Question Twenty-Nine: The Grace of Christ

Et primo quaeritur, utrum in Christo sit gratia creata. Secundo utrum ad hoc quod natura humana verbo uniretur in persona, requiratur habitualis gratia. Tertio utrum gratia Christi sit infinita. Quarto utrum gratia capitis Christo conveniat secundum humanam naturam. Quinto utrum in Christo requiratur habitualis gratia ad hoc quod sit caput. Sexto utrum Christus mereri potuit. Septimo utrum Christus aliis mereri potuit. Octavo utrum Christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis mereri potuit.

Is there created grace in Christ? For Christ’s human nature to be united personally to the Word is habitual grace required? Is the grace of Christ infinite? Does the grace of headship belong to Christ in His human nature? Is any habitual grace required in Christ for Him to be the head? Could Christ merit? Could Christ merit for others? Could Christ merit in the first instant of His conception?

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ARTICLE I The question is about the grace of Christ, and in the first article we ask: Is there created grace in Christ? [ARTICLE III Sent., 13, 1, 1; In Joan., c. 3, lect. 6, §4 (P 10:357b-358a); S.T., III, 7. 1; Comp. theol., 1, 2 13 & 214.]
Et primo quaeritur utrum in Christo sit gratia creata	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non.	It seems that there is not, for
Homo enim dicitur per gratiam creatam filius adoptivus. Sed Christus, secundum sanctos, non fuit filius adoptivus. Ergo non habuit gratiam creatam.	1. By created grace a man is said to be an adopted son of God. But according to the saints’ Christ was not an adopted son. He therefore did not have created grace.
Praeterea, ubi est coniunctio rei per essentiam, non est necessaria coniunctio per similitudinem; sicut ad cognoscendum requiritur unio cognoscibilis ad rem cognitam; et tamen quando aliqua sunt in anima per sui essentiam, non est necessarium ad cognitionem quod sint in ea per similitudinem. Sed Deus est animae Christi unitus per essentiam realiter in unitate personae. Ergo non requiritur quod uniatur per gratiam, quae est unio per similitudinem.	2. Where there is a union of one thing with another through its essence, there is no need of union through a likeness. Thus for knowledge there is required a union of the knower with the thing known; and yet when things are in the soul through their essence, in order to be known they do not need to be in the soul through a likeness. But God is really united to the soul of Christ by His essence in the unity of the person. There is consequently no need of His being united to it through grace, that is, through a likeness.
Praeterea, ad ea quae possumus per nostra naturalia, non indigemus gratia. Sed Christus poterat pervenire ad gloriam per id quod erat sibi naturale: est enim filius naturalis; et si filius, et haeres. Cum ergo gratia infundatur mentibus ad consequendam gloriam, videtur quod Christus gratia creata non indiguerit.	3. We do not need grace for actions which we can perform by our natural powers. But Christ was able to attain glory by His natural powers; for He is the natural Son, and if the Son, then the heir also. Now since grace is imparted to minds for the purpose of attaining glory, it therefore seems that Christ had no need of created grace.
Praeterea, subiectum potest sine accidente intelligi. Sed gratia, si fuit in Christo, accidens fuit. Potest ergo Christus intelligi sine gratia. Sic ergo intellecto, aut ei debetur vita aeterna, aut non. Si sic, ergo frustra addetur ei gratia: si autem non, cum filiis adoptivis vita aeterna debeatur ex hoc quod sunt filii, videtur quod filiatio adoptionis praeponderet filiationi naturali; quod est inconveniens.	4. A subject can be understood without an accident. But if grace was in Christ, it was an accident. Christ can therefore be understood without grace; and when He is so understood, either eternal life is due Him or not. If it is, then grace will be added to no purpose. If not, since eternal life is due to adopted sons because they are sons, it seems that adoptive sonship is worth more than natural sonship. But that is untenable.
Praeterea, quod est bonum per essentiam, non indiget bonitate participata. Sed Christus est bonus per essentiam, quia est verus Deus. Ergo non indiget gratia, quae est bonitas participata.	5. Whatever is good by its essence does not need participated goodness. But Christ is good by His essence, because He is true God. He therefore does not need grace, which is a. participated goodness.
Praeterea, plus superat bonitas increata bonitatem gratiae quam lumen solis, lumen candelae. Sed ille cui adest lumen solis, non indiget lumine candelae. Ergo, cum Christo affuerit bonitas increata per unionem, videtur quod non indiguerit gratia.	6. Uncreated goodness surpasses the goodness of grace more than the light of the sun surpasses that of a candle. But since uncreated goodness was in Christ through the union, it therefore seems that He did not need grace.
Praeterea, unio divinitatis ad Christum aut sufficit ei, aut non. Si non, praedicta unio imperfecta fuit; si autem sufficit, ergo appositio gratiae superflueret. Nihil autem in operibus Dei superfluum invenitur. Ergo Christus creatam gratiam non habuit.	7. The union of the divinity to Christ is either sufficient for Him or not. If it is not, the union in question will be imperfect; but if it is sufficient, the addition of grace would be superfluous. Now nothing superfluous is found in God’s works. Christ therefore did not have created grace.
Praeterea, qui scit aliquid notitia nobiliori, utpote per medium demonstrativum, non indiget ut cognoscat idem notitia minus nobili, utpote per medium probabile. Sed Christus erat bonus bonitate nobilissima, scilicet bonitate increata. Ergo non indiguit ut esset bonus bonitate minus nobili, scilicet bonitate creata.	8. One who knows something with a nobler kind of knowledge, such as that had through a demonstrative medium, does not need to know the same thing with a less noble kind of knowledge, as through a probable medium. But Christ was good with the noblest goodness, which is uncreated goodness. He therefore did not need to be good by a less noble sort of goodness, namely, created goodness.
Praeterea, instrumentum non indiget habitu ad suam operationem; praecipue si agens cuius est instrumentum, sit perfectae virtutis. Sed humanitas Christi est sicut instrumentum, divinitatis sibi unitae, ut Damascenus dicit in III libro. Cum ergo virtus divina sit perfectissima, videtur quod humanitas Christi gratia non indiguerit.	9. An instrument does not need a habit for its operation, especially if the agent whose instrument it is has perfect power. But the humanity of Christ is a kind of “instrument of the divinity” which is united to it, as Damascene says. Since the divine power is most perfect, it seems that the humanity of Christ did not need grace.
Praeterea, habenti plenitudinem omnis boni, nihil superaddi est necesse. Sed anima Christi omnis boni plenitudinem habuit ex hoc ipso quod verbum fuit sibi unitum, in quo est thesaurus omnis boni. Ergo non fuit necessarium quod superadderetur bonitas gratiae.	10. It is not necessary for anything to be added to one who has the fullness of all goodness. But Christ’s soul had the fullness of all goodness because the Word, the treasure-house of all goodness, was united to it. It was therefore not necessary for the goodness of grace to be added to it.
Praeterea, id quo aliquid fit melius est nobilius eo. Sed nulla creatura est nobilior anima verbo unita. Ergo per nullam gratiam creatam anima Christi potest fieri melior: frustra igitur in ea creata gratia esset.	11. That by which something is made better is nobler than the thing itself. But no creature is nobler than the soul united to the Word. Then Christ’s soul cannot be made better by any created grace; and so created grace would be useless in it.
Praeterea, duplex est imago Dei in nobis, ut habetur ex Glossa, super illud, Psalm. IV, 7: signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine: una creationis, quae consistit in mente secundum unam essentiam et tres potentias: alia recreationis, quae attenditur secundum lumen gratiae. Aut ergo imago gratiae est Deo similior quam imago mentis Christi, aut non. Si est Deo similior: ergo gratia est nobilior creatura quam anima Christi; si vero non est similior: ergo per eam mens Christi non propinquius accederet ad Dei conformitatem, ad quod solum gratia menti infunditur. Frustra igitur gratia in anima Christi poneretur.	12. The image of God in us is twofold, as is gathered from the Gloss in its comment upon the words of the Psalm (4:7): “The light of your countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us.” One is that of creation, which consists in the mind considered as one essence with three powers. The other is that of re-creation, viewed from the standpoint of the light of grace. Now either the image of grace is more like God than the image of Christ’s mind, or not. If it is more like God, then grace is a nobler creature than Christ’s soul. If it is not more like God, then by its means the mind of Christ would not come any closer to conformity with God—which is the purpose for which grace is infused into the mind. Grace would therefore be held to be in the soul of Christ in vain.
Praeterea, si effectus sunt repugnantes, et causas repugnantes habebunt: sicut enim congregatio et disgregatio visus ad invicem repugnant, ita albedo et nigredo. Sed filiatio naturalis cuius principium est nativitas aeterna, repugnat filiationi adoptionis, cuius principium est infusio gratiae. Ergo et gratia infusa repugnat nativitati aeternae. Cum ergo nativitas aeterna Christo conveniat, videtur quod gratia ei infusa non sit.	13. If effects are incompatible, they will have incompatible causes. just as the unifying and the breaking up of a field of vision, for instance, are mutually incompatible, so also are white and black. But natural sonship, whose principle is eternal birth, is incompatible with adoptive sonship, whose principle is the infusion of grace. The infused grace is also incompatible with eternal birth; and since eternal birth applies to Christ, it therefore seems that He did not have infused grace.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Ioannis I, 14 dicitur: vidimus eum plenum gratiae et veritatis. Sed in Christo fuit scientia creata, ad quam pertinet veritas. Ergo et gratia creata.	1. It is written in John (1: 14): “We saw... [Him] full of grace and truth.” But in Christ there was created knowledge, to which truth refers. Then there was also created grace.
Praeterea, meritum requirit gratiam. Sed Christus meruit sibi et nobis, ut sancti dicunt. Ergo Christus habuit gratiam creatam: nam creatoris non est mereri.	2. Merit requires grace. But Christ merited for Himself and us, as the saints Say. Christ therefore had created grace, for it is not attributable to the Creator to merit.
Praeterea, Christus fuit simul viator et comprehensor. Sed perfectio viatoris est gratia creata. Ergo Christus gratiam creatam habuit.	3. Christ was at the same time a wayfarer and a possessor. But the perfection of a wayfarer is created grace. Christ therefore had created grace.
Praeterea, nulla perfectio animae Christi defuit quae aliis insit, cum sit perfectissima. Sed aliae sanctorum animae non solum habent perfectionem naturae, sed gratiae. Ergo utraque perfectio fuit in Christo.	4. No perfection found in other souls was missing from Christ’s, since it is the most perfect of all. But the souls of saints have not only the perfection of nature but also that of grace. Both kinds of perfection were therefore found in Christ.
Praeterea, sicut se habet gloria ad comprehensorem, ita gratia ad viatorem. Sed in Christo, qui erat viator et comprehensor, fuit gloria creata, quia per actum creatum divinitate fruebatur. Ergo fuit in eo gratia creata.	5. The relation of grace’ to the wayfarer is the same as that of glory to the possessor. But in Christ, who was both wayfarer and possessor, there was created glory, because He enjoyed the divinity by a created act. Consequently there was created grace in Him.
	REPLY
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod necesse est ponere in Christo gratiam creatam. Cuius ratio necessitatis hinc sumi potest, quod animae ad Deum duplex potest esse coniunctio: una secundum esse in una persona, quae singulariter est animae Christi; alia secundum operationem, quae est communis omnibus cognoscentibus et amantibus Deum.	It is necessary to hold that there was created grace in Christ. The reason for this necessity can be gathered from the two different kinds of union with God which a soul can have: one consequent upon existence within a single person, which belongs uniquely to the soul of Christ; and another consequent upon an operation, which is common to all who know and love God.
Prima quidem coniunctio sine secunda ad beatitudinem non sufficit: quia nec ipse Deus beatus esset, si se non cognosceret et amaret: non enim in seipso delectaretur, quod ad beatitudinem requiritur. Ad hoc ergo quod anima Christi sit beata, praeter unionem ipsius ad verbum in persona, requiritur unio per operationem; ut scilicet videat Deum per essentiam, et videndo fruatur. Hoc autem excedit naturalem potentiam cuiuslibet creaturae, soli autem Deo secundum naturam suam conveniens est. Oportet igitur supra naturam animae Christi aliquid sibi addi, per quod ordinetur ad praedictam beatitudinem; et hoc dicimus gratiam. Unde necesse est in anima Christi gratiam creatam ponere.	The first kind of union is not sufficient for beatitude without the second, because not even God Himself would be blessed if He did not know and love Himself; for He would not take pleasure in Himself, as is required for beatitude. For the soul of Christ to be blessed, then, it requires besides its personal union with the Word also a union through its operation, that it may see God by His essence and, seeing Him, rejoice. Now this surpasses the natural ability of any creature and is proper to God alone according to His own nature. Something must therefore be added to the nature of Christ’s soul by which it is ordained to the beatitude in question. We call this grace. It is therefore necessary to hold that there was created grace in Christ’s soul.
Ex quo patet falsitas cuiusdam opinionis, quae posuit, in superiori parte animae Christi gratiam habitualem non esse, sed immediate uniri verbo, et ex tali unione effluere gratiam in inferiores vires. Nam si loquatur de unione in persona, non solum pars superior animae Christi unitur verbo, sed tota anima. Si autem loquatur de unione per operationem, ad hanc requiritur habitualis gratia, ut dictum est.	This shows the inanity of a certain opinion which affirmed that the higher part of Christ’s soul did not have habitual grace but was united immediately to the Word and from this union grace flowed into the lower powers. For if it refers to personal union, then not only the higher part of Christ’s soul but the whole soul is united to the Word. But if it refers to union by operation, then habitual grace is required for this kind of union, as has been said.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa quae nata sunt personae convenire ratione sui ipsius, non possunt dici de Christo, si habent repugnantiam ad proprietates personae aeternae, quae sola in eo est; sicut patet de hoc nomine creatura. Ea vero quae non sunt nata convenire personae nisi ratione naturae vel partis naturae, possunt dici de Christo quamvis habeant repugnantiam ad personam aeternam; et hoc propter dualitatem naturarum; sicut pati et mori, et alia huiusmodi. Filiatio autem per prius respicit personam; gratia autem non respicit personam nisi ratione mentis, quae est pars naturae. Et ideo filiatio adoptionis nullo modo convenit Christo: convenit tamen gratiam habere.	1. Attributes of such a kind as to belong to a person by reason of personality itself cannot be predicated of Christ if they are incompatible with the properties of an eternal person, which is the only kind of person in Him. An example would be the name creature. But things which belong to a person only by reason of his nature or a part of his nature can be predicated of Christ, even though they imply some incompatibility with an eternal person. This is because of the duality of natures. Examples would be to suffer, to die, and the like. Now sonship refers primarily to the person, whereas grace refers to the person only by reason of the mind, which is a part of the nature. Thus adoptive sonship by no means applies to Christ, though having grace does.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit quando unio per essentiam et per similitudinem ad idem ordinantur. Hoc autem non est in proposito: nam realis unio divinitatis ad animam Christi ordinatur ad unitatem personae; unio autem per similitudinem gratiae, ad fruitionem beatitudinis.	2. That argument is valid when union by essence and union by likeness are ordained to the same end. But that is not true, in the matter at hand. The real union of the divinity with Christ’s soul is ordained to personal unity, whereas the union by the likeness of grace is ordained to the enjoyment of beatitude.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod beatitudo est naturalis Christo secundum naturam divinam, non autem secundum humanam; et ideo ad hoc indiget gratia.	3. Beatitude is natural to Christ according to His divine nature, but not according to His human nature. For this reason He has need of grace.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod si ponatur anima Christi non habere gratiam, tunc Christo conveniet beatitudo increata in quantum est filius naturalis; non autem beatitudo creata, quae debetur filiis adoptivis.	4. Should it be asserted that Christ’s soul did not have grace, then uncreated beatitude will belong to Christ inasmuch as He is the natural Son, but not the created beatitude which is due to adopted sons.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod Christus secundum divinam naturam est bonus per essentiam; non autem secundum humanam naturam; et quantum ad hanc indiget participatione gratiae.	5. Christ is good by His essence in His divine nature but not in His human nature. It is with reference to the latter that He needs the participation of grace.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod lumen solis et candelae ad idem ordinantur, non autem unio divinitatis ad animam Christi et personam per gratiam: et ideo non est simile.	6. The light of the sun and of a candle are ordained to the same end, but not the union of the divinity to the soul of Christ by nature and that by grace. Thus there is no parallel.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod unio divinitatis ad animam Christi sufficit ad hoc quod est; non tamen sequitur quod unio gratiae superfluat, quia ad aliud ordinatur.	7. The union of the divinity with Christ’s soul is sufficient for its purpose. It does not follow, however, that the union of grace is superfluous, because it is ordained to something else.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod scientia nobilior et ignobilior ad idem ordinantur, scilicet ad cognitionem rei; non autem ita est in proposito; unde ratio non sequitur.	8. Both the nobler and the less noble knowledge are ordained to the same end, the cognition of a thing. But that is not the case in the question at issue. Hence the conclusion does not follow.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod duplex est instrumentum: quoddam inanimatum, quod agitur et non agit, ut securis: et tale non indiget habitu; quoddam vero animatum, ut servus, quod agit et agitur: et hoc indiget habitu. Et tale instrumentum est humanitas divinitatis.	9. An instrument can be of either of two kinds: one inanimate, which is acted upon and does not act, such as an ax, and such an instrument does not need a habit; the other animate, as a slave, which acts and is acted upon, and this kind needs a habit. Christ’s humanity is the latter kind of instrument of the divinity.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod animae Christi unita erat plenitudo omnis boni ex ipsa personali verbi unione: non tamen formaliter, sed personaliter; et ideo indigebat informari per gratiam.	10. The fullness of all goodness was, by reason of its personal union with the Word, united to Christ’s soul, not formally but personally. For this reason it needed to be informed by grace.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod anima unita verbo personaliter nulla creatura est melior simpliciter loquendo, sed secundum quid nihil prohibet: sicut enim eius corpore nobilior fuit color secundum quid, prout scilicet erat actus eius; ita et anima Christi melior est gratia eius, in quantum est perfectio ipsius.	11. No creature is better, simply speaking, than the soul united personally to the Word; but if we speak in a qualified way, nothing prevents it. Color was nobler than His body in a certain respect, namely, as being its act. In the same way Christ’s grace is better than His soul inasmuch as it is its perfection.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod gratia est similior quantum ad aliquid, in quantum comparatur ad animam Christi ut actus ad potentiam: et secundum hoc per gratiam anima Christi Deo conformabatur; sed quantum ad alia ipsa mens est similior, scilicet quantum ad naturales proprietates, in quibus Deum imitatur.	12. Grace is more like God in a certain respect, inasmuch as it is related to Christ’s soul as act to potency. From this point of view Christ’s soul was conformed to God through grace. But in other respects His mind itself is more like God, that is, from the standpoint of natural properties, in which it imitates God.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum sicut ad primum.	13. This is to be answered in the same way as the first difficulty.

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Q. 29: The Grace of Christ ARTICLE II In the second article we ask: For Christ’s human nature to be united personally to the word is habitual grace required? [ARTICLE III Sent., 2, 2, 2. sol. 1; 13, 39 1; Quodl. IX, (2), 2 ad 3; In Colos., c. 2, lect. 2.; S.T., III, 2, 10; 6, 6; Comp. theol., I, 214.]
Secundo quaeritur utrum ad hoc quod humana natura verbo uniretur in persona, requiratur habitualis gratia	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non.	It seems not, for
Prius enim est intelligere substantiam in esse suppositi, quam aliquod accidens ei inhaerens. Sed per unionem humanae naturae cum verbo constituitur humana natura in esse suppositi. Cum ergo gratia sit accidens, videtur quod prius sit intelligere unionem humanae naturae ad verbum quam gratiam; et ita gratia non requiritur ad unionem.	1. Before we can understand an accident inhering in a substance, we must understand the substance in the existence of a supposit. But by the union of the human nature with the Word the human nature is established in the existence of a supposit. Since grace is an accident, it seems that the union of the human nature with the Word must be understood before grace. Thus grace is not required for the union.
Praeterea humana natura est assumptibilis a verbo in quantum est rationalis. Hoc autem non datur sibi per gratiam. Ergo per gratiam non disponitur ad unionem.	2. Human nature is capable of being assumed by the Word inasmuch as it is rational. And it does not get this from grace. Then it is not disposed for the union by grace.
Praeterea, anima ad hoc infunditur corpori ut in ea perficiatur scientia et virtutibus; ut patet per Magistrum, in 2 dist. II Lib. Sentent. Sed per prius unitur verbo quam corpori anima Christi; alias sequeretur quod suppositum esset assumptum: nam ex unione animae ad corpus constituitur suppositum. Ergo prius est intelligere unionem animae Christi ad verbum quam sit intelligere gratiam in ipsa. Et sic gratia ad unionem praedictam non disponit.	3 The soul is infused into the body in order that in it the soul may be perfected with knowledge and virtues, as the Master makes clear. But Christ’s soul is united to the Word before it is to the body; otherwise it would follow that a supposit was assumed, for from the union of the soul with the body a supposit is constituted. The union of Christ’s soul with the Word must therefore be understood before we understand grace in it. Thus grace does not dispose for the union in question.
Praeterea, inter naturam et suppositum non cadit aliquod accidens medium. Sed natura humana unitur verbo sicut supposito. Non ergo cadit ibi gratia sicut medium disponens.	4. Between the nature and the sup no accident intervenes. But the human nature is united to the Word as to a supposit. Grace therefore does not intervene there as a disposing medium.
Praeterea, natura humana unitur verbo non solum secundum animam, sed etiam secundum corpus. Corpus autem non est gratiae susceptivum. Ergo ad unionem humanae naturae ad verbum non exigitur gratia sicut dispositio media.	5. The human nature is united to the Word not only as regards the soul but also as regards the body. Now the body is not capable of receiving grace. Consequently for the union of human nature to the Word grace is not needed as an intervening disposition.
Praeterea, sicut dicit Augustinus in epistola ad Volusian., in his quae mirabiliter fiunt, tota ratio facti est potentia facientis. Sed unio humanae naturae ad divinam est super omnia mirabiliter facta. Ergo non oportet ex parte facti aliquam dispositionem ponere, sed sufficit potentia facientis, et sic non requiritur aliqua gratia media.	6. As Augustine says, in miraculous occurrences “the whole reason for the miracle is the power of the miracle-worker.” But the union of human nature to the divine is a miraculous occurrence above all others. It is therefore not necessary to posit a disposition on the part of the miracle, but the power of the miracle-worker suffices. Thus no intervening grace is required.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Est quod Augustinus dicit, quod quidquid convenit filio Dei per naturam, convenit filio hominis per gratiam. Sed esse Deum convenit filio Dei per naturam. Ergo et filio hominis convenit per gratiam. Convenit autem ei per unionem. Ergo ad unionem requiritur gratia.	1. Augustine says that whatever belongs to the Son of God by nature belongs to the Son of Man by grace. But it belongs to the Son of God by nature to be God. This also belongs to the Son of Man, then, by grace. But this belongs to Him through the union. Therefore grace is required for the union.
Praeterea, excellentior est unio in persona quam per fruitionem. Sed ad hanc secundam unionem requiritur gratia. Ergo et ad primam.	2. Union in person is more excellent than union through fruition. But grace is required for the latter union. Then so is it for the former.
	REPLY
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod habitualem gratiam ad unionem praedictam requiri, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo per modum principii causantis. Et sic ponere unionem in Christo esse factam per gratiam, sonat haeresim Nestorii, qui ponebat non aliter humanitatem esse in Christo verbo unitam nisi secundum perfectam similitudinem gratiae. Alio modo per modum dispositionis. Et hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel secundum modum dispositionis necessitatis, vel congruitatis. Necessitatis quidem, sicut calor est dispositio ad formam ignis, vel raritas: quia materia non potest esse propria materia ignis, nisi intelligatur cum calore et raritate. Congruitatis vero, sicut pulchritudo est quaedam dispositio ad matrimonium.	The proposition that habitual grace is required for the union in question can be understood in two ways: (1) It is required as a principle causing the union. To hold that the union in Christ is brought about by grace in this sense smacks of the heresy of Nestorius, who held that the humanity is united to the Word in Christ in no other way than on the basis of a perfect likeness in grace. (2) It is required as a disposition. This in turn can be of two kinds: either necessary or suitable—necessary, as heat or rarity is a disposition necessary for the form of fire, because matter cannot be the proper matter for fire unless it is taken together with heat and rarity; or suitable, as beauty is a disposition suitable for marriage.
Dicunt ergo quidam, quod gratia habitualis est dispositio per modus necessitatis, quasi faciens humanam naturam esse assumptibilem. Sed istud non videtur. Nam gratia magis est finis assumptionis quam dispositio ad assumptionem. Dicit enim Damascenus, quod Christus ad hoc assumpsit humanam naturam, ut eam curaret, quae quidem curatio est per gratiam; unde gratia habitualis in Christo magis intelligitur ut effectus unionis quam ut praeparatio ad unionem. Et hoc significatur Ioan. I, 14: vidimus eum quasi unigenitum a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis; quasi ex hoc ipso plenitudo gratiae Christo conveniat quod est unigenitus patris per unionem.	Some therefore say that habitual grace is a necessary disposition, as making human nature capable of being assumed. But that does not seem to be true. For grace is rather the end of that assumption than a disposition for it. Damascene says” that Christ assumed human nature in order to cure it. But that curing is accomplished through grace. Habitual grace in Christ is accordingly to be understood rather as an effect of the union than as a preparation for that union. This is indicated in the words of John (1: 14): “We saw him as it were the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth,” as if the fullness of grace belongs to Him by the very fact that He is the Only-begotten of the Father through the union.
Et sic habitualis gratia non intelligitur dispositio ad unionem nisi per modum congruitatis. Et per hunc modum habitualis gratia potest dici gratia unionis, quamvis convenientius, et magis secundum intentionem sanctorum, gratia unionis intelligatur ipsum esse in persona verbi, quod humanae naturae absque meritis praecedentibus collatum est; ad quod non requiritur gratia habitualis, sicut ad fruitionem, quae in operatione consistit; nam habitus non est principium essendi, sed operandi.	Thus habitual grace is not to be understood as a disposition for the union except as suitable. In this sense habitual grace can be called the grace of union, though more fittingly and more in conformity with the meaning of the saints” the grace of union is understood as the very existence in the person of the Word, which is conferred upon the human nature without any previous merits; but for this, habitual grace is not required as it is for the fruition, which consists in an operation; for a habit is not a principle of being but of operating.
	Answers to Difficulties
Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta.	These are obvious from what has just been said.

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Q. 29: The Grace of Christ ARTICLE III In the third article we ask: Is the grace of Christ infinite? [ARTICLE I Sent., 17, 2 4 ad 3; 44, 2. 2 ad 3; III Sent., 13, 1, 2 sol. 2, In Joan., c. 3, lect. I, §4 (P 10:3;7b-358b); S.T., III, 7, 11; Comp. Theol., 1, 215.]
Tertio quaeritur utrum gratia Christi sit infinita	Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic.	It seems that it is, for
Omne enim finitum est mensuratum. Sed gratia Christi non est mensurata, quia spiritus datus est Christo non ad mensuram, ut dicitur Ioan. III, 34. Ergo gratia Christi est infinita.	1. Everything finite is measured. But the grace of Christ is not measured, because the Spirit has not been given to Christ by measure, as we read in John (3:34). The grace of Christ is therefore infinite.
Praeterea, quolibet finito Deus potest quodlibet maius facere. Sed Deus non potuisset maiorem gratiam dare Christo, ut Magister dicit, III Lib., dist. 13. Ergo gratia Christi est infinita.	2. For any finite thing whatsoever God can make a greater. But God could not have given Christ greater grace, as the Master says. Then the grace of Christ is infinite.
Sed dicendum, quod hoc non dicitur pro tanto quod Deus non posset maiorem gratiam facere, sed quia anima Christi non poterat maiorem recipere; erat enim tota capacitas eius gratia repleta.- Sed contra: Augustinus dicit in Lib. de natura boni, quod bonum consistit in modo, specie et ordine; et ubi haec tria magna sunt, ibi magnum bonum est; ubi parva, parvum. Ergo secundum hoc quod crescit creatura aliqua in bonitate, secundum hoc et modus eius crescit, et per consequens eius capacitatis mensura ampliatur; nam modus mensuram sequitur, ut Augustinus dicit III super Genesim ad litteram. Et ita, quanto plus augetur gratia, tanto plus augetur capacitas in anima Christi.	3. The answer was given that the grace of Christ is said to be finite, not because God could not give greater grace, but because the soul of Christ was not able to receive greater, for its entire capacity was filled with grace.—On the contrary, according to Augustine “the good of a creature consists in measure, species, and order; and where these three characteristics are great the good is great, and where they are small the good is small. Consequently, as a creature grows in goodness, the measure grows, and as a result the amount of its capacity is increased; for a thing’s measure depends upon its capacity, as Augustine says. Thus the more his grace is increased, the more the capacity in the soul of Christ is increased.
Praeterea, Anselmus in Lib. cur Deus homo, probat quod oportuit Deum incarnari, quia satisfactio pro natura humana non poterat fieri nisi per meritum infinitum, quod non potest esse hominis puri. Ex quo patet quod meritum hominis Christi fuit infinitum. Sed causa meriti est gratia. Ergo gratia Christi est infinita, quia a causa finita non potest egredi effectus infinitus.	4. Anselm proves that God had to be incarnated because atonement for human nature could not be made except through infinite merit, which could not be that of a mere man. From this it is evident that the merit of Christ as man was infinite. But the cause of merit is grace. The grace of Christ was therefore infinite, because an infinite effect cannot proceed from a finite cause.
Praeterea, caritas viatoris in infinitum augeri potest, quia quantumcumque homo in hac vita proficiat, semper potest in amplius proficere. Si ergo gratia Christi esset finita, gratia alterius hominis posset tantum crescere, quod esset maior gratia Christi: et sic ille esset melior Christo; quod est inconveniens.	5. The charity of a wayfarer can increase to infinity, because however much a man advances in this life, he can always advance still further. Now if the grace of Christ were finite, the grace of some other man could increase to such an extent that it would be greater than Christ’s, and so that man would be better than Christ. But that is inadmissible.
Praeterea, aut capacitas animae Christi est finita, aut infinita. Si infinita, et tota sua capacitas plena est; ergo habet gratiam infinitam; si autem sit finita, quolibet autem finito potest Deus quodlibet maius facere: ergo potest facere maiorem capacitatem quam habeat anima Christi, et sic potest facere meliorem Christum: quod est absurdum.	6. The capacity of Christ’s soul is either finite or infinite. If it is infinite, and its entire capacity full, then He has infinite grace. If, on the other hand, it is finite, and for anything finite God can make something greater, then He can make a greater capacity than that had by Christ’s soul; and so He can make Christ better. But that seems to be absurd.
Sed dicendum, quod Deus posset facere maiorem capacitatem quantum in se est, sed creatura non posset maiorem recipere.- Sed contra: optima creatura distat a Deo in infinitum. Ergo sunt infiniti gradus medii inter Deum et creaturam optimam; et sic qualibet bonitate vel capacitate creata potest Deus facere meliorem.	7. It was answered that God could make a greater capacity as far as He is concerned, but a creature would not be able to receive it.—On the contrary, the most excellent creature stands at an infinite distance from God. There are therefore an infinite number of intermediate degrees between God and the most excellent creature. Thus for any created goodness or capacity God can make a better.
Praeterea, nullum finitum potest super infinita. Sed gratia Christi poterat super infinita: poterat enim super salutem infinitorum hominum, et super abolitionem infinitorum peccatorum. Ergo gratia Christi erat infinita.	8. Nothing finite has power over an infinite number of things. But the grace of Christ had such power, for it had power over the salvation of an infinite number of men and over the effacement of an infinite number of sins. The grace of Christ was therefore infinite.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Nullum creatum est infinitum; alias creatura creatori adaequaretur. Sed gratia Christi erat quid creatum. Ergo finita.	1. Nothing created is infinite; otherwise a creature would be equal to the Creator. But the grace of Christ was something created. Therefore it was finite.
Praeterea, Sap. XI, 21, dicitur: omnia in pondere, numero et mensura disposuisti. Sed nullum infinitum habet pondus et mensuram determinatam. Ergo omnia quae sunt facta a Deo, ita sunt finita; et ita gratia non est infinita.	2. It is written in Wisdom (11: 2 1): “You ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight.” But nothing infinite has definite weight and measure. All things, therefore, which are made by God are finite; and so the grace of Christ is not infinite.
Respondeo.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod quaestio introducitur occasione illorum verborum quae habentur Ioann. III, 34: non ad mensuram dat Deus spiritum; et ideo horum verborum intellectum accipere oportet, ad veritatem praesentis quaestionis considerandam.	The occasion for the introduction of this question was the Passage in John (3:34): “For God doth not give the Spirit by measure.” We must therefore get an understanding of these words in order to get at the truth of the present question.
Potest autem in primis occurrere talis intellectus verborum dictorum, ut dicatur spiritus non ad mensuram Christo datus, quia spiritus sanctus, qui in se est infinitus, Christum replevit per gratiam. Sed iste intellectus non est secundum intentionem litterae. Nam verba praemissa inducuntur ad distinguendum inter Christum et Ioannem, et omnes sanctos, ut Glossa, ibidem, dicit. Secundum autem intellectum praedictum Christus quantum ad hoc non differt a creaturis. Nam spiritus sanctus qui est tertia persona in Trinitate, et est in se infinitus, et quemlibet sanctorum inhabitat.	There may first of all come to mind an interpretation of those words in which the Spirit is said not to be given to Christ in measure, because the Holy Spirit, who is infinite, filled Christ by means of grace. But that interpretation is not in accord with the meaning of the text. For the words under discussion are introduced in order to distinguish between Christ and John [the Baptist] and all the saints, as the Gloss points out. In that interpretation Christ does not differ in this respect from creatures; for the Holy Spirit, who is the third person of the Trinity, both is infinite in Himself and dwells in each one of the saints.
Et ideo ponitur in Glossa alius intellectus, ut praedicta verba referantur ad generationem aeternam, secundum quam pater dedit filio naturam infinitam, ut sic per spiritum spiritualis natura divina intelligatur; unde dicit Glossa, ibidem: ut tantus sit filius, quantus et pater; aequalem enim sibi genuit filium. Sed hic sensus verbis sequentibus non concordat, quia subiungitur: pater diligit filium, ut quasi dilectio patris ad filium ratio praedictae donationis intelligatur. Nec potest dici quod dilectio sit ratio generationis aeternae, cum magis dilectio personalis ex generatione sit; dilectio autem essentialis ad voluntatem pertinet. Non autem conceditur quod pater genuit filium voluntate.	For this reason another interpretation is set down in the Gloss: the words in question refer to eternal generation, in which the Father gave the Son an infinite nature, so that by “spirit” is understood the spiritual divine nature. The Gloss accordingly says: “That there should be a Son just as great as the Father, the Father begot a Son equal to Himself.” But this meaning does not agree with the words that follow; for the passage continues (John 3: 3 5): “The Father loves the Son,” so that it is to be understood as if the love of the Father for the Son is the reason for the giving that is spoken of. Nor can it be said that love is the reason for the eternal generation, since personal love is rather from the generation. Essential love, of course, pertains to the will; but we do not grant that the Father begot the Son by will.
Et ideo ponitur in Glossa alius intellectus, ut referatur ad unionem verbi ad humanam naturam. Ipsum enim Dei verbum, quod est divina sapientia, singulis creaturis secundum aliquam determinatam mensuram communicatur, in quantum Deus per omnia opera sua suae sapientiae sparsit indicia, secundum illud Eccli. I, 10: effudit Deus illam, scilicet sapientiam, super omnia opera sua, et super omnem carnem, secundum datum suum, praebens illam diligentibus se. Sed humanae naturae in Christo ipsum verbum absque mensura plenarie est unitum, ut sic per spiritum qui non est ad mensuram datus, ipsum Dei verbum intelligatur; unde Glossa, ibidem, dicit: sicut pater plenum et perfectum genuit verbum, sic plenum et perfectum est unitum humanae naturae. Sed hic etiam intellectus sequentibus verbis non usquequaque concordat. Haec enim datio, de qua praemissa verba loquuntur, filio facta esse ostenditur cum subiungitur: pater diligit filium, et omnia dedit in manu eius. Per unionem autem non est aliud datum filio, sed datum est homini ut sit filius.	Still another interpretation is accordingly given in the Gloss: the statement refers to the union of the Word with the human nature. For the very Word of God, which is the divine wisdom, is communicated to each creature in some definite measure inasmuch as God has spread indications of His wisdom through all His works, according to the words of Sirach (1: 10): “And he poured her (wisdom) out upon all his works, and upon all flesh, according to his gift: and has given her to them that love him.” But the Word Itself is united to the human nature in Christ fully, without measure, so that by “the spirit” which is not given “by measure” is understood the Word of God. Hence the Gloss explains: “As the Father begot the Word full and perfect, so It is united to human nature full and perfect.” But this interpretation also does not agree in all respects with the following words. For the gift of which the words under discussion speak was made to the Son, as is shown in the words which are added (John 3:3 5): “The Father loves the Son: and has given all things into his hand.” Now by the union nothing has been given to the Son, but it has been given to a man to be the Son.
Et ideo proprie praedicta verba videntur ad gratiam habitualem pertinere, in qua scilicet spiritus sanctus animae Christi datus esse ostenditur, praesupposita unione, per quam ille homo erat filius Dei. Haec autem gratia, simpliciter loquendo, finita erat; sed quodammodo infinita.	The words in question therefore seem to refer properly to habitual grace, in which the Holy Spirit is shown to have been given to the soul of Christ, the union by which that man was the Son of God being presupposed. Now this grace, absolutely speaking, was finite; but in a certain sense it was infinite.
Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod finitum et infinitum circa quantitatem intelliguntur, ut patet per philosophum in I Physic. Est autem duplex quantitas: scilicet dimensiva, quae secundum extensionem consideratur; et virtualis, quae attenditur secundum intensionem: virtus enim rei est ipsius perfectio, secundum illud philosophi in VIII Physic.: unumquodque perfectum est quando attingit propriae virtuti. Et sic quantitas virtualis uniuscuiusque formae attenditur secundum modum suae perfectionis. Utraque autem quantitas per multa diversificatur: nam sub quantitate dimensiva continetur longitudo, latitudo, et profundum, et numerus in potentia. Quantitas autem virtualis in tot distinguitur, quot sunt naturae vel formae; quarum perfectionis modus totam mensuram quantitatis facit.	To get a clear understanding of this matter we should bear in mind that finite and infinite are taken with reference to quantity, as the Philosopher makes clear. Now there are two kinds of quantity: dimensive, which is referred to extension; and virtual, which is referred to intensity; for the excellence (virtus) of a thing is its perfection, as the Philosopher teaches: “Anything is perfect when it attains its proper excellence”; and the virtual quantity of each form is considered according to the degree of its perfection. Both kinds of quantity are differentiated into many species. Under dimensive quantity are included length, width, and depth, and potentially number. Virtual quantity is distinguished into as many classes as there are natures and forms, whose degree of perfection constitutes all the measure of quantity that they have.
Contingit autem id quod est secundum unam quantitatem finitum, esse secundum aliam infinitum. Potest enim intelligi aliqua superficies finita secundum latitudinem, et infinita secundum longitudinem. Patet etiam hoc, si accipiatur una quantitas dimensiva, et alia virtualis. Si enim intelligatur corpus album infinitum, non propter hoc albedo intensive infinita erit, sed solum extensive, et per accidens; poterit enim aliquid albius inveniri. Patet nihilominus idem, si utraque quantitas sit virtualis. Nam in uno et eodem diversa quantitas virtualis attendi potest secundum diversas rationes eorum quae de ipso praedicantur; sicut ex hoc quod dicitur ens, consideratur in eo quantitas virtualis quantum ad perfectionem essendi; et ex hoc quod dicitur sensibilis, consideratur in eo quantitas virtualis ex perfectione sentiendi; et sic de aliis.	Now it sometimes happens that what is finite as regards one sort of quantity is infinite as regards another. This is easily seen if we take dimensive quantity in both cases, for we can conceive a surface which is finite in width but infinite in length. It is also clear if we take one dimensive quantity and another virtual; for if we conceive an infinite white body, its whiteness will not on this account be infinite in intensity, but only (indirectly) in extension; for something whiter might be found. The same is no less evident if both quantities are virtual; for in one and the same subject different virtual quantities can be taken into consideration on the basis of different formalities of the attributes predicated of this subject. Thus if a thing is called a being, virtual quantity is considered in it with regard to the perfection of existing; and if it is called sentient, this quantity is considered with regard to the perfection of sensing; and so on.
Quantum igitur ad rationem essendi, infinitum esse non potest nisi illud in quo omnis essendi perfectio includitur, quae in diversis infinitis modis variari potest. Et hoc modo solus Deus infinitus est secundum essentiam; quia eius essentia non limitatur ad aliquam determinatam perfectionem, sed in se includit omnem modum perfectionis, ad quem ratio entitatis se extendere potest, et ideo ipse est infinitus secundum essentiam. Haec autem infinitas nulli creaturae competere potest: nam cuiuslibet creaturae esse est limitatum ad perfectionem propriae speciei. Si ergo intelligatur aliqua anima sensibilis quae habeat in se quidquid potest concurrere ad perfectionem sentiendi qualitercumque, illa quidem anima erit finita secundum essentiam, quia esse suum est limitatum ad aliquam perfectionem essendi, scilicet sensibilem, quam excedit perfectio intelligibilis; esset tamen infinita secundum rationem sensibilitatis, quia eius sensibilitas ad nullum determinatum modum essendi limitaretur.	With regard to the formality of existing, then, only that can be infinite which includes all the perfection of existing—a perfection which is capable of being diversified in an infinite number of different modes. In this respect only God is infinite essentially, because His act of existing is not limited to any determined perfection but embraces every mode of perfection to which the formality of being can extend. For this reason He is essentially infinite. This kind of infinity cannot apply to any creature, for the act of existing of every creature is limited to the perfection of its own species. If, then, we conceive of a sentient soul which has in it whatever can contribute in the perfection of sensing in any way whatsoever, that soul will be finite essentially, because its act of being is limited to a particular perfection of existing, namely, sentience, which is surpassed by another perfection, intelligence. Yet it would be infinite as regards the formality of sentience, because its sentience would not be limited to any definite mode of sensing.
Et similiter dico de gratia habituali Christi, quod est finita secundum essentiam, quia esse suum est limitatum ad aliquam speciem entis, scilicet ad rationem gratiae; est tamen infinita secundum rationem gratiae: quia, cum infinitis modis possit considerari perfectio alicuius quantum ad gratiam, nullus eorum defuit Christo, sed habuit in se gratiam secundum omnem plenitudinem et perfectionem ad quam ratio huius speciei, quae est gratia, potest se extendere.	In like manner I say of the habitual grace of Christ that it is essentially finite because its act of being is limited to a particular species of being, that of grace; yet it is infinite in the line of grace. For, although a person’s perfection in point of grace can be considered to be of any one of an infinite number of modes, no one of them was wanting to Christ, but He had grace in all the fullness and perfection to which the formality of this species, grace, can extend.
Et hunc intellectum manifeste ponit Glossa, ibidem, dicens: ad mensuram dat Deus spiritum hominibus: filio autem non ad mensuram; sed sicut totum ex seipso genuit filium suum, ita incarnato filio suo totum spiritum suum dedit, non particulariter, nec per subdivisionem, sed universaliter et generaliter. Et Augustinus dicit ad Dardanum, quod Christus est caput, in quo sunt omnes sensus; sed in sanctis quasi solus tactus est, quibus datus est spiritus ad mensuram.	This interpretation [of the words quoted at the beginning of this reply] the Gloss expressly sets down, saying: “God gives the spirit to men by measure, to the Son not by measure; but just as He begot His Son wholly from Himself, so to His incarnate Son He gave His spirit wholly, not in part, not by any subdivision, but universally and generally.” Augustine also says that Christ is the head, in which all the senses are located; but in the saints, to whom the spirit is given by measure, there is only, as it were, the sense of touch.
Sic ergo dicendum est, quod gratia Christi fuit finita secundum essentiam, sed infinita fuit secundum perfectionem rationis gratiae.	Thus it must be said that the grace of Christ was finite essentially, but it was infinite in the perfection of the specific formality of grace.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo patet solutio ex dictis.	1. This answer is obvious from what has been said.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod gratia est finita secundum essentiam, sed infinita secundum rationem gratiae. Potest enim Deus facere meliorem essentiam quam sit essentia gratiae, non tamen aliquid melius in genere gratiae; cum gratia Christi omnia includat ad quae ratio gratiae se potest extendere.	2. Because grace is finite essentially but infinite in the line of grace, God can make a better essence than that of grace, but nothing better in the genus of grace, since the grace of Christ includes everything to which the specific formality of grace can extend.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod capacitas creaturae dicitur secundum potentiam receptibilitatis quae est in ipsa. Est autem duplex potentia creaturae ad recipiendum. Una naturalis, quae potest tota impleri; quia haec non se extendit nisi ad perfectiones naturales. Alia est potentia obedientiae, secundum quod potest recipere aliquid a Deo; et talis capacitas non potest impleri, quia quidquid Deus de creatura faciat, adhuc remanet in potentia recipiendi a Deo. Modus autem, qui crescente bonitate crescit, sequitur magis mensuram perfectionis receptae quam capacitatis ad recipiendum.	3. The capacity of a creature is predicated on the potency of reception which it has. Now the potency of a creature to receive is of two kinds. One is natural; and this can be entirely fulfilled, because it extends only to natural perfections. The other is obediential potency, inasmuch as it can receive something from God; and such a capacity cannot be filled, because whatever God does with a creature, it still remains in potency to receive from God. Now a measure which increases when goodness increases is determined by the amount of perfection received rather than by that of the capacity to receive.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod forma est principium actus. Secundum autem quod habet esse in actu, non est possibile quod a forma cuius est essentia finita, procedat actio infinita secundum intensionem. Unde et meritum Christi non fuit infinitum secundum intensionem actus: finite enim diligebat et cognoscebat; sed habuit quamdam infinitatem ex circumstantia personae, quae erat dignitatis infinitae. Quanto enim maior est qui se humiliat, tanto eius humilitas laudabilior est.	4. Form is the principle of act; but in so far as it has existence in act, it is not possible for an action infinite in intensity to proceed from a form whose essence is finite. Hence even the merit of Christ was not infinite in the intensity of the act, for He loved and knew finitely. But it had a certain infinity from the circumstance of the person, who was of infinite dignity; for the greater the one who humbles himself, the more praiseworthy his humility is found to be.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis caritas vel gratia viatoris in infinitum augeri possit, nunquam tamen potest pervenire ad aequalitatem gratiae Christi. Quod enim finitum aliquid per continuum augmentum possit attingere ad quantumcumque finitum, veritatem habet, si accipiatur eadem ratio quantitatis in utroque finito; sicut si comparemus lineam ad lineam, vel albedinem ad albedinem; non tamen si accipiatur alia et alia ratio quantitatis. Et hoc patet in quantitate dimensiva: quantumcumque enim linea augeatur in longum, nunquam perveniet ad latitudinem superficiei.	5. Even though the charity or grace of a wayfarer can increase to infinity, it can never arrive at equality with the grace of Christ. That something finite can by a continuous increase attain to any finite degree however great, is true if the same sort of quantity is referred to in both of the finite factors (for example, if we compare a line to a line or whiteness to whiteness), but not if different sorts of quantity are referred to. This is evident in dimensive quantity; for no matter how much a line is increased in length, it will never reach the width of a surface.
Et similiter patet in quantitate virtuali vel intensiva: quantumcumque enim cognitio cognoscentis Deum per similitudinem proficiat, nunquam potest adaequari cognitioni comprehensoris, qui videt Deum per essentiam. Et similiter caritas viatoris non potest adaequari caritati comprehensoris: aliter enim aliquis afficitur ad praesentia, et aliter ad absentia. Similiter etiam quantumcumque crescat gratia alicuius hominis, qui gratiam secundum aliquam particularem participationem possidet, nunquam potest adaequare gratiam Christi, quae universaliter plena existit.	The same likewise appears in virtual or intensive quantity; for no matter how much the knowledge of one who knows God by a likeness may advance, it can never equal the knowledge of a possessor, who sees God through His essence. Similarly the charity of a wayfarer cannot equal the charity of a possessor; for a person is differently affected toward things which are present and toward those which are absent. In like manner also, however much the grace of a man who possesses grace in the line of a particular participation may increase, it can never equal the grace of Christ, which is full in every respect.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod capacitas animae Christi est finita, et potest Deus maiorem capacitatem facere, et meliorem creaturam quam sit anima Christi, si per intellectum separetur a verbo. Non tamen sequitur quod possit facere meliorem Christum, quia Christus habet ex alio bonitatem, scilicet ex unione ad verbum, ex qua parte eius bonitas maior intelligi non potest.	6. The capacity of Christ’s soul is finite, and God can make a greater capacity and a better creature than the soul of Christ if the latter is separated in thought from the Word. Yet it does not follow that He could make Christ better, because Christ has His goodness from another, that is, from union with the Word, from which point of view His goodness cannot be conceived to be greater.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad septimum.	7. The answer to this is clear from what has just been said.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod ex circumstantia personae habet anima Christi quod possit super infinita, ex quo meritum eius habet infinitatem, ut prius dictum est, in corp. articuli.	8. From the circumstance of the person Christ’s soul has power over an infinite number of things; and that is also the source from which His merit has infinity, as was said above.

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Q. 29: The Grace of Christ ARTICLE IV In the fourth article we ask: Does the grace of headship belong to Christ in his human nature? [ARTICLE III Sent., 13, 2, 1; a. 2 sol. 1; In I Cor., c. 11, lect. 1 (P 13:234b-235b); In Ephes., c. 1, lect. 8; In Coloss., c. 1, lect. 5; S.T., III, 8, 1 & 4; Comp. Theol., I, 214.]
Quarto quaeritur utrum gratia capitis conveniat Christo secundum humanam naturam	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non.	It seems that it does not, for
Capitis enim est influere in membra. Sed Christus non influit in homines secundum humanam naturam per spiritualem influxum, qui praecipue ad animas pertinet; quia, sicut dicit Glossa Augustini, Ioann., V, 21, per verbum Dei vivificantur animae; sed per verbum carnem factum vivificantur corpora. Ergo Christus secundum humanam naturam non est caput Ecclesiae.	1. It is characteristic of the head to have an influence upon the members. But Christ in His human nature does not have an influence upon men, that is, not a spiritual influence, because such an influence relates especially to the soul. For, as is brought out in the comment in the Gloss on John 5:2, taken from Augustine, souls are vitalized by the Word of God; bodies, by the Word made flesh. Therefore Christ in His human nature is not the head of the Church.
Sed dicendum, quod Christus influit in animas effective secundum divinam naturam, sed dispositive secundum humanam.- Sed contra: ministri Ecclesiae, in quantum sacramenta dispensant, ad vitam spiritualem disponunt: nam sacramentum est causa dispositiva gratiae. Sed ministri Ecclesiae non dicuntur Ecclesiae caput. Ergo nec Christus secundum hoc caput Ecclesiae dicetur.	2. It was said in answer that Christ has an influence upon souls efficiently in His divine nature and dispositively in His human nature. On the contrary, the ministers of the Church, as dispensers of the sacraments, dispose men for spiritual life; for a sacrament is a dispositive cause of grace. But the ministers of the Church are not called the head of the Church. Then neither is Christ as a dispositive cause to be called the head of the Church.
Praeterea, Ecclesia fuisset etiamsi homo non peccasset. Non autem verbum Dei humanam naturam assumpsisset, ut dicit quaedam Glossa, super illud I Tim. I, vers. 15, Christus Iesus venit in hunc mundum et cetera. Ecclesia autem sine capite esse non potest. Ergo Christus non est caput Ecclesiae secundum humanam naturam.	3. The Church would have existed even if man had not sinned, but the Word of God would not have assumed human nature, as is said in a comment in the Gloss upon the words of the first Epistle to Timothy (1: 15): “Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners.” But the Church cannot be without a head. Christ is therefore not the head of the Church in His human nature.
Sed diceretur, quod homine non peccante, Christus fuisset caput Ecclesiae in quantum est verbum Dei; post peccatum autem in quantum est verbum caro factum.- Sed contra: ad plenam reparationem humani generis requiritur quod homo non sit debitor suae salutis alicui cui prius non fuisset; et propter hoc, ut Anselmus dicit in Lib. cur Deus homo, reparatio per Angelum fieri non potuit. Sed si Christus ante peccatum fuisset caput Ecclesiae solum in quantum est verbum, homo ante peccatum nulli creaturae debitor fuisset pro sua salute; est autem post peccatum debitor Christo secundum humanam naturam, si secundum eam est caput. Ergo videtur quod non sit plena reparatio humani generis facta; quod est inconveniens.	4. It was said that, had man not sinned, Christ would have been the head of the Church inasmuch as He is the Word of God, whereas after that sin He is the head inasmuch as He is the Word made flesh.—On the contrary, for the full reparation of mankind it is required that man should not be indebted for his salvation to anyone to whom he was not previously indebted. For this reason, as Anselm says, reparation could not be made by an angel. But if Christ had been the head of the Church before only as the Word, man would not have been indebted to any creature for his salvation, whereas after his sin he is indebted to Christ in His human nature if Christ is the head in this nature. It would therefore seem that full reparation of mankind has not been effected. But that is inadmissible.
Praeterea, boni Angeli et homines ad unam Ecclesiam pertinent. Unius autem Ecclesiae unum est caput. Cum ergo Christus non sit caput bonorum Angelorum, qui nunquam peccaverunt, nec sunt ei in natura conformes, videtur quod nec hominum caput secundum humanam naturam existat.	5. The good angels and men belong to one Church. But there is one head of the one Church. Since Christ is not the head of the good angels, who have never sinned and are, moreover, not like Him in nature, it therefore seems that He is not the head of men either in His human nature.
Praeterea, caput est corporis membrum. Sed Christus, ut videtur, non est membrum Ecclesiae, quia membrum partialitatem quamdam importat, et per consequens imperfectionem. Ergo Christus non est caput Ecclesiae.	6. The head is a member of the body. Christ, however, is not a member of the Church, so it seems, because to be a member implies partiality and therefore imperfection. Christ is therefore not the head of the Church.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum in III de animalibus: cor est principium sensuum et motus et vitae. Si igitur ratione spiritualis influentiae Christo aliquod nomen debetur, magis debetur ei nomen cordis quam capitis; praecipue cum caput a corde recipiat, Christus autem a nullo Ecclesiae membro.	7. According to the Philosopher, “the heart is the source of sensation, motion, and life.” Now if Christ deserves any name by reason of a spiritual influence, it is rather heart than head, particularly since the head undergoes the influence of the heart, whereas Christ does not undergo that of any member of the Church.
Praeterea, Ecclesia est congregatio fidelium. Sed Christus non habuit fidem. Si ergo Christus sit caput Ecclesiae, non erit caput conforme membris; quod est contra rationem capitis.	8. The Church is the congregation of the faithful. But Christ did not have faith. Then if Christ is the head of the Church, He will not be like the members. But that is contrary to the notion of a head.
Praeterea, caput non est posterius membris. Sed multa membra Ecclesiae praecesserunt Christum. Ergo Christus non est caput Ecclesiae.	9. The head does not come after the members. But many of the members of the Church came before Christ. Consequently Christ is not the head of the Church.
Sed diceretur, quod quamvis Christus non esset tunc in rerum natura, erat tamen in fide patrum.- Contra: Christus, secundum quod est caput Ecclesiae, gratiam membris Ecclesiae infundit. Si ergo ad rationem capitis sufficit quod Christus sit in fide credentium, videtur quod aequalis copia gratiae fuerit in veteri testamento sicut in novo, quod est falsum.	10. The answer was given that, although Christ did not then exist in the real order of things, He did exist in the faith of the fathers.—On the contrary, as head of the Church Christ imparts grace to its members. Now if it fulfills the notion of a head that Christ existed in the faith of believers, it accordingly seems that the supply of grace in the Old Testament was equal to that in the New. But that is false.
Praeterea, quod non est, non potest agere. Sed Christus quando erat in fide patrum tantum, non habebat esse in seipso secundum humanam naturam. Ergo non poterat influere, et ita non poterat esse caput.	11. What does not exist cannot act. But when Christ existed only in the faith of the fathers, He did not have existence in Himself in His human nature. He could therefore not exercise influence, and so could not be the head.
Praeterea, omnis propositio cuius subiectum est res rationis et praedicatum est res naturae, est falsa; sicut si dicatur, quod genus vel species currit. Sed Christus, secundum quod est in fide, significatur ut res rationis. Cum igitur esse caput vel influere dicat rem naturae, videtur quod haec propositio sit falsa: Christus, secundum quod est in fide, est caput Ecclesiae.	12. Every proposition whose subject is a conceptual being and the predicate is a real being is false; for example, if one were to say that a genus or species runs. But as existing in faith Christ is designated as a conceptual being. Since to be head or to exercise influence implies a real being, it therefore seems that the proposition “As existing in faith Christ is the head of the Church” is false.
Praeterea, unius corporis unum est caput. Sed Christus est caput Ecclesiae secundum divinitatem. Non ergo secundum humanitatem.	13. There is one head of one body. But Christ is the head of the Church in His divinity. Then He is not the head in His humanity.
Praeterea, capitis non est caput. Sed caput Christi est Deus; I Cor. XI, 3. Ergo Christus non est caput Ecclesiae.	14. A head does not have a head. But God is Christ’s head (1 Corinthians 11:3). Christ is therefore not the head of the Church.
Praeterea, de ratione capitis est quod habeat omnes sensus qui sunt in corpore, ut dicit Augustinus ad Dardanum. Sed aliquis sensus spiritualis est in Ecclesia qui non in Christo, scilicet fides et spes. Ergo Christus non est caput Ecclesiae.	15. It belongs to the notion of a head to have all the senses that there are in the body, as Augustine points out. But there are some spiritual senses in the Church that are not in Christ, namely, faith and hope. Christ is therefore not the head of the Church.
Praeterea, Ephes. I, 22, super illud: ipsum dedit caput supra omnem Ecclesiam, dicit Glossa; illi subiiciuntur tamquam capiti a quo habent originem. Non tamen habent originem homines et Angeli a Christo secundum humanam naturam, sed secundum divinam. Ergo Christus non est caput Ecclesiae secundum humanam naturam, sed secundum divinam.	16. On the words of the Epistle to the Ephesians (1: 2 2): “He has... made him head...” the Gloss comments: “Things are subjected to Him as their head, from whom they originate.” Now men and angels do not originate from Christ in His human nature but in His divine nature. Consequently Christ is the head of the Church not in His human but in His divine nature.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in libro LXXXIII quaestionum, quod illuminare animas est actus soli Deo conveniens. Ergo non convenit Christo secundum humanam naturam. Ergo Christus secundum humanam naturam non est caput Ecclesiae.	17. Augustine says that to enlighten souls is an act proper to God alone. It is therefore not proper to Christ in His human nature. Consequently Christ in His human nature is not the head of the Church.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Ephes. I, 22, super illud: ipsum dedit caput super omnem Ecclesiam, dicit Glossa: secundum humanitatem.	1. To the words of the Epistle to the Ephesians (1:22): “He has... made him head over all the church,” the Gloss adds: “in His humanity.”
Praeterea, capitis ad corpus est unio secundum conformitatem naturae. Non autem est conformitas Christi ad Ecclesiam secundum divinam naturam, sed secundum humanam naturam. Ergo Christus secundum humanam naturam est caput Ecclesiae.	2. The union of the head with the body is based upon a conformity in nature. Now Christ’s conformity to the Church is not in His divine nature but in His human nature. Therefore Christ in His human nature is the head of the Church.
Respondeo.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod in spiritualibus caput dicitur per transumptionem a capite corporis naturalis: et ideo consideranda est habitudo capitis ad membra, ut appareat qualiter Christus sit Ecclesiae caput.	The term head as applied to spiritual beings is taken in a transferred sense from the head of a physical body. To see in what sense Christ is the head of the Church we must accordingly consider the relationship of a head to the members of a body.
Invenitur autem caput ad alia membra esse in duplici habitudine: scilicet distinctionis et conformitatis. Distinctionis quidem quantum ad dignitatem, quia caput plene possidet omnes sensus, non autem alia membra. Secundo ratione gubernationis, quia caput omnia alia membra in suis actibus gubernat et regulat tam per sensus exteriores quam per interiores, qui in capite sedem habent. Tertio ratione causalitatis: nam caput influit omnibus membris sensum et motum: unde et medici dicunt, nervos a capite originem ducere, et quidquid pertinet ad vires animales apprehensivas et motivas. Invenitur etiam triplex conformitas capitis ad membra. Prima quidem secundum naturam; nam caput et cetera membra partes sunt unius naturae. Secunda ratione ordinis; est enim quaedam unio ordinis inter caput et membra, in quantum membra subserviunt sibi invicem, secundum quod dicitur I Corinth. XII, 14 sqq. Tertia est ratione continuitatis; nam caput ceteris membris in corpore naturali continuatur. Secundum has ergo conformitates et distinctiones, nomen capitis diversimode secundum metaphoram diversis attribuitur.	The head is found to stand in a twofold relationship of distinction and conformity to the other members. There is distinction in three respects: (1) in point of dignity, because the head fully possesses all the senses, but the other members do not; (2) in point of government, because the head governs and regulates all the other members in their acts by means of both the external and the internal senses, which have their seat in the head; (3) in point of causality, for the head causes sensation and motion in all the members, and hence physicians say that the nerves Aid everything pertaining to the apprehensive and motive powers of animals originate in the head. The conformity of the head to the members is also found to be threefold: (1) in nature, for the head and the rest of the members are parts of one nature; (2) in order, for there is a union of order between the head and the members inasmuch as the members are of service to each other, as is pointed out in the first Epistle to the Corinthians(12:25); (3) in continuity, for the head is continuous with the other members in a physical body. In accordance with these points of conformity and distinction the term head is attributed metaphorically to different beings in different ways.
Quaedam enim sunt inter quae est conformitas secundum naturam: et in his alicui eorum nomen capitis attribuitur ratione solius eminentiae seu dignitatis, sicut dicitur leo caput esse animalium, vel civitas aliqua caput regni, ratione suae dignitatis: Isa. VII, 8: caput Syriae Damascus. Quaedam vero habent conformitatem ad invicem secundum ordinis unionem, quia scilicet ad unum finem ordinantur: et istis attribuitur nomen capitis ratione gubernationis, quae est per ordinem ad finem; et sic principes dicuntur capita populi, secundum illud Amos VI, 1: optimates capita populorum. Sed ubi est continuitas, dicitur caput ratione influentiae, sicut fons dicitur caput fluminis.	There are some things among which there is conformity in nature. To one of these the term head is attributed only by reason of its eminence or dignity. Thus the lion is said to be the head of the animal kingdom, or a certain city is called the head of the realm because of its dignity. Isaiah (7:8), for instance, says: “The head of Syria is Damascus.” Certain other things have mutual conformity in a union of order, being ordained to one end. Among these the term head is attributed by reason of government, which is concerned with the relation to an end. Thus princes are called the heads of the people. For example, it is written in Amos (6:1): “You great men, heads of the people...” But where there is continuity, head is predicated by reason of influence, as a spring is called the head of a river.
Et istis tribus modis Christus secundum humanam naturam dicitur Ecclesiae caput. Est enim eiusdem naturae secundum speciem cum ceteris hominibus; et sic competit ei caput ratione dignitatis, secundum quod gratia in eo abundantior invenitur. Est etiam in Ecclesia invenire ordinis unitatem, secundum quod membra Ecclesiae sibi invicem deserviunt, et ordinantur in Deum; et sic Christus dicitur Ecclesiae caput ut gubernator. Est etiam in Ecclesia continuitas quaedam ratione spiritus sancti, qui unus et idem numero totam Ecclesiam replet et unit; unde etiam et Christus secundum humanam naturam dicitur caput ratione influentiae.	In these three different ways Christ in His human nature is called the head of the Church. He is of specifically the same nature as other men; and so the name head belongs to Him by reason of His dignity, on the grounds that grace is found more abundantly in Him. In the Church we also find a unity of order, since the members of the Church are of service to each other and are ordained to God; and in this respect Christ is called the head of the Church as its ruler. We also find in the Church a certain continuity by reason of the Holy Spirit, who, being one and numerically the same, fills and unites the whole Church. Christ in His human nature is accordingly called the head by reason of His influence.
Sed ad spiritualem sensum et modum potest aliquis intelligi influere dupliciter. Uno modo sicut principale agens: et sic solius Dei est influere gratiam in membra Ecclesiae. Alio modo instrumentaliter: et sic etiam humanitas Christi causa est influentiae praedictae; quia, ut Damascenus dicit, sicut ferrum urit propter ignem sibi coniunctum, ita actiones humanitatis Christi erant propter divinitatem unitam, cuius quasi organum erat ipsa humanitas. Et hoc ad rationem capitis sufficere videtur. Nam et caput naturalis corporis non influit in membra nisi ratione latentis virtutis.	In causing spiritual sensation and motion a thing can be understood to be operative in two ways: (1) As a principal agent. In this way it belongs to God alone to pour grace into the members of the Church. (2) Instrumentally. In this way the humanity of Christ also is the cause of that in-pouring. For as Damascene says, just as iron burns because of the fire joined to it, the actions of Christ’s humanity were salutary” because of the divinity united to it, of which the humanity was like an instrument. This seems to be enough for the notion of a head. For even the head of a physical body does not exercise its influence upon the members except by reason of its latent power.
Christus tamen secundum duas ultimas conditiones capitis potest dici caput Angelorum secundum humanam naturam, et caput utrorumque secundum divinam; non autem secundum primam, nisi accipiatur communitas quantum ad naturam generis, secundum quod homo et Angelus in natura rationali conveniunt, et ulterius communitas analogiae, secundum quod filio cum omnibus creaturis commune est a patre accipere, ut Basilius dicit, ratione cuius dicitur primogenitus omnis creaturae, Coloss. I, vers. 15.	In the second and third respects in which something is called a head Christ in His human nature can be called the head of the angels, and He can be called the head of both angels and men in His divine nature; but not in the first respect, unless we take the community involved to be based on their generic nature, seeing that man and the angels have in common the rationality of their nature; and in addition a community of analogy, seeing that, as Basil points out, the Son has in common with all creatures the reception of His nature from the Father, by reason of which He is called “the firstborn of every creature” (Colossians 1:15).
Ut ergo proprie loquamur, Christus totus secundum utramque naturam simul est caput totius Ecclesiae secundum tres conditiones praedictas; et per has tres conditiones apostolus probat, ad Coloss. I, 18-20, Christum Ecclesiae caput, sic dicens: ipse est caput corporis Ecclesiae, qui est principium, primogenitus ex mortuis, ut sit in omnibus ipse primatum tenens, quoad gubernationem; quia in ipso complacuit omnem plenitudinem habitare, quoad dignitatem; et per eum reconciliare omnia, quoad influentiam.	If, then, we are to speak properly, the whole Christ in both of His natures together is the head of the whole Church in the three respects mentioned. And the Apostle proves that Christ is the head of the Church in these three respects, saying (Colossians 1:18-20): “He is the head of the body, the church— who is the beginning, the firstborn from the dead, that in all things he may hold the primacy” (referring to government): “because in him, it has well pleased the Father that all fullness should dwell” (referring to dignity): “and through him to reconcile all things” (referring to influence).
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod vivificare tam animas quam corpora attribuitur divinitati verbi sicut principaliter agenti, humanitati vero sicut instrumento. Attribuitur tamen vita animarum divinitati verbi, et vita corporum humanitati, per quamdam appropriationem, ut attendatur conformitas inter caput et membra; sicut dicitur quod passio est causa remissionis culpae, et resurrectio causa iustificationis.	1. Vitalizing both souls and bodies is attributed to the divinity of the Word as the principal agent and to the humanity as an instrument. The life of souls, however, is attributed to the divinity of the Word and the life of bodies to the humanity by a kind of appropriation in order to bring out the conformity between the head and the members, in the same way in which the passion is called the cause of the forgiveness of sin, and the resurrection, the cause of justification.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod alii ministri Ecclesiae non disponunt nec operantur ad spiritualem vitam quasi ex propria virtute, sed virtute aliena; Christus autem virtute propria. Et inde est quod Christus poterat per seipsum effectum sacramentorum praebere, quia tota efficacia sacramentorum in eo originaliter erat; non autem hoc possunt alii qui sunt Ecclesiae ministri; unde non possunt dici caput, nisi forte ratione gubernationis, sicut quilibet princeps dicitur caput.	2. The other ministers of the Church neither dispose men for spiritual life nor contribute to it by their own power but do so by the power of another, whereas Christ does this by His own power. This is why Christ could bring about the effects of the sacraments by Himself, for the whole efficacy of the sacraments was in Him as its origin; but the other ministers of the Church cannot do so. Hence they cannot be called the head unless perhaps by reason of governing, in the same sense as any prince is called a head.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod supposita illa opinione, quod Christus non fuisset incarnatus, si homo non peccasset; Christus ante peccatum fuisset caput Ecclesiae secundum divinam naturam solum; sed post peccatum oportet quod sit Ecclesiae caput etiam secundum humanam. Nam per peccatum natura humana vulnerata est, et ad sensibilia demersa, ut ad invisibilem verbi gubernationem non sit sufficienter idonea. Unde oportuit medicinam vulneri adhiberi per humanitatem Christi, per quam Christus satisfecit; et oportuit quod visibilem naturam assumeret, ut per visibilem gubernationem ad invisibilia homo revocaretur.	3. If we assume the opinion that Christ would not have become incarnate if man had not sinned, then before the sin Christ would have been the head of the Church in His divine nature alone, but since the sin He must be the head of the Church in His human nature as well. For by sin human nature has been wounded and immersed in sensible things so that it is no longer sufficiently suited to the invisible government of the Word. For this reason medicine had to be applied to the wound through Christ’s humanity, through which He made atonement. He also had to assume a visible nature in order that man might be recalled to invisible things through a visible exercise of government.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod humana natura quamdam infinitatem dignitatis sortitur ex hoc ipso quod divinae unita est in persona; ut non sit iniuriosum homini quod Christo secundum humanam naturam debitor efficiatur suae salutis, quia humana natura operatur per virtutem divinae, ut dictum est in corp., art.; unde et una veneratione Christum in utraque natura veneramur, scilicet latria.	4. Christ’s human nature takes on a certain infinity in dignity by being united to the divine nature personally. As a result it is not insulting to man to be indebted for his salvation to Christ in His human nature, because the human nature works by the power of the divine, as has been said. Thus we venerate Christ in both His natures with the same veneration, that of latria.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod Christus non solum secundum divinam naturam, sed etiam secundum humanam, est Angelorum caput; quia eos illuminat secundum humanam naturam, ut Dionysius dicit, VI capit. de Divin. nominibus, unde et ad Coloss. I, 16, dicitur, quod ipse est caput omnis principatur et potestatis. Sed tamen humanitas Christi aliter se habet ad Angelos quam ad homines quantum ad duo. Primo quantum ad naturae conformitatem, per quam est in eadem specie cum hominibus, non autem cum Angelis. Secundo quantum ad finem incarnationis; quae quidem principaliter facta est propter hominum liberationem a peccato; et sic humanitas Christi ordinatur ad influentiam quam facit in homines, sicut ad finem intentum; influxus autem in Angelos non est ut finis incarnationis, sed ut incarnationem consequens.	5. Christ is the head of the angels not only in His divine nature but also in His human nature, because even in His human nature He enlightens them, as Dionysius teaches.”Thus He is said in the Epistle to the Colossians (1:16) to be the head of all principalities and powers. Yet Christ’s humanity is related differently to angels than to men in two respects: (1) as to His conformity in nature, being in the same species as men but not as the angels; (2) as to the end of the Incarnation, which was carried out principally for the sake of man’s liberation from sin; and so Christ’s humanity is ordained to the influence which He exercises upon men as the end intended, whereas His influence upon the angels is not the end of the Incarnation but a consequence of the Incarnation.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod Christus ab apostolo, expresse dicitur Ecclesiae membrum I Corinth. XII, 27: vos estis corpus Christi et membrum de membro. Dicitur autem membrum ratione distinctionis ab aliis Ecclesiae membris. Distinguitur autem ab aliis membris ratione suae perfectionis, quia in Christo est universaliter gratia, non autem in aliquo aliorum; sicut et caput corporis naturalis ab aliis membris distinguitur. Unde non oportet quod Christo attribuatur aliqua imperfectio.	6. Christ is expressly said by the Apostle (1 Corinthians 12:27) to be a member of the Church: “You are the body of Christ and members of member.” Now He is called a member by reason of His distinction from the other members of the Church, but He is distinguished from the other members by reason of His perfection (because grace is in Christ in its fullness, but not in any one of the others), just as the head of a physical body is distinguished from the other members. Hence there is no need of attributing any imperfection to Christ.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod cor est membrum latens, caput autem apparens; unde per cor potest significari divinitas Christi, vel spiritus sancti; per caput autem ipse Christus secundum naturam visibilem, cui natura divinitatis invisibilis influit.	7. The heart is a hidden member, but the head is apparent. By the heart, accordingly, the divinity of Christ or the Holy Spirit can be meant; but by the head, Christ Himself in His visible nature, which is under the influence of the nature of the invisible divinity.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod Christus habuit cognitionem perfectam eorum de quibus alii fidem habent; et ita quantum ad cognitionem aliis conformatur sicut perfectum imperfecto. Talis autem conformitas inter caput et membrum attenditur.	8. Christ had perfect knowledge of the things about which others have faith. Thus as regards knowledge He is conformed to the others as the perfect to the imperfect. That is the sort of conformity that is conceived between the head and the members.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod Christus, secundum quod homo, mediator est inter Deum et homines, ut dicitur I Tim. II, 5. Unde, sicut Deus dupliciter nos iustificare dicitur, principaliter scilicet per actionem suam, in quantum est causa efficiens nostrae salutis, et etiam per operationem nostram in quantum est finis a nobis cognitus et amatus; ita etiam Christus, secundum quod homo, dupliciter nos iustificare dicitur. Uno modo secundum suam actionem, in quantum nobis meruit et pro nobis satisfecit; et quantum ad hoc non poterat dici caput Ecclesiae ante incarnationem. Alio modo per operationem nostram in ipsum secundum quod dicimur per fidem eius iustificari; et per hunc modum etiam poterat esse caput Ecclesiae ante incarnationem secundum humanitatem. Utroque autem modo est caput Ecclesiae secundum divinitatem, et ante et post.	9. Christ as man is the mediator between God and men, as is said in the first Epistle to Timothy (2:5). Now God is said to justify us in two ways: principally by His own action inasmuch as He is the efficient cause of our salvation, and also by our operation inasmuch as He is the end known and loved by us. In the same way, then, Christ as man is said to justify us in two ways: (1) By His own action, inasmuch as He merited and atoned for us. In this respect He could not be called the head of the Church before the Incarnation. (2) By our operation in His regard, in the sense that we are said to be justified by faith in Him. In this respect He could be the head of the Church in His humanity even before the Incarnation. In both ways, moreover, He is the head of the Church in His divinity, both before and after the Incarnation.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod quia nondum erat meritum Christi in actu, nec satisfactio ante incarnationem; ideo non erat tanta gratiae plenitudo sicut et post.	10. Because the merit of Christ was not yet actual, nor was there atonement before the Incarnation, there was not the same fullness of grace as there was afterwards.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod Christo convenit ratio capitis non solum per actionem suam sed per actionem nostram in ipsum; unde ratio non sequitur.	11. Christ has a claim to the title of head not only by His own action, but also by our action in His regard. The argument therefore proves nothing.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod esse caput vel influere per operationem nostram in ipsum, in quantum in eum credimus, non est praedicatum quod sit res naturae, sed quod sit res rationis; unde ratio non sequitur.	12. The predicates “to be the head” or “to exercise influence” in the sense of “through our operation in His regard, inasmuch as we believe in Him” are not real beings but only conceptual. Hence the conclusion does not follow.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod Deus et homo unus est Christus; unde per hoc quod Christus est caput secundum humanitatem et secundum divinitatem, non sequitur quod Ecclesia habeat duo capita.	13. “The one Christ is God and man.” Consequently, from the fact that Christ is the head of the Church in His humanity and in His divinity it cannot be concluded that the Church has two heads.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod non secundum eamdem rationem omnino dicitur Deus caput Christi, et Christus caput Ecclesiae; unde ratio procedit quasi ex aequivocatione.	14. We do not say in exactly the same sense that God is the head of Christ and that Christ is the head of the Church. The difficulty is therefore arguing from an equivocation.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod quidquid est perfectionis in fide et spe, totum convenit Christo: solum autem quantum ad id quod imperfectionis est, de ipso negatur.	15. Whatever perfection there is in faith and hope belongs to Christ in its entirety. Only the imperfection which they contain is denied in His regard.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod licet Christus uno modo sit caput secundum divinitatem, non tamen removetur quin sit caput alio modo secundum humanitatem: quia ab ipso Christo secundum humanitatem, spiritualem originem sumimus, secundum illud Io. I, 16: de plenitudine eius omnes accepimus.	16. Although in one respect Christ is the head in His divinity, the possibility of His being the head in His humanity in another respect is not thereby removed; for we draw our spiritual origin from Christ in His humanity, as is written in John (1:16): “Of His fullness we have all received.”
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod solius Dei est illuminare animas principaliter et effective; sic autem humanitas Christi spiritualiter non influit in nos, sed alio modo, ut dictum est.	17. It is proper to God alone to enlighten souls principally and effectively. It is not in this sense that Christ in His humanity has a spiritual influence upon us, but in another, as has been said.

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Q. 29: The Grace of Christ ARTICLE V In the fifth article we ask: Is any habitual grace required in Christ for him to be the head? [ARTICLE III Sent., 13, 3, 2 sol. 1 & 2; In Joan., c. 1, lect. 8, §3 (P 10:308ab); S.T., III, 8, 5.]
Quinto quaeritur utrum in Christo requiratur aliqua habitualis gratia ad hoc quod sit caput	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non.	It seems that it is not, for
Quia apostolus ad Coloss. I, 19, ex hoc ponit in Christo capitis rationem, quia complacuit in ipso omnem plenitudinem inhabitare, ut in auctoritate supradicta, art. praeced. in fine, patet. Sed omnis plenitudo divinitatis Christum inhabitavit ex unione. Ergo praeter unionem non requiritur alia gratia ad hoc quod sit caput.	1. The Apostle in writing to the Colossians (1: 19) places the headship in Christ “because in him, it has well pleased the Father that all fullness should dwell,” as appears in the passage quoted above. But all the fullness of the divinity dwells in Christ from the union. Besides the union, then, no grace is required for Him to be the head.
Praeterea, Christus caput Ecclesiae est secundum quod ad nostram salutem operatur. Operatio autem humanitatis eius salutem nobis contulit, ut Damascenus dicit, secundum quod humanitas quasi instrumentum divinitatis erat. Cum igitur in instrumento non requiratur aliquis habitus, sed tantum motum a principali agente movetur; videtur quod in Christo, ad hoc quod esset caput Ecclesiae, nulla habitualis gratia requireretur.	2. Christ is the head of the Church in so far as He works for our salvation. But, as Damascene says, the action of His humanity conferred salvation upon us inasmuch as the humanity was in a way “the instrument of the divinity.” Now since an instrument does not require any habit but moves only when moved by the principal agent, it seems that Christ did not require habitual grace in order to be the head.
Praeterea, dupliciter alicuius hominis actio alteri potest esse salubris. Uno modo secundum quod agit ut persona singularis: et sic ad hoc quod eius actio sibi vel alteri meritoria esse possit, requiritur gratia. Alio modo ut persona communis: et sic sunt ministri Ecclesiae, qui sacramenta dispensando, et per orationes quas ex persona Ecclesiae Deo fundunt ad salutem aliorum operantur; et ad hoc non requiritur aliqua gratia, sed solummodo potestas vel status; fiunt enim huiusmodi non solum per bonos, sed etiam per malos. Christus autem, in quantum est Ecclesiae caput, consideratur ut persona communis, cuius vicem obtinent omnes Ecclesiae ministri. Ergo ad hoc quod esset caput, habituali gratia non indigebat.	3. The action of one man can contribute to the salvation of another in two ways: (1) Inasmuch as he acts as an individual person. Then grace is required in order that his action may be meritorious for himself or for another. (2) As a person representing the community. This applies to the ministers of the Church, who work for the salvation of others by administering the sacraments and pouring forth prayers to God in the name of the Church. No grace is needed for this but only a power or state, for such actions are performed not only by good but also by wicked men. Now Christ as head of the Church is considered as a person representing the community, and all the ministers of the Church are His vicars. He therefore had no need of habitual grace in order to be the head.
Praeterea, Christus fuit caput Ecclesiae secundum quod eius meritum fuit infinitum; sic enim in omnia membra Ecclesiae influere potuit ad deletionem omnium peccatorum. Sed meritum eius infinitatem non habuit ex gratia habituali, quae finita erat. Ergo Christus non fuit caput ratione alicuius habitualis gratiae.	4. Christ was the head of the Church because His merit was infinite. Thus He was able to exercise an influence upon all the members of the Church and wipe out their sins. But He did not get the infinity of His merit from habitual grace, which was finite. Christ was therefore not the head by reason of any habitual grace.
Praeterea, Christus est caput Ecclesiae, in quantum est Dei et hominum mediator. Sed mediator Dei et hominum est, in quantum est medius inter Deum et homines, habens cum Deo divinitatem, cum hominibus humanitatem; quod quidem est per unionem. Ergo sola unio absque habituali gratia sufficit ad capitis rationem.	5. Christ is the head of the Church inasmuch as He is the “mediator of God and man” (1 Timothy 2:5). But He is the mediator of God and man inasmuch as He is intermediate between God and men, having divinity with God and humanity with men. Now this comes from the union. Consequently the union alone without habitual grace is enough for the headship.
Praeterea, unius subiecti una est vita. Gratia autem est vita animae. Ergo in una anima est una gratia. Et ita in Christo, praeter gratiam quae est eius ut est singularis persona, non requiritur aliqua habitualis gratia, per quam sit caput.	6. One subject has one life. But grace is the life of the soul. In one soul there is therefore one grace; and so in Christ besides the grace which is His as an individual person there is not required any other habitual grace by which He is the head.
Praeterea, ex hoc Christus est caput quod influit in Ecclesiae membra. Sed Christus influere non posset quantumcumque gratiam haberet, nisi esset Deus et homo. Ergo non requiritur gratia habitualis, per quam sit caput; sed hoc ex sola unione habet.	7. Christ is the head because He influences the members of the Church. But no matter how much grace He had, He could not influence them unless He were God and man. Consequently no habitual grace by which He is the head is required, but He has this position from the union alone.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Est quod dicitur Io. I, 16: de plenitudine eius nos omnes accepimus gratiam pro gratia; et ita gratiam aliquam habuit, per quam in nos gratiam refudit.	1. There are the words of John (1:16): “Of His fullness we all have received: and grace for grace.” Thus He had some grace by which He in turn poured out grace upon us.
Praeterea, caput corporis mystici similitudinem habet cum capite corporis naturalis. Sed ad perfectionem corporis naturalis requiritur quod sit in eo vis sensitiva plenissime, ad hoc quod sensum in membra refundere possit. Ergo in Christo, ad hoc quod sit caput, requiritur gratiae plenitudo.	2. The head of the Mystical Body has some resemblance to the head of a physical body. But for the perfection of a physical body it is required that the power of sensation be in the head most fully in order that it can communicate sensation to the members. In Christ too, then, for Him to be the head the fullness of grace is required.
Praeterea, Dionysius, II cap. caelestis hierarchiae, dicit, quod illi qui sunt alios illuminantes, perficientes et purgantes, praehabent lumen, puritatem et perfectionem. Sed Christus in quantum est caput Ecclesiae, purgat, illuminat et perficit. Ergo oportet, ad hoc quod sit caput, quod in eo sit gratiae plenitudo, per quam sit purus, lucidus et perfectus.	3. Dionysius says that those who have the office of enlightening, perfecting, and cleansing others first have light, cleanness, and perfection themselves. But as head of the Church Christ cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. In order to be the head, therefore, He must have the fullness of grace, by which He is pure, full of light, and perfect.
Respondeo.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Damascenus, humanitas Christi quasi instrumentum divinitatis fuit; et ideo actiones eius nobis poterant esse salubres. In quantum ergo speciale divinitatis instrumentum fuit, oportuit quamdam specialem coniunctionem ipsius ad divinitatem esse.	As Damascene says, the humanity of Christ in some sense “was the instrument of the divinity”; and for this reason His actions could be salutary for us. Inasmuch as it was the instrument of the divinity, then, it had to have a special connection with the divinity.
Unaquaeque autem substantia tanto a Deo plenius bonitatem eius participat, quanto ad eius bonitatem appropinquat, ut patet per Dionysium, XII cap. caelestis hierarchiae. Unde et humanitas Christi, ex hoc ipso quod prae aliis vicinius et specialius divinitati erat coniuncta, excellentius bonitatem divinam participavit per gratiae donum.	The closer a substance stands to the goodness of God, the more fully it participates in His goodness, as Dionysius makes clear. Consequently the humanity of Christ also, because it is connected with the divinity more closely than the others and in a more special way, has participated in the divine goodness through the gift of grace in a more excellent way.
Ex quo idoneitas in ea fuit ut non solum gratiam haberet, sed etiam per eam gratia in alios transfunderetur, sicut per corpora magis lucentia lumen solis ad alia transit. Et quia Christus in omnes creaturas rationales quodammodo effectus gratiarum influit, inde est quod ipse est principium quodammodo omnis gratiae secundum humanitatem, sicut Deus est principium omnis esse: unde, sicut in Deo omnis essendi perfectio adunatur, ita in Christo omnis gratiae plenitudo et virtutis invenitur, per quam non solum ipse possit in gratiae opus, sed etiam alios in gratiam adducere. Et per hoc habet capitis rationem.	As a result there was a fitness in this humanity not only to have grace but also to communicate it to other beings, as the most shining bodies transmit the light of the sun to others. And because in some sense Christ communicates the effects of grace to all rational creatures, this is why He is in some sense the source of all grace in His humanity, just as God is the source of all being. Then, as all the perfection of being is united in God, in Christ the fullness of all grace and virtue is found, and because of it He not only is capable of the work of grace Himself but can bring others to grace. For this reason He has the headship.
In capite enim naturali non solum est vis sensitiva, ad hoc quod sentiat per visum, auditum et tactum, et huiusmodi sensus; sed etiam est in eo ut in radice, a qua in alia membra sensus effluunt. Sic ergo una et eadem gratia habitualis in Christo dicitur unionis, in quantum congruit naturae divinitati unitae: et capitis, in quantum per eam fit refusio in alios ad salutem; singularis vero personae, in quantum ad opera meritoria perficiebat.	In a physical head there is not only the power of sensing, in order that it may sense by sight, hearing, and touch and such senses; but this power is in it in such a way that it is the root from which sensation flows into all the other members. In Christ, accordingly, one and the same habitual grace is called the grace of union as befitting a nature united to the divinity, and the grace of headship as the means by which grace is communicated to others for their salvation, and also the grace of an individual person as perfecting Him for meritorious works.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in Christo intelligitur duplex plenitudo: una divinitatis, secundum quam Christus est plenus Deus; alia gratiae, secundum quam dicitur plenus gratiae et veritatis: et de hac plenitudine loquitur apostolus ad Coloss. I, 19; de prima autem Coloss. II, 9. Haec autem secunda a prima derivatur, et per eam gratia capitis completur.	1. In Christ two different kinds of fullness are referred to: one, of the divinity, according to which Christ is fully God; and the other, of grace, according to which He is said to be full of grace and truth. It is of this latter fullness that the Apostle speaks in Colossians 1:18-20, and of the former in Colossians 2:9. The second is derived from the first and by it the grace of headship is formally constituted.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod instrumentum inanimatum, quale est securis, habitu non indiget; instrumentum autem animatum, quale est servus, indiget: et tale instrumentum divinitatis est humana natura in Christo.	2. An inanimate instrument such as an ax does not need a habit; but an animate instrument such as a servant does. The human nature in Christ is such an instrument.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod minister Ecclesiae non agit in sacramentis quasi ex propria virtute, sed ex virtute alterius, scilicet Christi; et ideo in eo non requiritur gratia personalis, sed solum auctoritas ordinis, per quam quasi Christi vicarius constituitur. Christus autem operatus est nostram salutem quasi ex propria virtute, et ideo oportuit quod in eo esset gratiae plenitudo.	3. A minister of the Church does not act in the sacraments by his own power but by the power of another, that is, Christ. The minister accordingly does not need personal grace but only the authority of orders, by which he is constituted the vicar of Christ. But Christ wrought our salvation by His own power. The fullness of grace was therefore necessary in Him.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis meritum Christi quamdam infinitatis rationem habeat ex dignitate personae, tamen rationem meriti habet ex gratia habituali, sine qua meritum esse non potest.	4. Although Christ’s merit has a certain infinity from the dignity of the person, it gets its meritoriousness from habitual grace, without which there cannot be any merit.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod Christus est mediator Dei et hominum etiam secundum humanam naturam, in quantum cum hominibus habet passibilitatem, cum Deo vero iustitiam, quae est in eo per gratiam: et ideo requiritur praeter unionem habitualis gratia in Christo ad hoc quod sit mediator et caput.	5. Christ is the mediator between God and men even in His human nature, in so far as He has passibility together with men, and justice together with God. But His justice is in Him by means of grace. For this reason besides the union there is required habitual grace in Christ in order that He may be the mediator and the head.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod una et eadem gratia habitualis diversa ratione est gratia capitis et singularis personae et unionis, per modum superius dictum, in corp. art.	6. One and the same habitual grace is from different points of view the grace of the head, the grace of an individual person, and the grace of union, as was explained above.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod licet in Christo requiratur, ad hoc quod sit caput, utraque natura; tamen ex ipsa unione divinae naturae ad humanam sequitur in humana quaedam gratiae plenitudo, ex qua in alios redundantia fiat a capite Christo.	7. Although both natures are required in Christ for Him to be the head, from the union of the divine nature with the human there results in the human nature a certain fullness of grace, which issues in an overflow from Christ the head into others.

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Q. 29: The Grace of Christ ARTICLE VI In the sixth article we ask: Could Christ merit? [ARTICLE III Sent., 18, a. 2; a. 4 sol. 1-3; a. 5; S.T., III, 19, 3; Comp. theol., I, 231.]
Sexto quaeritur utrum Christus mereri potuerit	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non.	It seems that He could not, for
Omne enim meritum ex libertate arbitrii procedit, quia indeterminate se habet ad multa. Sed liberum arbitrium in Christo determinate se habebat ad bonum. Ergo mereri non potuit.	1. All merit proceeds from free choice, which is undetermined with regard to many things. But in Christ free choice is determined to good. He therefore could not merit.
Praeterea, quae est comparatio recipientis ad receptum, eadem est comparatio merentis ad praemium: quia ad hoc meretur aliquis ut recipiat quod meretur. Sed recipiens debet esse denudatum a recepto, ut patet in Lib. de anima. Ergo ille qui meretur, debet esse absque praemio: quod de Christo dici non potest, cum ipse fuerit verus comprehensor. Ergo videtur quod Christus mereri non potuit.	2. The relation of the one meriting to the reward is the same as that of a recipient to the thing received, because a person merits in order to receive what he merits. But “the recipient must be devoid of the thing received,” as is made clear in The Soul. Then one who merits must be without reward. But that cannot be said of Christ, since He was a true possessor. It therefore seems that Christ could not merit.
Praeterea, id quod debetur alicui, non oportet quod mereatur. Sed ex hoc ipso quod Christus comprehensor erat, debebatur ei impassibilitas mentis et corporis. Ergo ista non meruit.	3. Whatever is due to someone does not have to be merited. But because Christ was a possessor, impassibility of mind and body was due Him. He therefore did not merit these.
Praeterea, meritum non est respectu eorum quae necessario consequuntur quasi naturali ordine; quia meritum est respectu eius quod ex voluntate alterius redditur quasi merces. Sed gloria corporis quodam naturali ordine ex gloria animae habetur per Augustinum in epistola ad Dioscorum. Ergo cum Christus esset beatus quantum ad animam, utpote qui divinitate fruebatur; videtur quod gloriam corporis mereri non potuerit.	4. Merit does not have to do with events that occur necessarily as if by a natural sequence, because merit concerns that which is voluntarily given by another in return for something as its recompense. But the glory of the body comes from the glory of the soul by a certain natural sequence, as is seen from Augustine. Since Christ was blessed in His soul, enjoying as He did the possession of the divinity, it seems that He could not merit the glory of the body.
Praeterea, sicut Christus ante passionem habuit gloriam animae et non corporis, ita et sancti qui nunc sunt in gloria. Sed sancti nunc non merentur gloriam corporis. Ergo nec Christus meruit.	5. The saints who are now in glory have glory of soul and not of body, just as Christ had before His passion. But the saints do not now merit the glory of the body. Then neither did Christ.
Praeterea, non potest esse idem principium meriti et terminus; et sic non potest esse idem praemium et principium merendi. Sed caritas quae erat in Christo, ad praemium eius pertinebat, quia erat de perfectione beatitudinis, cum per eam frueretur. Ergo non poterat esse principium merendi. Omne autem meritum est ex caritate. Ergo in Christo meritum esse non potuit.	6. The same thing cannot be the principle and the term of merit, and so the same thing cannot be the reward and the principle of meriting. But the charity which was found in Christ was a part of His reward, because it belonged to the perfection of His beatitude, since by its means He had enjoyment. It could therefore not be the principle of meriting. But all merit is from charity. Consequently there could not have been any merit in Christ.
Praeterea, remoto priori removetur posterius. Sed meritum per prius respicit beatitudinem animae, quam Christus non meruit, quia ab instanti conceptionis eam habuit. Ergo nec aliquid aliud mereri potuit.	7. Do away with what goes before, and you do away with what comes after. But before all else merit refers to the blessedness of the soul, which Christ did not merit, because He had it from the instant of His conception. Then neither could He have merited anything else.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Est quod in Psal. XV, 1, super illud, conserva me, domine, dicit Glossa: praemium, quoniam speravi in te etiam meritum. Ergo Christus meruit.	1. On the words of the Psalm (15: 1): “Preserve me, O Lord,” the Gloss comments: “Behold the reward”; and on the words “for I have put my trust in thee” the comment is: “behold the merit.” Christ therefore merited.
Praeterea, cuicumque redditur merces aliqua pro suis operibus, meretur. Sed Christo, propter suam humilitatem passionis, reddita est merces exaltationis, ut patet Phil. II, vers. 9: propter quod Deus exaltavit illum, et donavit illi nomen quod est super omne nomen. Ergo Christus meruit.	2. Whoever is given any recompense in proportion to his deed, merits. But because of the humility of His passion Christ was given the recompense of exaltation, as is shown in the Epistle to the Philippians (2:9): “For which cause, God also has exalted him...” Therefore Christ merited.
Praeterea, sicut fruitio est actus comprehensoris, ita meritum viatoris. Sed Christus fruebatur in quantum comprehensor. Ergo merebatur in quantum viator.	3. Merit is the act of a wayfarer just as enjoyment is that of a possessor. But as a possessor Christ had enjoyment. Then He also merited as a wayfarer.
Respondeo.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod Christus meruit ante passionem, quando erat viator et comprehensor; quod sic patet. Ad meritum enim duo requiruntur: scilicet status merentis, et facultas merendi. Ad statum quidem merendi requiritur quod desit sibi id quod mereri dicitur; quamvis quidam dicant, quod aliquis potest mereri id quod iam habet; sicut dicunt de Angelis, quod beatitudinem, quam simul cum gratia acceperunt, meruerunt per opera sequentia quae circa nos faciunt.	Christ merited before His passion when He was both a wayfarer and a possessor. This is shown as follows. There are two requisites for merit: the state of one who merits and the ability to merit. For the state of one who merits, the lack of that which is said to be merited is required, though some say that a person can merit what he already has. Thus they say of the angels that they merited their blessedness, which they received simultaneously with grace, by the subsequent actions performed with regard to us.
Sed hoc non videtur esse verum, propter duo. Primo, quia contrariatur probationi Augustini, per quam contra Pelagianos probat, gratiam sub merito cadere non posse, quia ante gratiam nulla sunt merita nisi mala; cum ante gratiam homo sit impius, et meritis impii non gratia, sed poena debetur. Non ergo posset dici, quod gratiam quis meretur per opera quae quis post acceptam gratiam facit. Secundo, quia est contra rationem meriti. Nam meritum est causa praemii, non quidem per modum finalis causae: sic enim magis praemium est causa meriti; sed magis secundum reductionem ad causam efficientem: in quantum meritum facit dignum praemio, et per hoc ad praemium disponit. Id autem quod est causa per modum efficientis, nullo modo potest esse posterius tempore eo cuius est causa: unde non potest esse quod aliquis mereatur quod iam habet. Quod autem in humanis aliquis pro accepto beneficio domino suo servit, magis habet rationem gratiarum actionis quam meriti.	But this does not seem to be true for two reasons: (1) Because it is contrary to Augustine’s argument, by which he proves against the Pelagians that grace cannot fall under merit because before grace there are no deserts except evil, since before receiving grace man is a sinner and not grace but punishment is what sinners deserve. For if the opinion in question is admitted] it could be said that one merits grace by the deeds which he does after receiving grace. (2) Because it is against the nature of merit; for merit is the cause of reward, not as a final cause (for in this sense the reward is rather the cause of the merit), but rather by reduction to efficient causality, inasmuch as merit makes a man worthy of a reward and in this way disposes him for it. Now anything that is a cause in the line of efficiency can by no means be posterior in time to that of which it is the cause. It is impossible, then, for a person to merit what he already has. If in human affairs someone serves his master in return for a favor received, this is more of the nature of thanksgiving than of merit.
Facultas vero merendi requiritur ex parte naturae, et ex parte gratiae. Ex parte naturae quidem, quia per actum proprium quis mereri non potest nisi sit dominus sui actus; sic enim suum actum quasi pretium pro praemio dare potest. Est autem quis dominus sui actus per liberum arbitrium; unde naturalis facultas liberi arbitrii requiritur ad merendum. Ex parte vero gratiae, quia cum praemium beatitudinis facultatem humanae naturae excedat, per naturalia pura ad illud merendum homo non potest sufficere; et ideo requiritur gratia, per quam mereri possit.	The ability to merit is required both on the part of nature and on that of grace. It is required on the part of nature because no one can merit by his own act unless he has dominion over his act. If he has that dominion he can, as it were, give his act as a price for the reward. Now a man has dominion over his own acts through the power of free choice. The natural ability of free choice is therefore required for meriting. On the part of grace it is required because the reward of blessedness exceeds the capabilities of human nature, and so man is not able to merit it by his unaided natural powers. Grace by which he is enabled to merit is accordingly required.
Haec autem omnia in Christo fuerunt. Defuit tamen aliquid eorum quae ab beatitudinem perfectam requiruntur: scilicet impassibilitas animae, et gloria corporis, ratione cuius viator erat. Fuit etiam in eo facultas naturae ratione voluntatis creatae, et facultas gratiae propter plenitudinem gratiarum; et ideo mereri potuit.	Now all these conditions for merit were fulfilled in Christ. He was lacking in some of the factors required for perfect blessedness: impassibility of soul and glory of body. By reason of this lack He was a wayfarer. There was in Him, moreover, the ability of nature by reason of His created will, and the ability of grace because of the fullness of grace. He was therefore able to merit.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod licet anima Christi esset determinata ad unum secundum genus moris, scilicet ad bonum, non tamen erat determinata ad unum simpliciter: poterat enim hoc vel illud facere et non facere: et ideo libertas in eo remanebat, quae requiritur ad merendum.	1. Although in the line of moral conduct the soul of Christ was determined to one course of action, that is, good, it nevertheless was not determined to one in an unqualified sense; for it could perform this or that particular act or not perform it. He therefore retained the freedom which is required for meriting.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod beatitudinem animae, ratione cuius erat comprehensor, non meruit, sed solum beatitudinem corporis, et impassibilitatem animae, quae sibi deerant.	2. He did not merit blessedness of soul, by reason of which He was a possessor, but only the blessedness of body and impassibility of soul. These were lacking to Him.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod Christus non meruit aliquid quasi sibi non debitum, ut fieret ei debitum, sicut homines in primo actu meritorio merentur; nec iterum ut id quod erat debitum, fiat magis debitum, sicut in his quorum gratia augetur; sed ut id quod erat uno modo debitum ratione gratiae, fieret ei alio modo debitum ratione meriti.	3. Christ did not merit anything not due Him in such a way that it became due, as men merit in their first meritorious act. Nor again did He merit in such a way that what was due Him should become more due, as occurs in those whose grace increases. But He merited in such a way that what was due Him in one way—by reason of grace—should become due Him in another way—by reason of merit.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod gloria corporis sequitur ex gloria animae, quando anima est omni modo glorificata, secundum ordinem ad Deum, et secundum ordinem ad corpus. Sic autem anima Christi non erat glorificata, sed solum in ordine ad Deum; secundum autem quod erat forma corporis, passibilis erat.	4. The glory of the body results from the glory of the soul when the soul is glorified in every respect, both in its relation to God and in its relation to the body. It was not in this way that the soul of Christ was glorified, but only in its relation to God. Inasmuch as it was the form of the body, it was passible.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod animae sanctorum in patria sunt totaliter extra statum viatorum, quia iam sunt et beatae per fruitionem, et impassibiles; quod de anima Christi non erat; et ideo non est simile.	5. The souls of the saints in their heavenly home are entirely out of the state of wayfarers because they are already blessed both by enjoyment and by impassibility. The soul of Christ was not. There is therefore no parallel.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod caritas, quantum de se est, semper nata est esse merendi principium; sed quandoque non est merendi principium propter habentem, qui est extra merendi statum, sicut patet de sanctis in patria. Christus autem non erat extra statum merendi, quia viator erat: et ideo caritate eadem fruebatur et merebatur, sicut et eadem voluntate. Nec tamen erat idem principium meriti et praemii: quia non merebatur gloriam animae, ad quam pertinet caritas; sed gloriam corporis, ut dictum est.	6. As far as charity itself is concerned, it is always a source of merit; but sometimes it is not in fact a source of merit because of the one who has it, since he is out of the state of meriting. This is seen in the saints in heaven. Christ, however, was not out of the state of meriting, because He was a wayfarer. By the same charity, accordingly, He both enjoyed and merited, as also by the same will. Yet the same thing was not both the source of merit and the reward, because He did not merit glory of soul, to which charity is relevant, but glory of body, as has been said.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod ratio sequeretur si ex defectu Christi contingeret quod gloriam animae mereri non potuerit: quod patet ex praedictis, ubi supra, esse falsum.	7. That argument would prove something if it resulted from any defect on Christ’s part that He could not merit glory of soul. From what has already been said” it is clear that that is false.

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Q. 29: The Grace of Christ ARTICLE VII In the seventh article we ask: Could Christ merit for others? [ARTICLE De ver., 26, 6 ans. to contr. 4; II Sent., 20, 2, 3 ad 3; III Sent., 18, a. 6 sol. 1; S.T., I-II, 114, 6; III, 19, 4; 48, 1; a. 6 ad 3; Comp. theol., I, 231 & 239.]
Septimo quaeritur utrum Christus aliis mereri potuerit	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non.	It seems that He could not, for
Christus enim non meruit nisi secundum quod homo. Sed alii homines non possunt aliis mereri ex condigno. Ergo nec Christus.	1. Christ merited only inasmuch as He was a man. But other men cannot merit for others condignly. Then neither could Christ.
Praeterea, sicut meritum consistit in actu virtutis, ita et laus. Sed nullus laudatur ex opere alterius. Sed solum ex proprio. Ergo nec alicui imputatur ad meritum opus alienum; et ita opera Christi non sunt aliis meritoria.	2. Praise as well as merit depends upon an act of virtue. Now no one is praised for the act of someone else but only for his own. Then neither is the act of someone else imputed to anyone for his merit. Christ’s acts are accordingly not meritorious for others.
Praeterea, Christus caput est Ecclesiae, in quantum in Ecclesia primatum tenet, ut patet Ephes. I, 22. Sed alii praelati primatum in Ecclesia habentes non possunt subditis mereri. Ergo nec Christus potuit.	3. Because He holds the primacy in the Church, Christ is the Church’s head, as is made clear in the Epistle to the Colossians (1:18). But other prelates who have the primacy in the Church cannot merit for their subjects. Then neither could Christ do so.
Praeterea, meritum Christi aequaliter se habet ad omnes homines quantum est de se. Si igitur alicui Christus meruit salutem, omnibus meruit. Sed meritum Christi frustrari non potest. Ergo omnes salutem consequuntur; quod patet esse falsum.	4. In itself Christ’s merit is related in the same way to all men. If, then, Christ merited salvation for anyone, He merited it for all. But the merit of Christ cannot be frustrated. All therefore obtain salvation. But that obviously is false.
Praeterea, sicut Christus est caput hominum, ita et Angelorum. Angelis vero non meruit. Ergo nec hominibus.	5. Christ is the head not only of men but also of angels. But He did not merit for the angels. Then neither did He do so for men.
Praeterea, si Christus aliis mereri potuit, quilibet suus actus nobis meritorius fuit. Sed non nisi salutis. Ergo eius passio non erat necessaria ad nostram salutem.	6. If Christ could merit for others, then any one of His acts was meritorious for us—and that means for our salvation. His passion was accordingly not necessary for our salvation.
Praeterea, quod per unum fieri potest, superfluum est si per duo fiat. Sed gratia quae datur homini, sufficiens est ad hoc quod homo pro se mereatur vitam aeternam. Ergo superfluum esset, si Christus eam nobis meruisset.	7. Where one means will get results it is superfluous to use two. But the grace which is given to man is sufficient for man to merit eternal life for himself. It would therefore be superfluous for Christ to have merited it for us.
Praeterea, aut Christus sufficienter meruit nobis, aut insufficienter. Si sufficienter, meritum nostrum non requiritur ad salutem; si insufficienter, insufficientis gratiae fuit; quorum utrumque est inconveniens. Ergo Christus nobis non meruit.	8. Christ merited for us either sufficiently or insufficiently. If sufficiently, then our merit is not required for our salvation. If insufficiently, then His grace was insufficient. But both of these alternatives are inadmissible. Christ therefore did not merit for us.
Praeterea, sicut membris Christi aliquid ad gloriam deerat ante passionem ipsius, ita et nunc. Sed nunc nobis non meretur. Ergo nec tunc merebatur.	9. Something necessary for glory is lacking to Christ’s members now as it was before His passion. Since He does not merit for us now, neither did He then.
Praeterea, si Christus nobis meruisset, eius merito nostra conditio immutata fuisset. Sed eadem videtur esse hominis conditio post Christum sicut ante erat: quia sicut ante Diabolus tentare poterat sed non cogere, ita et modo: sicut etiam peccatoribus poena debebatur, ita et modo: sicut in iustis opera meritoria requirebantur, ita et modo. Ergo Christus nobis non meruit.	10. Had Christ merited for us, our condition would have been changed by His merit. But the condition of man seems to be the same after Christ as it was before. Just as the devil could tempt but not force man before, so too now. As punishment was due to sinners, so too now. As meritorious works were required in the just, so too now. Christ therefore did not merit for us.
Praeterea, in Psal. LXI, 13, dicitur: tu reddes unicuique iuxta opera sua. Hoc autem non esset, si merita Christi nobis imputarentur. Ergo Christus nobis non meruit.	11. In the Psalms (61:13) it is written: “You will render to every man according to his works.” But this would not be so if the merits of Christ were imputed to us. Christ therefore did not merit for us.
Praeterea, praemium mensuratur secundum radicem meriti. Si ergo Christus nobis meruit, unicuique nostrum praemium gloriae reddetur secundum quantitatem gratiae Christi: quod patet esse falsum.	12. Reward is meted out in proportion to the root of merit. Now if Christ merited for us, the reward of glory will be given to each one of us in proportion to the quantity of Christ’s grace. But that clearly is false.
Praeterea, id quod pro meritis datur, potius redditur quam gratis detur. Si ergo Christus nobis iustificationem meruit, videtur quod non gratis iustificemur a Deo; et sic gratia non erit gratia. Ergo Christus nihil nobis meruit.	13. That which is given on the basis of merit is paid rather than gratuitously given. If, then, Christ merited justification for us, it seems that we are not gratuitously justified by God. Then grace will not be grace. Christ therefore did not merit anything for us.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Christus pro nobis satisfecit: I Io. II, 2. Ipse est propitiatio pro peccatis nostris. Sed satisfactio sine merito esse non potest. Ergo Christus nobis meruit.	1. That Christ atoned for us is expressly said in the first Epistle of St. John (7:2): “He is the propitiation for our sins.” But there cannot be atonement without merit. Christ therefore merited for us.
Praeterea, caput in corpore naturali non solum sibi, sed membris operatur omnibus. Sed Christus est caput corporis sui, scilicet Ecclesiae. Ergo eius operatio membris meritoria fuit.	2. The head in a physical body works not only for itself but also for all the members. Now Christ is the head of His body, the Church. His activity was therefore meritorious for His members.
Praeterea, Christus et Ecclesia sunt quasi una persona. Sed ratione unitatis praedictae ex persona Ecclesiae loquitur, ut patet in Glossa super Psalm. XXI, Deus, Deus meus, respice et cetera. Ergo similiter ratione unitatis praedictae Christus quasi ex persona aliorum mereri potuit.	3. Christ and the Church are in a sense one person. On the basis of that unity He speaks in the name of the Church in the words of the Psalm (21:1): “ God, my God, look upon me,” as the Gloss brings out. Consequently Christ could likewise by reason of that same unity merit in the name of others.
Respondeo.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod opus humanum gratia informatum ad vitam aeternam consequendam dupliciter valet, secundum quod duo sunt quibus homo deficit a gloriae consecutione.	A human action informed by grace has value for obtaining eternal life in two ways that correspond to the two respects in which man falls short of winning glory.
Quorum primum est indignitas personae; sicut patet in eo qui non habet caritatem, qui non est idoneus nec dignus quod habeat vitam aeternam: et secundum hoc, opus humanum valet ad vitam aeternam consequendam, in quantum per ipsum quaedam dignitas et idoneitas in homine consequitur ad consecutionem gloriae. Sicut enim actus peccati redit in quamdam animae deformitatem, ita et actus meritorius in quemdam animae decorem et dignitatem; et ex hoc dicitur meritum condignum.	The first respect is the lack of dignity of the person. One who does not have charity, for example, is neither suited nor worthy to have eternal life. In this respect a human action is of value for winning eternal life to the extent that by it a certain dignity and aptness for winning glory is acquired. As an act of sin leads to a certain deformity of the soul, a meritorious act leads to the soul’s adornment and dignity. From this there arises merit that is called condign.
Aliud per quod deficit homo a consecutione gloriae, est aliquod impedimentum superveniens, ut homo qui alias est dignus, gloriam non consequatur; et hoc est reatus alicuius poenae temporalis. Et sic opus humanum ordinatur ad gloriam quasi per modum cuiusdam pretii, quo a reatu poena absolvitur; et ex hoc habet opus humanum rationem satisfactionis.	The other respect in which man falls short of winning glory is the interposition of an obstacle, with the result that a man who otherwise is worthy does not win glory. This is the debt of some penalty. A man who is justified, for example, is indebted to pay some temporal penalty. In this respect a human action is related to glory much like the price paid to free a man from a penalty due. Under this aspect the human action has the character of atonement.
Quantum ergo ad utrumque horum, opus Christi efficacius fuit operibus aliorum hominum. Nam per opus alterius hominis non redditur idoneus ad gloriae perceptionem nisi ille qui operatur, eo quod unus homo in alium spiritualiter influere non potest: et ideo unus alii ex condigno mereri non potuit gratiam vel vitam aeternam. Sed Christus secundum suam humanitatem spiritualiter influere potuit in alios homines: unde et eius opus in aliis causare potuit idoneitatem ad consecutionem gloriae. Et ideo potuit aliis ex condigno mereri, secundum quod influere in alios poterat, in quantum erat humanitas eius divinitatis instrumentum, secundum Damascenum.	In both of these respects Christ’s actions were more efficacious than those of other men. By the actions of other men only the one acting is made suited for the reception of glory, because one man cannot exercise a spiritual influence upon another. As a consequence one cannot merit grace or eternal life for another condignly. But Christ in His humanity could exercise spiritual influence upon other men. His actions could accordingly cause in others suitableness for the winning of glory. He could therefore merit condignly for others, just as He could exercise influence upon others, inasmuch as His humanity was “the instrument of His divinity,” as Damascene teaches.
Similiter etiam quantum ad secundum maior efficacia consideratur in Christo quam in aliis hominibus. Nam licet unus homo possit pro altero satisfacere, dummodo ille sit in gratia constitutus; non tamen potest satisfacere pro tota natura: quia opus unius puri hominis non aequivalet bono totius naturae. Sed opus Christi, in quantum erat Dei et hominis, habuit quamdam dignitatem, ut aequivaleret bono totius naturae: et ideo pro tota natura satisfacere potuit.	In the second respect also we can discover greater efficacy in Christ than in other men. Although one man can atone for another provided that the former is in the state of grace, he cannot atone for the whole nature, because the act of one mere man is not equal in value to the good of the whole nature. But the action of Christ, being that of God and man, had a dignity that made it worth as much as the good of the whole nature, and so could atone for that nature.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Christus, secundum quod homo, est aliis hominibus dignior; unde non oportet quod aliis conveniat quod Christo homini convenit.	1. As man Christ is of greater dignity than other men. It is accordingly not necessary to ascribe to other men whatever belonged to Christ as man.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod actus virtutis habet rationem laudis per comparationem ad agentem, et ideo non potest unus propter actum alterius laudari; sed rationem meriti habet ex ordine ad finem, ad quem potest aliquis idoneus reddi ex influentia Christi; et ideo Christus nobis mereri potuit.	2. An act of virtue is praiseworthy in its relation to the agent, and so one man cannot be praised for the act of another. But it gets its meritoriousness from its relation to the end, for which a person can be made suited by the influence of Christ. Christ could therefore merit for us.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod Christus primatum tenet in Ecclesia per propriam virtutem; sed alii praelati, in quantum gerunt personam et vicem Christi: unde Christus pro fidelibus tamquam pro suis membris mereri potuit, non autem alii praelati.	3. Christ holds the primacy in the Church by His own power, but other prelates hold it inasmuch as they represent the person and take the place of Christ. Christ could therefore merit for the faithful as for His own members, but other prelates cannot do so.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod meritum Christi quantum ad sufficientiam aequaliter se habet ad omnes, non autem quantum ad efficaciam: quod accidit partim ex libero arbitrio, partim ex divina electione, per quam quibusdam misericorditer effectus meritorum Christi confertur, quibusdam vero iusto iudicio subtrahitur.	4. Christ’s merit bears the same relation to all men in point of sufficiency, not in point of efficacy. This happens partly from men’s free choice, partly from divine election, through which the effect of Christ’s merits is mercifully bestowed upon some but by a just judgment is withdrawn from others.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod sicut mereri est viatoris, ita non nisi pro viatore aliquis mereri potest: quia oportet ut ei pro quo quis meretur, aliquid desit eorum quae sub merito cadunt. Angeli autem non sunt viatores quantum ad praemium essentiale; et ideo quantum ad hoc nihil eis meruit. Sunt autem aliquo modo viatores respectu praemii accidentalis, in quantum nobis ministrant, ad quod valet eis meritum Christi: unde dicitur Ephes. I, 10, quod per eum restaurantur quae in caelis et quae in terra sunt.	5. just as it belongs to a wayfarer to merit, so no one can merit except for a wayfarer, because the one for whom anyone merits must be lacking in some point that falls within the scope of merit. Now angels are not wayfarers with reference to the essential reward, and so Christ did not merit for them in this respect. But they are in some sense wayfarers with reference to the accidental reward in so far as they minister to us. In this respect, then, Christ’s merit is of value to them as well. It is accordingly said in the Epistle to the Ephesians (1:10) that through Him are re-established all things that are in heaven and on earth.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod licet quilibet actus Christi esset nobis meritorius, tamen ad satisfaciendum pro reatu naturae humanae quae erat morti ex divina sententia obligata, ut patet Gen. III, 19, oportuit quod loco omnium mortem sustineret.	6. Although every one of Christ’s acts was meritorious for us, yet to give satisfaction for the debt of human nature, which was made liable to death by the divine sentence, as is seen in Genesis (2:17), He had to undergo death in the place of all.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod gratia quae alicui personaliter datur, sufficit quantum ad id quod ad personam ipsius pertinet, non tamen ad absolutionem reatus totius naturae; quod patet in antiquis patribus, qui gratiam habentes, propter reatum naturae ad gloriam pervenire non poterant, et ideo requirebatur meritum Christi et satisfactio, ut reatus ille tolleretur. Gratia etiam personalis nulli unquam post peccatum primi hominis data fuit, nisi per fidem mediatoris explicitam vel implicitam.	7. The grace which is given to someone personally is sufficient for the needs of that person himself but not for paying the debt of the whole nature. This is evident in the case of the ancient patriarchs, who, though having grace, were unable because of the debt of the nature to arrive at glory. The merit and satisfaction of Christ was accordingly needed to remove that debt. Furthermore, personal grace was never given to anyone after the sin of the first man except through faith, either explicit or implicit, in the Mediator.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod meritum Christi sufficienter operatur ut quaedam causa universalis salutis humanae; sed oportet hanc causam applicari singulis per sacramenta, et per fidem formatam, quae per dilectionem operatur. Et ideo requiritur aliquid aliud ad salutem nostram praeter meritum Christi, cuius tamen meritum Christi est causa.	8. The merit of Christ is operative with sufficient efficacy as a universal cause of the salvation of men, but this cause must be applied to each by means of the sacraments and of informed faith, which works through love. Thus something else. besides Christ’s merit is needed for our salvation, though the merit of Christ is the cause of that other factor as well.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod similitudo non tenet, quia mereri non convenit nisi viatoribus. Christus autem ante passionem erat viator et comprehensor; nunc autem est tantum comprehensor. Et ideo tunc poterat mereri, licet nunc mereri non possit. Deficit etiam illa ratio quia nunc beatis, qui sunt membra Christi mystica, nihil deest ad gloriam, qui delectantur non solum de visa divina essentia, sed etiam de Christi humanitate glorificata.	9. [To the 9th, it must be said that the similarity does not hold, because meriting is restricted to wayfarers. But before his passion, Christ was both a wayfarer and a possessor, although now, he is only a possessor. Therefore then he could merit, although he cannot merit now. The objection also fails because now nothing is lacking to the blessed, who are members of Christ's mystical body. They enjoy not only the vision of the divine essence, but also the vision of Christ's glorified humanity.]
Ad decimum dicendum, quod post passionem Christi humana conditio est multum immutata; quia, iam expiato reatu naturae humanae, homines possunt libere ad patriam evolare; poenae etiam aeternae pro peccatis personalibus debitae per fidem passionis Christi remittuntur, et diminuuntur temporales virtute clavium, in quibus Christi passio operatur; Daemones etiam reprimuntur virtute passionis Christi, ut non possint tam violenter tentare; fidelibus auxilia multa dantur ad resistendum tentationibus; gratia etiam per virtutem passionis Christi datur in sacramentis ad merendum.	10. After the passion of Christ the condition of mankind has been much changed, because, with the debt of human nature paid, men can fly unrestrained to their heavenly home. Moreover, the eternal punishment due for personal sins is remitted by means of faith in the passion of Christ; and the temporal punishment is reduced by the power of the keys, in which the passion of Christ is operative. Furthermore, the demons are kept in check by the power of Christ’s passion so that they cannot tempt us so violently, and many helps are given to the faithful for resisting temptation. Finally, as a result of Christ’s passion grace with which to merit is given in the sacraments.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod Christus et membra eius sunt una persona mystica, unde opera capitis sunt aliquo modo membrorum. Et sic, cum propter opera Christi aliquid nobis a Deo datur, non fit contra id quod dicitur in Ps. LXI, 13: tu reddes unicuique iuxta opera sua. Et tamen ita merita Christi nobis prosunt, ut in nobis per sacramenta gratiam causent, per quam ad opera meritoria incitamur.	11. Christ and His members are one mystical person. Consequently the works of the head are in some sense the works of the members. Thus, when something is given us on account of Christ’s works, that is not opposed to the statement of the Psalms (61:13): “You will render to every man according to his works.” And yet Christ’s merits are of profit to us in such a way that through the sacraments they cause in us grace by which we are bestirred to meritorious works.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod meritum Christi comparatur ad praemium nostrum sicut causa prima et remota, unde ei non commensuratur, sed illi merito quod est causa proxima; quod consistit in actu proprio illius cui praemium redditur.	12. Christ’s merit is related to our reward as a first and remote cause. Our reward is therefore not commensurate to Christ’s merit but to that merit which is its proximate cause, which derives from the act of the one given the reward.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod hoc ipsum gratis alicui nostrum a Deo confertur quod efficaciam meriti Christi consequatur; unde per hoc ratio gratiae non evacuatur.	13. The very fact that any one of us obtains the benefit of Christ’s merit is itself gratuitously conferred upon us by God. Consequently grace is not thereby deprived of its essence.

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Q. 29: The Grace of Christ ARTICLE VIII In the eighth article we ask: Could Christ merit in the first instant of his conception? [ARTICLE III Sent., 18, a. 3; S.T., III, 34, 3.]
Octavo quaeritur utrum Christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis mereri potuerit	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non.	It seems that He could not, for
Ad meritum enim deliberatio requiritur. Sed deliberatio requirit tempus. Ergo in primo instanti suae creationis anima Christi mereri non potuit.	1. Deliberation is required for merit. But deliberation takes time. Therefore in the first instant of its creation the soul of Christ could not merit.
Praeterea, sicut meritum, ita et demeritum in actu liberi arbitrii consistit. Sed Angelus non potuit peccare in primo instanti suae creationis, quia sic in primo instanti suae creationis malus fuisset; quod est erroneum. Ergo nec anima Christi in primo instanti suae creationis mereri potuit.	2. Not only merit but also demerit depends upon an act of free choice. But the angels could not sin in the first instant of their creation, because they would in that case have been evil at the very instant of their creation. But that is false. Then neither could the soul of Christ merit at the first instant of its creation.
Praeterea, quandocumque sunt duo motus ordinati ad invicem, impossibile est quod in eodem instanti terminetur uterque. Sed creatio animae Christi et motus liberi arbitrii ipsius sunt quidam motus ordinati, nam motus liberi arbitrii creationem praesupponit. Ergo impossibile est quod motus liberi arbitrii terminetur in primo instanti in quo creatio terminatur, cum scilicet primo creata est anima.	3. Whenever there are two movements of which one is subordinated to the other, it is impossible for both to come to an end at the same instant. But the creation of Christ’s soul and the motion of free choice are subordinated movements, because the motion of free choice presupposes its creation. It is therefore impossible for the motion of free choice to come to an end at the very instant at which creation comes to an end, as soon as the soul is created.
Sed diceretur, quod anima Christi adiuvabatur ad merendum in primo instanti per gratiam.- Sed contra: nulla gratia creaturae collata trahit eam extra limites creaturae. Sed hoc convenit animae in quantum est creata, ut in primo instanti quo est, motum liberi arbitrii habere non possit; ut ex ratione inducta patet. Ergo per gratiam non potest ad hoc adiuvari ut in primo instanti mereatur.	4. The answer was given that Christ’s soul was helped by grace to merit at its first instant.—On the contrary, no grace conferred upon a creature carries it beyond the limits of creaturehood. But it attaches to the soul inasmuch as it is a creature to be unable to have the motion of its free choice at the first instant in which it is, as is evident from the argument given. It therefore cannot be helped by grace to merit at its first instant.
Praeterea, gratia perficit animam per modum cuiusdam habitus. Habitus vero, cum potentiam praesupponat, non dat animae posse agere simpliciter quod alias non posset agere; sed posse taliter agere, qualiter sine habitu non posset. Ergo si anima Christi secundum suam naturam non poterat usum liberi arbitrii in primo instanti suae creationis habere, videtur quod hoc ei gratia non contulit quod in primo instanti mereretur.	5. Grace perfects the soul after the manner of a habit. Now since a habit presupposes a power, it does not confer upon the soul an unqualified ability to act which it otherwise would not have; it confers rather the ability to act in a given way in which it could not act without the habit. If, then, Christ’s soul in its own nature could not have the use of free choice at the first instant of its creation, it seems that grace did not confer upon it the ability to merit at its first instant.
Praeterea, sicut se habet punctum ad lineam, ita se habet instans ad tempus. Sed secundum philosophum in libro VIII Physic., quando aliquod mobile utitur uno puncto ut duobus, scilicet ut principio unius lineae et fine alterius, de necessitate intercedit quies media, ut patet in motu reflexo. Cum ergo instans in quo anima Christi creata est, accipiatur ut terminus creationis, et ut principium motus liberi arbitrii, et sic uno instanti utimur ut duobus; videtur quod incidit tempus medium; et sic non in primo instanti suae creationis anima Christi merebatur.	6. An instant has the same relation to time as a point to a line. But according to the Philosopher, when a being in motion makes use of one point as two, that is, as the beginning of one line and the end of another, there necessarily intervenes a period of repose, as is shown in a reciprocating motion. Now, since the instant it which Christ’s soul was created is taken as the end of creation and as the beginning of the motion of free choice, and so we use one instant as two, it therefore seems that time intervenes. Thus Christ’s soul did not merit at the first instant of its creation.
Praeterea, sicut se habet natura ad actum naturae, ita gratia ad actum gratiae. Sed natura non potest in actum gratiae. Ergo nec gratia potest in actum naturae. Ergo non potest esse quod per gratiam anima Christi habuerit actum in primo instanti suae conceptionis qui ei naturaliter competit, scilicet eligere.	7. Grace stands to the act of grace as nature to the act of nature. By transposition, then, nature stands to the act of grace as grace to the act of nature. But nature is not capable of an act of grace. Then neither is grace capable of an act of nature. Consequently Christ’s soul at the first instant of its conception could not have had through grace an act which is within its competence by nature, namely, to choose.
Praeterea, forma habet tres actus; quia dat esse, distinguit, et ordinat in finem. Hi autem actus ad invicem ordinati sunt; sicut ens, et unum, et bonum. Nam ens a primo actu relinquitur, unum a secundo, bonum a tertio. Ergo et res aliqua prius est ens quam ordinetur in finem. Anima autem Christi per actum meritorium in finem ordinabatur. Ergo non potest esse quod in primo instanti suae creationis in quo esse habuit, mereretur.	8. A form has three acts: it gives being, it distinguishes, and it orients to an end. Now these acts are related in the same way as being, the one, and the good; for being results from the first act, one from the second, and good from the third. A thing is accordingly a being before it is oriented to an end. Now Christ’s soul was oriented to its end by a meritorious act. It is therefore not possible for it to have merited at the first instant of its creation at which it had being.
Praeterea, meritum consistit in actu virtutis qui praecipue electione perficitur secundum philosophum. Sed anima Christi non potuit in primo instanti suae creationis actum electionis habere: nam electio praesupponit consilium cum sit appetitus praeconsiliati, ut dicitur in III Ethic.; consilium autem tempore indiget, cum sit inquisitio quaedam. Ergo anima Christi in primo instanti suae creationis mereri non potuit.	9. Merit depends upon an act of virtue, which is brought to completion particularly by choice, as the Philosopher teaches. But Christ’s soul could not have had an act of choice at the first instant of its creation; for choice presupposes deliberation, since it is appetency for what has been previously deliberated, as is pointed out in the Ethics. But deliberation takes time, since it is an investigation. Christ’s soul could therefore not have merited at the first instant of its creation.
Praeterea, imbecillitas organorum usum liberi arbitrii impedit, ut patet in pueris recenter natis. Sed hanc imbecillitatem Christus assumpsit, sicut et alias nostras passibilitates. Ergo in primo instanti suae creationis anima Christi non meruit.	10. Feebleness of our organs prevents the use of free choice, as is seen in newly born infants. But Christ assumed this feebleness, just as He did the rest of our weaknesses. The soul of Christ therefore did not merit at the first instant of its creation.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Christus in instanti suae creationis fuit perfectissimus secundum animam. Sed maior perfectio est quae est secundum habitum et actum, quam quae est secundum habitum tantum. Ergo in Christo fuerunt virtutes in primo instanti suae creationis, non solum secundum habitum, sed secundum actum. Actus autem virtutum sunt meritorii. Ergo Christus in primo instanti suae creationis meruit.	1. At the very instant of His creation Christ was most perfect in soul. But a perfection which is actual as well as habitual is greater than one which is habitual only. There were therefore virtues in Christ not only habitually but also actually at the first instant of His creation. But the acts of the virtues are meritorious. Christ therefore merited at the first instant of His creation.
Praeterea, Christus in primo instanti suae creationis fruebatur ut verus comprehensor. Fruitio autem est per actum caritatis. Ergo in primo instanti suae creationis actum caritatis habuit. Actus autem caritatis erat in Christo meritorius. Ergo idem quod prius.	2. At the first instant of His creation Christ had enjoyment as a true possessor. But enjoyment is had by means of an act of charity. He accordingly had an act of charity at the first instant of His creation. But this act of charity was meritorious in Christ. Therefore we must conclude as before.
Sed diceretur, quod actus caritatis non erat meritorius nisi cum deliberatione.- Sed contra: deliberatio vel consilium non est de fine ultimo, sed de his quae sunt ad finem, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Sed motus caritatis praecipue est meritorius secundum quod tendit in ipsum finem ultimum. Ergo non requiritur, ad hoc quod sit meritorius, quod sit ibi aliqua collatio vel deliberatio.	3. It was said in answer that the act of charity was not meritorious unless accompanied by deliberation.—On the contrary, deliberation or counsel is not concerned “with the last end, but with the means to it,” as is brought out in the Ethics. But the movement of charity is meritorious particularly inasmuch as it tends to the last end. For this act to be meritorious it therefore does not have to involve any comparison or deliberation.
Sed diceretur, quod motus ille qui est in finem ultimum, non est meritorius, nisi secundum quod aliquis illum refert in finem; et sic est ibi aliqua collatio, quae non potest esse in instanti.- Sed contra: pars animae intellectiva potentior est in sua operatione quam sensitiva. Sed simul dum aliquis sentit, sentit se sentire. Ergo simul dum affectus fertur in Deum, potest fieri comparatio huius motus ad ipsum Deum. Et sic non est necessarium quod hoc fiat successive.	4. It was said that the motion to the last end is meritorious only in so far as the person relates it to the end. It thus involves a comparison, and that cannot take place in an instant.—On the contrary, the intellectual part of the soul is more powerful in its operation than the sensitive. But as soon as anyone senses, he senses that he is sensing. Consequently, as soon as the will is directed toward God there can be a reference of this motion to God Himself; and so this need not take place successively.
Praeterea, quicumque intelligit aliquid, simul intelligit quod est de intellectu eius; sicut qui intelligit hominem, simul intelligit animal. Sed unum relativorum est de intellectu alterius. Ergo quicumque intelligit unum relativorum, simul intelligit alterum. Possibile est ergo ut in eodem instanti mens referat motum caritatis in Deum comparando unum ad alterum. Et sic non requiritur ibi tempus.	5. Whoever understands anything understands at the same time whatever belongs to its notion; as in understanding man we understand at the same time animal. But of two relative terms each is in the notion of the other. Then whoever understands one relative term at the same time understands the other. It is therefore possible for the mind at one and the same instant to relate the motion of charity to God, referring one to the other. Thus no time is needed in that act.
Praeterea, Anselmus dicit, quod quidquid intelligitur esse perfectionis, totum Christo est attribuendum. Sed habere perfectam operationem in primo instanti suae creationis, ad perfectionem pertinet. Ergo Christo est attribuendum.	6. Anselm says that whatever we understand to belong to perfection we must attribute entirely to Christ. But to have a perfect operation at the first instant of one’s creation belongs to perfection. We must therefore attribute it to Christ.
Praeterea, Christus iuxta animae meritum non habuit quo posset proficere. Habuisset autem, si in primo instanti suae creationis non meruisset. Ergo et cetera.	7. As regards the merit of His soul Christ had no room to advance. He would have had, however, if He had not merited at the first instant of His creation. Therefore.
Praeterea, potentia rationalis in Christo non fuit minus perfecta quam potentia naturalis alterius creaturae. Sed aliqua potentia alterius creaturae in primo instanti quo esse incipit, potest habere suam operationem; sicut patet in candela, quae in ipso instanti quo accenditur, aerem illuminat. Ergo anima Christi in primo instanti suae creationis habuit actum potentiae rationalis; et ita potuit mereri.	8. The rational power in Christ was no less perfect than the natural power of any other creature. But some of the powers of other creatures can have their operation at the first instant at which they begin to be. A candle, for instance, at the very instant at which it is lighted lights up the air. Consequently Christ’s soul at the first instant of its creation had the act of its rational power, and so it could merit.
Praeterea, Gregorius dicit in Homil. Pentecostes: amor Dei non est otiosus: nam operatur magna, si est; si vero desinit operari, amor non est. Sed Christus habuit perfectam caritatem in primo instanti suae creationis. Ergo in eo fuit aliquis actus dilectionis; et ita fuit in eo meritum in illo instanti.	9. Gregory says: “The love of God is not inert. If it exists, it does great deeds. If it ceases to do deeds, it is not love.” But Christ had perfect charity at the first instant of His creation. Some act of love was therefore present; and so He had merit at that instant.
Praeterea, illud quod est posterius natura, non potest esse prius tempore, sed forte simul. Meritum autem est prius natura quam praemium. Christus autem in primo instanti suae conceptionis habuit praemium, quia fuit verus comprehensor. Ergo saltem in eodem instanti habuit meritum.	10. Something posterior by nature cannot be prior in time, though it may perhaps be simultaneous. Now merit is prior to reward by nature; but at the first instant of His conception Christ had the reward, because He was a true possessor. He therefore had merit at least at the same instant.
Respondeo.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod circa hoc est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt, quod Christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis non meruit, sed statim post primum instans mereri incepit. Alii vero dicunt, quod in ipso primo instanti meruit: quae quidem opinio videtur esse rationabilior. Nam quidquid perfectionis spiritualis est possibile alicui creaturae, totum creditur animae Christi esse collatum in primo instanti suae creationis. Quod enim in aliquo instanti meritum esse non possit, hoc dupliciter potest contingere: uno modo ex parte operantis; alio modo ex parte actus.	On this question there are two opinions. Some” say that Christ did not have merit at the first instant of His conception, but began to merit immediately after the first instant. Others say that He did merit at the very first instant. This latter opinion is the one which seems to be the more reasonable. For we believe that any spiritual perfection which any other creature can possibly have was conferred in its entirety upon the soul of Christ at the first instant of its creation. Now the impossibility of meriting at a given instant could come from either of two sources: (1) from the agent, or (2) from the act.
Ex parte quidem operantis potest hoc contingere propter defectum duplicis facultatis: scilicet gratuitae, sicut si dicamus, quod in illo instanti quo aliquis mortaliter peccat, non potest mereri, quia gratiam non habet: et iterum ex defectu facultatis naturalis, sicut puer in primo instanti quo incipit esse, mereri non potest, quia non habet usum liberi arbitrii.	This could come from the agent because of a lack of either of two capabilities. One is gratuitous. We might, for example, say that in the instant in which someone sins mortally, he cannot merit because he does not have grace. Again it could be because of the lack of a natural capability, as a child at the first instant at which it is conceived cannot merit because it does not have the use of free choice.
Neutrum autem horum potest dici in proposito. Christus enim in primo instanti habuit facultatem gratiae, utpote gratia plenus, et facultatem naturae, utpote plenarie usum liberi arbitrii habens; alias non potuisset esse comprehensor. Ergo non fuit ex parte operantis Christi aliquid quominus posset in primo suae conceptionis instanti mereri.	Now neither of these reasons is applicable in the matter at hand. For at His first instant Christ had the capability of grace, being full of grace, and also the capability of nature, having the full use of free choice; otherwise He could not have been a possessor. Consequently no impossibility of meriting at the first instant of His conception came from Christ, the agent.
Similiter nec ex parte actus meritorii. Quod enim aliquis actus in aliquo instanti esse non possit, potest contingere dupliciter. Uno modo per hoc quod in actu illo successio invenitur, et sic in instanti compleri non potest. Secundo per hoc quod actus praesupponit quaedam quae non possunt praecedere instans aliquod determinatum; sicut non potest esse quod ignis primo instanti suae generationis, si est extra locum suum generatus, sit in proprio loco, quia motus praeexigitur, qui non potest esse ante primum instans generationis.	Similarly no such impossibility came from the meritorious act either. That a given act could not be performed at a given instant could come about in two ways: (1) Because that act involves successiveness and so cannot be completed in an instant. Thus local motion cannot take place in an instant. (2) Because the act presupposes certain conditions that cannot precede a definite instant. Thus, if a fire has been kindled out of its proper place, it is impossible for that fire to be in its proper place at the first instant at which it comes into existence, because motion is a prerequisite, and that motion cannot be before the first instant of its existence.
Neutro autem istorum modorum impeditur quin Christus in primo instanti meruerit. Primo quidem, quia motus liberi arbitrii, in quo meritum consistit, non habet successionem, sed est simplex et instantaneus. Secundo vero, quia ad motum voluntatis non praeexigitur nisi actus apprehensivae virtutis: qui quidem motus in eodem instanti est cum actu voluntatis, eo quod bonum apprehensum movet voluntatem. Simul autem est motio moventis et motus mobilis. Ipsa vero apprehensio boni in Christo non praeexigebat aliquam inquisitionem ad hoc quod esset de bono certum iudicium; quia secundum certitudinem Christus statim de omnibus verum iudicium habuit.	Now in neither of these two ways was Christ prevented from meriting at His first instant. Not in the first, because the motion of free choice upon which merit depends is not successive but simple and instantaneous. Not in the second, because nothing is prerequisite for the motion of the will except the act of the apprehensive power; and that motion is at the same instant as the act of the will, because the apprehended good moves the will; for the mover moves and the being in motion is moved at the same time and with the same motion. In Christ, moreover, the apprehension of the good does not need any previous inquiry in order to reach a certain judgment about the good, because Christ immediately had a true judgment about everything with certitude.
Patet igitur quod nihil prohibet Christum in primo instanti meruisse. Et ideo concedendum, quod in primo suae conceptionis instanti meruit.	It is evident, then, that there was nothing to keep Christ from meriting at the first instant. It must therefore be granted that at the first instant of His conception He merited.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod deliberatio duo importat: scilicet perceptionem rationis cum certitudine iudicii de eo de quo fit deliberatio; et sic potest esse in instanti in eo in quo non est dubitatio de agendis: et sic fuit in Christo. Potest etiam dicere discussionem sive inquisitionem; et sic importat discursum quemdam, unde non potest esse in instanti: et tali deliberatione Christus non indigebat, quia non erat dubitatio de agendis.	1. The term deliberation can imply either of two meanings. The first is the perception by reason in a certain judgment of the matter about which the deliberation is being carried on. From this point of view it can take place in an instant in one devoid of any perplexity about what is to be done. In this sense deliberation found place in Christ. The term can also mean an inquiry or investigation. Then it implies a discourse and cannot take place in an instant. Christ needed no such deliberation, because He was not in doubt about what was to be done.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod voluntas rationalis naturae naturaliter ordinatur in bonum, non autem in malum; et ideo in primo instanti suae creationis, nisi aliquid impediat, potest ferri in bonum, non autem in malum, in quod non fertur nisi per errorem, qui incidit in conferendo vel inquirendo. Unde praeexigitur tempus collationis ad malum, non autem ad bonum.	2. The will of a rational nature is naturally oriented to good, not to evil. It can accordingly at the first instant of its creation, unless prevented, be attracted to good, but not to evil; for it is attracted to evil only through an error which occurs in comparing and investigating. Time for comparing is accordingly needed for evil, but not for good.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit in motibus successivis, non autem in instantaneis. Cuius ratio est, quia quando duo motus sunt ordinati, idem instans quod est finis primi motus, potest esse principium secundi; sicut in eodem instanti quo completur generatio ignis extra suum locum naturalem, incipit motus localis eiusdem, nisi sit aliquid impediens.	3. That argument is valid for successive but not for instantaneous movements. The reason for this is that, when two movements are in sequence, the same instant which is the end of the first movement can be the beginning of the second. Thus at the same instant at which the coming into existence of fire is completed outside its natural place, the local motion of the fire begins, unless there is some impediment,
Si ergo principium secundi motus et terminus eiusdem sunt idem, sicut accidit in motibus instantaneis; tunc principium motus secundi est in eodem instanti cum termino motus primi; sicut illuminatio et visio in eodem instanti terminantur. Si vero terminus secundi motus non potest esse in eodem instanti cum principio eiusdem, sicut accidit in omnibus motibus successivis; tunc impossibile erit quod terminus secundi motus sit in eodem instanti cum termino primi motus. Cum igitur motus liberi arbitrii sit instantaneus, nihil prohibet meritum eius esse in eodem instanti cum termino creationis.	If the beginning of the second movement and the end of the same movement are the same, as happens in the instantaneous movements, then the end of the second movement occurs at the same instant as the end of the first. Illumination and vision, for example, terminate at the same instant. But if the end of the second movement Cannot be same instant with the beginning of that movement, as happens in all successive movements, then it will be impossible for the end of the second movement to be at the same instant as the end of the first movement. Now since the motion of fret choice is instantaneous, nothing prevents its end from being at the same instant as the end of the creation of Christ’s soul.
Per hoc patet solutio ad quartum: non enim est extra facultatem creaturae ut in primo instanti compleatur eius motus instantaneus.	4. The answer to this is clear from what has just been said, for it is not beyond the capabilities of a creature that its instantaneous movement should be completed at the first instant.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod licet potentia rationalis in primo instanti suae creationis possit habere suam operationem quantum est de se: tamen si accipiatur potentia alligata organo, quod nondum est aptum ad perfectam operationem, impeditur ex defectu organi ne tunc operationem habere possit. Hoc autem impedimentum ab anima Christi per gratiam est remotum: et secundum hoc per gratiam habuit ut in primo instanti agere possit.	5. Although the rational power can have its operation at the first instant of its creation as far as it is concerned, yet, if it is taken as coupled with an organ which is not yet suited to a perfection, it is prevented by the defect of the organ from being able to have its operation at that time. But that obstacle was removed from Christ’s soul by grace. On this score it enjoyed through grace the ability to act at its first instant.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod non est simile de instanti in tempore, et de puncto in magnitudine, quantum ad propositum pertinet. Nam eodem puncto in magnitudine non potest aliquod mobile uti ut duobus nisi in eadem specie motus; sed eodem instanti temporis potest aliquod mobile uti ut duobus etiam quantum ad diversas species motus.	6. An instant in time and a point in space are not alike as regards the matter at hand. For a being in motion cannot use as two the same point in space except in the same species of motion; but a being in motion can use as two the same instant of time even as regards different species of motion.
In eadem autem motus specie non est possibile quod sit continuitas motus, si motus uno actu terminetur, et altero actu incipiat; quia sic intercidit quies media, et per consequens tempus. Possibile autem est in diversis motibus secundum speciem, quod simul sit terminus unius motus et principium alterius, eo quod inter eos non requiritur aliqua continuitas nec aliquis ordo, cum ambo possint esse simul; sicut simul dum aliquid movetur, possit dealbari; et in instanti in quo incipit dealbari, terminatur motus secundum locum. Quandoque vero inter partes eiusdem motus est ordo, ut duae earum non possint esse simul: unde nec terminus unius partis est simul principio alterius, si accipiantur ambo in actu. Et sic patet quod uti uno instanti ut duobus, non cogit ut sit tempus medium, sicut cogit ad hoc uti uno puncto ut duobus in motu locali.	In the same species of motion it is not possible to have continuity of motion if one movement actually ends and the other actually begins, because in this case repose intervenes, and consequently a time. In specifically different motions, however, it is possible for the end of one movement and the beginning of another to coincide, because between them no continuity or order is needed since both can exist together. For instance, while a thing is being moved it can at the same time be whitened, and at the instant at which it begins to become white the local motion ends. Between the parts of the same motion, however, there sometimes is an order, with the result that the two parts cannot exist together. In that case the end of one part does not coincide with the be inning of the other part if both are taken as actual. It is evident, then, that the use of one instant as two does not demand an intervening time, as does the use of one point as two in local motion.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod cum gratia sit perfectio naturae, non sic se habet gratia ad naturam sicut e converso. Commutata autem proportio non in omnibus tenet, sed in mensuris continuis vel discretis.	7. Since grace perfects nature it does not have the same relation to nature as nature to grace. When a proportion is transposed it does not hold good in all matters but only in continuous and discrete measures.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod illa ratio procedit de ordine naturae, non de ordine temporis: quod patet ex hoc quod in eodem instanti forma dat esse, ordinat et distinguit.	8. That argument holds for the order of nature, not for the order of time. This is clearly shown from the fact that at the very same instant the form gives being, orients, and distinguishes.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod consilium requiritur ad electionem, quando aliquis non est aptus in agendis; quod in Christo locum non habuit.	9. Deliberation is required for choice when the person is not certain in regard to the things to be done. But that does not apply to Christ.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod Christus non assumpsit defectus qui in imperfectionem gratiae et scientiae redundare possent. Huiusmodi autem defectus est ineptitudo organorum ad actum animae: unde hunc defectum Christus non assumpsit, sed per gratiam confortabantur organa, ut essent idonea ad operationem animae, sicut in statu innocentiae accidisset fortassis.	10. Christ did not assume any defects that could result in the imperfection of grace and of knowledge. Such a defect is the unsuitability of one’s organs for the activity of the soul. Christ therefore did not assume this defect, but His organs were strengthened by grace so that they were suited for the operation of the soul, as would perhaps also have happened in the state of innocence.
	Answers to Contrary Difficulties
Alia concedimus, quia verum concludunt, licet aliqua eorum non sufficienter.	We concede these arguments because they arrive at true conclusions even though some of them do not do so by adequate reasons.

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