Question Twenty-Five: Sensuality

Et primo quaeritur utrum sensualitas sit vis cognitiva, vel appetitiva tantum. Secundo utrum sensualitas sit simplex potentia, vel dividatur in plures potentias, scilicet irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Tertio utrum irascibilis et concupiscibilis sit tantum in appetitu superiori vel inferiori. Quarto utrum sensualitas obediat rationi. Quinto utrum in sensualitate possit esse peccatum. Sexto utrum concupiscibilis sit magis corrupta et infecta quam irascibilis. Septimo utrum sensualitas in vita ista curari possit a corruptione praedicta.

Is sensuality a cognitive or only an appetitive power? Is sensuality one simple power or is it divided into several: the irascible and the concupiscible powers? Are the irascible and the concupiscible powers only in the lower appetite or also in the higher? Does sensuality obey reason? Can there be sin in sensuality? Is the concupiscible power more corrupt and infected than the irascible? Can sensuality be cured in this life of the aforesaid corruption?

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ARTICLE I The question is about sensuality, and in the first article we ask: Is sensuality a cognitive or only an appetitive power? [ARTICLE II Sent., 24, 2, 1; S.T., I, 81, 1.]
Et primo quaeritur utrum sensualitas sit vis cognitiva vel appetitiva tantum	Difficulties
Et videtur quod sit vis cognitiva.	It seems that it is a cognitive power, for
Quia, ut dicit Magister in libro II Sent., 24, quod in anima nostra reperies aliquid commune cum bestiis, quod ad sensualitatem pertinet. Sed vires sensitivae cognitivae sunt nobis et bestiis communes. Ergo ad sensualitatem pertinent.	1. As the Master says, anything in our soul that is found to be had in common with beasts belongs to sensuality.” But the sense cognitive powers are common to us and the beasts. They therefore belong to sensuality.
Praeterea, Augustinus, XII de Trinitate, dicit quod sensualis animae motus, qui in corporis sensus intenditur, nobis et pecoribus communis est, et seclusus a ratione sapientiae; et hoc exponens, subiungit: sensu quippe corporis corporalia sentiuntur; aeterna vero et immutabilia spirituali ratione sapientiae intelliguntur. Sed sentire corporalia est cognitivae. Ergo sensualitas, cuius est actus sensualis motus, est vis cognitiva.	2. Augustine says: “The movement of the sensual soul, which is directed to the senses of the body, is common to us and beasts and quite outside reason as the principle of wisdom.” In expatiating upon this he adds: “Corporeal things are sensed by a sense of the body, whereas eternal and unchangeable things are understood by spiritual reason, the principle of wisdom.” But to sense corporeal things is the function of a cognitive power. Consequently sensuality, to which the act of sensual movement belongs, is a cognitive power.
Sed dicendum, quod Augustinus hoc subiungit ut manifestet obiecta sensuum: sic enim motus sensualitatis intenditur in corporis sensus, in quantum versatur circa sensibilia.- Sed contra: Augustinus hoc subiungit ad ostendendum quomodo sensualitas a ratione secludatur. Sed circa corpora, quae Augustinus dicit esse obiecta sensuum, ratio vertitur; et inferior disponendo, et superior iudicando; et sic per hoc non secluditur sensualitas a ratione. Ergo Augustinus non intendit hoc quod dicitur.	3. The answer was given that Augustine adds this in order to point out the objects of the senses, for the movement of sensuality is attributed to the senses of the body inasmuch as it is concerned with the objects of sense.—On the contrary, Augustine adds this to show in what respect sensuality is discriminated from reason. But reason too is concerned with corporeal things, which Augustine says are the objects of the senses—lower reason by disposing them, and higher reason by judging them. And so sensuality is not by this fact discriminated from reason. Augustine therefore did not have the meaning alleged in the answer.
Praeterea, in progressu peccati, quod in nobis agitur, ut Augustinus, ibidem, dicit, sensualitas tenet locum serpentis. Serpens autem in tentatione primorum parentum se habuit ut nuntians et proponens peccatum; quod est cognitivae, non autem appetitivae, quia eius est ferri in peccatum. Ergo sensualitas est vis cognitiva.	4. In the commission of a sin in progress within us sensuality has the role of the serpent, as Augustine says. Now in the temptation of our first parents the serpent’s role was that of suggesting and proposing the sin. But that is the function of the cognitive, not the appetitive power, because the business of the latter is to be drawn to the sin. Sensuality is therefore a cognitive power.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in eodem libro, quod sensualitas vicina est rationi scientiae. Non autem ei vicina esset, si esset solum appetitiva; cum ratio scientiae sit cognitiva; sic enim ad aliud genus potentiarum animae pertineret. Ergo sensualitas est cognitiva, et non tantum appetitiva.	5. Augustine says again: “Sensuality is very close to reason as the principle of science.” It would not be very close to it, however, if it were only an appetitive power, since reason as the principle of science is cognitive; for in that case it would belong to a different genus of the powers of the soul. Consequently sensuality is cognitive, and not only appetitive.
Praeterea, sensualitas, secundum Augustinum, XII de Civit. Dei, distinguitur et a ratione superiori, et ab inferiori, in quibus appetitus superior, qui est voluntas, continetur; alias in eis peccatum mortale esse non posset. Sed appetitus inferior non distinguitur ut alia potentia ab appetitu superiori, ut probabitur, in corp. art. Ergo sensualitas non est appetitus inferior. Est autem aliqua vis animae inferior, ut ex eius definitione apparet. Ergo est vis cognitiva inferior. Probatio mediae. Differentia per accidens obiectorum non indicat differentiam potentiarum secundum speciem: non enim visus dividitur per hoc quod est videre hominem et videre asinum: homo enim et asinus accidunt visibili, in quantum est visibile. Sed appetibile apprehensum a sensu et apprehensum ab intellectu, per quae videntur superior et inferior appetitus distingui, accidunt appetibili, in quantum est, appetibile; cum appetibile, in quantum appetibile, sit bonum, cui accidit apprehendi sensu vel intellectu. Ergo appetitus inferior non est alia potentia a superiori.	6. According to Augustine sensuality is distinguished from both higher reason and lower, in both of which is contained the higher appetite, the will. Otherwise there could not be any mortal sin in them. But the lower appetite is not distinguished from the higher appetite as a different power, as will be proved directly. Therefore sensuality is not the lower appetite. It is, however, some sort of lower power of the soul, as appears from its definition. It is therefore the lower cognitive power.—Proof of the minor: An accidental difference in objects does not indicate a specific difference in powers. Sight, for example, is not divided into different species by the difference between seeing a man and seeing an ass; for man and ass are accidental differences in the object of sight as such. But the object of appetite apprehended by sense and that apprehended by intellect the difference on which the distinction of higher and lower appetite seems to be based are accidental to the object of appetite as such, since the appetible as appetible is good, and it is accidental to good to be apprehended by sense or by intellect. The lower appetite is therefore not a power distinct from the higher.
Sed dicendum, quod duo appetitus praedicti distinguuntur per bonum simpliciter, et bonum ut nunc.- Sed contra: sicut se habet intellectus ad verum, ita se habet appetitus ad bonum. Sed verum simpliciter, quod est necessarium, et verum ut nunc, quod est contingens, non distinguunt intellectum in duas potentias. Ergo nec penes bonum simpliciter et bonum ut nunc, potest distingui appetitus in duas potentias.	7. The answer was given that the two appetites mentioned are distinguished on the basis of good in an unqualified sense and something good here and now.—On the contrary, appetite is related to good as the intellect to truth. But truth in an unqualified sense and something true here and now, which is contingent, do not distinguish the intellect into two powers. Then neither can the appetite be distinguished into two powers on the basis of good in an unqualified sense and something good here and now.
Praeterea, bonum ut nunc, est bonum apparens, ut videtur; bonum autem simpliciter est verum bonum. Sed appetitus superior quandoque in bonum apparens consentit, et appetitus inferior aliquod verum bonum interdum appetit, sicut ea quae sunt corpori necessaria. Ergo bonum ut nunc et bonum simpliciter, non distinguunt superiorem et inferiorem appetitum; et sic idem quod prius.	8. Something good here and now is an apparent good, it seems, whereas good in an unqualified sense is the true good. But the higher appetite sometimes consents to an apparent good, and the lower appetite sometimes tends to a true good, such as the necessities of the body. Consequently good here and now and good in an unqualified sense do not distinguish a higher and a lower appetite. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.
Praeterea, vis sensitiva contra appetitivam dividitur, ut patet per philosophum in I de anima, ubi quinque genera actionum animae distinguit: scilicet nutrire, sentire, appetere, moveri secundum locum, et intelligere. Sensualitas autem sub sensitiva continetur, ut ipsum nomen demonstrat. Ergo sensualitas non est vis appetitiva, sed cognitiva.	9. The sensitive power is set over against the appetitive, as is clear from the Philosopher’s distinction of five genera of activities in the soul: to nourish, to sense, to tend appetitively, to be moved locally, and to understand. But sensuality is included in the sensitive power, as even the name shows. Sensuality is therefore not an appetitive but a cognitive power.
Praeterea, cuicumque convenit definitio, et definitum. Sed definitio sensualitatis quam Magister ponit 24 dist. II libri sententiarum, convenit rationi inferiori, quae interdum intendit circa corporis sensus et circa ea quae ad corpus pertinent. Ergo ratio inferior, et sensualitas sunt idem. Sed ratio est vis cognitiva; ergo et sensualitas.	10. What is defined corresponds to the same thing as the definition. But the definition of sensuality which the Master gives corresponds to lower reason, which also is sometimes directed to the senses of the body and the body’s concerns. Lower reason and sensuality are there fore the same thing. But reason is a cognitive power; then so too is sensuality.
	To the Contrary
Sed contra. Est quod in definitione sensualitatis dicitur, quod est appetitus rerum ad corpus pertinentium.	l. In its definition sensuality is said to be an appetite for things which pertain to the body.
Praeterea, peccatum in appetendo est, non solum in cognoscendo. Sed in sensualitate aliquod peccatum est levissimum, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trinitate. Ergo sensualitas est vis appetitiva.	2. Sin consists in tending by appetite, not in knowing. But in sensuality there is some very slight sin, as Augustine says. Therefore sensuality is an appetitive power.
Respondeo.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod sensualitas nihil aliud esse videtur quam vis appetitiva sensitivae partis: et dicitur sensualitas quasi aliquid a sensu derivatum. Motus enim appetitivae partis ex apprehensione quodammodo oritur, quia omnis operatio passivi ab activo originem sumit. Appetitus autem potentia passiva est, quia movetur ab appetibili, quod est movens non motum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Appetibile vero non movet appetitum nisi apprehensum. In quantum ergo ex appetibili apprehenso per sensum movetur vis appetitiva inferior, eius motus sensualis dicitur, et ipsa potentia sensualitas nominatur.	Sensuality seems to be nothing but the appetitive power of the sensitive part of the soul, and it is called sensuality as being something derived from sense. The movement of the appetitive part arises somehow from apprehension, because every operation of a passive principle takes its origin from an active principle. Now appetite is a passive power, because it is moved by the object of appetite, which is an “unmoved mover,” as is said in The Soul. But the object of appetite does not move the appetite unless it is apprehended. Inasmuch as the lower appetitive power is moved by the appetible object apprehended by sense, its movement is called sensual, and the power itself is called sensuality.
Hic autem appetitus sensibilis medius est inter appetitum naturalem, et appetitum superiorem rationalem, qui voluntas nominatur. Quod quidem ex hoc inspici potest, quod in quolibet appetibili duo possunt considerari: scilicet ipsa res quae appetitur, et ratio appetibilitatis, ut delectatio vel utilitas, vel aliquid huiusmodi.	Now this sense appetite stands midway between natural appetite and the higher, rational appetite, which is called the will. This can be seen from the fact that in any object of appetite there are two aspects which can be considered: the thing itself which is desired, and the reason for its desirability, such as pleasure, utility, or something of the sort.
Appetitus ergo naturalis tendit in ipsam rem appetibilem sine aliqua apprehensione rationis appetibilitatis: nihil enim est aliud appetitus naturalis quam quaedam inclinatio rei, et ordo ad aliquam rem sibi convenientem, sicut lapidem ferri ad locum deorsum. Quia vero res naturalis in suo esse naturali determinata est; et una est eius inclinatio ad aliquam rem determinatam: unde non exigitur aliqua apprehensio, per quam secundum rationem appetibilitatis distinguatur res appetibilis a non appetibili. Sed haec apprehensio praeexigitur in instituente naturam, qui unicuique naturae dedit inclinationem propriam sibi convenientem.	Natural appetite tends to the appetible thing itself without any apprehension of the reason for its appetibility; for natural appetite is nothing but an inclination and ordination of the thing to something else which is in keeping with it, like the ordination of a stone to a place below. But because a natural thing is determined in its natural existence, its inclination to some determined thing is a single one. Hence there is not required any apprehension by which an appetible thing is distinguished from one that is not appetible on the basis of the reason for its appetibility. But this apprehension is a prerequisite in the one who established the nature, who gave to each nature its own inclination to a thing in keeping with itself.
Appetitus autem superior, qui est voluntas, tendit directe in rationem appetibilitatis absolute; sicut voluntas ipsam bonitatem appetit primo et principaliter, vel utilitatem, aut aliquid huiusmodi; hanc vero rem vel illam appetit secundario, in quantum est praedictae rationis particeps; et hoc ideo quia natura rationalis est tantae capacitatis quod non sufficeret ei inclinatio ad unam rem determinatam, sed indiget rebus pluribus et diversis: et ideo inclinatio eius est in aliquid commune, quod in pluribus invenitur, et sic per apprehensionem illius communis tendit in rem appetibilem, in qua huiusmodi rationem appetendam esse cognoscit.	The higher appetite, the will, however, tends directly to the very reason for appetibility itself in an absolute way. Thus the will tends primarily and principally to goodness itself, or utility, or something like that. It tends to this or that appetible thing, however, secondarily, inasmuch as it shares in the above-mentioned reason. This is because a rational nature has a capacity so great that an inclination to one determinate thing would not be sufficient for it, but it has need of a number of different things. For that reason its inclination is to something common found in many things; and so by the apprehension of that common aspect it tends to the appetible thing in which it knows that this aspect is to be sought.
Appetitus vero inferior sensitivae partis, qui sensualitas dicitur, tendit in ipsam rem appetibilem prout invenitur in ea id quod est ratio appetibilitatis: non enim tendit in ipsam rationem appetibilitatis, quia appetitus inferior non appetit ipsam bonitatem vel utilitatem aut delectationem, sed hoc utile vel hoc delectabile: et in hoc appetitus sensibilis est infra appetitum rationalem; sed quia non tendit tantum in hanc rem aut tantum in illam, sed in omne id quod est sibi utile vel delectabile, ideo est supra appetitum naturalem; et propter hoc apprehensione indiget, per quam delectabile a non delectabili distinguat.	The lower appetite of the sensitive part, called sensuality, tends to the appetible thing itself as containing that which constitutes the reason for its appetibility. It does not tend to the reason for the appetibility in itself because the lower appetite does not tend to goodness or utility or pleasure itself, but to this particular useful or pleasurable thing. In this respect the sense appetite is lower than the rational appetite. But because it does not tend only to this or only to that thing, but to every being which is useful or pleasurable to it, it is higher than natural appetite. For this reason it too has need of an apprehension by which to distinguish the pleasurable from what is not pleasurable.
Et huius distinctionis signum evidens est, quod appetitus naturalis habet necessitatem respectu ipsius rei in quam tendit, sicut grave necessario appetit locum deorsum. Appetitus autem sensitivus non habet necessitatem in rem aliquam, antequam apprehendatur sub ratione delectabilis vel utilis; sed apprehenso quod est delectabile, de necessitate fertur in illud: non enim potest brutum animal inspiciens delectabile, non appetere illud. Sed voluntas habet necessitatem respectu ipsius bonitatis et utilitatis: de necessitate enim vult homo bonum, sed non habet necessitatem respectu huius vel illius rei quantumcumque apprehendatur ut bona vel utilis quod ideo est, quia unaquaeque potentia habet quamdam necessariam habitudinem ad suum proprium obiectum.	It is a manifest sign of this distinction that natural appetite is under necessity in regard to the thing to which it tends, as a heavy body necessarily tends to a place downward; whereas sense appetite does not lie under any necessity in regard to any particular thing before it is apprehended under the aspect of the pleasurable or the useful, but of necessity goes out to it once it is apprehended as pleasurable (for a brute animal is unable, while looking at something pleasurable, not to desire it); but the will is under necessity in regard to goodness and utility itself (for man of necessity wills good), but is not under any necessity in regard to this or that particular thing, however much it may be apprehended as good or useful. This is so because each power has some kind of necessary relationship to its proper object.
Unde datur intelligi quod obiectum appetitus naturalis est haec res in quantum talis res; appetitus vero sensibilis haec res in quantum est conveniens vel delectabilis: sicut aqua, in quantum est conveniens gustui, et non in quantum est aqua; obiectum vero proprium voluntatis est ipsum bonum absolute. Et sic differt apprehensio sensus et intellectus: nam sensus est apprehendere hoc coloratum, intellectus autem ipsam naturam coloris.	From this it can be understood that the object of natural appetite is this thing inasmuch as it is of this particular kind; that of sense appetite is this thing inasmuch as it is agreeable or pleasurable (as water inasmuch as it is agreeable to taste, and not inasmuch as it is water); and the proper object of the will is good itself taken absolutely. And the apprehension of sense and that of intellect differ in the same way; for it is the function of sense to apprehend this colored thing, but of intellect to apprehend the very nature of color.
Sic ergo patet quod appetitus alius est secundum speciem voluntas et sensualitas, sicut et alia ratione appetitur ipsa bonitas et haec res bona: nam bonitas appetitur per seipsam, sed haec res bona, in quantum participat aliquid. Et ideo, sicut participantia dicuntur per participationem, ut haec res bona per bonitatem, ita appetitus superior regit appetitum inferiorem, et intellectus eodem modo iudicat de his quae sensus apprehendit. Sic ergo sensualitatis proprium obiectum est res bona vel conveniens sentienti: quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quia est conveniens ad ipsum esse sentientis, sicut cibus et potus, et alia huiusmodi; alio modo quia est conveniens sensui ad sentiendum, sicut color pulcher est conveniens visui ad videndum, et sonus moderatus auditui ad audiendum, et sic de aliis.	It is accordingly clear that the will and sensuality are specifically different appetites, just as goodness itself and a particular good thing are tended to in different ways; for goodness is tended to for its own sake, but a particular good thing is tended to as sharing in something. And so, just as things which share are perfected by what they share, as a particular good thing. by goodness, in the same way the higher appetite rules the lower, and the intellect likewise judges about the things which sense apprehends. The proper object of sensuality is accordingly a thing which is good or suitable for the one sensing. This comes about in two ways: (1) because it is suitable for the very existence of the one sensing, as food and drink and the like; and (7,) because it is suitable to our senses for sensing, as a beautiful color is suitable for sight to see and a modulated sound suitable for hearing to hear, and so on.
Et sic Magister complete sensualitatem notificat: per hoc enim quod dicit, quod est quaedam vis animae inferior, designatur eius distinctio ab appetitu superiori; per hoc autem quod dicit, ex qua motus, qui intenditur in corporis sensus, ostenditur eius habitudo ad ea quae sunt convenientia sensui ad sentiendum; per hoc autem quod dicit, atque appetitus rerum ad corpus pertinentium, ostenditur eius habitudo ad ea quae sunt convenientia ad conservandum esse sentientis.	The Master thus explains” sensuality completely. For in saying that it is “a lower power of the soul,” he points out its distinction from the higher appetite; in saying “from which there is a movement which is directed to the senses of the body,” he shows its relation to the things which are suitable to our senses for sensing; and in saying “and an appetite for the concerns of the body,” he shows its relation to the things which are suitable for preserving the existence of the one sensing.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliquid pertinet ad sensualitatem tripliciter. Uno modo sicut quod est de essentia sensualitatis; et sic ad sensualitatem pertinent solae appetitivae vires. Alio modo sicut id quod praeexigitur ad sensualitatem; et sic vires sensitivae apprehensivae ad sensualitatem pertinent. Alio modo sicut id quod sensualitati obsequitur; et sic motivae exequentes ad sensualitatem pertinent. Et sic verum est quod omnia quae sunt nobis communia et bestiis, ad sensualitatem pertinent aliqualiter, quamvis non omnia sint de essentia sensualitatis.	1. Something belongs to sensuality in three ways: (1) As of the essence of sensuality. In this way only the appetitive powers belong to sensuality. (2) As a prerequisite for sensuality. In this way the sense apprehensive powers belong to sensuality. (3) As pursuant to sensuality. In this way the motive and executive powers belong to sensuality. It is accordingly true that everything which is common to us and the beasts belongs in some way to sensuality, though not everything is of the essence of sensuality.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod Augustinus hoc quod dictum est, subiungit ad explicandum quales sunt actus sensuum exteriorum, in quos motus sensualitatis intenditur; non quod ipsum sentire corporalia sit sensualitatis motus.	2. Augustine adds the passage quoted in order to exemplify to what sort of acts the movement of sensuality is directed. He does not mean that sensing corporeal things is itself the movement of sensuality.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio inferior habet motum circa corporis sensus, sed non eodem modo sicut sensus sua obiecta percipiunt. Nam sensus percipiunt sua obiecta particulariter, ratio vero inferior habet actum circa sensibilia secundum aliquam intentionem universalem. Sensualitas vero hoc modo tendit in obiecta sensuum sicut et ipsi sensus, scilicet particulariter.	3. Lower reason has a motion in regard to the senses of the body, but not of the same kind as that by which the senses perceive their objects. For the senses perceive their objects in particular, whereas lower reason has an act concerning sensible things according to a universal intention. But sensuality tends to the object of the senses in the same way as the senses themselves, that is, in particular, as has been said. The conclusion accordingly does not follow.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod in tentatione primorum parentum serpens non solum proposuit aliquid ut appetendum, sed suggerendo decepit. Non autem deciperetur homo proposito sensibili delectabili, nisi iudicium rationis per passionem appetitivae partis ligaretur; et ideo sensualitas vis appetitiva est.	4. In the temptation of our first parents the serpent not only proposed something to be sought, but by his suggestions he deceived them. Now a man would not be deceived when a pleasurable object of sense is proposed if the judgment of reason were not inhibited by a passion of the appetitive faculty. Sensuality is accordingly an appetitive power.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod sensualitas dicitur esse vicina rationi scientiae, non quantum ad genus potentiae, sed quantum ad obiecta: quia utraque circa temporalia versatur, licet alio et alio modo, ut dictum est.	5. Sensuality is said to be very near reason as the principle of science, not as regards the genus of the power, but as regards its objects, because both deal with temporal matters, though in different ways, as has been said.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod diversitas apprehensionum per accidens se haberet ad appetitivas vires, nisi diversitati apprehensionum diversitas apprehensorum coniungeretur. Nam sensus, qui non est nisi particularium, non apprehendit bonitatem absolutam, sed hoc bonum; intellectus vero, quia est universalium, apprehendit bonitatem absolutam, ex quo diversificatur appetitus inferior a superiori, ut dictum est, in corp. art., et ad 3 argum.	6. The difference in the apprehensions would be accidental to the appetitive powers if there were not joined to it a difference of things apprehended. For sense, which attains only particulars, does not apprehend goodness taken absolutely, but a particular good; whereas the intellect, which attains universals, apprehends goodness itself taken absolutely. But from this difference the difference of lower and higher appetite is taken, as has been said.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod bonum in quod fertur appetitus sensibilis, est bonum particulare, quod consideratur ut hic et nunc, sive sit necessarium, sive contingens; quia etiam videre solem est oculis delectabile, ut habetur Eccle. XI, sive sit verum bonum, sive apparens.	7. The good here and now to which sense appetite is directed is a particular good considered as it is here and now, whether it be necessary or contingent, for “it is delightful for the eyes to see the sun,” as is had in Ecclesiastes [11:7]) and also whether it be a true or an apparent good.
Unde patet responsio ad octavum.	8. From the previous answer the answer to this difficulty is clear.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod sensitiva pars dupliciter accipitur. Quandoque secundum quod dividitur contra appetitivam; et sic continet vires apprehensivas tantum. Et hoc modo sensualitas non pertinet ad sensitivam partem nisi sicut ad id quod est quasi eius origo; unde et ab ea potest denominari. Quandoque vero accipitur secundum quod comprehendit in se et appetitivam et motivam, prout anima sensibilis dividitur contra rationalem et vegetabilem: et sic in sensitiva parte animae sensualitas includitur.	9. The sensitive part is taken in two ways: (1) Sometimes it is taken as opposed to the appetitive power, and then it includes only the apprehensive powers. Thus taken sensuality does not belong to the sensitive part except as to that which is, so to speak, its source. This is enough to justify the name derived from it. (2) It is sometimes taken as including both the appetitive and the motive powers, as is the case when the sensitive soul is opposed to the rational and the vegetative. In this usage sensuality is included in the sensitive part of the soul.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod ratio inferior alio modo intendit in corporis sensus et in res ad corpus pertinentes, quam sensualitas, ut prius dictum est; et propter hoc ratio non sequitur.	10. Lower reason is directed to the senses of the body and the body’s concerns in a different way from sensuality, as was said above. For this reason the argument is not consequent.

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Q. 25: Sensuality ARTICLE II In the second article we ask: Is sensuality one simple power or is it divided into several: the irascible and the concupiscible powers? [ARTICLE III Sent., 26,1, 2; S.T., I, 81, 2; 82, 5; In III de an., 14; De malo, 8, 3.]
Secundo quaeritur utrum sensualitas sit una simplex potentia, vel dividatur in plures potentias, scilicet irascibilem et concupiscibilem	Difficulties
Et videtur quod sit una simplex potentia, non divisa in plures potentias.	It seems that it is one simple power not divided into several, for
Quia in definitione sensualitatis dicitur, art. praeced., quod est quaedam vis animae inferior; quod non diceretur, si in se plures vires contineret. Ergo videtur quod non dividatur in plures potentias.	1. In its definition sensuality is said to be a lower power of the soul. This would not be said if it contained several powers. It therefore does not seem to be divided into several powers.
Praeterea, eadem potentia animae est unius contrarietatis, ut visus albi et nigri, sicut dicitur in II de anima. Sed conveniens et nocivum sunt contraria. Ergo eadem vis animae se habet ad utrumque. Sed concupiscibilis se habet ad conveniens, irascibilis vero ad nocivum. Ergo eadem vis est irascibilis et concupiscibilis; et sic sensualitas non dividitur in plures vires.	2. One and the same power of the soul “is concerned with one contrariety, as sight is concerned with white and black,” as is said in The Soul. But agreeable and harmful are contraries. One and the same power of the soul is therefore referred to both. But the concupiscible power is referred to the agreeable, and the irascible to the harmful. The irascible and the concupiscible are therefore one and the same power, and sensuality is accordingly not divided into several powers.
Praeterea, per eamdem virtutem aliquis recedit ab uno extremo et accedit ad alterum; sicut ratione gravitatis lapis recedit a loco supremo, et accedit ad locum infimum. Sed per vim irascibilem anima recedit a nocivo, fugiendo ipsum; per vim autem concupiscibilem accedit ad conveniens, concupiscendo ipsum. Ergo eadem vis animae est irascibilis et concupiscibilis; et sic idem quod prius.	3. It is by the same force that a person withdraws from one extreme and approaches the other, as by reason of gravity a stone leaves the top and goes to the bottom. But by the irascible power the soul withdraws from the harmful by shunning it; and by the concupiscible power it approaches the agreeable by craving it. The irascible and the concupiscible are therefore the same power of the soul. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.
Praeterea, proprium obiectum gaudii est conveniens. Gaudium autem non est nisi in concupiscibili. Ergo proprium obiectum concupiscibilis est conveniens. Sed conveniens est obiectum totius sensualitatis, ut patet ex definitione sensualitatis praeexposita: nam res ad corpus pertinentes sunt res corpori convenientes. Ergo tota sensualitas nihil aliud est quam concupiscibilis. Aut ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt idem, aut irascibilis ad sensualitatem non pertinet: et quodcumque horum detur, habetur propositum; scilicet quod sensualitas est una simplex vis.	4. The proper object of joy is the agreeable. Now joy is found only in the concupiscible power. The proper object of the concupiscible power is therefore the agreeable. But the agreeable is the object of the whole of sensuality, as is evident from the definition of sensuality explained above; for the body’s concerns are things agreeing with the body. Consequently the whole of sensuality is nothing but the concupiscible power. Then either the irascible and the concupiscible powers are the same, or the irascible does not belong to sensuality. Whichever of these two is granted, the thesis (that sensuality is one simple power) stands.
Sed dicendum, quod sensualitatis obiectum est etiam nocivum, sive disconveniens, ad quod irascibilis se extendit.- Sed contra: sicut conveniens est obiectum gaudii, ita nocivum vel disconveniens est obiectum tristitiae. Sed tam gaudium quam tristitia sunt in concupiscibili. Ergo tam conveniens quam nocivum sunt obiectum concupiscibilis; et sic quidquid est obiectum sensualitatis, est obiectum concupiscibilis; et ita idem quod prius.	5. The answer was given that the object of sensuality is also the harmful or disagreeable, which the irascible power attains.—On the contrary, the harmful or disagreeable is the object of sadness, just as the agreeable is the object of joy. But both joy and sadness are found in the concupiscible power. Consequently both the agreeable and the harmful are the object of the concupiscible. Thus, whatever is the object of sensuality is the object of the concupiscible. And so the same must be concluded as above.
Praeterea, appetitus sensibilis praesupponit apprehensionem. Sed eadem vi apprehensiva apprehenditur conveniens et nocivum. Ergo et eadem vis appetitiva se habet ad utrumque; et sic idem quod prius.	6. Sense appetite presupposes apprehension. But the agreeable and the harmful are apprehended by the same apprehensive power. Then the same appetitive power is concerned with both. Thus the conclusion is the same as above.
Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, odium est ira inveterata. Sed odium est in concupiscibili, ut probatur in II topicorum, quod amor est in eadem; ira autem in irascibili. Ergo eadem vis et irascibilis et concupiscibilis: aliter enim non posset esse in utraque.	7. According to Augustine “hatred is inveterate anger.” But hatred is in the concupiscible power, as is proved in the Topics, because love is in the same power. But anger is in the irascible. Therefore the irascible and the concupiscible are one and the same power, for otherwise anger could not be in both.
Praeterea, illud animae quod cuilibet potentiae competit, non requirit potentiam determinatam ab aliis distinctam. Sed concupiscere, ad quamlibet potentiam animae pertinet: quod patet ex hoc quod quaelibet potentia animae in suo obiecto delectatur, et illud concupiscit. Ergo ad concupiscendum non debet aliqua potentia ordinari ab aliis distincta; et sic concupiscibilis non est alia potentia ab irascibili.	8. That function of the soul which belongs to every power does not require a definite power distinct from the rest. But to crave (concupiscere) belongs to every power of the soul, as is evident from the fact that every power of the soul delights in its object and craves it. Consequently a power distinct from the rest need not be referred to craving. Thus the concupiscible power is not distinct from the irascible.
Praeterea, potentiae secundum actus distinguuntur. Sed in quolibet actu irascibilis includitur actus concupiscibilis; nam ira habet concupiscentiam vindictae, et sic de aliis. Ergo concupiscibilis non est alia potentia ab irascibili.	9. Powers are distinguished according to their acts. But in any act of the irascible power the act of the concupiscible is included, for anger has a craving for revenge, and so of the others. The concupiscible is therefore not a power distinct from the irascible.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Est quod Damascenus distinguit appetitum sensitivum in irascibilem et concupiscibilem, et similiter Gregorius Nyssenus in Lib. quem de anima et eius viribus scribit. Appetitus autem inferior est sensualitas. Ergo sensualitas in se plures vires continet.	1. Damascene distinguishes the sensitive appetite into the irascible and the concupiscible powers, and so does Gregory of Nyssa..But the lower appetite is sensuality. Sensuality therefore includes several powers.
Praeterea, in libro de spiritu et anima, distinguuntur hae tres vires motivae, rationalis, concupiscibilis et irascibilis. Sed rationalis est alia vis ab irascibili. Ergo et irascibilis a concupiscibili.	2. In Spirit and Soul these three motive powers are distinguished: “the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible.” But the rational power is distinct from the irascible. Then so also is the irascible from the concupiscible.
Praeterea, philosophus in III de anima ponit in appetitu sensitivo desiderium et animum, id est irascibilem et concupiscibilem, quae sunt ad invicem diversae.	3. The Philosopher places in the sensitive appetite “desire and high spirit,” that is, the concupiscible and the irascible.
Respondeo.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod appetitus sensualitatis has duas vires continet, scilicet irascibilem et concupiscibilem quae sunt ad invicem diversae potentiae; quod quidem hoc modo videri potest.	The appetite of sensuality contains these two powers: the irascible and the concupiscible, which are faculties distinct from one another. This can be seen from the following consideration.
Appetitus enim sensitivus quamdam convenientiam habet cum appetitu naturali, in quantum uterque tendit in rem convenientem appetenti. Invenitur autem appetitus naturalis ad duo tendere, secundum duplicem operationem rei naturalis. Una quarum est per quam res naturalis nititur acquirere id quod est conservativum suae naturae; sicut grave movetur deorsum, ut ibi conservetur. Alia est per quam res naturalis sua contraria destruit per qualitatem activam: et hoc quidem necessarium est corruptibili; quia, nisi haberet virtutem, qua suum contrarium vinceret, ab eo corrumperetur.	Sense appetite has something in common with natural appetite inasmuch as both tend to a thing agreeing with the subject of the tendency. Natural appetite is found to tend to two things in accordance with the two types of operation of a natural being. One of these is that by which the natural being strives to acquire what is capable of preserving its nature, as a heavy body moves downward in order to be preserved there” The other type is that by which the natural being destroys its contraries by an active quality. This is necessary for a corruptible being because, if it did not have the strength to conquer its contrary, it would be destroyed by it.
Sic ergo appetitus naturalis ad duo tendit: scilicet ad consequendum id quod est congruum et amicum naturae, et ad habendum quamdam victoriam super illud quod est ei adversum; et primum est quasi per modum receptionis, secundum vero est per modum actionis; unde ad diversa principia reducuntur. Recipere enim et agere non sunt ab eodem principio; ut ignis, qui per levitatem fertur sursum, per calorem contraria corrumpit.	Natural appetite accordingly has a twofold tendency: to obtain what is suited and favorable to this nature, and to gain, as it were, a victory over whatever is opposed to it. The first is done by way of reception, the second by ‘way of action. They are consequently reduced to different principles, for receiving and acting are not from the same principle, as fire is borne upward by its lightness and by heat destroys things contrary to it.
Ita in appetitu sensibili ista duo inveniuntur: nam animal per appetitivam potentiam appetit id quod est congruum et amicum sibi, et hoc per vim concupiscibilem, cuius proprium obiectum est delectabile secundum sensum; appetit etiam habere dominium et victoriam super ea quae sunt sibi contraria, et hoc per vim irascibilem; unde dicitur quod eius obiectum est aliquid arduum.	In sense appetite those same two tendencies are likewise found. For by its appetitive faculty an animal desires what is suited and favorable to it. This is done by the concupiscible power, whose proper object is what is delightful to sense. It also seeks to gain the mastery and victory over things that are contrary to it. This it does by the irascible power. Its object is accordingly said to be something arduous.
Et sic patet quod irascibilis est alia potentia a concupiscibili. Nam aliam rationem appetibilitatis habet aliquid ex hoc quod est arduum, cum quandoque illud quod est arduum, a delectatione separet, et rebus circumstantibus immisceat; sicut cum animal relicta voluptate cui vacabat, aggreditur pugnam, nec retrahitur propter dolores quos sustinet. Et iterum una earum, scilicet concupiscibilis, videtur ordinata ad recipiendum: haec enim appetit ut ei suum delectabile coniungatur; altera vero, scilicet irascibilis, est ordinata ad agendum, quia per actionem aliquam superat id quod est contrarium vel nocivum, ponens se in quadam altitudine victoriae super ipsum. Hoc autem communiter in potentiis animae invenitur quod recipere et agere ad diversas potentias pertinent, sicut patet de intellectu agente et possibili. Et inde est quod secundum Avicennam, ad irascibilem pertinet fortitudo et debilitas cordis, quasi virtuti ordinatae ad agendum; ad concupiscibilem autem dilatatio et constrictio ipsius, quasi virtuti ordinatae ad recipiendum.	From this it is clear that the irascible is a different power from the concupiscible. If something is pleasurable it has a different reason for its appetibility than if it is arduous, since the arduous sometimes keeps us away from pleasure and involves us in affairs that bring sadness, as when an animal leaves the pleasure which he was enjoying and enters a fight and is not made to withdraw from it by the pains which he incurs. One of the two, moreover, the concupiscible power, seems to be directed to reception; for it tends in order that the object of its delight may be joined to it. The other, however, the irascible power, is directed to action, because by its action it overcomes something which is contrary or harmful to it, getting the upper hand by victory over it. It is found to be the case among the powers of the soul in general that receiving and acting belong to different powers, as is clear of the agent and possible intellect. It is for this reason too that according to Avicenna courage and faintness of heart pertain to the irascible power as the faculty directed to action, whereas the expansion and contraction of the heart pertain to the concupiscible power as the faculty directed to reception.
Patet igitur ex dictis, quod irascibilis quodammodo ad concupiscibilem ordinatur, sicut propugnatrix ipsius. Ad hoc enim necessarium fuit animali per irascibilem victoriam de contrariis consequi, ut concupiscibilis sine impedimento suo delectabili potiretur: cuius signum est quod propter delectabilia pugna est inter animalia, scilicet propter coitum et cibum, ut dicitur in VIII de animalibus. Et inde est quod omnes passiones irascibilis habent et principium et finem in concupiscibili: nam ira incipit ex aliqua tristitia illata, quae est in concupiscibili, et terminatur post vindictam adeptam ad gaudium, quod iterum est in concupiscibili; et similiter spes incipit a desiderio vel amore, et terminatur in delectatione.	It is clear, then, from what has been said that the irascible power is in some sense subordinated to the concupiscible as its defender. For it is necessary for an animal to gain victory over the things contrary to it by means of the irascible power, as has been said, in order that the concupiscible may possess the object of its delight without hindrance. An indication of this is the fact that animals fight among themselves on account of things that give them pleasure, such as copulation and food, as is said in Animals. For this reason all the passions of the irascible power have their beginning and end in the concupiscible. Anger, for instance, begins with some sadness that has been caused (in the concupiscible power) and, after revenge has been got, ends with joy (which is likewise in the concupiscible power). In the same way hope begins with desire or love and ends in enjoyment.
Sciendum est autem, quod tam ex parte apprehensivarum virium quam ex parte appetitivarum sensitivae partis, aliquid est quod competit sensibili animae secundum propriam naturam; aliquid vero, secundum quod habet aliquam participationem modicam rationis, attingens ad ultimum eius in sui supremo; sicut dicit Dionysius, in VII cap. de divinis nominibus, quod divina sapientia coniungit fines primorum principiis secundorum.	It should be noted, however, that not only in the apprehensive powers but also in the appetitive there is something which belongs to the sensitive soul in accordance with its own nature and something else according as it has some slight participation in reason, coming into contact at its highest level of activity with reason at its lowest. There is verified here the statement of Dionysius that the divine wisdom “joins the ends of the first things to the beginnings of the second.”
Sicut vis imaginativa competit animae sensibili secundum propriam rationem, quia in ea reservantur formae per sensum acceptae; sed vis aestimativa, per quam animal apprehendit intentiones non acceptas per sensum, ut amicitiam vel inimicitiam, inest animae sensitivae secundum quod participat aliquid rationis: unde ratione huius aestimationis dicuntur animalia quamdam prudentiam habere, ut patet in principio Metaphys., sicut quod ovis fugit lupum, cuius inimicitiam nunquam sensit.	Thus the imaginative power belongs to the sensitive soul in accordance with its own nature, because forms received from sense are stored up in it; but the estimative power, by which an animal apprehends intentions not received by the senses, such as friendship or hostility, is in the sensitive soul according as it shares somewhat in reason. It is accordingly in virtue of this estimative power that animals are said to have a sort of prudence, as is seen in the beginning of the Metaphysics. A sheep, for example, flees from a wolf whose hostility it has never sensed.
Et similiter ex parte sensitivae. Nam quod animal appetat id quod est delectabile secundum sensum, quod ad concupiscibilem pertinet, hoc est secundum propriam rationem sensibilis animae; sed quod relicto delectabili appetit victoriam, quam consequitur cum dolore, quod ad irascibilem pertinet, competit ei secundum quod attingit aliqualiter appetitum superiorem; unde irascibilis est propinquior rationi et voluntati quam concupiscibilis. Et propter hoc incontinens irae est minus turpis quam incontinens concupiscentiae, utpote minus privatus ratione, ut dicit philosophus in II Ethic.	The same principle is verified also in regard to the appetitive power. The fact that an animal seeks what is pleasurable to its senses (the business of the concupiscible power) is in accordance with the sensitive soul’s own nature; but that it should leave what is pleasurable and seek something for the sake of a victory which it wins with pain (the business of the irascible), this belongs to it according as it in some measure reaches up to the higher appetite. The irascible power, therefore, is closer to reason and the will than the concupiscible. On this account a man unable to control his anger is less base than one unable to control his concupiscence, being less deprived of reason, as the Philosopher says.
Patet igitur ex dictis, quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt diversae potentiae, et quid est obiectum utriusque, et quomodo irascibilis iuvat concupiscibilem, et est superior et dignior ea, sicut aestimativa inter ceteras apprehensivas virtutes sensitivae partis.	It is therefore clear from what has been said that the irascible and the concupiscible are distinct powers, and also what is the object of each and how the irascible power helps the concupiscible and is higher and nobler than it, like the estimative among the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sensualitas dicitur esse vis singulariter, quia est una in genere, quamvis per aliquas partes dividatur.	1. Sensuality is called a power in the singular because it is one in genus although it is divided into different species or parts.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod tam conveniens delectabile quam nocivum tristabile ad concupiscibilem pertinet, secundum quod unum est fugiendum et alterum consequendum; sed habere quamdam altitudinem super utrumque, ut scilicet nocivum possit superari, et delectabile cum securitate quadam possideri, ad irascibilem pertinet.	2. Both the agreeable object of delight and the harmful object of sadness belong to the concupiscible inasmuch as one is to be fled, the other to be pursued. But to get the upper hand over both of them, so as to be able to overcome the harmful and possess with some security the pleasurable, belongs to the irascible power.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod recedere a nocivo et accedere ad delectabile, utrumque concupiscibili competit; sed impugnare et superare id quod potest esse nocivum, hoc pertinet ad irascibilem.	3. To draw away from the harmful and to draw near to the pleasurable are both the business of the concupiscible power. But to fight against and overcome what can be harmful pertains to the irascible.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad quartum et quintum: quia conveniens est obiectum concupiscibilis, secundum quod est delectabile; sed totius sensualitatis, secundum quod est quomodocumque expediens animali, vel per viam ardui, vel per viam delectabilis.	4-5. From the above answer the answer to these also is clear, because the agreeable is the object of the concupiscible power inasmuch as it is pleasurable, but it is the object of the whole of sensuality inasmuch as it is in any way advantageous to the animal, either by way of the arduous or by way of the pleasurable.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod eadem appetitiva concupiscibilis est convenientis prosecutiva, et inconvenientis fugitiva; unde irascibilis et concupiscibilis non distinguuntur per conveniens et nocivum, ut ex dictis, in solutione ad 2 argumentum, patet.	6. The same concupiscible appetitive power pursues the agreeable and flees the disagreeable. Consequently the irascible and the concupiscible powers are not distinguished on the basis of the agreeable and the harmful, as appears from what has been said.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod cum dicitur: odium est ira inveterata, est praedicatio per causam, et non per essentiam: nam passiones irascibilis terminantur ad passiones concupiscibilis, ut dictum est, in corp. art.	7. The statement that “hatred is inveterate anger” is a predication by cause, not by essence; for the passions of the irascible power end in the passions of the concupiscible, as has been said.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod concupiscere appetitu animali, ad solam concupiscibilem pertinet; sed concupiscere appetitu naturali, pertinet ad quamlibet potentiam: nam quaelibet potentia animae natura quaedam est, et naturaliter in aliquid inclinatur. Et similiter est distinguendum de amore et delectatione, et aliis huiusmodi.	8. To crave (concupiscere) with an animal appetite belongs to the concupiscible power alone; but to crave with natural appetite belongs to every power, for every power of the soul is a nature and naturally inclines to something. And the same distinction is to be applied to love and pleasure and the like.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod in definitione passionum irascibilis ponitur actus appetitivae communis, ut appetere; non autem aliquid ad concupiscibilem pertinens, nisi sit principium vel terminus; ut si dicatur, quod ira est appetitus vindictae propter praecedentem contristationem.	9. In the definition of the passions of the irascible power there is placed the common act of the appetitive power, to tend, but not anything that belongs to the concupiscible except as the beginning or the end, as would be the case if one were to say that anger is the desire for revenge because of a previous saddening.

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Q. 25: Sensuality ARTICLE III In the third article we ask: Are the irascible and the concupiscible powers only in the lower appetite or also in the higher? [ARTICLE III Sent., 17, a. 1, sol. 3; S.T., I, 59, 4; 82, 5; In III de an., 14.]
Tertio quaeritur utrum irascibilis et concupiscibilis sint tantum in appetitu superiori, vel etiam in inferiori	Difficulties
Et videtur quod in superiori.	It seems that they are also in the higher, for
Nam appetitus superior ad plura se extendit quam appetitus inferior, cum sit et corporalium et spiritualium. Si ergo appetitus inferior dividitur in duas vires, scilicet irascibilem et concupiscibilem, multo fortius et superior dividi debet.	1. The higher appetite extends to more things than the lower, since it is concerned with both corporeal and spiritual things. Now if the lower appetite is divided into two powers, the irascible and the concupiscible, then all the more should the higher be so divided.
Praeterea, quaecumque vires sunt animae secundum seipsam, ad superiorem pertinent partem: nam vires inferiores sunt communes animae et corpori. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt animae secundum seipsam: unde dicitur in Lib. de spiritu et anima: has potentias habet anima antequam corpori misceatur; siquidem sunt ei naturales, nec aliud sunt quam ipsa tota: namque animae substantia in his tribus plena et perfecta consistit; id est in rationabilitate, concupiscibilitate, et irascibilitate. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis ad appetitum superiorem pertinent.	2. To the higher part of the soul pertain those powers which belong to it alone, for the lower powers are common to the soul and the body. But the irascible and the concupiscible are powers of the soul alone. Thus it is said in Spirit and Soul: “The soul has these powers before being commingled with the body, since they are natural to it and are nothing but the soul itself as a whole. For the full and complete substance of the soul consists in these three: rationality, concupiscibility, and irascibility.” Consequently the irascible and the concupiscible powers pertain to the higher appetite.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum in Lib. de anima, et XI Metaphys., sola pars animae rationalis est a corpore separabilis. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis remanent in anima a corpore separata, ut dicitur in libro de spiritu et anima. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis ad partem rationalem pertinent.	3. According to the Philosopher only the rational part of the soul is separable from the body. But the irascible and the concupiscible powers remain in the soul when it is separated from the body, as is said in Spirit and Soul. They therefore belong to the rational part.
Praeterea, imago Trinitatis quaerenda est in superiori parte animae. Sed secundum quosdam assignatur imago in rationali, irascibili et concupiscibili. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis ad superiorem partem pertinent.	4. The image of the Trinity is to be sought in the higher part of the soul. But according to some the image is ascribed to the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible powers. Hence the irascible and the concupiscible belong to the higher part of the soul.
Praeterea, caritas dicitur esse in concupiscibili, spes autem in irascibili. Sed caritas et spes non sunt in appetitu sensitivo, qui non potest extendi ad immaterialia. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis non sunt tantum in appetitu inferiori, sed in superiori.	5. Charity is said to be in the concupiscible power; hope, in the irascible. But charity and hope are not found in the sensitive appetite’ which cannot extend to immaterial things. The irascible and the concupiscible powers are therefore not only in the lower appetite but also in the higher.
Praeterea, vires humanae dicuntur illae quas homo supra cetera animalia habet, quae pertinent ad superiorem animae partem. Sed distinguitur a magistris duplex irascibilis: humana et non humana; et similiter concupiscibilis. Ergo praedictae vires non sunt tantum in appetitu inferiori, sed in superiori.	6. Those powers are called human which man has beyond the other animals and which belong to the higher part of the soul. But two kinds of irascible powers are distinguished by the masters: one human and another not human; and the same is done with the concupiscible. The powers in question are therefore not only in the lower appetite but are also in the higher.
Praeterea, operationes virium sensitivarum tam apprehensivarum quam appetitivarum non manent in anima separata, quia per corporis organa exercentur; alias anima sensibilis in brutis esset incorruptibilis, utpote potens suam operationem habere per seipsam. Sed in anima separata remanet gaudium et tristitia, amor et timor, et alia huiusmodi, quae attribuuntur irascibili et concupiscibili. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis non sunt tantum in sensitiva parte, sed etiam in intellectiva.	7. The operations of the sensitive powers, both apprehensive and appetitive, do not remain in the separated soul because they are exercised through organs of the body; otherwise the sensitive soul in brutes would be incorruptible, as being capable of having its operation by itself. But in the separated soul there remain joy and sadness, love and fear, and the like, which are attributed to the irascible and the concupiscible powers. The irascible and concupiscible powers are therefore not only in the sensitive part but also in the intellective.
Sed contra,	To the Contrary
est quod Damascenus, et Gregorius Nyssenus, et philosophus ponunt esse eas in sensibili appetitu tantum.	Damascene, Gregory of Nyssa and the Philosophers hold that they are in sense appetite only.
Respondeo.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod cum actus appetitivarum partium praesupponat actum apprehensivarum, et distinctio appetitivarum ad invicem aliqualiter similis est distinctioni apprehensivarum.	Since the acts of the appetitive parts presuppose the act of the apprehensive, the distinction of the appetitive parts from each other is also somewhat similar to the distinction of the apprehensive.
Invenimus autem hoc in apprehensivis potentiis, quod respectu illarum, apprehensiva superior manet una et indivisa, respectu quarum apprehensivae inferiores distinguuntur; una enim intellectiva potentia cognoscimus omnia sensibilia quantum ad earum naturas, respectu quarum vires sensitivae distinguuntur. Unde secundum Augustinum, exterius aliud est quod videt et quod audit; sed interius in intellectu est idem. Et similiter est de appetitivis; quod appetitiva superior est una respectu omnium appetibilium, quamvis appetitivae inferiores respectu diversorum appetibilium distinguantur.	Among the apprehensive faculties we find that the higher apprehensive remains one and undivided with reference to things regarding which the lower apprehensive faculties are distinguished. By one and the same intellective power we come to know as to their natures all sensible things with reference to which the sense powers are distinguished. According to Augustine, what a man sees and what he hears is different externally, but internally in the intellect it is the same. And the same is to be said of the appetitive powers: the higher appetitive is one and the same in regard to all the objects of appetite, though the lower appetitive powers are distinguished in regard to all the different appetible objects.
Cuius ratio ex utraque parte est: quod vis superior habet obiectum universale, sed inferiores vires habent obiecta particularia; multa autem per se conveniunt particularibus quae per accidens se habent ad universale. Et ideo, cum accidentalis differentia non diversificet speciem, sed solum illa quae est per se, potentiae inferiores inveniuntur secundum speciem distinctae; sed superior potentia remanet indivisa. Sicut patet quod obiectum intellectus est quod quid est; unde eadem potentia intellectus se extendit ad omnia quae habent quidditatem, nec diversificatur per aliquas differentias, quae rationem quidditatis non diversificant. Sed cum obiectum sensus sit corpus, quod est natum movere organum, secundum diversam rationem movendi oportet potentias diversificari; unde alia potentia est visus et auditus, quia alia ratione movet sensum color et sonus.	The reason for this is found in the nature of each. The higher power has a universal object; the lower powers have particular objects. Many things correspond essentially to particulars which have only an accidental reference to something universal. Since it is not an accidental difference but only an essential one which distinguishes a species, the lower powers are found to be specifically distinct while the higher power remains undivided. It is clear, for example, that the object of the intellect is the what, and that the same faculty of intellect extends to all things that have quiddity and is not distinguished by any differences that do not differentiate the very notion of quiddity. But since the object of sense is a body, which is capable of moving the sense organ, the sensitive powers must be differentiated according to differences in the manner of moving. Sight and hearing are accordingly distinct powers because color and sound move the sense in different ways.
Et similiter est ex parte appetitivarum: nam obiectum appetitus superioris, ut supra, art. 1 huius quaest., dictum est, est bonum absolute; sed obiectum appetitus inferioris est res aliquo modo proficua animali. Arduum autem et delectabile non secundum eamdem rationem sunt convenientia animali, ut ex praedictis, art. praeced., patet. Et ideo per hoc essentialiter diversificatur obiectum appetitus inferioris: non autem obiectum appetitus superioris, qui tendit in bonum absolute quocumque modo.	The same is true of the appetitive powers. For the object of higher appetite is good taken absolutely, as was said above, whereas the object of the lower appetite is a thing in some way advantageous to the animal. But the arduous and the pleasurable are not suited to the animal under the same aspect, as appears from what has been said. Consequently the object of lower appetite is thereby essentially diversified, but not the object of higher appetite, which tends to what is good absolutely in any way whatever.
Sciendum tamen est, quod sicut intellectus habet aliquam operationem circa eadem circa quae sensus operantur, sed altiori modo, cum cognoscat universaliter et immaterialiter quod sensus materialiter et particulariter cognoscit; ita appetitus superior circa eadem habet operationem cum appetitibus inferioribus, quamvis altiori modo. Nam inferiores appetitus tendunt in sua obiecta materialiter, et cum aliqua passione corporali, a quibus passionibus nomen irascibilis et concupiscibilis imponitur; appetitus vero superior habet aliquos actus similes inferiori appetitui, sed absque omni passione. Et sic operationes superioris appetitus sortiuntur interdum nomina passionum; sicut voluntas vindictae dicitur ira, et quietatio voluntatis super aliquo diligibili, dicitur amor. Et eadem ratione, ipsa voluntas, quae hos actus producit, dicitur interdum irascibilis et concupiscibilis, non tamen proprie, sed per quamdam similitudinem; nec tamen ita quod in voluntate sint aliquae vires diversae similes irascibili et concupiscibili.	It should, however, be borne in mind that, just as the intellect has some of its operations directed to the same things as the senses, but in a higher way, since it knows universally and immaterially what sense knows materially and in particular; in the same way higher appetite has some of its operations directed to the same things as the lower appetites, though in a higher way. For the lower appetites tend to their objects materially and accompanied by a bodily passion; and it is from these passions that the irascible and concupiscible get their names. Now higher appetite has certain acts similar to those of lower appetite, though without any passion. The operations of higher appetite are accordingly sometimes given the names of passions. Thus the will for revenge is called “anger,” and the repose of the will in some object of spiritual affection is called “love.” By the same process the will itself which produces these acts is sometimes called “irascible” or “concupiscible,” not properly but by a figure of speech; and even so there is no implication in this that there are in the will two distinct powers corresponding to the irascible and the concupiscible.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis appetitus superior in plura se extendat quam inferior, tamen quia habet universale bonum pro proprio obiecto, non dividitur in plures potentias.	1. Even though the higher appetite extends to more things than the lower, yet, because it has good in general as its proper object, it is not divided into several powers.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod liber ille non est Augustini, nec oportet eum in auctoritate accipere; tamen potest dici, quod intelligit de irascibili et concupiscibili similitudinarie dictis; vel loquitur quantum ad originem potentiarum: nam omnes potentiae sensitivae ex essentia animae fluunt.	2. That book is not Augustine’s, nor need it be accepted as an authority. We can nevertheless say that it is either speaking of the irascible and concupiscible powers. figuratively, or it is speaking of them from the point of view of their source; for all of the powers, even the sensitive, flow from the essence of the soul.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod circa sensitivas potentias animae est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt, quod manent in anima separata secundum essentiam; alii vero, quod manent in essentia animae sicut in radice. Et quocumque modo dicatur, non alio modo remanet irascibilis et concupiscibilis quam aliae sensitivae vires; unde in libro praedicto dicitur quod anima recedens a corpore trahit secum sensum et imaginationem.	3. There are two opinions on the sensitive powers of the soul. Some say that these powers remain in the separated soul essentially; others say that they remain in the essence of the soul radically. And whichever opinion is taken, the irascible and the concupiscible powers do not remain in any other way than the rest of the sensitive powers. Thus it is said in the work mentioned that when withdrawing from the body, the soul takes with it sense and imagination.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod Augustinus in Lib. de Trinit., investigat multos modos Trinitatis in anima nostra, in quibus est aliqua similitudo Trinitatis increatae, quamvis vera ratio imaginis sit solum in mente; et ratione praedictae similitudinis aliqui ponunt imaginem in rationali, irascibili et concupiscibili, quamvis non sit proprie dictum.	4. In his work The Trinity Augustine investigates many sorts of trinities in our soul in which there is some resemblance to the uncreated Trinity, though the image in the proper sense of the term exists only in the mind. By reason of the resemblance mentioned some place the image in the rational, irascible, and concupiscible powers, though this is not said in a proper sense.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod caritas et spes non sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili, proprie loquendo, cum dilectio caritatis et expectatio spei sint sine passione; sed dicitur caritas esse in concupiscibili, in quantum est in voluntate, prout habet actus similes concupiscibili; et simili ratione dicitur esse spes in irascibili.	5. Charity and hope are not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, properly speaking, since the love of charity and the expectation of hope are without any passion. But charity is said to be in the concupiscible power inasmuch as it is in the will, viewed as having acts like those of the concupiscible; and in the same way hope is said to be in the irascible.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis dicuntur esse humanae, sive rationales, non per essentiam, quasi ad partem superiorem pertineant, sed per participationem, in quantum obediunt rationi, et participant regimen eius, ut Damascenus dicit.	6. The irascible and concupiscible powers are said to be human or rational, not by their essence, as if they belonged to the higher part of the soul, but by participation, inasmuch as they obey reason and participate in its rule, as Damascene again says.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod gaudium et timor, quae sunt passiones, non remanent in anima separata, cum corporali immutatione peragantur; sed remanent actus voluntatis similes illis passionibus.	7. Joy and fear, which are passions, do not remain in the separated soul, since they take place with a bodily change. But there remain acts of the will similar to those passions.

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Q. 25: Sensuality ARTICLE IV In the fourth article we ask: Does sensuality obey reason? [ARTICLE II Sent., 24, 3, 1 ad 5; In I Eth., 20; S.T., I, 81, 3; I-II, 17, 7; Quodl. IV, (11), 21; In III de an., 16.]
Quarto quaeritur utrum sensualitas obediat rationi	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non.	It seems that it does not, for
Rom. VII, 15, dicitur: non enim quod volo, facio; sed quod odi malum, illud facio. Hoc enim dicitur, ut quaedam Glossa exponit, propter motus sensualitatis. Ergo sensualitas voluntati et rationi non obedit.	1. In the Epistle to the Romans (7:15) it is written: “For [the good] which I will, I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do.” As a comment in the Gloss’ explains, this is said because of the motions of sensuality. Sensuality therefore does not obey the will and reason.
Praeterea, ibidem 23, dicitur: video aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae. Haec autem lex est concupiscentia. Ergo repugnat legi mentis, id est rationi; et ita non obedit ei.	2. In the same Epistle (7:23) it is written: “But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind...” Now this law is concupiscence. It is therefore fighting against the law of the mind, that is, reason; and so it does not obey it.
Praeterea, sicut ordinantur apprehensivae ad invicem, ita appetitivae. Sed intellectus non habet in potestate sua actus exteriorum sensuum: non enim videmus aut audimus quidquid intellectus decernit. Ergo nec motus sensualitatis sunt in potestate rationalis appetitus.	3. The relation among the appetitive powers is the same as that among the apprehensive. But the intellect does not have control of the acts of the external senses, for we do not see or hear whatever the intellect decides. Then neither are the motions of sensuality under the control of rational appetite.
Praeterea, naturalia in nobis non subduntur rationi. Sed sensualitas naturali impetu tendit in suum appetibile. Ergo motus sensualitatis non subditur rationi.	4. Natural activities in us. are not subject to reason. But sensuality tends to the object of its desire by a natural appetite. Consequently the motions of sensuality are not subject to reason.
Praeterea, motus sensualitatis sunt animae passiones, ad quas determinatae dispositiones corporum requiruntur, ut Avicenna determinat; sicut ad iram sanguis calidus et subtilis, ad gaudium temperatus sanguis. Sed dispositio corporalis non subditur rationi. Ergo nec motus sensualitatis.	5. The motions of sensuality are passions of the soul, for which definite dispositions of the body are required, as Avicenna determines. Thus for anger, hot thin blood is needed; and for joy, temperate blood. But one’s bodily disposition is not subject to reason. Then neither are the motions of sensuality.
Sed contra,	To the Contrary
est quod Damascenus dicit, quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis participant aliqualiter rationem, quae sunt partes sensualitatis. Ergo et motus sensualitatis est in potestate rationis. Hoc idem habetur ex dictis philosophi in I Ethic., et ex Gregorio Nysseno.	Damascene says that the irascible and the concupiscible powers participate to some extent in reason. But they are the parts of sensuality. Consequently the motions of sensuality also are under the control of reason. And the same can be gathered from what is said by the Philosopher and by Gregory of Nyssa.
	REPLY
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod in ordine mobilium et motorum est devenire ad aliquod primum, quod est movens se, a quo movetur illud quod non est ex se motum; quia omne quod est per aliud, reducitur ad per se, ut habetur ex VIII Physic. Unde, cum voluntas seipsam moveat, ex hoc quod est domina sui actus, oportet quod vires aliae, quae seipsas non movent, ab aliquo moveantur. Tanto autem unaquaeque aliarum virium plus de motu eius participat, quanto fit ei propinquior. Unde ipsae appetitivae inferiores voluntati obediunt quantum ad suos principales actus, utpote ei propinquissimae; aliae vero magis remotae, ut nutritiva et generativa, moventur a voluntate quantum ad aliquos earum exteriores actus.	In a series of mobile beings and movers we must arrive at some first being which moves itself and by which is moved whatever is not moved by itself, because everything that exists through another is reduced to that which exists through itself, as is gathered from the Physics. Then, since the will moves itself by reason of its being the master of its own act, the other powers which do not move themselves must somehow be moved by the will. Now the nearer any of the other powers comes to the will, the more it participates in the will’s motion. Consequently the lower appetitive powers obey the will in their principal acts as being nearest to the will; and the other powers farther removed, as the nutritive and generative, are moved by the will in some of their external acts.
Subduntur autem appetitivae inferiores, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscibilis, rationi, tripliciter. Primo quidem ex parte ipsius rationis. Cum enim eadem res sub diversis conditionibus considerari possit, et delectabilis et horribilis reddi, ratio opponit sensualitati mediante imaginatione rem aliquam sub ratione delectabilis vel tristabilis, secundum quod ei videtur; et sic sensualitas movetur ad gaudium vel tristitiam. Et ideo dicit philosophus, in I Ethic., quod ratio semper suadet ad optima. Secundo ex parte voluntatis. In viribus enim ordinatis ad invicem et connexis ita se habet, quod motus intensus in una earum, et praecipue in superiori, redundat in aliam. Unde, cum motus voluntatis per electionem intenditur circa aliquid, irascibilis et concupiscibilis sequitur motum voluntatis. Unde dicitur in III de anima quod appetitus movet appetitum, superior scilicet inferiorem, sicut sphaera sphaeram in corporibus caelestibus.	Now the lower appetitive powers, the irascible and the concupiscible, are subject to reason in three respects: (1) On the part of reason itself. For since the same thing considered under different conditions can be made either pleasurable or repulsive, by means of the imagination; reason lays a particular thing before sensuality under the aspect of the pleasurable or the disagreeable as it appears to reason; and so sensuality is moved to joy or to sorrow. The Philosopher accordingly says that reason persuades “to the best.” (2) On the part of the will For among powers hierarchically connected the situation is such that an intense movement in one, and especially in the higher, overflows into the other. Accordingly, when by a choice the movement of the will is directed to something intensely, even the irascible and the concupiscible powers follow the movement of the will. It is accordingly said in The Soul that appetite moves appetite (that is, the higher moves the lower) as sphere moves sphere among the heavenly bodies.
Tertio ex parte motivae exequentis. Sicut enim in exercitu progressio ad bellum pendet ex imperio ducis, ita in nobis vis motiva non movet membra nisi ad imperium eius quod in nobis principatur, id est rationis, qualiscumque motus fiat in inferioribus viribus. Unde ratio irascibilem et concupiscibilem reprimit, ne in actum exteriorem procedant; propter quod dicitur Genes. IV, 7: subter te erit appetitus tuus.	(3) On the part of the motive power which carries it out. For just as in an army the advance to battle depends upon the command of the general, so in us the motive power moves the members only at the command of that which rules in us, namely reason, whatever sort of movement may occur in the lower powers. Reason therefore holds the irascible and the concupiscible powers in check lest they proceed to an external act. On this account it is said in Genesis (4:7): “The lust thereof shall be under thee.”
Et sic patet quod concupiscibilis et irascibilis subduntur rationi; et similiter sensualitas, quamvis nomen sensualitatis pertineat ad has vires, non secundum quod participant rationem, sed secundum naturam sensitivae partis. Unde non ita proprie dicitur quod sensualitas subditur rationi, sicut de irascibili et concupiscibili.	Thus it is clear that the irascible and the concupiscible powers are subject to reason, and likewise sensuality, though the name sensuality does not refer to these powers according to their participation in reason but according to the nature of the sensitive part of the soul. It is consequently not said in as proper a sense that sensuality is subject to reason as that the irascible and the concupiscible powers are so subject.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum illud apostoli intelligitur quantum ad hoc quod non est in potestate nostra universaliter omnes inordinatos motus sensualitatis impedire; quamvis possimus impedire singulos, ut patet ex dictis, quaest. de libero arbitrio, art. XII.	1. The statement of the Apostle is to be understood as meaning that it is not in our power universally to prevent all inordinate movements of sensuality, though we can prevent individual ones, as is clear from what has been said.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod sensualitas, quantum est de se, repugnat rationi; tamen ratio potest eam reprimere, ut patet ex dictis, in corp. art.	2. As far as sensuality itself goes, it fights against reason; yet reason can keep it in check, as is clear from what has been said.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod inferiores apprehensivae obediunt superiori, ut patet de imaginatione et aliis sensibus interioribus; sed quod exterior sensus intellectui non obediat, contingit ex hoc quod sensus exterior indiget re sensibili ad sentiendum, sine qua in actum exire non potest.	3. The lower apprehensive powers also obey the higher, as is clear in the case of the imagination and the other internal senses; but the fact that the external senses do not obey the intellect is due to their need of a sensible thing, and to their inability to sense without it.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod appetitiva inferior non naturaliter tendit in rem aliam, nisi postquam proponitur sibi sub ratione proprii obiecti, ut ex dictis, art. I huius quaest., patet. Unde, cum in potestate rationis sit sub diversis rationibus unam et eamdem rem proponere, utpote cibum aliquem ut delectabilem et ut mortiferum, potest in diversa ratio sensualitatem movere.	4. The lower appetitive power does not naturally tend to anything until after that thing is presented to it under the aspect of its proper object, as is clear from what has been said. Since it is in the power of reason to present one and the same thing under different aspects, a particular sort of food, for instance, as delicious or as deadly, reason is able to move sensuality to different objects.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod dispositio corporalis, quae pertinet ad complexionem corporis, non subditur rationi; sed hoc non requiritur ad hoc quod passiones praedictae in actu sint, sed quod homo sit ad eas habilis. Actualis vero transmutatio corporis, utpote accensio sanguinis circa cor, vel aliquid huiusmodi, quod actu passiones huiusmodi concomitatur, sequitur imaginationem, et propter hoc subditur rationi.	5. A disposition of the body which is in its very constitution is not subject to reason. But that such a disposition be had is a requisite not [directly] for the actualization of the passions in question, but for man to be capable of them. The actual modification of the body, however, such as the boiling of the blood around the heart, or something of the sort, which actually accompanies passions of this kind, depends upon the imagination, and on that account is subject to reason.

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Q. 25: Sensuality ARTICLE V In the fifth article we ask: Can there be sin in sensuality? [ARTICLE II Sent., 24, 3, 2.; De malo, 7, 6; S.T., I-II, 74, 3 & 4; Quodl. IV, (11), 21 & 22.]
Quinto quaeritur utrum in sensualitate possit esse peccatum	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non.	It seems that there cannot, for
Nunquam enim nisi in voluntate peccatur. Sed sensualitas distinguitur a voluntate. Ergo in sensualitate non est peccatum.mmitted except by the will. But sensuality is distinguished from the will. Sin is therefore not in sensuality.
Praeterea, in anima separata peccata remanent. Sensualitas autem non remanet in anima separata, cum sit potentia coniuncti. Ergo, et cetera.	2. [Besides, sins remain in the separated soul. But sensuality does not remain, since it is the power of a soul joined to a body. Therefore, etc.]
Praeterea, actus eius mediante corpore exercetur. Cuius autem est potentia, eius est actus, secundum philosophum in Lib. de somno et Vig. Ergo in sensualitate non est peccatum.	3. Sins remain in the separated soul. But sensuality does not remain in the separated soul, since it is a power of the composite; for its act is exercised by means of the body. “But the act belongs to the same subject as the power,” as the Philosopher says. Consequently there is no sin in sensuality.
Praeterea, secundum Augustinum in V de Civit. Dei, est aliquid quod agit et non agitur, ut Deus; et in hoc peccatum non est; et est aliquid quod agit et agitur, scilicet voluntas; et in hac constat esse peccatum; et est aliquid quod agitur et non agit, ut sensualitas. Ergo nec in ea peccatum est.	4. According to Augustine there is something which acts and is not acted upon, that is, God; and in this there is no sin. There is some thing else which acts and is acted upon, namely, the will; and in this there is clearly sin. And there is something else which is acted upon and does not act, that is, sensuality. Then sin is not in this either.
Sed dicendum, quod in sensualitate potest esse peccatum ex hoc ipso quod ratio motum eius impedire potest.- Sed contra: in hoc quod ratio impedire potest et non impedit, designatur interpretatus consensus rationis: qui quidem non sufficit ad peccatum, cum non sufficiat ad meritum sine consensu expresso: Deus enim pronior est ad miserendum quam ad puniendum, ut dicit quaedam Glossa in Princ. Hierem. Ergo nec ex hac ratione potest dici quod peccatum sit in sensualitate.	5. The answer was given that there can be sin in sensuality by the mere fact that reason can prevent its movement.—On the contrary, the fact that reason can prevent it and does not, merely indicates the interpretative consent of reason, which is not sufficient for sin since nothing less than express consent suffices for merit. “For God is more ready to have mercy than to punish,” as is said in the Gloss in a comment upon the beginning of Jeremiah. Then not even for this reason can it be said that there is sin in sensuality.
Praeterea, nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest. Sed vitare non possumus quin motus sensualitatis sint inordinati: ut enim dicit Augustinus, quia homo noluit vitare malum cum potuit, inflictum est ei non posse cum velit. Ergo in sensualitate non est peccatum.	6. No one sins in doing something which he cannot avoid. But we cannot keep the movements of sensuality from being inordinate; for, as Augustine says, because man was unwilling to avoid sin when he was able, there has been inflicted upon him the inability to avoid it when he so wills. There is therefore no sin in sensuality.
Praeterea, quando motus sensualitatis est in aliquid licitum, non est peccatum; ut cum coniugatus movetur in uxorem suam. Sed sensualitas non discernit inter licitum et illicitum. Ergo nec quando in illicitum movetur, erit peccatum.	7. When the movement of sensuality is to something licit, there is no sin, as when a husband is aroused in regard to his wife. But sensuality does not distinguish between what is licit and what is illicit. Then not even when it is moved to something illicit will there be sin in it.
Praeterea, virtus et vitium sunt contraria. Sed virtus non potest esse in sensualitate. Ergo nec vitium.	8. Virtue and vice are contraries. But virtue cannot be in sensuality. Then neither can vice.
Praeterea, in eo est peccatum cui imputatur. Sensualitati autem non imputatur peccatum, cum non sit domina sui actus, sed voluntati. Ergo in sensualitate non est peccatum.	9. Sin is in that to which it is imputed. But since sensuality does not have control over its own act, sin is not imputed to it, but rather to the will. There is therefore no sin in sensuality.
Praeterea, id quod est materiale in peccato mortali, potest esse in sensualitate; nec tamen ibi peccatum mortale dicimus esse, quia in ea quod est formale in peccato mortali non est. Sed quod est formale in peccato veniali, privatio scilicet ordinis debiti, in sensualitate non est, sed in ratione, cuius est ordinare. Ergo in sensualitate non est peccatum veniale.	10. The material element of mortal sin can be in sensuality; and yet we do not say that mortal sin is there, because the formal element of mortal sin is not found in it. But the formal element of venial sin, the privation of due order, is not in sensuality but in reason, whose business it is to put things in order. Consequently venial sin is not found in sensuality.
Praeterea, si caecus qui a vidente ducitur in foveam cadat, non est peccatum caeci, sed videntis. Cum ergo sensualitas sit quasi caeca respectu divinorum, si cadat in illicitum, non erit peccatum eius, sed rationis, quae debet eam regere.	11. If a blind man being led by one who sees falls into a ditch, it is not the fault of the blind man but of the one who sees. Since sensuality is, so to speak, blind in regard to divine things, should it fall into something illicit, that will not be its own sin but that of reason, which is supposed to guide it.
Praeterea, sicut sensualitas aliquo modo regitur a ratione, ita et exteriora membra; in quibus tamen non dicimus esse peccatum. Ergo nec in sensualitate.	12. Like sensuality, the external members are guided by reason; and yet we do not say that there is sin in them. Then neither is it in sensuality.
Praeterea, dispositio et forma sunt in eodem, quia actus activorum sunt in patiente bene disposito. Sed veniale est dispositio ad mortale. Cum ergo veniale non possit esse in sensualitate, ergo nec mortale.	13. Disposition and form are in the same subject, because the acts of active principles are in the thing acted upon and disposed. But venial sin is a disposition for mortal sin. Therefore, since mortal sin cannot be in sensuality, neither can venial sin.
Praeterea, actus fornicationis propinquior est sensualitati quam rationi. Si ergo in sensualitate posset esse peccatum, esset peccatum mortale, scilicet fornicationis; quod cum sit falsum, videtur quod in ea peccatum esse non possit.	14. The act of fornication is nearer to sensuality than to reason. If, then, there could be any sin in sensuality, it would be a mortal sin, namely, that of fornication. But since that is false, it seems that there cannot be any sin in it.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Est quod Augustinus dicit: nonnullum vitium est cum caro concupiscit adversus spiritum. Haec autem concupiscentia carnis pertinet ad sensualitatem. Ergo in ea potest esse peccatum.	1. Augustine says: “There is some fault when the flesh lusts against the spirit.” Now that lust of the flesh belongs to sensuality. There can therefore be some sin in sensuality.
Praeterea, Magister dicit, 24 distinct., Lib. II Sent., quod in sensualitate est peccatum veniale.	2. The Master says that there is venial sin in sensuality.
Respondeo.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod peccatum nihil est aliud quam aliquis actus deficiens a recto ordine, qui esse debebat: et hoc modo accipitur peccatum in his quae sunt secundum naturam, et in his quae sunt secundum artem, ut dicit philosophus, II Phys. Sed tunc est peccatum mortale quando actus deficiens est moralis.	Sin is nothing but an act which lacks the right order which it was supposed to have. It is in this sense that “sin” or defect is taken in matters applying to nature and to art, as the Philosopher says. But there is question of mortal sin only when the defective act is moral.
Est autem aliquis actus moralis per hoc quod aliquo modo est in nobis: sic enim ei debetur laus vel vituperium; et ideo actus ille qui perfecte est in nostra potestate, perfecte est moralis; et in eo potest esse ratio peccati mortalis, sicut sunt actus quos voluntas elicit vel imperat. Actus autem sensualitatis non est perfecte in potestate nostra, eo quod praevenit iudicium rationis; est tamen aliqualiter in nostra potestate, in quantum sensualitas rationi subiicitur, ut ex dictis, art. praeced., patet. Et ideo actus eius attingit ad genus moralium actuum, sed imperfecte. Unde non potest in sensualitate esse peccatum mortale, quod est peccatum perfectum; sed solum veniale, in quo imperfecta peccati mortalis ratio invenitur.	An act is moral by the fact that it is somehow in our power, for thus it deserves praise or blame. Consequently an act which is completely in our power is completely moral and is capable of verifying the full notion of mortal sin. Such are the acts which the will elicits or commands. The act of sensuality, however, is not completely in our power, because it precedes the judgment of reason; yet it is in our power to some extent inasmuch as sensuality is subject to reason, as appears from what has been said. Its act accordingly attains to the genus of moral acts, but incompletely. In sensuality there consequently cannot be mortal sin, which is complete sin, but only venial sin, in which the incomplete character of mortal sin is found.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod subiectum alicuius est duplex: scilicet primum, et secundarium; sicut superficies est primum subiectum coloris, corpus autem secundarium, in quantum subiicitur superficiei. Similiter dicitur quod primum subiectum peccati est voluntas; sensualitas vero est subiectum peccati, in quantum aliqualiter participat voluntatem.	1. The subject of a thing is of either of two kinds: it is either first or secondary, as a surface is the first subject of color, and a body is its secondary subject inasmuch as it is the subject of the surface. Similarly we must say that the first subject of sin is the will, but sensuality is the subject of sin inasmuch as it in some way shares in the will.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod peccatorum notae remanent in conscientia, quacumque vi fuerint commissa; unde, dato quod sensualitas omnino non remaneat modo praedicto, peccatum sensualitatis remanere potest. Hoc autem, an scilicet sensualitas remaneat, alibi disserendum est.	2. The act of sensuality is in our power in some fashion, not from the nature of sensuality, but in so far as the powers of sensuality are rational by participation.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod actus sensualitatis est in nobis aliqualiter, non ex natura sensualitatis, sed in quantum sensualitatis vires sunt rationales per participationem.	3. The marks of our sins remain in our conscience, regardless of which faculty it may have been by which they were committed. Granted, then, that sensuality does not remain at all, in the sense explained above, the sin of sensuality can remain. The problem whether sensuality remains, however, is to be discussed elsewhere.”
Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis sensualitatis secundum se consideratae non sit agere, est tamen eius prout participat aliqualiter rationem.	4. Although it is not the function of sensuality considered in itself to act, it is its foundation in so far as it in some measure participates in reason.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod non dicitur esse peccatum in sensualitate propter interpretativum consensum rationis: quando enim motus sensualitatis praevenit iudicium rationis, non est consensus nec interpretatus nec expressus; sed ex hoc ipso quod sensualitas est subiicibilis rationi, actus eius quamvis rationem praeveniat, habet rationem peccati. Tamen sciendum, quod etsi aliquando consensus interpretatus sufficiat ad peccatum, non tamen oportet quod sufficiat ad meritum: plura enim requiruntur ad bonum quam ad malum; cum malum ex singularibus defectibus contingat, bonum autem ex tota et integra causa, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de divinis nominibus.	5. The reason why sin is said to be in sensuality is not the interpretative consent of reason. When the movement of sensuality precedes the judgment of reason, there is no consent either interpreted or expressed; but from the very fact that sensuality is able to be subjected to reason its act, even though it precedes reason, has the character of sin. It should, however, be borne in mind that, even though interpreted consent sometimes may suffice for sin, it does not have to suffice for merit. There are more requisites for good than for evil, since evil occurs from individual defects, whereas good depends upon a total situation not vitiated in any particular, as Dionysius says.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod peccata sensualitatis possumus quidem vitare singula, quamvis non omnia, ut patet ex his quae in alia quaestione, quaest. praec., art. 12 dicta sunt.	6. We can in fact avoid individual sins of sensuality, though not all, as is clear from what was said in another question.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod cum aliquis accedit ad uxorem suam ex concupiscentia, dummodo non excedat limites matrimonii, est peccatum veniale; unde patet quod ipse motus concupiscentiae in coniugato iudicium rationis praeveniens, peccatum veniale est. Sed quando per rationem determinatur quod est licitum concupisci, tametsi sensualitas in id feratur, nullum erit peccatum.	7. When a man approaches his wife from concupiscence there is venial sin, provided that he does not exceed the bounds of wedded life. It is accordingly clear that the very movement of concupiscence preceding reason in a married person is a venial sin. But when reason determines what one may licitly crave, then even though sensuality goes out to it, there will be no sin.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod virtus moralis est in viribus sensualitatis, idest in irascibili et concupiscibili, ut patet per philosophum, in III Ethicorum, ubi dicit quod temperantia et fortitudo sunt irrationabilium partium. Sed quia sensualitas nominat has vires quantum ad inclinationem naturalem sensui, quae est in contrarium rationi, et non secundum quod participant rationem; ideo magis proprie dicitur quod vitium sit in sensualitate, et virtus in irascibili et concupiscibili. Peccatum tamen quod est in sensualitate, virtuti non contrariatur; unde ratio non sequitur.	8. Moral virtue is in the powers of sensuality, the irascible and the concupiscible, as the Philosopher makes clear when he says that temperance and fortitude belong to the non-rational parts. But because sensuality designates these powers as having an inclination which is natural to sense but to something contrary to reason, and not as participating in reason, on this account vice is more properly said to be in sensuality, and virtue to be in the irascible and the concupiscible powers. The sin which is in sensuality, however, is not opposed to virtue as its contrary. Hence the conclusion does not follow.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod omne peccatum imputatur homini in quantum habet voluntatem; et tamen peccatum dicitur esse aliquo modo in illa potentia cuius actum contingit esse deformem.	9. Every sin is imputed to man inasmuch as he has a will; and yet sin is said to be in some sense in that power whose act happens to be deformed.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod materiale in peccato mortali potest accipi tripliciter. Uno modo sicut obiectum est materia actus: et sic materia mortalis peccati quandoque est in sensualitate, ut cum aliquis consentit in delectationem sensualitatis. Alio modo sicut actus exterior est materialis respectu interioris actus, qui est formale in peccato mortali, cum actus exterior et interior sint unum peccatum; et per hunc modum actus sensualitatis potest se habere materialiter in peccato mortali. Tertio modo materiale in peccato mortali est conversio ad bonum commutabile sicut ad finem, formale vero aversio a bono incommutabili; et sic id quod est materiale in peccato mortali non potest esse in sensualitate. Nec sequitur, si peccatum mortale non potest ibi esse, quod non sit ibi veniale, ratione praedicta in corp. art.	10. The material element in mortal sin can be taken in three ways: (1) In so far as the object is the matter of the act. In this sense the matter of mortal sin is sometimes in sensuality, as when a person consents to sensual pleasure. (2) In so far as the external act is called material with reference to the internal act, which is the formal element in mortal sin, since the external and the internal act constitute one sin. In this sense too the act of sensuality can be regarded as the material element in mortal sin. (3) In so far as the material element in mortal sin is the turning towards a changeable good as one’s end, whereas the formal element is the turning away from the unchangeable good. In this sense the material element in mortal sin cannot be in sensuality. Nor does it follow (for the reason given above) that, if mortal sin cannot be found there, then there is no venial sin there either.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod peccatum dicitur esse in sensualitate non quia ei imputetur, sed quia per eius actum committitur. Imputatur autem homini, in quantum actus ille in eius potestate consistit.	11. Sin is said to be in sensuality, not as being imputed to that power, but as being committed through its act. Sin is rather imputed to the man inasmuch as that act is in his power.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod membra exteriora sunt tantum mota; vires autem appetitivae inferiores sunt moventes ad similitudinem voluntatis: unde, in quantum participant aliqualiter voluntatem, possunt esse subiectum peccati.	12. The external members are merely moved, whereas the lower appetitive powers do the moving somewhat like the will. In so far, then, as they in some sense participate in the will, they can be the subject of sin.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod duplex est dispositio. Una qua patiens disponitur ad recipiendum formam; et talis dispositio est in eodem cum forma. Alia dispositio est qua agens disponitur ad agendum; et de hac non est verum quod sit in eodem cum forma ad quam disponit. Huiusmodi autem dispositio est veniale, quod in sensualitate est, ad peccatum mortale, quod est in ratione: nam sensualitas est ut agens in peccato mortali, in quantum inclinat rationem ad peccandum.	13. Dispositions are of two kinds. There is one by which a patient is disposed to receive a form. Such a disposition is in the same subject as the form. There is another disposition by which an agent is disposed to act. Regarding this kind it is not true that it is in the same subject as the form for which it disposes. Venial sin, which is in sensuality, is this kind of disposition to mortal sin, which is in reason; for sensuality is like an agent in regard to mortal sin, since it inclines reason to sin.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod actus fornicationis quamvis sit propinquior concupiscibili quam rationi quantum ad rationem obiecti, est tamen propinquior rationi quantum ad rationem imperii: nam membra exteriora non applicantur ad actum nisi ex imperio rationis: unde in eis potest esse peccatum mortale, non autem in actu sensualitatis, qui iudicium praevenit rationis.	14. Although the act of fornication is closer to the concupiscible power than to reason as regards the nature of the object, it is nonetheless closer to reason as regards the nature of command. The external members are applied to the act only by the command of reason. Mortal sin can accordingly be in them but not in the act of sensuality, which precedes the judgment of reason.

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Q. 25: Sensuality ARTICLE VI In the sixth article we ask: Is the concupiscible power more corrupt and infected than the irascible? [ARTICLE II Sent., 31, 2, 2; De malo, 4, ad 12; S.T., I-II, 83, 4.]
Sexto quaeritur utrum concupiscibilis sit magis corrupta et infecta quam irascibilis	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non.	It seems that it is not, for
Corruptio enim et infectio humanae naturae ex peccato originali venit. Peccatum autem originale est in essentia animae sicut in subiecto, ut a quibusdam dicitur, propter hoc quod ipsum anima contrahit ex coniunctione sui ad corpus, cui per essentiam suam coniungitur. Cum ergo essentiae animae omnes potentiae aequaliter appropinquet, utpote in ea radicatae, videtur quod infectio et corruptio non magis in concupiscibili quam in irascibili et aliis potentiis sit.	1. The corruption and infection of human nature comes from original sin. But original sin is in the essence of the soul as its subject, as some say, because the soul contracts it from its union with the body, to which it is joined by its essence. Since all the powers of the soul are equally close to its essence, being rooted in it, the infection and corruption does not seem to be any more in the concupiscible than in the irascible and other powers.
Praeterea, ex corruptione naturae in nobis est quaedam inclinatio ad peccatum. Sed peccata irascibilis sunt graviora quam concupiscibilis, quia secundum Gregorium, spiritualia peccata sunt maioris culpae quam carnalia. Ergo magis est corrupta irascibilis quam concupiscibilis.	2. From the corruption of our nature there is in us a certain inclination to sin. But the sins of the irascible power are more serious than those of the concupiscible, because according to Gregory spiritual sins are more culpable than carnal sins. The irascible power is therefore more corrupt than the concupiscible.
Praeterea, ex corruptione naturae in nobis contingunt subiti animae motus. Sed motus irascibilis videntur esse magis subiti quam concupiscibilis: irascibilis enim movetur cum quadam virtute animi, concupiscibilis cum quadam animi mollitie. Ergo irascibilis est magis corrupta quam concupiscibilis.	3. Sudden movements of the soul occur in us because of the corruption of our nature. But the movements of the irascible power seem to be more sudden than those of the concupiscible. For the irascible is moved with a certain virility of spirit, whereas the concupiscible is moved with a certain effeminacy. The irascible is therefore more, corrupt than the concupiscible.
Praeterea, huiusmodi corruptio et infectio de qua loquimur, est corruptio naturae, et per generationem traducta. Peccata autem irascibilis sunt magis naturalia et magis traducuntur a parentibus in filios quam peccata concupiscibilis, ut philosophus dicit in VII Ethicorum. Ergo irascibilis est magis corrupta quam concupiscibilis.	4. The sort of corruption and infection of which we are speaking is a corruption of nature handed on by generation. But the sins of the irascible power are “more natural” and are handed on from parents to children more than sins of the concupiscible, as the Philosopher says. The irascible is therefore more corrupt than the concupiscible.
Praeterea, corruptio in nobis provenit ex peccato primi parentis. Sed peccatum primi parentis fuit superbia sive elatio, quae est in irascibili. Ergo et in nobis est irascibilis magis corrupta quam concupiscibilis.	5. Corruption in us comes from the sin of our first parent. But the first sin of our first parent was one of pride or self-exaltation, which is in the irascible power. Consequently the irascible power is more corrupt and infected in us than is the concupiscible.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Ubi est maior turpitudo, ibi est maior corruptio et infectio. Sed secundum philosophum in VIII Ethic., turpior est incontinens concupiscentiae quam incontinens irae. Ergo concupiscibilis est magis corrupta et infecta quam irascibilis.	1. Where there is greater foulness there is greater corruption and infection. But according to the Philosopher a man unable to control his concupiscence is fouler than one unable to control his anger. Then the concupiscible power is more corrupt and infected than the irascible.
Praeterea, ibi sumus magis corrupti ubi difficilius resistimus. Sed difficilius est repugnare contra voluptatem, quae ad concupiscibilem pertinet, quam contra iram; ut patet per philosophum in II Ethic. Ergo in concupiscibili sumus magis corrupti quam in irascibili.	2. We are more corrupt where we resist with greater difficulty. But it is more difficult to fight against sensual pleasure, which pertains to the concupiscible power, than against anger, as the Philosopher makes clear. We are therefore more corrupt in the concupiscible power than in the irascible.
Respondeo.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod corruptio et infectio peccati originalis hoc modo differunt: quod infectio pertinet ad culpam, corruptio ad poenam.	The corruption and the infection of original sin differ in this respect, that infection refers to guilt, corruption to penalty.
Culpa autem originalis dupliciter esse dicitur in aliqua potentia animae: uno modo essentialiter; alio modo causaliter. Essentialiter quidem est vel in ipsa essentia animae, vel in parte intellectiva, ubi erat originalis iustitia, quae per peccatum originale privatur. Causaliter autem est in aliis potentiis quae attingunt actum generationis humanae, per quam originale peccatum traducitur: quem quidem attingit vis generativa sicut ipsum exequens; vis concupiscibilis sicut ipsum imperans ratione delectationis; sensus tactus sicut delectationem percipiens. Et ideo ista infectio attribuitur inter sensus tactui, inter appetitivas concupiscibili, inter omnes potentias animae generativae, quae dicitur esse infecta et corrupta.	Now original guilt is said to be in a power of the soul in two different ways: essentially and causally. Essentially it is either in the very essence of the soul or in the intellectual part, formerly the seat of original justice, which is taken away by original sin. Causally it is in the powers concerned in the act of human generation, by which original sin is handed on: the generative power, which carries it out, the concupiscible power, which commands it for the sake of pleasure, and the sense of touch, which perceives the pleasure. That infection is accordingly attributed to touch among the senses, to the concupiscible among the appetitive powers, and among the faculties of the soul in general to the generative power, which is said to be infected and corrupted.
Corruptio autem animae de qua loquimur consideranda est ad modum corruptionis corporalis. Quae quidem contingit ex hoc quod remoto continente singulae partes contrariae tendunt in id quod eis convenit secundum naturam, et sic fit corporis dissolutio. Similiter remota originali iustitia, per quam ratio inferiores vires continebat in statu innocentiae omnino sibi subiectas, vires inferiores singulae tendunt in id quod est eis proprium: scilicet concupiscibilis in delectationem, irascibilis in iram, et alia huiusmodi: unde philosophus in I Ethicor. comparat huiusmodi partes animae partibus corporis dissolutis.	The corruption of the soul of which we are speaking is to be viewed after the manner of bodily corruption. The latter comes about from the fact that, when the principle which holds the individual contrary parts together is removed, they tend to whatever agrees with them individually according to their own natures, and so the dissolution of the body takes place. So too since the loss of original justice, through which reason held the lower powers altogether subject to itself in the state of innocence, each of the lower powers tends to what is proper to it: the concupiscible to pleasure, the irascible to anger, and so on. The Philosopher accordingly compares these parts of the soul to palsied members of the body.
Sicut autem corruptio corporalis non dicitur esse in anima, qua recedente corpus dissolvitur, sed in corpore dissoluto; ita huiusmodi corruptio est in viribus sensitivis, in quantum continentia rationis privatae in diversa feruntur; non autem in ipsa ratione, nisi quatenus et ipsa propria perfectione privatur separata a Deo. Et ideo quantum aliqua inferiorum virium magis elongatur a ratione, tanto magis est corrupta. Et ideo cum irascibilis sit magis rationi propinqua quasi aliquid rationis in suo motu participans, secundum philosophum in VII Ethic., minus erit corrupta irascibilis quam concupiscibilis.	Now the corruption of the body is not said to be in the soul, whose withdrawal occasions the body’s dissolution, but rather in the body, which is dissolved. In the same way the corruption spoken of is in the sensitive powers inasmuch as they are deprived of the unifying control exercised by reason and go out in all directions; but it is not in reason itself except to the extent that it is deprived of its own proper perfection when separated from God. On this account the more one of the lower powers gets away from reason, the more corrupt it is; and consequently, since the irascible power is closer to reason as participating to some extent in reason in its own movement, as the Philosopher teaches, the irascible power will be less corrupt than the concupiscible.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis omnes potentiae in essentia animae radicentur, tamen quaedam per prius fluunt ab essentia animae quam aliae, et ad causam originalis diversam habitudinem habent: et sic non similiter est in omnibus corruptio et infectio originalis peccati.	1. Even though all the powers are rooted in the essence of the soul, some flow from that essence more immediately than the others and have a different relationship to the cause of original sin. The corruption and infection of original sin are accordingly not in all in the same way.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso quod motus rationis magis participatur in irascibili, peccata irascibilis sunt graviora; sed peccata concupiscibilis turpiora: ipsa enim discretio rationis culpam auget, sicut ignorantia culpam alleviat. Recessus autem a ratione, in qua tota dignitas humana consistit, ad turpitudinem pertinet: unde ex hoc ipso patet quod concupiscibilis est magis corrupta, utpote longius a ratione discedens.	2. From the fact that the irascible power shares in the movement of reason more than the concupiscible it results that the sins of the irascible power are more serious but those of the concupiscible more shameful. The very discernment of reason increases the guilt, just as ignorance lessens it. But because the whole human dignity consists in reason, withdrawal from it entails shamefulness. It is accordingly clear from this that the concupiscible power is more corrupt as withdrawing farther from reason.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod motus irascibilis et concupiscibilis dupliciter potest considerari: scilicet in appetendo et in exequendo. In appetendo quidem magis est subitus motus concupiscibilis quam irascibilis, quia irascibilis movetur quasi deliberando et conferendo vindictam intentam ad iniuriam receptam, quasi syllogizans, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.; sed concupiscibilis, ad solam apprehensionem delectabilis, movetur ad fruitionem delectabilis, ut ibi dicitur. Sed in exequendo motus irascibilis est magis subitus quam concupiscibilis; quia irascibilis cum quadam fiducia et fortitudine agit, concupiscibilis vero cum quadam mollitie insidiose tendit ad propositum adipiscendum. Unde dicit philosophus in VII Ethicorum, quod iracundus non est insidiator, sed manifestus; concupiscentia vero insidiator; et inducit versum Homeri, qui dixit, Venerem esse dolosam, et eius corrigiam variam, significans deceptionem qua Venus furatur intellectum etiam multum sapientis.	3. The movement of the irascible and of the concupiscible powers can be considered in two respects: in desiring and in executing. In desiring, the movement of the concupiscible power is more sudden than that of the irascible, because the irascible is moved by deliberating and comparing, as it were, the intended revenge with the insult received, as if syllogizing, as is said in the Ethics. But the concupiscible power is moved to enjoyment upon the mere apprehension of the pleasurable object, as is said in the same place. But in executing, the movement of the irascible is more sudden than that of the concupiscible, because the irascible power acts with a certain courage and confidence, whereas the concupiscible with a certain pusillanimity tends to the attainment of its purposes by wiles. The Philosopher accordingly says that “the wrathful man does not lay snares but works out in the open, whereas concupiscence lays snares.” And he alludes to the verse of Homer who said that Venus is guileful and her seducing girdle is cunningly adorned, thereby conveying the deception by which Venus snatches away the understanding even of a very wise man.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur esse naturale dupliciter: vel quantum ad naturam speciei, vel quantum ad naturam individui. Quantum autem ad naturam speciei peccata concupiscibilis sunt magis naturalia quam peccata irascibilis; unde philosophus dicit in II Ethic., quod voluptas ex puero omnibus nobis committitur quasi contemporanea vitae. Sed quantum ad naturam individui sunt magis naturalia peccata irascibilis;	4. Something is said to be natural in either of two senses: from the point of view of the nature of the species or from that of the nature of the individual. From the point of view of the nature of the species sins of the concupiscible power are more natural than those of the irascible. Thus the Philosopher says that sensual pleasure “grows up with all of us from our infancy,” as if it were contemporary with life. But from the point of view of the nature of the individual the sins of the irascible power are more natural.
et hoc ideo quia si consideretur motus appetitus sensibilis ex parte animae, concupiscibilis naturalius tendit in suum obiectum, utpote magis naturale et conveniens secundum seipsum: est enim cibi et potus, et aliorum huiusmodi, per quae natura conservatur; sed si consideretur huiusmodi motus ex parte corporis, maior transmutatio et commotio corporalis complexionis fit ex motu irae quam concupiscentiae, communiter et proportionaliter loquendo.	The reason for this is that, if the motion of the sensible appetite is viewed from the standpoint of the soul, the concupiscible power tends more naturally to its object as being more natural and better suited to it in itself; for this power is concerned with food and drink and other things of the sort by which nature is preserved. But if this sort of motion is viewed from the standpoint of the body, a greater alteration and commotion of the body is brought about by the motion of anger than by that of concupiscence, commonly and proportionately speaking.
Et ideo complexio corporalis, in qua plerumque filii parentibus similantur, plus facit ad dominium irae quam ad dominium concupiscentiae. Et propter hoc in peccatis irae magis imitantur filii parentes quam in peccatis concupiscentiae: quod enim est ex parte animae, refertur ad speciem; sed quod est ex determinata complexione corporis, pertinet magis ad individuum. Originale autem peccatum est peccatum totius humanae naturae. Unde patet quod ratio non sequitur.	For this reason the bodily make-up, in which children are for the most part like their parents, has more influence in the control of anger than in that of concupiscence. Consequently children imitate their parents more in sins of anger than in those of concupiscence. For what depends upon the soul relates to the species, but what depends upon a definite make-up of the body relates more to the individual. Original sin, however, is a sin of the whole of human nature. Hence it is clear that the argument proves nothing.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod in nobis contrario ordine corruptio accidit et in Adam; quia in Adam anima corrupit corpus, et persona naturam; in nobis autem est e converso. Unde, quamvis peccatum Adae per prius pertinuerit ad irascibilem, tamen in nobis corruptio magis pertinet ad concupiscibilem.	5. Corruption occurs in us in an order the inverse of that in Adam, because in Adam the soul corrupts the body, and the person the nature, whereas in us it is the other way about. Consequently, although the sin of Adam belonged first to the irascible power, yet in us corruption belongs more to the concupiscible.

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Q. 25: Sensuality ARTICLE VII In the seventh article we ask: Can sensuality be cured in this life of the aforesaid corruption? [ARTICLE S.T., I-II, 74, 3 ad 2.]
Septimo quaeritur utrum sensualitas in vita ista curari possit a corruptione praedicta	Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic.	It seems that it can, for
Quia praedicta corruptio vocatur fomes. Dicitur autem de beata virgine, quod in hac vita fuit totaliter a fomite liberata, praecipue post conceptionem filii Dei. Ergo sensualitas in hac vita est curabilis.	1. The aforesaid corruption is called the “fuel of sin.” But it is said of the Blessed Virgin that even in this life she was entirely freed from the fuel of sin, especially after the conception of the Son of God. Sensuality is therefore curable in this life.
Praeterea, omne illud quod obedit rationi, est susceptivum rectitudinis rationis. Sed vires sensualitatis, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscibilis, obediunt rationi, ut ex dictis, art. IV huius quaest., patet. Ergo sensualitas est receptiva rectitudinis rationis, et ita potest a contraria corruptione curari.	2. Whatever obeys reason is susceptible of the rectitude of reason. But the powers of sensuality, the irascible and the concupiscible, obey reason, as was made clear above. Sensuality is therefore susceptible of the rectitude of reason, and so can be cured of the contrary corruption.
Praeterea, virtus opponitur peccato. Sed in sensualitate potest esse virtus: ut enim philosophus dicit in III Ethic., temperantia et fortitudo sunt irrationabilium partium. Ergo sensualitas in hac vita potest curari a corruptione peccati.	3. Virtue is opposed to sin. But there can be virtue in sensuality; for, as the Philosopher says, temperance and fortitude belong to the non-rational parts of the soul. Sensuality can therefore be cured in this life of the corruption of sin.
Praeterea, ad corruptionem sensualitatis pertinet quod ex ea motus inordinati procedant, qui sunt concupiscentiae pravae. Sed temperatus non habet huiusmodi concupiscentias; in quo differt a continente, qui eas habet, sed non sequitur, ut patet in VII Ethic. Ergo sensualitas in hac vita potest totaliter curari.	4. It is a part of the corruption of sensuality that there proceed from it inordinate movements of depraved concupiscence. But “the temperate man does not have movements of concupiscence of this sort” and consequently differs in this respect from the continent mail, who has them but does not follow them, as is explained in the Ethics. Sensuality can therefore be entirely cured in this life.
Praeterea, si corruptio ista est incurabilis: aut est ex parte curantis, aut ex parte medicinae, aut ex parte morbi, aut ex parte naturae sanandae. Sed non est ex parte curantis, scilicet Dei, quia omnipotens est; nec ex parte medicinae, quia, ut dicitur Rom. V, donum Christi est virtuosius quam peccatum Adae, quo corruptio huiusmodi est inducta; nec ex parte morbi, quia est contra naturam, cum in natura instituta non fuerit; nec ex parte naturae: utile enim esset hanc infirmitatem removeri, cum ex ea sit homo pronus ad malum, et tardus ad bonum. Ergo sensualitas, in hac vita est curabilis.	5. If this corruption is incurable, the reason is to be found either in the physician, or in the medicine, or in the sickness, or in the nature to be healed. Now it is not to be found in the physician, that is, God, because He is omnipotent; nor in the medicine, because, as the Epistle to the Romans (5:15) makes clear, Christ’s gift is more potent than Adam’s sin by which this corruption was brought on; nor in the sickness, because it is against nature, since it was not in nature as instituted; nor in the nature to be healed, for it would be useful to have this infirmity removed, since because of it man is prone to evil and sluggish in good. Sensuality is therefore curable in this life.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Necessitas peccandi, saltem venialiter, consequitur necessitatem moriendi. Sed in hac vita necessitas moriendi non tollitur. Ergo nec necessitas peccandi venialiter; et sic nec corruptio sensualitatis, ex qua praedicta necessitas venit.	1. The necessity of sinning, at least venially, is a consequence of the necessity of dying. But in this life the necessity of dying is not taken away. Then neither is the necessity of sinning, and therefore neither is the corruption of sensuality from which the said necessity comes.
Praeterea, si sensualitas curabilis esset in hac vita, maxime per sacramenta Ecclesiae curaretur, quae sunt medicinae spirituales. Sed adhuc post sacramenta suscepta manet, ut experimento patet. Ergo sensualitas non est curabilis in hac vita.	2. If sensuality were curable in this life, it would be cured particularly through the sacraments of the Church, which are spiritual medicines. But it still remains even after the reception of the sacraments, as is evident from experience. Sensuality is therefore not curable in this life.
Respondeo.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod sensualitas in hac vita curari non potest nisi per miraculum. Cuius ratio est, quia id quod est naturale, non potest permutari nisi a virtute supernaturali. Huiusmodi autem corruptio qua partes animae dicuntur corruptae, sequitur quodammodo inclinationem naturae.	Sensuality cannot be cured in this life except by a miracle. The reason for this is that what is natural cannot be changed except by a supernatural power. But the sort of corruption by which the parts of the soul are said to be corrupt, in some sense follows the inclination of nature.
Quod enim homini in primo statu collatum fuit ut ratio totaliter inferiores vires contineret, et anima corpus, non fuit ex virtute principiorum naturalium, sed ex virtute originalis iustitiae ex divina liberalitate superadditae. Qua quidem iustitia per peccatum sublata, homo rediit ad statum convenientem sibi per principia sua naturalia; unde dicit Dionysius, in Eccl. Hierarch. III cap., quod per peccatum natura humana ad principii consequentem merito ducta est finem.	The gift bestowed upon man in his first state, as a result of which reason kept the lower powers entirely in check, and the soul kept in check the body, was not from the efficacy of any natural principles but from the efficacy of original justice, which was given by divine liberality over and above them. When this justice was removed by sin, man returned to a state which befitted him according to his own natural principles. Dionysius accordingly says that by sin human nature “was deservedly brought to an end befitting its beginning.”
Sicut ergo naturaliter homo moritur, nec ad immortalitatem reduci potest nisi miraculose; ita naturaliter concupiscibilis tendit in delectabile, et irascibilis in arduum, praeter ordinem rationis. Unde quod ista corruptio removeatur, non potest esse nisi miraculose virtute supernaturali faciente.	Just as man naturally dies and cannot be restored to immortality except miraculously, in the same way the concupiscible power naturally tends to what is pleasurable and the irascible to what is arduous, even outside the order of reason. As a consequence it is not possible for that corruption to be removed unless a supernatural power miraculously brings it about.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod beata virgo a fomite liberata fuit miraculose.	1. The Blessed Virgin was freed from the fuel of sin miraculously.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis obediunt rationi, in quantum motus earum vel ordinantur vel comprimuntur per rationem; non tamen ita quod totaliter inclinatio earum tollatur.	2. The irascible and the concupiscible powers obey reason inasmuch as their motions are either ordered or restrained by reason, but not so that their inclination is entirely taken away.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod virtus in irascibili et concupiscibili existens non contrariatur corruptioni praedictae, unde totaliter eam non tollit; contrariatur autem superexcellentiae inclinationis praedictarum virium in sua obiecta; et hoc per virtutem tollitur.	3. The virtue which is in the irascible and the concupiscible powers is not opposed to the aforesaid corruption as its contrary. Consequently it is not entirely removed. It is, however, contrarily opposed to any excess in the inclination of the said powers toward their objects; and this is removed by the virtue.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod temperatus, secundum philosophum, non caret omnino concupiscentiis, sed concupiscentiis vehementibus, quales possunt inesse continenti.	4. In the explanation of the Philosopher, the temperate man is not altogether without any movements of concupiscence but without vigorous movements, such as can be in the continent man.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod ex parte illorum omnium quatuor contingit quod sensualitas in hac vita non curetur. Ipse enim Deus quamvis sit potens curare, tamen secundum ordinem suae sapientiae disposuit ut non curetur in hac vita. Similiter donum gratiae, quod per Christum nobis confertur, quamvis sit efficacius quam peccatum primi hominis, non tamen ordinatur ad removendam corruptionem praedictam, quae est naturae, sed ad removendam culpam personae. Similiter huiusmodi corruptio quamvis sit contra statum naturae primitus institutae, est tamen consequens principia naturae sibi relictae. Est etiam homini utile ad vitandum elationis vitium, ut sensualitatis infirmitas maneat; II Corinth., cap. XII, 7: ne magnitudo revelationum extollat me, datus est mihi stimulus carnis meae: et ideo post Baptismum remanet haec infirmitas in homine; sicut sapiens medicus dimittit aliquem morbum non curatum, qui non posset curari sine periculo maioris morbi.	5. The reason why sensuality is not cured in this life is to be found in all four of the factors proposed. For God Himself, though able to cure it, has nevertheless appointed according to the order of His wisdom that it should not be cured in this life. In like manner the gift of grace which has been conferred upon us by Christ, though more efficacious than the sin of the first man, is not ordained to the removal of the corruption in question, which is one of our nature, but to the removal of the guilt of the person. In like manner too, although this corruption is against the state of nature as originally instituted, it is nevertheless a consequence of the principles of nature left to itself; and it is also useful for man in order to avoid the vice of self-exaltation that the infirmity of sensuality remain: “And lest the greatness of the revelations should exalt me, there was given me a sting of my flesh” (2 Cor. 12: 7). Consequently this infirmity remains in man after baptism, just as a wise physician discharges a patient without having cured his illness if it could not be cured without the danger of a more serious illness.

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