Question Eighteen: The Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence

  1. Primo utrum homo in statu innocentiae cognoverit Deum per essentiam.
  2. Secundo utrum homo in statu innocentiae Deum per creaturas viderit.
  3. Tertio utrum Adam in statu innocentiae fidem de Deo habuerit.
  4. Quarto utrum Adam in statu innocentiae habuerit omnium creaturarum notitiam.
  5. Quinto utrum Adam in statu innocentiae Angelos per essentiam viderit.
  6. Sexto utrum Adam in statu innocentiae errare sive decipi potuerit.
  7. Septimo utrum pueri qui ex Adam in statu innocentiae nascerentur, plenam rerum omnium scientiam haberent, sicut et Adam habuit.
  8. Octavo utrum pueri mox nati in statu innocentiae usum rationis plenarie habuissent.
  1. Did man in that state know God through His essence?
  2. Did man in the state of innocence see God through creatures?
  3. Did Adam in the state of innocence have faith about God?
  4. Did Adam in the state of innocence have knowledge of all creatures?
  5. Did Adam in the state of innocence see the angels through their essence?
  6. Could Adam in the state of innocence be mistaken or deceived?
  7. Would the children who were born of Adam in the state of innocence have had full knowledge of all things, as Adam did?
  8. In the state of innocence would children have had the full use of reason immediately at birth?
ARTICLE I

The question concerns the knowledge of the first man in the state of innocence,
and in the first article we ask:
Did man in that state know God through his essence?

[ARTICLE II Sent., 23, 2, 1; S.T., 1, 94, 1.]

Quaestio est de cognitione primi hominis in statu innocentiae. Et primo quaeritur utrum in statu illo cognoverit Deum per essentiam Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that he did, for
Dicit enim Magister in IV Sentent. dist. 1, quod homo ante peccatum Deum sine medio vidit. Sed videre Deum sine medio, est videre per essentiam. Ergo in statu innocentiae vidit Deum per essentiam. 1. The Master says: “Before sin, man saw God independently of any medium.” But to see God independently of any medium is to see God through His essence. Therefore in the state of innocence man saw God through His essence.
Sed dicebat, quod Magister intelligit quod vidit Deum sine medio quoad nubilum culpae, non autem sine medio creaturae.- Sed contra est quod Magister ibidem dicit, quod quia nos per medium Deum videmus, oportet quod ex visibilibus creaturis in ipsum deveniamus. Ergo videtur quod intelligat de medio creaturae. Sed videre sine medio creaturae, est videre per essentiam. Ergo et cetera. 2. It was said that the Master means that man saw God without a medium as far as obscurity due to sin is concerned, but not that he saw God without using creatures as a medium.—On the contrary, in that same place the Master says that, since we see God through a medium, we must reach Him by means of visible creatures. Therefore, he seems to mean the use of creatures as a medium. But to see without the use of creatures as a medium is to see through the essence. Therefore.
Praeterea, Phil. IV, 7 dicitur: pax Dei quae exsuperat omnem sensum, hoc - secundum quod intelligitur de pace quam Deus facit in beatis in patria - Glosa ibid. sic exponit: omnem sensum, idest intellectum nostrum, non eorum qui semper vident faciem patris. Ex quo haberi potest quod pax sive gaudium beatorum excedit intellectum omnis illius qui gaudio illo non perfruitur. Sed Adam in statu innocentiae gaudia beatorum vidit: unde dicit Gregorius, IV dialogorum: homo peccando extra semet ipsum fusus iam illa caelestis patriae gaudia quae prius contemplari solebat, videre non poterat. Ergo Adam in illo statu gaudio caelestis patriae fruebatur. 3. In Philippians (4:7) it is said: “And the peace of God, which surpasses all understanding.” But this means the peace which God gives the blessed in heaven. The Gloss explains it in this way: “All understanding, that is, our understanding, not the understanding of those who always see the face of the Father.” From this we see that the peace or joy of the blessed surpasses the understanding of all those who do not possess that joy. But Adam in his innocence saw the joys of the blessed. Hence, Gregory says: “Man, losing himself by sin, could not then see those joys of heaven which he was accustomed to contemplate before.” Therefore, in that state Adam possessed the joy of heaven.
Praeterea, Hugo de sancto Victore, dicit, quod homo in statu illo creatorem suum cognoscebat ea cognitione qua tunc per praesentiam contemplationis manifestius cernebatur. Sed videre Deum per praesentiam contemplationis, est videre ipsum per essentiam, ut videtur. Ergo Deum per essentiam in statu illo Adam vidit. 4. Hugh of St. Victor says: “In that state man knew his Creator with the knowledge with which He was then more clearly seen as present in contemplation. But to see God as present in contemplation would seem to be to see Him through His essence. Therefore, in the state of innocence Adam saw God through His essence.
Praeterea, homo factus est ad videndum Deum: ad hoc enim Deus fecit rationalem creaturam, ut beatitudinis eius particeps esset, quae in eius visione consistit, ut habetur 1 dist. II Sent. Si igitur Adam in statu innocentiae Deum per essentiam non videbat, hoc non erat nisi quia aliquod medium impediebat. Non autem impediebat medium culpae, quia tunc ab ea immunis erat; nec etiam impediebat medium creaturae, quia Deus est intimior animae hominis quam quaelibet alia creatura. Ergo Adam in statu innocentiae vidit Deum per essentiam. 5. Man was made to see God. For God made rational creatures to participate in His beatitude. This consists in seeing Him, as is shown in the Sentences. Therefore, if Adam in the state of innocence did not see God through His essence, this was only because some medium prevented him from doing so. However, the medium due to sin did not prevent him, for he was then free from sin. Nor did the use of creatures as a medium prevent him, for God is closer to the rational soul than any creature is. Therefore, in the state of innocence Adam saw God through His essence.
Praeterea, sicut affectiva hominis non perficitur nisi per summum bonum, ita cognitiva non nisi per summum verum, ut patet in Lib. de spiritu et anima. Sed unicuique inest desiderium suae perfectionis. Ergo Adam in primo statu desiderabat Deum per essentiam videre. Sed quicumque caret eo quod desiderat, affligitur. Si igitur Adam tunc Deum per essentiam non vidit, affligebatur. Hoc autem est falsum, quia afflictio, cum sit poena, culpam praecedere non potest. Ergo Deum per essentiam vidit. 6. just as the affective part of man is perfected only by the highest good, so the cognitive part is perfected only by the highest truth, as is clear from Spirit and Soul. But everyone has within him the desire of his perfection. Therefore, in his original state Adam desired to see God through His essence. But whoever is deprived of that which he desires suffers. Therefore, if Adam did not then see God through His essence, he suffered. However, this is false, because suffering, since it is a punishment, cannot precede sin. Therefore, he saw God through His essence.
Praeterea, anima hominis ita facta est ad Dei imaginem, ut nulla interposita creatura ab ipsa prima veritate formetur, ut dicitur in libro de spiritu et anima. Sed imago manebat integra et pura in homine in statu innocentiae. Igitur in ipsam summam veritatem ferebatur nullo mediante; et ita Deum per essentiam videbat. 7. The soul of man “is so made to God’s image that it is formed by the first truth itself without the interposition of any creature,” as is said in Spirit and Soul. But the image remained pure and whole in man in the state of innocence. Therefore, he was brought to the highest truth itself without any medium. Consequently, he saw God through His essence.
Praeterea, ad hoc quod aliquid intelligamus in actu, nihil aliud requiritur nisi ut species fiat intelligibilis in actu per abstractionem a materia et a conditionibus materiae: quod pertinet ad intellectum agentem; et ut in intellectu recipiatur: quod pertinet ad intellectum possibilem. Sed essentia divina est per se intelligibilis, utpote omnino a materia separata. Erat etiam animae ipsius hominis intima, cum in omnibus per essentiam Deus esse dicatur. Cum igitur nullum esset impedimentum in anima hominis in statu innocentiae, videtur quod Deum per essentiam videbat. 8. For us actually to understand something, all that is needed is the formation of actually intelligible species through abstraction from matter and the conditions of matter, which is the work of the agent intellect, and reception in our understanding, which is the work of the possible intellect. But the divine essence is of itself intelligible, inasmuch as it is completely separated from matter. It was also at the very center of man’s soul, since God is said to be in all things through His essence. Therefore, since in the state of innocence there would be no obstacle in the soul of man, it seems that he saw God through His essence.
Praeterea, cum anima Adae in statu innocentiae esset debito modo ordinata, non erat ratio superior minus perfecta circa suum obiectum quam inferior circa obiectum proprium. Sed inferior ratio, cuius est temporalia intendere, ipsa temporalia immediate videre poterat. Ergo et ratio superior, cuius est aeterna conspicere, poterat immediate aeternam Dei essentiam videre. 9. Since in the state of innocence Adam’s soul was properly ordered, higher reason was not less perfectly disposed toward its object than lower reason toward its proper object. But lower reason, whose task it is to give its attention to temporal things, could see those temporal things immediately. Therefore, higher reason, whose task it is to contemplate eternal things, could see immediately the eternal essence of God.
Praeterea, illud quo aliquid fit sensibile in actu, immediate a sensu visus cognoscitur, scilicet lux. Ergo et illud quo fit aliquid actu intelligibile, immediate ab intellectu hominis cognoscitur. Sed non fit aliquid intelligibile actu ab aliquo nisi in quantum est actu; et ita, cum solus Deus sit actus purus, ipse est quo omnia intelligibilia fiunt. Ergo intellectus hominis in primo statu Deum immediate videbat, cum tunc nullum haberet impedimentum. 10. That by which something is made actually sensible, namely, light, is known immediately by the sense of sight. Therefore, that by which something becomes actually intelligible is known immediately by man’s understanding. But a thing is made actually intelligible by another only in so far as that other is in act. So, since God alone is pure act, He Himself is that by which all things become intelligible. Therefore, man’s understanding in the first state saw God immediately, since then it had no obstacle.
Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, quod homo in statu innocentiae beatam vitam habuit, et omnium divitem. Sed beatitudo vitae consistit in hoc quod Deus per essentiam videatur. Ergo Deum per essentiam tunc vidit. 11. Damascene says that in the state of innocence man “had a life which was blessed and rich in all things.” But life’s beatitude consists in seeing God through His essence. Therefore, he then saw God through His essence.
Praeterea, Damascenus idem dicit, quod homo tunc reficiebatur fruitione dulcissimae contemplationis, sicut alius Angelus. Sed Angeli vident Deum per essentiam. Ergo et Adam in statu illo Deum per essentiam vidit. 12. Damascene says: “Man was then refreshed by the enjoyment of the sweetest contemplation, like another angel.” But the angels see God through His essence. Therefore, in that state Adam saw God through His essence.
Praeterea, natura hominis erat perfectior in statu innocentiae quam post statum peccati. Sed aliquibus post statum peccati concessum est ut Deum per essentiam viderent adhuc in hac mortali vita existentibus, sicut de Paulo et Moyse Augustinus dicit, XII super Genes. ad litteram, et in Lib. de videndo Deum. Ergo multo fortius Adam in statu innocentiae Deum per essentiam vidit. 13. Man’s nature was more perfect in the state of innocence than after the fall. But after the fall some were allowed to see God through His essence while they still lived in this mortal life, as Augustine says of Paul and Moses. Therefore, with much greater reason Adam in the state of innocence saw God through His essence.
Praeterea, Genes. II, 21, super illud: immisit dominus Deus soporem in Adam etc., dicit Glossa: extasis recte intelligitur ad hoc immissa, ut mens Adae particeps angelicae curiae et intrans in sanctuarium Dei, novissima intelligeret. Ex quo videtur quod sopor ille raptus quidam fuerit. Sed illi qui rapiuntur Deum per essentiam vident. Ergo et Adam per essentiam vidit. 14. The Gloss on Genesis (2:2 1), “Then the Lord God cast a deep sleep upon Adam,” says: “The correct interpretation is that Adam was made to fall into the ecstasy so that his mind, becoming a part of the angelic court and entering the sanctuary of God, might understand the last things.”“ From this it seems that that sleep was a kind of rapture. But those who are enraptured see God through His essence. Therefore, Adam, also, saw Him through His essence.
Praeterea, secundum Damascenum, Adam non tantum in corporali Paradiso fuit collocatus, sed etiam in spirituali. Spiritualis autem Paradisus nihil est aliud quam beatitudo in visione Dei per essentiam consistens. Ergo vidit Deum per essentiam. 15. According to Damascene, Adam was placed not only in a corporeal but also in a spiritual paradise. But spiritual paradise is nothing other than beatitude, which consists in the sight of God through His essence. Therefore, he saw God through His essence.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XIV de civitate Dei, quod in statu innocentiae non aberat quidquam quod bona voluntas adipisceretur. Sed bona voluntas hoc adipisci poterat, ut Deum per essentiam videret. Ergo hoc a primis parentibus non aberat; et ita Deum per essentiam videbant. 16. Augustine says: “In the state of innocence nothing was missing which a good will could acquire.” But a good will could acquire the sight of God through His essence. Therefore, this was not missing in the first parents. Therefore, they saw God through His essence.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Est quod Augustinus dicit in I de Trinitate, quod Dei visio per essentiam est tota merces sanctorum. Sed Adam in statu innocentiae beatus non erat. Ergo Deum per essentiam non vidit. 1. Augustine says. that the sight of God through His essence is “the whole reward” of the saints. But in the state of innocence Adam was not one of the blessed. Therefore, he did not see God through His essence.
Praeterea, Bernardus dicit, quod Deus in statu viae potest quidem totus diligi, sed non totus videri. Videretur autem totus si per essentiam videretur, cum eius essentia sit simplex. Ergo cum Adam esset in statu viae, Deum per essentiam videre non potuit. 2. Bernard says that in this life God can be loved entirely, but not seen entirely. But He would be seen entirely if He were seen through His essence, since His essence is simple. Therefore, while he was in this life Adam could not see God through His essence.
Praeterea, anima oppressa mole carnis, distinctam rerum cognitionem amittit; unde Boetius dicit in Lib. de Consolat. quod summam retinens, singula perdit. Sed in statu innocentiae anima hominis aliquatenus per corpus deprimebatur, licet non tantum sicut post peccatum. Ergo retardabatur a visione essentiae divinae, ad quam requiritur perfectissima dispositio mentis. 3. When the soul is weighed down by the burden of the flesh, it loses distinct knowledge of things. Hence, Boethius says: “Retaining the sum total, it loses the individuals.” But in the state of innocence man’s soul was weighed down to some extent by the body, although not as much as after sin. Therefore, he was withheld from sight of the divine essence, for which the mind must be most perfectly disposed.
Praeterea, esse viatorem et comprehensorem simul, soli Christo est proprium. Sed Adam in statu innocentiae viator erat; quod patuit ex hoc quod peccare potuit; ergo non fuit comprehensor, et ita Deum per essentiam non vidit. 4. It is proper to Christ alone to be wayfarer and possessor at the same time. But in the state of innocence Adam was a wayfarer, as is clear from the fact that he could sin. Hence, he was not a possessor, and so did not see God through His essence.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod quidam dixerunt, quod Deum per essentiam videre non solum contingit in patria, sed etiam in via, quamvis non ita perfecte in via sicut in patria. Secundum hoc homo in statu innocentiae mediam visionem habuit inter visionem beatorum et visionem hominum post peccatum; quia minus perfecte vidit quam beati, perfectius autem quam homo post peccatum videre potuerit. Some have said that there is sight of God through His essence not only in heavcn but also in this life, although not as perfectly in this life as in heaven. According to this opinion, man in the state of innocence had a sight midway between the sight of the blessed and the sight of man after the fall. For he saw less perfectly than the blessed, but more perfectly than man can see after the fall.
Sed istud dictum est contrarium Scripturae testimoniis, quae concorditer in divina visione beatitudinem hominis ultimam ponunt; unde ex hoc ipso quod aliquis Deum per essentiam videt, beatus est. Et sic nullus adhuc in via ad beatitudinem existens, Deum per essentiam videre potuit, nec etiam ipse Adam in statu innocentiae, ut communis opinio habet. Cuius etiam veritas ratione ostendi potest. But this position is contrary to the testimony of Scripture, which consistently makes the sight of God man’s final beatitude. Hence, from the very fact that a man sees God through His essence he is blessed. Thus, as the common opinion maintains, no one still on the way to beatitude can see God through His essence, not even Adam in the state of innocence. And reason can show the truth of this.
Cuiuslibet enim naturae est aliquod ultimum assignare, in quo eius ultima perfectio consistit. Hominis autem, in quantum homo, est perfectio non consistit nisi in actu intellectus, ex quo habet quod homo sit. In operatione autem intellectus possunt differentes gradus distingui dupliciter. Uno modo ex diversitate intelligibilium. Quanto enim quis excellentius intelligibile intelligit, tanto excellentior est eius intelligentia; unde, ut dicitur in X Ethic., perfectissima operatio intellectus est intellectus bene dispositi ad optimum intelligibile; sicut et pulcherrima visio corporalis est visus bene dispositi ad pulcherrimum sub visu iacentium. Alio modo in operatione intellectus accipiuntur gradus ex modo intelligendi. Possibile est enim unum et idem intelligibile a diversis diversimode intelligi, ab uno perfectius, ab alio minus perfecte. For every nature has something ultimate in which its final perfection consists. Now, the perfection of man, in so far as he is man, consists only in the act of understanding, by which he is constituted man. However, in the activity of understanding different levels can be distinguished in two ways. In one they derive from the diversity of intelligible objects. For, as the intelligible object which a person understands is more noble, so the more noble is his intelligence. For this reason, the Ethics says that the most perfect activity of understanding is the activity of that understanding which is well ordered to the best intelligible thing, just as the most beautiful physical sight is that of the sight “which is well ordered to the most beautiful object of sight.” In the other way, levels in the activity of understanding derive from the manner of understanding. For it is possible for one and the same intelligible object to be understood differently by different minds, more perfectly by one, and less perfectly by another.
Non est autem possibile ut ultimus terminus perfectionis humanae accipiatur secundum aliquem modum intelligendi: quia in istis modis intelligendi possunt considerari infiniti gradus, quorum unus alio perfectius intelligit. Nec est aliquis ita perfecte intelligens quo non possit excogitari alium perfectius intelligere nisi Deus qui infinita limpiditate omnia intelligit. Unde oportet quod ultimus terminus humanae perfectionis sit in intelligendo aliquod perfectissimum intelligibile, quod est essentia divina. However, it is not possible for the final limit of human perfection to be taken according to some manner of understanding, for among these modes of understanding one can perceive an infinite number of levels, one of which understands more perfectly than another. Nor is there any one who understands so perfectly that it is impossible to devise another who understands more perfectly, except God, who understands everything with infinite clarity. Hence, the final term of human perfection must lie in the understanding of some most perfect intelligible object, which is the divine essence.
In hoc igitur unaquaeque rationalis creatura beata est, quod essentiam Dei videt, non ex hoc quod ita limpide, vel plus vel minus eam videt. Non igitur visio beati a visione viatoris distinguitur per hoc quod est perfectius et minus perfecte videre, sed per hoc quod est videre et non videre. Et ideo cum Adam fuerit adhuc in via ad beatitudinem, Deum per essentiam non vidit. Accordingly, every rational creature finds its beatitude in this, that it sees the essence of God, and not in this, that it sees it with such a degree of clarity, or more or less. Consequently, the sight of the blessed is not distinguished from the sight of those in this life because the former see more perfectly and the latter less perfectly, but because the former see and the latter do not see. Therefore, since Adam was still on the way to beatitude, he did not see God through His essence.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod in aliqua visione triplex medium considerari potest: unum est medium sub quo videtur; aliud quo videtur, quod est species rei visae; aliud a quo accipitur cognitio rei visae. Sicut in visione corporali medium sub quo videtur, est lumen, quo aliquid fit actu visibile, et visus perficitur ad videndum; medium vero quo videtur, est ipsa species rei sensibilis in oculo existens, quae, sicut forma videntis in quantum est videns, principium est visivae operationis; medium autem a quo accipitur cognitio rei visae, est sicut speculum, a quo interdum species alicuius visibilis, ut puta lapidis, fit in oculo, non immediate ab ipso lapide. 1. In a given sight a threefold medium can be discerned. One is the medium under which it is seen; the second that by which it is seen, and this is the intentional likeness of the thing seen; the third is that from which one obtains knowledge of the thing seen. Thus, for instance, in bodily sight the medium under which a thing is seen is light, by which the thing becomes actually visible and the power of sight is given the perfection of seeing. The medium by which a thing is seen is the sensible species itself of the thing existing in the eye, which, as the form of the one seeing in so far as he is seeing, is the principle of the activity of sight. And the medium from which one receives knowledge of a thing seen is like a mirror, from which the eye at times receives the species of some visible thing, for example, a stone, and not from the stone itself.
Et haec tria etiam in visione intellectuali inveniuntur: ut lumini corporali respondeat lumen intellectus agentis, quasi medium sub quo intellectus videt; speciei vero visibili species intelligibilis, qua intellectus possibilis fit actu intelligens; medio vero a quo accipitur visi cognitio, sicut a speculo, comparatur effectus a quo in cognitionem causae devenimus; ita enim similitudo causae nostro intellectui imprimitur non immediate ex causa, sed ex effectu, in quo similitudo causae resplendet. Unde huiusmodi cognitio dicitur specularis propter similitudinem quam habet ad visionem quae fit per speculum. We find these three in intellectual sight, too. Thus, the light of the agent intellect corresponds to physical light as the medium under which our understanding sees. The intelligible species, by which the possible intellect is made actually to understand, corresponds to the visible species. And, finally, the effects from which we come to a knowledge of a cause correspond to the medium from which knowledge of the thing seen is obtained, as from a mirror. For the likeness of the cause is not imprinted on our understanding directly by the cause, but by the effect, in which a likeness of the cause shines forth. Consequently, this type of knowledge is called “mirrored” knowledge because of the likeness which it has to sight which takes place through a mirror.
Homo igitur in statu post peccatum ad cognoscendum Deum indiget medio, quod est quasi speculum, in quo resultat ipsius Dei similitudo. Oportet enim ut per ea quae facta sunt, in invisibilia eius deveniamus, ut dicitur Rom. I, 20. Hoc autem medio non indigebat homo in statu innocentiae. Indigebat autem medio quod est quasi species rei visae; quia per aliquod spirituale lumen menti hominis influxum divinitus, quod erat quasi similitudo expressa lucis increatae, Deum videbat. Therefore, to know God, man, as he is after the fall, needs a medium which is like a mirror, in which there arises a likeness of God himself. For we must reach “the invisible things of him... by the things that are made,” according to Romans (1:20). Man in the state of innocence, however, did not need this medium, but he did need a medium which is somewhat like the species of the thing seen, because he saw God through a spiritual light which was given to the human mind by God, and which was a kind of expressed likeness of the uncreated light.
Sed hoc medio non indigebit in patria, quia ipsam Dei essentiam per seipsam videbit, non per aliquam eius similitudinem vel intelligibilem vel sensibilem, cum nulla creata similitudo adeo perfecte Deum possit repraesentare, ut per eam videns ipsam essentiam Dei cognoscere aliquis possit. Indigebit tamen lumine gloriae in patria, quod erit quasi medium sub quo videtur, secundum illud Psalm. XXXV, 10: in lumine tuo videbimus lumen, eo quod ista visio nulli creaturae est naturalis, sed soli Deo: unde nulla creatura in eam ex sua natura potest pertingere; sed ad eam consequendam oportet quod illustretur lumine divinitus emisso. But he will not need this medium in heaven, because he will see the essence of God in itself and not through any intelligible or sensible likeness of it, since no created likeness can so perfectly represent God that one who sees through it can know the essence of God. Yet, he will need the light of glory, which will be a kind of medium under which God is seen, according to Psalms (3 5:10): “In your light we shall see light.” The reason for this is that this sight is not natural to any creature, but only to God. As a result, no creature can reach it by his own natural power, but to acquire it one must be enlightened by a divinely given light.
Secunda autem visio, quae est per medium, quod est species, naturalis est Angelo; sed est supra naturam hominis. Unde ad eam indiget lumine gratiae. The second sight, through a medium which is an intentional likeness, is natural to the angels, but above human nature. Accordingly, for it man needs the light of grace.
Tertia vero est competens naturae hominis; et ideo ea sola sibi relinquitur post peccatum. The third sight is proper to human nature; hence, it alone remains in man after the fall. Therefore, it is clear that the sight by which man in the state of innocence saw God was midway between the sight which we now have and the sight of the blessed.
Et ideo patet quod visio qua homo Deum in statu innocentiae vidit, media fuit inter visionem qua nunc videmus, et visionem beatorum. Patet igitur quod homo post peccatum triplici medio indiget ad videndum Deum: scilicet ipsa creatura, ex qua in divinam cognitionem ascendit; et similitudine ipsius Dei, quam ex creatura accipit; et lumine, quo perficitur ad hoc ut in Deum dirigatur: sive sit lumen naturae, ut intellectus agentis, sive gratiae, ut lumen fidei vel sapientiae. In statu vero ante peccatum indigebat duplici medio: scilicet medio quod est similitudo Dei; et quod est lumen elevans vel dirigens mentem. Beati autem uno tantum medio indigent, scilicet lumine gloriae elevante mentem. Ipse autem Deus seipsum videt absque omni medio, ipse enimmet est lumen quo seipsum videt. Accordingly, it is clear that after the fall man needs a triple medium to see God: creatures themselves, from which he rises to knowledge of God; a likeness of God, which he gets from creatures; and a light from which he receives the perfection of being directed toward God. This light may be the light of nature, such as the light of the agent intellect, or the light of grace, such as that of faith and wisdom. In the state before the fall, however, he needed a double medium: one which is a likeness of God, and one which is a light elevating and directing his mind. The blessed, however, need only one medium, the light of glory which elevates the mind. And God sees Himself without any medium, for He Himself is the light by which He sees Himself.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod Magister non removet quin per aliquam similitudinem creatam quasi per medium Deus in statu innocentiae videretur; sed quia non indigebat ad hoc medio visibilis creaturae. 2. The Master does not reject the possibility of seeing God in the state of innocence through some likeness of a creature as a medium, but only the necessity of the medium of visible creation.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod Adam in statu innocentiae non videbat gaudia caelestis curiae ut comprehenderet quae vel quanta essent, hoc enim solum beatorum est; sed cognoscebat de eis an sint, per hoc quod eorum aliquam participationem habebat. 3. In the state of innocence Adam did not perceive the joys of the heavenly court so that he understood what and how great they were, for this belongs only to the blessed. However, he did know that they existed, because he, had some participation of them.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod Deus in contemplatione videtur per medium, quod est lumen sapientiae, mentem elevans ad divina cernenda; non autem ut ipsa divina essentia immediate videatur: et sic per gratiam videtur etiam a contemplativis post statum peccati, quamvis perfectius in statu innocentiae. 4. In contemplation, God is seen through a medium which is the light of wisdom. This elevates the mind to the sight of things divine, not, however, to immediate vision of the divine essence itself. And it is in this way that God is seen through grace by the contemplatives after the fall, although He is seen more perfectly in the state of innocence.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod homo factus erat ad videndum Deum non in principio, sed in ultimo suae perfectionis; et ideo quod in principio suae conditionis Deum per essentiam non vidit, non fuit ex hoc quod aliquo obstaculo impediretur; sed solum proprio defectu, quia nondum ei inerat perfectio illa quae requiritur ad videndum divinam essentiam. 5. Man was made to see God, not in the beginning but in the last stage of his perfection. Therefore, that he did not see God through His essence at the beginning of his existence was not the result of being hindered by some obstacle, but only the result of his own imperfection, because he did not then have that perfection which is needed to see the divine essence.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod Adam in statu innocentiae desiderabat Deum per essentiam videre; sed eius desiderium erat ordinatum: ad hoc enim tendebat ut videret Deum, quando tempus esset. Unde ex hoc quod Deum ante tempus debitum non videbat, nulla ei afflictio inerat. 6. In the state of innocence Adam desired to see God through His essence, but that desire of his was well ordered. For he strove to see God when it would be time for him to do so. Hence, he did not suffer at all at not seeing God before the proper time.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod mens nostra dicitur immediate formari ab ipsa prima veritate, non quin eam cognoscat interdum mediante aliquo habitu vel specie vel creatura; sed per modum quo exemplatum formatur ad suum exemplar immediatum. Posuerunt enim quidam, ut patet per Dionysium de Divin. Nomin., superiora in entibus esse inferiorum exemplaria, et ita animam hominis a Deo procedere mediante Angelo, et ad exemplar divinum formari mediante angelico exemplari. Quod quidem ex verbis inductis removetur. Ipsa enim humana mens immediate a Deo creatur, et immediate ab ipso sicut ab exemplari formatur; et per hoc etiam immediate in ipso sicut in fine beatificatur. 7. Our mind is said to be formed immediately by the first truth itself, not because [there is question whether] it knows the first truth at times through the mediation of some habit, species, or creature, but because it is formed by it as a copy is formed to the likeness of its immediate exemplar. For some have held, as Dionysius points out, that among beings the higher are the models for the lower, and thus the soul of man proceeds from God through the mediation of angels, and is formed to the divine model through the mediation of an angelic model. The passage cited denies this, for the human mind is created immediately by God and formed immediately by Himself as its exemplar. For this reason, also, it achieves beatitude immediately in Him as its end.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod quamvis Deus sit per se maxime intelligibilis, et adesset menti hominis in statu innocentiae, non tamen aderat ei ut intelligibilis forma; quia intellectus hominis nondum habebat illam perfectionem quae ad hoc requiritur. 8. Although, intrinsically, God is completely intelligible, and was present to the mind of man in the state of innocence, He was not there as an intelligible form. For man’s understanding did not yet have the perfection needed for this.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod superioris rationis obiectum, secundum conditionem naturae, non est ipsa divina essentia, sed rationes quaedam a Deo in mentem profluentes, et etiam a creaturis acceptae, quibus ad aeterna conspicienda perficimur. 9. The object of higher reason according to its natural state is not the divine essence itself, but certain intelligible characters which flow into. the mind from God and are received from creatures. By these we are brought to the perfection of sight of eternal things.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod immediatum principium et proximum quo ea quae sunt in potentia, fiunt intelligibilia actu, est intellectus agens; sed primum principium quo omnia intelligibilia fiunt, est ipsa lux increata. Et ita ipsa essentia divina comparatur ad intelligibilia, sicut substantia solis ad visibilia corporalia. Non est autem necesse ut ille qui videt colorem aliquem, videat substantiam solis; sed ut videat lumen solis, prout eo color illustratur. Similiter etiam non est necessarium ut ille qui cognoscit aliquod intelligibile, videat essentiam divinam; sed quod percipiat lumen intelligibile, quod a Deo originaliter manat, prout ipso est aliquid intelligibile actu. 10. The agent intellect is the immediate and proximate principle by which things which are potentially intelligible become actually intelligible. But the first principle by which all things become intelligible is uncreated light itself. Thus, the divine essence is compared to intelligible things as the substance of the sun is to visible bodies. However, it is not necessary for one who sees some color to see the substance of the sun, but only the light of the sun, in so far as it illumines color. Similarly, it is not necessary for one who knows some intelligible thing to see the divine essence, but only to perceive intelligible light, which originally derives from God, in so far as by it something is made actually intelligible.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod dictum Damasceni non est intelligendum quod Adam simpliciter beatus esset; sed quadam beatitudine quae illi statui competebat; sicut etiam et in statu miseriae aliqui dicuntur secundum quid beati ratione alicuius perfectionis in eis existentis, Matth., V, 5: beati pauperes spiritu et cetera. 11. We should not take what Damascene says to mean that Adam was one of the blessed simply, but that he had the kind of beatitude which fitted his state. Similarly, in the state of affliction some are said to be blessed in some respect by reason of some perfection which exists in them, as in Matthew (5:3): “Blessed are the poor in spirit...”
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod etiam Angelus in statu naturae conditae non vidit Deum per essentiam; sed hoc ei competit solum per gloriam. Adam autem in statu innocentiae per gratiam habuit illum modum visionis quem Angelus habet per naturam, ut dictum est; et ideo dicitur sicut alter Angelus vidisse. 12. Even the angels in the state of their original nature did not see God through His essence; this belonged to them only through glory. But in the state of innocence Adam had through grace the kind of sight which the angels had naturally, as has been said. Therefore, he is said to have seen as another angel.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod Moyses et Paulus ex quadam privilegiata gratia Deum per essentiam viderant. Et tamen, quamvis simpliciter adhuc essent in statu viae, secundum quid tamen, prout Deum per essentiam videbant, non erant in statu viae. Et ideo etiam Adae secundum statum innocentiae, in quo adhuc viator erat, non competebat Deum per essentiam videre. Si tamen per aliquem raptum ad hoc fuerit elevatus supra communem cognitionem, quae tunc ei competebat, ut Deum per essentiam videret, inconveniens non est; cum talis gratia ita conferri potuerit homini in statu innocentiae sicut homini et post statum peccati. 13. By a certain privilege of grace Moses and Paul saw God through His essence. Still, although simply they were in the state of wayfarers, in some respect, that is, in so far as they saw God through His essence, they were not in that state. Therefore in the state of innocence, in which he was still a wayfarer, Adam had no claim to vision of God through His essence. Yet, if by a rapture he was raised above the ordinary knowledge which belonged to him, and so saw God through His essence, it is not strange, for such a grace can be given just as well in the state of innocence as after the fall.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod si intelligamus talem extasim Adae fuisse qualis fuit raptus Pauli: tunc dicemus, quod illa visio erat supra communem modum visionis qui ei tunc competebat. Sed quia non expresse habetur quod in illo sopore Deum per essentiam viderit, possumus dicere quod in illa extasi elevatus fuit non ad ipsam Dei essentiam videndam, sed ad cognoscenda quaedam profundiora de divinis mysteriis quam secundum communem modum humanae cognitionis tunc sibi competeret. 14. If we maintain that Adam’s ecstasy was of the same nature as Paul’s rapture, then we will say that that vision surpassed the ordinary manner of sight which then belonged to him. But, since it does not explicitly say that in that sleep he saw God through His essence, we can say that in that ecstasy he was not elevated to a vision of the essence of God, but to a knowledge of certain more profound truths about the divine mysteries than was fitting for him to know at that time according to the common manner of human cognition.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod Paradisus spiritualis, prout perfectam delectationem designat, quae beatum facit, in Dei visione consistit sed prout simpliciter delectationem de Deo habitam designat, in qualicumque contemplatione Dei Paradisus spiritualis consistit. 15. Spiritual paradise, in so far as it means perfect delight, which makes one blessed, consists in the sight of God. But, in so far as it means delight about God without qualification, it consists in any kind of contemplation which has God as its object.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod non fuisset bona et ordinata voluntas, si desiderasset tunc habere quod tunc ei non competebat; et propter hoc ratio non sequitur. 16. His will would not have been good and well ordered if he had desired to have at that time what did not then belong to him. For this reason, the conclusion does not follow.
Q. 17: The Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence

ARTICLE II

In the second article we ask:
Did man in the state of innocence see god through creatures?

[ARTICLE II Sent., 2 3, 2, 1; S.T., I, 94, 1.]
Secundo quaeritur utrum homo in statu innocentiae Deum per creaturas viderit Difficulties
Et videtur quod non. It seems that he did not, for
Cognoscere enim Deum per creaturam, est cognoscere causam per effectum. Haec autem est collativa sive venativa cognitio; quae, cum languida et imperfecta sit, homini in statu innocentiae non competebat. Ergo Adam in statu innocentiae non vidit Deum per creaturas. 1. To know God through creatures is to know a cause through an effect. But this is knowledge which involves comparison and investigation, and, since this is feeble and imperfect, it did not befit man in the state of innocence. Therefore, in the state of innocence Adam did not see God through creatures.
Praeterea, remota causa, removetur effectus. Sed Isidorus assignat hanc causam quare homo Deum per creaturas vidit, quia a creatore aversus ad creaturas se convertit; quod tunc in statu innocentiae nondum erat. Ergo tunc Deum per creaturas homo non videbat. 2. When the cause is removed the effect is removed. But Isidore says that the cause why man sees God through creatures is that he turned from the Creator and toward creatures. This was not yet so at that time in the state of innocence. Therefore, at that time man did not see God through creatures.
Praeterea, secundum Hugonem de sancto Victore homo in statu illo Deum cognoscebat per praesentiam contemplationis. Sed in contemplatione videtur sine medio creaturae. Ergo Deum non videbat per creaturas. 3. According to Hugh of St. Victor, man in that state knew God, contemplating Him as present.” But He is seen in contemplation without the medium of creatures. Therefore, he did not see God through creatures.
Praeterea, Isidorus dicit, quod Angelus, ante omnem creaturam factus, Deum per creaturam non cognovit. Sed homo in statu innocentiae sicut alter Angelus Deum vidit, secundum Damascenum. Ergo nec ipse Deum ex creaturis cognovit. 4. Isidore says that the angels, created before the rest of creation, did not know God through creatures. But, according to Damascene, man in the state of innocence saw God as another angel. Therefore, he did not know God from creatures.
Praeterea, tenebra non est ratio cognoscendi lucem. Sed omnis creatura creatori comparata, est tenebra. Ergo creator per creaturam cognosci non potest. 5. Darkness is not the reason for knowing light. But, compared to the Creator, every creature is darkness. Therefore, the Creator cannot be known through creatures.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in VIII super Genes. ad litteram: forte, inquam, sic cum eis loquebatur, scilicet, primis parentibus, etsi non tanta participatione divinae sapientiae quantam capiunt Angeli, tamen pro humano modulo quantumlibet minus, sed ipso genere visitationis et locutionis. Ex quo videtur posse accipi, quod homo in statu innocentiae illo genere cognitionis Deum cognoscebat quo Angeli cognoscunt. Sed Angeli non cognoscunt Deum per creaturas, ut patet per Augustinum, II super Genes. ad Litt., et per Dionysium cap. de Divin. Nom. Ergo homo in statu innocentiae Deum per creaturas non cognoscebat. 6. Augustine says: “I say that perhaps He spoke with them [our first parents] in this way, although not with the same degree of participation in the divine wisdom as the angels possess, yet, with whatever greater limitations imposed by human nature, within the same general category of vision and conversation. “ From this it seems that we can conclude that man in the state of innocence knew God with the same mode of knowledge with which the angels know him. But angels do not know God through creatures, as is clear in Augustine and Dionysius. Therefore, man in the state of innocence did not see God through creatures.
Praeterea, anima hominis similior est Deo quam aliqua sensibilis creatura. Ergo quando anima hominis in sua puritate erat, non tendebat ad Dei cognitionem per visibilem creaturam. 7. The soul of man is more like God than is any sensible creature, Therefore, when the soul of man was in its purity, it did not seek knowledge of God through visible creation.
Praeterea, posita cognitione perfectiori, superfluit minus perfecta. Sed homo in statu innocentiae per praesentiam contemplationis Deum cognoscebat, ut patet per auctoritatem inductam Hugonis de sancto Victore. Ergo Deum per creaturas non cognovit. 8. Less perfect knowledge is superfluous when more perfect is given. But, as Hugh of St. Victor says,” man in the state of innocence knew God “as present in contemplation.” Therefore, he did not know God through creatures.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Est quod Damascenus dicit II Lib., quod Adam in Paradiso corporali constitutus est, ubi per creaturas suum creatorem consideraret. Damascene says that Adam was established in a bodily paradise that there he might view his Creator through creatures.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod ad evidentiam huius quaestionis sciendum est, quod secundum Boetium in libro de consolatione, natura a perfectis principium sumit. Quod etiam in operibus divinis considerari potest. In quolibet enim eius opere ea quae prima sunt, perfectionem habent. Unde, cum in statu innocentiae constitueretur Adam ab ipso ut totius humani generis principium, non solum ut a quo natura humana propagaretur in posteros, sed etiam qui in alios originalem iustitiam transfunderet, oportet ponere hominem in statu innocentiae duplicem perfectionem habuisse: unam quidem naturalem, aliam autem gratis a Deo concessam supra debitum naturalium principiorum. For a clear understanding of this question we must bear in mind that, according to Boethius, nature begins with perfect things. This can be seen in divine works, for in any work of God the things which are first are perfect. Hence, since in the state of innocence God made Adam the source of the whole human race, not only to transmit human nature to posterity but also to pass on original justice to others, man in the state of innocence must be considered as having had a twofold perfection. One of these is natural and the other is given freely by God over and above what is due from natural principles.
Secundum autem naturalem perfectionem sibi competere non poterat ut Deum cognosceret nisi ex creaturis: quod sic patet. In nullo enim genere potentia passiva se extendit nisi ad illa ad quae se extendit potentia activa; et ideo dicit Commentator, IX Metaph., quod non est aliqua potentia passiva in natura cui non respondeat activa. According to natural perfection, however, man could fittingly know God only from creation. This is clear from the following. In any genus a passive power extends only to those things to which an active power extends. Therefore, the Commentator says” that there is no passive power in nature for which there is not a corresponding active power.
In natura autem humana duplex potentia ad intelligendum invenitur: una quasi passiva, quae est intellectus possibilis; alia quasi activa, quae est intellectus agens; et ideo intellectus possibilis secundum naturalem viam non est in potentia nisi ad illas formas quae per intellectum agentem actu intelligibiles fiunt. Hae autem non sunt nisi formae sensibilium rerum, quae a phantasmatibus abstrahuntur. Nam substantiae immateriales sunt intelligibiles per seipsas, non quia nos eas intelligibiles faciamus. Et ideo intellectus possibilis noster non potest se extendere ad aliqua intelligibilia nisi per illas formas quas a phantasmatibus abstrahit; et inde est quod nec Deum nec substantias alias immateriales cognoscere possumus naturaliter nisi per res sensibiles. In human nature, however, there is a double power for understanding: one passive, which is the possible intellect, and the other active, which is the agent intellect. Consequently, the possible intellect according to the natural process is in potency only to those forms which become actually intelligible through the agent intellect. But these are only the forms of sensible things which are abstracted from phantasms’ For immaterial substances are intelligible of themselves and not because we make them intelligible. Therefore, our possible intellect cannot reach any intelligible objects except through those forms which it abstracts from phantasms. Thus it is that by our natural power we can know God and’ other immaterial substances only through sensible things.
Sed ex perfectione gratiae hoc habebat homo in statu innocentiae ut Deum cognosceret per inspirationem internam ex irradiatione divinae sapientiae; per quem modum Deum cognoscebat non ex visibilibus creaturis, sed ex quadam spirituali similitudine suae menti impressa. But, in the state of innocence, man, by reason of the perfection of grace, received a knowledge of God by means of an internal inspiration due to the irradiation of divine wisdom. In this way he did not know God from visible creation but from a spiritual likeness imprinted on his mind.
Ita igitur in homine duplex Dei cognitio erat: una qua cognoscebat Deum conformiter Angelis per inspirationem internam; alia qua cognoscebat Deum conformiter nobis per sensibiles creaturas. Differebat tamen haec eius secunda cognitio a cognitione nostra, sicut differt inquisitio habentis habitum scientiae, qui ex notis considerat ea quae ante noverat, ab inquisitione addiscentis qui ex notis ad ignota nititur pervenire. Nos enim aliter Deum notum habere non possumus, nisi ex creaturis ad eius notitiam veniamus. Adam vero Deum aliter sibi notum, scilicet per illustrationem internam, ex creaturis considerabat. Accordingly, there were thus in man two kinds of knowledge of God, one, by which he knew God as the angels do, through an internal inspiration; the other, by which he knew God as we do, through sensible creatures. However, this second knowledge of his differed from our knowledge as the investigation of one who has the habit of a science and proceeds from things he knows to a consideration of things which he had once known differs from the investigation of one who is learning and strives to proceed from what he knows to things which he does not know. However, we cannot have knowledge of God any other way except by coming to know Him from creatures. But Adam, who already knew God in a different way, that is, through an internal inspiration, also possessed a knowledge of Him from creatures.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod illa cognitio collativa qua ex notis in ignota devenimus, imperfectionem habet, cum per eam aliquid quasi ignoratum quaeratur. Talis autem non fuit illa collativa cognitio qua homo in statu innocentiae utebatur. Nihil tamen prohibet dicere, quin etiam aliquid imperfectum homini in illo statu competebat, non quidem quantum ad id quod debetur suae naturae, sed per comparationem ad naturam digniorem: non enim fuit tantae perfectionis humana natura in sua conditione, quanta angelica vel divina. 1. That process of reasoning by which we reach the unknown from the known includes imperfection, since through it what is sought is unknown. But the process of reasoning which man in the state of innocence made use of was not of that sort. However, there is nothing to prevent us from saying that something [im]perfect belonged to man in that state, not indeed [im]perfect in that which was due to his nature, but by comparison with a higher nature. For, when human nature was created, it did not have as much perfection as an angelic nature or the divine nature.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod hoc quod Isidorus dicit, causa est quare homo necesse habebat ex creaturis cognitionem Dei, quasi ignoti, accipere; et hoc homo in statu innocentiae non indigebat, ut dictum est, in corp. art. 2. What Isidore says gives the reason why man had of necessity to get his knowledge of God, as an unknown, from creatures. Man in the state of innocence did not need this, as has been said.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod praeter illam contemplationem cognitionis, habebat aliam Dei notitiam qua eum ex creaturis cognoscebat, ut dictum est. 3. Besides the knowledge of contemplation, he had another knowledge of God by which he knew Him from creatures, as was said above.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod Adam conformabatur Angelo in cognitione contemplationis per gratiam; sed praeter hoc habebat aliam cognitionem suae naturae competentem, ut dictum est. 4. Through grace, Adam was like an angel in the knowledge of contemplation. But besides this he had another knowledge belonging to his nature, as has been said.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod creatura est tenebra in quantum est ex nihilo; in quantum vero est a Deo, similitudinem aliquam eius participat, et sic in eius similitudinem ducit. 5. Creatures are darkness in so far as they are from nothing, but, in so far as they are from God, they participate in some likeness of Him and thus lead to His likeness.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de illa cognitione quae est per inspirationem divinam. Quod patet ex hoc quod de locutione Dei ibi mentionem facit, nec omnino tacet de alio cognitionis modo, unde subiungit: fortassis etiam illo locutionis genere. Deus ei loquebatur, qui fit per creaturam, sive in extasi spiritus corporalibus imaginibus, sive ipsis sensibus corporis aliqua specie praesentata. 6. There, Augustine is talking of that knowledge which is had through divine inspiration. This is clear from the fact that he mentions there the speech of God, and is not altogether silent about the other mode of knowledge, when he adds: “Perhaps, also, God spoke to him with that manner of speaking which takes place through creatures,” whether by images of bodies in ecstasy of spirit, or by some image presented to the senses of the body themselves.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod anima quamvis sit Deo similior quam alia creatura, non tamen in cognitionem suae naturae, ut eam a ceteris discernat, potest pervenire nisi ex sensibilibus creaturis, a quibus nostra cognitio ortum habet. 7. Although the soul is more like God than any other creature is, it cannot reach a knowledge of His nature so that it can distinguish it from other things except through sensible creatures, from which our knowledge takes its origin.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod quamvis Adam Deum viderit per lumen contemplationis, non tamen superfluit illa cognitio qua Deum ex creaturis consideravit: ut scilicet idem pluribus modis cognosceret; et quod non solum gratuitam cognitionem, sed etiam naturalem haberet. 8. Although Adam saw God through the light of contemplation, the knowledge by which he saw God by means of creatures was not superfluous, that is to say, it was not superfluous that he knew the same thing in several ways, and that he had not only gratuitous but also natural knowledge.
Q. 17: The Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence

ARTICLE III

In the third article we ask:
Did Adam in the state of innocence have faith about God?

[ARTICLE II Sent., 29, 3; S.T., I, 95, 3; II-II, 5, 1.]
Tertio quaeritur utrum Adam in statu innocentiae fidem de Deo habuerit Difficulties Et videtur quod non.
It seems that he did not, for
Cognitio enim fidei est cognitio aenigmatica, ut patet I Cor., cap. XIII, 12: videmus nunc per speculum et cetera. Sed Adam in statu innocentiae habuit visionem non aenigmaticam, sed apertam. Ergo fidem non habuit. 1. The knowledge of faith is obscure knowledge, as is clear in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:12): “We see now in a glass...” But in the state of innocence Adam had plain, not obscure, knowledge. Therefore, he did not have faith.
Praeterea, Hugo de sancto Victore dicit, quod cognovit creatorem suum non ea cognitione qua modo a credentibus absens fide quaeritur. Ergo idem quod prius. 2. Hugh of St. Victor says: “He knew his Creator not with the knowledge with which believers now seek their absent Creator by faith.” We conclude as before.
Praeterea, Gregorius, in IV Dialog., dicit: fides illis competit qui ea quae credenda sunt, per experimentum cognoscere non possunt. Adam autem, ut ibidem dicitur, per experimentum cognovit ea quae nos credimus. Ergo fidem non habuit. 3. Gregory says that faith belongs to him “who cannot know by experience” the things which must be believed. But, as is said in the same place, Adam knew by experience what we believe. Therefore, he did not have faith.
Praeterea, fides non solum est de creatore, sed etiam de redemptore. Sed Adam in statu innocentiae nihil videtur cognovisse de redemptore, quia sui casus praescius non fuit, sine quo redemptio non fuisset. Ergo Adam fidem tunc (non) habuit. 4. Faith concerns not only the Creator but also the Redeemer. But in the state of innocence Adam seems to have known nothing about the Redeemer, because he did not foresee his fall, without which there would have been no redemption. Therefore, Adam did not have faith.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Est quod Augustinus dicit, Lib. XIV de civitate Dei, quod Adam in statu innocentiae habuit caritatem de corde puro et conscientia bona et fide non ficta. Ergo fidem habuit. 1. Augustine says that in the state of innocence Adam had “the charity of a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned.”
Praeterea, habuit omnes virtutes, ut Magister dicit in II Sent., dist. 29. Ergo et fidem. 2. As the Master says, he had all the virtues. Therefore, he also had faith.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod Adam in primo statu fidem habuit: quod quidem apparet si obiectum fidei consideremus. Ipsa enim veritas prima, prout est non apparens, est fidei obiectum; dico autem non apparens neque per speciem, sicut beatis apparet, neque per naturalem rationem, sicut aliquibus philosophis de Deo sunt nota, ut eum esse intelligentem et incorporeum et alia huiusmodi. Adam autem non solum sciebat illa de Deo quae naturali ratione cognosci possunt, sed etiam amplius; nec tamen ad videndum Dei essentiam pervenerat: unde constat quod de Deo cognitionem fidei habebat. In his first state, Adam had faith. This becomes evident if we consider the object of faith. For the object of faith is the first truth itself, in so far as it is not evident. Moreover, I say not evident, either through an intentional likeness, as it appears to the blessed, or through natural reason, as some things about God are known to some philosophers, as that He is intelligible, incorporeal, and so on. Adam, however, knew not only what can be known about God by natural reason, but even more. However, he did not attain to vision of God through His essence. Consequently, it is clear that he had knowledge of God through faith.
Sed fides est duplex secundum duplicem auditum, et duplicem locutionem. Est enim fides ex auditu, ut dicitur Rom., X, 17. Est enim quaedam locutio exterior, qua nobis Deus per praedicatores loquitur; quaedam autem interior locutio, qua nobis loquitur per internam inspirationem. Dicitur autem ipsa interna inspiratio locutio quaedam ad similitudinem exterioris locutionis: sicut enim in exteriori locutione proferimus ad audientem non ipsam rem quam notificare cupimus, sed signum illius rei, scilicet vocem significativam; ita Deus interius inspirando non exhibet essentiam suam ad videndum, sed aliquod suae essentiae signum, quod est aliqua spiritualis similitudo suae sapientiae. But faith is twofold, according to a twofold hearing and a twofold speaking. For “faith cometh by hearing,” as is said in Romans (10:17). Now, there is an external speaking, by which God speaks to us through preachers, and an interior speaking, by which He speaks to us through an internal inspiration. This internal inspiration is called a kind of speaking in view of its likeness to external speaking. For, as in external speaking we present to the hearer not the thing itself which we want to make known but a sign of that thing, that is to say, a word which expresses some meaning; so in internal inspiration it is not His essence which God presents to view, but some sign of His essence, which is some spiritual likeness of His wisdom.
Ab utroque autem auditu fides in cordibus fidelium oritur. Per auditum quidem interiorem in his qui primo fidem acceperunt et docuerunt, sicut in apostolis et prophetis: unde in Psal. LXXXIV, 9: audiam quid loquatur in me dominus Deus. Per secundum vero auditum fides oritur in cordibus aliorum fidelium, qui per alios homines cognitionem fidei accipiunt. Adam autem fidem habuit ut primo fidem edoctus a Deo; et ideo per internam locutionem fidem habere debuit. Faith arises in the hearts of the faithful from both kinds of hearing. By interior hearing it arose in those who first received faith and taught it, as in the Apostles and Prophets. Hence, in Psalms (84:9) we read: “I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me.” But faith arises in the hearts of the rest of the faithful, who receive knowledge of the faith through other men, by the second kind of hearing. Adam, however, had faith, and as one who first learned it from God. Therefore, he should have had faith through interior speaking.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod non habuit ita apertam cognitionem quae sufficeret ad obscuritatem fidei removendam, quae non removetur nisi per hoc quod prima veritas fit apparens. 1. He did not have knowledge so plain that it was enough to remove the obscurity of faith. This is removed only through the appearance of the first truth.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod Hugo a primo homine removet cognitionem fidei talem qualis nobis competit, qui cognitionem fidei habemus non per revelationem nobis factam, sed per hoc quod adhaeremus revelationibus aliis hominibus factis. 2. Hugh denies to the first man the kind of knowledge of faith which belongs to us, who have knowledge of faith, not through a revelation made to us, but through adherence to revelations made to others.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod experimentum illud quod homo habuit non fuit tale quale est eorum qui Deum per essentiam vident, ut prius dictum est; unde non sufficit ad fidem evacuandam. 3. That experience which man had was not the kind which those who see God through His essence have, as has been said earlier. Therefore, it is not enough to make faith superfluous.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod Adam de redemptore non habebat fidem explicite, sed tantum implicite, in quantum credebat Deum sibi sufficienter provisurum in his omnibus quae suae saluti necessaria essent. 4. Adam had only implicit and not explicit faith about the Redeemer in so far as he believed that God would make ample provision for all the things which would be necessary for his salvation.
Q. 17: The Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence

ARTICLE IV

In the fourth article we ask:
Did Adam in the state of innocence have knowledge of all creatures?

[ARTICLE II Sent., 23, 2, 2; S.T., I, 94, 3; II-II, 5, 2, ad 2.]
Quarto quaeritur utrum Adam in statu innocentiae habuerit omnium creaturarum notitiam Difficulties
Et videtur quod non. It seems that he did not, for
Non enim habuit cognitionem futurorum, cum hoc solius Dei sit proprium, secundum illud Isa. XLI, 23: futura annuntietis, et dicemus quia dii estis vos. Sed multa in creaturis futura erant. Ergo non omnium creaturarum cognitionem habuit. 1. He did not have knowledge of futures, since this is proper only to God, according to Isaiah (41:23): “Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods.” But among creatures there were many things which were in the future. Therefore, he did not have knowledge of all creatures.
Praeterea, sicut dicit Avicenna in Lib. VI de Natural., ad hoc sensus exteriores sunt animae humanae necessarii, ut per eos scientiam perfectam rerum capiat. Si igitur anima Adae scientiam omnium rerum habuit ex sua conditione, frustra sensus ei collati fuissent: quod esse non potest, cum in operibus Dei nihil sit frustra. Ergo scientiam omnium non habuit. 2. As Avicenna says, the senses are necessary to the human soul so that through them it may get perfect knowledge of things. Therefore, if the soul of Adam had knowledge of all things from the beginning, his senses would have been given to him to no purpose. But this cannot be, since nothing is to no purpose in the works of God. Therefore, he did not have knowledge of all things.
Praeterea, sicut dicit Boetius in libro V de Consol.: hinc membrorum condita nube, non in totum est oblita sui, summamque tenet, singula perdens. Ubi ostenditur quod anima in principio suae conditionis habet confusam cognitionem, qua sciuntur res in universali; non autem distinctam, qua sciuntur singula in propriis naturis. Si igitur Adam talem cognitionem habuit qualem animam humanam in sui conditione decet habere, videtur quod non habuerit creaturarum cognitionem distincte, sed solum sub confusione quadam. 3. As Boethius says: “Though the mind is born enfolded in the cloud of bodily members, it has not completely forgotten itself, and, while losing the particulars, it retains the sum.” Here it is shown that the soul, when first created, had confused knowledge, by which it knew things in general, but did not have distinct knowledge, by which it knew individual things in their proper natures. Therefore, if Adam had the kind of knowledge which it is fitting for the human soul to have when it is created, it seems that he did not have knowledge of creatures distinctly, but only in a confused way.
Praeterea, cognitio propria de re aliqua non habetur nisi per eius propriam speciem in anima existentem. Sed anima humana, ut habetur ex verbis philosophi in III de anima, est in sui principio sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum. Ergo non potuit habere Adam in principio suae conditionis de creaturis propriam cognitionem. 4. Proper knowledge of a thing is had only through the existence of its proper species in the soul. But, as appears from the Philosopher, when the human soul is created, it is “like a tablet on which nothing is written.” Therefore, when Adam was first created, he could not have proper knowledge of created things.
Sed dicebat, quod quamvis non haberet ex vi naturae, habuit tamen ex dono divino.- Sed contra, omnes homines in sui conditionis principio quantum ad meritum pares sunt, et quantum ad naturam speciei consimiles. Si igitur perfecta rerum cognitio divinitus fuit Adae collata in principio suae conditionis, videtur quod pari ratione omnibus aliis hominibus in sui principio conferretur; quod videmus esse falsum. 5. It was said that, although he did not have this in virtue of his nature, he had it by divine gift.—On the contrary, when first created, all men are equal with respect to merit, and specifically similar to each other. Therefore, if perfect knowledge of things was conferred on Adam by God when he was first created, it seems that with equal reason this is conferred on all other men when they are created. But we see that this is false.
Praeterea, nihil quod movetur ad perfectionem cognitionis est in termino perfectionis. Sed Adam movebatur ad perfectionem cognitionis. Ergo non erat in termino cognitionis, quasi perfectam cognitionem creaturarum habens. Probatio mediae. Intellectus, secundum philosophum in III de anima, nihil est eorum quae sunt, antequam intelligat; postquam autem intelligit, est actu aliquid eorum quae sunt; et ita quandoque est in actu aliquid eorum quae sunt, quandoque non. Omne autem quod hoc modo se habet, est in motu ad actum perfectum. Ergo intellectus humanus in sui principio est in motu ad perfectam cognitionem. Et ita intellectus Adae in sui principio non erat in termino perfectae scientiae, sed in motu ad perfectionem. 6. Nothing which is moved toward the perfection of knowledge is at the term of its perfection. But Adam was moved toward the perfection of knowledge. Therefore, he was not at the term of knowledge, as one who had perfect knowledge of creatures. I prove the minor: According to the Philosopher, before the intellect understands, it is not anything of the things which exist. But, after it understands, it is actually something of those things. Thus, at some time it is actually something of things that exist, and sometimes it is not. But everything which has this kind of existence is on the way to perfect act. Therefore, when first created, the human understanding is on the way to perfect knowledge. Hence, when Adam’s understanding was first created, it was not at the term of perfect knowledge, but on the way to perfection.
Praeterea, hoc pertinet ad excellentiam angelicae naturae quod Angeli mox in sui creatione cognitione omnium rerum naturalium implentur, secundum illud in libro de causis: omnis intelligentia est plena formis. Sed humana natura non pertingit ad excellentiam angelicae naturae. Ergo non fuit competens animae primi hominis statim in sui principio omnium rerum cognitionem habere. 7. For angels to be infused with knowledge of all natural things as soon as they are created is part of the excellence of angelic nature, according to The Causes: “Every intelligence is full of forms.” But human nature does not rise to the excellence of angelic nature. Therefore, it was not fitting for the soul of the first man, when first created, to have knowledge of all things.
Praeterea, impossibile est quod intellectus intelligat nisi quando intellectus fit actu ipsum intelligibile. Sed intellectus humanus non potest simul in actu fieri plura intelligibilia. Ergo non potest simul plura intelligibilia cognoscere; et ita non potuit primus homo simul omnium rerum notitiam habere. 8. It is possible for the intellect to understand only when it actually becomes the intelligible thing. But the human understanding cannot actually become many intelligible things at once. Therefore, neither can it know many intelligible things at once; hence, the first man could not have knowledge of all things at once.
Praeterea, unius perfectibilis est una perfectio, quia una potentia simul non perficitur nisi uno actu unius generis; sicut in materia prima non potest esse nisi una forma substantialis, nec in corpore nisi unus color. Sed intellectus humanus est potentia perfectibilis per habitus scientiarum. Ergo impossibile est quod simul in anima sint plures habitus. Et ita anima Adae non potuit habere omnium rerum scientiam, cum diversae res per diversos habitus cognoscantur. 9. For every subject of perfectibility there is one corresponding perfection, because one power cannot be perfected at one time except by one act of one kind. Thus, in first matter there can be only one substantial form, and in a body only one color. But the human understanding is a power which is perfected by the habits of the sciences. Therefore, it is impossible for many habits to be in the soul at the same time. Consequently, Adam’s soul could not have knowledge of all things, since different things are known through different habits.
Praeterea, si Adam cognovit omnes creaturas, aut cognovit eas in verbo, aut in propria natura, aut in sua intelligentia. Sed non cognovit eas in verbo, quia ista est cognitio beatorum videntium verbum; nec etiam in propria natura, quia nondum erant omnes creaturae in propria natura; nec iterum in propria intelligentia: non enim est contra perfectionem primi status ut superior potentia ab inferiori accipiat, sicut imaginatio a sensu, et sic humanae animae competebat ut intellectus a sensu acciperet; et sic, cum non omnes creaturas percepisset per sensum, non poterant omnes in intelligentia eius esse. Ergo nullo modo omnium creaturarum scientiam habuit. 10. If Adam knew all creatures, he knew them either in the Word, or in their proper natures, or in his intelligence. But he did not know them in the Word, for that is the knowledge of the blessed, who see the Word. Nor did he see them in their proper natures, since all of them did not yet exist in their proper natures. Nor did he see them in his own intelligence, for it is not contrary to the perfection of the first state for a higher power to receive something from a lower power, as imagination from sense. Hence, it was appropriate for the human soul to have the intellect receive from sense. Consequently, since he did not perceive all creatures through sense, it was impossible for all things to be in his intelligence. Therefore, he did not in any way have knowledge of all creatures.
Praeterea, Adam creatus fuit in statu quo proficere posset pari ratione secundum intellectum sicut et secundum affectum. Sed ille qui habet omnium rerum cognitionem, in ea proficere non potest. Ergo non habuit tunc omnium rerum scientiam. 11. Adam was created in a state in which he could with equal reason progress in understanding as well as in affection. But he who has knowledge of all things cannot make progress in that knowledge. Therefore, he did not have knowledge of all things.
Praeterea, Augustinus videtur dicere, Lib. VIII super Genes. ad litteram, quod Adam positus fuit in Paradisum ad operandum, non propter necessitatem, sed propter delectationem agriculturae, quae contingit ex hoc quod cum rerum natura humana ratio quodam modo loquitur, cum positis seminibus, plantatis surculis, tamquam interrogatur quae vis radicis et germinis quid possit, quidve non possit. Sed interrogare naturam de virtute naturae nihil est aliud quam vires naturae ex naturae operibus visis agnoscere. Ergo Adam indigebat accipere notitiam rerum ex rebus; et sic non habebat omnium creaturarum scientiam. 12. Augustine seems to say that Adam was placed in paradise to work, not from necessity but for the pleasure of tilling the soil. This comes from the fact that “human reason in a certain sense converses with physical reality, with the seeds which have been sown, with the shoots which have been planted, as if it asked them what the power of the root and the seed was, what it could do or could not do.” But to ask nature about the power of nature is nothing else but to learn the powers of nature from seeing the activities of nature. Therefore, Adam had to receive knowledge of things from things. Thus, he did not have knowledge of all creatures.
Praeterea, Adam in statu innocentiae non fuit perfectior Angelis beatis. Sed illi non omnia sciunt; unde beatus Dionysius, VI cap. Ecclesiasticae hierarchiae, dicit quod, inferiores a superioribus purgantur a nescientia. Ergo nec homo in statu innocentiae omnia scivit. 13. In the state of innocence Adam was not more perfect than the beatified angels. But they do not know everything. For this reason, Dionysius says that the lower angels are purified from ignorance by the higher angels. Therefore, neither did man in the state of innocence know all things.
Praeterea, sicut dicit Augustinus in Lib. de divinatione Daemonum, Daemones secreta cordium scire non possunt, nisi quatenus innotescunt ex motibus corporis. Cum igitur intellectus angelicus sit perspicacior intellectu humano, videtur quod nec Adam in statu innocentiae potuerit secreta cordium cognoscere. Et sic non habebat omnium creaturarum notitiam. 14. As Augustine says, the demons can know the secrets of hearts only in so far as these become known from movements of the body. Therefore,, since the angelic understanding has clearer sight than the human understanding, it seems that even Adam in the state of innocence could not know the secrets of hearts. Thus, he did not have knowledge of all creatures.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Augustinus dicit in libro XIV de civitate Dei, quod in statu illo nihil aberat quod bona voluntas adipisceretur. Sed hoc bona voluntate velle poterat ut omnium scientiam haberet. Ergo omnium scientiam habuit. 1. Augustine says” that in that state “nothing was missing which a good will could acquire.” But with a good will he could want to have knowledge of all things. Therefore, he had knowledge of all things.
Praeterea, Adam magis erat ad imaginem secundum animam quam secundum corpus. Sed Adam fuit in ipsa prima conditione perfectus quantum ad corpus secundum aetatem et staturam, quantum ad omnia membra. Ergo et fuit secundum animam perfectus quantum ad omnem scientiam. 2. Adam was an image [of God] more in his soul than in his body. But, when first created, Adam was perfect in body as regards age, stature, and all his members. Therefore, he was perfect also in soul as regards all knowledge.
Praeterea, perfectio naturae conditae maior est quam perfectio naturae lapsae. Sed cognitio futurorum pertinet ad conditionem naturae lapsae; unde quidam sanctorum in hanc perfectionem promoti sunt, ut futura cognoscerent per donum prophetiae post lapsum naturae. Ergo Adam etiam habuit multo fortius cognitionem futurorum, et multo magis praesentium. 3. The perfection of nature when it was created is greater than the perfection of fallen nature. But knowledge of the future pertains to the state of fallen nature. Hence, after the fall some saints were raised to the perfection of knowing the future through the gift of prophecy. Therefore, with much greater reason Adam had knowledge of the future, and much more of the present.
[not in Leonine] [4. Adam had all the virtues. Therefore, he had all knowledge.]
Praeterea, nomina rerum debent esse consona earum proprietatibus. Sed Adam imposuit rebus nomina, ut patet Genes. II, 19. Ergo ipse plene naturam rerum cognovit. 5. The names of things should fit their properties. But Adam gave names to things, as is clear from Genesis(2:20). Therefore, he had full knowledge of the nature of things.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod in Adam duplex fuit cognitio: scilicet cognitio naturalis, et cognitio gratiae. Cognitio autem naturalis humana ad illa se potest extendere quaecumque ductu naturalis rationis cognoscere possumus. Cuius quidem naturalis cognitionis est accipere principium et terminum. Principium autem eius est in quadam confusa cognitione omnium: prout scilicet homini naturaliter inest cognitio universalium principiorum, in quibus, sicut in quibusdam seminibus, virtute praeexistunt omnia scibilia quae ratione naturali cognosci possunt. Sed huius cognitionis terminus est quando ea quae virtute in ipsis principiis insunt, explicantur in actum: sicut cum ex semine animalis, in quo virtute praeexistunt omnia membra animalis, producitur animal habens distincta et perfecta omnia membra, dicitur esse terminus generationis animalis. Adam had a twofold knowledge: one natural and one due to grace. Natural human knowledge can extend to those things which we can know under the guidance of natural reason. And there is a beginning and a term of this natural knowledge. It has its beginning in a kind of confused knowledge of all things, in so far as man naturally has within him a knowledge of the general principles in which, as in seeds, there virtually pre-exist all the objects of knowledge which can be known by natural reason. This knowledge reaches its term when the things which are virtually in the principles are expressed in act, as animal generation is said to reach its term when the animal, with all its members perfect and distinct, is developed from the seed of the animal in which all its members pre-existed virtually.
Adam autem in principio suae conditionis non solum oportuit ut haberet naturalem cognitionem quantum ad sui principium, sed etiam quantum ad terminum; eo quod ipse condebatur ut pater totius humani generis. A patre autem filii accipere debent non solum esse per generationem, sed et disciplinam per instructionem. Adam, however, when first created, had to have natural knowledge not only in its first stage but also in its term, because he was created as the father of the whole human race. For the sons should receive from their father not only existence through generation, but also instruction through teaching.
Et quia non competit alicui esse principium secundum quod est in potentia, sed secundum quod est in actu: ratio cuius, actus naturaliter est prior potentia, et naturae operatio semper a perfectis incipit; inde est quod oportuit primum hominem mox in ipsa sui conditione constitui in termino perfectionis et quantum ad corpus, ut esset conveniens principium generationis totius humani generis, et quantum ad cognitionem, ut esset sufficiens instructionis principium. One is not a principle in so far as he is in potency, but in so far as he is in act, and, for this reason, act is naturally prior to potency, and the activity of nature always begins from things which are perfect. Because of this, the first man had to be set at the term of perfection as soon as he was created, and this both in body, so that he would be a suitable principle of generation of the whole human race, and in mind, so that he would be an adequate principle of instruction.
Sicut igitur nihil in corpore eius erat non explicitum in actum quod pertineret ad perfectionem corporis ipsius; ita quidquid seminaliter sive virtualiter erat in primis principiis rationis, totum erat explicitum secundum perfectam cognitionem eorum omnium ad quae virtus primorum principiorum se extendere poterat. Unde dicendum est, quod quidquid unquam homo aliquis de cognitione rerum naturali ingenio assequi potuit, hoc totum Adam naturali cognitione habitualiter scivit. And, just as nothing in his body which pertained to bodily perfection was not actually developed, so, too, whatever there was seminally or virtually in the first principles of reason was developed in its entirety, in so far as the perfect knowledge of all those things to which the power of the first principles could extend was concerned, Consequently, we must say that whatever knowledge of things any man could ever acquire by his natural talents Adam had in its entirety by habitual natural knowledge.
Sed multa sunt in creaturis quae naturali ratione cognosci non possunt, ad quae scilicet vis primorum principiorum non se extendit; sicut futura contingentia, sicut cogitationes cordium et sicut dispositiones creaturarum, secundum quod subsunt divinae providentiae: nam divinam providentiam comprehendere non poterat; unde nec ordinem ipsarum creaturarum, secundum quod divinae providentiae subsunt: quae interdum creaturas ad multa ordinat supra naturae facultatem. Sed ad haec aliquatenus cognoscenda adiuvabatur alia cognitione, quae est cognitio gratiae, per quam Deus ei interius loquebatur, ut dicit Augustinus, Lib. VIII super Genes. Sed in hac cognitione non instituebatur primus homo quasi in termino perfectionis ipsius existens, quia terminus gratuitae cognitionis non est nisi in visione gloriae, ad quam ipse nondum pervenerat; et ideo huiusmodi non omnia cognoscebat, sed quantum sibi de his divinitus revelabatur. Et sic oportet utrisque rationibus respondere. There also are many things in creatures which cannot be known by natural knowledge, that is, those to which the power of first principles does not extend, such as future contingents, the secret thoughts of men, and the dispositions of creatures in so far as they are subject to divine providence. For he could not have a comprehensive grasp of divine providence, and so no comprehensive grasp of the order of creatures themselves in so far as they are subject to divine providence. For providence sometimes ordains creatures to many things beyond their natural capacity. But he was helped to know these things to some extent by the other knowledge, which is knowledge due to grace, through which God spoke internally to him, as Augustine says. But the first man was not given this knowledge as though he were placed at the term of its perfection, since one reaches the term of this freely conferred knowledge only in the vision of glory, to which he had not yet arrived. Therefore, he did not know all of these things, but only as much of them as God revealed to him. Accordingly, we have to answer both sets of difficulties.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod quaedam futura sunt quae in suis causis naturaliter praecognosci possunt; et istorum cognitionem Adam habuit. Aliorum autem quae naturaliter cognosci non possunt, non omnium cognitionem habuit, sed eorum tantum quae sibi fuerunt divinitus revelata. 1. There are some futures which can be known naturally in their causes. Adam had knowledge of these. But he did not know all the others which cannot be known naturally, but only those which were revealed to him by God.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod Adam debuit habere omnia perfecte quae natura humana requirit. Sicut autem vis augmentativa datur homini ut ad perfectam quantitatem perveniat; ita et sensus dantur animae humanae ut perfectionem scientiae capiat. Sicut igitur Adam habuit augmentativam virtutem, non ut per eam cresceret, sed ut nihil ei deesset eorum quae ad perfectionem naturae requiruntur; ita etiam sensus habuit, non ut per eos scientiam acquireret, sed ut perfectam naturam humanam haberet et ut iterum per sensus ea quae habitualiter sciebat experiretur. 2. Adam should have had in its perfection everything which human nature requires. But, just as the power of growth is given to man so that he may reach perfect stature, so the senses are given to the human soul to attain the perfection of knowledge. Accordingly, just as Adam did not have the power of growth, in order through it to grow larger, but in order that he might lack nothing of what is needed for the perfection of his nature, so, too, he did not have senses to acquire knowledge through them, but to have a perfect human nature, and so that through the senses he might experience again what he knew habitually.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod Adam aliud habuit in quantum constituebatur principium totius humanae naturae, quam id quod communiter omnibus convenit. Competebat enim ei, in quantum erat totius humani generis instructor, ut non haberet confusam cognitionem, sed distinctam, qua instruere posset. Et propter hoc etiam oportuit quod intellectus eius non esset in sui principio sicut tabula non scripta, sed haberet etiam plenam rerum scientiam ex divina operatione. Nec hoc aliis competebat hominibus, qui non instituebantur ut principium humani generis. 3. Adam, in so far as he was made the source of all human nature, had something more than is commonly due to all men. For, in so far as he was the teacher of the whole human race, it was incumbent on him not to have confused, but distinct, knowledge, so that with it he could teach. And for this reason it was also necessary that, when he was first created, his understanding should not be like a tablet on which nothing is written, but should have the fullness of knowledge by reason of God’s action. Nor was this necessary for other men, who were not made the source of the human race.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad quartum et quintum et sextum. 4.-6. The solution to the fourth, fifth, and sixth difficulties is clear from the third response.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod hoc quod Angelus factus est in plena cognitione rerum naturalium competit sibi ex debito suae naturae, non autem homini; sed ex operatione divina; et ideo adhuc remanet natura humana infra angelicam: sicut etiam corpus hominis naturaliter est imperfectius caelesti corpore; quamvis corpus Adae virtute divina, in principio acceperit quantitatem perfectam, quod corpori caelesti competit ex debito suae naturae. 7. The angels were created with full knowledge of physical reality because it is due to their nature, but this is not so with man, who obtained this knowledge by reason of God’s action. Therefore, human nature still remains lower than the angelic nature. Similarly, man’s body is naturally more imperfect than a heavenly body, even though, by the power of God, Adam’s body had its full stature when it was created. This belongs to heavenly bodies as due to their nature.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod intellectus Adae non poterat actu esse multa intelligibilia, quasi actu ab eis informatus; poterat tamen simul multis habitualiter informari. 8. Adam’s understanding could not actually be many intelligible things, as actually informed by them; however, it could simultaneously be habitually informed by many intelligible things.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit quando illa potentia totaliter perficitur per unam perfectionem, sicut forma substantialis perficit materiam, et color potentiam superficiei. Sed unus habitus scientiae non complet potentiam intellectus quantum ad omnia intelligibilia; et ideo non est simile. 9. That argument is valid when the power is perfected completely by one perfection, as a substantial form perfects matter and color perfects the potency of a surface. But one habit of knowledge does not fully perfect the power of understanding with reference to all intelligible things. Therefore the case is not the same.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod Adam habuit cognitionem omnium naturarum non in verbo, sed in propria natura, et in sua intelligentia. Qui quidem duplex modus cognoscendi non distinguitur penes species rerum prout eis aliquid cognoscitur, sed prout ipsae sunt quae cognoscuntur: quia etiam quando intellectus cognoscit res in propria natura, non cognoscit eas nisi per species earum quas penes se habet. Quando igitur per species quas penes se habet, ducitur intellectus in ipsas res quae sunt extra animam, tunc dicitur cognoscere res in propria natura. Quando autem intellectus sistit in ipsis speciebus, considerans naturam et dispositionem ipsarum specierum, tunc dicitur cognoscere res in sua intelligentia, utpote cum intelligit se intelligere, et modum quo intelligit. 10. Adam had knowledge of all natures, not in the Word, but in their proper nature and in his intelligence. This twofold manner of knowing is not distinguished according to the species of things in so far as something is known by these species, but in so far as they are what is known. For, even when the understanding knows things in their proper nature, it knows them only through species which are present to it. Accordingly, when through species which are present to it the understanding is directed to things which are outside the soul, then it is said to know things in their proper nature. But, when the understanding stops at the species themselves, studying their nature and arrangement, then is it said to know things in its intelligence, as, for instance, when it understands that it understands and how it understands.
Quod igitur dicit quod res nondum omnes erant in propria natura, et ita in propria natura cognosci non poterant, non sequitur. Cognoscere enim rem in propria natura dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo per modum enuntiationis: dum scilicet cognoscitur res esse in propria natura: quod non potest esse nisi quando in propria natura est. Et sic Adam non cognovit omnes creaturas in propria natura, quia nondum erant omnes creaturae in propria natura: nisi dicamus, quod non erant in propria natura perfecte, sed imperfecte: quia omnia quae postmodum producta sunt in operibus sex dierum, praecesserunt secundum aliquem modum, ut patet per Augustinum super Genes. ad litteram. Therefore, to say that all things did not yet exist in their proper nature, and so could not be known in their proper nature, does not follow. For to know a thing in its proper nature is used in two senses. In one, it is used by way of a statement, namely, when the thing itself is known to be in its own proper nature. And this can be done only when the thing exists in its proper nature. Adam did not know all things in their proper nature in this way, for all things did not yet exist in their proper nature, unless we were to say that they were not in their proper nature perfectly, but imperfectly. For all things which were produced later in the works of the six days [of creation] did pre-exist in some way, as is clear from Augustine.
Alio modo dicitur aliquis cognoscere rem in propria natura per modum definitionis: dum scilicet cognoscit aliquis quid sit propria natura alicuius rei. Et sic etiam res non existens potest in propria natura cognosci; ut si omnes leones essent mortui, possem scire quid est leo. Et sic etiam res tunc non existentes Adam in propria natura cognoscere poterat. In the other way, one is said to know a thing in its proper nature by way of a definition, that is to say, when one knows what the proper nature of a thing is. In this way, even things which do not exist can be known in their proper nature. Thus, I would be able to know what a lion is even if all lions were dead. In this way, Adam could know in their proper nature even things which did not then exist.
Similiter etiam nihil prohibet quod omnes creaturae per suas similitudines in eius intelligentia essent, quamvis non omnes sensu comprehenderit; quia, etsi non sit contra dignitatem primi status ut superior potentia ab inferiori accipiat, erat tamen contra perfectionem quae primo homini debebatur, ut conderetur sine plenitudine scientiae, solummodo ex sensibus scientiam accepturus. Similarly, there is nothing to prevent all creatures from being in his intelligence through their likenesses, although he did not perceive them all by his senses. For, although it is not contrary to the dignity of the first state for a higher power to receive something from a lower, to be created without the fullness of knowledge and to have to receive knowledge only from sense were contrary to the perfection which belonged to the first man.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod Adam in cognitione proficere potuit dupliciter. Uno modo quantum ad ea quae nescivit, ad quae scilicet naturalis ratio se extendere non potest: in quibus potuit proficere partim ex revelatione divina, sicut in cognitione divinorum mysteriorum; partim ex sensuum experimento, sicut in futurorum cognitione, quae cum adimplebantur, sibi nota fieri potuissent, cum prius fuissent ignota. Alio modo etiam quantum ad ea quae sciebat: ut scilicet id quod sciebat tantummodo per scientiam mentis, postmodum posset cognoscere etiam per experientiam sensus. 11. Adam could make progress in knowledge in two ways. One of these related to things which he did not know, that is, those to which natural reason could not reach. In these he could make progress partly by reason of divine revelation, as in knowledge of divine mysteries, and partly from sense experience, as in knowledge of futures, which, though previously unknown to him, would become known when they came to pass. The other way related to that which he knew, and thus he could later know also through sense experience that which he knew only through intellectual knowledge.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod verba illa Augustini non sunt sic intelligenda ut intelligatur Adam ex naturae operibus oportuisse virtutem naturae cognoscere; sed quia naturam, quam interius mente cognoscebat operari, experiebatur secundum id quod in eius notitia praeexistebat; et hoc ei erat delectabile. 12. Those words of Augustine are not to be taken as though he meant that Adam had to, know the power of nature from the works of nature, but that he knew by experience that the nature, which he knew interiorly with his mind, acted according to that which pre-existed in his knowledge. And this he found delightful.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod Angeli non purgantur a nescientia rerum naturalium, sed a nescientia divinorum mysteriorum; quae etiam nescientia in Adam fuit, ut dictum est. Et ad haec etiam ipse illuminatione angelica indiguit. 13. The angels are purified from ignorance, not of natural things, but of divine mysteries. This ignorance existed in Adam, too, as has been said. And for this he himself needed an angelic illumination.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod etiam abscondita cordium sunt de illis ad quae cognoscenda ratio naturalis non se potest extendere; unde simile iudicium est de his et cognitione futurorum contingentium. 14. The secret thoughts of men are among those things to which natural reason cannot extend its knowledge. Hence, our judgment about these is the same as that about the knowledge of future contingents.
Answers to Contrary Difficulties
Ad primum vero quod in contrarium obicitur dicendum, quod Adam bona voluntate velle non poterat nisi quod ordinate volebat; hoc est ut hoc quod vellet, suo tempore appeteret habere, nec vellet id quod sibi non competebat. 1. With a good will Adam was able to will only what he willed according to right order, that is, to seek to have what he wanted at its proper time, and not to want what did not befit him.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod Adam, quantum ad corpus, habuit perfectionem naturalem, non autem supernaturalem, quae est perfectio gloriae; unde non sequitur quod secundum animam habuerit perfectionem cognitionis nisi naturalis. 2. Adam had natural perfection in his body, but not the supernatural perfection which is the perfection of glory. Consequently, it does not follow that he had in his soul any other than the perfection of natural knowledge.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod praecognitio futurorum est quidem perfectio naturae humanae, quia ea perficitur etiam post lapsum: non autem ita quod sit homini naturalis; unde non oportuit quod talem perfectionem Adam haberet. Soli enim Christo competit ut omnia ipsi sint collata quae alii sancti per gratiam habuerunt, eo quod ipse est nobis principium gratiae, sicut Adam principium naturae; ratione cuius perfectio naturalis cognitionis sibi debebatur. 3. Foreknowledge of futures is indeed a perfection of human nature, because it does have this perfection even after the fall; it is not a perfection, however, in such a way that it is natural to man. Hence, there was no need for Adam to have such a perfection. For it belongs to Christ alone to be given everything which the other saints had through grace, because He is the source of grace for us, as Adam is the source of nature. It was for this reason that the perfection of natural knowledge was due to Adam.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod de ratione status innocentiae erat ut Adam omnes virtutes haberet; quia quaecumque ei deesset, iustitiam originalem non haberet. Non autem est de necessitate innocentiae omnem cognitionem habere; unde non est simile. 4. It was by reason of the state of innocence that Adam had all the virtues, for, if any were lacking in him, he would not have had original justice. But the state of innocence does not require the possession of all knowledge. Hence, the case is not the same.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod Adam legitur animalibus nomina imposuisse, et eorum naturas plene novit, et per consequens omnium aliarum rerum naturalium; sed ex hoc non sequitur quod ea quae sunt supra naturalem cognitionem, cognoverit. 5. We read that Adam gave names to the animals and knew their natures fully, and, consequently, knew the natures of all other natural things. But it does not follow from this that he knew things which surpass natural knowledge.
Q. 17: The Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence

ARTICLE V

In the fifth article we ask:

Did Adam in the State of innocence see the angels through their essence?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 94, 2.]

Quinto quaeritur utrum Adam in statu innocentiae Angelos per essentiam viderit Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that he did, for
Dicit enim Gregorius, IV dialogorum: in Paradiso quippe homo assueverat verbis Dei perfrui, beatorum Angelorum spiritibus cordis munditia et celsitudine visionis interesse. Ergo videtur quod per altitudinem visionis suae ad ipsos Angelos videndos attigerit. 1. Gregory says: “In paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God and to share in purity of heart and loftiness of vision with the spirits of the beatified angels.” Therefore, through the loftiness of his vision he seems to have attained even to the vision of the angels.
Praeterea, Genes. II, 21, super illud: immisit Deus soporem etc., dicit Glossa: extasis recte intelligitur ad hoc immissa, ut mens Adae particeps angelicae curiae intraret in sanctuarium Dei, et intelligeret novissima. Sed non potuit esse particeps angelicae curiae nisi Angelos cognoverit. Ergo Angelorum notitiam habuit. 2. On the words of Genesis (2:2 1), “Then the Lord God cast a deep sleep upon Adam,” the Gloss reads: “The correct interpretation of this ecstasy is that it was given so that Adam’s mind, sharing the company of the heavenly court, might enter into the sanctuary of God and understand the last things.”But he could not share the company of the heavenly court unless he knew the angels. Therefore, he had knowledge of the angels.
Praeterea, Magister dicit in 23 dist. Lib. II, quod homo fuit praeditus cognitione rerum propter se factarum. Sed inter alias creaturas etiam Angeli propter hominem quodammodo facti sunt, ut Magister dicit, dist. 1, Lib. II. Ergo habuit Angelorum notitiam. 3. The Master says: “Man had a knowledge of the things which were made for his sake.” But, along with other creatures, even the angels are made in some way for man’s sake, as the Master says. Therefore, he had knowledge of the angels.
Praeterea, difficilius est facere aliquid quod est intelligibile in potentia, intelligibile in actu, et intelligere illud, quam intelligere aliquid quod est de se actu intelligibile. Sed intellectus Adae poterat facere species rerum materialium esse intelligibiles actu, quae de se sunt intelligibiles in potentia, et per hoc intelligere res materiales. Ergo multo fortius poterat intelligere ipsas essentias Angelorum, quae sunt de se intelligibiles actu, cum sint a materia immunes. 4. It is more difficult to make something which is intelligible in potency become intelligible actually and to understand it than to understand that which is of itself actually intelligible. But Adam’s understanding could make species of material things, which of themselves are intelligible in potency, become actually intelligible, and in this way understand material things. Therefore, with much more reason he was able to understand the essences of the angels, which of themselves are actually intelligible, since they are free of matter.
Praeterea, quod aliquis non magis intelligat ea quae de se sunt magis intelligibilia, contingit ex defectu intellectus sui. Sed essentiae Angelorum sunt de se magis intelligibiles quam essentiae rerum materialium; nec aliquis defectus in intellectu Adae erat. Cum igitur cognosceret res materiales per essentiam, multo fortius Angelos per essentiam cognoscere poterat. 5. That someone does not better understand things which are of themselves more intelligible is due to a defect of his understanding. But the essences of the angels are of themselves more intelligible than the essences of material things, and there was no defect in Adam’s understanding. Accordingly, since he knew material things through their essence, with much more reason he could know the angels through their essence.
Praeterea, intellectus potest intelligere res materiales, abstrahendo quidditatem a supposito materiali; et si illa quidditas est iterum suppositum habens quidditatem, poterit pari ratione ab illo quidditatem abstrahere; et cum non sit abire in infinitum, deveniet tandem ad hoc quod intelliget quidditatem aliquam simplicem, non habentem quidditatem. Sed huiusmodi est quidditas substantiae separatae, scilicet Angeli. Ergo intellectus Adae potuit cognoscere Angeli essentiam. 6. The intellect can understand material things by abstracting the quiddity from the material supposit. And, if that quiddity is again a supposit having a quiddity, it can with equal reason abstract the quiddity from it. And, since this cannot go on to infinity, it will at last arrive at the understanding of some simple quiddity, which does not have [another] quiddity. But such a quiddity is the quiddity of a separate substance, that is to say, of an angel. Therefore, Adam’s intellect could know the essence of an angel.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum libro III de anima, intellectus, propter hoc quod est potentia non coniuncta organo, non corrumpitur ab excellenti intelligibili: non enim minus intelligit infima, postquam intellexit maximum intelligibile, sed magis; cuius contrarium in sensu accidit. Sed intellectus Adae in statu innocentiae erat integer et perfectus. Ergo non impediebatur ab excellentia alicuius intelligibilis quin illud intelligere posset. Et ita poterat Angelos per essentiam cognoscere, cum hanc cognitionem nihil aliud impedire videatur nisi ipsius intelligibilis excellentia. 7. According to the Philosopher, since understanding is a power not joined to an organ, it is not destroyed by an excessively intelligible object. “For, after it has understood the highest intelligible, it does not understand the lowest intelligibles; less, but more,” contrary to what takes place in sense. But Adam’s understanding in the state of innocence was whole and complete. Therefore, the excellence of an intelligible object was not an impediment to his understanding of it. Consequently, he was able to know the angels through their essence, since the only impediment to this knowledge seems to be the excellence of the intelligible object.
Praeterea, ut supra dictum est, Adam mox conditus habuit omnem cognitionem ad quam naturaliter homo pervenire potest. Sed naturaliter homo pervenire potest ad hoc quod substantias separatas per essentiam cognoscat, ut patet ex multorum philosophorum sententiis, quas Commentator tangit in III de anima. Ergo Adam Angelos per essentiam cognoscebat. 8. As was mentioned above, Adam, as soon as he was created, had all the knowledge to which a man can come naturally. But man can naturally come to a knowledge of the separated substances through their essence, as is clear from the statements of many philosophers, which the Commentator mentions. Therefore, Adam knew the angels through their essence.
Praeterea, constat quod Adam animam suam per essentiam noverat. Sed essentia animae est a materia immunis, sicut et Angeli. Ergo et Angelum per essentiam cognoscere poterat. 9. It is evident that Adam knew his own soul through its essence. But the essence of the soul is free from matter, just as an angel’s essence. Therefore, he could also know the angels through their essence.
Praeterea, cognitio Adae fuit media inter cognitionem nostram et cognitionem beatorum. Sed beati cognoscunt et vident essentiam Dei, nos autem cognoscimus essentias rerum materialium; inter Deum autem et res materiales sunt substantiae spirituales, scilicet Angeli. Ergo Adam per essentiam Angelos cognovit. 10. Adam’s knowledge was intermediate between our knowledge and that of the blessed. But the blessed see and know the essence of God, and we know the essence of material things. But between God and material things are spiritual substances, that is, the angels. Therefore, Adam knew the angels through their essence.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Nulla potentia in cognoscendo potest extendere se ultra suum obiectum. Sed obiecta animae intellectivae sunt phantasmata, ad quae ita se habet anima intellectiva sicut sensus ad sensibilia, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo anima nostra non potest se extendere ad cognoscendum nisi ea in quae ex phantasmatibus devenire potest. Sed essentia Angelorum excedit omnia phantasmata. Ergo homo naturali cognitione, qua posuimus Adam perfectum, non potest pervenire ad hoc ut cognoscat Angelos per essentiam. 1. In its knowledge no power can reach beyond its object. But the objects of the intellective soul are phantasms, to which the intellective soul is related, as sense is to sensibles, as is said in The Soul. Therefore, our soul can attain to knowledge only of those things which it can derive from phantasms. But the essence of the angels is beyond all phantasms. Therefore, by natural knowledge, the perfection of which we assign to Adam, man cannot reach a knowledge of the angels through their essence.
Sed dicebat, quod quamvis Angelus non possit per phantasmata apprehendi, tamen effectus eius aliquis potest sub phantasmate deprehendi, et ex tali effectu potest Angelus cognosci.- Sed contra: nullus effectus qui non aequat suam causam sufficit ad hoc quod per ipsum suae causae essentia cognoscatur; alias cognoscentes Deum ex creaturis, essentiam Dei viderent, quod falsum est. Sed effectus corporeus, qui solus in phantasmate deprehendi potest, est talis effectus qui non aequat virtutem Angeli. Ergo per huiusmodi effectum non potest cognosci de Angelo quid est, sed solum an sit. 2. It was said that, although an angel cannot be perceived through phantasms, some effect of an angel can be grasped under the guise of a phantasm, and from such an effect the angel can be known.—On the contrary, no effect which is not equal to its cause is sufficient of itself to be a means to knowledge of the essence of its cause. Otherwise, those who know God from creatures would see the essence of God, which is false. But a physical effect, which alone can be grasped in a phantasm, is the kind of effect which is not equal to the power of the angels. Therefore, through this kind of effect one cannot know what an angel is, but only whether he exists.
Sed dicebat, quod Adam per aliquem effectum intelligibilem Angelos cognoscere poterat, secundum id quod dicit Avicenna, quod intelligentias esse in nobis, nihil est aliud quam impressiones earum esse in nobis.- Sed contra: unumquodque quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum eius in quo recipitur. Sed modus animae humanae est infra modum angelicae naturae. Ergo impressio facta ab Angelo in animam humanam, sive lumen angelicum, quo mentem humanam illuminat, est in anima humana inferiori modo ab angelica natura. Cum igitur anima cognoscat aliquid per modum quo cognitum est in ipsa, anima per huiusmodi impressionem non pertinget ad cognoscendum Angelum, secundum quod est in essentia sua. 3. It was said that Adam was able to know the angels through some intelligible effect, according to the dictum of Avicenna that the presence of intelligences in us is nothing other than the presence of their imprints in us.—On the contrary, what is received in a thing is received there according to the mode of being of that in which it is received. But the mode of being of the human soul is lower than that of the angelic nature. Therefore, the imprint made on the human soul by an angel, or by the angelic light, with which it enlightens the mind, is in the human soul in a lower manner than in the angelic nature. Accordingly, since the soul knows a thing through the mode in which the thing known is within it, through this kind of imprint the soul does not reach knowledge of an angel as it is in its essence.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod duplex est cognitio qua aliquid cognosci potest. Una qua cognoscitur de re an sit; et sic Adam in statu innocentiae Angelos cognoscebat et naturali cognitione, et divina revelatione, multo familiarius et plenius quam nos cognoscamus. Alia est qua cognoscitur de re quid est, et hoc est cognoscere rem per essentiam suam; et sic Adam, ut mihi videtur, Angelos in statu innocentiae non cognoscebat. Cuius ratio est, quia duplex cognitio Adae attribuitur: scilicet cognitio naturalis et cognitio gratiae. There is a twofold knowledge by which something can be known. One is that by which we know whether a thing exists, and according to this in the state of innocence Adam knew the angels both by natural knowledge and divine revelation far more fully and familiarly than we know them. The other is that by which we know what a thing is, and this is to know it through its essence. And, as I see it, Adam in the state of innocence did not know the angels in this way. The reason for this is that a twofold knowledge is ascribed to Adam: natural knowledge and knowledge due to grace.
Quod autem cognitione naturali Angelos per essentiam non cognoverit, ex hinc potest certum esse. In nullo enim genere potentia passiva naturalis se extendit ultra id ad quod se extendit potentia activa eiusdem generis; sicut potentia passiva in natura non invenitur nisi respectu eorum ad quae aliqua potentia activa naturalis se potest extendere, ut Commentator dicit IX Metaphys. In animae autem humanae intellectu duplex potentia invenitur: una quasi passiva, scilicet intellectus possibilis; et alia quasi activa, scilicet intellectus agens. Unde intellectus possibilis naturaliter non est in potentia ut in eo fiant nisi ea quae intellectus agens natus est facere: quamvis per hoc non excludatur quin aliqua alia in eo fieri possint operatione divina, sicut et in natura corporali per operationem miraculi. Actione autem intellectus agentis non fiunt intelligibilia ea quae sunt de seipsis intelligibilia, cuiusmodi sunt essentiae Angelorum, sed ea quae sunt de seipsis in potentia intelligibilia, qualia sunt essentiae rerum materialium, quae per sensum et imaginationem capiuntur; unde in intellectu possibili naturaliter non fiunt nisi illae species intelligibiles quae sunt a phantasmatibus abstractae. Per huiusmodi autem species impossibile est pervenire ad intuendam essentiam substantiae separatae, cum sint improportionabiles, et quasi alterius generis cum ipsis essentiis spiritualibus. Et ideo naturali cognitione homo non potest pertingere ut cognoscat Angelos per essentiam. That he did not know angels through their essence with natural knowledge can be seen with certainty from this. In no genus does a natural passive power extend farther than that to which the active power of the same genus extends, just as in nature there is a passive power only with reference to those things to which some natural active power can extend, as the Commentator says. In the understanding of the human soul, however, there is a twofold power: one passive, the possible intellect, and the other active, the agent intellect. Consequently, the possible intellect is naturally in potency to have produced in it only those things which the agent intellect is naturally constituted to produce. However, this does not exclude the possibility of other things being produced in it by divine activity, as they are produced in physical nature through miraculous activity. But the action of the agent intellect does not make intelligible those things which are of themselves intelligible, such as the essences of the angels, but things which of themselves are potentially intelligible, such as the essence of material things, which are received through sense and imagination. Hence, in the possible intellect there are naturally produced only those intelligible species which are abstracted from phantasms. However, it is impossible to reach vision of the essence of separated substances through this type of species, since they have no proportion to separated substances and belong, as it were, to a different genus from spiritual essences. Therefore, by natural knowledge man cannot attain to knowledge of the angels through their essence.
Similiter etiam nec Adam cognitione gratiae hoc potuit. Cognitio enim gratiae est elevatior quam cognitio naturae; sed haec elevatio potest intelligi vel quantum ad intelligibile, vel quantum ad modum intelligendi. Quantum ad intelligibile quidem per gratiam cognitio hominis elevatur etiam sine mutatione status, sicut cum per gratiam fidei elevamur ad cognoscendum ea quae sunt supra rationem; et similiter etiam per gratiam prophetiae. Sed quantum ad modum cognoscendi non elevatur humana cognitio, nisi status mutetur. Modus autem quo naturaliter cognoscit intellectus est ut a phantasmatibus accipiat, ut dictum est, in isto art. Unde nisi homo in alium statum mutetur, oportet quod etiam in cognitione gratiae, quae est per revelationem divinam, semper intellectus inspiciat ad phantasmata; et hoc est quod Dionysius dicit, quod impossibile est nobis aliter lucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum. Adam autem in statu innocentiae erat in statu viatoris; unde in omni gratiae cognitione oportebat quod aspiceret ad phantasmata. Isto autem modo cognoscendi non possunt essentiae Angelorum videri, ut iam dictum est. Unde nec naturali cognitione nec gratuita Adam Angelos per essentiam cognovit; nisi forte ponamus eum per gratiam in altiorem statum elevatum, sicut fuit Paulus in raptu. Similarly, Adam was not capable of this even through the knowledge due to grace. For knowledge due to grace is higher than knowledge due to nature, but this elevation can be taken with reference either to the intelligible object or to the manner of understanding. With reference to the intelligible object, man’s knowledge is indeed raised through grace even without a change of state, as when we are raised to a knowledge of things which are above reason through the grace of faith, and similarly through the grace of prophecy. But, in so far as its manner of knowing is concerned, human knowledge is not elevated without a change of man’s state. But the manner in which his understanding knows naturally is by receiving from phantasms, as has been said. Consequently, unless there is a change in man’s state, his understanding, even in the knowledge due to grace, which is through divine revelation, must always recur to phantasms. This is what Dionysius says: “It is impossible for the divine radiance to shine on us in any other way, except as shrouded in a variety of sacred veils.” But in the state of innocence Adam was in the state of a wayfarer. Hence, in all knowledge due to grace he had to look to phantasms. The essences of angels, however, cannot be seen with that mode of knowledge, as has been said. 13 Thus, Adam did not know the angels through their essence either through natural knowledge or through knowledge due to grace, unless, perhaps, we say that he was elevated to a higher state through grace, as Paul was in his rapture.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod ex illa auctoritate Gregorii non potest haberi nisi quod Adam Angelos cognoverit in quadam celsitudine visionis, non tamen tanta quae pertingeret ad eorum essentiam cognoscendam. 1. All we can conclude from the authoritative citation from Gregory is that Adam knew the angels in some lofty vision, not, however, so lofty that it reached a knowledge of their essence.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod si sopor Adae intelligitur talis extasis fuisse qualis raptus Pauli, nihil prohiberet dici quin in illo raptu Angelos per essentiam viderit; sed hoc erit supra communem modum cognitionis qui sibi tunc competebat. Si autem sopor ille non talis extasis fuisse dicatur, ut Adam secundum quid in statum beatorum elevaretur, sed sicut solet mens prophetarum elevari ad divina mysteria intuenda, sicut verba Glossae sonare videntur; tunc dicitur particeps angelicae curiae fuisse per quamdam cognitionis eminentiam, quae tamen usque ad eorum essentias non pertingebat. 2. If we understand that Adam’s sleep was of the same nature as Paul’s rapture, there would be nothing to prevent us from saying that he saw the angels through their essence in that rapture. But this was above the common mode of knowing which then belonged to him. However, if we understand that his sleep was not of such a nature that in it Adam in some respect was elevated to the state of the blessed, but was like that in which it is customary for the minds of the prophets to be raised to vision of the divine mysteries, as the words of the Gloss seem to intend, then he is said to have shared the company of the heavenly court through a certain pre-eminence of knowledge, which still did not reach their essence.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod Adam habuit cognitionem Angelorum, in quantum erant propter ipsum facti. Scivit enim eos esse consortes suae beatitudinis, et ministros suae salutis in via, in quantum cognovit distinctionem ordinum et eorum officia multo perfectius quam nos cognoscamus. 3. Adam had knowledge of the angels in so far as they were made for his sake. For he knew that they would be companions of his beatitude and helpers for his salvation in this life, in so far as he knew the distinction of [angelic] orders and their duties much better than we know them.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod difficultas in intelligendo accidit dupliciter; uno modo ex parte cognoscibilis, alio modo ex parte cognoscentis. Ex parte cognoscibilis difficilius est facere aliquid intelligibile et intelligere ipsum, quam intelligere id quod est in se intelligibile; sed ex parte cognoscentis potest esse difficilius ad cognoscendum id quod est in se intelligibile. Et hoc convenit intellectui humano propter hoc quod non est proportionatus ad intelligendum naturaliter essentias separatas, ratione iam dicta, in corp. art. 4. Difficulty in understanding arises in two ways. In one, the difficulty comes from the thing known; in the other, from the one knowing. On the part of the thing known, it is more difficult to make something intelligible and understand it than to understand that which of itself is intelligible. But, on the part of the one knowing, it can be more difficult to know that which is itself intelligible. And this is the case with the human understanding, since naturally to understand separated essences is out of proportion with its power, for the reason we have given.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod intellectus Adae non patiebatur defectum alicuius perfectionis quae tunc sibi inesse deberet. Habebat tamen aliquos defectus naturales, inter quos unus erat quod oportebat eum in cognoscendo ad phantasmata inspicere; quod quidem intellectui humano naturaliter contingit ex hoc ipso quod est corpori unitus, et ex hoc quod secundum naturam suam est infimus in ordine intellectuum. 5. Adam’s understanding did not suffer from the lack of any perfection which should have been in it at that time. However, it did have some natural deficiencies, among which one was that in knowing it had to look to phantasms. But this is a natural condition of human understanding by reason of its union with the body, and by reason of the fact that by its nature it is the lowest in the order of intellects.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod intellectus potest abstrahendo pervenire ad quidditatem rei materialis non habentem aliam quidditatem; quam quidem intelligere potest, quia eam a phantasmatibus abstrahit et est facta intelligibilis per lumen intellectus agentis, ex quo habet quod ea possit perfici sicut propria perfectione. Sed ex hac quidditate non potest assurgere ad cognoscendum essentiam substantiae separatae, eo quod ista quidditas est omnino deficiens a repraesentatione illius quidditatis; cum non omnino eodem modo quidditas inveniatur in substantiis separatis et rebus materialibus, sed quasi aequivoce, ut dicit Commentator in III de anima. Dato etiam quod per hanc quidditatem posset cognoscere talem esse quidditatem substantiae separatae in quodam communi, non tamen adhuc videret essentiam Angeli, ita quod sciret differentiam uniuscuiusque essentiae separatae ab aliis essentiis separatis. 6. By abstraction, understanding can reach a quiddity of a natural thing which does not have another quiddity, and which it can understand because it abstracts it from phantasms and makes it intelligible through the light of the agent intellect. From this it receives the possibility of being perfected by the quiddity as by a proper perfection. But it cannot rise from this quiddity to a knowledge of the essence of a separated substance, because the former quiddity is completely incapable of representing the latter, since quiddity does not exist in separated substances and in material things in entirely the same manner, but, as it were, equivocally, as the Commentator says. And, granted that through this quiddity he could know in some general way that the quiddity of separated substance is of such a nature, he nevertheless would not see the essence of an angel in such a way that he could know the difference between any one separated essence and the others.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod intellectus humanus quamvis ab intelligibili excellenti non corrumpatur, tamen invenitur in eo defectus proportionis ad hoc quod naturaliter possit pertingere ad maxime intelligibilia. Unde ex verbis philosophi non potest haberi quod summe intelligibilia intelligat, sed solum hoc quod si ea intelligeret, non minus intelligeret alia. 7. Although human understanding is not destroyed by an excessively intelligible object, it lacks the proportion needed to be able naturally to reach the highest intelligibles. Hence, we cannot conclude from what the Philosopher says that it understands the highest intelligibles; but only that, if it did understand them, it would not understand others less.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod hanc quaestionem philosophus insolutam dimisit in III de anima, ubi quaerit, utrum intellectus coniunctus possit separata intelligere; nec alibi invenitur eam solvisse in libris eius qui ad nos pervenerunt. Sequentes vero ipsum, in hoc discordaverunt. 8. The Philosopher leaves this question unsolved when he inquires whether an intellect joined [to a body] can understand separated substances. Nor does he solve the question anywhere else in the works which have come down to us. And his followers have disagreed on this point.
Quidam enim dixerunt, quod intellectus noster non potest pertingere ad intelligendas essentias separatas. Quidam vero posuerunt quod ad hoc pertingere possit. Horum autem quidam usi sunt rationibus insufficientibus, sicut Avempace, cuius est ratio inducta de quidditate, et Themistius, cuius est ratio inducta de facilitate intelligendi, quas etiam Commentator in Lib. III de anima solvit. Quidam vero usi sunt positionibus extraneis et contra fidem, sicut Alexander, et ipse Commentator Averroes. Alexander enim dicit, quod intellectus possibilis cum sit generabilis et corruptibilis, secundum eum, nullo modo pertingere potest ad hoc quod substantias separatas intelligat; sed in fine suae perfectionis pertingit ad hoc quod intelligentia agens, quam ponit quamdam substantiam separatam, coniungatur nobis quasi forma: et in illo statu intelligemus per intelligentiam agentem sicut nunc intelligimus per intellectum possibilem. Et quia intelligentia agens, cum sit substantia separata, intelligit substantias separatas; inde est quod in illo statu intelligemus substantias separatas; et in hoc consistit ultima felicitas hominis, secundum eum. For some have said that our intellect cannot achieve an understanding of separated essences. Some, however, have held that it can. Some of these men have given insufficient reasons, as Avempace, who gave the argument about quiddity, and Themistius, who gave the argument about ease of understanding. Both of these arguments, the Commentator answered. Some, however, as Alexander and the Commentator himself, have taken non-Aristotelian positions, which are against the faith. For Alexander says that, since the possible intellect can be produced by generation and can perish, it can in his theory in no wise reach an understanding of the separated substances. But, at the term of its perfection, it does reach the point where the agent intellect, which Alexander makes one of the separated substances, is united to us as form. In that state we understand through the agent intellect, just as now we understand through the possible intellect. And it is because the agent intellect, as a separated substance, understands separated substances that we understand separated substances in that state. In his opinion it is in this that the final happiness of man will consist.
Sed quia non videtur esse possibile quod id quod est incorruptibile et separatum, ut intellectus agens, continuetur ut forma intellectui possibili, qui secundum Alexandrum est corruptibilis et materialis: ideo aliis visum est, quod etiam ipse intellectus possibilis sit separatus et incorruptibilis. Unde Themistius dicit, quod intellectus possibilis etiam est separatus; et quod in natura sua est intelligere non solum res materiales, sed etiam substantias separatas: et quod intelligibilia eius non sunt nova, sed aeterna: et quod intellectus speculativus, quo nos intelligimus, est compositus ex intellectu agente et intellectu possibili. Sed si hoc est, cum intellectus possibilis nobis a principio continuetur, tunc ab ipso principio substantias separatas cognoscere possemus. However, since it does not seem possible for something which is incorruptible and separated, as the agent intellect, to be united as the form for the possible intellect, which, for Alexander, is corruptible and material, it has seemed to others that the possible intellect itself is separated and incorruptible. Hence, Themistius says that the possible intellect, too, is separated, and that it is natural to it to understand not only material things but also separated substances. He adds that its intelligible objects are not temporal, but eternal, things, and that the speculative intellect, by which we understand, is made up of the agent and the possible intellects. But, if this is so, we can know separated substances from the beginning, since the possible intellect is united to us from the beginning.
Et ideo Commentator tertiam viam ponit mediam inter opinionem Alexandri et Themistii. Dicit enim, intellectum possibilem esse separatum et aeternum, in quo convenit cum Themistio, et differt ab Alexandro; dicit tamen intelligibilia speculativa esse nova, et effecta per actionem intellectus agentis; et in hoc convenit cum Alexandro, et differt a Themistio. Et haec dicit habere duplex esse: unum quo fundantur in phantasmatibus, et secundum hoc sunt in nobis; aliud quo sunt in intellectu possibili, unde mediantibus istis intelligibilibus intellectus possibilis nobis continuatur. Therefore, the Commentator takes a third way, between the opinion of Alexander and that of Themistius. For he says that the possible intellect is separated and eternal, in which he agrees with Themistius and differs from Alexander, and, nevertheless, that the objects of the speculative understanding are temporal things and produced through the activity of the agent intellect. In this he agrees with Alexander and differs from Themistius. He says that these objects have a double existence: one, by which they are based on phantasms, and in this sense they are in us; the other, by which they are in the possible intellect. Consequently, through the mediation of these intelligible objects the possible intellect is united to us.
Ad haec autem intelligibilia intellectus agens se habet sicut forma ad materiam. Cum enim intellectus possibilis recipiat huiusmodi intelligibilia quae in phantasmatibus fundantur, et iterum intellectum agentem, et intellectus agens sit perfectior: oportet quod proportio intellectus agentis ad huiusmodi intelligibilia quae sunt in nobis, sit sicut proportio formae ad materiam; sicut etiam est proportio lucis et coloris ad invicem, quae recipiuntur in diaphano; et similiter est de omnibus duobus receptis in uno, quorum unum est altero perfectius. Quando igitur in nobis completur generatio huiusmodi intelligibilium, tunc intellectus agens perfecte nobis coniungetur ut forma: et sic nos per intellectum agentem poterimus substantias separatas cognoscere, sicut nunc possumus cognoscere per intellectum qui est in habitu. Now, the agent intellect is related to these intelligible things as form to matter. For, since the possible intellect receives intelligibles of this type which are grounded in phantasms, and also receives the agent intellect, and since the agent intellect is more perfect, the proportion of the agent intellect to intelligibles of this sort, which are in us, must be like the proportion of form to matter. This is like the reciprocal proportion between light and color which are received in the transparent, as also between all things, one of which is more perfect than the other, which are received in one thing. Therefore, when the production of such intelligibles takes place in us, then the agent intellect is united to us perfectly as a form. And in this way we will be able to know separated substances through the agent intellect, just as we are now able to know through the understanding which is in its habitual state.
Patet igitur ex dictis istorum philosophorum quod non poterant invenire modum quo intelligeremus substantias separatas, nisi intelligendo per aliquam substantiam separatam. Quod autem intellectus possibilis vel agens sit substantia separata, non est consonum veritati fidei, nec etiam sententiae philosophi, qui in Lib. III de anima ponit intellectum agentem et possibilem esse aliquid animae humanae. It is evident from the statements of these philosophers that they could find no way for us to understand separated substances except by understanding through some separated substance. But it is not in harmony with the truths of the faith to say that the possible or the agent intellect is a separated substance. Neither does it agree with the opinion of the Philosopher, who holds that agent and possible intellects are part of the human soul.
Et ideo hac positione retenta, non videtur esse possibile quod naturali cognitione homo pertingat ad cognoscendum essentias separatas. Accordingly, if we retain that position, it does not seem possible for man by his natural knowledge to achieve a knowledge of separated essences.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod homo in statu innocentiae per hoc quod intelligebat aliquod intelligibile perfecte, cognoscebat etiam perfecte actum intelligendi; et quia actus intelligendi est effectus proportionatus et adaequans virtutem a qua exit, inde est quod intelligebat perfecte essentiam animae suae. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod intellexerit Angeli essentiam; cum iste actus intelligendi non adaequet virtutem intellectus. 9. In the state of Innocence man knew his act of understanding perfectly because he understood some intelligible object perfectly. And, since the act of understanding is an effect proportionate to, and commensurate with, the power from which it proceeds, it follows that he understood the essence of his soul perfectly. But it does not follow from this that he understood the essence of the angels, since that act of understanding is not commensurate with the power of his understanding.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod sicut natura angelica est media inter naturam divinam et corporalem, ita etiam cognitio qua cognoscitur essentia angelica, est media inter cognitionem qua cognoscitur essentia divina, et qua cognoscitur essentia rei materialis. Sed inter duo extrema possunt esse multa media: nec oportet quod quicumque excedit unum extremorum, pertingat ad quodlibet medium, sed quod pertingat ad aliquod medium. Homo igitur in statu innocentiae ad aliquod medium pervenit, ad hoc scilicet ut notitiam Dei acciperet non ex sensibilibus creaturis, sed revelatione interna; non autem ad hoc medium quod cognosceret essentiam angelicam; ad quod tamen medium Angelus in sui creatione nondum beatus pervenit. 10. As the angelic nature is intermediate between the divine and physical nature, so the knowledge by which an angelic essence is known is intermediate between the knowledge by which the divine essence is known and by which the essences of material things are known. But there can be many things intermediate between two extremes. And it is not necessary for anyone who exceeds one extreme to reach every intermediate level, but to reach some intermediate level. Accordingly, in the state of innocence man reached one intermediate level, namely that of receiving knowledge of God not from sensible creatures but from internal revelation. However, he did not arrive at the level of knowing angelic essences. Nevertheless, when the angels were created and not yet beatified, they had arrived at this level.
Q. 17: The Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence

ARTICLE VI

In the sixth article we ask:
Could Adam in the state of innocence be mistaken or deceived?

[ARTICLE II Sent., 23, 2, 3; S.T., I, 94, 4.]
Sexto quaeritur utrum Adam in statu innocentiae errare sive decipi potuerit Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that he could, for
Quia, ut dicit Ambrosius, omne peccatum est ex errore. Sed Adam potuit peccare; igitur et errare. 1. As Ambrose says, error is the source of every sin. But Adam could sin. Therefore, he could be mistaken.
Praeterea, voluntas non est nisi de bono, vel aestimato bono. Cum autem voluntas est de bono, non peccatur. Nunquam ergo est peccatum nisi praecedat aestimatio qua aestimatur aliquid bonum et non est. Omnis autem talis aestimatio deceptio quaedam est. Ergo Adam antequam peccaret, in statu innocentiae deceptus fuit. 2. The will concerns only that which is good or regarded as good. But, when the will deals with what is good, there is no sin. Therefore, there is never sin unless there is an antecedent evaluation in which something is regarded as good, but is not. But in every such evaluation there is deception of some sort. Therefore, before he sinned, Adam in the state of innocence was deceived.
Praeterea, Magister dicit, II Sent., dist. 21, quod ideo mulier non horruit serpentem loquentem, quia cum noverit creatum esse, etiam officium loquendi a Deo accepisse putavit. Hoc autem falsum erat. Ergo mulier falsum opinata est antequam peccaret; ergo decepta fuit. 3. The Master says: “The woman was not frightened by the fact that the serpent talked because, since she knew it, was created, she considered that it had received even the power of speech from God.” But this was false. Therefore, the woman judged falsely before she sinned. Hence, she was deceived.
Praeterea, sicut Magister in eadem dist. dicit, et etiam Augustinus super Genes. ad litteram, in tali specie venire permissus est Diabolus in qua eius malitia facile posset deprehendi. Sed in quacumque specie venisset, potuisset deprehendi, si homo in statu innocentiae decipi non poterat. Decipi igitur potuit. 4. According to the Master, and as Augustine also says: “The devil was allowed to come in that form in order that his malice could be easily detected.” But, if in the state of innocence man could not have been deceived, the devil could have been detected in any form in which he came. Therefore, man could be deceived.
Praeterea, mulier, audita promissione serpentis, speravit illam se consequi posse; alias stulte appetiisset, cum tamen stultitia ante peccatum non fuerit. Sed nullus sperat quod opinatur esse impossibile. Ergo, cum esset impossibile id quod Daemon promittebat, videtur quod mulier ante peccatum, hoc credens, decepta fuerit. 5. When the woman heard what the serpent promised, she hoped to be able to obtain it; otherwise, her desire would have been stupid. I foxvever, there was no stupidity before the fall. But no one hopes for what he considers impossible. Therefore, since what the devil promised was impossible, it seems that in believing this the woman was deceived before the fall.
Praeterea, intellectus hominis in statu innocentiae collativus erat, et deliberatione indigens. Non autem indigebat deliberatione nisi ad vitandum errorem. Ergo errare poterat in statu innocentiae. 6. In the state of innocence man’s understanding argued to conclusions and needed deliberation. But it needed deliberation only to avoid error. Therefore, in the state of innocence it could err.
Praeterea, intellectus Daemonis cum non sit corpori coniunctus, videtur esse multo perspicacior quam intellectus hominis etiam in statu innocentiae, qui erat corpori coniunctus. Sed Daemon decipi potest; unde sancti dicunt quod quando videbant Christum Daemones infirmitates patientem, extimabant eum purum hominem, quando autem miracula facientem, tunc extimabant eum Deum esse. Ergo multo fortius homo in statu innocentiae decipi potuit. 7. The understanding of demons, since it is not united to a body, seems to be much more discerning than the understanding of man in the state of innocence, which was joined to a body. But a demon can be deceived. Consequently, the saints say that, when the demons saw Christ suffering infirmities, they thought He was simply man, but, when they saw him working miracles, they thought He was God. Therefore, man in the state of innocence with much greater reason can be deceived.
Praeterea, dum homo primo peccato peccavit, in ipso actu nondum erat in statu culpae; quia cum status culpae causetur ex peccato, ante primum peccatum fuisset aliud peccatum. Sed in actu quo primo homo peccavit, deceptus fuit. Ergo ante statum culpae homo decipi potuit. 8. While man was committing the first sin, in that act itself he was not in the state of guilt. For, since the state of guilt is caused by sin, there would have been another sin before the first sin. But in the act by which man first sinned he was deceived. Therefore, he could be deceived before the state of guilt.
Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, II libro: haec, scilicet cognitio fallax, Adae extiterat noviter plasmato. Sed quicumque habet fallacem cognitionem, decipitur. Ergo Adam deceptus fuit in ipsa novitate suae plasmationis. 9. Damascene says: “This,” that is, fallacious knowledge, “existed in Adam when he was first created.” But whoever has fallacious knowledge is deceived. Therefore, Adam was deceived when he was first created.
Praeterea, speculativa cognitio est contra affectionem divisa. Sed potest esse peccatum in affectiva sine hoc quod sit aliqua deceptio in speculativa parte; quia multoties habentes scientiam contra scientiam agimus. Ergo et potuit esse in primo homine deceptio in parte speculativa, antequam esset peccatum in affectiva 10. Speculative knowledge is distinguished from the affections. But there can be sin in the affective part without deception in the speculative part. For, many times we have knowledge and act contrary to it. Therefore, in the first man, too, there could have been deception in the speculative part before there was sin in the affective part.
Praeterea, sicut habetur in Glosa I Tim. capit. II, 14, super illud: Adam non est seductus etc., Adam non fuit seductus eo modo quo mulier, ut putaret esse verum quod Diabolus suggerebat; in eo tamen fuisse seductum credi potest, quod commissum veniale putaverit, quod peremptorium erat. Ergo Adam ante peccatum decipi potuit. 11. As the Gloss on the first Epistle to Timothy (2:14), “Adam was not seduced... “ reads: “Adam was not led astray in the way the woman was, that is, so that he thought that what the devil suggested was true. Still we can believe that he was led astray in this, that he thought that the sin committed was venial when it was mortal.” Therefore, before the fall Adam could be deceived.
Praeterea, nullus liberatur a deceptione nisi per notitiam veritatis. Sed Adam non omnia sciebat. Ergo non in omnibus poterat a deceptione esse immunis. 12. No one is freed from deception except through knowledge of the truth. But Adam did not know all things. Therefore, he could not have been free from deception in all things.
Si dicatur, quod servabatur per divinam providentiam a deceptione.- Contra: divina providentia maxime in necessitatibus subvenit. Sed in maxima necessitate quando fuisset ei utilissimum a seductione liberari, divina providentia non servavit eum a seductione illaesum. Ergo multo minus in aliis fuisset divina providentia a deceptione liberatus. 13 It was said that through divine providence he was saved from deception.—On the contrary, divine providence brings assistance especially in necessary matters. But in his greatest need, when it would have been most useful for him to be freed from being led astray, divine providence did not protect him from being misled. Therefore, with much less reason would divine providence have freed him from being led astray in other matters.
Praeterea, homo in statu innocentiae dormivisset, ut dicit Boetius in Lib. de duabus naturis, et eadem ratione etiam somniasset. Sed in somnio quilibet homo decipitur, cum aliqualiter similitudinibus rerum inhaereat quasi rebus ipsis. Ergo Adam in statu innocentiae decipi potuit. 14. In the state of innocence man would have slept, and likewise would have dreamed, as Boethius says. But every man is deceived in dreams, since to some extent he considers the likenesses of things as if they were the things themselves. Therefore, in the state of innocence Adam could be deceived.
Praeterea, Adam in statu innocentiae sensibus corporalibus usus fuisset. Sed in cognitione sensitiva, frequenter accidit deceptio, sicut cum unum duo videntur, et cum id quod a remotis videtur, parvum videtur. Ergo Adam in statu innocentiae non fuisset omnino a deceptione liber. 15. Adam would have used his bodily senses. But there is frequent deception in sense knowledge, as when one thing seems to be two, and when something which is seen from a distance seems small. Therefore, in the state of innocence Adam would not have been altogether free from deception.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Sicut dicit Augustinus, approbare vera pro falsis non est natura instituti hominis, sed poena damnati. Ergo in statu innocentiae non poterat decipi; quod est vera pro falsis approbare. 1. As Augustine says: “To accept as true things that are false is not natural for man as he was created, but a punishment for the condemned.”“ Therefore, in the state of innocence he could not be deceived, which is to accept as true things which are false.
Praeterea, anima nobilior est corpore. Sed in statu innocentiae homo nullum defectum pati poterat in corpore. Ergo multo minus deceptionem, quae est animae defectus. 2. The soul is more noble than the body. But in the state of innocence man could suffer no bodily defect. Therefore, much less could he suffer deception, which is a defect of the soul.
Praeterea, in statu innocentiae nihil poterat esse contra hominis voluntatem, quia sic potuisset ei inesse dolor. Sed decipi est omnibus contrarium voluntati, secundum Augustinum, etiam his qui decipere volunt. Ergo in statu innocentiae homo decipi non poterat. 3. In the state of innocence there could be nothing contrary to man’s will, since pain thus would have been able to exist in him. But in man, to be deceived is contrary to his will, according to Augustine, even in those who want to deceive. Therefore, in the state of innocence man could not be deceived.
Praeterea, omnis error vel est culpa, vel poena: quorum neutrum in statu innocentiae esse poterat. Ergo nec error. 4. Every error is due either to guilt or to punishment, neither of which could exist in the state of innocence. Therefore, error could not exist there either.
Praeterea, quando id quod est superius in anima, dominatur inferiori, non potest esse error; quia per id quod est superius in anima, scilicet synderesim, et intellectum principiorum, tota cognitio hominis rectificatur. Sed in statu innocentiae id quod est inferius in homine, erat omnino superiori subditum. Ergo non poterat esse tunc deceptio. 5. When that which is higher in the soul directs what is lower, there cannot be any error, because the whole of man’s knowledge is corrected by that which is higher in the soul, that is to say, by synderesis and the understanding of principles. But in the state of innocence that which is lower in man was subject to higher reason. Therefore, there could not then be deception.
Praeterea, secundum Augustinum: posse credere natura est hominum, credere vero gratia fidelium. Ergo eadem ratione posse decipi est naturae, decipi autem vitii. Sed in statu innocentiae non erat vitium. Ergo nec tunc poterat esse deceptio. 6. According to Augustine: “The capacity to believe is in man’s nature, but actual belief is a gift of grace to the faithful.” Therefore, by the same token, the capacity to be deceived is due to nature, but to be deceived is a defect. But in the state of innocence there were no defects. Therefore, neither could there be deception.
Praeterea, sicut dicit Damascenus in libro II, homo in statu innocentiae dulcissimo fructu contemplationis lasciviens, hac, scilicet contemplatione, nutritus est. Sed cum homo convertitur ad divina, non decipitur. Ergo Adam in statu illo decipi non poterat. 7. Damascene says that in the state of innocence man “delighted in the sweetest fruit of contemplation, being nourished by this [contemplation 1.”“ But, when man is turned toward the things of God, he is not deceived. Therefore, in that state Adam could not be deceived.
Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit: quidquid mali patimur, peccata nostra meruerunt. Sed deceptio est malum. Ergo ante peccatum esse non potuit. 8. Jerome says: “Whatever evil we suffer, our sins have merited.” But deception is evil. Therefore, it could not exist before sin.
REPLY
Responsio. Dicendum, quod circa hoc est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt, quod cum Adam non habuerit simpliciter omnium rerum scientiam, sed quaedam cognoverit, et quaedam ignoraverit: in his quorum notitiam habebat, nullo modo decipi poterat, ut in his quae naturaliter cognoscuntur, et in his quae sibi divinitus revelabantur; in aliis autem quorum scientiam non habebat, sicut sunt cogitationes cordium, futura contingentia, et singularia a sensu absentia, poterat quidem falsam aestimationem habere, leviter in huiusmodi aliquod falsum opinando, non autem ita quod praecise assensum praeberet. Et ideo dicunt, quod in eum error cadere non poterat, nec iterum falsa pro veris approbaret, quia in his designatur praecisus assensus ad id quod est falsum. There are two opinions on this question. For some” say that, since Adam did not have full knowledge of everything, but knew some things and was ignorant of others, in the things which he knew he could not be deceived, that is, in those which he knew naturally and those which were divinely revealed to him. But in other things, which he did not know, such as men’s secret thoughts, future contingents, and individual things absent from his senses, he could indeed judge falsely, if without serious consideration he formed some false opinion about these things, not, however, in such a way that he gave unqualified assent. Accordingly, they say that error could have no place in him, nor could he accept something false as true, because in these things there is question of unqualified assent to that which is false.
Alii vero hoc dictum improbare nituntur, ex hoc quod Augustinus, omnem falsam aestimationem errorem nominat, et dicit etiam omnem errorem malum esse, in magnis quidem magnum, in parvis autem parvum. But others attempt to reject this declaration because Augustine calls every false judgment error and also says that every error is evil, great in important matters, and small in small matters.
Sed in hoc non est multum insistendum: quia cum de rebus agitur, debet quaestio nominum intermitti. Unde dico, quod non solum non potuit in statu innocentiae error esse, sed nec etiam qualiscumque falsa opinio; quod sic patet. But we should not insist too much on this, because we should pass over the question of names when we are treating of things. Hence, I say that in the state of innocence there could be not only no error but not even false opinion of any sort. This is evident from the following.
Quamvis enim in statu innocentiae potuerit esse alicuius boni carentia, nullatenus tamen esse poterat aliqua corruptio boni. Bonum autem ipsius intellectus est cognitio veritatis; et ideo habitus illi quibus intellectus perficitur ad cognoscendum verum, virtutes dicuntur, ut dicitur VI Ethic., utpote intellectus actum bonum reddentes. Falsitas autem non solum est carentia veritatis, sed ipsius corruptio. Non enim sic se habet ad veritatem ille qui omnino caret veritatis cognitione, in quo est carentia veritatis, quamvis contrarium non opinetur, et ille qui habet falsam opinionem, cuius aestimatio corrupta est per falsitatem. Unde sicut verum est bonum intellectus, ita falsum est malum ipsius, propter quod habitus opinativus non est virtus intellectualis, quia eo contingit falsum dicere, ut dicitur VI Ethic. Nullus autem actus virtutis malus esse potest, ac si ipsa opinio falsa, sit quidam malus actus intellectus. Unde cum in statu innocentiae non fuerit aliqua corruptio vel aliquod malum, non potuit esse in statu innocentiae aliqua falsa opinio. Although in the state of innocence some good could be absent, in no sense could there be any corruption of a good. However, the good of our understanding is the knowledge of truth. Accordingly, those habits by which the understanding is perfected for knowledge of the truth are called virtues, as is said in the Ethics, because they make the act of the understanding good. Falsity, on the other hand, is not only lack of truth but also a corruption of it. For one who has no knowledge of truth at all, who lacks the truth, yet has no contrary opinion, does not have the same relation to truth as one who holds some false opinion and whose judgment is vitiated by falsity. Consequently, just as truth is the good of the understanding, so that which is false is its evil. For this reason, the habit of opinion is not an intellectual virtue, since by it one says what is false, as we see in the Ethics. But no act of virtue can be evil, as if the false opinion itself would be an evil act of [the virtue of ] understanding. Consequently, since in the state of innocence there was not any corruption or any evil, there could not be any false opinion in that state.
Dicit etiam Commentator in III de anima, quod falsa opinio ita se habet in cognoscibilibus, sicut monstrum in natura corporali. Est enim falsa opinio proveniens praeter intentionem ipsorum principiorum primorum, quae sunt quasi virtutes seminales cognitionis, sicut et monstra eveniunt praeter intentionem virtutis naturalis agentis; et hoc ideo quia omne malum est praeter intentionem, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de divinis Nomin. Unde, sicut in conceptione humani corporis in statu innocentiae nulla monstruositas accidisset, ita etiam in intellectu eius nulla falsitas esse posset. The Commentator also says that a false opinion has the same place in matters of knowledge as a monstrosity has in physical nature. For a false opinion is one which originates without being intended by first principles, which are the seminal powers, as it were, of knowledge, just as monstrosities originate without being intended by the natural power which is at work. This is because all evil is “unintended,” as Dionysius says. Hence, just as in the state of innocence there would be no monstrosities in the conception of the human body, so in understanding there could be no falsity.
Quod item patet ex hoc quod semper contingit inordinatio quando aliquid movetur a non proprio motivo; sicut si voluntas moveatur a delectabili sensus, cum debeat moveri tantummodo ab honesto. Proprium autem motivum intellectus est id quod habet infallibilem veritatem. Unde quandocumque intellectus movetur ab aliquo fallibili signo, est aliqua inordinatio in ipso, sive perfecte sive imperfecte moveatur. Unde, cum nulla inordinatio in intellectu hominis in statu innocentiae esse potuerit, nunquam intellectus hominis inclinatus fuisset magis in unam partem quam in aliam, nisi ab infallibili aliquo motivo. This is likewise clear from the fact that disorder always arises when a thing is moved by something which is not its proper mover, as would happen if the will should be moved by what gives pleasure to sense, since it should be moved only by what is noble. The proper mover of the understanding, however, is that which contains infallible truth. Consequently, whenever the understanding is moved by some fallible sign, there is some disorder in it, whether the movement is complete or incomplete. As a result, since in the state of innocence there could be no disorder in man’s understanding, it would never have been inclined more to one part than to the other except by an infallible motive.
Ex quo patet quod in eo non solum nulla falsa opinio fuisset; sed penitus in eo nulla fuisset opinio; et quidquid cognovisset, secundum certitudinem cognovisset. From this it is clear that not only was there no false opinion in man’s understanding, there was no opinion there at all. And whatever he knew, he knew with certainty.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod error ille ex quo omne peccatum procedit, est error electionis, prout eligit quod eligendum non est, secundum quem omnis malus ignorans dicitur a philosopho in III Ethicorum. Hic autem error praesupponit inordinationem in parte appetitiva. Ex hoc enim quod appetitus sensibilis afficitur ad suum delectabile, et appetitus superior ei non repugnat, impeditur ratio ne id quod habitualiter habet, in electionem deducat. Et sic patet quod iste error non omnino praecedit peccatum, sed sequitur. 1. That error from which all sin proceeds is an error of choice, in so far as one chooses what should not be chosen. According to this, the Philosopher says that everyone who is evil lacks knowledge. But this error presupposes disorder in the appetitive part. For it is due to the fact that sensible appetite is drawn toward that which delights it and the higher appetite does not resist it, that reason is hindered from choosing that which it has habitually. Consequently, it is evident that this error does not entirely precede sin, but follows it.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod illud quod apprehenditur ut apparens bonum, non potest esse omnino non bonum, sed secundum aliquid bonum est: et secundum hoc ut bonum apprehenditur a principio; utpote cum cibus prohibitus apprehenditur ut visu decorus et delectabilis gustui, et tunc appetitus sensibilis in huiusmodi bonum fertur sicut in proprium obiectum. Sed quando superior appetitus inferiorem sequitur, tunc sequitur illud quod est bonum secundum quid, ut bonum sibi simpliciter; et sic ex deordinatione appetitus sequitur postmodum error electionis, ut dictum est. 2. That which is perceived as an apparent good cannot lack all goodness whatsoever. Rather, it is good to some extent, and in this respect it is perceived as good from the beginning. This is the case Mien some forbidden food is perceived as agreeable to see and pleasant to taste, and when the sensible appetite is attracted to such a good as to its proper object. But when the higher appetite follows the lower, it follows that which is good in some respect, as though it were good for it without qualification. Therefore, error of choice follows afterward from disorder of appetite, as has been said.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod haec ratio contra utramque opinionem videtur esse, si intelligamus quod mulier crediderit ex natura sua serpentem accepisse usum loquendi; cum illi etiam qui hominem in statu innocentiae credunt falli potuisse, nullo modo credant eum potuisse falli in diiudicandis naturis rerum, cum rerum naturalium plenam cognitionem habuerit. Hoc autem est contra naturam serpentis quod usum loquendi habeat per naturam, cum hoc sit solum animalis rationalis. Et ideo oportet dicere quod non credidit mulier serpentem usum loquendi accepisse secundum naturam suam, sed secundum aliquam virtutem occulte interius operantem; nec contulit an esset a Deo vel Daemone. 3. If we understand that the woman believed that the serpent had received the use of speech as part of its nature, this argument seems to be contrary to both opinions. For those who believe that in the state of innocence man could be deceived do not at all believe that he could be deceived when judging about the natures of things, since he had full knowledge of natural things. However, it is contrary to the serpent’s nature to have the use of speech naturally, since this belongs only to rational animals. Therefore, we have to say that the woman did not believe that the serpent had the use of speech by its nature, but by reason of some power acting inside it in a hidden way. She did not consider whether it was from God or from the demon.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod ratio illa sic intelligenda est (quare in specie serpentis apparuerit) non quia deprehendi non posset in quacumque specie appareret, sed quia in tali specie apparens facilius poterat deprehendi. 4. That reason why he appeared in the form of a serpent should not be taken to mean that he could not be detected under whatever form he appeared, but that he could be more easily detected under such a form.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod mulier speravit se posse aliquo modo consequi quod serpens promisit, et credidit hoc aliquo modo esse possibile; et in hoc seducta fuit, secundum apostolum, I Tim. II, 14. Sed istam seductionem praecessit quaedam mentis elatio, qua suam excellentiam inordinate appetiit, quam concepit statim ad verba serpentis, sicut homines frequenter ad verba adulantium supra seipsos efferuntur. Et haec quidem elatio praecedens, fuit excellentiae propriae in generali, quae est primum peccatum, quod consecuta est seductio, quia credidit esse verum quod serpens dicebat; et sic consecuta est elatio, qua determinate hanc excellentiam appetiit quam serpens promittebat. 5. The woman hoped that in some way she would be able to get what the serpent promised, and she believed that this was in some way possible. In this she was led astray, as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:14). But a certain elation of mind preceded that leading astray, and because of it she inordinately desired her own excellence, which she realized as soon as the serpent spoke, as men frequently are lifted above themselves when they hear words of flatterers. And this exaltation which preceded concerned her own proper excellence in general and is the first sin. There followed this the seduction by which she believed that what the serpent was saying was true. Thus, there resulted the exaltation with which she definitely desired this excellence which the serpent promised.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod intellectus hominis in statu innocentiae indigebat deliberatione ne incideret in errorem, sicut indigebat comestione, ne corpus eius deficeret. Erat autem ita rectae deliberationis, ut deliberando posset omnem errorem vitare, sicut comedendo, omnem defectum corporalem. Unde sicut si non comederet, peccaret omittendo, ita si non deliberaret, cum tempus esset; et sic error peccatum sequeretur. 6. In the state of innocence man’s understanding needed deliberation in order not to fall into error, just as he needed to eat in order that his body might not waste away. However, he was so gifted with correct deliberation that by deliberating he would be able to avoid every error, just as by eating he could avoid every bodily infirmity. Therefore, just as he would commit a sin of omission if he did not eat, so,, if he did not deliberate when the occasion was given, error and sin would follow.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod sicut homo in statu innocentiae defendebatur a passione corporali intrinseca, sicut est febri, et huiusmodi, per efficaciam naturae; ab exteriori autem, sicut est percussio et vulnus, non ex aliqua virtute interiori, cum non haberet dotem impassibilitatis, sed ex providentia divina, quae eum ab omni nocumento servabat immunem; ita etiam ab illa deceptione quae interius contingit, cum aliquis seipsum paralogizat, defendebatur vigore propriae rationis, ab exteriori autem deceptione defendebatur auxilio divino, quod sibi ad omnia necessaria tunc aderat; Daemonibus autem non adest, et propter hoc decipi possunt. 7. It was by his natural power that man in the state of innocence was protected from internal bodily suffering, as that of fever and the like, but it was not by any internal power that he was protected from external suffering, as blows or wounds, since he did not have the gift of impassibility. This was due rather to divine providence, which preserved him from all injury. Similarly, it was by the strength of his own reason that he was protected from the deception which comes from within, as when someone independently reasons incorrectly, but it was by the divine aid, which he had at that time for all necessary matters, that he was protected from deception from without. The demons, however, do not have this; hence, they can be deceived.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod actus momentanei simul dum esse incipiunt suum effectum habent, sicut in eodem instanti quo aer illuminatur, oculus videt. Unde cum motus voluntatis, in quo primo consistit peccatum, sit in instanti: in eodem instanti quo peccavit, fuit statu innocentiae destitutus; et sic decipi potuit in illo instanti. 8. Instantaneous actions have their effect as soon as they begin, just as the eye sees in the same instant that the air is illuminated. Hence, since the movement of will, in which sin primarily consists, is instantaneous, one loses the state of innocence in the same instant in which he sins. Thus, he could be deceived in that instant.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod Damascenus loquitur de fallacia primi hominis qua in ipso peccato deceptus est. Quod quidem peccatum noviter plasmatus commisit; non enim diu in statu innocentiae perseveravit. 9. Damascene is speaking of the fallacy of the first man by which he was deceived in the sin itself. And, indeed, he committed this sin shortly after he was created, for he did not long persevere in the state of innocence.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod ex hoc quod anima hominis in statu innocentiae coniuncta erat summo bono, non poterat aliquis defectus in homine esse quamdiu talis coniunctio continuaretur. Haec autem coniunctio facta erat principaliter per affectum: unde antequam affectiva corrumperetur, nec deceptio in intellectu, nec aliquis defectus in corpore esse poterat; quamvis e converso potuerit esse defectus in affectu, non praeexistente defectu in speculativo intellectu, eo quod coniunctio non perficitur ad Deum in intellectu, sed in affectu. 10. Since the soul of man in the state of innocence was united to the highest good, there could be no defect in man as long as this union lasted. But this union was brought about principally through the affections. Consequently, no deception could exist in the understanding nor any defect in the body before the affective part was corrupted, although, conversely, there could be defect in the affections without a pre-existing defect in speculative understanding, since the union with God is not completed in the understanding but in the affections.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod illam falsam opinionem qua credidit esse veniale quod erat mortiferum, in Adam praecessit mentis elatio, sicut et de muliere dictum est. 11. In Adam the elation of spirit preceded the false opinion by which he believed that what was mortally sinful was only venially so, just as happened with the woman, as has been said.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod in his quorum notitiam non habebat, a deceptione defendi poterat partim ab interiori, quia eius intellectus in alteram partem inclinatus non esset nisi a sufficienti motivo; partim, et principalius, a divina providentia quae eum a deceptione servasset immunem. 12. In those things which he did not know he was able to be protected from deception partly from within, since his understanding would not be inclined to one part except for a sufficient motive, and partly, and more especially, by divine providence, which preserved him from deception.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod in statu quo peccavit, divinum ei auxilium non defuisset ne seduceretur, si ad Deum se convertisset; quod quia non fecit, in peccatum et seductionem decidit; et tamen illa seductio peccatum consecuta est, ut ex dictis, patet. 13. In the state in which he sinned had he turned to God, he would have had divine help to keep him from being led astray. But, since he did not do this, he fell into sin and was led astray. Yet, his being led astray followed the sin, as is clear from what has been said.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod quidam dicunt quod Adam in statu innocentiae non somniasset. Sed istud non est necessarium. Somnii enim visio non est in parte intellectiva, sed in parte sensitiva; unde deceptio non fuisset in intellectu qui liberum usum in somno non habuisset, sed magis in parte sensitiva. 14. Some say that in the state of innocence Adam did not dream. But this is not necessary, for the vision of dreams is not in the intellective, but in the sensitive, part. Hence, the deception would not have been in the understanding, which does not have free exercise in sleep, but in the sensitive part.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod quando sensus repraesentat secundum quod accipit, non est falsitas in sensu, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de vera religione, sed falsitas est in intellectu, qui iudicat hoc modo esse in rebus sicut sensus demonstrat. Quod nunquam in Adam fuisset, quia vel a iudicio cessasset intellectus, ut in somnis, vel in vigilando de sensibilibus iudicans, verum iudicium habuisset. 15. When sense represents what it receives, there is no falsity in sense, as Augustine says, but falsity is in the understanding, which judges that things exist in reality in the way in which sense portrays them. However, this never happened in Adam, since his understanding would either have refrained from judgment, as in dreams, or, when judging about sensible objects when awake, would have had a true judgment.
Q. 17: The Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence

ARTICLE VII

In the seventh article we ask:
Would the children who were born of Adam in the state of innocence have had full knowledge of all things, as Adam did?

[ARTICLE II Sent., 23, 2, 2; S.T., I, 101, 1.]
Septimo quaeritur utrum pueri qui ex Adam in statu innocentiae nascerentur, plenam rerum omnium scientiam haberent, sicut et Adam habuit Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that they would, for
Quia secundum Anselmum, qualis fuit Adam, tales etiam filios generasset. Sed Adam habuit omnium naturalium plenam scientiam, ut dictum est prius. Ergo et illam eius filii mox nati habuissent. 1. According to Anselm, Adam would have begotten sons such as he himself was. But Adam had full knowledge of all natural things, as has been said. Therefore, his sons, too, would have had that knowledge immediately at birth.
Praeterea, sicut affectus perficitur virtute, ita intellectus scientia. Sed Adam filii in statu innocentiae nati, mox cum plenitudine omnium virtutum nati essent: transfudisset enim in eos originalem iustitiam, ut Anselmus dicit. Ergo et similiter omnem scientiam habuissent. 2. As the affections are perfected by virtue, so the understanding is perfected by knowledge. But the sons born of Adam, in the state of innocence, would have had the fullness of all the virtues immediately at birth. For he would have passed original justice on to them, as Anselm says. Therefore, they would likewise have had all knowledge.
Praeterea, secundum Bedam, infirmitas, concupiscentia, ignorantia et malitia consequuntur ex peccato. Sed in pueris mox natis nulla fuisset concupiscentia, infirmitas vel malitia; ergo nec etiam ignorantia aliqua, et ita habuissent omnem scientiam. 3. According to Bede, weakness, concupiscence, ignorance, and malice result from sin. But there would have been no wickedness, weakness, or concupiscence in those children immediately at birth. Therefore, there would not have been any ignorance either; hence, they would have had all knowledge.
Praeterea, magis decuit eos nasci perfectos in anima quam in corpore. Sed in corpore absque omni defectu nati fuissent. Ergo et in anima absque omni ignorantia. 4. It would have been more fitting for them to be born perfect in soul than in body. But they would have been born without any bodily defect. Therefore, there would likewise have been no ignorance in their souls.
Praeterea, homo in statu innocentiae, secundum Damascenum, fuit sicut alius Angelus. Sed Angeli mox in sua conditione omnium naturalium notitiam habuerunt. Ergo et eadem ratione homines in statu innocentiae. 5. According to Damascene, man in the state of innocence was “as another angel.” But, immediately upon their creation, the angels had knowledge of all natural things. Therefore, for the same reason, men in the state of innocence had it, also.
Praeterea, eiusdem naturae fuit anima Adae et animae filiorum eius. Sed anima Adae in sui principio condita fuit omni plena scientia naturali, ut dictum est. Ergo et animae filiorum eius in eadem scientiae plenitudine conderentur. 6. Adam’s soul and the souls of his sons had the same nature. But in its very beginning Adam’s soul was created full of all natural knowledge, as has been said. Therefore, the souls of his sons would have been created with the same fullness of knowledge.
Praeterea, maior perfectio cognitionis debetur homini quam aliis animalibus. Sed alia animalia mox nata habent naturalem aestimationem convenientis et nocivi; sicut agnus fugit lupum, et sequitur matrem mox natus. Ergo multo fortius pueri in statu innocentiae perfectam scientiam habuissent. 7. Greater perfection of knowledge belongs to man than to the other animals. But, immediately at birth, the other animals have natural [instinctive] judgment of what is helpful and what is harmful. Thus, a newborn lamb flees from the wolf and follows its mother. Therefore, children in the state of innocence with much greater reason would have had perfect knowledge.
Sed in contrarium. To the Contrary
Est auctoritas Hugonis de s. Victore, qui dicit, quod non fuissent nati perfecti in scientia, sed ad eam per temporis spatium pervenissent. 1. Hugh of St. Victor says that they would not have been born with perfect knowledge, but would have reached it in the course of time.
Praeterea, cum anima sit corporis perfectio, oportet proficere proportionaliter animam et corpus. Sed pueri in statu innocentiae non habuissent perfectam staturam in corpore, sicut et Adam habuit in principio suae conditionis. Ergo eadem ratione nec habuissent plenam scientiam, sicut Adam habuit. 2.. Since the soul is the perfection of the body, its development must be proportionate to that of the body. But in the state of innocence Adam’s children would not have had full bodily stature as Adam did when he was first created. Therefore, for the same reason they would not have had the fullness of knowledge as Adam had.
Praeterea, filiorum est accipere a patre esse, naturam et disciplinam. Sed si filii Adam mox nati plenam scientiam habuissent, ab eo disciplinam non potuissent accipere. Ergo non servaretur inter eos et primum parentem completus paternitatis ordo. 3. Sons receive existence, nature, and instruction from their father. But, if Adam’s sons had had full knowledge as soon as they were born, they would not have been able to receive instruction from him. Therefore, the full relationship of paternity would have not been preserved between them and the first parent.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod circa hoc est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt, quod pueri in statu innocentiae, quantum ad ea quae sunt animae, perfecti fuissent sicut et Adam, et quantum ad virtutes, et quantum ad scientiam. Quod autem non essent perfecti secundum corpus, hoc erat propter necessitatem materni uteri, quia oportebat nasci. On this question there have been two opinions. For some have said that children in the state of innocence would have been perfect, just as Adam, with reference to everything belonging to the soul, that is, as regards both virtues and knowledge. They would not, however, have been perfect as regards the body. This was due to the exigencies of their mother’s womb, for they had to be born.
Alii vero sequentes Hugonem, dicunt, quod sicut secundum corpus non statim accepissent perfectam staturam, sed ad eam profecissent tempore, ita etiam ad perfectam scientiam tempore pervenissent. Others, however, following Hugh, say that, just as they would not immediately have received perfect stature of body, but in time would have reached it, so, too, they would in time have reached perfect knowledge.
Ut autem sciatur quae harum opinionum verior sit, sciendum est, quod alia ratio est de Adam, et de filiis eius mox natis. Adam enim, quia instituebatur ut principium totius humani generis, oportuit ut statim conditus non solum haberet id quod pertinet ad principium naturalis perfectionis, sed id quod pertinet ad terminum. Filii autem eius, qui non constituebantur ut principium humani generis, sed ut ex principio existentes, non oportebat in termino perfectionis naturalis institui. Sufficiebat autem, si habebant tantum de perfectione mox nati, quantum initium naturalis perfectionis requirit. However, in order to know which of these opinions contains more truth, we must remember that the same reasons do not hold for Adam and for his sons immediately upon birth. For, since Adam was ordained to be the source of the whole human race, as soon as he was created he had to have not only what belonged to the beginning of natural perfection but also that which belonged to its term. But his sons, who were not constituted the source of the human race, but as having existence from its source, did not have to be set at the term of natural perfection. It was enough for them to have at birth only as much as the initial state of natural perfection demands.
Initium autem naturalis perfectionis quoad cognitionem secundum duas opiniones diversimode assignatur. Quidam enim, ut Platonici, posuerunt quod anima ad corpus venit plena omnibus scientiis, sed nube corporis opprimitur, et impeditur ne scientia habita libere uti possit nisi quantum ad quaedam universalia; sed postmodum per exercitium studii et sensuum, huiusmodi impedimenta tolluntur, ut libere sua scientia uti possit: et sic discere dicunt esse idem quod reminisci. Quod si haec opinio vera esset, tunc oporteret dicere, quod pueri mox nati in statu innocentiae omnium scientiam habuissent, quia corpus in statu illo erat omnino animae subditum, unde per molem corporis non potuisset anima ita opprimi ut suam perfectionem quodam modo amitteret. However, according to two opinions, the initial stage of the natural perfection of knowledge is placed at different levels. For some, as the Platonists, have held that the soul comes to the body filled with all the sciences, but it is clouded over by the body and thus its capacity for free use of the knowledge which it has is inhibited except with reference to some universals. But afterwards, through the exercise of study and of the senses, these obstacles are removed, so that it can use its knowledge freely. Thus, they say that learning is the same as remembering. But, if this opinion were true, we would have to say that in the state of innocence, as soon as children were born, they would have had knowledge of all things because the body in that state of innocence was altogether subject to the soul, and, so, the weight of the body would not have been able so to oppress the soul that it would lose its perfection in any way.
Sed quia haec opinio procedere videtur ex hoc quod eadem ponitur natura animae et Angeli, ut sic anima in suae creationis principio plenam scientiam habeat, sicut et intelligentia dicitur esse plena formis creata; ratione cuius Platonici dicebant animas fuisse ante corpora, et post corpus redire ad compares stellas, quasi quasdam intelligentias: quae quidem opinio non est consona Catholicae veritati. But this opinion seems to proceed from the position that the nature of the angels and of the soul is the same, so that the soul would have full knowledge as soon as it is created, just as an intelligence is said to be created full of forms. For this reason, the Platonists said that souls existed before being united to bodies and, after leaving bodies, return as intelligences to stars of rank equal to theirs. But this opinion is out of harmony with Catholic truth.
Ideo secundum opinionem Aristotelis alii dicunt, quod intellectus humanus est ultimus in ordine intelligibilium, sicut materia prima in ordine sensibilium; et sicut materia secundum sui essentiam considerata nullam formam habet, ita intellectus humanus in sui principio est sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum, sed postmodum in eo scientia per sensus acquiritur virtute intellectus agentis. Sic igitur principium naturalis humanae cognitionis est esse quidem in potentia ad omnia cognoscibilia, non habere autem a principio notitiam nisi eorum quae statim per lumen intellectus agentis cognoscuntur, sicut sunt prima principia universalia. Therefore, others according to the opinion of Aristotle say that human understanding is last in the order of intelligible things, just as first matter is last in the order of sensible things. And as matter, considered in its essence, has no form, so the human understanding, in the beginning, is “like a tablet, on which nothing is written,” but, later, acquires knowledge through the senses by virtue of the agent intellect. Thus, the beginning of natural human knowledge is, indeed, to be in potency to all things knowable, but to know from the beginning only those things which are known immediately through the light of the agent intellect, that is to say, universal first principles.
Et sic non oportuit filios Adam mox natos omnem scientiam habuisse; sed ad eam tempore proficientes pervenissent. Sed tamen aliquam scientiam in eis perfectam ponere oportet, scilicet scientiam eligendorum et vitandorum, quae ad prudentiam pertinet, quia sine prudentia ceterae virtutes esse non possunt, ut probatur VI Ethic.: quas oportebat pueros habere propter originalem iustitiam. Hence, it was not necessary for Adam’s sons to have knowledge of all things immediately at birth, but they would have reached it as they advanced in age. Nevertheless, it is necessary to ascribe to them some perfect knowledge, namely, the knowledge of things which must be chosen or avoided, a knowledge which pertains to prudence. For, as is proved in the Ethics, without prudence the other virtues cannot exist. And Adam’s children must have had these virtues because of original justice.
Et haec opinio mihi videtur verior, si consideretur id quod naturae integritas requirebat. Si autem aliquid aliud ex divina gratia eis fuisset collatum ultra id quod requirit naturae integritas, hoc asseri non potest, cum non habeatur ex auctoritate expressum. To me this opinion seems to contain more truth, if we look to what was required by the integrity of nature. But, if by divine grace anything else had been given them beyond that which integrity of nature required, this could not be asserted, since there is no express authority for it.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod qualis fuit Adam, tales filios genuisset quantum ad ea quae sibi debebantur ex natura speciei. Sed quantum ad ea quae sibi debebantur ut erat principium totius humani generis, non oportebat quod filii ei similes nascerentur. 1. Adam would have begotten sons like himself in those things which were due to him by his specific nature. But it was not necessary for his sons to be born like him in those things which were due to him as the source of the whole human race.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ad perfectam coniunctionem cum Deo, quam requirebat innocentiae status, omnes virtutes requiruntur, non autem omnes scientiae. 2. For the perfect union with God, which the state of innocence demands, all the virtues are needed, but not all the sciences.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis pueri mox nati non habuissent omnem scientiam, non tamen ignorantiam habuissent quae ex peccato consequitur, quae est nescientia eorum quae debent sciri: habuissent enim nescientiam eorum quae status eorum non requirebat ut scirent. 3. Although the children would not have all knowledge as soon as they were born, they would not have had the ignorance which follows from sin, which is a lack of knowledge of things which ought to be known. For they would have been ignorant of those things which their state did not require them to know.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod etiam in corpore puerorum non fuisset aliquis defectus quo privarentur bono tunc eis debito; erat tamen in eorum corporibus carentia alicuius boni quod eis postmodum accessisset, sicut staturae perfectae, et dotum gloriae. Et similiter est dicendum ex parte animae. 4. In the bodies of these children there would have been no defect by which they would be deprived of a good which then was their due. Nevertheless, their bodies did lack a good which would accrue to them later, such as fullness of stature and the gifts of glory. The same must be said of the soul.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod Angeli secundum gradum naturae sunt altiores animabus, quamvis quantum ad beneficia gratiae, animae eis esse possint aequales; unde non oportet de natura animae concedere quod Angelo naturaliter debetur. In statu autem innocentiae dictus est homo quasi alius Angelus propter plenitudinem gratiae. 5. Angels are on a higher level of nature than souls, although souls can be equal to them in the gifts of grace. Consequently, it is not necessary to concede to the soul as something natural that which is naturally due to angels. However, in the state of innocence, man is said to be as another angel because of the fullness of grace.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod quamvis anima Adae et animae filiorum eius sint eiusdem naturae, non tamen eiusdem officii: quia anima Adae constituebatur ut quidam fons, unde in omnes posteros disciplina proveniret; et ideo oportebat eam statim esse perfectam: quod non oportuit de animabus filiorum. 6. Although the soul of Adam and the souls of his sons had the same nature, they did not have the same office. For Adam’s soul was made a source from which all teaching would come to posterity. Therefore, it had to be perfect immediately, which was not necessary for the souls of his children.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod animalia bruta in sui principio accipiunt naturalem aestimationem ad cognoscendum nocivum et conveniens, quia ad hoc ex propria inquisitione pervenire non possunt. Homo autem ad hoc et multa alia potest per rationis inquisitionem pervenire; unde non oportuit quod omnis scientia homini naturaliter insit. Et tamen scientia operabilium ad prudentiam pertinens est homini naturalior quam scientia speculabilium; unde quidam inveniuntur naturaliter prudentes, non autem naturaliter scientes, ut dicitur Ethic. VI. Et propter hoc etiam prudentiam non obliviscuntur homines de facili sicut scientiam. Et ideo etiam pueri magis tunc fuissent perfecti in his quae pertinent ad prudentiam, quam in his quae pertinent ad scientiam speculativam, ut dictum est. 7. At the beginning, brute animals receive natural [instinctive] judgment in order to know what is harmful and what is helpful, because they cannot reach this through their own investigation. Man, however, can reach this and many other things through the investigation of reason. Hence, it is not necessary for all knowledge to exist in him naturally. Nevertheless, the knowledge of practical matters, which pertains to prudence, is more natural to man than the knowledge of speculative matters. For this reason we find that some are naturally prudent but do not naturally possess learning, as is said in the Ethics. For this reason men do not forget prudence as easily as they forget science. Therefore, at that time the children would have been more perfect in the matters which pertain to prudence than in those which pertain to speculative science, as has been said.
Q. 17: The Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence

ARTICLE VIII

In the eighth article we ask:

In the state of innocence would children have had the full use of reason immediately at birth?

[ARTICLE II Sent., 20, 2, 2; S.T., I, 101, 2.]
Octavo quaeritur utrum pueri mox nati in statu innocentiae usum rationis plenarie habuissent Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that they would, for
Quia si impediti fuissent, hoc non fuisset nisi propter defectum corporis. Sed corpus in statu illo in nullo resistebat animae. Ergo nec poterat usus rationis impediri. 1. If they were restricted in its use, this would have resulted only from some bodily defect. But in that state there was nothing in which the body resisted the soul. Therefore the use of reason could not be restricted.
[55661] De veritate, q. 18 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, virtus vel potentia quae non utitur organo, non impeditur in sua operatione propter organi defectum. Sed intellectus est potentia non utens organo, ut dicitur in Lib. III de anima. Ergo actus intellectus non poterat tunc impediri propter defectum organi corporalis. 2. A virtue or power which does not use an organ is not restricted in its activity because of a defect of an organ. But the understanding is a power which does not use an organ as is said in The Soul. Therefore, the act of the understanding could not then be impeded because of the defect of a bodily organ.
Si dicatur, quod impediebatur propter defectum corporis, in quantum intellectus accipiebat a sensibus: —contra, intellectus est superior quam aliqua sensitiva potentia. Sed hoc videtur esse inordinatum quod superius ab inferiori accipiat. Cum igitur nulla inordinatio fuerit in natura hominis in statu illo, videtur quod non oportuisset intellectum a sensibus accipere. 3. If it be said that the act of understanding was restricted because of a defect of body in so far as the understanding received something from the senses, the answer is that the understanding is higher than any sense power. But it seems to be out of order for the higher to receive from the lower. Therefore, since there was nothing out of order in man’s nature in that state, it seems that it would not have been necessary for the understanding to receive from the senses.
Praeterea, intellectus indiget sensibus ad hoc ut per eos scientiam acquirat; cum autem scientiam acquisiverit, non indiget eis, sicut nec homo equo postquam explevit iter suum, ut dicit Avicenna. Sed secundum unam opinionem, pueri in statu innocentiae habuerunt plenarie habitus omnium scientiarum. Ergo non poterant impediri quin uterentur scientia habita propter imperfectionem organorum sensibilium. 4. The understanding needs the senses to acquire knowledge through them. But, once it has acquired knowledge, it does not need them, just as a man does not need a horse once he has finished his journey, as Avicenna says. But, according to one opinion, children in the state of innocence had the fullness of all knowledge. Therefore, they could not be kept from using the knowledge they had because of imperfection in the sense organs.
Praeterea, defectus organorum corporalium magis impedit sensum quam intellectum sed pueri non patiuntur tantum defectum corporalem quin possint videre et audire. Ergo nec propter defectum corporalem eorum intellectus impeditur; sed, ut videtur, propter poenam primi peccati. Hoc autem ante peccatum non fuisset. Ergo tunc pueri plenum usum intellectus habuissent mox nati. 5. Defect of bodily organs hinders sense more than understanding. But children do not suffer so great a bodily defect that they cannot see and hear. Therefore, neither is their understanding hindered because of bodily defect, but seemingly because of the punishment for the first sin. But this would not have existed before the fall. Therefore, children at that time would have had the full use of understanding as soon as they were born.
Praeterea, sicut se habent animalia bruta ad naturalem aestimationem, ita se habet homo ad notitiam quam naturaliter habet. Sed bruta animalia mox nata uti possunt naturali aestimatione. Ergo et pueri in statu innocentiae mox nati uti poterant naturali notitia ad minus primorum principiorum. 6. Man’s relation to the knowledge which he has naturally is the same as that which brute animals have to natural [instinctive] judgment. But brute animals can make use of this natural judgment immediately at birth. Therefore, in the state of innocence children were able to make use of natural knowledge, at least of first principles, immediately at birth.
Praeterea, Sap. IX, 15: corpus quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam. Sed corpus hominis in statu innocentiae non erat corruptibile. Ergo ex eo anima non aggravabatur, quin liberum usum rationis haberet. 7. Wisdom (9:15) says: “For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul...” But in the state of innocence the body was not corruptible. Therefore, the soul was not weighed down by it, and so kept from having free use of reason.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Omnis actio quae est communis animae et corpori, impeditur propter corporis defectum. Sed intelligere est actio animae et corpori communis, ut patet in I de anima. Ergo ex defectu sive imperfectione quam patiebantur pueri in corpore, usu rationis poterat impediri. 1. Every activity which is common to soul and body is hindered because of a defect of the body. But understanding is an activity common to soul and body, as is clear from The Soul. Therefore, the use of reason could be hindered by a bodily defect or imperfection which t lie children suffered.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum in Lib. III de anima, nequaquam sine phantasmate intelligit anima. Sed usus phantasiae impeditur per defectum organi corporalis. Ergo et usus intellectus; et sic idem quod prius. 2. According to the Philosopher: “The soul in no way understands without a phantasm.” But the use of the imagination can be hindered by a defect of a bodily organ. Therefore, so can the use of understanding. We conclude as before.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod circa hoc est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt, quod pueri in statu innocentiae habuissent plenum usum omnium corporalium membrorum; et quod ista ineptitudo membrorum quae in pueris nunc videtur, ut scilicet non possint uti pedibus ad incedendum et manibus ad scalpendum, et sic de aliis, totaliter ex primo peccato provenit. There are two opinions on this question. For some say that children in the state of innocence would have had the full use of all their bodily members and that the clumsiness which we now see in children, that they are not able to use their feet to walk, their hands to carve, and so on, comes entirely from the first sin.
Alii autem, considerantes huiusmodi ineptitudines ex principiis naturalibus causari, utpote ex humiditate, quam necesse est in pueris abundare dicunt quod etiam in statu innocentiae membra puerorum non fuissent omnino habilia ad suos actus, quamvis nec omnino ita deficientia sicut et modo sunt: quia nunc cum eo quod est naturae, adiungitur id quod est corruptionis. Quae quidem opinio probabilior videtur. Others, thinking that this type of clumsiness has its cause in natural principles, as moistness, which must abound in children, say that in the state of innocence the members of children would not have been altogether suitable for their acts, although they would not be so completely deficient as they now are, since now what is due to corruption has been added to that which is due to nature. And this opinion seems more probable.
Unde, cum necesse sit humiditatem praecipue in cerebro abundare in pueris, in quo vis imaginativa et aestimativa et memorativa et sensus communis sua organa habent; harum virtutum actus praecipue necesse erat impediri, et per consequens intellectum qui immediate ab huiusmodi potentiis accipit, et ad eas se convertit quandocumque est in actu; et tamen non tantum fuisset usus intellectus ligatus in pueris sicut nunc est. Si autem alia opinio esset vera, tunc in nullo usus intellectus in pueris ligatus esset. Hence, since it is necessary that moistness, especially in the brain, abound in children, and it is the brain in which imagination, natural judgment, memory, and common sense have their organs, the acts of these powers must be particularly hindered, and, consequently, understanding, which receives something immediately from these powers, and turns to them whenever it is in act, must be hindered, too. Nevertheless, the use of understanding was not fettered in children to the extent that it is now. However, if the other opinion were true, the use of understanding in children at that time would not have been fettered in any way.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod anima dupliciter a corpore potest impediri. Uno modo per modum contrarietatis, quod fit dum corpus animae resistit et eam obnubilat: quod quidem in statu innocentiae non fuisset. Alio modo per modum impotentiae et defectus: in quantum scilicet corpus non est sufficiens ad omnia illa explenda ad quae anima, quantum est de se, sufficiens esset; et hoc modo animam a corpore fuisse impeditam in statu innocentiae nihil prohibuit. Sic enim constat quod per corpus impediebatur ne obstrusa transiret, ne tanta facilitate locum mutaret, quanta cum est separata mutat; et per hunc modum impediebatur ne usum potentiarum perfecte habere posset. In hoc tamen nullus dolor fuisset, quia anima propter sui ordinationem non imperasset nisi quod corpus exequi posset. 1. The soul can be restricted by the body in two ways. One is by way of opposition, as happens when the body resists the soul and obscures it. This, however, would not have happened in the state of innocence. The other is by way of incapacity and defect, namely, in so far as the body is unable to execute all that the soul would be capable of considered in itself. And there was nothing to keep the soul from being restricted by the body in this way in the state of innocence. For it is thus evident that by reason of the body the soul is hindered from passing through things thrust in its path and from changing its location with as much ease as it does when separated from the body. In this way, also, it is kept from being able to have perfect use of its powers. Still, there would have been no pain in this, since the soul, by reason of its orderly disposition, would have given only those commands which the body could carry out.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis intellectus non utatur organo, tamen accipit a potentiis quae organo utuntur; et ideo propter impedimentum vel defectum corporalium organorum eius actus impeditur. 2. Although the understanding does not use an organ, nevertheless, it receives something from faculties which use an organ. Therefore, its act can be restricted because of an impediment or defect of the bodily organs.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod species intelligibilis id quod in ea formale est, per quod est intelligibilis actu, habet ab intellectu agente, qui est potentia superior intellectu possibili; quamvis id quod in ea materiale est, a phantasmatibus abstrahatur. Et ideo magis proprie intellectus possibilis a superiori accipit quam ab inferiori, cum id quod ab inferiori est, non possit accipi ab intellectu possibili nisi secundum quod accipit formam intelligibilitatis ab intellectu agente. 3. The intelligible species has that which is formal in it, through which it is actually intelligible, from the agent intellect, which is a higher power than the possible intellect, although that which is material in it is abstracted from phantasms. Therefore, more properly, the possible intellect receives from what is higher than from what is lower, since that which is from the lower can be received by the possible intellect only in so far as it receives the form of intelligibility from the agent intellect.
Vel dicendum, quod inferiores vires quantum ad aliquid etiam superiores sunt, maxime in virtute agendi et causandi, ex hoc ipso quod sunt propinquiores rebus exterioribus, quae sunt causa et mensura cognitionis nostrae. Et hinc est quod sensus non per se, sed secundum quod est informatus specie rei sensibilis, ministrat imaginationi, et sic deinceps. Or we should say that the lower powers are higher in some respect, especially in the ability to act and to cause. This is due to their greater proximity to external things, which are the cause and measure of our knowledge. It is for this reason that the sense serves imagination, not of itself, but in so far as it is informed by the species of a sensible thing, and so for the rest.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod secundum philosophum in III de anima, intellectiva comparatur ad phantasmata sicut ad obiecta. Unde non solum indiget intellectus noster converti ad phantasmata in acquirendo scientiam, sed etiam in utendo scientia acquisita; quod patet ex hoc quod si laedatur organum imaginativae virtutis, ut fit in phraeneticis, etiam scientia prius acquisita homo uti tunc non potest dum anima est in corpore. Dictum autem Avicennae intelligitur de anima a corpore separata, quae habet alium modum intelligendi. 4. According to the Philosopher, the intellective soul is related to phantasms as to its objects. Consequently, our understanding needs conversion to phantasms not only in acquiring knowledge but also in using knowledge once it is acquired. This is evident from the fact that, as long as the soul is in the body, a man cannot use even previously acquired knowledge if the organ of the power of imagination is injured, as happens in the insane. What Avicenna says should be taken of the soul separated from the body, which has a different mode of understanding.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod quia imaginativae virtutis organum, et memorativae et cogitativae, est in ipso cerebro, quod est locus summae humiditatis in corpore humano. Ideo etiam propter abundantiam humiditatis quae est in pueris, magis impediuntur actus harum virium quam etiam sensuum exteriorum. Intellectus autem accipit immediate non a sensibus exterioribus, sed ab interioribus. 5. The organ of the power of imagination, of memory, and of the cogitative sense is in the brain itself, which is the place of greatest moistness in the human body. Therefore, because of the large measure of moistness which is in children, the acts of these powers are hindered more than the acts of the external senses. But understanding receives immediately from the interior and not the exterior senses.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod quaedam alia animalia naturaliter sunt siccae complexionis: et ideo in principio suae creationis non est in eis tanta humiditatis abundantia, quae multum actus sensuum interiorum impediat. Homo autem naturaliter est temperatae complexionis, et oportet quod in eo abundet calidum et humidum: et ideo in principio suae generationis oportet quod proportionaliter in eo maior humiditas inveniatur. In omnibus enim generationibus animalium et plantarum principium ab humore sumitur. 6. Some other animals naturally have a dry disposition; hence, at their birth there is not so great a profusion of moistness which greatly impedes the acts of the interior senses. But man naturally has a moderate disposition, and therefore he must have a high degree of warmth and moistness. So, at the beginning of his existence there has to be proportionately more moistness in him. For all animal and plant generations begin from moistness.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod corpus quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam, non solum per impotentiam, sed etiam per resistentiam et obnubilationem. Sed corpus hominis in statu innocentiae impediebat actus animae solum per imperfectionem virtutis vel dispositionis. 7. The body which corrupts weighs down the soul not only because it is powerless but also because it resists and obscures the soul. However, the human body in the state of innocence hindered the acts of the soul only because of the imperfection of a power or disposition.