward murder; hence, he would sin mortally. However, if one took pleasure in such thought because of knowledge of the things about which he is thinking, or for some other reason of this sort, it would not always be a mortal sin. It would, rather, be classed under some other genus of sin than murder, such as curiosity or something else of this sort.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod illa delectatio quae fuit venialis, nunquam eadem numero erit mortalis; sed actus consensus superveniens peccatum mortale erit. 5. The pleasure which was venial will never, as numerically the same, become mortal, but the act of consent added to it will be a mortal sin.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod quamvis ratio superior sola per se convertatur ad Deum, tamen huius conversionis aliqualiter fit particeps inferior ratio, secundum quod a superiori regulatur; sicut et irascibilis et concupiscibilis dicuntur participare aliqualiter ratione, in quantum rationi obediunt. Et ita etiam aversio peccati mortalis potest pertinere ad rationem inferiorem. 6. Although higher reason alone is of itself directed to God, lower reason to some degree shares in this conversion, in so far as it is ruled by higher reason. Similarly, the concupiscent and irascible are said to share in reason to some degree in so far as they obey reason. Thus, the turning away [from God] in mortal sin can belong to lower reason.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod Augustinus in Lib. contra Manichaeum non eodem modo exponit illa tria, sicut in libro de Trinit. In XII de Trinitate enim serpentem attribuit sensualitati, mulierem inferiori rationi, virum superiori; sed in Lib. contra Manichaeum, serpentem sensui, mulierem concupiscentiae sive sensualitati, virum rationi. Unde patet quod ratio non sequitur. 7. In Against the Manichaeans, Augustine does not explain those three things as he does in The Trinity. In the latter, he attributes serpent to sensuality, woman to lower reason, and man to higher reason; whereas, in the former he attributes serpent to sense, woman to concupiscence or sensuality, and man to reason. Therefore, it is clear that the conclusion does not follow.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod actus interior, scilicet cogitatio, habet alterius modi delectationem a delectatione actus exterioris quae consequitur cogitationem per seipsam. Sed delectatio quae consequitur cogitationem ex parte actus cogitati, reducitur in idem genus; quia nullus delectatur in aliquo, nisi afficiatur ad illud, et apprehendat illud ut conveniens. Unde qui consentit in delectationem interiorem approbat etiam exteriorem delectationem, et vult ea frui, saltem cogitando de ea. 8. The internal act, that is to say, thought, has pleasure of a kind different from the pleasure of the external act. And this follows thought for its own sake. But the pleasure which follows thought because of the act thought about is put in the same class [as the act] because no one takes pleasure in something unless he is attached to it and perceives it as agreeable. Consequently, one who consents to interior pleasure also approves the exterior pleasure and wants to enjoy it, at least by thinking about it.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod consensus in delectationem prohibetur praecepto illo. Non concupisces etc.; non enim sine causa de actu exteriori et de interiori concupiscentia diversa praecepta dantur in lege. Nihilominus tamen si in nullo praecepto speciali prohiberetur, ex hoc ipso quod fornicatio prohibetur, prohibentur et omnia consequentia quae ad idem pertinent. 9. Consent to pleasure is forbidden by the precept: “Thou shall not covet...” (Exod. 20:17; Dent. 5:21). For it is not without cause that different precepts are given in the law for the external act and the internal desire. Nevertheless, even if it were not forbidden in any special commandment, all the consequences of fornication which concern the same object would be forbidden by the very fact that fornication is forbidden.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod antequam ratio delectationem perpendat vel nocumentum ipsius, non habet interpretativum consensum, etiamsi non resistat; sed quando iam perpendit ratio de delectatione insurgente, et de nocumento consequente; utpote cum percipit homo se totaliter per huiusmodi delectationem in peccatum inclinari, et in praeceps ruere, nisi expresse resistat, videtur consentire. Et tunc peccatum ad rationem transfertur per actum eius: quia agere et non agere, cum quis agere debet, ad genus actus reducuntur, secundum quod peccatum omissionis ad peccatum actus reducitur. 10. Before reason considers its own pleasure or harm, it does not have interpretative consent, even though it does not resist. But, when it has considered the rising pleasure and the harm that will follow, it seems to consent, as a man seems to consent, unless he openly resists when he perceives that he will be completely drawn to sin by pleasure of this sort, and will fall headlong. Then the sin is attributed to reason because of its act, since to act and not to act when one should are reduced to [one] genus, inasmuch as sin of omission is reduced to sin of act.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod vis praecepti divini pervenit usque ad rationem inferiorem, in quantum participat regimen superioris rationis, ut prius dictum est. 11. The force of a commandment of God reaches lower reason inasmuch as it shares the rule of higher reason, as has been said.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod conversio qua quis post deliberationem ad aliquid de genere mali convertitur, sufficit ad rationem peccati mortalis; quamvis post hanc completionem aliqua alia completio addi possit. 12. The conversion by which one turns after deliberation to something which is of its nature evil is sufficient for the character of mortal sin, although another complete act can be added to this one.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Dionysius, bonum causatur ex una tota et perfecta causa, sed malum ex singularibus defectibus: et ita plura requiruntur ad hoc quod aliquid sit bonum meritorium, quam ad hoc quod sit malum demeritorium; quamvis Deus sit pronior ad remunerandum bona quam ad puniendum mala. Unde consensus delectationis sine consensu operis non sufficit ad merendum, sufficit autem in malis ad demerendum. 13. As Dionysius says: “Good is caused by one whole and complete cause, but evil by individual defects.” Thus, more things are required for something to be a meritorious good than for it to be a blameworthy evil, although God is more inclined to reward good deeds than to punish evil ones. Consequently, consent to pleasure without consent to the deed is not enough for merit, but, when there is question of evil, it is enough for blame.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod mulier de iure non debet velle contra viri debitam ordinationem; sed tamen de facto quandoque potest contrarium velle, et vult: et ita etiam est de inferiori ratione. 14. By right a woman ought not to will anything contrary to the just appointment of her husband, but, as a matter of fact, sometimes one can and does will the opposite. Thus it is with lower reason.
Answers to Contrary Difficulties
Rationes in contrarium concedimus, quamvis ultima falso concludat. Procedit enim ac si gentilis secundum superiorem rationem peccare non posset, quod falsum est. Nullus est enim qui non aestimet in aliquo esse finem humanae vitae; et cum ex illo deliberationem accipit, ad rationem superiorem pertinet. We concede the arguments to the contrary, although the last concludes falsely. For it proceeds as though a gentile could not sin according to higher reason. And this is false, for there is no one who does not judge that something is the end of human life. And, when he uses that as a basis of his deliberation, he is using higher reason.

Q. 15: Higher and Lower Reason

ARTICLE V

In the fifth article we ask:
Can venial sin exist in higher reason?


[ARTICLE Il Sent., 24,3,5; S.T., I-II, 74, 9-10; Q.D. de malo, 7, 5.]
Quinto quaeritur utrum in ratione superiori possit esse peccatum veniale Difficulties
Et videtur quod non. It seems that it cannot, for
Superioris enim rationis est inhaerere rationibus aeternis. Ergo et peccatum in ea esse non potest nisi per hoc quod deflectitur ab aeternis rationibus. Sed deflecti a rationibus aeternis est peccatum mortale. Ergo in superiori ratione non potest esse peccatum nisi mortale. 1. It belongs to higher reason to cling to the eternal norms of conduct. Therefore, sin can be in it only in so far as it turns away from these eternal norms. But to turn away from them is a mortal sin. Therefore, there can be only mortal sin in higher reason.
Praeterea, peccatum veniale, per contemptum fit mortale. Sed non videtur esse sine contemptu quod aliquis deliberet aliquid esse malum et a Deo puniendum, et tamen illud committere consentiat. Ergo videtur quod quandocumque post deliberationem superioris rationis in actum consentitur etiam peccati venialis sit mortale peccatum. 2. Through contempt venial sin becomes mortal. But there seems to be contempt when one considers something to be evil and to be punished by God and, nevertheless, consents to commit it. Therefore, it seems that there is a mortal sin whenever one consents to the act even of a venial sin after the consideration of higher reason.
Praeterea, est aliquid in anima in quo non potest esse peccatum nisi veniale, scilicet sensualitas; aliquid vero in quo potest esse et veniale et mortale, ut ratio inferior; ergo videtur quod aliquid etiam sit in anima in quo non sit nisi peccatum mortale: hoc autem non est synderesis quia in ea nullum est peccatum; ergo hoc convenit superiori rationi. 3. There is something in the soul, sensuality, in which there can be only venial sin, and something in which there can be venial and mortal sin, namely, lower reason. Therefore it seems that there is also something in the soul in which there can be only mortal sin. But this is not synderesis, because in that there is no sin. Therefore, this description fits higher reason.
Praeterea, in Angelo et in homine in statu innocentiae non poterat esse peccatum veniale, propter hoc quod peccatum veniale ex corruptione carnis oritur, quae tunc non erat. Sed ratio superior est remota a carnis corruptione. Ergo in ea peccatum veniale esse non potest. 4. In angels and in man in the state of innocence there could not be venial sin, because venial sin arises from the weakening of the flesh, and this did not then exist. But higher reason is apart from the weakening of the flesh. Therefore, there can be no venial sin in it.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Consensus in actum peccati non est gravior quam ipse actus peccati. Sed consensus in actu venialis peccati ad superiorem rationem pertinet. Ergo et peccatum veniale. 1. Consent to the act of sin is not more serious than the act of sin itself. But consent to the act of venial sin belongs to higher reason. Therefore so does venial sin.
Praeterea, subitus motus infidelitatis peccatum veniale est; et non est nisi in superiori ratione. Ergo in ea est peccatum veniale. 2. An unpremeditated movement of infidelity is a venial sin, and this takes place only in higher reason. Therefore, there is venial sin in it.
REPLY
Responsio. Dicendum, quod in superiori parte rationis potest esse peccatum veniale et mortale; sed tamen aliqua materia est circa quam in superiori ratione non potest esse nisi peccatum mortale: quod sic patet. Superior enim ratio habet actum circa aliquam materiam directe, scilicet circa rationes aeternas; et circa aliquam materiam indirecte, scilicet circa res temporales, de quibus iudicat secundum rationes aeternas. Circa materiam autem propriam, scilicet circa rationes aeternas, habet actum duplicem, et subitum et deliberatum. Cum autem peccatum mortale non perficiatur nisi post actum deliberationis, poterit esse in superiori ratione peccatum veniale, quando est motus subitus; mortale autem quando est deliberatus, sicut in peccato infidelitatis apparet. Sed circa materiam temporalium rerum non habet nisi actum deliberatum, quia non fertur in ea nisi conferens ad ea rationes aeternas. Unde quantum ad huiusmodi materiam, si sit in genere peccati mortalis semper actus rationis superioris erit peccatum mortale; si autem sit in genere venialis peccati, erit veniale, ut patet cum quis consentit in verbum otiosum. There can be venial and mortal sin in the higher part of reason. Nevertheless, there is some subject matter concerning which there can be only mortal sin in higher reason. This is plain in what follows. For higher reason has an act concerning some matter directly, that is, concerning eternal norms, and an act concerning some matter indirectly, that is, temporal norms, about which it judges according to eternal norms. With reference to its proper matter, eternal norms, it has a double act, one unpremeditated and one deliberate. But, since mortal sin is committed only after the act of deliberation, there can be venial sin in higher reason when there is an unpremeditated movement, and mortal when there is deliberate movement, as we see in the sin of infidelity. But it has only a deliberate act with reference to the matter of temporal things because it is directed to them only when it compares the eternal norms with them. Consequently, the act of higher reason will always be a mortal sin in this matter, if such matter is by nature a mortal sin. But, if it is by nature a venial sin, it will be venial, as is clear when one gives consent to an idle word.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod ratio superior peccat per hoc quod deflectitur a rationibus aeternis, non solum faciendo contra eas, sed etiam faciendo praeter eas, quod est peccatum veniale. 1. Higher reason sins in this, that it turns away from eternal norms not only by acting against them, but by acting outside them, which is a venial sin.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod non quilibet contemptus facit peccatum mortale, sed contemptus Dei; per hunc enim solum homo a Deo avertitur. Post quantamcumque autem deliberationem aliquis in peccatum veniale consentiat, non contemnit Deum, nisi forte aestimaret peccatum illud esse contrarium praecepto divino, unde ratio non sequitur. 2. Not every contempt makes a sin mortal, but contempt of God. And through this alone man is turned away from God. But, when one consents to a venial sin after any deliberation, no matter how much, he does not have contempt of God, unless, perhaps, he would judge that the sin is contrary to a divine commandment. Thus, the conclusion does not follow.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod hoc quod in sensualitate non possit esse nisi peccatum veniale, contingit ex imperfectione eius. Ratio autem, perfecta potentia est; et ideo in ea potest esse peccatum secundum omnem peccati differentiam: actus enim eius potest esse in in quolibet genere completus. Unde si sit in genere peccati venialis, erit veniale; si in genere mortalis, erit mortale. 3. That there can be only venial sin in sensuality comes from its imperfection. But reason is a perfect power and, therefore, there can be sin in it according to every difference of sin. For its act can be complete in any genus. Hence, if it is by nature a venial sin, it is venial; if it is by nature a mortal sin, it is mortal.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis ratio superior non sit immediate carni coniuncta, tamen corruptio carnis usque ad eam pertingit, in quantum superiores potentiae ab inferioribus accipiunt. 4. Although higher reason is not directly connected with the flesh, the weakening of the flesh reaches it, inasmuch as higher powers receive something from the lower powers.