Question Twenty-One: Good

Primo utrum bonum aliquid addat super ens. Secundo utrum ens et bonum convertantur secundum supposita. Tertio utrum bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam verum. Quarto utrum omnia sint bona bonitate prima. Quinto utrum bonum creatum sit bonum per suam essentiam. Sexto utrum bonum creatum consistat in modo, specie et ordine, sicut Augustinus dicit.

Does good add anything to being? Are being and good interchangeable as to their real subjects? Is good in its essential character prior to the true? Is everything good by the first goodness? Is a created good good by its essence? Does the good of a creature consist in measure, species, and order as Augustine says?

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ARTICLE I The question concerns good, and in the first article we ask: Does good add anything to being? [ARTICLE De ver., I, 1 c; I Sent., 8, 1, 3; 9, 5, 1 ad 2 & 3; De pot., 9, 7, ad 6; S.T., I, 5, 1 & 4.]
Quaestio est de bono. Et primo quaeritur utrum bonum aliquid addat super ens	Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic.	It seems that it does, for
Unumquodque enim est ens per essentiam suam. Creatura autem non est bona per essentiam, sed per participationem. Ergo bonum addit aliquid secundum rem supra ens.	1. Everything is a being essentially. But a creature is good not essentially but by participation. Good, therefore, really adds something to being.
Praeterea, cum bonum in ratione sua includat ens, et tamen bonum secundum rationem distinguatur ab ente; oportet quod ratio boni addat supra rationem entis. Sed non potest dici quod addat super ens aliquam negationem, sicut unum, quod addit super ens indivisionem, quia tota ratio boni in positione consistit. Ergo aliquid positive addit bonum super ens; et ita videtur quod aliquid realiter addat.	2. Since good includes being in its very notion, and yet good is rationally distinct from being, the formal character of good must add something to that of being. But it cannot be said to add a negation to being, as does the one, which adds undividedness, because the whole character of good consists in something positive. Hence it adds something to being positively, and thus it seems to add to being in reality.
Sed dicebat, quod addit respectum ad finem.- Sed contra: secundum hoc enim bonum nihil aliud esset quam ens relatum. Sed ens relatum concernit determinatum genus entis, quod est ad aliquid. Ergo bonum est in aliquo uno praedicamento determinato; quod est contra philosophum in I Ethic., ubi ponit bonum in omnibus generibus.	3. The answer was given that it adds a relation to an end.—On the contrary, in this case good would be nothing but related being. But related being pertains to a definite category of being, which is called itrelation” or “to something.” Good would therefore be in a definite category. But this is contrary to what the Philosopher says, placing good in all the categories.
Praeterea, ut potest accipi ex dictis Dionysii in IV cap. de Div. Nomin., bonum est diffusivum sui et esse. Ergo per hoc est aliquid bonum per quod est diffusivum. Sed diffundere importat actionem quamdam; actio autem ab essentia procedit mediante virtute. Ergo aliquid dicitur esse bonum ratione virtutis superadditae ad essentiam; et sic bonum addit aliquid realiter super ens.	4. As can be gathered from the words of Dionysius, good tends to pour out itself and existence. A thing is good, therefore, by the fact that it is diffusive. But to pour out or diffuse implies an action, and an action proceeds from the essence through the mediation of a power. A thing is therefore said to be good by reason of a power added to the essence, and so good really adds something to being.
Praeterea, quanto magis receditur ab uno primo simplici tanto maior in rebus differentia invenitur. Sed ens et bonum in Deo sunt unum re, et distinguuntur ratione. Ergo in creaturis distinguuntur plus quam ratione; et ita distinguuntur re, cum supra distinctionem rationis non sit nisi distinctio rei.	5. The farther we get from the first being, which is one and simple, the more we find difference in things. But in God being and good are really one, being distinguished, only conceptually. In creatures, therefore, they are distinguished m ore than conceptually; and so, since there is no distinction beyond the conceptual except the real, they are distinguished really.
Praeterea, accidentalia realiter addunt supra essentiam rei. Sed bonitas est rei creatae accidentalis; alias non posset bonitatem amittere. Ergo bonum addit aliquid realiter super ens.	6. Accidentals really add something to the essence. But goodness is accidental to the creature; otherwise it could not be lost. Good therefore really adds something to being.
Praeterea, omne illud quod dicitur per informationem alicuius, addit aliquid realiter super illud, eo quod nihil informatur seipso. Sed bonum dicitur per informationem, ut dicitur in commento libri de causis; ergo bonum addit aliquid supra ens.	7. Whatever is predicated as informing something else really adds something to it, since nothing is informed by itself. Good, however, is predicated as informing, as is said in The Causes. It therefore adds something to being.
Praeterea, nihil determinatur se ipso; sed bonum determinat ens; ergo bonum addit aliquid super ens.	8. Nothing is determined by itself. But good determines being. It therefore adds something to being.
Sed dicebat, quod bonum determinat ens secundum rationem. —Sed contra: aut illi rationi respondet aliquid in re, aut nihil. Si nihil, sequetur quod ratio illa sit cassa et vana; si autem aliquid respondet in re, ergo habetur propositum, quod bonum aliquid realiter addat super ens.	9. The answer was given that good determines being in concept. —On the contrary, corresponding to that concept there is either something in reality or nothing. If nothing, it follows that the concept is void and useless; but if there is something corresponding in reality, the point is established: good really adds something to being.
Praeterea, relatio specificatur secundum id ad quod dicitur. Sed bonum dicit relationem ad determinatum terminum, scilicet ad finem. Ergo bonum dicit specificam relationem. Sed omne ens specificatum addit aliquid realiter super ens commune. Ergo et bonum realiter aliquid addit super ens.	10. A relation is specified according to the term in respect to which it is predicated. But good implies a relation to a definite sort of being, an end. Good therefore implies a specified relation. Every specified being, however, really adds something to being in general. Hence good really adds something to being.
Praeterea, sicut bonum et ens convertuntur, ita homo et risibile. Sed risibile, quamvis convertatur cum homine, addit tamen realiter super hominem; scilicet ipsam hominis proprietatem, quae est de genere accidentium. Ergo et bonum realiter addit super ens.	11. Good and being are interchangeable, like man and “capable of laughter.” But though “capable of laughter” is interchangeable with man, it nevertheless really adds something to man, namely, a property. But a property is classed as an accident. Similarly, therefore, good really adds something to being.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Est quod Augustinus dicit, quod in quantum Deus bonus est, sumus; in quantum vero sumus, boni sumus. Ergo videtur quod bonum non addat aliquid super ens.	1. Augustine says: “Inasmuch as God is good, we are; but inasmuch as we are, we are good.” It therefore seems that good does not add anything to being.
Praeterea, quaecumque ita se habent quod unum addit super alterum re vel ratione, unum eorum potest intelligi sine altero. Sed ens non potest intelligi sine bono. Ergo bonum non addit aliquid super ens nec re nec ratione. Probatio mediae. Plus potest facere Deus quam homo intelligere. Sed non potest Deus facere aliquod ens quod non sit bonum; quia hoc ipso quod est a bono, bonum est, ut patet per Boetium in Lib. de Hebdom. Ergo nec intellectus potest hoc intelligere.	2.Whenever things are so related that one adds something to the other either really or conceptually, one can be understood without the other. But being cannot be understood without good. Hence good does not add anything to being either really or conceptually. Proof of the minor: God can make more than man can understand. But God cannot make a being that is not good, because by the very fact of its being from good it is good, as Boethius makes clear. Therefore neither can the intellect understand it.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum est, quod tripliciter potest aliquid super alterum addere. Uno modo quod addat aliquam rem quae sit extra essentiam illius rei cui dicitur addi; sicut album addit aliquid super corpus, quia essentia albedinis est praeter essentiam corporis. Alio modo dicitur aliquid addere super alterum per modum contrahendi et determinandi; sicut homo addit aliquid super animal: non quidem ita quod sit in homine aliqua res quae sit penitus extra essentiam animalis, alias oporteret dicere, quod non totum quod est homo esset animal, sed animal esset pars hominis; sed animal per hominem contrahitur, quia id quod determinate et actualiter continetur in ratione hominis, implicite et quasi potentialiter continetur in ratione animalis. Sicut est de ratione hominis quod habeat animam rationalem, de ratione autem animalis est quod habeat animam, non determinando ad rationalem vel non rationalem; ista tamen determinatio ratione cuius homo super animal addere dicitur, in aliqua re fundatur. Tertio modo dicitur aliquid addere super alterum secundum rationem tantum; quando scilicet aliquid est de ratione unius quod non est de ratione alterius: quod tamen nihil est in rerum natura, sed in ratione tantum, sive per illud contrahatur id cui dicitur addi, sive non. Caecum enim addit aliquid supra hominem, scilicet caecitatem, quae non est aliquid ens in natura, sed rationis tantum ens est comprehendentis privationes; et per hoc homo contrahitur, non enim omnis homo caecus est; sed cum dicimus talpam caecam, non fit per hoc additum aliqua contractio.	Something can be added to something else in three ways. (1) It adds some reality which is outside the essence of the thing to which it is said to be added. For instance, white adds something to body, since the essence of whiteness is something beyond that of body. (2) One thing is added to the other as limiting and determining it. Man, for instance, adds something to animal—not indeed in such a way that there is in man some reality which is completely outside the essence of animal; otherwise it would be necessary to say that it is not the whole of man which is animal but only a part. Animal is limited by man because what is contained in the notion of man determinately and actually, is only implicitly and, as it were, potentially contained in the notion of animal. It belongs to the notion of man that he have a rational soul; to the notion of animal, that it have a soul, without its being determined to rational or nonrational. And yet that determination by reason of which man is said to add something to animal is founded in reality. (3) Something is said to add to something else in concept only. This occurs when something which is nothing in reality but only in thought, belongs to the notion of one thing and not to the notion of the other, whether that to which it is said to be added is limited by it or not. Thus blind adds something to man, i.e., blindness, which is not a being in nature but merely a being in the thought of one who knows privations. By it man is limited, for not every man is blind. But when we say “a blind mole,” no limitation is placed by what is added.
Non autem potest esse quod super ens universale aliquid addat aliquid primo modo, quamvis illo modo possit fieri additio super aliquod ens particulare; nulla enim res naturae est quae sit extra essentiam entis universalis, quamvis aliqua res sit extra essentiam huius entis. Secundo autem modo inveniuntur aliqua addere super ens, quia ens contrahitur per decem genera, quorum unumquodque addit aliquid super ens; non quidem aliquod accidens, vel aliquam differentiam quae sit extra essentiam entis, sed determinatum modum essendi, qui fundatur in ipsa essentia rei. Sic autem bonum non addit aliquid super ens: cum bonum dividatur aequaliter in decem genera, ut ens, ut patet in I Ethicor.:	It is not possible, however, for something to add anything to being in general in the first way, though in that way there can be an addition to some particular sort of being; for there is no real being which is outside the essence of being in general, though some reality may be outside the essence of this being. But in the second way certain things are fomid to add to being, since being is narrowed down in the ten categories, each of which adds something to being—not, of course, an accident or difference which is outside the essence of being, but a definite manner of being which is founded upon the very existence of the thing. It is not in this way, however, that good adds something to being, since good itself, like being, is divided into the ten categories, as is made clear in the Ethics.
et ideo oportet quod vel nihil addat super ens, vel addat aliquid, quod sit in ratione tantum. Si enim adderet aliquid reale, oporteret quod per rationem boni contraheretur ens ad aliquod speciale genus. Cum autem ens sit id quod primo cadit in conceptione intellectus, ut Avicenna dicit, oportet quod omne aliud nomen vel sit synonymum enti: quod de bono dici non potest, cum non nugatorie dicatur ens bonum; vel addat aliquid ad minus secundum rationem; et sic oportet quod bonum, ex quo non contrahit ens, addat aliquid super ens, quod sit rationis tantum.	Good must, accordingly, either add nothing to being or add something merely in concept. For if it added something real, being would have to be narrowed down by the character of good to a special genus. But since being is what is first conceived by the intellect, as Avicenna says,.every other noun must either be a synonym of being or add something at least conceptually. The former cannot be said of good, since it is not nonsense to call a being good. Thus good, by the fact of its not limiting being, must add to it something merely conceptual.
Id autem quod est rationis tantum, non potest esse nisi duplex, scilicet negatio et aliqua relatio. Omnis enim positio absoluta aliquid in rerum natura existens significat. Sic ergo supra ens, quod est prima conceptio intellectus, unum addit id quod est rationis tantum, scilicet negationem: dicitur enim unum quasi ens indivisum. Sed verum et bonum positive dicuntur; unde non possunt addere nisi relationem quae sit rationis tantum. Illa autem relatio, secundum philosophum in V Metaph., invenitur esse rationis tantum, secundum quam dicitur referri id quod non dependet ad id ad quod refertur, sed e converso, cum ipsa relatio quaedam dependentia sit, sicut patet in scientia et scibili, sensu et sensibili. Scientia enim dependet a scibili, sed non e converso: unde relatio qua scientia refertur ad scibile, est realis; relatio vero qua scibile refertur ad scientiam, est rationis tantum: dicitur enim scibile relatum, secundum philosophum, non quia ipsum referatur, sed quia aliud referatur ad ipsum. Et ita est in omnibus aliis quae se habent ut mensura et mensuratum, vel perfectivum et perfectibile.	What is merely conceptual, however, can be of only two kinds: negation and a certain kind of relation. Every absolute positing signifies something existing in reality. Thus to being, the first intellectual conception, one adds what is merely conceptual—a negation; for it means undivided being. But true and good, being predicated positively, cannot add anything except a relation which is merely conceptual. A relation is merely conceptual, according to the Philosopher, when by it something is said to be related which is not dependent upon that to which it is referred, but vice versa; for a relation is a sort of dependence. An example is had in intellectual knowledge and its object, as also in sense and the sensible object. Knowledge depends upon its object, but not the other way about. The relation by which knowledge is referred to its object is accordingly real, but the relation by which the object is referred to the knowledge is only conceptual. According to the Philosopher, the object of knowledge is said to be related, not because it is itself referred, but because something else is referred to it. The same holds true of all other things which stand to one another as measure and thing measured or as perfective and perfectible.
Oportet igitur quod verum et bonum super intellectum entis addant respectum perfectivi. In quolibet autem ente est duo considerare: scilicet ipsam rationem speciei, et esse ipsum quo aliquid subsistit in specie illa; et sic aliquod ens potest esse perfectivum dupliciter. Uno modo secundum rationem speciei tantum. Et sic ab ente perficitur intellectus, qui percipit rationem entis. Nec tamen ens est in eo secundum esse naturale; et ideo hunc modum perficiendi addit verum super ens. Verum enim est in mente, ut philosophus dicit in VI Metaphys.; et unumquodque ens in tantum dicitur verum, in quantum est conformatum vel conformabile intellectui; et ideo omnes recte definientes verum, ponunt in eius definitione intellectum. Alio modo ens est perfectivum alterius non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam secundum esse quod habet in rerum natura. Et per hunc modum est perfectivum bonum. Bonum enim in rebus est, ut philosophus dicit in VI Metaphys. In quantum autem unum ens secundum esse suum est perfectivum alterius et consummativum, habet rationem finis respectu illius quod ab eo perficitur; et inde est quod omnes recte definientes bonum ponunt in ratione eius aliquid quod pertinet ad habitudinem finis; unde philosophus dicit in I Ethicorum, quod bonum optime diffinierunt dicentes, quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt.	The true and the good must therefore add to the concept of being, a relationship of that which perfects. But in any being there are two aspects to be considered, the formal character of its species and the act of being by which it subsists in that species. And so a being can be perfective in two ways. (1) It can be so just according to its specific character. In this way the intellect is perfected by a being, for it perceives the formal character of the being. But the being is still not in it according to its natural existence. It is this mode of perfecting which the true adds to being. For the true is in the mind, as the Philosopher says; and every being is called true inasmuch as it is conformed or conformable to intellect. For this reason all who correctly define true put intellect in its definition. (2) A being is perfective of another not only according to its specific character but also according to the existence which it has in reality. In this fashion the good is perfective; for the good is in things, as the Philosopher says. Inasmuch as one being by reason of its act of existing is such as to perfect and complete another, it stands to that other as an end. And hence it is that all who rightly define good put in its notion something about its status as an end. The Philosopher accordingly says that they excellently defined good who said that it is “that which all things desire.”
Sic ergo primo et principaliter dicitur bonum ens perfectivum alterius per modum finis; sed secundario dicitur aliquid bonum, quod est ductivum in finem: prout utile dicitur bonum; vel quod natum est consequi finem: sicut et sanum dicitur non solum habens sanitatem, sed et faciens et conservans et significans.	First of all and principally, therefore, a being capable of perfecting another after the manner of an end is called good; but secondarily something is called good which leads to an end (as the useful is said to be good), or which naturally follows upon an end (as not only; that which has health is called healthy, but also anything which causes, preserves, or signifies health).
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod, cum ens dicatur absolute, bonum autem superaddat habitudinem causae finalis; ipsa essentia rei absolute considerata sufficit ad hoc quod per eam aliquid dicatur ens, non autem ad hoc quod per eam dicatur aliquid bonum; sicut enim in aliis generibus causarum habitudo secundae causae dependet ex habitudine causae primae; primae vero causae habitudo non dependet ex aliquo alio; ita etiam est in causis finalibus, quod secundi fines participant habitudinem causae finalis ex ordine ad ultimum finem, ipse autem ultimus finis habet hanc habitudinem per seipsum.	1. Since being is predicated absolutely and good adds to it the status of a final cause, the essence of a thing considered absolutely suffices for the thing to be called a being on its account, but not thereby to be called good, just as in the case of the other kinds of causes the status of a secondary cause depends upon that of the primary cause, but that of the primary cause depends upon no other; so also in the case of final causes secondary ends share in the status of final cause from their relation to the last end, but the last end has this status of itself.
Et inde est quod essentia Dei, qui est ultimus finis rerum, sufficit ad hoc quod per eam Deus dicatur bonus; sed essentia creaturae posita nondum dicitur res bona nisi ex habitudine ad Deum, ex qua habet rationem causae finalis. Et pro tanto dicitur quod creatura non est bona per essentiam, sed per participationem. Uno modo scilicet in quantum ipsa essentia secundum rationem intelligendi consideratur ut aliud quid quam habitudo ad Deum, a qua habet rationem causae finalis, et ad quem ordinatur ut ad finem. Sed secundum alium modum creatura potest dici per essentiam bona, in quantum scilicet essentia creaturae non invenitur sine habitudine ad Dei bonitatem; et hoc intendit Boetius in libro de Hebdom.	And so it is that the essence of God, who is the last end of creatures, suffices for God to be called good by reason of it; but when the essence of a creature is given, the thing is not yet called good except from the relation to God by reason of which it has the character of a final cause. In this sense it is said that a creature is not good essentially but by participation. For from one point of view this is so inasmuch as the essence itself, in our understanding of it, is considered as something other than that relation to God by which it is constituted a final cause and is directed to God as its end. But from another point of view a creature can be called essentially good inasmuch as the essence of a creature does not exist without a relation to God’s goodness. This is Boethius’ meaning.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod non solum negatio dicit id quod est rationis tantum, sed etiam quaedam relatio, ut dictum est.	2. It is not only negation that expresses what is merely conceptual but also a certain type of relation, as has been said.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnis relatio realis est in genere determinato; sed relationes non reales possunt circuire omne ens.	3. Every real relation is in a definite category, but non-real relations can run through all being.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod diffundere, licet secundum proprietatem vocabuli videatur importare operationem causae efficientis, tamen largo modo potest importare habitudinem cuiuscumque causae sicut influere et facere, et alia huiusmodi. Cum autem dicitur quod bonum sit diffusivum secundum sui rationem, non est intelligenda diffusio secundum quod importat operationem causae efficientis, sed secundum quod importat habitudinem causae finalis; et talis diffusio non est mediante aliqua virtute superaddita. Dicit autem bonum diffusionem causae finalis, et non causae agentis: tum quia efficiens, in quantum huiusmodi, non est rei mensura et perfectio, sed magis initium; tum etiam quia effectus participat causam efficientem secundum assimilationem formae tantum, sed finem consequitur res secundum totum esse suum, et in hoc consistebat ratio boni.	4. Though, according to the proper use of the word, to pour out seems to imply the operation of an efficient cause, yet taken broadly it can imply the status of any cause, as do to infiuence, to make, etc. When good is said to be of its very notion diffusive, however, diffusion is not to be understood as implying the operation of an efficient cause but rather the status of a final cause. Nor is such diffusion brought about through the mediation of any added power. Good expresses the diffusion of a final cause and not that of an agent, both because the latter, as efficient, is not the measure and perfection of the thing caused but rather its beginning, and also because the effect participates in the efficient cause only in an assimilation of its form, whereas a thing is dependent upon its end in its whole existence. It is in this that the character of good was held to consist.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod dupliciter aliqua possunt esse unum in Deo secundum rem. Uno modo ex parte eius in quo sunt, tantum, et non ex propria ratione, sicut scientia et potentia. Non enim scientia ex hoc quod scientia, est idem quod potentia secundum rem, sed ex hoc quod est divina. Et quae sic sunt unum re in Deo, in creaturis inveniuntur differre secundum rem. Alio modo ex ipsa ratione eorum quae dicuntur esse unum realiter in Deo. Et sic bonum et ens sunt unum in Deo realiter, quia de ratione boni est quod non differat secundum rem ab ente; et ideo ubicumque invenitur bonum et ens, sunt idem secundum rem.	5. Things can be really one in God in two ways. (1) Their unity may be merely from that in which they are, and not from their own formal characters. In this way knowledge and power are one; for knowledge is not really the same as power by reason of its being knowledge, but by reason of its being divine. Now things which are really one in God in this way are found to differ really in creatures. (2) The things which are said to be really one in God may be so by their very formal characters. In this way good and being are really one in God, because it is of the very notion of good that it does not differ in reality from being. Hence, wherever good and being are found, they are really identical.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod sicut ens est quoddam essentiale, et quoddam accidentale; ita et bonum quoddam accidentale, et quoddam essentiale; et eodem modo amittit aliquid bonitatem sicut esse substantiale vel accidentale.	6. Just as there is,essential being and accidental being, so also there is essential good and accidental good; and a thing loses its goodness in just the sdme way as it loses its substantial or accidental act of being.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod ex habitudine praedicta contingit quod bonum secundum rationem dicatur ens informare vel determinare.	7. From the relationship mentioned above it comes about that good is said to inform or determine being conceptually.
Unde patet responsio ad octavum.	8. The answer is clear from what has just been said.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod isti rationi aliquid respondet in re, scilicet realis dependentia eius quod est ad finem ad finem ipsum, sicut est et in aliis relationibus rationis.	9. To that concept something does correspond in reality (a real dependence of that which is a means to an end upon the end itself), as there also does in other conceptual relations.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod quamvis bonum dicat aliquam specialem habitudinem, scilicet finis, tamen ista habitudo competit cuilibet enti, nec ponit aliquid secundum rem in ente; unde ratio non sequitur.	10. Although good expresses a special status, that of an end, nevertheless that status belongs to any being whatsoever and does not put anything real into being. Hence the conclusion does not follow.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod risibile quamvis convertatur cum homine, tamen addit aliquam naturam extraneam super hominem, quae est praeter essentiam hominis; sic autem nihil potest addi super ens, ut dictum est.	11. “Capable of laughter,” though interchanged with man, still adds to man a distinct reality which is over and above man’s essence. But nothing can be added to being in this way, as has been said.
	Answers to Contrary Difficulties
Primum vero quod in contrarium obiicitur, concedimus; quod bonum non addit secundum rem supra ens.	1. We grant this, because good as such does not really add anything to being.
Secundum vero probat quod nec etiam secundum rationem; ideo ad secundum dicendum, quod dupliciter potest intelligi aliquid sine altero. Uno modo per modum enuntiandi, dum scilicet intelligitur unum esse sine altero; et hoc modo quidquid intellectus potest intelligere sine altero, Deus potest facere. Sic autem ens non potest intelligi sine bono, ut scilicet intellectus intelligat aliquid esse ens et non esse bonum. Alio modo potest intelligi aliquid sine altero per modum definiendi, ut scilicet intelligatur unum, non cointellecto altero; sicut animal intelligitur sine homine, et omnibus aliis speciebus: et sic ens potest intelligi sine bono. Nec tamen sequitur quod Deus possit facere ens sine bono, quia hoc ipsum quod est facere, est producere aliquid in esse.	2. This argues that nothing is added even conceptually. To this it must be said that a thing can be understood without another in two ways. (1) This occurs by way of enunciating, when one thing is understood to be without the other. Whatever the intellect can understand without another in this sense, God can make without the other. But being cannot be so understood without good, i.e., so that the intellect understands that something is a being and is not good. (2) Something can be understood without another by way of defining, so that the intellect understands one without at the same time understanding the other. Thus animal is understood without man or any of the other species. In this sense being can be understood without good. Yet it does not follow that God can make a being without good, because the very notion of making is to bring into existence.

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Q. 21: Good ARTICLE II In the second article we ask: Are being and good interchangeable as to their real subjects? [ARTICLE I Sent., 8,1, 3; In De hebdom., 2; S.T., III, 20; S.T., I, 5, 3.]
Secundo quaeritur utrum ens et bonum convertantur secundum supposita	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non.	It seems that they are not, for
Opposita nata sunt circa idem fieri. Bonum autem et malum sunt opposita. Cum igitur malum non sit natum in omnibus esse, quia, ut Avicenna dicit, ultra orbem lunae non est malum; videtur quod nec bonum in omnibus entibus inveniatur; et ita bonum cum ente non convertitur.	1. Opposites are capable of occurring in regard to the same thing. But good and evil are opposites. Now evil is not capable of being in all things; for, as Avicenna says, beyond the sphere of the moon there is no evil. It seems, then, that neither is good found in all beings. And so good is not interchangeable with being.
Praeterea, quaecumque ita se habent quod unum ad plura se extendit quam aliud, non sunt convertibilia ad invicem. Sed, sicut in IV cap. de Divin. Nomin. dicit Commentator maximus, bonum extendit se ad plura quam ens; extendit enim se ad non entia, quae per bonum vocantur in esse. Ergo bonum et ens non sunt convertibilia.	2. Predicates such that one extends to more things than another are not interchangeable with one another. But, as Maximus the commentator says, good extends to more things than being; for it extends to non-beings, which are called into being by good. Therefore good and bcing are not interchangeable.
Praeterea, sicut Algazel dicit, bonum est perfectio cuius apprehensio est delectabilis. Sed non omne ens habet perfectionem; materia enim prima non habet perfectionem aliquam. Ergo non omne ens est bonum.	3. Good is a perfection of which the apprehension is enjoyable, as Algazel says. But not every being has perfection, for prime matter has none. Not every being, therefore, is good.
Praeterea, in mathematicis est ens; non autem ibi est bonum, ut patet per philosophum in III Metaph. Ergo bonum et ens non convertuntur.	4. In mathematics being is found but not good, as appears from what the Philosopher says. Being and good are therefore not interchangeable.
Praeterea, in Lib. de causis dicitur, quod prima rerum creatarum est esse. Sed secundum philosophum in praedicamentis, prius est a quo non convertitur consequentia. Ergo ab ente non convertitur consequentia ad bonum; et ita bonum et ens non convertuntur.	5. In The Causes it is said that the first of created things is the act of being. But according to the Philosopher “the prior is that from which there is a sequence which cannot be reversed.” The sequence from being to good therefore cannot be reversed; and so good and being are not interchangeable.
Praeterea, divisum non convertitur cum aliquo dividentium, sicut animal cum rationali. Sed ens dividitur per bonum et malum, cum multa entia mala dicantur. Ergo bonum et ens non convertuntur.	6. What is divided is not interchangeablewith any one of the things into which it is divided, as animal is not interchangeable with rational. But being is divided into good and evil, since many beings are called evil. Therefore good and being are not interchangeable.
Praeterea, privatio etiam, secundum philosophum in IV Metaph., dicitur ens quodam modo. Sed nullo modo potest dici bonum; alias malum, cuius ratio in privatione consistit, esset bonum. Ergo bonum et ens non convertuntur.	7. Even a privation, according to the Philosopher, is called a being in a certain sense. But it cannot in any sense be called good; otherwise evil, consisting essentially in a privation, would be good. Good and being are therefore not interchangeable.
Praeterea, secundum Boetium in libro de Hebd., propter hoc omnia dicuntur esse bona, quia sunt a bono quod est Deus. Sed bonitas Dei est ipsa sua sapientia et sua iustitia. Ergo eadem ratione, omnia quae sunt a Deo, essent sapientia et iusta; quod est falsum. Ergo et primum; scilicet quod omnia sint bona.	8. According to Boethius, all things are said to be good by reason of the fact that they are from the good, namely God. But God’s goodness is His very wisdom and justice. By the same reasoning, then, all things which are from God would be wise and just. But this is false. So too, then, is the first, viz., that all things are good.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Nihil tendit nisi in suum simile. Sed omne ens tendit in bonum, ut Boetius dicit in Lib. de Hebdom. Ergo omne ens est bonum; nec potest aliquid esse bonum nisi aliquo modo sit. Ergo bonum et ens convertuntur.	1. Nothing tends except to what is like itself. But, as Boethius says, “every being tends to good.” Then every being is good, and nothing can be good unless it in some way is. Consequently good and being are interchangeable,
Praeterea, a bono non potest aliquid esse nisi bonum. Sed omne ens procedit a divina bonitate. Ergo omne ens est bonum; et sic idem quod prius.	2. Only what is good can be from the good. But every being proceeds from the divine goodness. Therefore every being is good; and so the conclusion must be the same as above.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod cum ratio boni in hoc consistat quod aliquid sit perfectivum alterius per modum finis, omne illud quod invenitur habere rationem finis, habet etiam rationem boni. Duo autem sunt de ratione finis; ut scilicet sit appetitum vel desideratum ab his quae finem nondum attingunt, et ut sit dilectum, et quasi delectabile, ab his quae finem participant: cum eiusdem rationis sit tendere in finem, et in fine quodammodo quiescere; sicut per eamdem naturam lapis movetur ad medium, et quiescit in medio.	Since the essence of good consists in this, that something perfects another as an end, whatever is found to have the character of an end also has that of good. Now two things are essential to an end: it must be sought or desired by things which have not yet attained the end, and it must be loved by the things which share the end, and be, as it were, enjoyable to them. For it is essentially the same to tend to an end and in some sense to repose in that end. Thus by the same natural tendency a stone moves towards the center [of the world] and comes to rest there.
Haec autem duo inveniuntur competere ipsi esse. Quae enim nondum esse participant, in esse quodam naturali appetitu tendunt; unde et materia appetit formam, secundum philosophum in I Phys. Omnia autem quae iam esse habent, illud esse suum naturaliter amant, et ipsum tota virtute conservant; unde Boetius dicit in III de consolatione: dedit divina providentia creatis a se rebus hanc vel maximam manendi causam, ut quoad possunt, naturaliter manere desiderent. Quare nihil est quod ullo modo queas dubitare, cuncta quae sunt, appetere naturaliter constantiam permanendi, devitareque perniciem.	These two properties are found to belong to the act of being. For whatever does not yet participate in the act of being tends toward it by a certain natural appetite. In this way matter tends to form, according to the Philosopher. But everything which already has being naturally loves its being and with all its strength preserves it. Boethius accordingly says: “Divine providence has given to the things created by it this greatest of reasons for remaining, namely, that they naturally desire to remain to the best of their ability. Therefore you cannot in the least doubt that all beings naturally seek permanence in perduring and avoid destruction.”
Ipsum igitur esse habet rationem boni. Unde sicut impossibile est quod sit aliquid ens quod non habeat esse, ita necesse est ut omne ens sit bonum ex hoc ipso quod esse habet; quamvis etiam et in quibusdam entibus multae aliae rationes bonitatis superaddantur supra suum esse quo subsistunt.	Existence itself, therefore, has the essential note of goodness. Just as it is impossible, then, for anything to be a being which does not have existence, so too it is necessary that every being be good by the very fact of its having existence, even though in many beings many other aspects of goodness are added over and above the act of existing by which they subsist.
Cum autem bonum rationem entis includat, ut ex praedictis patet, impossibile est aliquid esse bonum quod non sit ens; et ita relinquitur quod bonum et ens convertantur.	Since, moreover, good includes the note of being, as is clear from what has been said, it is impossible for anything to be good which is not a being. Thus we are left with the conclusion that good and being are interchangeable.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod bonum et malum opponuntur per modum privationis et habitus; non autem oportet ut cuicumque inest habitus, nata sit inesse privatio; et ideo non oportet ut in quibuscumque natum est esse bonum, natum sit esse malum. In contrariis, etiam quando unum inest per naturam alicui, alterum non est natum inesse eidem, secundum philosophum in praedicamentis. Bonum autem cuilibet enti naturaliter inest, cum dicatur bonum ex ipso suo naturali esse.	1. Good and evil are opposed as privation and possession or habit. But privation does not have to be in every being in which habit is found; and so evil does not have to be in everything in which there is good. Furthermore, in the case of contraries as long as one is really in a certain thing, the other is not capable of being in the same thing, as the Philosopher says. Good, however, is really in every being whatever, since it is called good from its own real act of existing.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod bonum non se extendit ad non entia per praedicationem, sed per causalitatem, in quantum non entia appetunt bonum; ut dicamus non entia ea quae sunt in potentia, et non in actu. Sed esse non habet causalitatem, nisi forte secundum rationem causae exemplaris; quae quidem causalitas non se extendit nisi ad ea quae actu esse participant.	2. Good extends to non-beings not attributively but causally, inasmuch as non-beings tend to good. And so we can call non-beings things which are in potency and not in act. But the act of being does not have causality except perhaps after the manner of an exemplary cause. This sort of causality, however, extends only to the things which actually participate in being.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut materia prima est ens in potentia et non in actu; ita est perfecta in potentia et non in actu, bona in potentia et non in actu.	3. Just as prime matter is a being in potency and not in act, so it is perfect in potency and not in act and good potentially and not actually.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod ea de quibus mathematicus considerat, secundum esse quod habent in rebus, bona sunt. Ipsum enim esse lineae vel numeri bonum est, sed a mathematico non considerantur secundum suum esse, sed solum secundum rationem speciei; considerat enim ea abstracte: non sunt autem abstracta secundum esse, sed solum secundum rationem. Dictum est autem supra, quod bonum non consequitur rationem speciei nisi secundum esse quod habet in re aliqua; et ideo ratio boni non competit lineae vel numero secundum hoc quod cadunt in consideratione mathematici, quamvis linea et numerus bona sint.	4. The things which a mathematician studies are good according to the existence which they have in reality. The very existence of a line or of a number, for instance, is good. But the mathematician does not study them according to their existence but only according to their specific formal character. For he studies them abstractly, though they are not abstract in their existence but only in their notion. It was said above that good is not consequent upon the specific character except according to the existence which it has in some real thing. And so the note of goodness does not belong to a line or number as they fall within the purview of the mathematician, even though a line and a number are good.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod ens non dicitur esse prius bono illo modo dicendi prius quem obiectio tangit, sed alio modo, sicut absolutum respectivo.	5. Being is not called prior to good in the sense of prior employed in the objection, but in another sense, as the absolute is prior to the relative.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod aliquid potest dici bonum et ex suo esse, et ex aliqua proprietate, vel habitudine superaddita; sicut dicitur homo bonus et in quantum est et in quantum est iustus et castus, vel ordinatus ad beatitudinem. Ratione igitur primae bonitatis ens convertitur cum bono, et e converso; sed ratione secundae bonum dividit ens.	6. A thing can be called good both from its act of existing and from some added property or state. Thus a man is said to be good both as existing and as being just and chaste or destined for beatitude. By reason of the first goodness being is interchanged with good, and conversely. But by reason of the second, good is a division of being.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod privatio non dicitur ens naturae, sed solummodo ens rationis; et sic etiam est bonum rationis. Nam privationem cognoscere, et quodcumque tale, bonum est; et mali cognitio, secundum Boetium, bono deesse non potest.	7. Privation is not called a reality but only a conceptual being. In this sense it is a good for reason, for to know a privation or anything of the sort is good. Even knowledge of evil, as Boethius points out, cannot be lacking in good.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod secundum Boetium, aliquid dicitur esse bonum ex ipso suo esse; sed iustum dicitur ratione alicuius suae actionis. Esse autem in omnia quae a Deo procedunt, diffunditur; non autem omnia participant illud agere ad quod iustitia ordinatur. Quamvis enim in Deo sit idem agere quod esse, ac per hoc sua iustitia sit sua bonitas, tamen in creaturis aliud est agere, et aliud esse. Unde esse potest communicari alicui cui agere non communicatur. Et quibus utrumque communicatur, non est idem esse quod agere. Unde etiam homines qui sunt boni et iusti, sunt quidem boni in quantum sunt; non autem iusti in quantum sunt, sed in quantum habent habitum quemdam ordinatum ad agere; et similiter potest dici de sapientia, et aliis huiusmodi.	8. According to Boethius, a thing is called good from its very existence, but is called just by reason of some action of its own. Existence, however, is communicated to everything that comes forth from God. But not all things share in that activity to which justice is referred. For although in God to act and to be are the same thing, and thus His justice is His goodness, nevertheless in creatures to act and to be are distinct. Hence existence can be communicated to something to which activity is not; and even in those beings to which both are communicated, to act is not the same as to be. Hence also men who are good and just are indeed good because they exist, but not just because they exist, but rather because they have a certain habit directed to action. And the same can be said of wisdom and other things of the sort.
Vel aliter dicendum secundum eumdem, quod iustum et sapiens et alia huiusmodi sunt quaedam specialia bona, cum sint quaedam speciales perfectiones; bonum autem aliquid perfectum absolute designat. Ab ipso igitur Deo perfecto procedunt res perfectae, non eodem modo perfectionis quo Deus perfectus est; quia quod fit non est secundum modum agentis, sed secundum modum facti; nec omnia quae a Deo perfectionem recipiunt eodem modo recipiunt. Et ideo, sicut Deo et creaturis omnibus commune est esse perfectum absolute, non autem esse perfectum hoc vel illo modo; ita esse bonum convenit Deo, et omnibus creaturis: sed habere hanc bonitatem quae est sapientia vel quae est iustitia, non oportet quod sit omnibus commune; sed quaedam Deo tantum conveniunt, ut aeternitas et omnipotentia, quaedam vero quibusdam creaturis et Deo, ut sapientia, et iustitia, et alia huiusmodi.	Or a different answer can be taken from the same Boethius: The just and the wise and other things of this kind are special goods since they are special perfections; but good designates something perfect in an unqualified sense. From the perfect God, therefore, things come forth perfect, but not with the same degree of perfection with which God is perfect, because what is made does not exist in the manner of the agent but in that of the product. Nor do all things which receive perfection from God receive it in the same measure. And so, just as it is common to God and all creatures to be perfect in an absolute sense, but not to be perfect in this or that particular way, so also does it belong to God and to all creatures to be good; but the particular goodness which is wisdom or that which is justice does not have to be common to all. Some goods belong to God alone, as eternity and omnipotence; but some others, to certain creatures as well as to God, as wisdom and justice and the like.

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Q. 21: Good ARTICLE III In the third article we ask: Is good in its essential character prior to the true? [ARTICLE In Hebr., c. 11, lect. 1 (P 13: 756b); S.T., I, 16, 4.]
Tertio quaeritur utrum bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam verum	Difficulties
	It seems that it is, for
Illud enim quod est in rebus, est prius eo quod est in apprehensione tantum, eo quod apprehensio nostra causatur et mensuratur ex rebus. Sed secundum philosophum in VI Metaph., bonum est in rebus, verum autem in mente. Ergo bonum est prius quam verum secundum rationem.	1. What is in things is prior to what is only in apprehension, because our apprehension is caused and measured by things. But according to the Philosopher” good is in things, the true in the mind. Good is therefore in its essential character prior to the true.
Praeterea, prius est aliquid in se perfectum secundum rationem quam sit alterius perfectivum. Sed bonum dicitur aliquid in quantum est in se perfectum, verum autem in quantum est alterius perfectivum. Ergo bonum est prius quam verum.	2. What is perfect in itself is prior in character to that which perfects another. Now a thing is called good inasmuch as it is perfect in itself, but true inasmuch as it can perfect another. Hence good is prior to the true.
Praeterea, bonum dicitur per ordinem ad causam finalem, verum autem in ordine ad causam formalem. Sed causa finalis est prior formali, quia finis est causa causarum. Ergo bonum est prius quam verum secundum rationem.	3. Good is predicated with reference to the final cause, the true with reference to the formal cause. But the final cause is prior to the formal because the end is the cause of causes. Good is therefore prior in essential character to the true.
Praeterea, particulare bonum est posterius quam bonum universale. Sed verum est quoddam particulare bonum, est enim bonum intellectus, ut dicit philosophus in VI Ethic. Ergo bonum est naturaliter prius secundum rationem quam verum.	4. A particular good is posterior to the universal good. But the true is a particular good, for it is the good of the intellect, as the Philosopher says. Therefore good is naturally prior in character to the true.
Praeterea, bonum habet rationem finis. Finis autem est primum in intentione. Ergo intentio boni est prior intentione veri.	5. Good has the character of an end. But the end is first in intention. Therefore the intention of good is prior to that of the true.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Bonum est perfectivum affectus, verum autem intellectus. Intellectus autem naturaliter praecedit affectum. Ergo et verum, bonum.	1. Good perfects the will; the true, the intellect. The intellect, however, naturally precedes the will. Then the true likewise precedes good.
Praeterea, quanto aliquid est immaterialius, tanto est prius. Sed verum est immaterialius quam bonum, quia bonum in rebus naturalibus invenitur, verum solum in mente immateriali. Ergo verum est naturaliter prius bono.	2. The more immaterial anything is, the more it is prior. But the true is more immaterial than good, for good is found even in material beings, whereas the true is found only in an immaterial mind. The true is therefore by nature prior to good.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod tam verum quam bonum, sicut dictum est, habent rationem perfectivorum, sive perfectionum. Ordo autem inter perfectiones aliquas potest attendi dupliciter: uno modo ex parte ipsarum perfectionum; alio modo ex parte perfectibilium.	Both the true and good have the essential character of that which perfects or of perfections, as has been said.The order among perfections, however, can be considered in two ways: (1) from the viewpoint of the perfections themselves, and (2) from that of the beings perfected.
Considerando ergo verum et bonum secundum se, sic verum est prius bono secundum rationem, cum verum sit perfectivum alicuius secundum rationem speciei; bonum autem non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam secundum esse quod habet in re. Et ita plura includit in se ratio boni quam ratio veri, et se habet quodammodo per additionem ad illam; et sic bonum praesupponit verum, verum autem praesupponit unum, cum veri ratio ex apprehensione intellectus perficiatur; unumquodque autem intelligibile est in quantum est unum; qui enim non intelligit unum, nihil intelligit, ut dicit philosophus in IV Metaph. Unde istorum nominum transcendentium talis est ordo, si secundum se considerentur, quod post ens est unum, deinde verum post unum, et deinde post verum bonum.	If the true and good are considered in themselves, then the true is prior in meaning to good since the true perfects something specifically, whereas good perfects not only specifically but also according to the existence which the thing has in reality. Thus the character of good includes more notes than that of the true and is constituted by a sort of addition to the character of the true. Thus good presupposes the true, but the true in turn presupposes the one, since the notion of the true is fulfilled by an apprehension on the part of the intellect, and a thing is intelligible in so far as it is one; for whoever does not understand a unit understands nothing, as the Philosopher says.The order of these transcendent names, accordingly, if they are considered in themselves, is as follows: after being comes the one, after the one comes the true; and then after the true comes good.
Si autem attendatur ordo inter verum et bonum ex parte perfectibilium, sic e converso bonum est naturaliter prius quam verum, duplici ratione.	If, however, the order between the true and good is viewed from the standpoint of the beings perfected, then the converse holds: good is naturally prior tothe true, and that for two reasons.
Primo, quia perfectio boni ad plura se extendit quam veri perfectio. Vero enim non sunt nata perfici nisi illa quae possunt aliquod ens percipere in seipsis vel in seipsis habere secundum suam rationem, et non secundum illud esse quod ens habet in seipso: et huiusmodi sunt solum ea quae immaterialiter aliquid recipiunt, et sunt cognoscitiva; species enim lapidis est in anima non autem secundum esse quod habet in lapide. Sed a bono nata sunt perfici etiam illa quae secundum materiale esse aliquid recipiunt: cum ratio boni in hoc consistat quod aliquid sit perfectivum tam secundum rationem speciei quam etiam secundum esse, ut prius dictum est. Et ideo omnia appetunt bonum; sed non omnia cognoscunt verum. In utroque enim ostenditur habitudo perfectibilis ad perfectionem, quae est bonum vel verum; scilicet in appetitu boni et cognitione veri.	(1) The perfection of good has greater extension than that of the true. By the true only those things can be perfected which can receive a being into themselves or have it within themselves according to its formal character but not according to the existence which that being has in itself. Of this sort are only those things which can receive something immaterially and have the power of cognition. For the species of a stone is in the soul but not according to the act of existing which it has in the stone. But even things which receive something according to the material act of being are capable of being perfected by good, since the essence of good consists in being perfective both specifically and existentially, as has been said. All things, accordingly, seek good, but not all know the true. In both the tendency to good and the knowledge of truth, however, there is verified the relation of the perfectible to a perfection, which is good or the true.
Secundo, quia illa etiam quae nata sunt perfici bono et vero, per prius perficiuntur bono quam vero: ex hoc enim quod esse participant, perficiuntur bono, ut dictum est; ex hoc autem quod cognoscunt aliquid, perficiuntur vero. Cognitio autem est posterior quam esse; unde et in hac consideratione ex parte perfectibilium bonum praecedit verum.	(2) The things capable of being perfected by both the true and good, moreover, are perfected by good before they are by the true. For by the mere fact that they share in the act of being they are perfected by good, as has been said;6 but by the fact that they know something they are perfected by the true. Knowledge, however, is subsequent to existence. Hence in this consideration from the viewpoint of the beings which are perfectible good precedes the true.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de ordine veri et boni ex parte perfectibilium, non autem ex parte ipsius veri et boni: mens enim sola perfectibilis est vero; sed omnis res perfectibilis est bono.	1. The argument is taken from the order of the true and good from the viewpoint of the perfectible beings, not from that of the true and good in themselves. For only the mind is perfectible by the true, but every real being is perfectible by good.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod bonum non solum habet rationem perfecti, sed etiam perfectivi sicut et verum, ut prius dictum est; unde ratio non sequitur.	2. Like the true, good has not only the character of the perfect but also that of the perfective, as was said above. Hence the argument does not hold.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod finis est prior in causando quam aliqua aliarum causarum; causatum autem perficitur per suam causam; unde ratio ista procedit secundum ordinem perfectibilis ad perfectionem, in quo bonum est prius. Sed absolute considerando formam et finem, cum ipsa forma sit finis, prior est ipsa forma in se considerata quam secundum quod est alterius finis; ratio autem veri ex ipsa specie consurgit, prout est intellecta sicuti est.	3. The end’comes before any of the other causes in the line of causation. And so the argument is based upon the relation of the perfectible to its perfection. In this relationship good is prior. But if the form and the end are considered absolutely, then, since the form itself is the end, the form considered in itself is prior to its aspect as the end of something else. But the essential character of the true arises from the species itself in so far as it is understood as it is.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod verum dicitur esse quoddam bonum, in quantum habet esse in aliquo speciali perfectibili, et sic etiam haec obiectio pertinet ad ordinem perfectibilis ad perfectionem.	4. The true is said to be a good inasmuch as it has existence in some special being capable of being perfected. Thus this objection too is concerned with the relation of the perfectible to its perfection.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod finis dicitur esse prior in intentione his quae sunt ad finem, non autem aliis causis, nisi secundum quod ipsae sunt ad finem; et sic solvendum est sicut ad tertium. Et tamen sciendum, quod cum dicitur quod finis est prior in intentione, intentio sumitur pro actu mentis, qui est intendere. Cum autem comparamus intentionem boni et veri, intentio sumitur pro ratione quam significat definitio; unde aequivoce accipitur utrobique.	5. The end is said to be prior in intention to the means, but not to the other causes except in so far as they are means to the end. Thus the solution is the same as that given to the third difficulty. It should nevertheless be noted that when the end is called prior in intention, intention is taken as the act of the mind which is to intend. But when we compare the intention of good with that of the true, intention is taken as the essential character which is signified by a definition. Hence the term is used equivocally in the two contexts.
	Answers to Contrary Difficulties
Ad primum vero quod in contrarium obicitur, dicendum, quod aliquid est natum perfici bono non solum mediante affectu, sed etiam in quantum habet esse: unde quamvis intellectus sit prior affectu, non sequitur quod per prius perficiatur aliquid vero quam bono.	1. A thing is capable of being perfected by good not only through the mediation of the will but also in so far as it has the act of existing. Hence, although the intellect comes before the will, it does not follow that anything is perfected by the true before being perfected by good.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de vero et bono prout secundum se considerantur; unde concedenda est.	2. That argument is based upon the true and good considered in themselves. It is therefore to be granted.

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Q. 21: Good ARTICLE IV In the fourth article we ask: Is everything good by the first goodness? [ARTICLE I Sent., 19, 5, 2 ad 3; C.G., I, 40; S.T., 19 6, 4.]
Quarto quaeritur utrum omnia sint bona bonitate prima	Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic.	It seems that it is, for
Quia secundum Boetium in libro de hebdomadibus: si intelligamus per impossibile Deum esse, abstracta per intellectum bonitate; sequetur omnia alia esse entia, non autem esse bona. Intellecta autem in Deo bonitate, sequetur omnia esse bona, sicut et entia. Ergo omnia dicuntur bona bonitate prima.	1. According to Boethius, if by an impossible supposition we were to understand that God existed without His goodness, it would follow that all other things would be beings but not good; but if we understand goodness to be in God, then it follows that all things are good as well as beings. Everything, therefore, is called good by reason of the first goodness.
Sed dicebat, quod ideo hoc contingit quod non intellecta bonitate in Deo non est bonitas in aliis creaturis, quia bonitas creaturae causatur a bonitate Dei, non quia denominetur res bona formaliter bonitate Dei.- Sed contra: quandocumque aliquid denominatur aliquale ex solo respectu ad alterum, non denominatur tale per aliquid sibi formaliter inhaerens, sed per id quod est extra ipsum, ad quod refertur; sicut urina quae dicitur esse sana ex hoc quod significat sanitatem animalis, non denominatur sana ab aliqua sanitate sibi inhaerente, sed a sanitate animalis quam significat. Sed creatura dicitur esse bona per respectum ad primam bonitatem, quia secundum hoc unumquodque dicitur bonum quod a primo bono defluxit, ut dicit Boetius in Lib. de Hebdom. Ergo creatura non denominatur bona ab aliqua formali bonitate in ipsa existente, sed ipsa bonitate divina.	2. The answer was given that the reason why it happens that when we do not understand goodness in God there is no goodness in His creatures, is that the goodness of the creature is caused by the goodness of God, and not that the thing is formally denominated good by the goodness of God.—On the contrary, whenever anything is denominated in a given way merely from its relation to something else, it is not so denominated from something inhering in it formally but from something outside it to which it is referred. Thus urine is called healthy because it is a sign of the health of an animal. It is not so denominated from any health inherent in it but from the animal’s health which it signifies. But a creature is called good in reference to the first goodness because everything is called good from the fact of its flowing from the first good, as Boethius says. Hence the creature is not denominated good from any formal goodness found in it but from the divine goodness.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, VIII de Trinitate: bonum est hoc, et bonum illud; tolle hoc et illud, et vide ipsum bonum, si potes; ita Deum videbis non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis boni. Sed ipso bono quod est omnis boni bonum, omnia dicuntur bona. Ergo divina bonitate, de qua loquitur, omnia dicuntur bona.	3. Augustine says: “This is good and that is good. Remove this and that and, if possible, see the good itself. Thus you will see God, not as good by some other good, but as the good of every good.” But by reason of that good which is the good of every good all things are called good. Therefore, by reason of the divine goodness of which Augustine speaks, everything is said to be good.
Praeterea, cum omnis creatura sit bona, aut est bona aliqua bonitate sibi inhaerente, aut solum bonitate prima. Si aliqua bonitate sibi inhaerente; cum illa bonitas sit etiam quaedam creatura, et ipsa bona erit; aut ergo se bonitate, aut alia. Si se bonitate, ergo erit bonitas prima: haec est enim ratio primi boni, ut ex auctoritate Augustini inducta patet, quod seipso sit bonum; et sic habetur propositum, quod creatura est bona bonitate prima. Si autem illa bonitas est bona bonitate alia, eadem quaestio remanet de illa: aut ergo erit procedere in infinitum, quod est impossibile; aut erit devenire ad aliquam bonitatem denominantem creaturam, quae est bona se ipsa: et haec erit bonitas prima. Ergo oportet omnibus modis quod creatura sit bona bonitate prima.	4. Since every creature is good, it is good either by some inherent goodness or only by the first goodness. If it is good by some goodness inherent to it, then, since that goodness is also a creature, it too will be good either by being goodness itself or by some other goodness. But if it is good by being goodness itself, then it will be the first goodness; for it is of the essence of the first good that it be good of itself, as appears from the passage of St. Augustine just cited. And thus the point is established—a creature is good by the first goodness. If, however, that goodness is good by some other goodness, the same problem remains in regard to the latter. We must, therefore, proceed to infinity—which is impossible—or arrive at some goodness giving its name to created goodness, which is good of itself; and this will be the first goodness. Hence, from every point of view creatures must be good by the first goodness.
Praeterea, secundum Anselmum, omne verum est verum veritate prima. Sed sicut veritas prima se habet ad vera, ita bonitas prima se habet ad bona. Ergo omnia sunt bona bonitate prima.	5. Everything true is true by the first truth according to Anselm. But the first goodness stands to good things in the same way as the first truth to true things. Everything is therefore good by the first goodness.
Praeterea, quod non potest in minus, non potest in maius. Sed minus est esse quam esse bonum; creatura autem non potest in esse, cum omne esse sit a Deo. Ergo nec potest in esse bonum: ergo bonitas qua aliquid dicitur bonum non est bonitas creata.	6. What is incapable of the lesser is incapable of the greater. But to be is something less than to be good. A creature, however, has no power over the act of being, since all being is from God. Neither, then, has it power over being good. The goodness by which anything is called good is therefore not created goodness.
Praeterea esse, secundum Hilarium est proprium Deo. Sed proprium est quod uni soli convenit. Ergo nullum est aliud esse nisi ipse Deus. Sed omnia sunt bona in quantum habent esse. Ergo omnia sunt bona ipso esse divino quod est eius bonitas.	7. To be, according to Hilary, is “proper to God.” But whatever is proper belongs to only one. There is therefore no other act of being besides God Himself. But all things are good in so far as they have the act of being. All things, therefore, are good by the very divine act of being which constitutes God’s goodness.
Praeterea, bonitas prima nihil addit supra bonitatem; alias bonitas prima esset composita. Sed verum est omnia esse bona bonitate. Ergo etiam verum est omnia esse bona bonitate prima.	8. The first goodness has nothing added to goodness; otherwise it would be composite. But it is true that everything is good by goodness. It is consequently also true that everything is good by the first goodness.
Ipse dicebat, quod bonitas prima addit supra bonitatem absolutam secundum rationem et non secundum rem.- Sed contra: ratio cui non respondet aliquid in re, est cassa et vana. Sed non est vana ratio qua intelligimus bonitatem primam. Ergo si addit aliquid secundum rationem, addet etiam secundum rem: quod est impossibile, et sic nec etiam secundum rationem addet. Et ita omnia dicentur esse bona bonitate prima, sicut et bonitate absoluta.	9. The answer was given that to goodness taken absolutely something may be added conceptually though not really.—On the contrary, a notion to which there corresponds nothing in reality is empty and useless. But the notion by which we understand the first goodncss is not useless. If, therefore, anything is added in our notion, it will also be added in reality. But this is impossible. Neither, then, will anything be added conceptually. Everything, as a consequence, will be callcd good by the first goodness just as by goodness taken absolutely.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Omnia sunt bona inquantum sunt entia, quia, secundum Augustinum, in quantum sumus, boni sumus. Sed non dicuntur omnia entia formaliter per essentiam primam, sed per essentiam creatam. Ergo nec omnia sunt bona formaliter bonitate prima, sed bonitate creata.	1. Everything is good in so far as it is a being, because, according to Augustine, “inasmuch as we are, we are good.” But not everything is called a being formally by reason of the first essence but by reason of a created essence. Consequently, neither is everything formally good by the first goodness but by a created goodness.
Praeterea, vertibile non informatur invertibili, cum sint opposita. Sed omnis creatura est vertibilis; bonitas autem prima est invertibilis. Ergo creatura non dicitur bona formaliter bonitate prima.	2. The changeable is not informed by the unchangeable, since they are opposites. But every creature is changeable, whereas the first goodness is unchangeable. A creature is therefore not called good formally by the first goodness.
Praeterea, omnis forma est proportionata suo perfectibili. Sed bonitas prima, cum sit infinita, non est proportionata creaturae, cum sit finita. Ergo creatura non dicitur bona formaliter bonitate prima.	3. Every form is proportioned to the thing which it perfects. But the first goodness, being infinite, is not proportioned to a creature, which is finite. A creature is therefore not said to be good formally by reason of the first goodness.
Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, VIII de Trinit. cap. III, omnia creata participatione boni bona sunt. Sed participatione boni non est ipsa bonitas prima, ipsa enim est totalis et perfecta bonitas. Ergo non omnia sunt bona bonitate prima formaliter.	4. All created things “are good by participation in the good,” as Augustine says..But participation in the good is not the first goodness itself, for this is total and perfect goodness. Not everything, therefore, is good formally by the first goodness.
Praeterea, creatura dicitur habere vestigium Trinitatis, secundum quod est una, vera et bona; et sic bonum pertinet ad vestigium. Sed vestigium et partes eius sunt aliquid creatum. Ergo creatura est bona bonitate creata.	5. A creature is said to have a vestige of the Trinity inasmuch as it is one, true, and good. Thus good belongs to the vestige. But the vestige and its parts are something created. Therefore a creature is good by a created goodness.
Praeterea, bonitas prima est simplicissima. Ergo nec est in se composita, nec alii componibilis; et ita non potest esse alicuius forma, cum forma veniat in compositionem eius cuius est forma. Sed bonitas qua aliqua dicuntur esse bona, est forma quaedam, cum omne esse sit a forma. Ergo creaturae non sunt bonae bonitate prima formaliter.	6. The first goodness is perfectly simple. It is therefore neither composite in itself nor compoundable with anything else. Thus it cannot be the form of anything, since a form enters into composition with that which it informs. But the goodness by which certain things are said to be’good is a form, since every act of being comes from a form; Creatures are therefore not good formally by the first goodness.
	REPLY
Responsio. Dicendum, quod circa hanc quaestionem diversimode aliqui posuerunt. Quidam enim, frivolis rationibus ducti, adeo desipuerunt quod ponerent Deum esse de substantia cuiuslibet rei. Quorum quidam posuerunt eum esse idem quod materia prima, ut David de Dinando. Quidam vero posuerunt ipsum esse formam cuiuslibet rei. Cuius quidem erroris statim falsitas aperitur. Hoc enim Deum omnes de Deo loquentes intelligunt, quod est omnium principium effectivum, cum oporteat omnia entia ab uno primo ente effluere. Causa autem efficiens, secundum doctrinam philosophi, in II Phys., cum causa materiali non coincidit in idem, cum habeant contrarias rationes. Unumquodque enim est agens secundum quod est actu; materiae vero ratio est esse in potentia; efficiens vero et forma effecti sunt idem specie, in quantum omne agens agit sibi simile, sed non idem numero, quia non potest esse idem faciens et factum. Ex quo patet, quod ipsa divina essentia neque est materia alicuius rei, neque forma, ut ea possit creatura dici formaliter bona, sicut forma coniuncta; sed quaelibet forma est Dei quaedam similitudo.	There have been various positions concerning this question. Some, induced by trivial reasons, were so foolish as to state that God is a substantial part of all things. Some of these, e.g., David of Dinant, taught that He is the same as prime matter. Some others said that He is the form of all things. Now the falsity of this erroneous opinion is immediately made apparent. For when they speak of God, all men understand that He is the effective principle of all things, since all being must flow from a single first being. The efficient cause, however, according to the teaching of the Philosopher, does not coincide with the material cause, since they have contrary characters. For a thing is an agent inasmuch as it is in act; but the characteristic of matter is to be in potency. The efficient cause and the form of the effect are the same in species inasmuch as every agent effects something similar to itself; but they are not numerically the same, because the maker and the thing made cannot be identical. It is apparent from this that the divine essence is neither the matter of any creature nor is it its form in such a way that by it the creature can be said to be good formally as by an intrinsic form. But every form is a certain likeness of God.
Et ideo Platonici dixerunt, quod omnia sunt bona formaliter bonitate prima non sicut forma coniuncta, sed sicut forma separata. Ad cuius intellectum sciendum est, quod Plato ea quae possunt separari secundum intellectum, ponebat etiam secundum esse separata; et ideo, sicut homo potest intelligi praeter Socratem et Platonem, ita ponebat hominem esse praeter Socratem et Platonem, quem dicebat per se hominem, et ideam hominis, cuius participatione Socrates et Plato homines dicebantur. Sicut autem inveniebat hominem communem Socrati et Platoni, et omnibus huiusmodi; ita etiam inveniebat bonum esse commune omnibus bonis, et posse intelligi bonum non intelligendo hoc vel illud bonum; unde et ponebat bonum esse separatum praeter omnia bona particularia: et hoc ponebat esse per se bonum, sive ideam boni, cuius participatione omnia bona dicerentur; ut patet per philosophum in I Ethic.	The Platonists therefore said that all things are formally good by the first goodness, not as by a conjoint form, but as by a separated form. For an understanding of this point it should be noted that Plato held that all things that can be separated in thought are separated in reality. Thus, just as man can be understood apart from Socrates and Plato, he taught that man exists apart from Socrates and Plato. This he called “man-in-himself” or “the idea of man,” and said that by participation in this man Socrates and Plato are called men. Moreover, just as he found man common to Socrates and Plato and all others like them, in the same way he found good to be common to all good things and to be capable of being understood independently of any understanding of this or that good. Hence he asserted that good is separate from all particular goods, and he called it “good-in-itself” or “the idea of good.” By participation in it, he said, all things are called good. This is set forth by the Philosopher.
Sed hoc differebat inter ideam boni et ideam hominis: quod idea hominis non se extendebat ad omnia; idea autem boni se extendit ad omnia etiam ad ideas. Nam etiam ipsa idea boni est quoddam particulare bonum. Et ideo oportebat dicere, quod ipsum per se bonum esset universale omnium rerum principium, quod Deus est. Unde sequitur secundum hanc opinionem, quod omnia denominentur bona ipsa bonitate prima, quae Deus est, sicut Socrates et Plato secundum Platonem dicebantur homines participatione hominis separati, non per humanitatem eis inhaerentem.	There is this difference between the idea of good and that of man as Plato explained them: the idea of man does not extend to everything, whereas that of good does, even to the other ideas. For even the very idea of good is a particular good. And so it was necessary to say that the very good-in-itself is the universal principle of all things; and this principle is God. It therefore followed, according to this position, that all things are denominated good by the first goodness, which is God, just as, according to Plato, Socrates and Plato are called men by participation in separated man, not by any humanity inherent in them.
Et hanc opinionem aliquo modo Porretani secuti sunt. Dicebant enim, quod de creatura praedicamus bonum simpliciter, ut cum dicitur: homo est bonus; et bonum aliquo addito, ut cum dicimus: Socrates est bonus homo. Dicebant igitur, quod creatura dicitur bona simpliciter non aliqua bonitate inhaerente, sed bonitate prima, quasi ipsa bonitas absoluta et communis esset bonitas divina; sed cum dicitur creatura bonum hoc vel illud, denominatur a bonitate creata; quia particulares bonitates creatae, sunt sicut et ideae particulares secundum Platonem. Sed haec opinio a philosopho improbatur multipliciter: tum ex hoc quod quidditates et formae rerum insunt ipsis rebus particularibus, et non sunt ab eis separatae, ut probatur multipliciter in VII Metaph.; tum etiam suppositis ideis: quod specialiter ista positio non habeat locum in bono, quia bonum non univoce dicitur de bonis, et in talibus non assignabatur una idea secundum Platonem, per quam viam procedit contra eum philosophus in I Ethic.	This Platonic position was in a sense followed by the Porretans. They said that we predicate good of a creature either simply, as when we say, “Man is good,” or with some qualification, as when we say, “Socrates is a good man.” A creature is called good simply, they said, not by any inherent goodness but by the first goodness—as if good taken absolutely and in general were the divine goodness; but when it creature is called a good something-or-other, it is so denominated from a created goodness, because particular created goodnesses are like particular ideas for Plato. But this opinion is refuted by the Philosopher in a number of ways. He argues that the quiddities, and forms of things are in particular things themselves and not separated from them, and he shows this in various ways. He also argues more specifically that, granting that there are ideas, that position does not apply to good, since good is not predicated univocally of goods; and where the predication was not univocal, Plato did not assign a single idea. This is how the Philosopher proceeds against him in the Ethics.
Specialiter tamen quantum ad propositum pertinet, apparet falsitas praedictae positionis ex hoc quod omne agens invenitur sibi simile agere; unde si prima bonitas sit effectiva omnium bonorum, oportet quod similitudinem suam imprimat in rebus effectis; et sic unumquodque dicetur bonum sicut forma inhaerente per similitudinem summi boni sibi inditam, et ulterius per bonitatem primam, sicut per exemplar et effectivum omnis bonitatis creatae. Et quantum ad hoc opinio Platonis sustineri potest.	In particular for the point at issue the falsity of the above-mentioned position appears from the fact that every agent is found to effect something like itself. If, therefore, the first goodness is the effective cause of all goods, it must imprint its likeness upon the things produced; and so each thing will be called good by reason of an inherent form because of the likeness of the highest good implanted in it, and also because of the first goodness taken as the exemplar and effective cause of all created goodness. In this respect the opinion of Plato can be held.
Sic igitur dicimus secundum communem opinionem, quod omnia sunt bona creata bonitate formaliter sicut forma inhaerente, bonitate vero increata sicut forma exemplari.	We say, therefore, following the common opinion, that all things are good by a created goodness formally as by an inherent form, but by the uncreated goodness as by an exemplary form.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod, sicut tactum est prius, pro tanto creaturae non essent bonae nisi bonitas intelligeretur in Deo, quia bonitas creaturae exemplatur a divina bonitate; unde non sequitur quod creatura dicatur bona bonitate increata nisi sicut forma exemplari.	1. As has been touched upon above, the reason why creatures would not be good unless goodness were understood in God is this: the goodness of the creature is modeled upon the divine goodness. Hence it does not follow that the creature is called good by the uncreated goodness except as by an exemplary form.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod dupliciter denominatur aliquid per respectum ad alterum. Uno modo quando ipse respectus est ratio denominationis, et sic urina dicitur sana per respectum ad sanitatem animalis. Ratio enim sani, secundum quod de urina praedicatur, est esse signum sanitatis animalis. Et in talibus, quod denominatur per respectum ad alterum, non denominatur ab aliqua forma sibi inhaerente, sed ab aliquo extrinseco ad quod refertur. Alio modo denominatur aliquid per respectum ad alterum, quando respectus non est ratio denominationis, sed causa sicut si aer dicatur lucens a sole: non quod ipsum referri aerem ad solem sit lucere aeris, sed quia directa oppositio aeris ad solem est causa quod luceat. Et hoc modo creatura dicitur bona per respectum ad Deum; unde ratio non sequitur.	2. A thing is denominated with reference to something else intwo ways. (1) This occurs when the very reference itself is the meaning of the denomination. Thus urine is called healthy with respect to the health of an animal. For the meaning of healthy as predicated of urine is “serving as a sign of the health of an animal.” In such cases what is thus relatively denominated does not get its name from a form inherent in it but from something extrinsic to which it is referred. (2) A thing is denominated by reference to something else when the reference is not the meaning of the denomination but its cause. For instance, air is said to be bright from the sun, not because the very fact that the air is referred to the sun is the brightness of the air, but because the placing of the air directly before the sun is the cause of its being bright. It is in this way that the creature is called good with reference to God. Consequently the argument is not valid.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod Augustinus in multis opinionem Platonis sequitur, quantum fieri potest secundum fidei veritatem; et ideo verba sua sic sunt intelligenda, ut ipsa divina bonitas dicatur esse bonum omnis boni, in quantum est causa efficiens prima et exemplaris omnis boni, sine hoc quod excludatur bonitas creata, qua creaturae denominantur bonae sicut forma inhaerente.	3. In many points Augustine follows the opinion of Plato, but just as far as the truth of the faith allows. His words are, consequently, to be interpreted in this way: the divine goodness is called the good of every good in the sense that it is the first efficient and exemplary cause of every good, without excluding a created goodness by which creatures are denominated good as from an inherent form.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod aliter se habet in formis generalibus, et aliter in formis specialibus. In formis enim specialibus non recipitur praedicatio concreti de abstracto, ut dicatur: albedo est alba; vel: calor est calidus; ut patet etiam per Dionysium in II cap. de Div. Nomin. Sed in formis generalibus huiusmodi praedicatio recipitur; dicimus enim quod essentia est ens, et bonitas bona, et unitas una, et sic de aliis.	4. The case of general forms is different from that of special forms. Where there is question of special forms, as is clear from Dionysius, the concrete cannot be predicated of the abstract so that we should say: whiteness is white, or heat is hot. But when there is question of general forms, such predication is permitted. We say that an essence is a being, goodness is good, oneness is one, and so forth.
Cuius ratio est, quia illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione intellectus, est ens; unde oportet quod cuicumque apprehenso per intellectum, intellectus attribuat hoc quod est ens. Et ideo cum apprehendit essentiam alicuius entis, dicit illam essentiam esse ens; et similiter unamquamque formam generalem vel specialem, ut: bonitas est ens, albedo est ens, et sic de aliis. Et quia quaedam sunt quae concomitantur rationem entis inseparabiliter, ut unum, bonum, et huiusmodi; oportet quod haec etiam de quolibet apprehenso praedicentur eadem ratione qua ens. Unde dicimus: essentia est una et bona; et similiter dicimus: unitas est una et bona; et ita etiam de bonitate et albedine, et qualibet forma generali vel speciali.	The reason for this is that what is first apprehended by the intellect is being. Hence the intellect must attribute this (being) to whatever is apprehended by it. And so when it apprehends the essence of any being, it says that that essence is a being. The same is true of any general or special form; e.g., goodness is a being, whiteness is a being, and so on. And because certain things are inseparably connected with the notion of being, as the one, good, etc., these also must, for the same reason as being, be predicated of anything apprehended. Thus we say that an essence is one and good, and likewise that oneness is one and good; and the same is true of goodness and whiteness and any other general or special form.
Sed album, quia est speciale, non concomitatur inseparabiliter rationem entis; unde potest apprehendi forma albedinis sine eo quod attribuatur ei esse album; unde non cogimur dicere: albedo est alba. Album enim uno modo dicitur; ens autem et unum et bonum, et alia huiusmodi, quae de quolibet apprehenso necesse est dici, multipliciter dicuntur. Aliquid enim dicitur ens, quia in se subsistit; aliquid, quia est principium subsistendi, ut forma; aliquid, quia est dispositio subsistentis, ut qualitas; aliquid, quia est privatio dispositionis subsistentis, ut caecitas. Et ideo cum dicimus: essentia est ens; si procedatur sic: ergo est aliquo ens, vel se vel alio; processus non sequitur, quia non dicebatur hoc modo esse ens, sicut aliquid subsistens in esse suo est ens, sed sicut quo aliquid est. Unde non oportet quaerere quomodo ipsa essentia aliquo sit sed quomodo aliquid alterum sit per essentiam.	The white, however, being special, does not inseparably accompany the notion of being. The form of whiteness can therefore be apprehended without having white attributed to it. Hence we are not forced to say that whiteness is white. White is predicated in a single sense; but being and the one and good and other such attributes which inust necessarily be said of everything apprehended, are predicated in many senses. One thing is called a being because it subsists in itself; another, because it is a principle of subsisting, as a form; another, because it is a disposition of a subsisting being, as a quality; another, because it is the privation of a disposition of a subsisting being, as blindness. When, therefore, we say, “An essence is a being,” if we go on thus: “Therefore it is a being by something, either by itself or by another,” the inference is wrong, because being was not predicated in the sense in which something subsisting with its own existence is a being, but in the sense of that by which something is. Hence what we should ask is not how an essence is by something else, but how something else is by that essence.
Similiter, cum dicitur bonitas bona, non hoc modo dicitur bona quasi in bonitate subsistens; sed hoc modo quo bonum dicimus illud quo aliquid bonum est. Et sic non oportet inquirere utrum bonitas sit bona se bonitate vel alia; sed utrum ipsa bonitate sit aliquid bonum quod sit alterum ab ipsa bonitate, sicut est in creaturis; vel quod sit idem cum ipsa bonitate, sicut est in Deo.	In the same way, when goodness is said to be good, it is not called good in the sense that it is subsisting in goodness, but in the sense in which we call good that by which something is good. There is, accordingly, no point in inquiring whether goodness is good by its own goodness or by some other, but rather whether by that goodness anything is good which is distinct from that goodness (as occurs in creatures) or which is identical with that goodness (as is true of God).
Ad quintum dicendum, quod similiter etiam distinguendum est de veritate; scilicet quod omnia sunt vera veritate prima sicut exemplari primo, cum tamen sint vera veritate creata sicut forma inhaerente. Sed tamen alia ratio est de veritate et bonitate. Ipsa enim ratio veritatis in quadam adaequatione sive commensuratione consistit. Denominatur autem aliquid mensuratum vel commensuratum ab aliquo exteriori, sicut pannus ab ulna. Et per hunc modum intelligit Anselmus omnia esse vera veritate prima, in quantum scilicet unumquodque est commensuratum divino intellectui, implendo illud ad quod divina providentia ipsum ordinavit vel praescivit. Ratio autem bonitatis non consistit in commensuratione; unde non est simile.	5. A similar distinction must be made in regard to truth, namely, that all things are true by the first truth as their first exemplar, even though they are still true by a created truth as their inherent form. There is, nevertheless, a difference between truth and goodness. The essence of truth consists in a certain equation or commensuration. But a thing is designated as measured or commensurate from something extrinsic, as cloth from a forearm or cubit. This is what Anselm meant in saying that all things are true by the first truth; 1.e., they are true inasmuch as each is made commensurate to the divine intellect by fulfilling the destiny set for it by divine providence or the foreknowledge had of it. The essence of goodness, however, does not consist in commensuration. Hence there is no parallel here.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod creatura non potest hoc modo inesse quod a seipsa esse habeat; potest tamen aliqua inesse ita quod sit formale principium essendi, sic enim quaelibet forma inesse potest. Et per hunc etiam modum bonitas creata potest inesse bonum tamquam formale principium.	6. A creature does not have power over the act of being in the sense that it has being of itself; and yet in some respects it does have power over it, since the creature may be a formal principle of existing. In this way any form has power over the act of being. It is in this way too that created goodness has power over the act of being good as its formal principle.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod cum dicitur: esse est proprium Deo; non est intelligendum quod nullum aliud esse sit nisi increatum; sed quod solum illud esse proprie dicitur esse, in quantum ratione suae immutabilitatis non novit fuisse vel futurum esse. Esse autem creaturae dicitur esse per quamdam similitudinem ad illud primum esse, cum habeat permixtionem eius quod est futurum esse vel fuisse, ratione mutabilitatis creaturae.	7. When to be is said to be proper to God, we are not to understand that there is no other act of being than the uncreated one, but only that that act of being is properly said to be inasmuch as, by reason of its immutability, it admits of no has been or will be. But the act of being of a creature is so called by a certain likeness to that first to be, although it has in it an admixture of will be or has been by reason of the mutability of the creature.
Vel potest dici, quod esse est proprium Deo, quia solus Deus est suum esse; quamvis alia esse habeant, quod esse non est esse divinum.	Or it can be said that to be is proper to God because only God is His act of being, although others have an act of being, which is, indeed, distinct from the divine act of being.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod bonitas prima nihil addit secundum rem supra bonitatem absolutam; addit autem aliquid secundum rationem.	8. The first goodness does not add anything in reality to goodness taken absolutely, but it does add something conceptually.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod sicut dicit Commentator in Lib. de causis, ipsa bonitas pura ex hoc ipso individuatur et a cunctis aliis dividitur, quod non recipit aliquam additionem. Non enim est de ratione bonitatis absolute ut recipiat additionem vel non recipiat. Si enim esset de ratione eius recipere additionem, tunc quaelibet bonitas additionem reciperet, et nulla esset bonitas pura. Similiter etiam si esset de ratione eius non recipere additionem, nulla bonitas reciperet, et omnis bonitas esset bonitas pura, sicut etiam de ratione animalis non est neque rationale neque irrationale. Et ideo hoc ipsum quod est non posse recipere additionem, contrahit bonitatem absolutam, et distinguit primam bonitatem, quae est bonitas pura, ab aliis bonitatibus. Hoc autem quod est non recipere additionem, cum sit negatio, est ens rationis, et tamen fundatur super simplicitate bonitatis primae. Unde non sequitur quod ratio sit cassa et vana.	9. Pure goodness in itself is made individual and set apart from all other things by the fact that it receives no addition, as the comment in The Causes explains. It does not, however, belong to the notion of goodness taken absolutely to receive an addition or not to receive it. For if it were in its notion to receive an addition, then every goodness would receive an addition, and there would be no pure goodness. Similarly, if it were in its notion not to receive an addition, then no goodness would receive it, and every goodness would be pure goodness. The case is parallel to that of animal, in whose notion is found neither rational nor irrational. The very fact of its being unable to receive an addition, therefore, restricts absolute goodness and distinguishes the first goodness, which is pure goodness, from other goodnesses. But the fact of not receiving an addition, being a negation, is a conceptual being, yet founded upon the simplicity of the first goodness. It does not follow, therefore, that this notion is empty and useless.

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Q. 21: Good ARTICLE V In the fifth article we ask: Is a created good good by its essence? [ARTICLE De ver., 21, 1 ad 1; In De bebdom., 3; C.G.., I, 38 & 70; III, 10; S.T., I, 6, 3; Comp. theol., I, 109.]
Quinto quaeritur utrum bonum creatum sit bonum per suam essentiam	Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic.	It seems that it is, for
Illud enim sine quo res non potest esse, videtur ei esse essentiale. Sed creatura sine bonitate esse non potest, quia non potest esse aliquid creatum a Deo quod non sit bonum. Ergo creatura est bona per essentiam.	1. That without which a thing cannot be seems to be essential to it. But a creature cannot be without goodness, because nothing can be created by God which is not good. A creature is therefore good by its essence.
Praeterea, creatura ab eodem habet esse, et esse bonum; quia ex hoc ipso quod habet esse, bona est, ut prius ostensum est. Sed creatura habet esse per suam essentiam. Ergo est etiam bona per suam essentiam.	2. To be and to be good are had by the creature from the same source, because from the mere fact of having being it is good, as has previously been shown. But a creature has being by its essence. By its essence, therefore, it is also good.
Praeterea, quidquid convenit alicui in quantum huiusmodi, est ei essentiale. Sed bonum convenit creaturae in quantum est, quia, ut dicit Augustinus, in quantum sumus, boni sumus. Ergo creatura est bona per sui essentiam.	3 Whatever belongs to something under the qualification “as such” is essential to it. But good belongs to a creature as existing, because, as Augustine says, “inasmuch as we are, we are good.” Hence a creature is good by its own essence.
Praeterea, cum bonitas sit quaedam forma creata creaturae inhaerens, ut ostensum est, aut erit forma substantialis, aut accidentalis. Si accidentalis, aliquando sine ea creatura esse poterit; quod de creatura dici non potest. Ergo relinquitur quod sit forma substantialis. Sed omnis talis forma, vel est essentia rei, vel pars essentiae. Ergo creatura est bona per suam essentiam.	4. Since goodness is a created form inhering in the creature, as has been shown, it will be either the substantial form or an accidental form. If accidental, the creature will be able sometimes to be without it. But this cannot be said of a creature. It remains, then, that it is the substantial form. But every such form is either the essence of the thing or a part of the essence. A creature is therefore good by its essence.
Praeterea, secundum Boetium in libro de hebdomadibus, creaturae sunt bonae in quantum a primo bono fluxerunt. Sed per suam essentiam fluxerunt a primo bono. Ergo per suam essentiam sunt bonae.	5. According to Boethius, creatures are good inasmuch as they have emanated from the first good. But they have emanated from the first good essentially. Therefore creatures are essentially good.
Praeterea, semper denominans est simplicius vel aeque simplex denominato. Sed nulla forma superaddita essentiae est simplicior vel aeque simplex ipsi essentiae. Ergo nulla alia forma superaddita essentiae denominat ipsam essentiam; non enim possumus dicere quod essentia sit alba. Sed ipsa essentia rei denominatur bonitate; quaelibet enim essentia bona est. Ergo bonitas non est forma superaddita essentiae; et sic quaelibet creatura est bona per suam essentiam.	6. That which gives its name is always simpler than that which receives the name, or equally simple. But no form added to the essence is simpler than the essence or equally simple. Therefore no other form added to the essence gives its name to the essence; for we cannot say that the essence is white. But the very essence of a thing is named from goodness, for every essence is good. Goodness is therefore not a form added to the essence, and accordingly any creature is essentially good.
Praeterea, sicut unum convertitur cum ente, ita et bonum. Sed unitas a qua dicitur unum quod convertitur cum ente, non dicit aliquam formam superadditam essentiae rei, ut Commentator dicit in IV Metaphys.: sed unaquaeque res est una per suam essentiam. Ergo et unaquaeque est bona per suam essentiam.	7. Just as the one is interchangeable with being, so too is good. But oneness, from which the one which is interchanged with being is designated, does not express a form added to the essence of a thing, as the Commentator says; but everything is one by its essence. So too, then, is everything good by its essence.
Praeterea, si creatura est bona per aliquam bonitatem superadditam essentiae: cum omne quod est, bonum sit; illa etiam bonitas, cum sit res quaedam, bona erit. Non autem alia bonitate, quia sic iretur in infinitum sed per essentiam suam. Ergo eadem ratione poterit poni quod creatura ipsa esset bona per suam essentiam.	8. If a creature is good by a goodness added to its essence, since everything which is, is good, that goodness too, being something real, will be good. But it will not be good by some other goodness—for that would involve an infinite regress—but by its own essence. By the same reasoning, then, it can be asserted that the creature itself is good by its own essence.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Nihil quod dicitur de aliquo per participationem, convenit ei per suam essentiam. Sed creatura dicitur bona per participationem, ut patet per Augustinum, VIII de Trinitate, cap. III. Ergo creatura non est bona per essentiam suam.	1. Nothing which is said of a thing by participation belongs to that thing by its essence. But a creature is called good by participation, as is clear from Augustine. A creature is therefore not good essentially.
Praeterea, omne illud quod est bonum per essentiam suam, est substantiale bonum. Sed creaturae non sunt substantialia bona, ut patet per Boetium in libro de Hebdomad. Ergo creaturae non sunt bonae per essentiam.	2. Everything that is good by its own essence is a substantial good. But creatures are not substantial goods, as is clear from Boethius. Creatures, therefore, are not good by their essence.
Praeterea, de quocumque praedicatur aliquid essentialiter, oppositum eius de eo praedicari non potest. Sed oppositum boni praedicatur de aliqua creatura, scilicet malum. Ergo creatura non est bona per essentiam.	3. Whatever has something predicated of it essentially, cannot have its opposite predicated of it. But evil, the opposite of good, is predicated of some creatures. A creature is therefore not good essentially.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod secundum tres auctores oportet dicere, creaturas non esse bonas per essentiam, sed per participationem; scilicet secundum Augustinum, Boetium et auctorem libri de causis, qui dicit solum Deum esse bonitatem puram. Sed tamen diversis rationibus ad unam positionem moventur.	With three authorities we must say that creatures are not good by their essence but by participation. These are Augustine, Boethius, and the author of The Causes, who says that only God is pure goodness. They were, however, brought to the same position by different considerations.
Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod, ut ex dictis patet, sicut multiplicatur esse per substantiale et accidentale, sic etiam et bonitas multiplicatur; hoc tamen inter utrumque differt, quod aliquid dicitur esse ens absolute propter suum esse substantiale, sed propter esse accidentale non dicitur esse absolute: unde cum generatio sit motus ad esse; cum aliquis accipit esse substantiale, dicitur generari simpliciter; cum vero accipit esse accidentale, dicitur generari secundum quid. Et similiter est de corruptione, per quam esse amittitur. De bono autem est e converso. Nam secundum substantialem bonitatem dicitur aliquid bonum secundum quid; secundum vero accidentalem dicitur aliquid bonum simpliciter. Unde hominem iniustum non dicimus bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid, in quantum est homo; hominem vero iustum dicimus simpliciter bonum.	For the clarification of this point it should be noted that, as appears from what has been said, goodness is divided into substantial and accidental, just as is the act of being. There is, however, this difference: a thing is called a being in an absolute sense because of its substantial act of existing; but because of its accidental act of existing it is not said to be absolutely. Since generation is a motion toward existcnce, when someone receives substantial existence, he is said to be generated without qualification; but when he receives accidental existence, he is said to be generated in a certain sense. The same also holds for corruption, which is the loss of existence. But just the opposite is true of good. From the point of view of its substantial goodness a thing is said to be good in a certain sense, but from that of its accidental goodness it is said to be good without qualification. Thus we do not call an unjust man good simply, but only in a certain senseinasmuch as he is a man. But a just man we call good without further restriction.
Cuius diversitatis ista est ratio. Nam unumquodque dicitur esse ens in quantum absolute consideratur; bonum vero, ut ex dictis patet, secundum respectum ad alia. In seipso autem aliquid perficitur ut subsistat per essentialia principia; sed ut debito modo se habeat ad omnia quae sunt extra ipsum, non perficitur nisi mediantibus accidentibus superadditis essentiae: quia operationes quibus unum alteri quodam modo coniungitur, ab essentia mediantibus virtutibus essentiae superadditis progrediuntur; unde absolute bonitatem non obtinet nisi secundum quod completum est secundum substantialia et secundum accidentalia principia.	The reason for this difference is this. A thing is called a being inasinuch as it is considered absolutely, but good, as has already been made clear, in relation to other things. Now it is by its essential principles that a thing is fully constituted in itself so that it subsists; but it is not so perfectly constituted as to stand as it should in relation to everything outside itself except by means of accidents added to the cssence, because the operations by which one thing is in some sense joined to another proceed from the essence through powers distinct from it. Consequently nothing achieves goodness absolutely unless it is complete in both its essential and its accidental principles.
Quidquid autem creatura perfectionis habet ex essentialibus principiis et accidentalibus simul coniunctis, hoc totum Deus habet per unum suum esse simplex. Eius enim essentia est eius sapientia et iustitia et fortitudo, et alia huiusmodi, quae in nobis sunt essentiae superaddita. Et ideo ipsa absoluta bonitas in Deo idem est quod eius essentia; in nobis autem consideratur secundum ea quae essentiae superadduntur. Et pro tanto bonitas completa vel absoluta et augetur et minuitur et totaliter aufertur, non autem in Deo; quamvis substantialis bonitas in nobis semper maneat. Et secundum hunc modum videtur dicere Augustinus quod Deus est bonus per essentiam, non autem per participationem.	Any perfection which a creature has from its essential and accidental principles combined, God has in its entirety by His one simple act of being. His essence is His wisdom, His justice, His power, and so forth—all of which in us are distinct from our essence. In God, accordingly, absolute goodness is itself also the same as His essence; but in tis it is taken with reference to things that are added to our essence. Consequently, complete or absolute goodness increases and diminishes and disappears entirely in us, but not in God. Our substantial goodness, however, always remains. It is in this sense, it seems, that Augustine says that God is good essentially, but we, by participation.
Sed adhuc inter Dei bonitatem et nostram alia differentia invenitur. Essentialis enim bonitas non attenditur secundum considerationem naturae absolutam, sed secundum esse ipsius; humanitas enim non habet rationem boni vel bonitatis nisi in quantum esse habet. Ipsa autem natura vel essentia divina est eius esse; natura autem vel essentia cuiuslibet rei creatae non est suum esse, sed est esse participans ab alio. Et sic in Deo est esse purum, quia ipse Deus est suum esse subsistens; in creatura autem est esse receptum vel participatum. Unde dato, quod bonitas absoluta diceretur de re creata secundum esse suum substantiale, nihilominus adhuc remaneret habere bonitatem per participationem, sicut et habet esse participatum. Deus autem est bonitas per essentiam, in quantum eius essentia est suum esse. Et hanc videtur esse intentio philosophi in Lib. de causis, qui dicit solam divinam bonitatem esse bonitatem puram.	Still another difference is found between God’s goodness and ours. Goodness is not taken as essential when a nature is considered absolutely but when it is taken in its act of existence. Humanity, for instance, does not have the note of good or goodness except by its having existence. The divine nature or essence, however, is itself its act of being, whereas the nature or essence of any created thing is not its act of being but participates in being from another. In God, accordingly, the act of being is pure, because God is His own subsistent act of being; but in the creature the act of being is received or participated. Even granted, therefore, that absolute goodness were attributed to a creature because of its substantial existence, nevertheless the fact would still remain that it has goodness by participation, just as it has a participated existence. But God is goodness essentially inasmuch as His essence is His existence. This seems to be the meaning of the philosopher in The Causes when he says that only the divine goodness is pure goodness.
Sed adhuc alia differentia invenitur inter divinam bonitatem et creaturae. Bonitas enim habet rationem causae finalis. Deus autem habet rationem causae finalis cum sit omnium ultimus finis, sicut et primum principium. Ex quo oportet ut omnis alius finis non habeat habitudinem vel rationem finis nisi secundum ordinem ad causam primam; quia secunda causa non influit in causatum nisi praesupposito influxu causae primae, ut patet in Lib. de causis. Unde et bonum quod habet rationem finis non potest dici de creatura, nisi praesupposito ordine creatoris ad creaturam.	A still further difference is discovered between the divine goodness and that of creatures. Goodness has the character of a final cause. But God has this, since He is the ultimate end of all beings just as He is their first principle. From this it follows that any other end has the status or character of an end only in relation to the first cause, because a secondary cause does not influence the effect unless the influence of the first cause is presupposed, as is made clear in The Causes. Hence too, good, having the character of an end, cannot be said of a creature unless we presuppose the relation of Creator to creature.
Dato igitur quod creatura esset ipsum suum esse, sicut et Deus, adhuc tamen esse creaturae non haberet rationem boni, nisi praesupposito ordine ad creatorem; et pro tanto adhuc diceretur bona per participationem, et non absolute in eo quod est. Sed esse divinum, quod habet rationem boni non praesupposito aliquo alio, habet rationem boni per seipsum; et haec videtur esse intentio Boetii in Lib. de Hebd.	Granted, therefore, that a creature were its own act of being, as God is, the act of being of the creature would still.not have the character of good except on the supposition of its relation to its Creator; and it would, by that fact, still be called good by participation and not absolutely in its essential constitution. But the divine act of being, which has the character of good even if nothing else is presupposed, has this character of itself. This is what Boethius seems to have meant.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod creatura non potest esse non bona bonitate essentiali, quae est bonitas secundum quid; potest tamen esse non bona bonitate accidentali, quae est bonitas absoluta et simpliciter. Et praeterea ipsa bonitas quae attenditur secundum esse substantiale, non est ipsa essentia rei, sed esse participatum; et hoc etiam praesupposito ordine ad primum esse per se subsistens.	1. A creature cannot fail to be good with essential goodness, which is goodness in a qualified sense; yet it can fail to be good with accidental goodness, which is absolute and unqualified goodness. That goodness, moreover, which is referred to from the viewpoint of the substantial act of being is not the very essence of the thing but is a participated act of being. This is true even if the relation to the first act of being subsisting by itself is presupposed.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ab eo a quo res habet esse, habet esse bonum secundum quid, scilicet secundum esse substantiale; non autem ab eodem formaliter habet esse simpliciter, et esse bonum simpliciter, ut ex dictis patet; et propter hoc ratio non sequitur.	2. A thing has from the same source being and goodness in a qualified sense, 1.e., in its substantial existence; but it does not formally have from the same source being without qualification and goodness without qualification, as is clear from what has been said. For this reason the conclusion does not follow.
Et similiter dicendum ad tertium, et quartum.	3-4. The same answer applies.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod creatura non solum est a Deo secundum essentiam suam, sed secundum esse suum, in quo praecipue consistit ratio bonitatis substantialis, et etiam secundum perfectiones superadditas, in quibus consistit bonitas absoluta; et haec non sunt essentia rei. Et praeterea ipse respectus quo essentia rei refertur ad Deum ut ad principium, est aliud quam essentia.	5. A creature is from God not only in its essence but also in its act of existing, which constitutes the chief characteristic of substantial goodness; and also in its additional perfections, which constitute its absolute goodness. These are not the essence of the thing. And furthermore, even the relation by which the essence of the thing is referred to God as its source is distinct from the essence.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod hoc modo essentia denominatur bona sicut et ens; unde, sicut habet esse per participationem, ita et bona est per participationem. Esse enim et bonum communiter acceptum est simplicius quam essentia, quia et communius; cum dicantur non solum de essentia, sed etiam de eo quod per essentiam subsistit, et iterum de ipsis accidentibus.	6. An essence is denominated good in the same way as it is denominated a being. It is good by participation, then, just as it has existence by participation. Existence and good taken in general are simpler than essence because more general, since these are said not only of essence but also of what subsists by reason of the essence and even, too, of accidents.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod unum quod convertitur cum ente, dicitur secundum rationem negationis, quam addit supra ens; bonum autem non addit negationem super ens, sed eius ratio in positione consistit: et ideo non est simile.	7. The predication of the one which is interchanged with being is based upon the note of negation which it adds to being. But good does not add to being a negation but essentially consists in something positive. There is consequently no parallel.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod hoc modo bonitas rei dicitur bona sicut et esse rei dicitur ens: non quia eius sit aliquid aliud esse; sed quia per hoc esse res esse dicitur, et quia hac bonitate res bona dicitur. Unde, sicut non sequitur quod ipsa substantia rei non dicatur per esse aliquod quod ipsa non sit, quia esse eius non dicitur ens per aliquod esse aliud ab ipso: ita etiam praedicta ratio non sequitur de bonitate. Sequitur autem de unitate, de qua introducit eam Commentator in IV Metaphysic.: quia unum indifferenter se habet ad hoc quod respiciat essentiam vel esse; unde essentia rei est una per seipsam, non propter esse suum: et ita non est una per aliquam participationem, sicut accidit de ente et bono.	8. The existence of a thing is called a being, not because it has some existence other than itself, but because by that existence the thing is said to be. In just the same way goodness is called good because by it a thing is said to be good. From the fact that the existence of a thing is not called a being because of an existence distinct from itself it does not follow that the substance of the thing is not said to be by an existence which is distinct from it. In just the same way that conclusion does not follow in regard to goodness. It does, however, apply to oneness (in regard to which the Commentator adduces the argument) because it makes no difference to the one whether it be referred to essence or to existence. Hence the essence of a thing is one of itself, not because of its act of existing; and so it is not one by any participation, though it is a being and good in this way.

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Q. 21: Good ARTICLE VI In the sixth article we ask: Does the good of a creature consist in measure, species, and order as Augustine says? [ARTICLE S.T., I, 5, 5; 1-11, 85, 4.]
Sexto quaeritur utrum bonum creaturae consistat in modo, specie et ordine, sicut Augustinus dicit	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non.	It seems that it does not, for
Quia bonum habet rationem finis, secundum philosophum. Sed tota ratio finis consistit in ordine. Ergo et tota ratio boni in ordine consistit; et ita alia duo superfluunt.	1. Good, according to the Philosopher has the character of an end. But the whole character of an end consists in order. The whole character of good, therefore, consists in order; and the other two are superfluous.
Praeterea, ens et bonum et unum, secundum intentiones differunt. Sed ratio entis consistit in specie, unius vero ratio consistit in modo. Ergo boni ratio non consistit in specie et modo.	2. Being, good, and one differ in meaning. But the notion of being consists in species; that of one, in measure. That of good, therefore, does not consist in species and measure.
Praeterea, species nominat causam formalem. Sed in hoc distinguitur bonum et verum, secundum quosdam, quod verum dicit rationem causae formalis, bonum autem rationem causae finalis. Ergo species non pertinet ad rationem boni.	3. Species designates a formal cause. But in this respect, according to some, good differs from the true, because the true expresses the notion of a formal cause whereas good expresses that of a final cause. Species therefore does not pertain to the notion of good.
Praeterea, malum et bonum, cum sint opposita, attenduntur circa idem. Sed sicut Augustinus dicit in Lib. LXXXIII quaestionum, totum malum de speciei privatione repertum est. Ergo tota ratio boni in positione speciei consistit; et ita superfluunt (ut) videtur modus et ordo.	4. Evil and good, being opposites, are applied to the same thing. But as Augustine says, “evil is discovered to consist entirely in the privation of species.” The whole notion of good, therefore, consists in the positive presence of species; and so measure and order seem superfluous.
Praeterea, modus est de consequentibus rem. Sed aliqua bonitas pertinet ad essentiam rei. Ergo modus non est de ratione boni.	5. Measure pertains to the properties of a thing; but a certain goodness belongs to its essence. Measure is therefore not an essential note of good.
Praeterea, quae Deus potest facere per unum, non facit per plura. Sed Deus potuit facere creaturam per unum istorum, quia quodlibet horum habet quamdam rationem bonitatis. Ergo non oportet quod quodlibet istorum trium requiratur ad rationem boni.	6. What God can do through one thing He does not do through several. But God could have made a creature good through one of those three notes, because each one has some aspect of goodness. All three are not, therefore, to be considered necessary for the formal character of good.
Praeterea, si ista tria sunt de ratione bonitatis, tunc in quolibet bono oportet ista tria esse. Sed quodlibet istorum trium est bonum. Ergo in quolibet istorum sunt ista tria; et ita unum non debet contra aliud dividi.	7. If those three notes are essential to goodness, then in every good the three must be found. But each of the three is itself good. In each of them, then, there are all three; and so they should not be distinguished from one another.
Praeterea, si ista tria sint bona, oportet quod habeant modum, speciem et ordinem. Ergo modi erit modus, et speciei species, et sic in infinitum.	8. If those three notes are good, they must have measure, species, and order. There will therefore be a measure of the measure, a species of the species, and so on to infinity.
Praeterea, modus, species et ordo diminuitur per peccatum, secundum Augustinum. Sed bonitas substantialis rei non diminuitur per peccatum. Ergo ratio boni universaliter non consistit in tribus praedictis.	9. Measure, species, and order are decreased by sin, according to Augustine. But the substantial goodness of a thing is not decreased by sin. The formal character of good therefore does not consist universally in those three notes.
Praeterea, id quod est de ratione boni, non recipit praedicationem mali. Sed haec tria recipiunt praedicationem mali, secundum Augustinum in Lib. de natura boni: dicitur enim malus modus, mala species, et sic de aliis. Ergo ratio boni non consistit in his tribus.	10. Whatever is essential to good does not have evil predicated of it. But measure, species, and order can have evil predicated of them, according to Augustine; for he speaks of “a bad measure,” “a bad species,” etc. The character of good therefore does not consist in those three notes.
Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit in Exaemeron, quod natura lucis non est in numero, pondere et mensura, ut alia creatura. Sed ex his tribus, secundum Augustinum, constituuntur tria praedicta. Cum ergo lux sit bona, ratio boni non includit tria praedicta.	11. Ambrose says: “The nature of light does not consist in number, weight, and dimension like any other creature.” But according to Augustine, species, measure, and order are constituted by these three. Since, therefore, light is good, the character of good does not include species, measure, and order.
Praeterea, secundum Bernardum, modus caritatis est non habere modum; et tamen caritas bona est. Ergo non requirit tria praedicta.	12. According to Bernard, the measure of charity is not to have any measure; and yet charity is good. It does not, then, require the three notes mentioned.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Est quod Augustinus dicit in libro de natura boni, quod ubi haec tria sunt magna, magnum bonum est; ubi parva, parvum; ubi nulla nullum. Ergo ratio boni in his tribus consistit.	1. Augustine says: “Where these three are great, the good is great; where they are small, it is small; where they are not at all, it is not at all.” The essence of the good therefore consists in measure, species, and order.
Praeterea, Augustinus in eodem libro, dicit, quod secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur bona quod sunt moderata, speciosa, ordinata.	2. Augustine says again: “Things are called good inasmuch as they are measured, specified, and ordered.”
Praeterea, creatura dicitur bona secundum respectum ad Deum, sicut vult Boetius in Lib. de Hebdom. Sed Deus habet ad creaturam habitudinem triplicis causae: scilicet efficientis, finalis et formalis exemplaris. Ergo et creatura dicitur esse bona secundum habitudinem ad Deum in ratione triplicis causae. Sed secundum hoc quod comparatur ad Deum ut ad causam efficientem, habet modum sibi a Deo praefixum; ut autem comparatur ad eum ut ad causam exemplarem, habet speciem; ut autem comparatur ad eum ut ad finem, habet ordinem. Ergo bonum creaturae consistit in modo, specie et ordine.	3. A creature is called good from its relation to God, as Boethius maintains.But God bears to the creature the relation of a threefold cause: efficient, final, and exemplary formal. The creature is therefore said to be good according to its relation to God under the aspect of a threefold cause. Accordingly, because it is referred to God as its cfficient cause, it has the measure set for it by God. Referred to God as its exemplary cause, it has species. Referred to Him as its end, it has ordcr. The good of the creature therefore consists in measure, species, and order.
Praeterea, creaturae omnes ordinantur in Deum mediante rationali creatura, quae est sola capax beatitudinis. Hoc autem est in quantum a rationali creatura cognoscitur. Ergo, cum creatura sit bona ex hoc quod ordinatur ad Deum; ad hoc quod sit bona, tria requiruntur: scilicet quod sit existens, quod sit cognoscibilis, quod sit ordinata. Est autem existens per aliquem modum, cognoscibilis per speciem, ordinata autem per ordinem. Ergo in his tribus consistit bonum creaturae.	4. All creatures are oriented to God through the mediation of a rational creature, which alone is capable of beatitude. And this occurs inasmuch as God is known by the rational creature. Since, then, it creature is good from its orientation to God, three things are required for it to be good: that it be existing, that it be knowable, and that it be oriented. But it is existing by its measure, knowable by its species, and oriented by its order. In these three, therefore, the good of a creature consists.
Praeterea, sapientiae XI, 21, dicitur: omnia in numero, pondere et mensura constituisti. Sed secundum Augustinum libro IV super Genesim ad litteram, mensura cuilibet rei modum praefigit, numerus speciem praebet, pondus vero dat ordinem. Ergo in his tribus, modo, specie et ordine, bonitas creaturae consistit, cum creatura secundum hoc sit bona quod a Deo sit disposita.	5. It is said in Wisdom (1:2 1): “But you hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight.” But according to Augustine, measure sets the limit of each thing; number gives its species; and weight gives order. In these three, then, limit or measure, species, and order, consists the goodness of a creature, since a creature is good in virtue of the disposition given it by God.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod ratio boni in tribus praedictis consistit, secundum quod Augustinus dicit. Ad huius autem evidentiam sciendum est, quod aliquod nomen potest respectum importare dupliciter. Uno modo sic quod nomen imponatur ad significandum ipsum respectum, sicut hoc nomen pater, vel filius, aut paternitas ipsa. Quaedam vero nomina dicuntur importare respectum, quia significant rem alicuius generis, quam comitatur respectus, quamvis nomen non sit impositum ad ipsum respectum significandum; sicut hoc nomen scientia est impositum ad significandum qualitatem quamdam, quam sequitur quidam respectus, non autem ad significandum respectum ipsum.	The essence of good consists in the above-mentioned three notes, as Augustine says. For the elucidation of this point it should be noted that a name can imply a relation in two ways. (1) The name is used to signify the relation itself, as father or son or even fatherhood. (2) Some names are said to imply a relation because they signify a thing of a given kind which is accompanied by a relation, although the name is not used to signify the relation itself. Thus the word knowledge is used to signify a certain quality which entails a relation, but not to signify the relation itself.
Et per hunc modum ratio boni respectum implicat: non quia ipsum nomen boni significet ipsum respectum solum, sed quia significat id ad quod sequitur respectus, cum respectu ipso. Respectus autem importatus in nomine boni, est habitudo perfectivi, secundum quod aliquid natum est perficere non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam secundum esse quod habet in rebus; hoc enim modo finis perficit ea quae sunt ad finem. Cum autem creaturae non sint suum esse, oportet quod habeant esse receptum; et per hoc earum esse est finitum et terminatum secundum mensuram eius in quo recipitur.	In this way the essence of good implies a relation, not because the name good itself signifies only a relation, but because it signifies something which has a relation along with the relation itself. The relation implied in the word good is the status of that which perfects. This follows from the fact that a thing is capable of perfecting not only according to its own specific character but also according to the act of being which it has in reality. In this way an end perfects the means to that end. But since creatures are not their own act of existing, they must have a received existence. Thus their existence is limited and determined according to the measure of the thing in which it is received.
Sic igitur inter ista tria quae Augustinus ponit, ultimum, scilicet ordo, est respectus quem nomen boni importat; sed alia duo, scilicet species, et modus, causant illum respectum. Species enim pertinet ad ipsam rationem speciei, quae quidem secundum quod in aliquo esse habet, recipitur per aliquem modum determinatum, cum omne quod est in aliquo, sit in eo per modum recipientis. Ita igitur unumquodque bonum, in quantum est perfectivum secundum rationem speciei et esse simul, habet modum, speciem et ordinem. Speciem quidem quantum ad ipsam rationem speciei; modum quantum ad esse; ordinem quantum ad ipsam habitudinem perfectivi.	Among the three notes which Augustine lays down, the last, order, is the relation which the name good implies; but the other two, species and measure, are causes of that relation. For species belongs to the very specific character which, having existence in a subject, is received in a determined measure, since everything which is in a subject is in it according to the measure of the subject. Thus every good, being perfective in accordance with both its specific character and its act of being, has measure, species, and order: species in its specific character, measure in its act of being, and order in its status as perfective.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet, si nomen boni esset impositum ad significandum ipsam habitudinem; quod falsum est, ut ex dictis patet. Et propter hoc ratio non sequitur.	1. That argument would hold if the name good were used to signify the relation itself; but this is false, as is apparent from what has been said. The reasoning is therefore not consequent.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod bonum non differt ratione ab ente et uno, quasi habeant oppositas rationes; sed quia ratio boni includit rationem entis et unius, et aliquid addit.	2. Good does not differ from being and the one because the notions are opposed but because the notion of good includes those of being and the one and adds something to them.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod secundum philosophum in VIII Metaphys., sicut in numeris quaelibet unitas vel addita vel remota variat numeri speciem; ita in definitionibus quodlibet additum vel remotum diversam speciem constituit. Ex ipsa igitur specie tantum constituitur ratio veri, in quantum verum est perfectivum secundum rationem speciei tantum, ut ex dictis patet; sed ex specie simul et numero constituitur ratio boni, quod est perfectivum non solum secundum speciem, sed etiam secundum esse.	3. According to the Philosopher, just as in regard to numbers the addition or subtraction of one changes the species of the number, so also in definitions the addition or subtraction of anything constitutes a different species. Thus from the species alone is constituted the essence of the true inasmuch as the true is perfective according to the specific character alone, as is clear from what has been said; but from the species plus the measure is constituted the essence of good, which is perfective not only in regard to species but also in regard to the act of being.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod cum dicit Augustinus, quod totum malum est repertum de speciei privatione, non excludit alia duo: quia, ut ipse in eodem libro dicit, ubi est aliqua species, necessario est aliquis modus. Ordo etiam consequitur speciem et modum. Sed nominat speciem tantum, quia alia duo ipsam speciem consequuntur.	4 When Augustine says that evil is discovered to consist entirely in the privation of species, he does not exclude the other two because, as he himself says in the very same book, “where there is any species there is necessarily some measure.” Order also follows upon species and measure. But he names species alone because the other two are consequent upon species.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod ubicumque est aliquid receptum, oportet ibi esse modum, cum receptum limitetur secundum recipiens; et ideo, cum esse creaturae et accidentale et essentiale sit receptum, modus non solum invenitur in accidentalibus, sed etiam in substantialibus.	5. Wherever something has been received, there measure must be found, since what is received is limited in proportion to the recipient. Since a creature’s act of being, both accidental and essential, is received, measure is found not only in accidentals but also in substantials.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod cum in istis tribus ratio boni constituatur, non potuit a Deo fieri quod aliquid esset bonum non habens speciem, modum et ordinem; sicut ab eo fieri non potuit quod esset aliquis homo, qui non esset animal rationale.	6. Since the essence of the good consists in species, measure, and order, even God could not bring it about that anything should be good without having species, measure, and order, just as it would be impossible for Him to make a man who was not a rational animal.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod etiam modus, species et ordo, singulum eorum est bonum, non in illo modo dicendi bonum quo subsistens in bonitate est bonum, sed quo principium bonitatis bonum est. Unde non oportet quod singulum eorum habeat modum, speciem et ordinem; sicut non oportet quod forma habeat formam, quamvis sit ens, et omne ens sit per formam. Et hoc est quod quidam dicunt, quod cum dicitur, omnia habere modum, speciem et ordinem, intelligitur de creatis non de concreatis.	7. Measure, species, and order are each good, not in the sense in which something subsisting in goodness is called good, but in the sense in which the principle of goodness is said to be good. Hence it is not necessary that each of them have measure, species, and order, just as it is not necessary that a form have a form, although it is a being and every being is in virtue of a form. This is the explanation of some who say that, when we speak of all things having measure, species, and order, this applies to things created, not to those which are co-created.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad octavum.	8. The answer is clear from what has just been said.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod quidam dicunt, modum, speciem et ordinem, secundum quod constituunt bonum naturae, et secundum quod diminuuntur per peccatum, prout pertinent ad bonum moris, esse eadem secundum rem, sed differre secundum rationem; sicut patet in voluntate, quod ipsa una et eadem potest considerari in quantum est natura quaedam: et sic est in ea modus, species et ordo, constituentia bonum naturae; vel in quantum est voluntas, prout habet ordinem ad gratiam: et sic attribuitur ei modus, species et ordo, quae possunt diminui per peccatum, quae constituunt bonum moris.	9. Some say that the measure, species, and order which constitutee the good of a real being and those which are in the domain of moral good and are decreased by sin are really the same but differ in concept. One and the same will, for instance, can be considered from the point of view of being a certain reality and thus having in it a measure, species, and order which constitute it a good in the real order, and also from the point of view of being specifically a will with an ordination to grace, and thus having attributed to it a measure, species, and order able to be decreased through sin, which constitute it a moral good.
Vel potest melius dici, quod cum bonum consequatur esse, et bonum per speciem, modum et ordinem constituatur: sicut est aliud esse substantiale et accidentale, ita constat esse aliam formam substantialem et accidentalem; et utraque proprium modum habet, et proprium ordinem.	Or a better answer would be that, in view of the fact that good is consequent upon existence and is constituted by species, measure and order, just as substantial and accidental existence are distinct, so substantial and accidental form are obviously distinct; and each has its own measure and order.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod secundum Augustinum in libro de natura boni, modus, species et ordo non ideo dicuntur mala quia in se mala sint, sed quia vel minora sunt quam esse debeant, vel quia non accommodantur quibus accommodanda sunt; et ideo ex aliqua privatione circa modum, speciem et ordinem dicuntur mala, non autem ex seipsis.	10. Measure, species, and order, according to Augustine, are not called bad because they are bad in themselves but either because “they are less than they ought to be” or because “they are not adapted to the things to which they should be adapted.” It is accordingly from some privation in point of measure, species, or order that they are called bad, not of themselves.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod verbum Ambrosii non est hoc modo intelligendum quod lux omnino careat modo, cum habeat limitatam speciem et virtutem; sed quia non determinatur respectu aliquorum corporalium, eo quod ad omnia corporalia se extendit, in quantum omnia nata sunt vel illuminari, vel alios effectus per lucem recipere, ut patet per Dionysium in IV cap. de divinis nominibus.	11. Ambrose’s statement is not to be understood in the sense that light is entirely without measure, since it has a limited species and power, but in the sense that it is not determined as regards any particular corporeal beings because it extends to all things corporeal inasmuch as all of them are capable of being illuminated or of receiving the other effects of light, as Dionysius makes clear.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod caritas secundum esse suum quod habet in subiecto, modum habet, et sic creatura quaedam est; prout vero comparatur ad obiectum infinitum, quod Deus est, non habet modum, ultra quem caritas nostra procedere non debeat.	12.Charity has measure arising from the existence which it has in a subject. In this sense it is a creature. But as referred to an infimite object, God, it has no measure beyond which our charity should not go.

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