Question Twenty-Two: The Tendency to Good and the Will
- Primo utrum omnia appetant bonum.
- Secundo utrum omnia appetant ipsum Deum.
- Tertio utrum appetitus sit quaedam specialis potentia animae.
- Quarto utrum voluntas in rationalibus sit alia potentia praeter appetitivam sensitivae partis.
- Quinto utrum voluntas aliquid de necessitate velit.
- Sexto utrum voluntas de necessitate velit quidquid vult.
- Septimo utrum aliquis mereatur illud volendo quod de necessitate vult.
- Octavo utrum Deus possit cogere voluntatem.
- Nono utrum aliqua creatura possit immutare voluntatem, vel imprimere in ipsam.
- Decimo utrum voluntas et intellectus sint eadem potentia.
- Undecimo utrum voluntas sit altior potentia quam intellectus, vel e converso.
- Duodecimo utrum moveat voluntas intellectum, et alias vires animae.
- Tertiodecimo utrum intentio sit actus voluntatis.
- Quartodecimo utrum eodem motu voluntas velit finem, et intendat ea quae sunt ad finem.
- Quintodecimo utrum electio sit actus voluntatis.
- Do all things tend to good?
- Do all things tend to God Himself?
- Is appetite a special power of the soul?
- In rational beings is will a power distinct from sense appetite?
- Does the will will anything necessarily?
- Does the will necessarily will whatever it wills?
- Does a person merit by willing what he wills necessarily?
- Can God force the will?
- Can any creature change the will or influence it?
- Are will and intellect the same power?
- Is the will a higher power than the intellect, or is the opposite true?
- Does the will move the intellect and the other powers of the soul?
- Is intention an act of the will?
- Does the will in the same motion will the end and intend the means?
- Is choice an act of the will?
The question is about the tendency to good and the will,
and in the first article we ask:
Do all things tend to good?
[ARTICLE De ver., 21, 2; C.G., III, 16; S.T., I, 5, 1; 80, 1.]
Quaestio est de appetitu boni et voluntate. Et primo quaeritur utrum omnia bonum appetant Difficulties Et videtur quod non. It seems that they do not, for Eodem enim modo ens se habet ad verum et bonum, cum convertatur cum utroque; sicut etiam cognitio se habet ad verum, sic appetitus ad bonum. Non autem omne ens cognoscit verum. Ergo nec omne ens appetit bonum. 1. Being is related to the true and to good in the same way since it is interchanged with either one. Furthermore, tendency is related to good as cognition is to the true. But not every being knows the true. Neither, then, does every being tend to good. Praeterea, remoto priori, removetur posterius. Sed in animali cognitio appetitum praecedit; cognitio autem nullo modo se extendit ad non animata, ut dicamus ea cognoscere naturaliter. Ergo nec appetitus ad eadem se extendet, ut dicamus ea naturaliter appetere bonum. 2. When the prior is removed the posterior also is removed. But in an animal cognition precedes appetitive tendency. Cognition, however, in no sense extends to inanimate things so that we could say that they know naturally. Neither, then, does appetitive tendency extend to them so that we could say that they naturally tend to good. Praeterea, secundum Boetium in libro de hebdomadibus, unumquodque dicitur appetere aliquid in quantum est sibi simile. Si igitur res aliqua appetit bonum, oportet quod sit similis bono. Cum autem similia sint quorum est qualitas vel forma una, oportet formam boni esse in appetente bonum. Sed non potest esse quod sit ibi secundum esse naturae, quia iam ulterius bonum non appeteret; quod enim habet quis, iam non appetit. Ergo oportet quod in appetente bonum forma boni praeexistat per modum intentionis. Sed in quocumque est aliquid per hunc modum, illud est cognoscens. Ergo appetitus boni non potest esse nisi in cognoscentibus; et sic idem quod prius. 3. According to Boethius’ a thing is said to tend to something else inasmuch as it is like it. If, then, something tends to good, it must be like good. But since things are alike which have the same quality or form, the form of good must be in whatever tends to good. Now it cannot be there according to the thing’s real existence, because it would then no longer tend; for what someone has he does not seek. The form of good must therefore pre-exist intentionally in the being which tends to good. But anything which has something else in it in this manner is cognitive. Only in cognitive beings, therefore, can there be a tendency to good; and so the conclusion is the same as before. Praeterea, si omnia bonum appetunt oportet hoc intelligi de bono quod omnia possunt habere; quia nihil appetit naturaliter vel rationaliter illud quod impossibile est ipsum habere. Sed bonum extendens se ad omnia entia, non est nisi esse. Ergo idem est dicere omnia bonum appetere, et omnia esse appetere. Sed non omnia appetunt esse; immo, ut videtur, nulla; quia omnia esse habent, et nihil appetit nisi quod non habet, ut patet per Augustinum in Lib. de Trinitate, et per philosophum in I Phys. Ergo non omnia bonum appetunt. 4. If all things tend to good, this must be understood of a good which all can have, because nothing tends either naturally or rationally to what is impossible for it to have. But the only good extending to all beings is existence. It is therefore the same to say that all things tend to good as that they tend to existence. Now not all things tend to existence; in fact it seems that none do, because all have existence and nothing tends except to what it does not have, as is made clear by Augustine and the Philosopher. Not all things, therefore, tend to good. Praeterea, unum et verum et bonum aequaliter cum ente convertuntur. Sed non omnia entia appetunt unum et verum. Ergo nec bonum. 5. The one, the true, and the good are all equally interchanged with being. But not all beings tend to the one and the true. Neither, then, do they tend to the good. Praeterea, secundum philosophum, quidam habentes rectam rationem, contra rationem operantur. Non autem operarentur, nisi appeterent vel vellent. Quod autem est contra rationem, est malum. Ergo quidam appetunt malum; non igitur omnia appetunt bonum. 6. Some people who know the right thing to do act contrary to this knowledge, according to the Philosopher. Now they would not this knowledge, according so act if they did not desire or will to do so. But what is against reason is evil. Some people therefore tend to evil, and so not all tend to good. Praeterea, bonum quod omnia appetere dicuntur, ut Commentator dicit in Princ. Ethicorum, est esse. Sed quidam non appetunt esse, sed magis non esse, ut damnati in Inferno, qui etiam mortem animae desiderant, ut penitus non essent. Igitur non omnia bonum appetunt. 7. The good which all things are said to tend to, as the Commentator says, is to be. But some people do not seek to be but rather not to be—the damned in hell, for instance, who desire even the death of the soul —so that they should not exist at all. Not everything, therefore, seeks good. Praeterea, sicut vires apprehensivae comparantur ad sua obiecta, ita etiam et appetitivae. Sed vis apprehensiva debet esse denudata a specie sui obiecti, ad hoc quod cognoscat, sicut pupilla a colore. Ergo et appetens bonum debet esse denudatum a specie boni. Sed omnia habent speciem boni. Ergo nihil appetit bonum. 8. The appetitive powers stand to their objects in just the same relation as the apprehensive to theirs. But an apprehensive power has to be devoid of the species of its object in order to be able to know, as the pupil of the eye must be without color. Hence whatever tends to good must also be devoid of the species of good. But everything has the species of good. Therefore nothing tends to good. Praeterea, operari aliquid propter finem convenit et creatori, et naturae, et agenti a proposito. Sed creator, et agens a proposito, creatura ut homo, operando propter finem, et desiderando vel diligendo bonum, habent cognitionem finis vel boni. Ergo et natura, quae est quasi media inter duo, utpote praesupponens opus creationis, et praesupposita in opere artis, si debeat appetere finem propter quem operatur, oportet quod ipsum cognoscat. Sed non cognoscit. Ergo etiam naturalia non appetunt bonum. 9. To work for an end belongs to the Creator, to nature, and to an agent who acts with a purpose. But the Creator and a created agent with a purpose, such as man, in working for an end and desiring and loving good, have knowledge of the end or good. Then since nature is in a sense intermediate between the two, presupposing the work of creation and being presupposed in the work of art, if it takes pleasure in seeking the end for which it works, it too must know that end. But it does not have knowledge. Then the things of nature also do not tend to good. Praeterea, omne illud quod appetitur, quaeritur. Sed secundum Platonem nihil potest quaeri cuius cognitio non habetur: sicut si aliquis quaereret servum fugitivum, nisi eius notitiam haberet, cum inveniret, se invenisse nesciret. Ergo illa quae non habent cognitionem boni, non appetunt ipsum. 10. Whatever is tended to is sought. But according to Plato, nothing of which knowledge is not had can be sought. Thus if anyone were to seek a runaway slave without having any knowledge of his appearance, upon finding him he would not know that he had done so. Hence things which do not have knowledge of good do not tend to it. Praeterea, appetere finem est eius quod ordinatur in finem. Sed ultimus finis, qui est Deus, non ordinatur in finem. Ergo non appetit finem vel bonum; et ita non omnia bonum appetunt. 11. To strive for an end belongs to what is directed to an end. But the last end, God, is not directed to an end. He does not, then, strive for an end or good; and so not everything tends to good. Praeterea, natura determinata est ad unum. Si ergo res naturaliter appetunt bonum, non deberent aliquod bonum aliud naturaliter appetere. Sed naturaliter omnia appetunt pacem, ut patet per Augustinum, XIX de civitate Dei, et per Dionysium, XII cap. de divinis nominibus; et iterum pulchrum omnia appetunt, ut etiam per Dionysium patet, IV cap. de divinis nominibus. Ergo non omnia appetunt bonum naturaliter. 12. A nature is determined to one thing. Then if things naturally tend to good, they should not naturally tend to anything else. But all things seek peace, as Augustine and Dionysius explain, and also the beautiful, as Dionysius also says. Consequently not all things naturally tend to good. Praeterea, sicut aliquis appetit finem quando non habet, ita delectatur in eo iam habito. Sed non dicimus res inanimatas delectari in bono. Ergo nec debet dici quod bonum appetant. 13. Just as a person strives for an end when he does not have it, he also takes pleasure in it when he has it. But we do not say that inanimate things take pleasure in good. Neither, then, should we say that they tend to good. Sed contra. To the Contrary Est quod Dionysius dicit, cap. IV de divinis nominibus: existentia pulchrum et bonum desiderant; et omnia quaecumque faciunt, propter hoc quod videtur eis bonum, faciunt; et omnium existentium intentio principium habet et finem bonum. 1. Dionysius says: “Existents desire the beautiful and the good; and whatever they do, they do because it seems good. The intention of all existents has as its principle and term the good.” Praeterea, philosophus dicit in I Ethicorum, quod quidam bonum bene definierunt, dicentes, quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt. 2. The Philosopher says” that some have defined good well by saying that it is “what all things tend to.” Praeterea, omne quod agit, agit propter finem, ut patet per philosophum in II Metaphys. Sed quod agit propter aliquid, appetit illud. Ergo omnia appetunt finem et bonum, quod habet rationem finis. 3. Whatever acts, acts for an end, as is made clear by the Philosopher. But whatever acts for something tends to it. Therefore everything tends to an end and to good, which has the character of an end. Praeterea, omnia appetunt suam perfectionem. Sed unumquodque ex hoc quod est perfectum, est bonum. Ergo omnia appetunt bonum. 4. Everything seeks its own perfection. But by the fact that a thing is perfect it is good. Everything therefore seeks good. Respondeo. REPLY Dicendum, quod omnia bonum appetunt, non solum habentia cognitionem, sed etiam quae sunt cognitionis expertia. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod quidam antiqui philosophi posuerunt, effectus advenientes in natura, ex necessitate praecedentium causarum provenire; non ita quod causae naturales essent hoc modo dispositae propter convenientiam talium effectuum: All things, not only those which have knowledge but also those which are without it, tend to good. To understand this it will help to bear in mind that some of the ancient philosophers taught that well-suited effects in nature come about from the necessity of their prior causes, though the natural causes themselves have not been disposed in that particular way with a view to the suitability of the effects. quod philosophus in II Physic. ex hoc improbat quod secundum hoc, huiusmodi convenientiae et utilitates si non essent aliquo modo intentae, casu provenirent, et sic non acciderent in maiori parte, sed in minori, sicut et cetera quae casu accidere dicimus; unde necesse est dicere, quod omnes res naturales sunt ordinatae et dispositae ad suos effectus convenientes. With this opinion the Philosopher finds fault ‘14 because according to it, unless such suitabilities and aptnesses were in some sense intended, they would come about by chance and so would not happen most of the time but only rarely, like other things which we say happen by chance. Hence we must say that all natural things are ordained and disposed to their well-adapted effects. Dupliciter autem contingit aliquid ordinari vel dirigi in aliquid sicut in finem: uno modo per seipsum, sicut homo qui seipsum dirigit ad locum quo tendit; alio modo ab altero, sicut sagitta quae a sagittante ad determinatum locum dirigitur. A se quidem in finem dirigi non possunt nisi illa quae finem cognoscunt. Oportet enim dirigens habere notitiam eius in quod dirigit. Sed ab alio possunt dirigi in finem determinatum etiam quae finem non cognoscunt sicut patet de sagitta. There are two ways in which a thing may be ordained or directed to something else as its end: (1) by itself, as a man directs himself to the place where he is going; and (2) by something else, as an arrow is aimed at a definite spot by the archer. Nothing can direct itself to an end unless it knows the end, for the one directing must have knowledge of that to which he directs. But even things which do not know the end can be directed to a definite end, as is evident from the arrow. Sed hoc dupliciter contingit. Quandoque enim id quod dirigitur in finem, solummodo impellitur et movetur a dirigente, sine hoc quod aliquam formam a dirigente consequatur per quam ei competat talis directio vel inclinatio; et talis inclinatio est violenta, sicut sagitta inclinatur a sagittante ad signum determinatum. Aliquando autem id quod dirigitur vel inclinatur in finem, consequitur a dirigente vel movente aliquam formam per quam sibi talis inclinatio competat: unde et talis inclinatio erit naturalis, quasi habens principium naturale; sicut ille qui dedit lapidi gravitatem, inclinavit ipsum ad hoc quod deorsum naturaliter ferretur; per quem modum generans est motor in gravibus et levibus, secundum philosophum in Lib. VIII Physic. This can come about in two ways. (1) Sometimes what is directed to an end is merely driven or moved by the one directing it without acquiring from the director any form by which such a direction or inclination belongs to it. Such an inclination, like that by which the arrow is aimed by the archer at a definite target, is violent. (2) Sometimes what is directed or inclined to an end acquires from the director or mover some form by which such an inclination belongs to it. In that case the inclination will be natural, having a natural principle. Thus He who gave heaviness to the stone inclined it to be borne downward naturally. In this way the one who begets them is the mover in regard to heavy and light things, according to the Philosopher. Et per hunc modum omnes res naturales, in ea quae eis conveniunt, sunt inclinata, habentia in seipsis aliquod inclinationis principium, ratione cuius eorum inclinatio naturalis est, ita ut quodammodo ipsa vadant, et non solum ducantur in fines debitos. Violenta enim tantummodo ducuntur, quia nil conferunt moventi; sed naturalia etiam vadunt in finem, in quantum cooperantur inclinanti et dirigenti per principium eis inditum. It is after this fashion that all natural things are inclined to what is suitable for them, having Within themselves some principle of their inclination in virtue of which that inclination is natural, so that in a way they go themselves and are not merely led to their due ends. Things moved by violence are only led, because they contribute nothing to the mover. But natural things go to their ends inasmuch as they cooperate with the one inclining and directing them through a principle implanted in them. Quod autem dirigitur vel inclinatur in aliquid ab aliquo, in id inclinatur quod est intentum ab eo qui inclinat vel dirigit; sicut in idem signum sagitta dirigitur quo sagittator intendit. Unde, cum omnia naturalia naturali quadam inclinatione sint inclinata in fines suos a primo motore, qui est Deus, oportet quod id in quod unumquodque naturaliter inclinatur, sit id quod est volitum vel intentum a Deo. Deus autem, cum non habeat alium suae voluntatis finem nisi seipsum, et ipse sit ipsa essentia bonitatis: oportet quod omnia alia naturaliter sint inclinata in bonum. Appetere autem nihil aliud est quam aliquid petere quasi tendere in aliquid ad ipsum ordinatum. What is directed or inclined to something by another is inclined to that which is intended by the one inclining or directing it. The arrow, for example, is directed to the same target at which the archer aims. Consequently, since all natural things have been inclined by a certain natural inclination toward their ends by the prime mover, God, that to which everything is naturally inclined must be what is willed or intended by God. But since God can have no end for His will other than Himself and He is the very essence of goodness, all other things must be naturally inclined to good. To desire or have appetency (appetere) is nothing else but to strive for something (ad aliquid petere), stretching, as it were, toward something which is destined for oneself. Unde, cum omnia sint ordinata et directa a Deo in bonum, et hoc modo quod unicuique insit principium per quod ipsummet tendit in bonum, quasi petens ipsum bonum; oportet dicere, quod omnia naturaliter bonum appetant. Si enim essent omnia inclinata in bonum sine hoc quod haberent in se aliquod inclinationis principium, possent dici ducta in bonum: sed non appetentia bonum; sed ratione inditi principii dicuntur omnia appetere bonum, quasi sponte tendentia in bonum: propter quod etiam dicitur Sapient., VII, vers. 1, quod divina sapientia disponit omnia suaviter, quia unumquodque ex suo motu tendit in id in quod est divinitus ordinatum. Accordingly, since all things are destined and directed by God to good, and this is done in such a way that in each one is a principle by which it tends of itself to good as if seeking good itself, it is necessary to say that all things naturally tend to good. If all things were inclined to good without having within themselves any principle of inclination, they could be said to be led to good, but not to be tending toward it. But in virtue of an innate principle all things are said to tend to good as if reaching for it of their own accord. For this reason it is said in Wisdom (8: 1) that divine wisdom “orders all things sweetly” because each one by its own motion tends to that for which it has been divinely destined. Answers to Difficulties Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod verum et bonum quodammodo similiter se habent ad ens, et quodammodo dissimiliter: quia secundum conversionem praedicationis similiter; sicut enim unumquodque ens est bonum, ita et verum: sed secundum ordinem causae perficientis, dissimiliter: non enim verum habet ordinem causae perficientis ad omnia entia, sicut bonum: quia scilicet perfectio veri attenditur secundum rationem speciei solum; unde immaterialia sola possunt perfici vero, quia ipsa tantum recipere possunt rationem speciei sine esse materiali; bonum vero cum sit perfectivum secundum rationem speciei et esse simul, potest perficere tam materialia quam immaterialia. Et ideo omnia possunt appetere bonum, sed non omnia cognoscere verum. 1. The true and good are somewhat similarly related to being, and also somewhat dissimilarly. From the viewpoint of predicative interchangeability they are similarly related, for every being is good just as it is true. But as perfecting causes they are dissimilarly related; for the true, unlike good, does not stand as a perfecting cause to all beings, because the perfection of the true is considered from the point of view of the specific character only. Only immaterial beings, then, can be perfected by the true, because only they can receive the specific character without its material act of existing. But good, being perfective both in regard to the specific character and in regard to the act of existing, can perfect material beings as well as immaterial. All things can accordingly tend to good, but not all can know the true. Ad secundum dicendum, quod quidam dicunt, quod sicut omnibus appetitus naturalis inest, ita et cognitio naturalis. Sed hoc non potest esse verum: quia, cum cognitio sit per assimilationem, similitudo in esse naturae, non facit cognitionem, sed magis impedit; ratione cuius oportet organa sensuum a speciebus sensibilium esse denudata, ut possint eas recipere secundum esse spirituale, quod cognitionem causat. Unde illa quae nullo modo possunt aliquid recipere nisi secundum esse materiale, nullo modo possunt cognoscere; tamen possunt appetere, in quantum ordinantur ad aliquam rem in esse naturae existentem. Appetitus enim non respicit de necessitate esse spirituale, sicut cognitio. Unde potest esse appetitus naturalis, sed non cognitio. Nec tamen hoc prohibetur per hoc quod appetitus in animalibus cognitionem sequitur: quia etiam in rebus naturalibus sequitur apprehensionem vel cognitionem: non tamen ipsorum appetentium, sed illius qui ea in finem ordinat. 2. Some say that there is natural cognition in all things just as there is a natural appetitive tendency. But this cannot be true because, in view of the fact that cognition is by assimilation, likeness in real existence does not bring about cognition but rather hinders it. It is for this reason that the sense organs must be devoid of sensible species in order to be able to receive them by way of the spiritual existence which causes knowledge. Hence those things which in no way receive anything except according to material existence can in no way know. Yet they can tend inasmuch as they are directed to something having real existence. Appetitive tendency does not necessarily look to a spiritual existence as does cognition. Hence there can be a natural appetite but not a natural cognition. This still does not prevent appetite from following cognition in animals, because even in the things of nature it follows apprehension or cognition—not that of the things which have the appetite but that of Him who directs them to their end. Ad tertium dicendum, quod omne quod appetit aliquid, appetit illud in quantum habet aliquam similitudinem cum ipso. Nec illa similitudo sufficit quae est secundum esse spirituale; alias oporteret ut animal appeteret quidquid cognoscit; sed oportet quod sit similitudo secundum esse naturae. Sed haec similitudo attenditur dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod forma unius secundum actum perfectum est in alio; et tunc ex hoc quod aliquid sic assimilatur fini, non tendit in finem, sed quiescit in fine. Alio modo ex hoc quod forma unius est in alio incomplete, id est in potentia; et sic, secundum quod aliquid habet in se formam finis et boni in potentia, tendit in bonum vel in finem, et appetit ipsum. Et secundum hunc modum materia dicitur appetere formam, in quantum est in ea forma in potentia. Et ideo etiam quanto ista potentia magis est perfecta et propinquior actui, tanto causat vehementiorem inclinationem; ex quo contingit ut omnis motus naturalis in finem intendatur, quando id quod tendit in finem, iam est fini similius. 3. Whatever tends to anything tends to it in so far as that thing has some likeness to itself. And a likeness in spiritual existence does not suffice; otherwise an animal would have to tend to whatever it knows. The likeness must be one in real existence. Now this likeness may be taken in two ways: (1) in so far as the form of one thing is in another with perfect actuality; and in this case there does not follow from likeness to the end a tendency to the end, but repose in it; and (2) in so far as the form of one is in another incompletely, i.e., potentially; and so, by reason of the potential possession of the form of the end and of good, the thing tends to good or its end and desires it. It is in this sense, as having form within it potentially, that matter is said to desire form. The more, then, that potentiality is achieved and brought closer to actuality, the more vigorous is the inclination which it causes. This is why any natural motion is intensified near the end when the thing tending to the end is more like that end. Ad quartum dicendum, quod cum dicitur: omnia bonum appetunt, non oportet bonum determinari ad hoc vel illud: sed in communitate accipi, quia unumquodque appetit bonum naturaliter sibi conveniens. Si tamen ad aliquod unum bonum determinetur, hoc unum erit esse. Nec hoc prohibetur per hoc quod omnia esse habent quia quae esse habent appetunt eius continuationem; et quod habet esse in actu uno modo, habet esse in potentia alio modo; sicut aer est actu aer, et potentia ignis; et sic quod habet esse actu, appetit esse actu. 4. When we say that all things tend to good, good is not to be restricted to this or that but to be taken in its generality, because each being naturally tends to a good suitable to itself. If, notwithstanding, the term good is limited to some single good, that will be the act of being. Nor is this prevented by the fact that all things have the act of being, because whatever has being desires its continuance and what actually has being in one way has it only potentially in another. Thus air is actually air and potentially fire. And so what actually has being desires to be actually. Ad quintum dicendum, quod unum et verum non habent rationem finis, sicut et bonum; et ideo nec etiam rationem appetibilis dicunt. 5. The one and the true do not have the character of an end as does good; and so they do not have the character of the appetible either. Even those who act contrary to reason are seeking good directly. Ad sextum dicendum, quod illi etiam qui operantur contra rationem, appetunt bonum per se; ut puta qui fornicatur, attendit ad id quod est bonum et delectabile secundum sensum; sed quod sit malum secundum rationem, est praeter intentionem eius. Unde bonum est desideratum per se, malum vero per accidens. 6. A man who fornicates, for instance, is interested in something good and pleasurable to sense. That the act is bad from the viewpoint of reason is beyond his intention. Good is accordingly desired directly; evil, indirectly. Ad septimum dicendum, quod sicut aliquid se habet ad hoc quod sit bonum, ita ad hoc quod sit appetibile. Dictum est autem supra, 5, quod secundum esse substantiale non dicitur aliquid bonum simpliciter et absolute, nisi superaddantur aliae perfectiones debitae: et ideo ipsum esse substantiale non est absolute appetibile nisi debitis perfectionibus adiunctis. Unde philosophus dicit in IX Ethicor.: omnibus delectabile est esse. Non oportet autem accipere malam vitam et corruptam neque in tristitiis: haec enim est mala simpliciter, et simpliciter fugienda, quamvis sit appetibilis secundum quid. Eiusdem autem rationis est in appetendo et fugiendo, aliquid esse bonum et corruptivum mali, vel esse malum et corruptivum boni. Nam ipsum carere malo dicimus bonum, secundum philosophum in V Ethic. Non esse igitur accipit rationem boni, in quantum tollit esse in tristitiis vel in malitia, quod est malum simpliciter, licet sit bonum secundum quid. Et per hunc modum non esse potest desiderari sub ratione boni. 7. A thing is appetible in the same way as it is good. It was said above that in its substantial act of being a thing is not called good simply and absolutely unless other due perfections are added. The substantial act of being is accordingly not appetible in an absolute sense if its due perfections are not joined to it. Hence the Philosopher says: “To be is delightful to all things.” But we are not to understand an evil and corrupt life or a sorrowful one, for this is evil simply and is simply to be shunned, though it is appetible in a certain respect. In the matter of seeking and shunning, it is all of a piece for a thing to be good and to be destructive of evil, or again to be evil and to be destructive of good. Hence we call the very lack of evil a good, as the Philosopher points out. Non-existence therefore assumes the aspect of a good inasmuch as it takes away being in a state of sorrow or wickedness, which is simply evil, although it is good in some respect. In this sense non-existence can be desired under the aspect of good. Ad octavum dicendum, quod in apprehensivis potentiis non semper hoc est verum quod potentia denudetur totaliter a specie sui obiecti. Hoc enim fallit in illis potentiis quae habent obiectum universale, sicut intellectus cuius obiectum est quid, cum tamen habeat quidditatem; oportet tamen quod sit denudatus a formis illis quas recipit. Fallit etiam in tactu, propter hoc quod, etsi habeat specialia obiecta, sunt tamen de necessitate animalis. Unde organum eius non potest esse omnino absque calido et frigido: est tamen quodammodo praeter calidum et frigidum, in quantum est medie complexionatum, medium autem neutrum extremorum est. Appetitus autem habet obiectum commune, scilicet bonum. Unde non est denudatum totaliter a bono, sed ab illo bono quod appetit; habet tamen illud in potentia, et secundum hoc similatur illi; sicut et potentia apprehensiva est in potentia ad speciem sui obiecti. 8. Concerning apprehensive powers it is not always true that the power is altogether devoid of the species of its object. It is false in regard to those powers which have a universal object, as in the case of the intellect, whose object is the what although it has whatness itself. Yet it must be devoid of the forms which it receives. It is false also in regard to touch, because, although it has special objects, they nevertheless necessarily belong to an animal. Thus its organ cannot be wholly without warmth and cold; and yet it is somehow independent of heat and cold, being of an intermediate make-up. But what is intermediate is neither of the extremes. Now appetitive tendency has a common object, good. Hence it is not altogether devoid of good, but just of that good to which it tends. It nevertheless has that good potentially and in this respect is like it, just as an apprehensive power is in potency to the species of its object. Ad nonum dicendum, quod, sicut ex dictis patet, in omni dirigente in finem requiritur cognitio finis. Natura autem non dirigit in finem, sed dirigitur. Deus autem, et agens a proposito quodlibet etiam dirigunt in finem; et ideo oportet quod habeant finis cognitionem, non autem res naturalis. 9. As is clear from what has been said, knowledge of the end is required in everyone directing anything to an end. Nature, however, does not direct to an end but is directed. But God and also any purposeful agent direct to an end, and so they must have knowledge of the end, but not a thing of nature. Ad decimum dicendum, quod ratio illa recte procedit de eo quod appetit finem, quasi seipsum in finem dirigens, quia in eo requiritur quod sciat cum ad finem perventum fuerit; non autem oportet in eo quod tantum in finem dirigitur. 10. That argument is correct in regard to a being that tends to an end by directing itself towards it, because it has to know when it has reached the end. But there is no such necessity in a thing which is merely being directed to its end. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod per quam naturam aliquid tendit in finem quem nondum habet et delectatur in fine cum habet iam; sicut per eamdem naturam terra movetur deorsum et quiescit ibi. Fini ergo ultimo non competit tendere in finem, sed seipso fine frui. Et hoc licet proprie appetitus dici non possit, est tamen quiddam ad genus appetitus pertinens, a quo omnis appetitus derivatur. Ex hoc enim quod Deus seipso fruitur, alia in se dirigit. 11. By the same nature by which a thing tends to an end which it does not yet have, it delights in an end which it already has. Thus by the same nature the element earth moves downward and rests there. Now it is not consonant with the last end to tend to an end, but it is consonant with it to take pleasure in itself as an end. Though this cannot properly be called an appetite, still it is something belonging to the genus of appetite, and from it all appetite is derived. For from the fact that God takes pleasure in Himself, He directs other things to Himself. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod appetitum terminari ad bonum et pacem et pulchrum, non est eum terminari in diversa. Ex hoc enim ipso quod aliquid appetit bonum, appetit simul et pulchrum et pacem: pulchrum quidem, in quantum est in seipso modificatum et specificatum, quod in ratione boni includitur; sed bonum addit ordinem perfectivi ad alia. Unde quicumque appetit bonum, appetit hoc ipso pulchrum. Pax autem importat remotionem perturbantium et impedientium adeptionem boni. Ex hoc autem ipso quod aliquid desideratur, desideratur etiam remotio impedimentorum ipsius. Unde simul et eodem appetitu appetitur bonum, pulchrum et pax. 12. If appetite terminates in good and peace and the beautiful, this does not mean that it terminates in different goals. By the very fact of tending to good a thing at the same time tends to the beautiful and to peace. It tends to the beautiful inasmuch as it is proportioned and specified in itself. These notes are included in the essential character of good, but good adds a relationship of what is perfective in regard to other things. Whoever tends to good, then, by that very fact tends to the beautiful. Peace, moreover, implies the removal of disturbances or obstacles to the obtaining of good. By the very fact that something is desired, the removal of obstacles to it is also desired. Consequently, at the same time and by the same appetitive tendency good, the beautiful, and peace are sought. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod delectatio in ratione sui includit cognitionem boni, quod delectat: et propter hoc non possunt delectari in fine habito nisi ea quae cognoscunt finem. Sed appetitus cognitionem non importat in appetente, ut ex dictis patet. Tamen large et improprie accipiendo delectationem, Dionysius dicit in IV cap. de divinis nominibus, quod pulchrum et bonum est omnibus delectabile et amabile. 13. Pleasure includes in its notion knowledge of the good which gives pleasure. For this reason only things which know the end can take pleasure in an end. But appetitive tendency does not entail knowledge in the being which tends, as is evident from what has been said. Nevertheless, using pleasure broadly and improperly, Dionysius says that what is beautiful and good is found by all to be pleasurable and lovable.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
In the second article we ask:
Do all things tend to God himself?
[ARTICLE II Sent., 1, 2, 1; C.G.., III, 17 & 18; S.T., I, 6, 1 c & ad 2; 44, 4; Comp. theol., I, 100 & 101.]
Secundo quaeritur utrum omnia appetant ipsum Deum Difficulties Et videtur quod non. It seems that they do not, for Res enim ordinatur in Deum ut est cognoscibilis et appetibilis. Sed non omnia quae ordinantur in ipsum ut est cognoscibilis, cognoscunt ipsum; non enim omnia cognoscentia cognoscunt Deum. Ergo nec omnia quae ordinantur in ipsum ut in appetibile, appetunt ipsum. 1. Things are oriented to God as knowable and appetible. But not all things oriented to God as knowable know Him, for not all cognitive beings know God. Therefore, neither do all things oriented to Him as appetible tend to Him. Praeterea, bonum quod ab omnibus est desideratum, secundum philosophum in I Ethicorum, est esse, ut ibidem vult Commentator. Sed Deus non est esse omnium. Ergo Deus non est illud bonum quod ab omnibus est desideratum. 2. The good which is desired by all things is, in the opinion of the Philosopher, existence, as the Commentator maintains. But God is not the existence of all. Then God is not the good which is desired by all. Praeterea, nullus appetit id quod refugit. Sed quidam refugiunt Deum, cum odiant ipsum, ut habetur in Psalm. LXXIII, 23: superbia eorum qui te oderunt, ascendit semper; et Iob, XXI, 14, dicitur: dixerunt Deo: recede a nobis. Ergo non omnia appetunt Deum. 3. No one seeks what he flees from. But some people flee from God, as is had in the Psalms (73:23): “The pride of them that hate thee ascends continually.” And Job (21:14) says: “[They] have said to God: Depart from us.” Hence not all things seek God. Praeterea, nullus appetit id quod habet. Sed quidam, sicut beati, qui eo fruuntur, habent ipsum Deum. Ergo non omnia Deum appetunt. 4. No one seeks what he has. But some, the blessed who enjoy the possession of Him, have God. Then not all things seek Him. Praeterea, naturalis appetitus non est nisi eius quod potest haberi. Sed sola rationalis creatura potest habere Deum, cum sola sit ad imaginem Dei, et eo ipso imago Dei sit quo capax eius est, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de Trinit. Ergo non omnia naturaliter appetunt Deum. 5. There is a natural appetite only for what can be had. But only a rational creature can have God, since it alone is made to the image of God and “is the image of God by the very fact of having a capacity for Him,” as Augustine says. Not all things, then, naturally seek God. Sed contra. To the Contrary Est quod Augustinus dicit in Lib. Solil.: Deum diligit quidquid diligere potest. Sed omnia possunt diligere, quia omnia appetunt bonum. Ergo omnia appetunt Deum. 1. There is the statement of Augustine: “Whatever can love loves God.” But all things can love because all seek good. Then all seek God. Praeterea unumquodque appetit naturaliter finem suum propter quem est. Sed omnia sunt ordinata in Deum sicut in finem; Proverb. XVI, 4: universa propter semetipsum operatus est dominus. Ergo omnia naturaliter appetunt Deum. 2. Everything naturally tends to the end for which it exists. But all things are ordained to God as their end; for as is written in Proverbs (16:4): “The Lord has made all things for himself.” All things, therefore, naturally tend to God. Responsio. REPLY Dicendum, quod omnia naturaliter appetunt Deum implicite, non autem explicite. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod secundaria causa non potest influere in suum effectum nisi in quantum recipit virtutem primae causae. Sicut autem influere causae efficientis est agere, ita influere causae finalis est appeti et desiderari. Et ideo, sicut secundarium agens non agit nisi per virtutem primi agentis in eo existentem, ita secundarius finis non appetitur nisi per virtutem finis principalis in eo existentem: prout scilicet est ordinatum in illud, vel habet similitudinem eius. All things naturally tend to God implicitly, but not explicitly. That this may appear clearly it should be observed that a secondary cause can influence its effect only in so far as it receives the power of the first cause. The influence of an efficient cause is to act; that of a final cause is to be sought or desired. A secondary agent acts only by the efficacy of the first agent existing in it; similarly a secondary end is sought only by reason of the worth of the principal end existing in it inasmuch as it is subordinated to the principal end or has its likeness. Et ideo, sicut Deus, propter hoc quod est primum efficiens, agit in omni agente, ita propter hoc quod est ultimus finis, appetitur in omni fine. Sed hoc est appetere ipsum Deum implicite. Sic enim virtus primae causae est in secunda, ut etiam principia in conclusionibus; resolvere autem conclusiones in principia, vel secundas causas in primas, est tantum modo virtutis rationalis. Unde solum rationalis natura potest secundarios fines in ipsum Deum per quamdam viam resolutionis deducere, ut sic ipsum Deum explicite appetat. Et sicut in demonstrativis scientiis non recte scitur conclusio nisi per resolutionem in prima principia, ita appetitus creaturae rationalis non est rectus nisi per appetitum explicitum ipsius Dei, actu vel habitu. Accordingly, because God is the last end, He is sought in every end, just as, because He is the first efficient cause, He acts in every agent. But this is what tending to God implicitly, means. For the efficacy of the first cause is in the second as the principles of reasoning are in the conclusions. But to reduce conclusions to their principles or secondary causes to their first causes belongs only to the power of reasoning. Hence only a rational nature can trace secondary ends back to God by a sort of analytic procedure so as to seek God Himself explicitly. In demonstrative sciences a conclusion is correctly drawn only by a reduction to first principles. In the same way the appetite of a rational creature is correctly directed only by an explicit appetitive tendency to God, either actual or habitual. Answers to Difficulties Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod etiam omnia cognoscentia cognoscunt implicite Deum in quolibet cognito. Sicut enim nihil habet rationem appetibilis nisi per similitudinem primae bonitatis, ita nihil est cognoscibile nisi per similitudinem primae veritatis. 1. All cognitive beings also know God implicitly in any object of knowledge. Just as nothing has the note of appetibility except by a likeness to the first goodness, so nothing is knowable except by a likeness to the first truth. Ad secundum dicendum, quod ipsum esse creatum est similitudo divinae bonitatis; unde in quantum aliqua desiderant esse, desiderant Dei similitudinem et Deum implicite. 2. Created existence is itself a likeness to the divine goodness. So in desiring to be, things implicitly desire a likeness to God and God Himself. Ad tertium dicendum, quod Deus dupliciter potest considerari: vel in se, vel in effectibus suis. In se quidem, cum sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, non potest non diligi; unde ab omnibus videntibus eum per essentiam diligitur, et ibi quantum quisque cognoscit, tantum diligit. Sed in aliquibus effectibus suis in quantum sunt contrarii voluntati, sicut sunt poenae illatae, vel praecepta quae gravia videntur, ipse Deus refugitur, et quodammodo odio habetur. Et tamen oportet quod illi qui eum quantum ad aliquos effectus odiunt, in aliis effectibus eum diligunt; sicut ipsi Daemones, secundum Dionysium in IV cap. de divinis nominibus, appetunt esse et vivere naturaliter, et in hoc ipsum Deum appetunt et diligunt. 3. God can be viewed in two ways, in Himself and in His effects. Viewed in Himself He cannot but be loved since He is the very essence of goodness. Hence He is loved in His essence by all who see Him; and to the extent that each one knows Him each loves Him. But viewed in some of His effects, e.g., punishment or commands that seem onerous, seeing that they are contrary to our will, God is shunned and, in a sense, hated. And yet those who hate Him in some of His effects necessarily love Him in others. Thus even the devils, as Dionysius teaches, naturally desire to be and to live, and in this respect seek and love God Himself. Ad quartum dicendum, quod beati qui iam fruuntur Deo, appetunt fruitionis continuitatem; et iterum ipsa fruitio est sicut iam quidam habitus perfectus suo appetibili, quamvis nomen appetitus imperfectionem importet. 4. The blessed who already enjoy the possession of God desire the continuance of their enjoyment. Furthermore, the enjoyment itself is a sort of appetite perfected by its object, although the name appetite implies imperfection. Ad quintum dicendum, quod sola creatura rationalis est capax Dei, quia ipsa sola potest ipsum cognoscere et amare explicite; sed aliae creaturae participant divinam similitudinem, et sic ipsum Deum appetunt. 5. Only a rational creature has the capacity for God because only it can know and love Him explicitly. But other creatures too participate in a likeness to God and so tend to Him.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
In the third article we ask:
Is appetite a special power of the soul?
[ARTICLE III Sent., 27, 1, 2; S.T., I, 80, 1.]
Tertio quaeritur utrum appetitus sit quaedam specialis potentia animae Difficulties Et videtur quod non. It seems that it is not, for Potentiae enim animae non ordinantur nisi ad opera vitae. Sed opera vitae dicuntur quibus animata ab inanimatis distinguuntur; sed secundum appetere non distinguuntur animata ab inanimatis, quia etiam inanimata bonum appetunt. Ergo appetitus non est specialis potentia animae. 1. The powers of the soul are ordained only to vital operations. Now those operations are called vital by which animate things are distinguished from inanimate. But it is not as regards tending that animate things are distinguished from inanimate, because even the inanimate tend to good. Appetite is therefore not a special power of the soul. Praeterea, appetitus nihil aliud esse videtur quam quaedam directio in finem. Sed appetitus naturalis sufficit ad hoc quod aliquid per ipsum dirigatur in finem. Ergo non oportet superaddi appetitum animalem, qui sit specialis potentia animae. 2. Appetite is nothing, it seems, but a sort of direction to an end. But natural appetite suffices for a thing to be directed to an end. So there is no necessity of adding an animal appetite which would be a special power of the soul. Praeterea, operationes et potentiae differunt penes terminos. Sed idem est terminus appetitus naturalis et animalis, scilicet bonum. Ergo eadem est potentia vel operatio. Sed appetitus naturalis non est potentia animae. Ergo nec animalis. 3. Operations and powers are differentiated as to their terms. But there is the same term, good, for both natural and animal appetite. It is therefore the same power or operation. But natural appetite is not a power of the soul. Then neither is animal appetite. Praeterea, appetitus est rei non habitae, secundum Augustinum. Sed in animalibus iam per cognitionem bonum habetur. Ergo cognitionem boni non sequitur in animalibus aliquis appetitus qui specialem requirat potentiam. 4. Appetite is for what is not had, according to Augustine. But in the case of animals the good is already had by knowledge. Therefore there does not follow upon knowledge among animals any appetite which would call for a special power. Praeterea, specialis potentia ordinatur ad specialem actum, non autem ad actum communem omnibus animae potentiis. Sed appetere bonum est commune omnibus potentiis animae; quod patet ex hoc quod quaelibet potentia appetit suum obiectum, et delectatur in ipso. Ergo appetitus non est specialis potentia animae. 5. A special power is destined for a special act, not for an act common to all the powers of the soul. But to tend to good is common to all the powers of the soul. This is apparent from the fact that every power tends to its object and takes pleasure in it. Therefore appetite is not a special power of the soul. Praeterea, si potentia appetitiva appetit bonum: aut appetit bonum communiter, aut bonum sibi. Si autem appetat bonum communiter; cum omnis potentia alia appetat aliquod bonum particulare, appetitiva potentia non erit specialis potentia, sed universalis. Si autem appetat bonum sibi; cum etiam quaelibet alia potentia sibi bonum appetat, pari ratione quaelibet alia potentia dici poterit appetitus. Ergo non erit aliqua potentia quae specialiter debeat dici appetitus. 6. If the appetitive power tends to good, it tends either to good in general or to what is good for itself. Now if it should tend to good in general, since every other power tends to some particular good, the appetitive power will not be a special power but a universal one. But if it tends to what is good for itself, since every other power also tends to what is good for itself, every other power can for the same reason be called an appetite. There will therefore not be any power of the soul which can be called appetite in a special way. Sed contra. To the Contrary Est quod philosophus appetitivum posuit specialem potentiam animae in Lib. III de anima. The Philosopher posits the appetitive part as a special power of the soul. Responsio. REPLY Dicendum, quod appetitus est specialis potentia animae. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod cum potentiae animae ordinentur ad opera quae sunt animatorum propria; secundum hoc aliqua operatio habet quod ad eam specialis potentia animae deputetur, quod ipsa est propria operatio animati. Invenitur autem aliqua operatio quae secundum unum modum est communis et animatis et non animatis: sed secundum alium modum est animatorum propria; sicut moveri et generari. Appetite is a special power of the soul. In this regard it should be noted that, since the powers of the soul are destined for operations proper to animate beings, an operation has a special power of the soul appointed for it for the reason that it is an operation proper to an animate being. There is found, indeed, a certain operation which from one point of view is common to both animate and inanimate beings but from another is proper to animate beings; for instance, to be moved or generated. Res enim spirituales absolute habent naturam ut moveant, sed non ut moveantur. Corpora autem moventur quidem; et quamvis unum possit alterum movere, non tamen aliquod eorum potest movere seipsum; quia illa quae movent seipsa, ut probatur in VIII Physic., dividuntur in duas partes, quarum una est movens, et alia mota. Spiritual things considered in themselves have such a nature as to move but not to be moved. Bodies, however, are moved; and though one can move another, still no one of them can move itself. For things which move themselves are divided into two parts, one of which is the mover, the other, moved, as is shown in the Physics. Quod quidem in rebus pure corporalibus esse non potest; quia formae earum non possunt esse moventes, quamvis possint esse motus principium, ut quo aliquid movetur; sicut in motu terrae gravitas est principium quo movetur, non tamen est motor. Et hoc contingit tum propter simplicitatem corporum inanimatorum, quae non habent tantam diversitatem in partibus ut una pars possit esse movens et alia mota; tum etiam propter ignobilitatem et materialitatem formarum. Quae quia longe distant a formis separatis, quarum est movere, non retinent ut movere possint, sed solum ut sint motus principia. But this cannot be realized in purely corporeal beings, because their forms cannot be movers, though they can be the principle of motion in the sense of that by which something is moved. In the movement of the element earth, for instance, heaviness is the principle by which it is moved but yet is not the mover. This is so both because of the simplicity of inanimate bodies, which do not have enough diversity in their parts for one to originate motion and another to be moved, and also because of the baseness and materiality of their forms, which, being far removed from the separated forms to which it belongs to move, do not retain the ability to move but only the function of being principles of motion. Res vero animatae sunt compositae ex natura spirituali et corporali; unde potest esse in eis una pars movens et alia mota, tam secundum motum localem, quam secundum alios motus. Et ideo, in quantum moveri efficitur hoc modo propria actio ipsorum animatorum, ut ipsa seipsa moveant ad determinatas species motus: inveniuntur in animalibus speciales potentiae ordinatae; sicut ad motum localem in animalibus vis motiva, in plantis vero et in animalibus communiter vis augmentativa ad motum augmenti, nutritiva ad motum alterationis, generativa ad motum generationis. Similiter etiam appetere, quod quodammodo commune est omnibus, fit quodammodo speciale animatis, scilicet animalibus, in quantum in eis invenitur et appetitus, et movens appetitum. Ipsum enim bonum apprehensum est movens appetitum, secundum philosophum in Lib. III de anima. Unde, sicut animalia moventur ex se prae aliis, ita et appetunt ex se. Et propter hoc, sicut vis motiva est specialis potentia in anima, ita et vis appetitiva. Animate things, however, are composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature. There can accordingly be in them a moving part and another moved—both locally and in other ways. And so, inasmuch as to be moved is made an action proper to animate beings in the sense that they move themselves to definite species of movement, there is found in animals a hierarchy of special powers. Thus for locomotion in animals there is a motive power; and in plants and animals alike, a power of growth for the movement of growing, a nutritive power for the movement of alteration, and a generative power for the movement of generation. To tend, which is in a way common to all things, likewise becomes in a way special for animate beings, or rather animals, inasmuch as there are found in them appetite and what moves the appetite. This latter, according to the Philosopher, is the apprehended good itself. Hence, just as animals more than other things are moved of themselves, so too they tend of themselves. For this reason the appetitive power is a special faculty in the soul in the same way as the motive power. Answers to Difficulties Ad primum igitur patet solutio per iam dictis. 1. The solution is clear from what has already been said. Ad secundum dicendum, quod quia animalia nata sunt participare divinam bonitatem eminentius ceteris inferioribus rebus, inde est quod indigent multis operationibus et auxiliis ad suam perfectionem; sicut qui potest consequi perfectam sanitatem multis exercitiis, est propinquior sanitati quam ille qui non potest percipere nisi modicam sanitatem, et ob hoc non indiget nisi modico exercitio, secundum exemplum philosophi in II caeli et mundi. Et ideo, cum appetitus naturalis sit determinatus ad unum, nec possit esse multiformis, ut in tot diversa se extendat quot animalia indigent; necessarium fuit ut animalibus superadderetur appetitus animalis consequens apprehensionem, ut ex multitudine apprehensorum, animal in diversa ferretur. 2. It is precisely because animals are capable of participating in divine goodness a more eminent way than other, inferior things, that they have need of many operations and helps to their perfection. A man who can gain perfect health by much exercise is nearer to health than one who can attain only a little health and needs for this only a little exercise—to use the example given by the Philosopher. Now a natural appetite is determined to a single object and cannot be so diversely oriented that it extends to as many different things as animals have need of. For this reason it was necessary for animals to be supplied in addition with an animal appetite consequent upon apprehension so that among many objects of apprehension the animal would be attracted to different ones. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis bonum appetatur tam per appetitum naturalem quam per appetitum animalem, tamen per naturalem appetitum non appetit aliquid bonum ex seipso, sicut per animalem; et ideo ad appetendum bonum appetitu animali exigitur potentia, quae non exigitur ad appetendum per appetitum naturalem. Et propterea bonum in quod tendit appetitus naturalis, est determinatum et uniforme; non autem est ita de bono quod appetitur per appetitum animalem. Et potest simile induci de virtute motiva. 3. Although good is sought by both natural and animal appetite, nevertheless by its natural appetite a thing does not of itself seek good as it does by its animal appetite. Consequently for the seeking of good by animal appetite there is required a power which is not required for the exercise of natural appetite. Furthermore the good to which a natural appetite tends is definite and always the same; but this is not true of the good sought by an animal appetite. And the same can be applied to the motive power. Ad quartum dicendum, quod appetens bonum non quaerit habere bonum secundum esse intentionale, qualiter habetur a cognoscente, sed secundum esse naturale; et ideo per hoc quod animal habet bonum ut cognoscens ipsum, non excluditur quin possit eum appetere. 4. The being which desires a good does not seek to have the good according to its intentional existence, as it is had by one who knows it, but according to its essential or real existence. Consequently the fact that an animal possesses the good by knowing it does not keep it from being able to desire it. Ad quintum dicendum, quod unaquaeque potentia appetit suum obiectum appetitu naturali; sed appetitus animalis ad specialem potentiam pertinet. Et quia appetitus naturalis est determinatus ad unum, animalis autem sequitur apprehensionem; inde est quod singulae potentiae appetunt bonum determinatum, sed vis appetitiva appetit quodcumque bonum apprehensum. Nec tamen sequitur quod sit generalis potentia, quia bonum commune appetit speciali modo. 5. Every power tends to its object by a natural appetite. But animal appetite belongs to a special power. And because natural appetite is determined to a single object whereas animal appetite follows apprehension, individual powers tend to a determined good but the appetitive faculty tends to any good apprehended. Yet it does not follow that it is a universal power, since it tends to good in a special way. Unde patet solutio ad ultimum. 6. The solution to this difficulty is evident from what has just been said.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
In the fourth article we ask:
In rational beings is will a power distinct from sense appetite?
[ARTICLE De ver., 25, 1; III Sent., 26,1, 2 sol. & ad 2; C.G., II, 47; In III de an., 14, nn. 802-06; 15, n. 831; S.T., I, 80, 2.]
Quarto quaeritur utrum voluntas in rationabilibus sit alia potentia praeter appetitivam sensitivae partis Difficulties Et videtur quod non. it seems that it is not, for Accidentalis enim differentia obiectorum non diversificat potentias. Sed obiecta voluntatis et appetitus non differunt nisi per differentias accidentales bono, quod per se est obiectum appetitus. Non enim videntur aliter differre, nisi quod voluntas est boni apprehensi per intellectum, appetitus autem sensibilis est boni apprehensi per sensum; quae accidunt bono in quantum est bonum. Ergo voluntas non est alia potentia ab appetitu. 1. An accidental difference in objects does not distinguish powers. But the objects of the, will and of the sense appetite are differentiated only by accidental differences in good, which is essentially the object of appetite. They do not, indeed, seem to differ except inasmuch as the will has as its object the good apprehended by the intellect, and sense appetite, that apprehended by sense. But these differences are accidental to good as such. Therefore the will is not a power distinct from sense appetite. Praeterea, vis appetitiva sensitiva et intellectiva differunt per particulare et universale; quia sensus apprehendit particularia, intellectus autem universalia. Sed per hoc non potest distingui appetitus sensitivae partis et intellectivae, quia omnis appetitus est boni in rebus existentis, quod non est universale, sed singulare. Ergo non debet dici quod appetitus rationalis, qui est voluntas, sit alia potentia ab appetitu sensitivo, per modum quo intellectus est alia potentia a sensu. 2. Sensitive and intellectual apprehensive powers differ as particular and universal, for sense apprehends particulars and intellect universals. But the appetite of the sensitive and intellective parts cannot be distinguished in this way, because any appetite is for the good as it exists in reality. This, however, is not universal but singular. The rational appetite—the will—must therefore not be said to be a power other than sense appetite as intellect is other than sense. Praeterea, sicut apprehensionem sequitur vis appetitiva, ita appetitivam sequitur vis motiva. Sed motiva non est alia potentia et alia in rationabilibus et irrationabilibus. Ergo nec appetitiva; et sic idem quod prius. 3. The motive power follows the appetitive just as the appetitive follows apprehension. But the motive power is not one thing in rational beings and another in irrational. Then neither is the appetitive. And so the conclusion is the same as before. Praeterea, philosophus in I de anima, distinguit quinque genera potentiarum animae et operationum: quorum unum includit generationem, nutritionem et augmentum; secundum, sensum; tertium, appetitum; quartum, motum secundum locum; quintum, intellectum; ubi intellectus a sensu distinguitur, non autem appetitus intellectivus a sensitivo appetitu. Ergo videtur quod non distinguatur potentia appetitiva superior ab inferiori, sicut potentia apprehensiva superior ab apprehensiva inferiori. 4. The Philosopher distinguishes five kinds of powers and operations of the soul. One includes generation, nutrition, and growth; the second is sense; the third, appetite; the fourth, locomotion; and the fifth, intellect. Intellect is here distinguished from sense, but not intellective appetite from sense appetite. It therefore seems that a higher appetitive power is not distinguished from a lower as a higher apprehensive power is distinguished from a lower. Sed contra. To the Contrary Est quod philosophus, in Lib. III de anima, distinguit voluntatem ab appetitu sensitivo. 1. The Philosopher distinguishes the will from sense appetite. Praeterea, quaecumque sunt ordinata ad invicem, oportet esse distincta. Sed appetitus intellectivus est superior appetitu sensitivo, secundum philosophum in III de anima, et etiam movet ipsum ut sphaera sphaeram, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo voluntas est alia potentia ab appetitu sensitivo. 2. All things that stand in a series must be distinct. But intellective appetite is higher than that of sense according to the Philosopher, and even moves it “as sphere moves sphere,” as he says in the same place. The will is therefore a power other than sense appetite. Responsio. REPLY Dicendum, quod voluntas est alia potentia ab appetitu sensitivo. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod sicut appetitus sensitivus distinguitur ab appetitu naturali propter perfectiorem modum appetendi, ita etiam appetitus rationalis ab appetitu sensitivo. Quanto enim aliqua natura est Deo propinquior, tanto expressior in ea divinae dignitatis similitudo invenitur. Hoc autem ad divinam dignitatem pertinet ut omnia moveat et inclinet et dirigat, ipse a nullo alio motus vel inclinatus aut directus. Unde, quanto aliqua natura est Deo vicinior, tanto minus ab alio inclinatur et magis nata est seipsam inclinare. The will is a power distinct from sense appetite. It should be noted in this connection that rational appetite is distinguished from that of sense in just the same way as sensitive appetite is distinguished from that of nature—because of a more perfect way of tending. The closer a nature is to God, the more pronounced is the likeness of the divine excellence which is found in it. Now it belongs to the divine excellence to move and incline and direct all things while not being moved, inclined, or directed by any other. Hence the nearer a nature is to God, the less it is inclined by another and the more it is capable of inclining itself. Natura igitur insensibilis, quae ratione suae materialitatis est maxime a Deo remota, inclinatur quidem in aliquem finem, non tamen est in ea aliquid inclinans, sed solummodo inclinationis principium, ut ex praedictis patet. An insensible nature, therefore, being by reason of its materiality the farthest removed from God, is inclined to an end, to be sure, but has within it nothing which inclines, but only a principle of inclination, as was explained above. Natura vero sensitiva ut Deo propinquior, in seipsa habet aliquid inclinans, scilicet appetibile apprehensum; sed tamen inclinatio ipsa non est in potestate ipsius animalis quod inclinatur, sed est ei aliunde determinata. Animal enim ad aspectum delectabilis non potest non concupiscere illud; quia ipsa animalia non habent dominium suae inclinationis; unde non agunt, sed magis aguntur, secundum Damascenum; et hoc ideo quia vis appetitiva sensitiva habet organum corporale, et ideo vicinatur dispositionibus materiae et rerum corporalium, ut moveatur magis quam moveat. A sensitive nature, however, being closer to God, has within itself something which inclines, i.e., the apprehended object of appetite. Yet this inclination is not within the control of the animal which is inclined but is determined by something else. An animal is not able at the sight of something attractive not to crave it, because animals do not themselves have the mastery over their own inclination. Hence “they do not act but are rather acted upon,” as Damascene says. This is because the sensuous appetitive power has a bodily organ and so is nearly in the condition of matter and of corporeal things so as rather to be moved than to move. Sed natura rationalis, quae est Deo vicinissima, non solum habet inclinationem in aliquid sicut habent inanimata, nec solum movens hanc inclinationem quasi aliunde eis determinatam, sicut natura sensibilis; sed ultra hoc habet in potestate ipsam inclinationem, ut non sit ei necessarium inclinari ad appetibile apprehensum, sed possit inclinari vel non inclinari. Et sic ipsa inclinatio non determinatur ei ab alio, sed a seipsa. Et hoc quidem competit ei in quantum non utitur organo corporali: et sic recedens a natura mobilis, accedit ad naturam moventis et agentis. Quod autem aliquid determinet sibi inclinationem in finem, non potest contingere nisi cognoscat finem, et habitudinem finis in ea quae sunt ad finem: quod est tantum rationis. Et ideo talis appetitus non determinatus ex aliquo alio de necessitate, sequitur apprehensionem rationis; unde appetitus rationalis, qui voluntas dicitur, est alia potentia ab appetitu sensibili. But a rational nature, being closest to God, not merely, like inanimate things, has an inclination to something, and, like a sentient nature, a mover of this inclination determined as it were extrinsically, but further so has its inclination within its own power that it does not necessarily incline to anything appetible which is apprehended, but can incline or not incline. And so its inclination is not determined for it by anything else but by itself. This belongs to it inasmuch as it does not use a bodily organ; and so, getting farther away from the nature of what is moved, it approaches that of what moves and acts. It can come about that something determines for itself its inclination to an end only if it knows the end and the bearing of the end upon the means to it. But this belongs to reason alone. Thus such an appetite, which is not determined of necessity by something else, follows the apprehension of reason. Hence, rational appetite, called will, is a power distinct from sense appetite. Answers to Difficulties Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod voluntas ab appetitu sensibili non distinguitur directe per hoc quod est sequi apprehensionem hanc vel illam; sed ex hoc quod determinare sibi inclinationem, vel habere inclinationem determinatam ab alio: quae duo exigunt potentiam non unius modi. Sed talis diversitas requirit diversitatem apprehensionum ut ex praedictis patet. Unde quasi ex consequenti accipitur distinctio appetitivarum virium penes distinctionem apprehensivarum, et non principaliter. 1. The will is not distinguished from sense appetite directly on the basis of the apprehension which it follows but on that of determining one’s inclination for oneself or having it determined by another. These two sorts of inclination require different kinds of powers. And such a diversity further demands a difference in the apprehensions, as appears from what has been said. Hence the distinction of the appetitive powers is more or less resultantly based upon the distinction of the apprehensive, not principally. Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis appetitus semper intendat ad aliquid in rerum natura existens, quod est per modum particularis, et non universalis, tamen ad appetendum quandoque movetur per apprehensionem alicuius universalis conditionis: sicut appetimus hoc bonum ex hac consideratione qua consideramus simpliciter bonum esse appetendum; quandoque vero per apprehensionem particularis secundum suam particularitatem. Et ideo sicut appetitus ex consequenti distinguitur per differentiam apprehensionis quam sequitur, ita etiam ex consequenti distinguitur per universale et particulare. 2. Although appetite always looks to something existing in reality as a particular and not as a universal, nevertheless it is sometimes moved to tend by the apprehension of some universal condition. We tend to this particular good, for instance, from the consideration of the fact that we look upon good as simply to be sought. At other times we tend as a result of the apprehension of a particular thing in its particularity. Thus appetite is distinguished into universal and particular in a secondary sense, Just as it is distinguished in a secondary sense according to the difference in the apprehension which it follows. Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum motus et operationes sint in singularibus, et ab universali propositione non possit fieri descensus ad conclusionem particularem nisi mediante assumptione particulari; non potest universalis conceptio intellectus applicari ad electionem operis, quae est quasi conclusio in operabilibus, ut dicitur in VII Ethic., nisi mediante apprehensione particulari. Et ideo motus qui sequitur apprehensionem universalem intellectus mediante particulari apprehensione sensus, non requirit aliam potentiam motivam respondentem intellectui, et aliam respondentem sensui, sicut est de appetitu qui immediate sequitur apprehensionem, et praeterea, motiva imperata, de qua obiectio tangit, est vis affixa musculis et nervis: unde non potest esse intellectivae partis, quae organo non utitur. 3. Motion and operations are found in singulars. But there can be a descent from a universal proposition to a particular conclusion only through the mediation of a particular assumption. Now in matters of operating the choice of a deed is a sort of conclusion, as is said in the Ethics. A universal conception of the intellect, accordingly, can be applied to the choice of a deed only by means of a particular apprehension. Consequently the motion which follows upon a universal apprehension of the intellect by means of a particular sense apprehension does not require one motive power corresponding to intellect and another corresponding to sense, as is true of the appetite which follows apprehension immediately. Moreover, the motive power in question in the difficulty, that which is commanded, is a power attached to the muscles and nerves. Hence it cannot pertain to the intellective part, which uses no organ. Ad quartum dicendum, quod quia sensus et intellectus differunt per rationes apprehensibilis in quantum est apprehensibile, propter hoc quod ad diversa genera pertinent potentiarum. Sensus enim tendit in apprehendendum particulare, sed intellectus in apprehendendum universale. Appetitus vero superior et inferior non differunt per differentias appetibilis in quantum est appetibile, cum in idem bonum tendat quandoque uterque appetitus; sed differunt penes diversum modum appetendi, ut ex dictis patet. Et ideo sunt quidem diversae potentiae, sed non diversa potentiarum genera. 4. Because sense and the intellect differ according to the formal aspects of the apprehensible in so far as it is apprehensible, they therefore belong to different genera of powers. Sense is concerned with apprehending the particular; the intellect, with apprehending the universal. But higher and lower appetite are not differentiated by differences in the appetible as such, since either appetite sometimes tends to the same good. They differ rather in their different ways of tending, as is evident from what has been said. Hence they are indeed distinct powers but not distinct kinds of powers.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
In the fifth article we ask:
Does the will will anything necessarily?
[ARTICLE II Sent., 25, a. 2; S.T., I, 82, 1; I-II, 10, 1; De malo, 6.]
Quinto quaeritur utrum voluntas aliquid de necessitate velit Difficulties Et videtur quod sic. It seems that it does, for Quia secundum Augustinum in XIII de Trinit., beatitudinem omnes una voluntate expetunt. Sed quod ab omnibus communiter expetitur, de necessitate expetitur; si enim non de necessitate, contingeret ab aliquo non expeti. Ergo voluntas de necessitate aliquid expetit. 1. According to Augustine’ all seek happiness “with a single will.” But what is sought by all in common is sought of necessity; for if it were not of necessity, it might chance not to be sought by someone. The will therefore wills something necessarily. Praeterea, omne motivum perfectae virtutis de necessitate movet suum mobile. Sed secundum philosophum in III de anima, bonum est motivum voluntatis, secundum quod apprehenditur. Ergo, cum aliquid sit perfectum bonum, sicut Deus et beatitudo, ut etiam dicitur in I Ethic., aliquid erit quod voluntatem de necessitate movebit; et ita a voluntate aliquid necessario appetitur. 2. Every cause of motion having perfect efficacy moves its object of necessity. But according to the Philosopher good as apprehended is the cause of the motion of the will. Therefore, since something is a perfect good, viz., God and beatitude, as is said in the Ethics, there will be something which will move the will with necessity. And so something is desired by the will necessarily. Praeterea, immaterialitas est causa quare aliqua potentia cogi non possit; potentiae enim organis affixae coguntur, sicut patet praecipue de motiva. Sed intellectus est immaterialior potentia quam voluntas; quod patet ex hoc quod habet immaterialius obiectum, scilicet universale: cum bonum in rebus particularibus existens sit obiectum voluntatis. Cum igitur intellectus cogatur ut aliquid de necessitate teneat, ut dicitur in V Metaphys., videtur quod etiam voluntas de necessitate aliquid appetat. 3. Immateriality is the reason why a given power cannot be forced; for powers connected with organs are forced, as appears especially in regard to the motive power. But the intellect is a more immaterial power than the will. This is clear from the fact that it has a more immaterial object, the universal, whereas the object of the will is the good existing in particular things. Since, then, the intellect is forced to hold something of necessity, as is said in the Metaphysics, it seems that the will also tends to something of necessity. Praeterea, necessitas non removetur a voluntate nisi ratione libertatis, cui videtur necessitas opposita. Sed non omnis necessitas impedit libertatem: unde dicit Augustinus in V de civitate Dei: si illa definitur esse necessitas secundum quam dicimus: necesse est ut ita sit vel ita fiat; nescio cur eam timeamus ne nobis libertatem auferat voluntatis. Ergo voluntas de necessitate aliquid vult. 4. Necessity is removed from the will only by reason of freedom, to which necessity seems to be opposed. But not every sort of necessity prevents freedom. Hence Augustine says: “If necessity is defined to be that according to which we say: ‘It is necessary for something to be or to become thus and so, I do not know why we should fear that it will take away the freedom of the will.” The will therefore of necessity wills something. Praeterea, necessarium est quod non potest non esse. Sed Deus non potest non velle bonum, sicut non potest non esse bonus. Ergo necessario vult bonum: et ita aliqua voluntas necessario vult aliquid. 5. Necessary means unable not to be. But God is unable not to will good just as He is unable not to be good. He therefore necessarily wills good; and so some will wills something necessarily. Praeterea, secundum Gregorium, peccatum quod per poenitentiam non deletur, mox suo pondere ad aliud trahit. Peccatum autem non committitur nisi voluntate, secundum Augustinum. Cum ergo tractio sit quidam motus violentus, ut patet in VII Physic., aliquis potest violenter cogi ad aliquid de necessitate volendum. 6. According to Gregory “a sin which is not wiped out by repentance, by its own weight soon draws a person to another.” But a sin is not committed unless it is done voluntarily, as Augustine teaches..Since drawing is a violent motion, as is made clear in the Physics, one can accordingly be violently forced to will something of necessity. Praeterea, secundum quod Magister dicit in XXV dist. I Lib., et sumit ex verbis Augustini, in secundo statu, idest in statu culpae, non potest homo non peccare, ante reparationem, etiam mortaliter, post reparationem vero saltem venialiter. Sed tam peccatum mortale quam veniale est voluntarium. Ergo aliquis status hominis est, in quo non potest non velle id, in quo peccatum consistit; et sic de necessitate voluntas aliquid vult. 7. Following Augustine, the Master says: “In the second state (the state of guilt) man cannot avoid sinning even mortally before reparation and at least venially after reparation.” But both mortal and venial sin are voluntary. There is therefore a state of man in which he is unable not to will something which constitutes a sin. And so the will of necessity wills something. Praeterea, quanto aliquid magis natum est ad movendum, tanto magis natum est necessitatem inferre. Sed bonum magis potest movere quam verum; cum bonum sit in rebus, verum autem in mente tantum, ut dicitur in Lib. VI Metaphys. Ergo, cum verum cogat intellectum, multo fortius bonum coget voluntatem. 8. The more a thing is disposed by nature to cause motion, the more it is disposed to impose necessity. But good can cause motion more than what is true, since good is in things but what is true is only in thought, as is said in the Metaphysics. Therefore, since what is true forces the intellect, with all the more reason does good force the will. Praeterea, bonum fortius imprimit quam verum; quod patet ex hoc quod amor, qui est impressio boni, est magis unitivus quam cognitio, quae est impressio veri: amor enim, secundum Augustinum, est vita quaedam uniens amantem amato. Ergo bonum magis potest inferre necessitatem voluntati quam verum intellectui; et sic idem quod prius. 9. Good makes a stronger impression than truth. This is evident from the fact that love, which is the imprint left by the impact of good, is more conducive to unity than knowledge, which is the imprint left by the impact of truth. For according to Augustine, love is a sort of life uniting the lover to the beloved. Good can therefore impose necessity upon the will more than truth can upon the intellect. Thus the conclusion is the same as before. Praeterea, quanto aliqua potentia magis potest in sua obiecta, tanto minus potest ab eis cogi. Sed ratio magis potest in sua obiecta quam voluntas: ratio enim, secundum Augustinum, XII de Trinitate, format in se species rerum, non autem voluntas; sed movetur ab appetibilibus. Ergo magis potest voluntas cogi ab appetibilibus quam ratio a cognoscibilibus; et sic idem quod prius. 10. The more power a faculty has over its objects, the less it can be forced by them. But reason has more power over its objects than will; for according to Augustine, reason forms within itself the species of things, and the will does not, but is moved by appetible things. The will can therefore be forced by its objects more than reason can by its own. And so the same conclusion is reached as before. Praeterea, quod per se inest, de necessitate inest. Sed velle aliquid, per se inest voluntati. Ergo voluntas de necessitate aliquid vult. Probatio mediae. Summum bonum est per se volitum. Ergo quandocumque in ipsum fertur voluntas, per seipsum vult. Sed semper in ipsum fertur, quia naturaliter fertur in ipsum. Ergo voluntas semper per se vult summum bonum. 11. What is in something essentially is in it of necessity. But to will something is in the will essentially. Therefore the will wills something of necessity. Proof of the minor: The highest good is willed essentially. Therefore whenever the will is directed to it, it wills essentially. But then it is always directed to it because it is so naturally. Therefore the will always essentially wills the highest good. Praeterea, in cognitione scientiae necessitas invenitur. Sed, sicut omnes homines naturaliter volunt scire, secundum philosophum in I Metaph., ita etiam naturaliter volunt bonum. Ergo in voluntate boni necessitas invenitur. 12. In scientific knowledge necessity is found. Now just as all men naturally want to know, as the Philosopher says, so too do they naturally will good. In willing good necessity is therefore found. Praeterea, Glossa, Rom. VII 15 ss., dicit, quod voluntas vult naturaliter bonum. Sed ea quae insunt secundum naturam, sunt de necessitate. Ergo voluntas vult bonum de necessitate. 13. The Gloss says that the will “naturally wills good.”But things which are in something by nature are necessary. Therefore the will necessarily wills good. Praeterea, omne quod augetur et minuitur, potest etiam totaliter auferri. Sed libertas voluntatis augetur et minuitur: liberius enim arbitrium habuit homo ante peccatum quam post peccatum, secundum Augustinum. Ergo libertas voluntatis potest totaliter tolli; et ita voluntas potest de necessitate cogi. 14 Whatever is increased or diminished can also be taken away entirely. But the freedom of the will is increased or diminished, for before the fall man had freer choice than after the fall, according to Augustine.” The freedom of the will can therefore be taken away entirely. And so the will can be forced with necessity. Sed contra. To the Contrary Secundum Augustinum in V de civitate Dei, si aliquid est voluntarium, non est necessarium. Sed omne quod volumus, est voluntarium. Ergo voluntas non vult aliquid de necessitate. 1. According to Augustine, if anything is voluntary, it is not necessary. But whatever we will is voluntary. The will therefore does not will anything necessarily. Praeterea, Bernardus dicit, quod liberum arbitrium potentissimum est sub Deo. Sed quod est tale, non potest cogi ab aliquo; ergo voluntas non potest cogi ut aliquid de necessitate velit. 2. Bernard says that free choice is the most powerful thing under God. But such a thing cannot be forced by anyone. The will therefore cannot be forced to will something of necessity. Praeterea, libertas opponitur necessitati. Sed voluntas est libera. Ergo non de necessitate aliquid vult. 3. Freedom is opposed to necessity. But the will is free. Therefore it does not will anything of necessity. Praeterea, Bernardus dicit, quod liberum arbitrium ex ingenita nobilitate nulla necessitate movetur. Sed dignitas voluntatis auferri non potest. Ergo non potest voluntas de necessitate aliquid velle. 4. Bernard says that our choice, which is free because of our innate will, is moved by no necessity. But the dignity of the will cannot be taken away. The will therefore cannot will anything of necessity. Praeterea, potestates rationales se habent ad opposita, secundum philosophum. Sed voluntas est rationalis potentia; est enim in ratione, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo se habet ad opposita; et ideo non de necessitate determinatur ad aliquid. 5. Rational faculties are open to opposites according to the Philosopher. But the will is a rational faculty, for it is in reason, as is said in The Soul. It is therefore open to opposites, and so it is not determined to anything necessarily. Praeterea, quod de necessitate determinatur ad aliquid, naturaliter est determinatum ad illud. Sed voluntas contra naturalem appetitum dividitur. Ergo voluntas non de necessitate aliquid vult. 6. Whatever is determined to something of necessity is naturally determined to it. But the will is distinguished from natural appetite. It therefore does not will anything of necessity. Praeterea, ex eo quod aliquid est voluntarium, dicitur esse in nobis ita quod nos domini illius simus. Sed illud quod est in nobis, cuius domini sumus, possumus velle et non velle. Ergo omne quod voluntas vult, potest velle et non velle; et ita non de necessitate aliquid vult. 7. From the fact that something is voluntary it is said to be in us in such a way that we are masters of it. But we can will or not will anything within us of which we are masters. Therefore, whatever the will wills it can will or not will. Thus it does not will anything necessarily. Responsio. REPLY Dicendum, quod sicut potest accipi ex verbis Augustini, in V de civitate Dei XI cap., duplex est necessitas: necessitas scilicet coactionis, et haec in voluntatem nullo modo cadere potest; et necessitas naturalis inclinationis, sicut dicimus Deum de necessitate vivere: et tali necessitate voluntas aliquid de necessitate vult. As can be gathered from the words of Augustine, necessity is of two kinds: (1) the necessity of force; and this can by no means apply to the will; and (2) the necessity of natural inclination, as we say that (sod necessarily lives; and with such necessity the will necessarily wills something. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod in rebus ordinatis oportet primum modum includi in secundo, et in secundo inveniri non solum id quod sibi competit secundum propriam rationem, sed etiam quod competit secundum rationem primi; sicut homini convenit non solum ratione uti, quod ei competit secundum propriam differentiam, quae est rationale, sed etiam uti sensu vel alimento, quod etiam ei competit secundum genus suum, quod est animal vel vivum. Et similiter etiam videmus in sensibus; quod cum sensus tactus sit quasi fundamentum aliorum sensuum; in organo uniuscuiusque sensus non solum invenitur proprietas illius sensus cuius est organum proprium, sed etiam proprietas tactus: sicut oculus non solum sentit album et nigrum, in quantum est organum visus, sed etiam sentit calidum et frigidum, et corrumpitur ab eorum excellentiis, secundum quod est organum tactus. For an understanding of this it should be noted that among things arranged in an order the first must be included in the second, and in the second must be found not only what belongs to it by its own nature but also what belongs to it according to the nature of the first. Thus it is the lot of man not only to make use of reason, as belongs to him in accordance with his specific difference, rational; but also to make use of senses and food, as belongs to him in accordance with his genus, animal or living being. In like manner we see among the senses that the sense of touch is a sort of foundation for the other senses and that in the organ of each sense there is found not only the distinctive characteristic of the sense whose proper organ it is, but also the characteristics of touch. Thus the eye not only senses white and black as the organ of sight, but also as the organ of touch senses heat and cold and is destroyed by an excess in them. Natura autem et voluntas hoc modo ordinata sunt, ut etiam ipsa voluntas quaedam natura sit; quia omne quod in rebus invenitur, natura quaedam dicitur. Et ideo in voluntate oportet invenire non solum id quod voluntatis est, sed etiam quod naturae est. Hoc autem est cuiuslibet naturae creatae, ut a Deo sit ordinata in bonum, naturaliter appetens illud. Unde et voluntati ipsi inest naturalis quidam appetitus boni sibi convenientis. Et praeter hoc habet appetere aliquid secundum propriam determinationem, non ex necessitate; quod ei competit in quantum voluntas est. Now nature and the will stand in such an order that the will itself is a nature, because whatever is found in reality is called a nature. There must accordingly be found in the will not only what is proper to the will but also what is proper to nature. It belongs to any created nature, however, to be ordained by God for good, naturally tending to it. Hence even in the will there is a certain natural appetite for the good corresponding to it. And it has, moreover, the tendency to something according to its own determination and not from necessity. This belongs to it inasmuch as it is the will. Sicut autem est ordo naturae ad voluntatem, ita se habet ordo eorum quae naturaliter vult voluntas, ad ea respectu quorum a seipsa determinatur, non ex natura. Et ideo, sicut natura est voluntatis fundamentum, ita appetibile quod naturaliter appetitur, est aliorum appetibilium principium et fundamentum. In appetibilibus autem finis est fundamentum et principium eorum quae sunt ad finem; cum quae sunt propter finem, non appetantur nisi ratione finis. Et ideo, id quod voluntas de necessitate vult quasi naturali inclinatione in ipsum determinata, est finis ultimus, ut beatitudo, et ea quae in ipso includuntur, ut esse, cognitio veritatis, et aliqua huiusmodi; ad alia vero non de necessitate determinatur naturali inclinatione, sed propria dispositione absque omni necessitate. Just as there is an ordination of nature to the will, there is, moreover, a parallel ordination of the things which the will naturally wills to those in regard to which it is determined of itself and not by nature. Thus, just as nature is the foundation of will, similarly the object of natural appetite is the principle and foundation of the other objects of appetite. Now among the objects of appetite the end is the foundation and principle of the means to the end, because the latter, being for the sake of the end, are not desired except: by reason of the end. Accordingly what the will necessarily wills, determined to it by a natural inclination, is the last end, happiness, and whatever is included in it: to be, knowledge of truth, and the like. But it is determined to other things, not by a natural inclination, but by so disposing itself without any necessity. Quamvis autem quadam necessaria inclinatione ultimum finem velit voluntas; nullo tamen modo concedendum est quod ad illud volendum cogatur. Coactio enim nihil aliud est quam violentiae cuiusdam inductio. Violentum autem est, secundum philosophum in III Ethicorum, cuius principium est extra, nil conferente vim passo; sicut si lapis sursum proiiciatur; quia nullo modo, quantum est de se, ad hunc motum inclinatur. Sed cum ipsa voluntas sit quaedam inclinatio, eo quod est appetitus quidam, non potest contingere ut voluntas aliquid velit, et inclinatio eius non sit in illud; et ita non potest contingere ut voluntas aliquid coacte vel violente velit, etiam etsi aliquid naturali inclinatione velit. Patet igitur quod voluntas non necessario aliquid vult necessitate coactionis, vult tamen aliquid necessario necessitate naturalis inclinationis. Although the will wills the last end by a certain necessary inclination, it is nevertheless in no way to be granted that it is forced to will it. For force is nothing else but the infliction of some violence. According to the Philosopher that is violent “whose principle is outside it with the being which suffers the violence contributing nothing.” The throwing of a stone upward would be an example, because the stone of itself is not at all inclined to that motion. But seeing that the will is an inclination by the fact of its being an appetite, it cannot happen that the will should will anything without having an inclination to it. Thus it is impossible for the will to will anything by force or violently even though it does will something by a natural inclination. It is therefore evident that the will does not will anything necessarily with the necessity of force, yet it does will something necessarily with the necessity of natural inclination. Answers to Difficulties Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod ille communis appetitus beatitudinis non procedit ex aliqua coactione, sed ex naturali inclinatione. 1. That common appetite for happiness does not come from any forcing but from a natural inclination. Ad secundum dicendum, quod quantumcumque aliquod bonum efficaciter moveat voluntatem, non tamen ipsam cogere potest: quia ex quo ponitur quod velit aliquid, ponitur inclinationem habere in illud quod est coactioni contrarium. Sed ex perfectione boni alicuius contingit quod voluntas determinatur ad illud inclinatione naturalis necessitatis. 2. However effectively a good moves the will, it still cannot force it; because as soon as we posit that the will wills something, we posit that it has an inclination to it. But that is the contrary of force. It does happen, however, that because of the excellence of a good the will is determined to it by an inclination of natural necessity. Ad tertium dicendum, quod intellectus aliquid naturaliter intelligit, sicut et voluntas aliquid naturaliter vult; sed coactio non est contraria intellectui secundum suam rationem, sicut et voluntati. Intellectus enim etsi habeat inclinationem in aliquid, non tamen nominat ipsam inclinationem hominis, sed voluntas ipsam inclinationem hominis nominat. Unde quidquid fit secundum voluntatem, fit secundum hominis inclinationem, et per hoc non potest esse violentum. Sed operatio intellectus potest esse contra inclinationem hominis, quae est voluntas; ut cum alicui placet aliqua opinio, sed propter efficaciam rationum deducitur ad assentiendum contrario per intellectum. 3. The intellect naturally understands something just as the will naturally wills. But force is not contrary to the intellect in its very notion as it is to the will. For although the intellect has an inclination to something, it nevertheless does not designate a man’s inclination itself, whereas the will does designate the very inclination of the man. Hence whatever happens according to the will happens according to the man’s inclination and so cannot be violent. But the operation of the intellect can be against a man’s inclination, his will. This occurs, for instance, when a certain opinion pleases him but because of the force of the arguments he is brought by his intellect to assent to the contrary.  De veritate, q. 22 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de necessitate naturali, quam a voluntate non excludimus respectu aliquorum: et haec etiam necessitas in divina voluntate invenitur, sicut et in divino esse; ipse enim est necessarium per seipsum, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. 4. Augustine is speaking of natural necessity, which we do not exclude from the will in regard to certain things. This necessity is also found in the divine will just as it is found in the divine existence; for God is necessary essentially, as is said in the Metaphysics. Unde patet solutio ad quintum. 5. From what has just been said the answer is clear. Ad sextum dicendum, quod peccatum commissum non trahit cogendo voluntatem, sed inclinando: in quantum privat gratia, per quam homo fortificabatur contra peccatum, et in quantum etiam ex actu peccati relinquitur dispositio et habitus in anima inclinans ad sequens peccatum. 6. A sin committed does not draw a man by forcing his will but by inclining it, inasmuch as it deprives the man of the grace by which he is strengthened against sin, and also inasmuch as there is left in the soul from the act of sinning a disposition or habit inclining it to subsequent sin. Ad septimum dicendum, quod circa hoc est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt, quod homo, quantumcumque sit in statu peccati mortalis, potest peccatum mortale vitare per libertatem voluntatis: et exponunt quod dicitur: non potest non peccare; id est non habere peccatum non potest; sicut et videre dicitur habere visum et uti visu; potest autem, secundum eos, non peccare, id est non uti peccato. Et secundum hoc patet quod nulla necessitas inducitur in voluntate ad consentiendum peccato. Alii autem dicunt, quod sicut homo in statu huius vitae non potest peccatum veniale vitare, non quin possit vitare hoc vel illud, sed quia non potest vitare omnia, ut scilicet nullum committat; ita est etiam et de mortalibus in eo qui gratiam non habet. Et secundum hoc etiam patet quod voluntas non habet necesse velle hoc vel illud, quamvis sine gratia inveniatur deficiens ab indeficienti inclinatione in bonum. 7. On this point there are two opinions. Some say that however much a man may be in the state of mortal sin, he can avoid mortal sin by the freedom of his will. They explain the statement that man cannot avoid sinning to mean that he cannot avoid having sin, just as to see means to have sight as well as to make use of sight. But in their opinion he is able not to sin, meaning not to make use of sin. And it is accordingly evident that no necessity of consenting to sin is introduced into the will. Others say that, just as a man in the state of this present life cannot avoid venial sin, not in the sense that he is unable to avoid this or that particular venial sin, but in the sense that he cannot avoid all venial sins so as not to commit a single one, the same is also true of mortal sins in a man who does not have grace. And in accordance with this opinion it is clear that the will is not necessitated to will this or that mortal sin, although when without grace it is found to fall short of an unwavering inclination to good. Ad octavum dicendum, quod forma recepta in aliquo non movet illud in quo recipitur; sed ipsum habere talem formam, est ipsum motum esse; sed movetur ab exteriori agente; sicut corpus quod calefit per ignem, non movetur a calore recepto, sed ab igne. Ita etiam et intellectus non movetur a specie iam recepta, vel a vero quod consequitur ipsam speciem; sed ab aliqua re exteriori quae imprimit in intellectum, sicut est intellectus agens, vel phantasma, vel aliud aliquid huiusmodi. Et praeterea, sicut verum est proportionatum intellectui, ita et bonum affectui. Unde verum propter hoc quod est in apprehensione, non est minus natum movere intellectum quam bonum affectum. Et praeterea, hoc quod voluntas non cogitur a bono, non est ex insufficientia boni ad movendum, sed ex ipsa ratione voluntatis, ut ex dictis patet. 8. A form received into something does not move the recipient, but the very having of such a form means that it has, been moved. It is, however, moved by an external agent. Thus a body which is heated by fire is not moved by the heat received but by the fire. So too the intellect is not moved by the species already received or by the true knowledge which is consequent upon the species, but by some external thing which influences the intellect—the agent intellect or a phantasm or something else of the sort. Moreover, just as truth is proportioned to the understanding, so too is good proportioned to the affection. Hence because truth is in our apprehension, it is not for that reason any less capable of moving our understanding than good our affection. And furthermore, the fact that the will is not forced by a good does not come from the insufficiency of the good for moving but from the very nature of willing, as is apparent from what has been said. Et per hoc patet responsio ad nonum. 9. From the above answer the answer here too is evident. Ad decimum dicendum, quod res quae est extra animam, non imprimit speciem suam in intellectum possibilem nisi per operationem intellectus agentis: et pro tanto dicitur anima in seipsa formas rerum formare. Et similiter etiam non est sine operatione voluntatis quod voluntas in appetibile tendat. Unde ratio non sequitur. Et praeterea potest dici sicut ad praecedentia duo. 10. A thing which is external to the soul does not imprint its species upon the possible intellect except through the operation of the agent intellect. On this account the soul is said to form within itself the forms of things. In like manner it is not without the operation of the will that the will tends to its object. The argument is accordingly not conclusive. And besides, the same answer can be given as was given to the two preceding difficulties. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod primum bonum est per se volitum, et voluntas per se et naturaliter illud vult, non tamen illud semper vult in actu. Non enim oportet ea quae sunt naturaliter animae convenientia, semper actu in anima esse; sicut principia quae sunt naturaliter cognita, non semper actu considerantur. 11. The first good is essentially willed, and the will essentially and naturally wills it. Nevertheless it does not always actually will it, for is not necessary that the things which are naturally associated with the soul are always actually in the soul, just as principles which are naturally known are not always actually being considered. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod non ad eamdem necessitatem pertinet necessitas qua per scientiam aliquid necessario cognoscimus, et necessitas qua de necessitate scientiam appetimus: primum enim potest esse secundum necessitatem coactionis, sed secundum non nisi secundum necessitatem naturalis inclinationis. Et sic etiam voluntas de necessitate vult bonum, in quantum naturaliter vult bonum. 12. The necessity by which we know something necessarily in scientific knowledge and that by which of necessity we desire knowledge do not belong to the same kind of necessity. The former can be the necessity of force, but the latter can be only a necessity of natural inclination. It is in this way that the will necessarily wills good inasmuch as it naturally wills it. Et per hoc patet solutio ad decimumtertium. 13. From the above answer this answer also is clear. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod libertas quae augetur et minuitur, est libertas a peccato et a miseria, non autem libertas a coactione; unde non sequitur quod voluntas possit ad hoc deduci quod cogatur. 14. The freedom which is increased and diminished is freedom from sin and from misery, not freedom from force. Hence it does not follow that the will can be brought to such a pass that it is forced. Answers to Difficulties to the Contrary Ad primum autem in contrarium dicendum, quod auctoritas illa est intelligenda de necessitate coactionis, quae repugnat voluntati, non autem de necessitate naturalis inclinationis, quae secundum Augustinum in V de civitate Dei, voluntati non repugnat. 1. That authoritative statement is to be understood of the necessity of force, which is repugnant to the will, not of the necessity of natural inclination, which, according to Augustine, is not repugnant to the will. Ad secundum dicendum, quod non pertinet ad impotentiam voluntatis, si naturali inclinatione de necessitate in aliquid feratur, sed ad eius virtutem; sicut grave tanto est virtuosius, quanto maiori necessitate deorsum fertur. Pertineret autem ad eius infirmitatem, si ab alio cogeretur. 2. It is not due to the weakness of the will if it is directed to something of necessity by a natural inclination but rather to its strength, just as a heavy body is the stronger, the greater the necessity with which it is borne downward. But it would be due to its weakness if it were forced by another. Ad tertium dicendum, quod libertas, secundum Augustinum, opponitur necessitati coactionis, non autem naturalis inclinationis. 3. Freedom is opposed to the necessity of force, according to Augustine, but not to the necessity of natural inclination. Ad quartum dicendum, quod necessitas naturalis non repugnat dignitati voluntatis; sed sola necessitas coactionis. 4. Natural necessity is not repugnant to the dignity of the will, but only the necessity of force. Ad quintum dicendum quod voluntas, in quantum est rationalis, ad opposita se habet: hoc est enim considerare ipsam secundum hoc quod est ei proprium; sed prout est natura quaedam, nihil prohibet eam determinari ad unum. 5. Inasmuch as the will is rational it is open to opposites. This is to consider it according to what is distinctive of it. But from the viewpoint of its being a nature nothing prevents it from being naturally determined to one object. Ad sextum dicendum, quod voluntas dividitur contra appetitum naturalem cum praecisione sumptum, id est qui est naturalis tantum, sicut homo contra id quod est animal tantum; non autem dividitur contra appetitum naturalem absolute, sed includit ipsum, sicut homo includit animal. 6. The will is distinguished from natural appetite in a precisive sense, i.e., an appetite which is only natural, just as man is distinguished from what is only animal. It is not distinguished from natural appetite in an absolute sense, but includes it, just as man includes animal. Ad septimum dicendum, quod illa etiam ratio procedit de voluntate secundum quod voluntas est; hoc enim est proprium voluntati, in quantum est voluntas, quod sit domina suorum actuum. 7. This argument also is based upon the will taken as will. For it is characteristic of the will as will to be master of its own acts.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
In the sixth article we ask:
Does the will necessarily will whatever it wills?
[ARTICLE II Sent., 25, a. 2; C.G., II, 47; S.T., I, 82, 2; I-II, 10, 2; De malo, 3, 3; 6; In Perih., 14, nn. 23-24.]
Sexto quaeritur utrum voluntas de necessitate velit quidquid vult Difficulties Et videtur quod sic. It seems that it does, for Quanto enim aliquid est nobilius, tanto est immutabilius. Sed vivere est nobilius quam esse, intelligere quam vivere, et velle quam intelligere. Ergo velle est immutabilius quam esse. Sed esse animae volentis est immutabile, quia est incorruptibile. Ergo et velle eius est immutabile; et ita, quidquid vult, immutabiliter et necessario vult. 1 The nobler a thing is, the more unchangeable it is. But to live is nobler than to be; to understand, nobler than to live; and to will, nobler than to understand. Therefore to will is more unchangeable than to be. But the being of a soul that wills is unchangeable because it is incorruptible. Therefore its willing is also unchangeable; and so whatever it wills, it wills unchangeably and necessarily. Praeterea, quanto aliquid est Deo conformius, tanto immutabilius est. Sed magis conformatur anima Deo secunda conformitate quae est similitudinis, quam prima conformitate, quae est imaginis. In prima autem conformitate habet immutabilitatem; quia non potest imaginem amittere anima, secundum illud Ps. XXXVIII, 7: in imagine pertransit homo. Ergo et secundum conformitatem secundam, quae est similitudinis, consistens in debita voluntatis ordinatione, habebit immutabilitatem, ut voluntas immutabiliter velit bonum, nec possit velle malum. 2. The more conformed a thing is to God, the more unchangeable it is. But the soul is more conformed to God by secondary conformity, which is that of likeness, than by primary conformity, which is that of an image. But in its primary conformity the soul has unchangeableness because it cannot lose its image, according to the words of the Psalm (38:7): “Man passes as an image.” Then according to secondary conformity, which is that of a likeness consisting in the due ordering of the will, it will also have unchangeableness so that the will will unchangeably will good and cannot will evil. Praeterea, sicut se habet actus ad ens actu, ita potentia ad ens potentiale. Sed Deus, cum sit actu bonus, non potest aliquid actu malum facere. Ergo etiam eius potentia, quae bona est, non potest producere aliquid quod sit malum in potentia: et ita voluntas quam divina potentia produxit, non potest in malum. 3. Potency stands to potential being as act to actual being. But God, being actually good, cannot actually do anything evil. Therefore His power, which is good, also cannot produce anything which is evil potentially; and thus the will, which the divine power has produced, cannot tend to evil. Praeterea, secundum philosophum in VI et VII Ethic., sicut principia se habent ad conclusiones in scientiis demonstrativis, ita fines ad ea quae sunt ad fines in operabilibus et appetibilibus. Sed ex principiis quae sunt naturaliter scita, inducitur necessitas in intellectum ut conclusiones de necessitate cognoscat. Ergo ex hoc quod voluntas de necessitate vult finem ultimum per modum iam dictum, de necessitate etiam volet omnia alia quae in finem ultimum ordinantur. 4. According to the Philosopher’ in matters of operation and appetency ends are related to means just as in demonstrative sciences principles are to conclusions. But from principles that are naturally known necessity is imposed upon the intellect so that it knows conclusions necessarily. Then from the fact that the will necessarily wills the last end in the way already explained, it will of necessity will all other things which are directed to the ultimate end. Praeterea, omne illud quod est naturaliter determinatum ad aliquid, de necessitate consequitur illud, nisi sit aliquid impediens. Sed voluntas naturaliter vult bonum, ut dicit Glossa Roman. VII, 15. Ergo immutabiliter vult bonum, cum non sit aliquid quod eum impedire posset, eo quod est sub Deo potentissima, secundum Bernardum. 5. Whatever is naturally determined to something necessarily attains it unless something interferes. But the will “naturally wills good,” as is said in the Gloss. It therefore unchangeably wills good, since there is nothing to stop it, seeing that it is “the most powerful” thing under God, as Bernard teaches. Praeterea, sicut tenebra opponitur luci, ita malum bono. Sed visus qui est naturaliter determinatus ad cognoscendum lucem et lucida, ita naturaliter ea videt, quod illud quod est tenebrosum, videre non potest. Ergo et voluntas, cuius obiectum est bonum, ita immutabiliter vult bonum, quod malum nullo modo velle poterit. Et sic voluntas habet aliquam necessitatem non solum respectu finis ultimi, sed etiam respectu aliorum. 6. Evil is opposed to good as darkness to light. But sight, which is naturally determined to know light and what is lighted, sees them naturally so as to be unable to see what is dark. Then the will, whose object is the good, so unchangeably wills good that it can in no way will evil. And so the will has some necessity not only in regard to the last end but also in regard to other things. Sed contra. To the Contrary Augustinus dicit, quod voluntas est qua peccatur et recte vivitur. Ergo voluntas non se habet immutabiliter neque ad bonum neque ad malum. 1. Augustine says: “It is by the will that one sins or lives correctly.” Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, peccatum adeo est voluntarium, quod nisi sit voluntarium non est peccatum. Si igitur peccatum nullo modo est a voluntate, peccatum nullo modo erit; quod experimento patet esse falsum. 2. According to Augustine “sin is voluntary to such an extent that if it is not voluntary it is not a sin.” If, then, sin is not at all from the will, there will not be any sin at all. But it is evident from experience that that is false. Responsio. REPLY Dicendum, quod ex hoc aliquid dicitur esse necessarium, quod est immutabiliter determinatum ad unum. Unde, cum voluntas indeterminate se habeat respectu multorum, non habet respectu omnium necessitatem, sed respectu eorum tantum ad quae naturali inclinatione determinatur, ut dictum est. Et quia omne mobile reducitur ad immobile, et indeterminatum ad determinatum, sicut ad principium; ideo oportet quod id ad quod voluntas est determinata, sit principium appetendi ea ad quae non est determinata; et hoc est finis ultimus, ut dictum est. Invenitur autem indeterminatio voluntatis respectu trium: scilicet respectu obiecti, respectu actus, et respectu ordinis in finem. Something is said to be necessary from the fact that it is unchangeably determined to one thing. Since, therefore, the will stands undetermined in regard to many things, it is not under necessity in regard to everything but only in regard to those things to which it is determined by a natural inclination, as has been said . And because everything mobile is reduced to what is immobile as its principle, and everything undetermined, to what is determined, that to which the will is determined must be the principle of tending to the things to which it is not determined; and this is the last end, as has been said . Now there is found to be indetermination of the will in regard to three things: its object, its act, and its ordination to its end. Respectu obiecti quidem est indeterminata voluntas quantum ad ea quae sunt ad finem, non quantum ad ipsum finem ultimum, ut dictum est. Quod ideo contingit, quia ad finem ultimum multis viis perveniri potest, et diversis diversae viae competunt perveniendi in ipsum. Et ideo non potuit esse appetitus voluntatis determinatus in ea quae sunt ad finem, sicut est in rebus naturalibus, quae ad certum finem et determinatum non habent nisi certas et determinatas vias. Et sic patet quod res naturales, sicut de necessitate appetunt finem, ita et ea quae sunt ad finem; ut nihil sit in eis accipere quod possint appetere vel non appetere. Sed voluntas de necessitate appetit finem ultimum, ut non possit ipsum non appetere; sed non de necessitate appetit aliquid eorum quae sunt ad finem. Unde respectu huius modi est in eius potestate appetere hoc vel illud. In regard to its object the will is undetermined as to the means to the end, not as to the last end itself, as has been said. This is so because there are many ways of reaching the last end, and for different people different ways prove suitable. The appetite of the will could not, then, be determined to the means to the end as is the appetite in natural things, which have definite and fixed ways of reaching a definite and fixed end. And so it is evident that natural things not only desire the end necessarily, but also desire the means in the same way, so that there are among the means none to which natural things can cither tend or not. The will, however, necessarily desires the last end in such a way that it is unable not to desire it, but it does not necessarily desire any of the means. In their regard, then, it is within the Power of the will to desire this or that. Secundo est voluntas indeterminata etiam respectu actus; quia etiam circa obiectum determinatum potest uti actu suo cum voluerit, vel non uti; potest enim exire in actum volendi respectu cuiuslibet, vel non exire. Quod in rebus naturalibus non contingit: grave enim semper descendit deorsum in actu, nisi aliquid prohibeat. Quod exinde contingit, quod res inanimatae non sunt motae a seipsis, sed ab aliis; unde non est in eis moveri vel non moveri: res autem animatae moventur a seipsis; et inde est quod voluntas potest velle et non velle. In the second place the will is undetermined in regard to its act, because even concerning a determined object it can perform its act or not perform it when it wishes. It can pass or not pass into the act of willing with regard to anything at all. This is not true of natural things, for something heavy always actually goes down unless something else prevents it. This is the case because inanimate things do not move themselves but are moved by other things. There is in them, then, no ability to be moved or not to be moved. But animate things are their own source of movement. Hence it is that the will can will or not. Tertio indeterminatio voluntatis est respectu ordinis ad finem, in quantum voluntas potest appetere id quod secundum veritatem in finem debitum ordinatur, vel quod secundum apparentiam tantum. Et haec indeterminatio ex duobus contingit: scilicet ex indeterminatione circa obiectum in his quae sunt ad finem, et iterum ex indeterminatione apprehensionis, quae potest esse recta vel non recta; sicut enim ex aliquo principio vero dato non sequitur falsa conclusio nisi per aliquam falsitatem rationis vel assumentis aliquam falsam, vel falso ordinantis principium in conclusionem. Ita etiam ex quo inest appetitus rectus ultimi finis, non posset sequi quod aliquis inordinate aliquid appeteret, nisi ratio acciperet aliquid ut ordinabile in finem quod non est in finem ordinabile; sicut qui appetit naturaliter beatitudinem appetitu recto, nunquam deduceretur in appetendam fornicationem, nisi in quantum apprehendit eam ut quoddam hominis bonum, in quantum est quiddam delectabile, et sic ut ordinabilem in beatitudinem, velut quamdam imaginem eius. Et ex hoc sequitur indeterminatio voluntatis, qua potest bonum vel malum appetere. A third indetermination of the will is found in regard to its ordination to its end inasmuch as the will can desire what is in truth directed to its appointed end or what is so only in appearance. This indetermination comes from two sources: from the indetermination in regard to its object in the case of the means, and again from the indetermination of our apprehension, which can be correct or not. From a given true principle a false conclusion does not follow unless it is because of some falsity in the reasoning through a false subsumption or the false relating of the principle to the conclusion. In the same way from a correct appetite for the last end the inordinate desire for something could not follow unless reason were to take as referable to the end something which is not so referable. Thus a person who naturally desires happiness with a correct appetite would never be led to desire fornication except in so far as he apprehends it as a good for man, seeing that it is something pleasurable, and as referable to happiness as a sort of copy of it. From this there follows the indetermination of the will by which it can desire good or evil. Cum autem voluntas dicatur libera, in quantum necessitatem non habet, libertas voluntatis in tribus considerabitur: scilicet quantum ad actum, in quantum potest velle vel non velle; et quantum ad obiectum, in quantum potest velle hoc vel illud, etiam eius oppositum; et quantum ad ordinem finis, in quantum potest velle bonum vel malum. Since the will is said to be free inasmuch as it is not necessitated, the freedom of the will can be viewed in three respects: (1) as regards its act, inasmuch as it can will or not will; (2) as regards its object, inasmuch as it can will this or that, even if one is the opposite of the other; and (3) as regards its ordination to the end, inasmuch as it can will good or evil. Sed quantum ad primum horum inest libertas voluntati in quolibet statu naturae respectu cuiuslibet obiecti. Cuiuslibet enim voluntatis actus est in potestate ipsius respectu cuiuslibet obiecti. Secundum vero horum est respectu quorumdam obiectorum, scilicet respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem, et non ipsius finis; et etiam secundum quemlibet statum naturae. Tertium vero non est respectu omnium obiectorum, sed quorumdam, scilicet eorum quae sunt ad finem; nec respectu cuiuslibet status naturae, sed illius tantum in quo natura deficere potest. Nam ubi non est defectus in apprehendendo et conferendo, non potest esse voluntas mali etiam in his quae sunt ad finem, sicut patet in beatis. Et pro tanto dicitur, quod velle malum nec est libertas, nec pars libertatis, quamvis sit quoddam libertatis signum. In regard to the first of these three there is freedom in the will in any state of nature with reference to any object, for the act of any will is in its power as regards any object. The second of these is had with reference to some objects, the means and not the end itself. This too holds for any state of nature. The third is not with reference to all objects but only certain ones, the means to the end, and not with reference to any state of nature but only that in which nature can fail. Where there is no failure in apprehending and comparing, there can be no willing of evil even when there is question of means, as is clear among the blessed. For this reason it is said that to will evil is not freedom or any part of it, though it is a sign of freedom. Answers to Difficulties Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod esse animae non est ei determinatum a seipsa, sed ab alio; sed ipsa determinat sibi suum velle; et ideo, quamvis esse sit immutabile, tamen velle indeterminatum est, ac per hoc in diversa flexibile. Et tamen non est verum quod intelligere vel velle sit nobilius quam esse si secernantur ab esse, immo sic esse est eis nobilius, secundum Dionysium V cap. de divinis nominibus. 1. The act of being of the soul is not determined for it by itself but by another, but it does determine its own act of willing. Thus, although its being is unchangeable, still its willing is undetermined and so can be directed to different things. It is not true, however, that to understand or to will is nobler than to be if they are discriminated from being. Rather being is then nobler than they, according to Dionysius. Ad secundum dicendum, quod conformitas imaginis attenditur secundum potentias naturales, quae sunt ei determinatae a natura; et ideo illa conformitas semper manet. Sed secunda conformitas, quae est similitudinis, est per gratiam, et habitus et actus virtutum, ad quae anima ordinatur per actum voluntatis, qui in sua potestate consistit; et ideo ista conformitas non semper manet. 2. The conformity of an image is viewed from the standpoint of natural powers, which are determined for the thing by nature. And so that conformity always remains. But secondary conformity, that of likeness, is had by grace and the habits and acts of the virtues, to which the soul is directed by an act of the will which stands within its power. That conformity, then, does not always remain. Ad tertium dicendum, quod in Deo non est potentia passiva vel materialis, quae distinguitur contra actum, de qua obiectio procedit; sed potentia activa, quae est ipse actus, quia unumquodque est potens agere secundum quod est actu. Et tamen hoc quod voluntas sit flexibilis ad malum, non habet secundum quod est a Deo, sed secundum quod est de nihilo. 3. In God there is no passive or material potency to be distinguished from act, as is supposed in the objection; but there is active potency, which is the act itself, because a being is capable of acting inasmuch as it is in act. And yet the ability of the will to be directed to evil does not come from the fact of its being from God but from that of its being made out of nothing. Ad quartum dicendum, quod in scientiis demonstrativis conclusiones hoc modo se habent ad principia, quod remota conclusione removetur principium; et sic propter hanc determinationem conclusionum respectu principiorum, ex ipsis principiis intellectus cogitur ad consentiendum conclusionibus. Sed ea quae sunt ad finem, non habent hanc determinationem respectu finis, ut remoto aliquo eorum, removeatur finis; cum per diversas vias possit perveniri ad finem ultimum vel secundum veritatem vel secundum apparentiam. Et ideo ex necessitate quae inest appetitui voluntario respectu finis, non inducitur necessitas ei respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem. 4. In demonstrative sciences conclusions are so related to principles that when the conclusion is removed the principle is removed. And so from this fixity of the conclusions with regard to the principles the intellect is forced by the principles themselves to assent to the conclusions. But the means do not have with regard to the end such a fixity that upon the removal of any one of them the end is removed, since it is possible to attain the last end in various ways either really or apparently. Consequently, from the necessity which is in the voluntary appetite in regard to the end, there is not imposed upon it any necessity in regard to the means. Ad quintum dicendum, quod voluntas vult naturaliter bonum, sed non determinate hoc bonum vel illud; sicut visus naturaliter videt colorem, sed non hunc vel illum determinate. Et propter hoc, quidquid vult, vult sub ratione boni; non tamen oportet quod semper hoc vel illud bonum velit. 5. The will naturally wills good but not this or that particular good. It is like sight, which naturally sees color but not this or that particular color. For this reason whatever the will wills it wills under the aspect of good; yet it does not always have to will this or that good. Ad sextum dicendum, quod nihil est adeo malum quod non possit habere aliquam speciem boni; et ratione illius bonitatis habet quod movere possit appetitum. 6. Nothing is so evil that it cannot have some aspect of good; and it is by reason of that goodness that it can move the appetite.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
In the seventh article we ask:
Does a person merit by willing what he wills necessarily?
[ARTICLE S.T., III, 138; S.T., II-II, 88, 6; 189, 2.]
Septimo quaeritur utrum aliquis mereatur volendo illud quod de necessitate vult Difficulties Et videtur quod non. It seems that he does not, for Quia illud quod quis de necessitate vult, naturaliter vult. Sed naturalibus non meremur. Ergo tali voluntate non meremur. 1. What anyone necessarily wills he wills naturally. But we do not merit by what is natural. Therefore we do not merit by such an act of the will. Praeterea, meritum et demeritum sunt circa idem. Sed nullus demeretur in eo quod vitare non potest, secundum Augustinum. Ergo nullus meretur in eo quod de necessitate vult. 2. Merit and demerit apply to the same thing. But according to Augustine’ no one gets any demerit in anything that he cannot avoid. Praeterea, nullus meretur nisi per actum virtutis. Sed omnis actus virtutis est ex electione, non autem ex naturali inclinatione. Ergo nullus meretur in eo quod de necessitate vult. 3. No one merits except by an act of virtue. But every act of virtue is from a choice, not from a natural inclination. Then no one merits in anything that he does from necessity. Sed contra. To the Contrary Deum naturaliter et ex necessitate quaelibet creatura appetit. Sed in dilectione Dei meremur. Ergo in eo quod necessario quis vult mereri potest. 1. Every creature naturally and necessarily seeks God. But in loving God we merit. it is therefore possible to merit in what one necessarily does. Praeterea, beatitudo in vita aeterna consistit. Sed sancti appetendo vitam aeternam merentur. Ergo aliquis meretur volendo id quod naturaliter vult. 2. Happiness consists in eternal life. But saints merit by desiring eternal life. Therefore a person merits by willing what he wills necessarily. Responsio. REPLY Dicendum, quod aliquis volendo id quod naturaliter vult, quodammodo meretur, et quodammodo non. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod differenter est aliquid provisum naturaliter homini et ceteris animalibus, tam secundum corpus, quam secundum animam. Aliis enim animalibus secundum corpus provisa sunt specialia tegumenta, sicut corium durum, et plumae, et aliqua huiusmodi, specialia etiam munimenta, sicut cornua et ungues, et huiusmodi; et hoc quia habent paucas vias operandi, ad quas possunt determinata instrumenta ordinari. Sed homini ista provisa sunt in generali, in quantum sunt ei datae manus a natura, quibus sibi valeat varia et tegumenta et munimenta praeparare; et hoc ideo quia ratio hominis est ita multiplex et ad diversa se extendens, quod non possunt determinata instrumenta ei sufficientia praeparari. In willing what he naturally wills a person merits in a certain sense and in a certain sense does not. For the explanation of this it should be observed that there is a difference in the way in which providence is exercised in regard to man and in regard to the other animals both as to his body and as to his soul. For other animals are provided with special coverings for their bodies, such as a tough hide, feathers, and the like, and also special weapons, such as horns, claws, and so forth. This is because they have just a few ways of acting to which they can adapt definite instruments. But man is provided with those things in a general way inasmuch as there has been given to him by nature hands by which he is able to prepare for himself a variety of coverings and protections. This is because man’s reason is so manifold and extends to so many different things that definite tools sufficient for him could not be provided for him ahead of time. Similiter etiam est ex parte apprehensionis, quod aliis animalibus sunt inditae secundum naturalem aestimationem quaedam speciales conceptiones eis necessariae; sicut ovi, quod lupus sit ei inimicus, et alia huiusmodi; sed loco horum homini sunt indita universalia principia naturaliter intellecta, per quae in omnia quae sunt ei necessaria, procedere potest. The case is similar in regard to apprehension. Other animals have innate in them in the line of natural discretion certain specific conceptions necessary for them, as a sheep has a natural realization that a wolf is its enemy, and so on. But in place of these there are implanted in man certain naturally understood universal principles by means of which he can go on to [figure out] everything that is necessary for him. Et similiter etiam est ex parte appetitus. Aliis enim rebus inditus est naturalis appetitus alicuius rei determinatae, sicut gravi quod sit deorsum et unicuique etiam animali id quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam; sed homini inditus est appetitus ultimi finis sui in communi, ut scilicet appetat naturaliter se esse completum in bonitate. Sed in quo ista completio consistat, utrum in virtutibus, vel scientiis, vel delectationibus, vel huiusmodi aliis, non est ei determinatum a natura. In regard to their appetitive tendency also the same holds true. In other things there is implanted a natural appetite for something definite, as in a heavy body, to be down, and in every animal, whatever suits it according to its nature. But man has implanted in him an appetite for his last end in general so that he naturally desires to be complete in goodness. But in just what that completeness consists, whether in virtues or knowledge or pleasure or anything else of the sort, has not been determined for him by nature. Quando ergo ex propria ratione, adiutus divina gratia, apprehendit aliquod speciale bonum, ut suam beatitudinem, in quo vere sua beatitudo consistit, tunc meretur, non ex hoc quod appetit beatitudinem quam naturaliter appetit, sed ex hoc quod appetit hoc speciale quod non naturaliter appetit, ut visionem Dei, in quo tamen secundum rei veritatem sua beatitudo consistit. Si vero aliquis per rationem erroneam deducatur ut appetat aliquid speciale ut suam beatitudinem, puta corporales delectationes, in quibus tamen secundum rei veritatem sua beatitudo non consistit; sic appetendo beatitudinem, demeretur, non quia appetit beatitudinem, sed quia indebite appetit hoc ut beatitudinem, in quo beatitudo non est. When, therefore, by his own reason with the help of divine grace he grasps as his happiness any particular good in which his happiness really does consist, then he merits, not because he desires happiness (which he naturally desires), but because he desires this particular good (which he does not naturally desire)—for example, the vision of God, in which his happiness does in truth consist. But if anyone were by erroneous reasoning to be brought to desire as his happiness some particular good—for example, bodily pleasures, in which his happiness does not in fact consist—he incurs demerit by so desiring. This is not because he desires happiness, but because he unwarrantedly desires as his happiness this particular thing in which his happiness is not found. Patet igitur quod volendo id quod quis naturaliter vult, secundum se non est neque meritorium neque demeritorium; sed secundum quod specificatur ad hoc vel ad illud, potest esse vel meritorium vel demeritorium. Et hoc modo sancti merentur appetendo Deum et vitam aeternam. It is therefore clear that willing what anyone naturally wills is in itself neither meritorious nor blameworthy. But when it is specified to this or that, it can be either the one or the other. In this way the saints merit by desiring God and eternal life. Answers to Difficulties Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. From what has just been said the answers are clear.
22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
In the eighth article we ask:
Can God force the will?
[ARTICLE S.T., III, 88, 89, 91; S.T., I, 105, 4; 111, 2; I-II, 9, 6; De malo, 3,3; Comp. theol., 1, 129.]
Octavo quaeritur utrum Deus possit cogere voluntatem Difficulties Et videtur quod sic. It seems that He can, for Quicumque enim vertit aliquid quocumque vult, potest illud cogere. Sed, sicut dicitur Prov. XXI, 1, cor regum in manu Dei: quocumque voluerit, vertet illud. Ergo Deus potest cogere voluntatem. 1. Whoever turns something whithersoever he wishes can force it. But, as is said in Proverbs (2 1:1), “The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord: whithersoever he will he shall turn it.” God can therefore force the will. Praeterea, Rom. I, 24 super illud: propter quod tradidit Deus illos et cetera. Dicit Glossa Augustini: manifestum est Deum operari in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas voluntates eorum in quodcumque voluerit, sive in bonum pro misericordia sua, sive ad malam pro meritis eorum. Ergo Deus potest cogere voluntatem. 2. Quoting Augustine on Romans (1:24): “Wherefore, God gave them up to the desires of their heart...” the Gloss says. “It is evident that God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills to whatever He wishes, whether to good, according to His mercy, or to evil, according to their deserts.” God can accordingly force the will. Praeterea, si finitum finite agit, infinitum aget infinite. Sed aliqua creatura finita trahit voluntatem finite: quia, ut dicit Tullius, honestum est quod sua vi nos trahit, et sua dignitate nos allicit. Ergo Deus, qui habet infinitam virtutem in agendo, potest totaliter cogere voluntatem. 3. If a finite being acts finitely, an infinite being will act infinitely. But a finite creature attracts the will in a finite way, because, as Cicero says, the honorable is what attracts us by its own vigor and entices us by its own excellence. Therefore God, who has infinite efficacy in acting, can therefore force the will. Praeterea, ille proprie dicitur ad aliquid cogi qui non potest non facere illud sive velit sive non velit. Sed voluntas non potest non velle quod Deus voluntate beneplaciti vult eam velle; alias voluntas Dei esset inefficax respectu voluntatis nostrae. Ergo Deus potest cogere voluntatem. 4. He is properly said to be forced to something who is unable not to do it whether he wants to or not. But the will is unable not to will what God by His will of good pleasure wants it to will; otherwise the will of God would be inefficacious in regard to our will. God can therefore force the will. Praeterea, cuilibet creaturae inest perfecta obedientia ad creatorem. Sed voluntas creatura quaedam est; ergo inest ei oboedientia perfecta ad creatorem; ergo Deus potest eam cogere ad quod vult. 5. In any creature there is perfect obedience to the Creator. But the will is a creature. Hence there is in it a perfect obedience to the Creator. God can therefore force it to what He wills. Sed contra. To the Contrary Est quod esse liberum a coactione est naturale voluntati. Sed naturalia non possunt ab aliquo removeri. Ergo voluntas non potest cogi a Deo. 1. To be free from force is natural to the will. But what is natural to anything cannot be removed from it. The will therefore cannot be forced by God. Praeterea, Deus non potest facere quod opposita sint simul vera. Sed voluntarium et violentum sunt opposita, quia violentum est species involuntarii, ut patet in III Ethicorum. Ergo Deus non potest facere ut voluntas aliquid coacte velit; et ita non potest cogere voluntatem. 2. God cannot make opposites to be true at the same time. But what is voluntary and what is violent are opposites, because the violent is a species of the involuntary, as is made clear in the Ethics. God therefore cannot make the will do anything by force; and so He cannot force the will. Responsio. REPLY Dicendum, quod Deus potest mutare voluntatem de necessitate, non tamen potest eam cogere. Quantumcumque enim voluntas immutetur in aliquid, non dicitur cogi in illud. Cuius ratio est, quia ipsum velle aliquid est inclinari in illud; coactio autem vel violentia est contraria inclinationi illius rei quae cogitur. Cum igitur Deus voluntatem immutat, facit ut praecedenti inclinationi succedat alia inclinatio, ita quod prima aufertur, et secunda manet. Unde illud ad quod inducit voluntatem, non est contrarium inclinationi iam existenti, sed inclinationi quae prius inerat: unde non est violentia nec coactio. God can change the will with necessity but nevertheless cannot force it. For however much the will is moved toward something, it is not said to be forced to it. The reason for this is that to will something is to be inclined to it. But force or violence is contrary to the inclination of the thing forced. When God moves the will, then, He causes an inclination to succeed a previous inclination so that the first disappears and the second remains. Accordingly, that to which He induces the will is not contrary to an inclination still extant but merely to one that was previously there. This is not, then, violence or force. Sicut lapidi ratione suae gravitatis inest inclinatio ad locum deorsum; hac autem inclinatione manente, si sursum proiiciatur, erit violentia. Si autem Deus auferat a lapide inclinationem gravitatis, et det ei inclinationem levitatis, tunc ferri sursum non erit ei violentum; et ita immutatio motus potest esse sine violentia. The case is parallel to that of a stone, in which by reason of its heaviness there is an inclination downward. While this inclination remains, if the stone is thrown upward, violence is done it. But if God were to subtract from the stone the inclination of its heaviness and give it an inclination of lightness, then it would not be violent—for the stone to be borne upward. Thus a change of motion can be had without violence. Et per hunc modum intelligendum est quod Deus voluntatem immutat sine hoc quod voluntatem cogat. Potest autem Deus voluntatem immutare ex hoc quod ipse in voluntate operatur sicut et in natura; unde, sicut omnis actio naturalis est a Deo, ita omnis actio voluntatis in quantum est actio, non solum est a voluntate ut immediato agente, sed etiam a Deo ut primo agente, qui vehementius imprimit. Unde, sicut voluntas potest immutare actum suum in aliud, ut ex dictis patet, ita etiam et multo amplius, Deus. It is in this way that God’s changing of the will without forcing it is to be understood. God can change the will because He works within it just as He works in nature. Now, just as every natural action is from God, so too every action of the will, in so far as it is an action, not only is from the will as its immediate agent but also is from God as its first agent, who influences it more forcefully. Then, just as the will can change its act to something else, as is apparent from the explanation above, so too and much more can God. Immutat autem voluntatem dupliciter. Uno modo movendo tantum; quando scilicet voluntatem movet ad aliquid volendum, sine hoc quod aliquam formam imprimat voluntati; sicut sine appositione alicuius habitus, quandoque facit ut homo velit hoc quod prius non volebat. Alio vero modo imprimendo aliquam formam in ipsam voluntatem. Sicuti enim ex ipsa natura, quam Deus voluntati dedit, inclinatur voluntas in aliquid volendum, ut ex dictis patet; ita ex aliquo superaddito, sicut est gratia vel virtus, inclinatur ulterius ad volendum aliquid anima, ad quod prius non erat determinata naturali inclinatione. God changes the will in two ways. (1) He does it merely by moving it. This occurs, for instance, when He moves the will to want something without introducing any form into the will. Thus He sometimes without the addition of any habit causes a man to want what he did not want before. (2) He does it by introducing some form into the will itself. By the very nature which God gave the will He inclines it to will something, as is clear from what has been said. Now in like fashion by something additional, such as grace or a virtue, the soul is inclined to will something to which it was not previously determined by a natural inclination. Sed haec quidem inclinatio superaddita, quandoque est perfecta, quandoque imperfecta. Quando quidem est perfecta ita facit necessariam inclinationem in id ad quod determinat; sicut per naturam de necessitate inclinatur voluntas in appetendum finem, sicut contingit in beatis, in quibus caritas perfecta inclinat sufficienter in bonum, non solum quantum ad finem ultimum, sed etiam quantum ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Aliquando vero forma superaddita non est usquequaque perfecta, sicut est in viatoribus; et tunc ex forma superaddita voluntas inclinatur quidem, sed non de necessitate. This additional inclination is sometimes perfect, sometimes imperfect. When it is perfect it causes a necessary inclination to the thing to which it determines the will, in the same way as the will is inclined by nature necessarily to desire the end. This happens among the blessed, whom perfect charity sufficiently inclines to good not only as regards the last end but also as regards the means to this end. Sometimes, however, the additional form is not in all respects perfect, as among the wayfarers on earth. Then the will is indeed inclined by reason of the additional form, but not necessarily. Answers to Difficulties Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta. Nam primae rationes probabant quod Deus potest immutare voluntatem; secundae vero, quod non potest cogere; quorum utrumque verum est, ut ex dictis patet. From what has just been said the answers are clear. For the first set of arguments go to prove that God can change the will; the second, that He cannot force it. Both of these are true, as is evident from the explanation above. Sciendum tamen, quod ubi dicitur in Glossa inducta, quod Deus operatur in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas voluntates eorum in malum, non est intelligendum, ut Glossa ibidem dicit, quasi Deus malitiam impartiatur; sed quia, sicut apponit gratiam, unde inclinatur hominum voluntas ad bonum, ita subtrahit quibusdam: qua subtracta, incurvatur voluntas eorum ad malum. It should, however, be noted that, when it is said in the Gloss as cited that God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills to evil, this is not to be understood (as the Gloss itself says in the same place) as if God bestowed wickedness, but in the sense that, just as He confers grace by which men’s wills are inclined to good, He also withdraws it from some; and when it is thus withdrawn, their wills are bent to evil.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
In the ninth article we ask:
Can any creature change the will or influence it?
[ARTICLE II Sent., 8, a. 5; C.G., III, 88 & 92; S.T., I, 106, 2; I-II, 80, 1; De malo, 3, 3 & 4; In Joan., c. 13, lect. 1, §3 (P 10:526b-527a).]
Nono quaeritur utrum aliqua creatura possit immutare voluntatem, vel imprimere in ipsam Difficulties Et videtur quod sic. It seems that it can, for Quia ipsa voluntas creatura quaedam est. Sed voluntas actum suum immutat quo vult. Ergo videtur quod aliqua creatura immutet voluntatem et cogat ipsam. 1. The will is a creature. But the will changes its own act as it wishes. It therefore seems that some creature can change the will and force it. Praeterea, difficilius est immutare totum quam partem. Sed secundum quosdam philosophos, corpora caelestia immutant totam multitudinem ad aliquid volendum. Ergo multo fortius videtur quod possunt cogere voluntatem alicuius unius. 2. It is harder to change a whole thing than a part of it. But according to some philosophers’ the heavenly bodies change a whole crowd to will something. With all the more reason, then, does it seem that they can force the will of a single man. Praeterea, quicumque vincitur ab aliquo, cogitur ab illo. Sed secundum philosophum in VII Ethic., incontinentes vincuntur a passionibus. Ergo passiones immutant et cogunt voluntatem incontinentis. 3. Whoever is bound by something is forced by it. But according to the Philosopher incontinent people are bound by their passions. Passions therefore change and force the will of an incontinent person. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum in III de Trin., superiora tam in spiritibus quam in corporibus movent inferiora naturali quodam ordine. Sed Angelorum beatorum sicut intellectus est superior et perfectior nostro intellectu, ita et voluntas nostra voluntate. Ergo, sicut per intellectum suum possunt imprimere in intellectum nostrum, eum illuminando, secundum doctrinam Dionysii, ita videtur quod per voluntatem suam possint imprimere in voluntatem nostram aliqualiter, eam immutando. 4. According to Augustine both among spirits and among bodies the higher move the lower with a certain natural order. But not only the intellect but also the will of the blessed angels is higher and more perfect than ours. Therefore, just as they can influence our intellect by theirs by enlightening it, according to the teaching of Dionysius, so also it seems that by their will they can influence our will by changing it in some way. Praeterea, secundum Dionysium, superiores Angeli illuminant purgant et perficiunt inferiores. Sed sicut illuminatio pertinet ad intellectum, ita purgatio videtur pertinere ad affectum. Ergo, sicut Angeli possunt imprimere in intellectum, ita etiam in voluntatem. 5. According to Dionysius, the higher angels enlighten, cleanse, and perfect the lower. But just as enlightenment applies to the intellect, so cleansing seems to apply to the affections. Angels can accordingly influence the will as they can the intellect. Praeterea, magis natum est aliquid immutari a superiori natura quam ab inferiori. Sed voluntate nostra sicut est inferior appetitus sensibilis, ita est superior voluntas angelica. Ergo, cum appetitus sensibilis immutet interdum voluntatem, multo fortius voluntas angelica poterit voluntatem nostram immutare. 6. A thing is naturally more disposed to be changed by a higher nature than by a lower. But just as sense appetite is inferior to our will, the will of angels is superior. Therefore, since sense appetite sometimes changes our will, with all the more reason will the angelic will be able to change ours. Praeterea, Luc. XIV, 23, dicit paterfamilias servo suo: compelle intrare. Intratur autem per voluntatem ad illam coenam. Ergo per Angelum, qui est minister Dei, potest voluntas nostra ad aliquid cogi. 7. In Luke (14:23) the master says to his servant, “Compel them to come in.” Now it is by their will that they enter that banquet hall. Our will can therefore be forced by an angel, the servant of God. Sed contra. To the Contrary Est quod Bernardus dicit: liberum arbitrium est potentissimum sub Deo. Sed nihil immutatur nisi a fortiori. Ergo nihil potest voluntatem immutare. 1. Bernard says that free choice is the most powerful thing this side of God. But nothing is changed except by something stronger. Then nothing can change the will. Praeterea, meritum et demeritum in voluntate aliquo modo consistit. Si ergo aliqua creatura posset immutare voluntatem, posset aliquis iustificari vel peccator effici per aliquam creaturam: quod falsum est; quia nullus fit peccator nisi per seipsum, nec aliquis fit iustus nisi Deo operante, et ipso cooperante. 2. Merit and demerit are in some sense situated in the will. If, then, any creature could change the will, a person could be justified or even made a sinner by some creature. But that is false, because no one becomes a sinner except by himself; nor does anyone become just except by the operation of God and his own cooperation. Responsio. REPLY Dicendum, quod voluntas potest intelligi immutari ab aliquo dupliciter. Uno modo sicut ab obiecto suo, sicut voluntas immutatur ab appetibili: et sic non quaerimus hic de immutante voluntatem. Hoc enim supra ostensum est, quod aliquod bonum de necessitate movet voluntatem per modum obiecti, quamvis voluntas non cogatur. Alio vero modo potest intelligi voluntas immutari ab aliquo per modum causae efficientis: et sic dicimus, quod non solum nulla creatura potest cogere voluntatem agendo in ipsam, quia hoc nec Deus poterat; sed nec etiam potest directe agere in voluntatem ut eam immutet necessario, vel qualitercumque inclinet, quod Deus potest; sed indirecte potest aliqualiter inclinare voluntatem aliqua creatura, non tamen necessario immutare. Cuius ratio est, quia, cum actus voluntatis sit quasi medius inter potentiam et obiectum, immutatio actus voluntatis potest considerari vel ex parte ipsius voluntatis, vel ex parte obiecti. The will can be understood to be changed by something in two ways. (1) This is referred to its object. In this sense the will is changed by the appetible thing. But nothing which changes the will in this way is in question here; for that was treated above, where it was shown that a certain good does move the will with necessity (in the way in which the object moves it), though the will is not forced. (2) The will can be taken to be moved by something in the manner of an efficient cause. In this sense we say that not only can no creature by acting upon the will force it (for even God could not do this), but also it cannot even act upon the will directly so as to change it with necessity or in any way to incline it (which God can do). But indirectly a creature can in some way incline the will though not change it with necessity. The reason for this is that, since the act of the will mediates as it were between the power and its object, a change in the act can be considered either from the point of view of the will or from that of the object. Ex parte quidem voluntatis immutare actum voluntatis non potest nisi quod operatur intra voluntatem; et hoc est ipsa voluntas, et id quod est causa esse voluntatis; quod, secundum fidem, solus Deus est. Unde solus Deus potest inclinationem voluntatis quam ei dedit transferre de uno in aliud, secundum quod vult. Sed secundum illos qui ponunt animam creatam ab intelligentiis (quod tamen fidei contrarium est), ipse Angelus vel intelligentia habet effectum intrinsecum voluntati, in quantum causat esse quod est intrinsecum ipsi voluntati; et secundum hoc Avicenna ponit, quod sicut corpora nostra immutantur a corporibus caelestibus, ita voluntates nostrae immutantur a voluntate animarum caelestium; quod tamen est omnino haereticum. From the point of view of the will only what works inside the will can change the act of the will. This is the will itself and that which is the cause of the being of the will, which according to the faith is God alone. Consequently only God can transfer the act of the will which He has made, from one thing to another as He wishes. But according to those who hold that the soul was created by intelligences (which is in fact contrary to the faith), the angel or intelligence itself has an effect intrinsic to the will, since it causes the act of being which is intrinsic to the will. Avicenna accordingly maintains that our wills are changed by the will of the heavenly souls just as our bodies are changed by the heavenly bodies. This is, however, thoroughly heretical. Sed si consideretur actus voluntatis ex parte obiecti, sic voluntatis invenitur duplex obiectum. Unum, ad quod de necessitate naturalis inclinatio determinatur. Et hoc quidem obiectum est voluntati inditum et propositum a creatore, qui ei naturalem inclinationem dedit in illud. Unde nullus potest necessario per tale obiectum immutare voluntatem nisi solus Deus. Aliud vero est obiectum voluntatis, quod quidem natum est inclinare voluntatem, in quantum est in eo aliqua similitudo vel ordo respectu ultimi finis naturaliter desiderati; non tamen ex hoc obiecto voluntas de necessitate immutatur, ut prius dictum est, quia non in eo singulariter invenitur ordo ad ultimum finem naturaliter desideratum. Et mediante hoc obiecto potest aliqua creatura inclinare aliquatenus voluntatem, non tamen necessario immutare; sicut patet cum aliquis persuadet alicui aliquid faciendum proponendo ei eius utilitatem vel honestatem; tamen in potestate voluntatis est ut illud acceptet vel non acceptet, eo quod non est naturaliter determinata ad illud. But if the act of will is considered from the point of view of the object, the object of the will is found to be twofold. There is one to which the natural inclination of the will is determined with necessity. This object is implanted in the will and proposed to it by the Creator, who gave it its natural inclination to this. Consequently no one can change the will necessarily by means of such an object except God alone. But there is another object of the will capable of inclining the will inasmuch as there is in it some likeness or ordination with regard to the last end which is naturally desired. And yet the will is not changed necessarily by this object, as was said above, because there is not found in it alone an ordination to the naturally desired last end. Now by means of this object a creature can incline the will to some extent but not change it in a necessary way. This is the case when someone persuades another to do something by proposing to him its usefulness or nobility. It nonetheless remains within the power of the will to accept it or not, seeing that it is not determined to it by nature. Sic igitur patet quod nulla creatura potest directe immutare voluntatem, quasi agendo intra ipsam voluntatem; potest autem extrinsecus, aliquid proponendo voluntati, eam aliqualiter inducere, non tamen necessario immutare. It is accordingly apparent that no creature can directly change the will as if by acting within the will itself; but by proposing something to the will extrinsically it can in some way induce it, though not change it necessarily. Answers to Difficulties Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod voluntas potest seipsam immutare respectu aliquorum etiam directe, cum sit domina suorum actuum; et cum dicitur quod non immutatur directe a creatura, intelligitur a creatura alia. Non tamen ipsa potest se cogere, quia in hoc importatur contradictio, scilicet quod aliquid sit coactum a seipso: quia violentum est in quo nihil confert vim patiens, confert autem vim inferens. Et sic voluntas non potest se cogere, quia sic ipsa in illa vi aliquid conferret, in quantum cogeret se, et nil conferret, in quantum cogeretur: quod est impossibile; per quem etiam modum probat philosophus in V Ethic., quod nullus patitur iniustum a seipso, quia qui patitur iniustum, patitur aliquid contra voluntatem suam; si autem faciat iniustum, est secundum suam voluntatem. 1. The will can change itself in regard to certain things even directly, since it is master of its acts. And when we say that it cannot be changed directly by a creature, we mean by another creature. Still it cannot force itself, because to say that anything is forced by itself implies a contradiction, since that is violent in which the patient contributes nothing; but the one who exerts force does contribute something. And so the will cannot force itself, because in applying the force it would thus be contributing something inasmuch as it would force itself, and contributing nothing inasmuch as it would be forced. And this is impossible. It is in this way that the Philosopher proves that no one suffers anything unjust from himself, because anyone who suffers something unjust suffers against his will; but if he does something unjust, that is according to his will. Ad secundum dicendum, quod corpora caelestia non possunt de necessitate immutare voluntatem neque unius hominis neque multitudinis, sed possunt immutare ipsa corpora. Ex ipso autem corpore aliquo modo voluntas inclinatur, licet non necessario, quia resistere potest, sicut cholerici ex naturali complexione inclinantur ad iram; tamen aliquis cholericus potest resistere per voluntatem isti inclinationi. Non autem resistunt nisi sapientes corporalibus inclinationibus, qui sunt pauci respectu stultorum: quia stultorum infinitus est numerus, Eccle. I, 15. Et ideo dicitur quod corpora caelestia immutant multitudinem, in quantum multitudo sequitur inclinationes corporales; non autem immutant hunc vel illum, qui per prudentiam resistunt inclinationi praedictae. 2. Heavenly bodies cannot with necessity change the will either of one man or of a crowd, but they can change their bodies. And by means of the body the will is in some way inclined, though not necessarily since it can resist. Choleric persons, for example, are inclined by their natural temperament to wrath; yet a choleric person can resist that inclination by his will. But only the wise resist bodily inclinations; and they are few in comparison with the foolish, because according to Ecclesiastes (1:15) “the number of fools is infinite.” Consequently it is said that heavenly bodies change a crowd inasmuch as the crowd follows bodily inclinations; but they do not change this or that individual who with prudence resists the inclination mentioned. Ad tertium dicendum, quod incontinens non dicitur vinci a passionibus quasi ipsae passiones corporales cogant vel immutent necessario voluntatem; alioquin incontinens non esset puniendus, quia poena non debetur involuntario. Incontinens autem non dicitur involuntarius operari, secundum philosophum in III Ethic.; sed dicitur incontinens vinci a passionibus, in quantum earum impulsui voluntarie cedit. 3. An incontinent person is not said to be bound by his passions as if the bodily passions forced or necessitated his will; otherwise an incontinent person should not be punished, because punishment is not deserved for what is involuntary. Now the incontinent man is not said to act involuntarily, according to the Philosopher, but he is said to be bound by his passions inasmuch as he voluntarily yields to their urge. Ad quartum dicendum, quod Angeli non imprimunt intellectui quasi interius in intellectum aliquid agentes; sed solum ex parte obiecti, in quantum aliquod intelligibile proponunt, quo et intellectus noster confortatur, et convincitur ad assensum. Sed obiectum voluntatis per Angelum propositum non de necessitate immutat voluntatem, ut dictum est; et ideo non est simile. 4. Angels influence the intellect by acting upon it interiorly but only from the viewpoint of the object, because they propose the intelligible object by which our intellect is actuated and won over to assent. But the object of the will proposed by an angel does not change the will of necessity, as has been said. Thus there is no parallel. Ad quintum dicendum, quod purgatio illa secundum quam Angeli purgantur, ad intellectum pertinet, est enim purgatio a nescientia, ut Dionysius dicit, VI cap. ecclesiasticae hierarchiae: si tamen pertineret ad affectum, dicerentur purgare quasi persuadendo. 5. That cleansing which the angels undergo applies to the intellect, for it is a cleansing from ignorance, as Dionysius says. But even if it did apply to the affections, it would be used in the sense of persuading. Ad sextum dicendum, quod illud quod est inferius voluntate, ut corpus vel appetitus sensibilis, non immutat voluntatem quasi directe in voluntatem agendo, sed solum ex parte obiecti. Obiectum enim voluntatis est bonum apprehensum; sed bonum apprehensum a ratione universali non movet nisi mediante apprehensione particulari, ut dicitur in III de anima, eo quod actus sunt in particularibus. Ex ipsa autem passione appetitus sensitivi cuius causa potest esse interdum complexio corporis, vel quaecumque impressio corporalis: quia ex hoc quod appetitus ille utitur organo, impeditur et interdum totaliter ligatur ipsa particularis apprehensio, vel id quod ratio superior dictat in universali, non applicetur actu ad hoc particulare. Et sic voluntas in appetendo movetur ad illud bonum quod sibi nuntiat apprehensio particularis, praetermisso illo bono quod nuntiat ratio universalis. Et per hunc modum huiusmodi passiones voluntatem inclinant; non tamen de necessitate immutant, quia in potestate voluntatis est huiusmodi comprimere, ut usus rationis non impediatur, secundum id Genes. IV, 7: subter te erit appetitus illius, scilicet peccati. 6. What is inferior to the will, as the body or sense appetite, does not change the will by acting upon it directly but only from the point of view of its object. For the object of the will is the apprehended good. But the good apprehended by universal reason moves the will only through the mediation of a particular apprehension, as is said in The Soul, since acts are performed in individual cases. Now by the passion of the sense appetite, the cause of which can sometimes be the bodily make-up or anything undergone by the body from the fact that sense appetite uses an organ, the particular apprehension itself is impeded and sometimes entirely inhibited so that what higher reason dictates in a universal way is not actually applied to this particular case. And so in its appetitive tendency the will is moved to that good which the particular apprehension reports to it, passing up the good which universal reason reports. In this way such passions incline the will; yet they do not change it with necessity, because it remains within the power of the will to restrain such passions so that the use of reason is not prevented, in accordance with the words of Genesis (4:7): “But the lust thereof shall be under thee,” namely, that of sin. Ad septimum dicendum, quod compulsio illa de qua ibi fit mentio, non est coactionis, sed efficacis persuasionis, vel per aspera, vel per lenia. 7. The compelling there mentioned is not that of force but that of efficacious persuasion either by harsh or by gentle means.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
In the tenth article we ask:
Are will and intellect the same power?
[ARTICLE S.T., I, 80, 1; 82, 3.]
Decimo quaeritur utrum voluntas et intellectus sint una potentia Difficulties Et videtur quod sic. It seems that they are, for Potentiae enim distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Obiectum autem intellectus est verum, voluntatis vero bonum. Cum igitur bonum et verum sint item supposito, et differant ratione, videtur quod intellectus et voluntas sint idem re, sed differant solum ratione. 1. Powers are distinguished on the basis of their objects. Now the object of the intellect is the true, that of the will, the good. Since the good and the true are identical as to their real subject and differ in formal character, it therefore seems that the intellect and the will are really identical and differ only in formal character. Praeterea, secundum philosophum in III de anima, voluntas est in ratione. Ergo vel est idem quod ratio, vel pars rationis. Sed ratio est eadem potentia cum intellectu. Igitur et voluntas. 2. According to the Philosopher, the will is in reason. It is therefore either the same as reason or a part of reason. But reason is the same power as the intellect. Then so is the will. Praeterea, vires animae communiter dividuntur in rationale, concupiscibile et irascibile. Sed voluntas distinguitur ab irascibili et concupiscibili. Ergo continetur sub rationali. 3. The faculties of the soul are commonly divided into the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible. But the will is distinguished from the irascible and the concupiscible. It is therefore contained within the rational. Praeterea, ubicumque invenitur idem obiectum re et ratione, est una potentia. Sed voluntatis et intellectus practici est idem obiectum re et ratione: utriusque enim obiectum videtur bonum. Ergo intellectus practicus non est alia potentia quam voluntas. Sed intellectus speculativus non est alia potentia quam practicus, quia secundum philosophum in III de anima, speculativus per extensionem fit practicus. Ergo voluntas et intellectus simpliciter sunt una potentia. 4. Wherever there is found an object which is the same in reality and in formal character, there is a single power. But the object of the will and of the practical intellect is the same in reality and in formal character, for the object of both is the good. Therefore the practical intellect is not a power different from the will. But the speculative intellect is not a power different from the practical because, according to the Philosopher, by extension the speculative intellect becomes practical. Therefore the will and the intellect (taken simply) are a single power. Praeterea, sicut ad cognoscendum differentiam duorum ad invicem, oportet quod sit idem qui cognoscit utrumque eorum inter quae differentia consideratur, ita oportet quod idem sit qui cognoscit et vult. Sed ad hoc quod cognoscatur differentia inter aliqua duo, ut inter album et dulce, oportet quod eadem potentia sit quae cognoscat utrumque: ex quo probat philosophus in II de anima, sensum communem esse. Ergo eadem ratione oportet esse unam potentiam quae cognoscit et vult; et ita intellectus et voluntas sunt una potentia, ut videtur. 5. To know the difference of two things from one another it is necessary for the same person to know both of the things differentiated. Similarly it must be the same person who knows and wills. But for the knowing of the difference between any two things, as “between white and sweet,” it must be the same power which knows both. From this the Philosopher proves the existence of the central sense. By the same reasoning, then, it must be a single power which knows and wills; and so the intellect and the will are a single power, so it seems. Sed contra. To the Contrary Est quod appetitivum genus animae aliud est ab intellectivo, secundum philosophum. Sed voluntas continetur sub appetitivo. Ergo voluntas est alia potentia ab intellectu. 1. The appetitive genus of powers of the soul is different from the intellective according to the Philosopher. But the will is listed under the appetitive. The will is therefore a power different from the intellect. Praeterea, intellectus cogi potest, secundum philosophum in V Metaph. Sed voluntas non potest cogi, ut dictum est. Ergo intellectus et voluntas non sunt una potentia. 2. The intellect can be forced, according to the Philosopher. But the will cannot be forced, as has been said. The intellect and the will are therefore not one and the same power. Responsio. REPLY Dicendum, quod voluntas et intellectus sunt diversae potentiae, etiam ad diversa genera potentiarum pertinentes. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod cum distinctio potentiarum attendatur penes actus et obiecta, non quaelibet obiectorum differentia ostendit diversitatem potentiarum; sed differentia obiectorum, in quantum obiecta sunt; non autem aliqua accidentalis differentia, quae, dico, accidat obiecto secundum quod est obiectum. Sensibili enim, in quantum est sensibile, accidit esse animatum vel inanimatum, quamvis ipsis rebus quae sentiuntur, hae differentiae sint essentiales. Et ideo penes has differentias non diversificantur potentiae sensitivae, sed penes audibile et visibile et tangibile, quae sunt differentiae sensibilis in quantum est sensibile, sive per esse sensibile per medium vel sine medio. The will and the intellect are distinct powers, even belonging to different genera of powers. That this may be clearly understood it should be noted that, since the distinction of powers is taken from the acts and objects, not just any difference at all among the objects reveals the distinctness of the powers but a difference in the objects precisely inasmuch as they are objects; and this will not be an accidental difference—I mean one which merely happens to be connected with the object taken specifically as object. It merely happens to the object of sense, for instance, inasmuch as it is sensible, to be animate or inanimate, though these differences are essential for the things which are sensed. It is accordingly not from these differences that the sense powers are diversified, but according as their objects are audible, visible, or tangible (for these are differences in the sensible inasmuch as it is sensible); that is to say, according to whether the objects are sensible through a medium or without a medium. Et quando quidem differentiae essentiales obiectorum, in quantum obiecta sunt, sumuntur ut dividentes per se aliquod speciale obiectum animae, ex hoc diversificantur potentiae, sed non genera potentiarum; sicut sensibile nominat non obiectum animae simpliciter, sed quoddam obiectum quod praedictis differentiis per se dividitur. Unde visus, auditus et tactus sunt diversae potentiae speciales ad idem genus potentiarum animae pertinentes, scilicet ad sensum. Sed quando differentiae acceptae dividunt ipsum obiectum communiter acceptum, tunc ex tali differentia genera diversae potentiarum innotescunt. Now when essential differences of objects as objects are taken as dividing some specific object of the soul of themselves, by this fact powers are diversified but not genera of powers. Thus the sensible designates, not the object of the soul without qualification, but an object which of itself is divided by the aforesaid differences. Hence sight, hearing, and touch are distinct specific powers belonging to the same genus of powers of the soul, i.e., to sense. But when the differences considered divide the object taken in general, then from such a difference distinct genera of powers become known. Dicitur autem aliquid esse obiectum animae, secundum quod habet aliquam habitudinem ad animam. Ubi ergo invenimus diversas rationes habitudinis ad animam, ibi invenimus per se differentiam obiecti animae, demonstrantem diversum genus potentiarum animae. Res autem ad animam invenitur duplicem habitudinem habere: unam secundum quod ipsa res est in anima per modum animae, et non per modum sui; aliam secundum quod anima comparatur ad rem in suo esse existentem. Et sic obiectum animae est aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo in quantum natum est esse in anima non secundum esse proprium, sed secundum modum animae, id est spiritualiter; et haec est ratio cognoscibilis in quantum est cognoscibile. Alio modo est aliquid obiectum animae secundum quod ad ipsum anima inclinatur et ordinatur secundum modum ipsius rei in seipsa existentis; et haec est ratio appetibilis in quantum est appetibile. Something is said to be an object of the soul according as it has some relation to the soul. Hence, where we find different aspects of relatedness to the soul, there we find an essential difference in the object of the soul, and this indicates a distinct genus of the soul’s powers. Now a thing is found to have a twofold relationship to the soul: one by which the thing itself is in the soul in the soul’s manner and not in its own, the other by which the soul is referred to the thing in its own existence. Thus something is an object of the soul in two ways. (1) It is so inasmuch as it is capable of being in the soul, not according to its own act of being, but according to the manner of the soul—spiritually. This is the essential constituent of the knowable. in so far as it is knowable. (2) Something is the object of the soul according as the soul is inclined and oriented to it after the manner of the thing itself as it is in itself. This is the essential constituent of the appetible in so far as it is appetible. Unde cognoscitivum in anima et appetitivum constituunt diversa genera potentiarum. Unde, cum intellectus sub cognoscitivo comprehendatur, voluntas autem sub appetitivo, oportet voluntatem et intellectum esse potentias etiam genere diversas. The cognitive and appetitive principles in the soul accordingly constitute distinct genera of powers. Hence, since the intellect is included in the cognitive, and the will in the appetitive, the will and the intellect must be powers that are distinct even generically. Answers to Difficulties Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod distinctio potentiarum non ostenditur ex obiectis secundum rem consideratis, sed secundum rationem: quia ipsae rationes obiectorum specificant ipsas operationes potentiarum. Et ideo ubi est diversa ratio obiecti, ibi invenimus diversam potentiam, quamvis sit eadem res quae subest utrique rationi, sicut est de bono et vero. Et hoc etiam patet in rebus materialibus: nam aer patitur ab igne in quantum est calidus, secundum quod est in potentia aer calidus; in quantum vero ignis est lucidus, patitur ab eo secundum quod ipse est diaphanus: nec est eadem potentia in aere secundum quam dicitur diaphanus, et secundum quam dicitur potentia calidus, quamvis idem ignis sit qui in utramque potentiam agat. 1. The distinction of powers is not manifested by the objects taken according to their reality but according to their formal aspect, because the formal aspects of the objects specify the operations of the powers. And so where there is a different formal aspect of the object, there we find a different power, even though it is the same thing which has the two formal aspects, as is the case with good and the true. This is also verified in material things. Air is modified by fire inasmuch as fire is hot, in view of the fact that air is potentially hot. But inasmuch as fire is luminous, air is modified by it in view of the fact that air is transparent. Nor is it the same potency in air by which it is called transparent and by which it is called potentially hot, even though it is the same fire which acts upon both potencies. Ad secundum dicendum, quod potentia dupliciter potest considerari: vel in ordine ad obiectum, vel in ordine ad essentiam animae, in qua radicatur. Si ergo voluntas consideretur in ordine ad obiectum, sic ad aliud genus animae pertinet quam intellectus; et sic voluntas contra rationem et intellectum distinguitur, ut dictum est. Si vero voluntas consideretur secundum id in quo radicatur, sic, cum voluntas non habeat organum corporale, sicut nec intellectus, voluntas et intellectus ad eamdem partem animae reducentur. Et sic quandoque intellectus vel ratio sumitur prout includit in se utrumque; et sic dicitur quod voluntas est in ratione. Et secundum hoc rationabile includens intellectum et voluntatem dividitur contra irascibile et concupiscibile. 2. A power can be considered in two ways: either in reference to the object or in reference to the essence of the soul in which it is rooted. If the will is considered in reference to its object, it then belongs to a different genus from intellect. In this way will is distinguished from reason and intellect, as has been said. But if the will is considered according to that in which it is rooted, then since the will, like the intellect, does not have a bodily organ, the will and the intellect are reduced to the same part of the soul. In this way the intellect or reason is sometimes taken as including both within it, and then the will is said to be in reason. On this basis the rational part, including both the intellect and the will, is distinguished from the irascible and the concupiscible. Et per hoc patet solutio ad tertium. 3. From the above answer this also is clear. Ad quartum dicendum, quod obiectum intellectus practici non est bonum, sed verum relatum ad opus. 4. The object of the practical intellect is not the good, but the true which is related to operation. Ad quintum dicendum, quod velle et cognoscere non sunt actus unius rationis; et ideo non possunt pertinere ad unam potentiam, sicut cognoscere dulce et album; unde non est simile. 5. To will and to know are not acts of the same formal character, and so they cannot belong to the same power as can knowledge of what is sweet and what is white. Hence there is no parallel.
22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
In the eleventh article we ask:
Is the will a higher power than the intellect, or is the opposite true?
[ARTICLE II Sent., 25, a. 2 ad 4; III Sent., 27,1, 4; C.G., III, 26; S.T., I, 82,3; 4 ad 1; II-II, 23,6 ad 1; De carit., 3 ad 12 & 13.]
Undecimo quaeritur utrum voluntas sit altior potentia quam intellectus, vel e converso Difficulties Et videtur quod intellectus sit nobilior et altior. It seems that the intellect is the nobler and higher, for Nobilitas enim animae consistit in hoc quod est ad imaginem Dei. Sed anima est ad imaginem Dei secundum rationem vel intelligentiam: unde Augustinus dicit in III super Genesim ad litteram: intelligamus in eo factum hominem ad imaginem Dei, quo irrationabilibus animantibus antecellit: id autem est ipsa ratio, vel mens, vel intelligentia, vel si quo alio vocabulo commodius appellatur. Ergo excellentissima potentia animae est intellectus. 1. The nobility of the soul consists in its being made to the image of God. But the soul is made to the image of God in virtue of reason or intelligence. Hence Augustine says: “Let us understand that man is made to the image of God in that particular in which he excels irrational animals; but that is reason, mind, or intelligence, or whatever it may more appropriately be called.” Therefore the most excellent power of the soul is the intellect. Ipse dicebat, quod sicut imago est in intellectu, ita est etiam in voluntate, cum imago, secundum Augustinum in Lib. de Trinit., attendatur secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem.- Sed contra: ex quo nobilitas animae penes imaginem attenditur, oportet quod illud sit excellentius animae, ubi magis proprie invenitur ratio imaginis. Sed etiam si imago sit in voluntate et intellectu, magis proprie est in intellectu quam in voluntate: unde Magister, in II Sent. dist. 16, dicit, imaginem esse in cognitione veritatis, similitudinem in dilectione boni. Ergo adhuc oportet quod intellectus sit nobilior voluntate. 2. The answer was given that the image is in the will as well as in the intellect, since according to Augustine, the image is seen in memory, intelligence, and will.—On the contrary, when the nobility of the soul is considered from the standpoint of the image, that in which the notion of image is most properly verified must be the most excellent part of the soul. Now even if the image is in both the will and the intellect, it is more properly in the intellect than in the will. Hence the Master of the Sentences says that the image is in the knowledge of truth and merely a likeness in the love of good. Therefore the intellect must still be nobler than the will. Praeterea, cum de potentiis iudicemus ex actibus, oportet illam potentiam esse nobiliorem cuius actus est nobilior. Sed intelligere est nobilius quam velle. Ergo intellectus est nobilior quam voluntas. Probatio mediae. Cum actus specificentur ex terminis, oportet illum actum esse nobiliorem cuius est terminus nobilior. Sed actus intellectus est secundum motum ad animam, voluntatis autem actus est secundum motum ab anima ad res. Ergo, cum anima sit nobilior rebus exterioribus, intelligere erit nobilius quam velle. 3. Since we judge of the powers from their acts, that power must be the nobler whose act is the nobler. But to understand is nobler than to will. Therefore the intellect is nobler than the will. Proof of the minor: Since acts are specified by their terms, that act must be nobler whose term is nobler. But the act of the intellect involves a motion to the soul; that of the will, from the soul to things. Since the soul is nobler than external things, to understand is therefore nobler than to will. Praeterea, in omnibus ordinatis, quanto aliquid magis distat ab infimo, tanto est altius. Sed infimum in potentiis animae est sensus. Voluntas autem magis appropinquat sensui quam intellectus. Nam voluntas cum sensitivis potentiis communicat in conditione obiecti; sicut enim sensus est particularium, ita et voluntas: volumus enim particularem sanitatem et non hoc universale quod est sanitas. Intellectus autem est universalium. Ergo intellectus est altior potentia quam voluntas. 4. Among all things arranged in an order the more distant anything is from the lowest member, the higher it is. But the lowest among the powers of the soul is sense, and the will stands closer to sense than does the intellect. For the will shares with the sense powers the condition of its object, because the will is concerned with particulars just as is sense. We wish for a particular health and not health as something universal. But the intellect is concerned with universals. The intellect is therefore a higher power than the will. Praeterea, regens est nobilius recto. Sed intellectus regit voluntatem. Ergo est nobilior voluntate. 5. That which rules is nobler than the thing ruled. But the intellect rules the will. Therefore it is nobler than the will. Praeterea, illud a quo est aliquid, habet auctoritatem super ipsum, et maioritatem, si sit diversum in essentia. Sed intelligentia est a memoria, sicut filius a patre: voluntas autem a memoria et intelligentia, sicut spiritus sanctus a patre et filio. Ergo intelligentia habet auctoritatem respectu voluntatis, et est maior et potior ea. 6. That from which something comes has authority over it and is greater than it if it is distinct in essence. But intelligence is from memory as the Son from the Father, and will is from memory and intelligence as the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. Intelligence therefore has authority in regard to the will and is greater and stronger than it. Praeterea, quanto aliquis actus est simplicior et immaterialior, tanto est nobilior. Sed actus intellectus est simplicior quam voluntatis, et immaterialior: quia intellectus abstrahit a materia, non autem voluntas. Ergo actus intellectus est nobilior quam voluntatis. 7. The simpler and more immaterial an act is, the nobler it is. But the act of the intellect is simpler and more immaterial than that of the will, because the intellect abstracts from matter, but not the will. The act of the intellect is therefore nobler than that of the will. Praeterea, intellectus in anima comparatur splendori in materialibus; voluntas autem sive affectus, calori, ut patet ex dictis sanctorum. Sed splendor est nobilior calore, cum sit qualitas nobilioris corporis. Ergo intellectus est nobilior voluntate. 8. The intellect bears to the soul the same relation as brightness to material things, and the will or affective power, that of warmth, as appears from the sayings of the saints. But brightness is nobler than warmth, since it is the quality of a nobler body. The intellect is therefore also nobler than the will. Praeterea, illud quod est proprium hominis in quantum est homo, secundum philosophum in Ethicis, est nobilius eo quod est commune homini et aliis animalibus. Sed intelligere est proprium hominis; velle autem etiam aliis animalibus convenit: unde philosophus dicit in III Ethicorum, quod voluntario participant pueri et bruta. Ergo intellectus est nobilior voluntate. 9. According to the Philosopher, that which is proper to man as man is nobler than that which is shared by man and the other animals. But to understand is proper to man, whereas to will belongs to the other animals also. The Philosopher accordingly says, “Children and brutes share in what is voluntary.” The intellect is therefore nobler than the will. Praeterea, quanto aliquid est propinquius fini, tanto est nobilius; cum fine sit ratio bonitatis in his quae sunt ad finem. Sed intellectus videtur esse propinquior fini quam voluntas. Prius enim homo attingit finem cognoscendo ipsum, quam per voluntatem appetendo ipsum. Ergo intellectus est nobilior quam voluntate. 10. The nearer a thing is to its end, the nobler it is, since the goodness of means is from the end. But the intellect seems to be nearer to the end than the will, for a man first attains the end by his intellect by knowing it before he does so by his will by desiring it. The intellect is therefore nobler than the will. Praeterea, secundum Gregorium in VI Moral., contemplativa vita est maioris meriti quam activa. Sed contemplativa pertinet ad intellectum, activa autem ad voluntatem. Ergo et intellectus est nobilior quam voluntas. 11. Gregory says, “The contemplative life is... of greater merit than the active.” But the contemplative life pertains to the intellect; the active, to the will. Then the intellect is also nobler than the will. Praeterea, philosophus dicit in X Ethic., quod intellectus est optimum eorum quae sunt in nobis. Ergo est nobilior voluntate. 12. The Philosopher says that the intellect is the most excellent of the things which are in us. It is therefore nobler than the will. Sed contra. To the Contrary Perfectioris potentiae perfectior est habitus. Sed habitus quo perficitur voluntas, scilicet caritas, est nobilior fide et scientia, quibus perficitur intellectus, ut patet per apostolum, I Cor. XIII, 2. Ergo voluntas est nobilior intellectu. 1. The habit of a more perfect power is more perfect. But the habit by which the will is perfected, charity, is nobler than faith and knowledge, by which the intellect is perfected, as is evident from what the Apostle says in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13: 2). The will is therefore nobler than the intellect. Praeterea, illud quod est liberum sui, est nobilius non libero. Sed intellectus non est liber sui, cum possit cogi; voluntas autem est libera, cum cogi non possit. Ergo voluntas est nobilior intellectu. 2. What is free is nobler than what is not. But the intellect is not free since it can be forced, but the will is free since it cannot be forced. The will is therefore nobler than the intellect. Praeterea, ordo potentiarum est secundum ordinem obiectorum. Sed bonum, quod est obiectum voluntatis, est nobilius vero, quod est obiectum intellectus. Ergo et voluntas est nobilior intellectu. 3. The order of the powers follows the order of their objects. But good, which is the object of the will, is nobler than the true, which is the object of the intellect. The will is therefore also nobler than the intellect. Praeterea secundum Dionysium in V cap. de divinis nominibus, quanto aliqua divinarum participationum est communior, tanto est nobilior. Sed voluntas est communior intellectu, quia quaedam participant voluntate, quae non participant intellectu, ut prius dictum est. Ergo voluntas est intellectu nobilior. 4. According to Dionysius the more common any one of the divine participations is, the nobler it is. But the will is more common than the intellect, because some things participate in will which do not participate in intellect, as was said above. The will is therefore nobler than the intellect. Praeterea, quanto aliquid est Deo propinquius, tanto est nobilius. Sed voluntas Deo magis appropinquat quam intellectus: quia, sicut dicit Hugo de s. Victore, super VII cap. caelestis hierarchiae, ibi dilectio intrat, ubi cognitio foris est: plus enim Deum diligimus quam de ipso possimus cognoscere. Ergo voluntas est nobilior intellectu. 5. The nearer to God anything is, the nobler it is. But the will comes closer to God than the intellect, because, as Hugh of St. Victor says, love enters in where knowledge remains outside, for we love God more than we are able to know of Him. Therefore the will is nobler than the intellect. Responsio. REPLY Dicendum, quod aliquid potest altero eminentius dici et simpliciter, et secundum quid. Ad hoc autem quod ostendatur aliquid esse altero simpliciter melius, oportet quod eorum comparatio attendatur penes eorum essentialia, et non penes accidentalia; quia per hoc ostenderetur unum alteri eminere secundum quid; sicut homo si comparetur leoni quantum ad differentias essentiales, invenitur leone simpliciter nobilior, in quantum homo est rationale animal, leo vero irrationale; leo vero est homine excellentior, si comparetur secundum fortitudinem corporalem: hoc autem est esse nobilius secundum quid. Ut igitur consideretur quae harum potentiarum sit potior simpliciter, voluntas, an intellectus, hoc ex per se earum differentiis considerandum est. A thing can be said to be more eminent than another either simply or in a certain respect. For something to be shown to be simply better than another the comparison must be made on the basis of what is essential to them and not on that of accidentals. In the latter case one thing would be shown to stand out over another merely in a certain respect. Thus if a man were to be compared to a lion on the basis of essential differences, he would be found to be simply nobler inasmuch as the man is a rational animal, the lion irrational. But if a lion is compared to a man on the basis of physical strength, he surpasses the man. But this is to be nobler only in a certain respect. To see, then, which of these two powers, the will or the intellect, is better without qualification, we must consider the matter from their essential differences. Perfectio autem et dignitas intellectus in hoc consistit quod species rei intellectae in ipso intellectu consistit; cum secundum hoc intelligat actu, in quo eius dignitas tota consideratur. Nobilitas autem voluntatis et actus eius consistit ex hoc quod anima ordinatur ad rem aliquam nobilem, secundum esse quod res illa habet in seipsa. Perfectius autem est, simpliciter et absolute loquendo, habere in se nobilitatem alterius rei, quam ad rem nobilem comparari extra se existentem. Unde voluntas et intellectus, si absolute considerentur, non comparando ad hanc vel illam rem, hunc ordinem habent, quod intellectus simpliciter eminentior est voluntate. The perfection and dignity of the intellect consists in this, that the species of the thing which is understood is in the intellect itself, since in this way it actually understands, and from this its whole dignity is seen. The nobility of the will and of its act, however, consists in this, that the soul is directed to some noble thing in the very existence which that thing has in itself. Now it is more perfect, simply and absolutely speaking, to have within oneself the nobility of another thing than to be related to a noble thing outside oneself. Hence, if the will and the intellect are considered absolutely, and not with reference to this or that particular thing, they have this order, that the intellect is simply more excellent than the will. Sed contingit eminentius esse comparari ad rem aliquam nobilem per aliquem modum, quam eius nobilitatem in seipso habere; quando scilicet illius rei nobilitas habetur multo inferiori modo quam eam habeat res illa in seipsa. Si autem nobilitas illius rei insit alii rei vel aeque nobiliter, vel nobilius quam in re cuius est, tunc, absque omni dubitatione, nobilius erit quod in se nobilitatem alterius rei habebit, quam quod ad ipsam rem nobilem qualitercumque ordinatur. Rerum autem quae sunt anima superiores, formas percipit intellectus inferiori modo quam sint in ipsis rebus: recipitur enim aliquid in intellectu per modum sui, ut dicitur in Lib. de causis. Et eadem ratione earum rerum quae sunt anima inferiores, sicut sunt res corporales, formae sunt nobiliores in anima quam in ipsis rebus. But it may happen that to be related in some way to some noble thing is more excellent than to have its nobility within oneself. This is the case, for instance, when the nobility of that thing is possessed in a way much inferior to that in which the thing has it within itself. But if the nobility of one thing is in another just as nobly or more nobly than it is in the thing to which it belongs, then without doubt that which has the nobility of that thing within itself is nobler than that which is related in any way whatsoever to that noble thing. Now the intellect takes on the forms or things superior to the soul in a way inferior to that which they have in the things themselves; for the intellect receives things after its own fashion, as is said in The Causes. And for the same reason the forms of things inferior to the soul, such as corporeal things, are more noble in the soul than in the things themselves. Sic igitur tripliciter potest comparari intellectus ad voluntatem. Uno modo absolute et in universali, non respectu huius vel illius rei; et sic intellectus est eminentior voluntate; sicut habere id quod est dignitatis in re aliqua est perfectius quam comparari ad nobilitatem eius. Alio modo per respectum ad res materiales sensibiles: et sic iterum intellectus est simpliciter nobilior voluntate, ut puta intelligere lapidem quam velle lapidem; quia forma lapidis nobiliori modo est in intellectu secundum quod ab intellectu intelligitur, quam sit in se ipsa secundum quod a voluntate desideratur. Tertio modo in respectu ad res divinas, quae sunt anima superiores; et sic velle est eminentius quam intelligere, sicut velle Deum vel amare quam cognoscere; quia scilicet ipsa divina bonitas perfectius est in ipso Deo prout a voluntate desideratur, quam sit participata in nobis prout ab intellectu cognoscitur. The intellect can accordingly be compared to the will in three ways: (1) Absolutely and in general, without any reference to this or that particular thing. In this way the intellect is more excellent than the will, just as it is more perfect to possess what there is of dignity in a thing than merely to be related to its nobility. (2) With regard to material and sensible things. In this way again the intellect is simply nobler than the will. For example, to know a stone intellectually is nobler than to will it, because the form of the stone is in the intellect, inasmuch as it is known by the intellect, in a nobler way than it is in itself as desired by the will. (3) With reference to divine things, which are superior to the soul. In this way to will is more excellent than to understand, as to will God or to love Him is more excellent than to know Him. This is because the divine goodness itself is more perfectly in God Himself as He is desired by the will than the participated goodness is in us as known by the intellect. Answers to Difficulties Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus accipit rationem et intelligentiam pro tota parte intellectiva, quae comprehendit in se et apprehensionem intellectus et appetitum voluntatis; et sic voluntas non excluditur ab imagine. 1. Augustine takes reason and intelligence for the whole intellective part, which includes both the apprehension of the intellect and the appetite of the will; and so the will is not excluded from the image. Ad secundum dicendum, quod Magister appropriat imaginationem rationi, eo quod prius est; similitudinem vero amori, quia in comparatione ad Deum cognitio completur per amorem, sicut imago perficitur et venustatur per colores et alia huiusmodi, quibus fit similis exemplari. 2. The Master appropriates to reason the fact of being an image because it is prior; and to love, likeness, because with reference to God knowledge is completed by love, just as a picture is achieved and beautified by colors and similar means, by which it is made like the original. Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit quantum ad res illas quibus anima est nobilior; sed eadem ratione potest probari praeeminentia voluntatis in comparatione ad res anima nobiliores. 3. That argument is based upon things surpassed in nobility by the soul. But by the same reasoning can be shown the pre-eminence of the will in reference to things nobler than the soul. Ad quartum dicendum, quod voluntas non communicat in obiecto cum sensibus nisi secundum quod fertur ad res sensibiles, quae sunt anima inferiores; secundum vero quod fertur ad res intelligibiles et divinas, magis elongatur a sensibus quam intellectus, cum intellectus minus capere possit de divinis quam appetat et diligat affectus. 4. The will has its object in common with the senses only in so far as it is directed to sensible things, which are inferior to the soul. But in so far as it is directed to intelligible and divine things, it is more distant from the senses than is the intellect, since the intellect can grasp less of divine things than the affective power desires and loves. Ad quintum dicendum, quod intellectus regit voluntatem, non quasi inclinans eam in id in quod tendit, sed sicut ostendens ei quo tendere debeat. Quando ergo minus potest ostendere intellectus aliquod nobile quam inclinatio voluntatis feratur in illud, voluntas est potior intellectu. 5. The intellect rules the will, not by inclining it to that to which it tends, but by showing it that to which it should tend. When, therefore, the intellect is less capable of exhibiting something noble than the inclination of the will is of being directed to it, the will surpasses the intellect. Ad sextum dicendum, quod voluntas non directe ab intelligentia procedit; sed ab essentia animae, praesupposita intelligentia. Unde ex hoc non ostenditur ordo dignitatis, sed solummodo ordo originis, quo intellectus est prior naturaliter voluntate. 6. The will does not proceed from intelligence directly but from the essence of the soul, intelligence being presupposed. From this, then, the order of dignity is not revealed, but only the order of origin, by which the intellect is naturally prior to the will. Ad septimum dicendum, quod intellectus non abstrahit a materia nisi cum intelligit res sensibiles et materiales. Cum vero intelligit res quae sunt supra ipsum, non abstrahit, immo recipit minus simpliciter quam sint res ipsae in seipsis; unde remanet actus voluntatis qui fertur in ipsas res prout in seipsis sunt, simplicior et nobilior. 7. The intellect abstracts from matter only when it knows sensible and material things; but when it knows things which are above it, it does not abstract; rather it receives things in a way that is less simple than the things are in themselves. Hence, the act of the will, which is directed to the things as they are in themselves, remains simpler and nobler. Ad octavum dicendum, quod locutiones illae quibus intellectus splendori, affectus vero calori comparatur, sunt metaphoricae: et ex talibus locutionibus ut Magister dicit in III sententiarum, non est trahenda argumentatio. Dionysius etiam dicit in epistola ad Titum, quod symbolica theologia non est argumentativa. 8. Those expressions by which the intellect is compared to brightness and the will to warmth are metaphorical; and from such expressions no argument is to be drawn, as the Master says. Dionysius also says that symbolical theology is not argumentative. Ad nonum dicendum, quod sicut intelligere est solius hominis, ita velle; quamvis appetere sit aliorum quam hominis. 9. Willing belongs to man alone as well as understanding, though tending appetitively belongs to other things besides man. Ad decimum dicendum, quod quamvis anima prius feratur in Deum per intellectum quam per affectum, tamen perfectius pervenit in ipsum affectus quam intellectus, ut dictum est, in corp. articuli. 10. Although the soul is referred to God by the intellect before it is by the affections, nevertheless the affections attain Him more perfectly than does the intellect, as has been said. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod a contemplatione voluntas non excluditur: unde Gregorius dicit super Ezechielem, quod vita contemplativa est Deum et proximum diligere. Unde eminentia vitae contemplativae ad activam non praeiudicat voluntati. 11. The will is not excluded from contemplation. Gregory says that the contemplative life is to love God and one’s neighbor. Hence the pre-eminence of the contemplative life over the active is not prejudicial to the will. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod philosophus loquitur de intellectu secundum quod accipitur pro parte intellectiva, quae comprehendit in se voluntatem. Vel potest dici, quod considerat intellectum et alias potentias animae absolute, non secundum quod comparantur ad hoc obiectum vel illud. 12. The Philosopher is Speaking of the intellect according as it is taken for the whole intellective part, which includes the will also. Or it can be said that he is viewing the intellect and the other powers of the soul absolutely, not as referred to this or that particular object. Answers to Contrary Difficulties Ad primum vero quod in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum, quod caritas est habitus perficiens voluntatem in ordine ad Deum; et in tali ordine voluntas est nobilior intellectu. l. Charity is a habit perfecting the will with reference to God. In this reference the will is nobler than the intellect. Ad secundum dicendum, quod libertas voluntatis non ostendit eam esse nobiliorem simpliciter, sed nobiliorem in movendo: quod ex sequentibus patebit. 2. The freedom of the will does not show that it is nobler simply, but that it is nobler in moving, as will appear more clearly from what follows. Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum verum sit quoddam bonum: est enim bonum intellectus, ut patet per philosophum in VI Ethic.; non est dicendum quod bonum sit nobilius vero, sicut nec quod animal sit nobilius homine; cum homo includat in se nobilitatem animalis, et superaddat. Loquimur enim de vero et bono, secundum quod sunt obiecta voluntatis et intellectus. 3. Since the true is a certain good (for it is the good of the intellect, as is made clear by the Philosopher), good should not be called nobler than the true, just as animal is not nobler than man, since man includes the nobility of animal and adds to it. We are now speaking of the true and the good in so far as they are the objects of the will and of the intellect. Ad quartum dicendum, quod velle non invenitur in pluribus quam intelligere, quamvis appetere in pluribus inveniatur. Sciendum tamen est, quod in hac ratione non ducitur auctoritas Dionysii secundum eius intentionem, propter duo. Primo, quia Dionysius loquitur quando unum includitur in ratione alterius, sicut esse in vivere, et vivere in intelligere, cum dicit unum esse simplicius altero. Secundo, quia quamvis participatio quae est simplicior, sit nobilior, tamen si accipiatur cum illo modo quo invenitur in rebus carentibus superadditis perfectionibus, erit ignobilior; sicut esse quod est nobilius quam vivere, si accipiatur cum illo modo quo inanimata sunt, ille modus essendi erit ignobilior quam esse viventium, quod est vivere. Et sic non oportet quod semper id quod est in pluribus, sit nobilius; alias oporteret dicere sensum esse nobiliorem intellectu, et nutritivam potentiam quam sensitivam. 4. Willing is not found more extensively than understanding although tending appetitively is. It should, however, be observed that in this argument the passage from Dionysius is not used in his meaning for two reasons. (1) Dionysius is speaking on the supposition that one is included in the notion of the other, as being in living and living in understanding. He accordingly says that one is simpler than the other. (2) Although a participation which is simpler is nobler, nevertheless, if it is taken together with the mode in which it is found. in things lacking additional perfections, it will be less noble. Thus if to be, which is nobler than to live, is taken together with the mode in which inanimate things are, that mode of being will be less noble than the being of living things, which is to live. It is accordingly not necessary that what is found more extensively should always be more noble; otherwise we should have to say that sense is nobler than intellect and the nutritive power nobler than the sensitive. Ad quintum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de voluntate in ordine ad Deum; et sic conceditur esse nobilior. 5. That argument is concerned with the will in reference to God. In this sense it is granted to be more noble.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
In the twelfth article we ask:
Does the will move the intellect and the other powers of the soul?
[ARTICLE S.T., III, 26; S.T., I, 82,4; I-II, 9, 1 & 3; De malo, 6.]
Duodecimo quaeritur utrum voluntas moveat intellectum et alias animae vires Difficulties Et videtur quod non. It seems that it does not, for Movens enim est naturaliter prius moto. Sed voluntas est posterior intellectu; nihil enim amatur vel desideratur nisi cognitum, secundum Augustinum in Lib. de Trinit. Ergo voluntas non movet intellectum. 1. The mover is naturally prior to the thing moved. But the will is posterior to the intellect, for nothing is loved or desired unless it is known, according to Augustine. The will therefore does not move the intellect. Praeterea, si voluntas movet intellectum ad suum actum, tunc sequitur quod intellectus intelligat, quia voluntas vult ipsum intelligere. Sed voluntas non vult aliquid nisi intellectum. Ergo prius intellectus intellexit ipsum intelligere quam voluntas illud vellet. Sed antequam intellectus hoc intelligeret, oportet ponere quod voluntas illud vellet, quia ponitur intellectus a voluntate moveri. Ergo est abire in infinitum; vel dicendum, quod voluntas non movet intellectum. 2. If the will moves the intellect to its act, then it follows that the intellect understands because the will wants it to understand. But the will does not want anything unless it is understood. The intellect therefore first understands its understanding before the will wills it. But before the intellect could understand this, the will would have to be held to will it, because the intellect is held to be moved by the will. We should then have to go on to infinity. But this is impossible. Therefore the will does not move the intellect. Praeterea, omnis potentia passiva movetur a suo obiecto. Sed voluntas est potentia passiva; est enim appetitus movens motum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo movetur a suo obiecto. Sed obiectum eius est bonum intellectum vel apprehensum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo intellectus, aut alia vis apprehensiva, movet voluntatem, et non e converso. 3. Every passive power is moved by its object. But the will is a passive power, for appetite is a mover which is moved, as is said in The Soul. Hence it is moved by its object. But its object is the understood or apprehended good, as is said in the same book. Therefore the intellect or some other apprehensive power moves the will, and not the other way about. Praeterea, quod una potentia dicatur aliam movere, hoc non est nisi propter imperium quod una super aliam habet. Imperare autem est rationis, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo eius est movere alias potentias, et non voluntatis. 4. One power is said to move another only because of the ability to command which it has over the other. But to command belongs to reason, as is said in the Ethics. It therefore belongs to reason to command the other powers and not to the will. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, XII super Genesim ad litteram, movens et agens est nobilius moto et facto. Sed intellectus, ad minus respectu sensibilium, est nobilior quam voluntas, ut dictum est. Ergo ad minus respectu horum non movetur a voluntate. 5. According to Augustine, the mover and agent is nobler than the thing moved or made. But the intellect is nobler than the will, at least in regard to sensible things, as has been explained. At least in regard to these, then, it is not moved by the will. Sed contra. To the Contrary Est quod Anselmus dicit in Lib. de similitudinibus, cap. II, quod voluntas movet omnes animae vires. l. Anselm says that the will moves all the other powers of the soul. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, VIII super Genesim ad litteram, omnis motus procedit ab immobili. Sed inter potentias animae sola voluntas est quae est immobilis in hoc quod a nullo cogi potest. Ergo omnes aliae vires a voluntate moventur. 2. According to Augustine every motion proceeds from what is immovable. But among the powers of the soul the will is the only one which is immovable in the sense of not being able to be forced by anything. All the other powers of the soul are therefore moved by the will. Praeterea, secundum philosophum in II Meteororum, omnis motus est propter finem. Sed bonum et finis est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo voluntas movet alias vires. 3. According to the Philosopher, every motion occurs for the sake of an end. But good and the end are the object of the will. The will, then, moves the other powers. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, hoc facit in spiritibus amor quod in corporibus pondus. Sed pondus movet corpora. Ergo amor voluntatis movet spirituales animae potentias. 4. According to Augustine, among spirits love does the same thing as weight among bodies. But weight moves bodies. Then the love of the will moves the spiritual powers of the soul. Respondeo. REPLY Dicendum, quod intellectus aliquo modo movet voluntatem, et aliquo modo voluntas movet intellectum et alias vires. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum, quod tam finis quam efficiens movere dicuntur, sed diversimode; cum in qualibet actione duo considerentur: scilicet agens, et ratio agendi; ut in calefactione ignis est agens, et ratio agendi calor. In movendo dicitur finis movere sicut ratio movendi: sed efficiens sicut agens motum, hoc est educens mobile de potentia in actum. In a way the intellect moves the will, and in a way the will moves the intellect and the other powers. For the clarification of this it should be noted that both an end and an efficient cause are said to move, but in different ways. Two things are to be taken into account in any action, the agent and the reason for acting. In heating, the agent is fire and the reason for acting is heat. Similarly in moving, the end is said to move as the reason for moving, but the efficient cause, as the one producing the movement, that is, the one which brings the subject of the motion from potency to act. Ratio autem agendi est forma agentis per quam agit; unde oportet quod insit agenti ad hoc quod agat. Non autem inest secundum esse naturae perfectum, quia hoc habito quiescit motus; sed inest agenti per modum intentionis; nam finis est prior in intentione, sed posterior in esse. Et ideo finis praeexistit in movente proprie secundum intellectum, cuius est recipere aliquid per modum intentionis, et non secundum esse naturae. Unde intellectus movet voluntatem per modum quo finis movere dicitur, in quantum scilicet praeconcipit rationem finis, et eam voluntati proponit. The reason for acting is the form of the agent by which it acts. It must accordingly be in the agent for it to act. It is not there, however, according to its perfect act of being; for when that is had the motion comes to rest. But it is in the agent by way of an intention, for the end is prior in intention but posterior in being. Thus the end preexists in the mover in a proper sense intellectually (for it belongs to intellect to receive something by way of an intention) and not according to its real existence. Hence the intellect moves the will in the way in which an end is said to move—by conceiving beforehand the reason for acting and proposing it to the will. Sed movere per modum causae agentis est voluntatis, et non intellectus: eo quod voluntas comparatur ad res secundum quod in seipsis sunt; intellectus autem comparatur ad res secundum quod sunt per modum spiritualem in anima. Agere autem et moveri convenit rebus secundum esse proprium quo in seipsis subsistunt, et non secundum quod sunt in anima per modum intentionis; calor enim in anima non calefacit, sed in igne. Et sic comparatio voluntatis ad res est secundum quod competit eis motus, non autem comparatio intellectus; et praeterea actus voluntatis est quaedam inclinatio in aliquid, non autem actus intellectus. Inclinatio autem est dispositio moventis secundum quod efficiens movet. Unde patet quod voluntas habet movere per modum causae agentis, et non intellectus. To move in the manner of an efficient cause, however, belongs to the will and not to the intellect; for the will is referred to things as they are in themselves, whereas the intellect is referred to them as existing spiritually in the soul. Now to act and to move pertain to things according to their own act of being by which they subsist in themselves, not according as they exist in the soul in the manner of an intention. It is not heat in the soul which heats, but that which is in fire. Thus the will is referred to things as subject to motion, but not the intellect. Furthermore the act of the will is an inclination to something, but not that of the intellect. But an inclination is the disposition of something that moves other things as an efficient cause moves. It is accordingly evident that the will has the function of moving in the manner of an agent cause; not, however, the intellect. Potentiis autem animae superioribus, ex hoc quod immateriales sunt, competit quod reflectantur super seipsas; unde tam voluntas quam intellectus reflectuntur super se, et unum super alterum, et super essentiam animae, et super omnes eius vires. Intellectus enim intelligit se, et voluntatem, et essentiam animae, et omnes animae vires; et similiter voluntas vult se velle, et intellectum intelligere, et vult essentiam animae, et sic de aliis. Cum autem aliqua potentia super aliam fertur, comparatur ad eam secundum suam proprietatem: sicut intellectus cum intelligit voluntatem velle, accipit in seipso rationem volendi; unde et ipsa voluntas, cum fertur super potentias animae, fertur in eas ut in res quasdam quibus convenit motus et operatio, et inclinat unamquamque in propriam operationem. Et sic non solum res exteriores movet voluntas per modum causae agentis, sed etiam ipsas animae vires. The higher powers of the soul, because immaterial, are capable of reflecting upon themselves. Both the will and the intellect, therefore, reflect upon themselves, upon each other, upon the essence of the soul, and upon all its powers. The intellect understands itself and the will and the essence of the soul and all the soul’s powers. Similarly the will wills that it will, that the intellect understand, that the soul be, and so of the other powers. Now when one power is brought to bear upon another, it is referred to that other according to what is proper to itself. When the intellect understands that the will is willing, it receives within itself the intelligible character of willing. When the will is brought to bear upon the other powers of the soul, it is directed to them as things to which motion and operation belong, and it inclines each to its own operation. Thus the will moves in the manner of an efficient cause not only external things but also the very powers of the soul. Answers to Difficulties Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum in reflexione sit quaedam similitudo motus circularis, in quo est ultimum motus quod primo erat principium, oportet sic dicere in reflexione, ut illud quod primo erat prius, secundo fiat posterius. Et ideo, quamvis intellectus sit prior voluntate simpliciter, tamen per reflexionem efficitur voluntate posterior; et sic voluntas intellectum movere potest. 1. Since there is in reflection a certain similarity to circular motion, in which what is last is the same as what was originally the beginning, we must so express ourselves in regard to reflection that what was originally prior then becomes posterior. And so, although the intellect is prior to the will when taken absolutely, it nonetheless becomes posterior to the will by reflection. Thus the will can move the intellect. Ad secundum dicendum, quod non est procedere in infinitum; statur enim in appetitu naturali, quo inclinatur intellectus in suum actum. 2. There is no necessity of going on to infinity, for we stop at the natural appetite by which the intellect is inclined to its act. Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa ostendit quod intellectus movet per modum finis; hoc enim modo se habet bonum apprehensum ad voluntatem. 3. The argument shows that the intellect moves in the manner of an end, for this is the bearing of the apprehended good upon the will. Ad quartum dicendum, quod imperium est et voluntatis et rationis quantum ad diversa; voluntatis quidem secundum quod imperium inclinationem quamdam importat; rationis vero, secundum quod haec inclinatio distribuitur et ordinatur ut exequenda per hunc vel per illum. 4 Command belongs to both will and reason but in different respects. It belongs to the will in so far as a command implies an inclination; it belongs to reason in so far as this inclination is distributed and ordained to be carried out by this or that individual. Ad quintum dicendum, quod quaelibet potentia praeeminet alteri in hoc quod est proprium sibi: sicut tactus perfectius comparatur ad calorem, quem sentit per se, quam visus, qui sentit ipsum per accidens; et similiter intellectus completius comparatur ad verum quam voluntas; et voluntas perfectius comparatur ad bonum quod est in rebus, quam intellectus. Unde, quamvis intellectus simpliciter sit nobilior voluntate, ad minus respectu aliquarum rerum; tamen secundum rationem movendi, quae competit voluntati ex ratione propria obiecti, voluntas nobilior invenitur. 5. Any power surpasses another in what is proper to itself. Thus touch is referred to heat, which it senses in itself, in a more perfect way than sight, which sees it only by accident. Similarly the intellect is referred to truth more completely than the will; and conversely, the will is referred to the good in things more perfectly than the intellect. Hence, although the intellect is nobler than the will absolutely, at least in regard to some things, nevertheless under the aspect of moving, which belongs to the will by reason of the distinctive characteristic of its object, the will is found to be nobler.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
In the thirteenth article we ask:
Is intention an act of the will?
[ARTICLE II Sent., 38, 1, 3; S.T., I-II, 12 , 1.]
Tertiodecimo quaeritur utrum intentio sit actus voluntatis Difficulties Et videtur quod non. It seems that it is not, for Quia super illud Luc. XI, 34: lucerna corporis tui est oculus tuus, Glossa, id est intentio. Sed oculus in anima est ratio vel intellectus. Ergo intentio pertinet ad rationem vel intellectum, et non ad voluntatem. 1. In regard to the words of Luke (11: 34): “The light of your body is your eye,” the Gloss explains: “That is, ‘thy intention.” But the eye in the soul is reason or the intellect. Intention therefore pertains to reason or the intellect, not to the will. Sed dicendum, quod est voluntatis in ordine ad rationem, et pro tanto oculo comparatur.- Sed contra: actus superioris et prioris potentiae non dependet ab actu posterioris. Sed voluntas est prior intellectu in agendo, quia voluntas movet intellectum, ut dictum est, art. praeced. Ergo actus voluntatis non dependet a ratione. Si ergo intentio esset actus voluntatis, nullo modo ad rationem pertineret. 2. The answer was given that it pertains to the will as subordinated to reason and in this respect is compared to an eye.—On the contrary, the act of a higher and prior power does not depend upon that of a posterior power. The will, however, is prior to the intellect in acting, because it moves the intellect; as has been said. Then the act of the will does not depend upon reason. If intention were an act of the will, it would therefore in no way pertain to reason. Sed dicendum, quod secundum hoc actus voluntatis dependet a ratione in quantum ad volendum praeexigitur cognitio voliti; et sic intentio, quamvis sit actus voluntatis, est aliquo modo rationis.- Sed contra: nullus actus voluntatis est qui cognitionem non praeexigat. Ergo secundum hoc nullus actus deberet attribui simpliciter voluntati, nec velle nec amare, sed voluntati et rationi simul; quod est falsum. Ergo et primum; scilicet quod intentio sit actus voluntatis. 3. The answer was given that the act of the will does depend upon reason in this respect, that knowledge of the thing willed is a prerequisite for willing; and so, although intention is an act of the will, it nevertheless does in some sense belong to reason.—On the contrary, there is no act of the will for which knowledge is not a prerequisite. Consequently, according to the proposed solution no act should be attributed to the will simply, not even willing and loving, but to will and reason together. This, however, is false. Then so is the preceding contention that intention is an act of the will. Praeterea, ipsum nomen intentionis importat relationem in finem. Sed referre aliquid in finem pertinet ad rationem. Ergo intentio est rationis. 4. The very name intention implies a relation to an end. But it belongs to reason to refer anything to an end. Intention therefore belongs to reason and not to will. Sed dicendum, quod in intentione non solum est relatio in finem, sed actus voluntatis qui refertur in finem; et utrumque per nomen intentionis significatur.- Sed contra: actus ille relationi in finem prosternitur ut materiale formali. Sed magis denominatur aliquid a formali quam a materiali. Ergo intentio magis denominatur ab eo quod est rationis, quam ab eo quod est voluntatis; et sic magis debet poni actus rationis quam voluntatis. 5. It was maintained in answer that there is in intention not only a relation to an end but also an act of the will which is referred to the end, and that both are meant by the name intention.—On the contrary, that act is made the substratum of the relation to an end as a material principle is made that of the formal. But a thing takes its name from its formal rather than its material principle. Intention accordingly takes its name rather from what belongs to reason than from what belongs to will, and so it should be held to be an act of reason rather than of will. Praeterea, sicut primus motor dirigit totam naturam, ita ratio dirigit voluntatem. Sed intentio in rebus naturalibus magis proprie attribuitur primo motori quam ipsis rebus naturalibus; cum res naturales non dicantur aliquid intendere nisi secundum quod sunt directae a primo motore. Ergo et in potentiis animae magis debet attribui intentio rationi quam voluntati. 6. Reason directs the will just as the prime mover directs the whole of nature. But the intention in the things of nature is more properly attributed to the prime mover than to the things of nature themselves, since these are said to intend something only in so far as they are directed by the prime mover. Then among the powers of the soul too, intention should be attributed to reason rather than to the will. Praeterea, intentio, proprie loquendo, non est nisi cognoscentis. Sed voluntas non est cognoscens. Ergo intentio non est voluntatis. 7. Properly speaking there is an intention only in a knower. But the will is not a knower. Intention therefore does not belong to the will. Praeterea, eorum quae nullo modo sunt unum, non potest esse actus unus. Sed voluntas et ratio nullo modo sunt unum, cum ad diversa genera potentiarum animae pertineant; voluntas enim est in appetitivo, sed ratio in intellectivo. Ergo ratio et voluntas non possunt habere unum actum; et ita, si intentio est actus rationis aliquo modo, non erit actus voluntatis. 8. There cannot be a single act of things that are in no sense one. But the will and reason are in no sense one, since they even belong to different genera of powers of the soul: the will is in the appetitive genus and reason is in the intellective. Consequently reason and the will cannot have a single act; and so, if intention is in any sense an act of reason, it will not be an act of the will. Praeterea, voluntas, secundum philosophum in III Ethic., cap. XXI, est finis tantum. Sed finis est unus tantum in uno ordine. Ergo voluntas secundum suum actum comparatur tantum ad unum. Sed ubi est unum tantum, ibi non est ordo. Cum ergo intentio ordinem importet, videtur quod nullo modo sit voluntatis. 9. According to the Philosopher “willing has as its object only the end.” But in a single order there is only a single end. The will in its act, then, is referred to only one thing. But where there is only one thing, there is no order. Since intention implies order, it therefore seems that it in no sense belongs to the will. Praeterea, intentio nihil aliud esse videtur quam directio voluntatis in ultimum finem. Sed dirigere voluntatem est rationis. Ergo intentio ad rationem pertinet. 10. Intention seems to be nothing but the direction of the will to the last end. But it belongs to reason to direct the will. Intention therefore belongs to reason. Praeterea, sicut in perversitate peccati error est rationis, contemptus irascibilis, inordinatio voluntatis concupiscibilis; ita e contrario in reformatione animae fides est rationis, spes irascibilis, caritas concupiscibilis. Sed fides, secundum Augustinum, est quae intentionem dirigit. Ergo intentio est rationis. 11. In the perversity of sin error belongs to reason, contempt to the irascible power, and the inordinacy of will to the concupiscible. In the reformation of the soul, on the other hand, faith belongs to reason, hope to the irascible power, and charity to the concupiscible. But according to Augustine, it is faith which “directs the intention.” Intention therefore belongs to reason. Praeterea, secundum philosophum in III Ethic., voluntas est possibilium, et impossibilium, intentio vero est solum possibilium. Ergo intentio non est voluntatis. 12. According to the Philosopher, the will is referred to both possibles and impossibles, but intention only to possibles. Intention does not, then, belong to the will. Praeterea, quod non est in anima, non est in voluntate. Sed intentio non est in anima: quia nec est potentia, sic enim esset naturalis, et in ea meritum non consisteret; nec est habitus, sic enim esset in dormiente; nec est passio, sic enim esset partis sensitivae, ut patet per philosophum in VII Ethic. Haec autem tria sunt solummodo in anima, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo intentio non est in voluntate. 13 What is not in the soul is not in the will. Now intention is not in the soul, because it is not a power (for then it would be natural, and there would be no merit in it), nor is it a habit (for then it would be in one asleep), nor is it a passion (for then it would pertain to the sensitive part, as is apparent from what the Philosopher says). Since there are in the soul only these three, as is said in the Ethics, intention is not in the will. Praeterea, ordinare rationis est, cum ad sapientem pertineat, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Sed intentio ordinatio quaedam est in finem. Ergo est rationis. 14. To order is the function of reason, since this belongs to the wise man, as is said in the Metaphysics. But intention is an ordination to an end. It therefore is the function of reason. Praeterea, intentio est distantis a fine: haec enim praepositio in distantiam importat. Sed magis distat a fine ratio quam voluntas; quia ratio solum demonstrat finem, voluntas vero inhaeret fini sicut proprio obiecto. Ergo intendere est magis rationis quam voluntatis. 15. Intention is referred to what is distant from an end, since distance is implied in the [Latin] preposition in [here used as a prefix]. But reason is more distant from the end than is the will, because reason merely points out the end, whereas the will clings to the end as its proper object. Intending, then, belongs to reason rather than to the will. Praeterea, omnis actus voluntatis aut est eius absolute, aut per comparationem ad superiores vires, aut in comparatione ad inferiores. Sed intendere non est actus voluntatis absolute, quia sic idem esset quod velle vel amare; nec est actus eius in ordine ad superiorem, id est rationem, sic enim actus eius est eligere; nec in ordine ad inferiores, cum sic sit eius actus imperare. Ergo intendere nullo modo est actus voluntatis. 16. Every act of the will belongs to it either absolutely, or by a reference to higher powers, or by a reference to lower powers. Now intending is not an act of the will absolutely, because in that case it would be the same as willing or loving. Nor is intending its act by a reference to a higher power, reason, for in that reference its act is to choose. Nor is it so by a reference to lower powers, since its act in that reference is to command. Intending is therefore in no wise an act of the will. Sed contra. To the Contrary Intentio est solum de fine. Sed finis et bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo intentio ad voluntatem pertinet. 1. Intention is referred only to the end. But the end and good arc the object of the will. Intention therefore pertains to the will. Praeterea, intendere est quoddam prosequi. Sed prosecutio vel fuga ad voluntatem pertinet, non ad rationem; sed solum dicere aliquid esse prosequendum vel fugiendum. Ergo intentio est voluntatis. 2. Intending is a sort of pursuing. But pursuit and flight pertain to the will, not to reason. To reason it belongs only to say that something should be pursued or fled. Intention accordingly belongs to the will. Praeterea, omne meritum in voluntate consistit. Sed intentio est meritoria, et penes eam praecipue attenditur meritum vel demeritum. Ergo intentio est voluntatis. 3. All merit is situated in the will. But intention is meritorious, and chiefly on the basis of it merit and demerit are reckoned. Hence intention is a function of the will. Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit: affectus operi tuo nomen imponit. Sed actus iudicatur bonus vel malus ex intentione. Ergo intentio in affectu videtur contineri; et sic videtur esse voluntatis, et non rationis. 4. Ambrose says: “Affection gives the name to your work.” But an act is judged to be good or bad from the intention. The intention is therefore contained in affection, and so it seems to belong to the will and not to reason. Respondeo. REPLY Dicendum, quod intentio est actus voluntatis: quod quidem manifeste apparet ex eius obiecto. Oportet enim potentiam et actum in obiecto convenire, cum potentia non ordinetur in obiectum nisi per actum; oportet enim potentiae visivae et visionis esse idem obiectum, scilicet colorem. Cum ergo obiectum huius actus qui est intentio, sit bonum, quod est finis, quod etiam est obiectum voluntatis, oportet intentionem actum voluntatis esse. Non tamen est actus voluntatis absolute, sed in ordine ad rationem. Intention is an act of the will. This shows up very clearly from its object. A power and its act must agree in their object, since a power is referred to the object only through the act. Thus for the power of sight and for vision there must be the same object, color. Now since the object of the act of intention is the good which is an end, and this is also the object of the will, intention must be an act of the will. It is, however, an act of the will, not absolutely, but in subordination to reason. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod quandocumque sunt duo agentia ordinata, secundum agens dupliciter potest movere vel agere: uno modo secundum quod competit naturae suae; alio modo secundum quod competit naturae superioris agentis; impressio enim superioris agentis manet in inferiori; et ex hoc inferius agens non solum agit actione propria, sed actione superioris agentis; sicut sphaera solis movetur proprio motu, qui spatio unius anni expletur, et motu primi mobilis, qui est motus diurnus, similiter aqua movetur motu proprio tendendo in centrum, et habet quemdam motum ex impressione lunae, quae movet ipsam, ut patet in fluxu et refluxu maris. Corpora etiam mixta habent quasdam operationes sibi proprias, quae consequuntur naturam quatuor elementorum, ut tendere deorsum, calefacere, infrigidare; et habent alias operationes ex impressione caelestium corporum, ut magnes attrahit ferrum. That this may be seen clearly it should be noted that, whenever there are two agents standing in an order, the second agent can move or act in two ways: (1) according to what belongs to its own nature, and (2) according to what belongs to the nature of the higher agent. The influence of the higher agent remains in the lower, and for this reason the lower acts not only by its own action but also by the action of the higher. The sphere of the sun, for example, moves by its own motion, which is completed in the course of a year, and by the motion of the first mobile, which is the motion of one day. In like fashion water moves by its own motion, tending to the center, and it has a motion from the influence of the moon moving it, as is revealed in the tides. Compounds also have certain reactions proper to themselves which are based upon the natures of the four elements, such as to tend downward, to heat, and to cool; and they have other operations from the influence of the heavenly bodies, as a magnet attracts iron. Et quamvis nulla actio inferioris agentis fiat nisi praesupposita actione superioris, tamen illa actio quae competit ei secundum suam naturam, attribuitur ei absolute, sicut aquae moveri deorsum; illa vero quae ei competit ex impressione superioris agentis, non attribuitur ei absolute, sed in ordine ad aliud: sicut fluere et refluere dicitur esse proprius motus maris, non in quantum est aqua, sed in quantum movetur a luna. Though no action of the lower agent takes place unless that of the higher agent is presupposed, nevertheless the action which belongs to it in accordance with its own nature is attributed to it absolutely, as it is attributed to water to move downward; but that which belongs to it from the influence of the higher agent is not attributed to it absolutely but only with reference to something else. Thus the ebb and flow of the tides are said to be the proper motion of the sea, not in so far as it is water, but in so far as it is moved by the moon. Ratio autem et voluntas sunt quaedam potentiae operativae ad invicem ordinatae; et absolute considerando, ratio prior est, quamvis per reflexionem efficiatur voluntas prior et superior, in quantum movet rationem. Now reason and the will are operative powers related to each other. Viewed absolutely, reason is prior, although by reflection the will is made prior and superior inasmuch as it moves reason. Unde voluntas potest habere duplicem actum. Unum, qui competit ei secundum suam naturam, in quantum tendit in proprium obiectum absolute; et hic actus attribuitur voluntati simpliciter, ut velle et amare, quamvis ad hunc actum praesupponatur actus rationis. Alium vero actum habet, qui competit ei secundum id quod ex impressione rationis relinquitur in voluntate. Cum enim proprium rationis sit ordinare et conferre, quandocumque in actu voluntatis apparet aliqua collatio vel ordinatio, talis actus erit voluntatis non absolute, sed in ordine ad rationem: et hoc modo intendere est actus voluntatis; cum intendere nihil aliud esse videatur quam ex eo quod quis vult, in aliud tendere sicut in finem. Et ita intendere in hoc differt a velle, quod velle tendit in finem absolute; sed intendere dicit ordinem in finem, secundum quod finis est in quem ordinantur ea quae sunt ad finem. Cum enim voluntas moveatur in suum obiectum sibi propositum a ratione, diversimode movetur, secundum quod diversimode sibi proponitur. Unde, cum ratio proponit sibi aliquid ut absolute bonum, voluntas movetur in illud absolute; et hoc est velle. Cum autem proponit sibi aliquid sub ratione boni, ad quod alia ordinentur ut ad finem, tunc tendit in illud cum quodam ordine, qui invenitur in actu voluntatis, non secundum propriam naturam, sed secundum exigentiam rationis. Et ita intendere est actus voluntatis in ordine ad rationem. The will can accordingly have two types of acts. (1) It has one which belongs to it according to its own nature inasmuch as it tends to its own object absolutely. This act is attributed to the will without qualification, e.g., to will and to love, although even for this act the action of reason is presupposed. (2) It has another type of act which belongs to it inasmuch as the influence of reason is left in the will. Since the proper function of reason is to order and compare, whenever there appears in the act of the will any comparison or ordering, such an act does not belong to the will absolutely but in subordination to reason. It is in this way that intending is an act of the will, since to intend seems to be nothing but to tend from what one wills to something else as to an end. Thus intending differs from willing in this, that willing tends to an end absolutely whereas intending expresses a reference to an end inasmuch as the end is that to which the means are referred. Since the will is moved to its object as proposed to it by reason, it is moved in various ways according as the object is variously proposed. When reason proposes something to it as a good absolutely, the will is moved to it absolutely. This is willing. When reason proposes something to it under the aspect of a good to which other things are referred as to an end, then the will tends to it with a certain order, which is found in the act of the will, not in accordance with its own nature, but in accordance with the demands of reason. In this way intending is an act of the will in subordination to reason. Answers to Difficulties Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod intentio assimilatur oculo quantum ad id quod de proprietate rationis in intentione invenitur. 1. Intention is likened to an eye as regards the characteristic of reason which is found in it. Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio movet quodammodo voluntatem, et voluntas quodammodo rationem, ut ex dictis patet; et sic utraque diversis respectibus est altera prior, et utrique potest attribui actus in ordine ad alteram. 2. Reason moves the will in a certain sense, and the will in a certain sense moves reason, as is evident from what has been said. Thus each one is higher than the other in a different respect, and to each can be attributed an act in subordination to the other. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis quilibet actus voluntatis praesupponat cognitionem rationis, non tamen semper in actu voluntatis apparet id quod est proprium rationis, ut ex dictis, in corp. art., patet; unde ratio non sequitur. 3. Although any act of the will presupposes knowledge on the part of reason, nevertheless there does not always appear in the act of the will what is proper to reason, as is clear from what has been said. Hence the argument proves nothing. Ad quartum dicendum, quod relatio in finem activa est rationis: eius enim est referre in finem; sed relatio passiva potest esse cuiuscumque directi vel relati in finem per rationem: et sic potest esse voluntatis. Et hoc modo relatio in finem pertinet ad intentionem. 4. An active relation to the end belongs to reason, for it is its function to refer or relate to an end. But a passive relation can belong to whatever is directed or referred to an end by reason, and so it can also belong to the will. It is in this sense that the relation to an end pertains to intention. Et per hoc patet solutio ad quintum. 5. From what has just been said the answer is clear. Ad sextum dicendum, quod in primo motore non solum invenitur cognitio, sed voluntas; et ideo proprie potest ei intentio attribui. Sed ad rationem non pertinet nisi cognitio; unde non est simile. 6. In the prime mover there is found not only knowledge but also will, and so intention can properly be attributed to it. But only knowledge belongs to reason. The case is accordingly not the same. Ad septimum dicendum, quod intendere est non cognoscentis, cum res naturales intendant finem, quamvis intentio praesupponat aliquam cognitionem. Si autem loquamur de intentione animali, sic non est nisi cognoscentis, sicut nec velle. Non tamen oportet quod intendere et velle sint actus eiusdem potentiae, cuius est cognoscere, sed eiusdem suppositi: non enim proprie dicitur cognoscere vel intendere potentia aliqua, sed suppositum per potentiam. 7. Intending also has to do with non-cognitive beings, since even the things of nature intend an end, even though intention supposes some knowledge. But if we speak of an intention of the soul, this has to do only with cognitive beings, as does willing. Yet it is not necessary that intending and willing be acts of the same power as knowing, but merely of the same supposit. Properly speaking, it is not a power which knows or intends, but the supposit through a power. Ad octavum dicendum, quod ratio et voluntas sunt unum ordine, sicut universum dicitur esse unum; et sic nihil prohibet unum actum esse utriusque: unius quidem immediate, sed alterius mediate. 8. Reason and the will are one by order, just as the universe is said to be one. In this case nothing prevents a single act from belonging to both, to one immediately, to the other mediately. Ad nonum dicendum, quod quamvis voluntas sit principaliter de fine, ex eo quod ea quae sunt ad finem non desiderantur nisi propter finem, nihilominus tamen voluntas est eorum quae sunt ad finem. Quod enim philosophus dicit in III Ethicorum, quod voluntas est finis, electio eorum quae sunt ad finem; non ob hoc dicitur quod voluntas semper sit finis, sed aliquando, et principalius; et ex hoc quod electio nunquam est finis, ostenditur quod non sit idem eligere et velle. 9. Although the will is chiefly concerned with the end in view of the fact that the means are desired only for the sake of the end, nevertheless the will is also concerned with the means to the end. The statement of the Philosopher that “the will is concerned with the end; choice, with the means,”“ does not mean that the will is always directed to the end, but merely sometimes and chiefly. From the fact that choice is never directed to the end it is shown that choosing and willing are not the same thing. Ad decimum dicendum, quod directio in finem activa pertinet ad rationem, sed passiva potest ad voluntatem pertinere: et sic pertinet ad intentionem. 10. Active direction to an end belongs to reason, but passive direction to an end can belong to will. In the latter way it belongs to intention. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod fides dirigit intentionem, sicut ratio voluntatem; unde, sicut fides est rationis, ita intentio voluntatis. 11. Faith directs our intention as reason directs our will. Intention accordingly is a function of the will as faith is of reason. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod voluntas non semper est impossibilium, sed aliquando; et hoc sufficit, secundum intentionem philosophi, ad ostendendum differentiam inter voluntatem et electionem, quae semper est possibilium, ut scilicet eligere non sit omnino idem quod velle; et similiter nec intendere est omnino idem quod velle; sed ex hoc non excluditur quin sit actus voluntatis. 12. The will is not always concerned with impossibles but merely sometimes. In conformity with the Philosopher’s meaning this suffices to show the difference between willing and choice, which is always concerned with possibles; that is, it shows that to choose is not altogether the same as to will. Similarly, neither is to intend altogether the same as to will. But this does not keep it from being an act of the will. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod intentio est quidam actus animae. In illa autem trimembri divisione philosophi actiones animae non continentur: quia actiones non sunt animae ut in anima, sed magis ut ab anima. Vel potest dici quod actiones comprehenduntur sub habitibus, sicut principiatum continetur in suo principio. 13. Intention is an act of the soul. But in that threefold division proposed by the Philosopher the actions of the soul are not included, because actions do not belong to the soul as being in the soul but rather as being from the soul.—Or it may be said that actions are included under habits as that which proceeds from a principle is contained within its principle. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod ordinare est rationis, sed ordinari potest esse voluntatis; et sic intentio ordinationem importat. 14. To order is the function of reason, but to be ordered can be the function of the will. In this way intention implies ordering. Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet si nihil aliud requireretur ad intentionem nisi sola distantia; requiritur autem inclinatio, quae voluntati competit, et non rationi; unde ratio non sequitur. 15. That argument would prove something if nothing else were required for intention besides mere distance. But along with distance there is required an inclination; and that inclination is in the province of the will, not of reason. Hence the conclusion does not follow. Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod intentio est actus voluntatis in ordine ad rationem ordinantem ea quae sunt ad finem, in finem ipsum; sed electio est actus voluntatis in ordine ad rationem comparantem ea quae sunt in finem ad invicem: et propter hoc intentio et electio differunt. 16. Intention is an act of the will in subordination to reason as it directs to an end the means to it. Choice is an act of the will in subordination to reason as it compares among themselves the means to an end. On this account intention and choice also differ.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
In the fourteenth article we ask:
Does the will in the same motion will the end and intend the means?
[ARTICLE II Sent., 38, 1, 4; S.T., I-II, 8, 3; 12, 4.]
Quartodecimo quaeritur utrum voluntas eodem motu velit finem et intendat ea quae sunt ad finem Difficulties Et videtur quod non. It seems that it does not, for Impossibile enim est eumdem actum esse simul bonum et malum. Sed contingit esse voluntatem malam cum intentione bona; sicut cum quis vult furari ut det eleemosynam. Ergo non est idem actus intentio et voluntas. 1. It is impossible for the same act to be at the same time good and bad. But it sometimes happens that there is a bad act of will with a good intention, as when someone wishes to steal in order to give an alms. Intending and willing are therefore not the same act. Praeterea, secundum philosophum in X Eth., motus qui terminatur ad medium et ad extremum differunt specie. Sed id quod est ad finem, et finis, se habent quodammodo ut medium et extrema. Ergo intentio finis et voluntas eius quod est ad finem, differunt specie; et ita non sunt unus actus. 2. According to the Philosopher, a motion which terminates in the mean and one which terminates in the extreme are specifically different. But the means to an end and the end are related about as the mean and the extreme. The intention of the end and the willing of the means are therefore specifically different, and so they are not a single act. Praeterea, secundum philosophum in VII Ethic., fines in practicis sunt sicut principia in demonstrativis scientiis. Sed non est idem actus intellectus speculativi quo intelliguntur principia, et quo considerantur conclusiones. Quod patet ex hoc quod ex diversis habitibus eliciuntur: est enim intellectus habitus principiorum, sed scientia conclusionum. Ergo in operativis non est idem actus voluntatis quo intendimus finem et volumus ea quae sunt ad finem. 3. According to the Philosopher, in practical matters ends are comparable to principles in demonstrative sciences. But the act of the speculative intellect by which it understands principles is not the same as that by which it sees conclusions. This is shown by the fact that they are elicited from different habits; for understanding is the habit of principles, and science, that of conclusions. Then in matters of operation it is not the same act of the will by which we intend the end and will the means. Praeterea, actus distinguuntur per obiecta. Sed finis et id quod est ad finem, sunt diversa obiecta. Ergo non idem actus est intentio finis et voluntas eius quod est ad finem. 4. Acts are distinguished by their objects. But the end and the means are distinct. The intention of the end and the willing of the means are therefore not the same act. Sed contra. To the Contrary Duo actus non possunt esse simul unius potentiae. Sed voluntas simul dum vult id quod est ad finem, intendit finem. Ergo intentio finis et voluntas eius quod est ad finem, non sunt diversi actus. 1. There cannot be two acts of the same power at the same time. But while the will is willing the means, it is at the same time intending the end. The intention of the end and the willing of the means are therefore not distinct acts. Praeterea, sicut lux est ratio visibilitatis colori, ita finis est ratio appetibilitatis his quae sunt ad finem. Sed eodem actu visus videt colorem et lucem. Ergo eodem actu voluntas vult id quod est ad finem, et intendit finem; ergo intentio finis et voluntas non sunt diversi actus. 2. The end is the reason for the appetibility of the means just as light is the reason for the visibility of color. But in the same act sight sees color and light. In the same act, therefore, the will wills the means and intends the end. Respondeo. REPLY Dicendum, quod circa hanc quaestionem duplex est opinio, ut Magister dicit in II Sent., dist. 28. Quidam enim dixerunt quod alius actus sit voluntas eius quod est ad finem, et intentio finis. Quidam vero dixerunt e contrario, quod sit unus actus, sed quod eorum distinctio sit tantummodo propter rerum varietatem. Utraque autem opinio secundum aliquid vera est. Concerning this question there are two opinions, as the Master of the Sentences says. Some have said that the willing of the means to an end and the intention of the end are distinct acts. Others, on the contrary, have said that they are one and the same act but that their distinction comes merely from the difference in things. Each of these opinions is in some respect true. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod cum unitas actus ex unitate obiecti pensanda sit; si sint aliqua duo quae per aliquem modum sint unum, actus qui fertur in ea secundum quod sunt unum, erit unus; actus vero qui fertur in ea secundum quod sunt duo, erunt duo, sicut partes lineae sunt quodammodo duo, et quodammodo unum, prout scilicet uniuntur in toto: et ideo actus visionis, si feratur in duas partes lineae secundum quod sunt duae, id est in utramque per se secundum id quod est proprium sibi, erunt duae visiones, nec poterunt simul videri; si autem feratur in totam lineam comprehendentem utramque partium, erit una visio, et simul tota linea videbitur. In clarification of this it should be noted that, since the unity of an act is to be judged from the unity of its object, if there are any two things which are one in any sense, an act which is directed to them under the aspect of their unity will be one. But an act which is directed to them under the aspect of their duality will be two different acts. Take for example the parts of a line, which are in some sense two and in some sense one—as they are united in the whole. If an act of vision is directed to the two parts of the line as two, that is, to each one under the aspect of what is proper to it, there will be two acts Of seeing, and the two parts will not be able to be seen at the same time. But if our vision is directed to the whole line embracing both parts, it will be a single act of seeing, and the whole line will be seen at once. Omnia autem quae sunt ad invicem ordinata, sunt quidem plura in quantum sunt res quaedam per se consideratae; sunt vero unum in ordine quo ad invicem ordinantur: et ideo actus animae qui fertur in ea secundum quod sunt ad invicem ordinata est unus; actus vero animae qui fertur in ea secundum quod sunt in se considerata, est multiplex. Sicut patet in consideratione statuae Mercurii: quam si aliquis consideret ut est quaedam res, erit alia consideratio eius, et consideratio Mercurii, cuius statua est imago; si autem consideretur statua ut imago Mercurii, erit idem modus considerationis in statuam et in Mercurium. Now all things that are arranged in an order are, indeed, many in so far as they are things viewed in themselves, but they are one in regard to the order in which they are arranged. An act of the soul which is directed to them from the point of view of their order is accordingly one. But an act which is directed to them as considered in themselves is manifold. This distinction shows up in a viewing of the statue of Mercury. If one looks upon it as a thing in itself, one’s attention will in one act be directed to it, and in another to Mercury, whose image the statue is. But if one looks upon the statue as the image of Mercury, in the same act one’s attention will be directed to the statue and to Mercury. Similiter quando motus voluntatis fertur in finem et in id quod est ad finem, si feratur in ea secundum quod utrumque est quaedam res per se existens, erit diversus motus voluntatis: et sic est vera opinio quae dicit, quod intentio finis et voluntas eius quod est ad finem, sunt diversi actus. Si autem voluntas feratur in unum eorum secundum quod habet ordinem ad aliud, sic est unus actus voluntatis in utrumque: et sic est vera opinio quae ponit, unum actum esse intentionem finis et voluntatem eius quod est ad finem. Similarly when the motion of the will is directed to the end and to the means, if it is directed to them inasmuch as each is a certain thing existing by itself, there will be a distinct motion of the will for each. In this way the opinion which says that the intention of the end and the willing of the means are distinct acts is true. But if the will is directed to one as having an ordination to the other, there is a single act of the will in regard to both. In this way the other opinion’ which holds that the intention of the end and the willing of the means are one and the same act, is true. Sed si recte inspiciatur ratio intentionis, invenitur haec opinio esse verior quam alia. Motus enim voluntatis in finem non dicitur absolute intentio, sed simpliciter velle; sed intentio dicitur inclinatio voluntatis in finem, secundum quod ad finem terminantur ea quae sunt in finem. Qui enim vult sanitatem, dicitur eam simpliciter velle; sed solum eam intendere dicitur, quando aliquid propter sanitatem vult. Et ideo concedendum est, quod intentio non sit alius actus numero quam voluntas. Now if the essential character of intention is rightly examined, the latter opinion is found to be truer than the former. For the motion of the will toward an end taken absolutely is not called an intention, but it is called willing without further qualification. But an inclination of the will to an end as being that in which the means terminate is called an intention. A person who wants health is said simply to will it. He is said to intend it only when he wills something else on account of health. And so it must be granted that intention is not an act numerically distinct from willing. Answers to Difficulties Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis unus actus non possit esse bonus et malus, tamen alicuius actus mali potest esse aliqua circumstantia bona; sicut actus vitiosus est, si quis comedat plus quam debet, licet comedat quando debet. Et ita voluntas qua quis vult furari ut pascat pauperes, est actus malus simpliciter, habens tamen aliquam circumstantiam bonam: propter quid enim ponitur una de circumstantiis. 1. A single act cannot be both good and bad; yet there can be a good circumstance of a bad act. The act is vicious if a person eats more than he should, though he may eat when he should. Thus the act of will by which someone wishes to steal in order to give food to a poor man is an act simply evil, yet having a good circumstance; for the reason for which something is done is listed as one of the circumstances. Ad secundum dicendum, quod verbum philosophi est intelligendum, quando sistitur in medio; quando enim per medium transitur ad terminum, tunc est unus numero motus. Et ita quando voluntas movetur in id quod est ad finem, cum ordine ad finem, est unus motus. 2. The Philosopher’s statement is to be understood as meaning: when the motion stops in the mean. When it passes through the mean to the term, then the motion is numerically one. And so when the will is moved to a means subordinated to the end, there is a single motion. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quando conclusio et principium considerantur utrumque per se, sunt diversae considerationes; sed quando consideratur principium in ordine ad conclusionem, est eadem consideratio utriusque, sicut fit in syllogismo. 3 When the conclusion and the principle are considered each by itself, there are distinct considerations; but when the principle is considered in its relation to the conclusion, as happens in syllogizing, there is one and the same consideration of both. Ad quartum dicendum, quod finis et id quod est ad finem, sunt unum obiectum, in quantum consideratur unum in ordine ad aliud. 4. The end and the means are one object in so far as one is considered in relation to the other.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
In the fifteenth article we ask:
Is choice an act of the will?
[ARTICLE II Sent., 24, 1, 2; S.T., I, 83,3; In III Eth., 6, nn. 452,456; 9, nn. 484,486; In VI Eth., 2, nn. 1129,1133-41; S.T., I-II, 13, 1.]
Quintodecimo quaeritur utrum electio sit actus voluntatis Difficulties Et videtur quod non, sed rationis. It seems that it is not, but rather of reason, for Ignorantia enim non est voluntatis, sed rationis. Sed perversitas electionis, ignorantia quaedam est; unde omnis malus, dicitur esse ignorans ignorantia electionis, ut patet in III Ethicorum. Ergo et electio rationis est. 1. Ignorance is not found in the will but in reason. But the perversity of a choice is a sort of ignorance. Hence also “every evil person is said to be ignorant” with the ignorance of choice, as is explained in the Ethics. Choice, then, pertains to reason. Praeterea, sicut ad rationem pertinet inquisitio et argumentatio, ita conclusio. Sed electio est quasi quaedam conclusio consilii, ut patet in III et VII Ethic. Cum ergo consilium sit rationis, et electio similiter rationis erit. 2. Not only do inquiry and argumentation belong to reason but also conclusion. But a choice is, as it were, the conclusion of a deliberation, as is made clear in the Ethics. Since deliberation belongs to reason, choice will therefore also belong to reason. Praeterea, secundum philosophum in VIII Ethicorum, principalitas virtutis moralis in electione consistit. Sed, sicut ipse dicit in VI Ethic., id quod est prudentiae in virtutibus moralibus, est principale, quod formaliter complet rationem virtutis. Ergo electio pertinet ad prudentiam. Sed prudentia est in ratione. Ergo et electio. 3. According to the Philosopher, the chief characteristic of moral virtue consists in choice. But, as he himself says, in the moral virtues the part of prudence is the most important factor, adding the last formal determinant to the essential nature of virtue. Choice therefore pertains to prudence. But prudence is in reason, and so choice also is. Praeterea, electio discretionem quamdam importat. Sed discernere rationis est. Ergo et eligere. 4. Choice implies a certain discrimination. But to discriminate is a function of reason. Therefore to choose also is. Sed contra. To the Contrary Est, quod eligere est duobus propositis unum alteri praeoptare, ut patet per Damascenum. Sed optare est actus voluntatis, et non rationis. Ergo et eligere. 1. To choose is, when two things are proposed, to want one in preference to the other, as Damascene explains. But to want is an act of the will, not of reason. Then so is to choose. Praeterea, philosophus dicit in III Ethicorum, quod electio est desiderium praeconsiliati. Sed desiderium est voluntatis, et non rationis. Ergo et electio. 2. The Philosopher says that choice is the desire of what has been previously deliberated. But desire is a function of the will, not of reason. Then so is choice. Respondeo. REPLY Dicendum, quod electio habet in se aliquid voluntatis, et aliquid rationis. Utrum autem sit actus proprie voluntatis, vel rationis, philosophus videtur relinquere sub dubio in VI Ethicorum, ubi dicit, quod electio vel est appetitus intellectivi, idest appetitus in ordine ad intellectum, vel intellectus appetitivi, idest intellectus in ordine ad appetitum. Primum autem verius est, scilicet quod sit actus voluntatis in ordine ad rationem. Choice contains something of the will and something of reason. But the Philosopher seems to leave in doubt whether it is properly an act of the will or of reason, when he says that choice is an act either of the intellective appetite (that is, of appetite as subordinated to the intellect) or of the appetitive intellect (that is, of the intellect in subordination to appetite). The first, that it is an act of the will in subordination to reason, is the truer. Quod enim sit directe actus voluntatis, patet ex duobus. Primo ex ratione obiecti: quia proprium obiectum electionis est id quod est ad finem, quod pertinet ad rationem boni, quod est obiectum voluntatis; nam bonum dicitur et finis, ut honestum vel delectabile, et quod est ad finem, ut utile. Secundo ex ratione ipsius actus. Electio enim est ultima acceptio qua aliquid accipitur ad prosequendum; quod quidem non est rationis, sed voluntatis. Nam quantumcumque ratio unum alteri praefert, nondum est unum alteri praeacceptatum ad operandum, quousque voluntas inclinetur in unum magis quam in aliud: non enim voluntas de necessitate sequitur rationem. Est tamen electio actus voluntatis non absolute, sed in ordine ad rationem, eo quod in electione apparet id quod est proprium rationis, scilicet conferre unum alteri, vel praeferre: quod quidem in actu voluntatis invenitur ex impressione rationis, in quantum scilicet ipsa ratio proponit voluntati aliquid non ut utile simpliciter, sed ut utilius ad finem. That it is directly an act of the will is clear from two considerations: (1) From the formality of its object. The proper object of choice is the means to an end, and this belongs to the formality of good, which is the object of the will. For both the end, such as the honorable or the pleasurable, and the means, namely, the useful, are called good. (2) From the formality of the act itself. Choice is the final acceptance of something to be carried out. This is not the business of reason but of will; for, however much reason puts one ahead of the other, there is not yet the acceptance of one in preference to the other as something to be done until the will inclines to the one rather than to the other. The will does not of necessity follow reason. Choice is nevertheless not an act of the will taken absolutely but in its relation to reason, because there appears in choice what is proper to reason: the comparing of one with the other or the putting of one before the other. This is, of course, found in the act of the will from the influence of reason: reason proposes something to the will, not as useful simply, but as the more useful to an end. Sic ergo patet quod voluntatis actus est velle et intendere. Sed velle prout ratio proponit voluntati aliquid bonum absolute, sive sit propter se eligendum, ut finis, sive propter aliud, ut quod est ad finem: utrumque enim velle dicimur. Sed eligere est actus voluntatis, secundum quod ratio proponit ei bonum ut utilius ad finem. Intendere vero, secundum quod ratio proponit ei bonum ut finem consequendum ex eo quod est ad finem. It is accordingly clear that the act of the will is to will, to choose, and to intend. It is to will in so far as reason proposes to the will something good absolutely, whether it is something to be chosen for itself, as an end, or because of something else, as a means. In either case we are said to will it. In so far as reason proposes to the will a good as the more useful to an end, the act is to choose. It is to intend in so far as reason proposes to the will a good as an end to be attained through a means. Answers to Difficulties Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ignorantia electioni attribuitur quantum ad id quod habet de ratione. 1. Ignorance is attributed to choice on the basis of the part played in it by reason. Ad secundum dicendum, quod practicae inquisitionis est duplex conclusio: una quae est in ratione, scilicet sententia, quae est iudicium de consiliatis; alia vero quae est in voluntate, et huiusmodi est electio: et dicitur conclusio per quamdam similitudinem, quia sicut in speculativis ultimo statur in conclusione, ita in operativis ultimo statur in operatione. 2. The conclusion of a practical inquiry is of two kinds. One is in reason, and this is decision, the judgment about what has been deliberated upon. The other is in the will, and this is choice. It is called a conclusion by a sort of simile, because in speculative matters the discourse finally comes to rest in the conclusion, and in matters of operation it comes to rest in the doing. Ad tertium dicendum, quod electio dicitur esse principale in virtute morali et ex parte eius quod habet de ratione, et ex parte eius quod habet de voluntate: utrumque enim requiritur ad rationem virtutis moralis; et dicitur electio principale respectu exteriorum actuum. Unde non oportet quod electio sit actus prudentiae totaliter; sed participat aliquid prudentiae, sicut et rationis. 3. Choice is said to be the principal element in moral virtue both from the point of view of the role of reason in it, and from that of the role of the will. Both are necessary for the essential character of moral virtue. Choice is called the principal element with reference to external acts. It is accordingly not necessary that choice be entirely an act of prudence, but it shares in the characteristics of prudence as it does in those of reason. Ad quartum dicendum, quod discretio invenitur in electione, secundum quod pertinet ad rationem, cuius proprietatem sequitur voluntas in eligendo. 4. Discrimination is found in choice in accordance with what belongs to reason, whose distinctive characteristic the will follows in choosing, as has been said.