Question Seven: The Book of Life

  1. Primo utrum liber vitae sit quid creatum.
  2. Secundo utrum liber dicatur essentialiter vel personaliter in divinis.
  3. Tertio utrum liber vitae approprietur filio.
  4. Quarto utrum liber vitae idem sit quod praedestinatio.
  5. Quinto utrum liber vitae dicatur respectu vitae increatae.
  6. Sexto utrum liber vitae dicatur respectu vitae naturae in creaturis.
  7. Septimo utrum liber vitae dicatur simpliciter respectu vitae gratiae.
  8. Octavo utrum possit dici liber mortis, sicut dicitur liber vitae.
  1. Is the Book of Life a created thing?
  2. Is the Book of Life predicated of God personally or essentially?
  3. Can the Book of Life be appropriated to the Son?
  4. Is the Book of Life the same as predestination?
  5. Is the Book of Life spoken of in relation to uncreated life?
  6. Is the Book of Life spoken of in relation to the natural life of creatures?
  7. Does the Book of Life used without qualification refer to the life of grace?
  8. Can we speak of a Book of Death as we speak of a Book of Life?
ARTICLE I
This question treats the book of life.

In the first article we ask:
Is the book of life a created thing?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 24, aa. 1-2; I Sent., 40,1, 2, ad 5; III Sent., 3 1, 1, 2, sols. 1-2; In Philip., c. 4, lect. 1 (P. 13:525b); In Heb., c. 12, lect. 4 (P. 13:780a).]
Quaestio est de libro vitae. Et primo quaeritur utrum liber vitae sit quid creatum Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that it is, for
Quia Apocal. cap. XX, 12, super illud: alius liber apertus est, qui est vitae, Glossa: id est Christus, qui tunc apparebit potens, et suis dabit vitam. Sed Christus in iudicio apparebit in forma humana, quae non est aliquid increatum. Ergo liber vitae nihil increatum dicit. 1. Explaining that line in the Apocalypse (20:12), “and another book was opened, which was the book of life,” the Gloss says: “The book of life is Christ, who will then appear in His power and give life to His own.”’ Now, at the final judgment, Christ will appear in human form, which is not something uncreated. Consequently, the book of life does not mean anything uncreated.
Praeterea, Gregorius in moralibus dicit, quod liber vitae dicitur ipse iudex venturus: quia quisquis eum viderit, mox cuncta quae fecit, ad memoriam revocabit. Sed Christo datum est iudicium secundum humanam naturam, ut patet Ioannis cap. V, vers. 27: potestatem dedit ei iudicium facere, quia filius hominis est. Ergo Christus secundum humanam naturam est liber vitae; et sic idem quod prius. 2. Gregory says: “Our future judge Himself is called the book of life, because whoever sees Him will at once remember all he has done. Now, judgment has been given to Christ as man. This is clear from the words of John (5:2 7): “And he has given him power to do judgment, because he is the son of man.” Therefore, Christ as man is the book of life, and the same must be said as before.
Praeterea, liber dicitur ex hoc quod est receptivus Scripturae. Sed receptivum dicitur aliquid ex potentia materiali, quae in Deo esse non potest. Ergo liber vitae non dicit aliquid increatum. 3. A thing is called a book because it has received writing. But a thing is said to be receptive in so far as it contains material potency, which cannot exist in God. Therefore, nothing uncreated is called the book of life.
Praeterea, liber, cum importet quamdam collectionem, designat distinctionem et differentiam. Sed in natura increata, quae est simplicissima, nulla diversitas invenitur. Ergo liber ibi dici non potest. 4. Since book means a kind of collection, it signifies distinction and difference. But, being most simple, an uncreated nature contains no diversity. Therefore, nothing in such a nature can be called a book.
Praeterea, in quolibet libro differt Scriptura libri ab ipso libro. Scriptura autem libri sunt figurae, quibus cognoscuntur quae in libro leguntur. Ideae autem quibus Deus res cognoscit, non sunt aliud quam divina essentia. Ergo ipsa natura increata liber dici non potest. 5. In every book, the writing is something other than the book. Now, the writing in a book is made up of figures, and by means of these we know the things which are read in the book. However, the ideas by which God knows things do not differ from the divine essence. Consequently, His uncreated nature cannot be called a book.
Sed dicebat, quod quamvis in natura divina non sit aliqua differentia realis, est tamen ibi aliqua differentia secundum rationem.- Sed contra, quod est secundum rationem solum, est in intellectu nostro tantum. Si igitur differentia quam liber requirit, est solum secundum rationem, oportet quod sit tantum in intellectu nostro liber vitae; et ita non erit aliquid increatum. 6. But it was said that even though there is no real difference in the divine nature, there is nevertheless a conceptual difference.—On the contrary, a merely conceptual difference exists only in our mind. Consequently, if the difference which this book involves is only a conceptual difference, the book of life must exist only in our intellects, and hence will not be something uncreated.
Praeterea, liber vitae videtur esse cognitio divina de salvandis. Cognitio autem salvandorum sub visionis scientia continetur: cum igitur anima Christi in verbo omnia videat quae Deus cognoscit scientia visionis, videtur quod etiam numerum electorum et omnes electos cognoscat. Ergo anima Christi liber vitae dici potest; et sic dicit aliquid creatum. 7. The book of life seems to be God’s knowledge of those who are to be saved. Moreover, the knowledge of the elect is contained in God’s knowledge of vision. Now, since the soul of Christ sees in the Word all the things that God knows with His knowledge of vision, it seems that it also knows the number of the elect and all those who have been chosen. Therefore, the soul of Christ can be called the book of life; hence, the book of life means something created.
Praeterea, Eccli., XXIV, 32, dicitur: haec omnia liber vitae. Glossa: id est novum et vetus testamentum. Sed novum et vetus testamentum sunt quid creatum. Ergo liber vitae dicit quid creatum. 8. We read in Sirach (24:32): “All these are the book of life...”; and the Gloss on this passage adds: “That is, the new and old testament.” Now, the Old and New Testament are created. Therefore, the book of life means something created.
Praeterea, liber videtur ex eo dici quod in eo est aliquid scriptum. Scriptura autem aliquam difformitatem requirit; unde et intellectus noster in sui principio propter sui puritatem comparatur tabulae in qua nihil est scriptum. Sed divina natura est purior multo et simplicior quam intellectus noster. Ergo non potest dici liber. 9. A book seems to get its name from the fact that something is written in it. Writing, however, involves some imperfection; hence, in its initial purity, our intellect is compared to “a page on which nothing has been written.” But God’s nature is far more pure and simple than our intellect. Hence, it cannot be called a book.
Praeterea, liber est ad hoc ut in eo legatur. Sed non potest dici quod divina natura sit liber, quia ipse in seipso legat; ut patet per Augustinum, qui dicit, quod non dicitur liber vitae, quia aliquid in seipso legat ad hoc quod cognoscat in se quae prius nescivit. Similiter nec potest dici liber quia aliquis alius in eo legat: nullus enim potest legere aliquid nisi ubi invenitur aliqua difformitas, sicut in charta non scripta nihil legitur propter sui uniformitatem. Ergo divina natura increata liber dici non potest. 10. A book exists for someone to read. But God’s nature cannot be said to be a book in the sense that He reads it. This is evident from Augustine’s statement that its title, “Book of Life,” does not mean that God has to read it in order to know something which He did not know previously. Similarly, it cannot be called a book in the sense that someone other than God reads it, because no one can read anything unless he finds some diversity of markings—for example, no one can read a blank piece of paper, because it is undifferentiated. Therefore, God’s uncreated nature cannot be called a book.
Praeterea, a libro non accipitur cognitio de rebus quasi a causa rerum, sed quasi a signo. Sed in Deo accipitur notitia de rebus non quasi a signo, sed quasi a causa. Ergo liber vitae divina cognitio dici non potest. 11. From a book one does not receive knowledge of things as from their cause but as from a sign of them. Now, God does not receive His knowledge of things, as it were, from a sign, but, as it were, from a cause. Therefore, God’s knowledge cannot be called the book of life.
Praeterea, nihil est signum sui ipsius. Liber autem est signum veritatis. Ergo cum Deus sit ipsa veritas, non potest ipsemet liber dici. 12. Nothing can be merely a sign of itself. Now, a book is a sign of truth. Consequently, since God is truth itself, He Himself cannot be called a book.
Praeterea, alio modo est scientiae principium liber et magister. Sed sapientia omnis dicitur esse a Deo quasi a magistro. Non ergo quasi a libro. 13. A book and a teacher are principles of knowledge in different ways. Now, all wisdom is said to come from God as from a teacher. Therefore, it does not come from Him as from a book.
Praeterea, alio modo repraesentantur res in speculo et in libro. Sed Deus dicitur speculum, sapientiae cap. VII, 26, propter hoc quod res omnes repraesentantur in ipso. Ergo non potest vel debet dici liber. 14. A thing is represented differently in a mirror and in a book. Now, Wisdom (7:2 6) calls God a mirror because all things are represented in Him. Consequently, He cannot and should not be called a book.
Praeterea, ab uno libro originali, etiam qui transcribuntur, libri dicuntur. Sed mentes hominum et Angelorum quodammodo transcribuntur a mente divina, dum ab ea cognitionem de rebus suscipiunt. Si ergo mens divina liber vitae dicitur, et mentes creatae libri debent dici; et sic liber vitae non semper dicit aliquid increatum. 15. Even those books that are copied from the original are called books. But the minds of men and angels, in some sense, copy God’s mind when they receive knowledge of things from it. Consequently, if the divine mind is called the book of life, created minds should be similarly called; and thus it is not always something uncreated that is called the book of life.
Praeterea, liber vitae videtur importare repraesentationem vitae, et quamdam causalitatem ad vitam. Sed hoc totum convenit Christo secundum quod homo, quia in ipso, sicut in exemplari, repraesentatur omnis vita gratiae et gloriae, ut dictum est Moysi Exod. XXV, 4: vade, et fac omnia secundum exemplar quod tibi in monte monstratum est. Similiter ipse nobis vitam promeruit. Ergo ipse Christus secundum quod homo, potest dici liber vitae. 16. The book of life seems to imply a representation of life and an exercise of causality over it. Now, all this belongs to Christ as man, because in Him, as in a pattern, is represented all life, both that of grace and that of glory. For this reason it was said to Moses (Exodus 25:40): “Look and make it according to the pattern that was shown you in the mount.” Moreover, Christ merited life for us. Therefore, Christ Himself, as man, can be called the book of life.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Est quod dicit Augustinus in libro XX de civitate Dei: quaedam vis est intelligenda divina, qua fiet ut cuique opera sua, vel bona vel mala, in memoriam revocentur; quae nimirum vis divina libri nomen accepit. Sed vis divina est quid increatum. Ergo et liber vitae dicit quid increatum. 1. Augustine says: “We should know that there is a divine force which causes each one to remember his deeds, good or bad. Indeed, this divine power is called a book.” Now, a divine force is something uncreated. Therefore, something uncreated is also called the book of life.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in eodem libro, quod liber vitae est praescientia divina, quae falli non potest. Sed praescientia est quid increatum. Ergo et liber vitae. 2. In the same work, Augustine says: “The book of life is God’s foreknowledge, which cannot be mistaken.” But His foreknowledge is something uncreated. Therefore, the book of life is also something uncreated.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod liber in divinis non potest dici nisi metaphorice, ut ipsa repraesentatio vitae liber vitae dicatur. Et secundum hoc sciendum est, quod vita dupliciter repraesentari potest: uno modo ipsa vita secundum se; alio modo secundum quod ab aliquibus participabilis est. Vita autem secundum seipsam repraesentari potest dupliciter. Uno modo per modum doctrinae: quae quidem repraesentatio maxime pertinet ad auditum, qui est maxime sensus disciplinalis, ut dicitur in principio de sensu et sensato; et hoc modo liber vitae dicitur in quo continetur doctrina de vita consequenda; et sic novum et vetus testamentum liber vitae dicitur. Alio modo per modum exemplaris: et haec quidem repraesentatio pertinet ad visum; et sic liber vitae dicitur ipse Christus, quia in eo, sicut in exemplari, possumus aspicere qualiter sit vivendum, ut perveniamus ad vitam aeternam. Applied to God, book can be used only metaphorically; thus, it is in this sense that the representation of life is called the book of life. In this connection, it should be noted that life can be represented in two ways: first, as it is in itself, or, secondly, as it can be participated in by certain individuals. Furthermore, life taken in itself can be represented in two ways. This can be done, first, by means of instruction; and this kind of representation pertains to the sense of hearing, which, as said in The Senses and the Sensed, is the chief sense for learning. Taken in this meaning, therefore, the book of life signifies that which contains instructions on how one should live. Consequently, the Old and New Testaments are called the book of life. The second way of representing life in itself is by giving a model; and this kind of representation pertains to the sense of sight. Consequently, Christ Himself is called the book of life, because, by looking at Him as at a model, we can see how we must live in order to attain eternal life.
Sic autem nunc non agimus de libro vitae; sed secundum quod liber vitae dicitur repraesentatio eorum qui ad vitam pervenient, qui dicuntur in libro vitae conscripti secundum quamdam similitudinem ad res humanas. We are not speaking of the book of life in these senses, however, but only in the sense that the book of life is said to be the representation of those who are to attain eternal life, and whose names, according to a comparison drawn from human affairs, are said to be written down in this book.
In qualibet enim multitudine quae providentia regitur alicuius gubernantis, ad multitudinem illam nullus admittitur nisi secundum gubernantis ordinationem; et ideo illi qui debent admitti in collegium multitudinis, conscribuntur quasi illius multitudinis consortes; et ex illa conscriptione dirigitur princeps multitudinis in admittendis vel excludendis ad consortium multitudinis sibi subiectae. Multitudo autem illa quae eminentissimo modo divina providentia gubernatur, est collegium Ecclesiae triumphantis, quae et civitas Dei nominatur in Scripturis; et ideo conscriptio eorum qui ad illam societatem sunt admittendi, sive repraesentatio, liber vitae dicitur: quod patet ex modo loquendi in Scripturis. Dicitur enim Lucae cap. X, 20: gaudete, quia nomina vestra scripta sunt in libro vitae, in caelis, et Isaia IV, 3: sanctus vocabitur omnis qui scriptus est in vita in Ierusalem; et Hebr., XII, 22: accessistis ad civitatem Dei viventis, Ierusalem caelestem, et multorum millium Angelorum frequentiam, et Ecclesiam primitivorum, qui conscripti sunt in caelis. Oportet igitur, ut similitudinem sequamur, ut ex hac conscriptione dirigatur ad vitam conferendam ille qui tali multitudini praeest; quod soli Deo convenit. Ipse autem non dirigitur aliquo creato, cum sit regula a nullo extrinseco directa. Unde liber vitae, secundum quod nunc de eo loquimur, aliquid increatum dicit. For, in a state that is wisely ruled, anyone who becomes a citizen must do so according to the ordinances of its ruler. Hence, those who are to be admitted to citizenship are enrolled as being, as it were, participants in the state. By using this enrollment, the ruler of the state is guided in rejecting persons from and in admitting them to the fellowship of the citizens subject to him. Now, the citizens who are ruled most perfectly by divine providence form the society of the Church triumphant, which is also called the City of God in Scripture. Hence, the enrollment or representation of those who are to be admitted to that society is called the book of life. This is clear from Scripture’s manner of speaking. For example, Luke (10:20) says: “Rejoice in this, that your names are written in heaven,” that is, in the book of life; Isaiah (4:3): “Everyone... shall be called holy... that is written in life in Jerusalem”; and in the Epistle to the Hebrews (12:22-23) we read: “But you are come... to the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to the company of many thousands of angels, and to the church of the first-born who are written in the heavens.” It is necessary, therefore, to carry out the metaphor—and say that from this enrollment the ruler of the society shall know those who are to be given life. The bestowal of life, of course, belongs to God alone. However, God is not guided by anything created, for He is a rule that is directed by nothing extrinsic to Himself. Consequently, the book of life, in the sense in which we are now using it, means something uncreated.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur et secundum, patet responsio ex dictis. Loquitur enim Glossa et auctoritas Gregorii de libro vitae secundum aliam acceptionem, secundum quam dicitur exemplar vivendi: quo inspecto quilibet scire poterit in quo exemplari concordaverit et in quo discordaverit. 1-2. Our answer is clear from what we have said above. For the Gloss and Gregory’s statement concern the book of life in another sense, namely, as it means a model for living: anyone who looks at it can tell whether or not he conforms to it.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod in illis quae translative dicuntur de Deo, hoc est generaliter observandum, quod secundum nihil imperfectionis in divinam praedicationem assumuntur: et ideo auferendum est quidquid ad materialitatem vel privationem vel temporalitatem pertinet. Quod autem liber sit receptivus alicuius extraneae impressionis, convenit libro inquantum est temporalis, et de novo conscriptus; et secundum hoc in divinam praedicationem non venit. 3. When terms are applied to God, the general rule should be observed that in no respect can imperfection be contained in predicates applied to the divinity. Consequently, whatever implies matter, privation, or time must be removed. Now, that it receives markings from something extrinsic belongs to a book in so far as it is temporal and newly written. These notes are not included in the predicate when it is applied to God.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod de ratione libri est quod importet differentiam eorum quae cognoscuntur per librum, quia per unum librum multorum cognitio traditur. Sed quod oporteat, ad multorum cognitionem tradendam, in ipso libro esse diversitatem, est ex defectu libri: multo enim esset liber perfectior, si per unum quid posset omnia edocere quae per multa edisserit. Unde cum in Deo sit summa perfectio, ipse talis liber est qui multa demonstrat per id quod est maxime unum. 4. The very notion of book implies a difference existing between the things known by its means, because a book hands down the knowledge of many things. But that a book must have diversity to hand down knowledge of many things is a defect in the book. It would be much more perfect if it could teach by means of one thing all that it now explains by means of many things. Consequently, since God is most perfect, the book of life is such that it shows many things by means of that which is one in the highest degree.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod hoc est ex defectu libri materialis, quod litterae in eo scriptae differunt a charta in qua scribuntur: hoc enim ad eius compositionem pertinet, ex qua contingit ut habens non sit id quod habetur; et ideo in Deo huiusmodi rationes rerum non differunt ab eius essentia secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum. 5. That the letters written in a book differ from the pages on which they are written is due to a defect of material books. For, because books are composite things, that which has is not the same as that which is had. Consequently, in God these ideas differ from His essence, not really, but only conceptually.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod quamvis diversitas inter Scripturam et id in quo scribitur, sit in ratione tantum, tamen repraesentatio, quae complet rationem libri, non est tantum in ratione nostra, sed in Deo; et ideo liber vitae secundum rem est in Deo. 6. Although the distinction between the writing and that in which it is written is merely conceptual, the representation, which completes the notion of a book, is not only in our mind but also in God. Hence, the book of life is really in God.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod liber vitae, ut dictum est, habet dirigere Deum, qui dat vitam, in hoc quod vitam det. Quamvis autem anima Christi habeat in se cognitionem omnium salvandorum, tamen ex hac cognitione non dirigitur Deus, sed ex cognitione increata, quae est ipse. Unde scientia animae Christi non potest dici liber vitae secundum quod nunc de eo loquimur. 7. As indicated above, the book of life directs God, who gives life, in His giving of life. Now, even though the soul of Christ knows all the elect, God is directed, not by Christ’s human knowledge, but by His own uncreated knowledge, which is Himself. Hence, the knowledge possessed by the soul of Christ cannot be called the book of life in the sense in which we are speaking of it.
Ad octavum patet responsio ex dictis. 8. The reply is clear from what has been said.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod quamvis in Deo nulla sit diversitas, sed summa puritas, tamen comparatur libro scripto, et non tabulae non scriptae, sicut intellectus noster. Intellectus enim noster secundum hoc tabulae rasae comparatur, quod est in potentia ad omnes formas intelligibiles, et nullam earum habet in actu; sed in intellectu divino sunt omnes formae rerum in actu, et omnes in eo sunt unum; et ideo cum uniformitate stat ibi ratio Scripturae. 9. Although there is no diversity but only the greatest purity in God, He is nonetheless compared to a book that has been written in, and not to the blank page to which our intellect has been compared. For our intelligence is compared to a blank page because it is in potency to all intelligible forms, and as yet has none of them actually. In God’s intellect, however, all the forms of things exist in act, and in Him they are one. Consequently, in God the formal character of writing is compatible with His oneness.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod in libro vitae et ipse Deus legit, et alii legere possunt secundum quod eis datur. Nec Augustinus removere intendit quin Deus in libro vitae legat; sed quia hoc modo non legit ut cognoscat ea quae prius nescivit. Alii etiam in eo legere possunt, quamvis sit uniformis per totum, inquantum secundum unum et idem est ratio diversorum. 10. God Himself reads the book of life, and others can read it in so far as they are allowed to do so. Augustine does not mean to deny that God reads the book of life; he denies only that He reads it in order to know what He previously did not know. Moreover, others can read the book of life, even though it is entirely simple, since it is possible for one and the same reality to be the intelligible character of many things.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod similitudo rei est duplex: una est quae est exemplaris, et haec est causa rei; alia quae est exemplata, et haec est effectus et signum rei. Liber autem apud nos conformatur scientiae nostrae, quae est causata a rebus; et ideo ab eo accipitur cognitio de rebus non sicut a causa, sed sicut a signo. Sed scientia Dei est causa rerum, continens rerum similitudines exemplares; et ideo a libro vitae accipitur scientia sicut a causa, et non sicut a signo. 11. One thing is a likeness of another in two ways. In the first way, it is the model for the other thing and thus its cause; second, it itself can be modeled upon the other, and thus be its effect and sign. Now, in the case of men, a book conforms to their knowledge, which, in turn, is caused by things. Consequently, they receive knowledge of things from a book, not as from a cause, but as from a sign. However, God’s knowledge is the cause of things, since it contains the archetypes of all things. Hence, knowledge is received from the book of life as from a cause, and not as from as a sign.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod liber vitae et est ipsa veritas increata, et est similitudo veritatis creatae, sicut liber creatus est signum veritatis. 12. The book of life is uncreated truth itself as well as a likeness of created truth, just as a created book is a sign of truth.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod in Deo exemplaris causa et efficiens incidunt in idem; et ideo ex hoc quod est causa exemplaris, potest dici liber; ex hoc autem quod efficiens sapientiae causa est, potest dici magister. 13. In God, exemplary and efficient causality come to the same thing. Consequently, from the fact that He is an exemplary cause He can be called a book, and from the fact that He is the efficient cause of wisdom He can be called a teacher.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod repraesentatio speculi in hoc differt a repraesentatione libri, quod repraesentatio speculi immediate refertur ad res, sed liber mediante cognitione. Continentur enim in libro figurae, quae sunt signa vocum, quae sunt signa intellectuum, qui sunt similitudines rerum; in speculo autem ipsae rerum formae resultant. In Deo autem resultant utroque modo rerum species, inquantum ipse cognoscit res, et cognoscit se cognoscere eas; et ideo ratio speculi et ratio libri ibi inveniuntur. 14. The representation a mirror gives differs from that which a book gives, because it refers directly to things while that of a book refers to things through the medium of knowledge. For the letters contained in a book are only signs of words, and these, in turn, are signs of concepts, which are likenesses of things. A mirror, however, reflects the forms of things. Yet in God the species of things are reflected in both ways, because He knows things and He knows that He knows them. Consequently, in God both the notion of mirror and the notion of book can be verified.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod etiam mentes sanctorum libri dici possunt, ut patet Apocal., cap. XX, 12: libri aperti sunt: quod Augustinus exponit de cordibus iustorum; non possunt tamen dici libri vitae per modum prius dictum; ut ex dictis patet. 15. The minds of the saints can also be called books. This is clear from the Apocalypse (20:12): “And the books were opened”—which Augustine explains as meaning the hearts of the just. However, the saints’ minds cannot be called books of life in the sense in which we are taking this term. This is clear from what has been said.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod licet Christus, secundum quod homo, sit exemplar et causa vitae aliquo modo; non tamen, secundum quod homo, est causa vitae gloriae per auctoritatem, nec est exemplar Deum dirigens ad dandum vitam; unde, secundum quod homo, non potest dici liber vitae. 16. Although Christ as man is an archetype and, in some sense, the cause of life, as man He is not the cause of the life of glory through His authority nor an archetype directing God in His bestowal of life. Consequently, Christ as man cannot be called the book of life.
ARTICLE II

In the second article we ask:
Is the book of life predicated of God personally or essentially?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 39, 8. See also readings given for preceding article.]
Secundo quaeritur utrum liber vitae dicatur essentialiter vel personaliter in divinis Difficulties
Et videtur quod personaliter. It seems that it is predicated personally, for
In Psalm. enim XXXIX, 9, dicitur: in capite libri scriptum est de me; Glossa: apud patrem, qui est caput mei. Sed nihil habet caput in divinis nisi quod habet principium; quod autem habet principium, in divinis dicitur personaliter. Ergo liber vitae personaliter dicitur. 1. In the Psalms (39:8) we read: “In the head of the book it is written of me...” and the Gloss explains: “That is, in the Father, who is my head.” Now, in God nothing has a head except that which has a principle. But that which has a Principle is a personal predicate in matters pertaining to God. Therefore, the book of life is a personal predication.
Praeterea, sicut verbum dicit notitiam ex alio procedentem, ita et liber, quia Scriptura libri a scriptore procedit. Sed verbum, ratione praedicta, dicitur personaliter in divinis. Ergo et liber vitae. 2. just as word signifies knowledge proceeding from another, book also signifies this, because the writing in a book proceeds from a writer. Now, for the reason already given, word is predicated personally of God. Consequently, the book of life is also a personal predication.
Sed dicebat, quod verbum importat processum realem, liber autem vitae processum rationis tantum.- Sed contra, nos non possumus nominare Deum nisi ex his quae apud nos sunt. Sed sicut apud nos verbum procedit a prolatore realiter distinctum ab eo, ita et liber a scriptore. Ergo eadem ratione utrumque importabit in divinis distinctionem realem. 3. It was said, however, that word implies a real procession, whereas book implies a procession only according to our way of understanding.—On the contrary, we can name God only from the things that exist here below. But, in our experience, a word coming from a speaker is really distinct from him, and so is a book really distinct from its author. For this reason, therefore, both terms imply a real distinction in God.
Praeterea, verbum vocis magis distat a dicente quam verbum cordis; et adhuc magis verbum Scripturae, quod significat verbum vocis. Si ergo verbum divinum, quod sumitur ad similitudinem verbi cordis, ut Augustinus dicit, realiter distinguitur a dicente, multo fortius liber, qui Scripturam importat. 4. There is greater distance between one who speaks and his oral word than there is between him and the word within his heart; and an even greater distance is between him and a written word signifying the word within his heart. Consequently, if the divine Word, which, as Augustine says, resembles the word within the heart, is really distinct from the one who utters it, much more distinct will be a book, since this implies writing.
Praeterea, illud quod attribuitur alicui, oportet quod ei conveniat secundum omnia quae sunt de ratione ipsius. Sed de ratione libri non solum est quod aliquid repraesentet, sed etiam quod ab aliquo scribatur. Ergo in divinis accipitur nomen libri secundum quod est ab alio; et sic personaliter dicitur. 5. That which is attributed to a thing should belong to it according to all that belongs to its nature. Now, the notion of a book demands not only that it represent something but also that it be written by someone. Consequently, in matters concerning God, the word book is taken according as a book is something by another. Hence, it is predicated personally.
Praeterea, sicut de ratione libri est quod legatur, ita et quod scribatur. Sed, secundum quod scribitur, est ab alio; secundum autem quod legitur, est ad alium. Ergo de ratione libri est quod sit ab alio et ad alium; ergo liber vitae dicitur personaliter. 6. just as the notion of a book includes its being read, so does it also include its being written. But, in so far as it is written, it is by another, and in so far as it is read, it is directed to another. Therefore, it belongs to the notion of a book to be to another and by another. Hence, the book of life is predicated personally.
Praeterea, liber vitae dicit notitiam expressam ab alio. Sed quod exprimitur ab alio, oritur ab eo. Ergo liber vitae importat relationem originis, et sic dicitur personaliter. 7. Book of life signifies knowledge expressed by another. But what is expressed by another has its origin in another. Consequently, the book of life implies a relation of origin, and thus is a personal predication.
Sed contra, To the Contrary
est quod liber vitae est ipsa divina praedestinatio, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de civitate Dei, et ut habetur in Glossa Apocal. cap. XX, 12. Sed praedestinatio dicitur essentialiter, et nunquam personaliter. Ergo et liber vitae. The book of life is predestination itself. This is clear from Augustine and the Gloss. But predestination is predicated of the divine essence, never of the divine Persons. Consequently, the book of life is similarly predicated.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod quidam dixerunt quod liber vitae dicitur quandoque personaliter, quandoque essentialiter; secundum enim quod transfertur in divina ex ratione Scripturae, personaliter dicitur, secundum hoc enim importat originem ab alio (liber enim nonnisi ab alio scribitur); secundum autem quod importat repraesentationem eorum quae in libro scribuntur, sic dicitur essentialiter. Some say that the book of life is sometimes a personal, sometimes, an essential predication: in so far as it is used of God according to the notion of writing, it is predicated personally, and in this usage it implies origin from another, for a book has to be written by another; but, in so far as it implies a representation of the things written in the book it is predicated essentially.
Sed ista distinctio non videtur esse rationabilis, quia nomen aliquod dictum de Deo non dicitur personaliter nisi de sui ratione relationem originis importet, secundum hoc quod in divinam praedicationem venit. In his autem quae translative dicuntur, non accipitur metaphora secundum quamcumque similitudinem, sed secundum convenientiam in illo quod est de propria ratione rei cuius nomen transfertur; sicut nomen leonis in Deo non transfertur propter convenientiam quae est in sensibilitate, sed propter convenientiam in aliqua proprietate leonis. Unde et liber vitae non transfertur ad divina secundum id quod est commune omni artificiato, sed secundum id quod est proprium libri inquantum est liber. Procedere autem a scriptore convenit libro non inquantum est liber, sed inquantum est artificiatum; sic enim et domus est ab aedificatore et cultellus a fabro. Sed repraesentatio eorum quae scribuntur in libro, est de propria ratione libri inquantum huiusmodi; unde, tali repraesentatione manente, etiamsi ab alio scriptus non esset, esset quidem liber, sed non esset artificiatus. Unde patet quod liber non transumitur ad divina ex hoc quod ab alio scribitur, sed ex hoc quod repraesentat ea quae scribuntur in libro. Et ideo, cum repraesentatio sit communis toti Trinitati, liber in divinis non dicitur personaliter, sed essentialiter tantum. This distinction, however, does not seem reasonable, because a term used of God is not predicated personally unless its meaning in connection with God implies a relation of origin. Moreover, with regard to words used in a transferred sense, a metaphor is not to be understood as indicating complete resemblance, but only some agreement in a characteristic belonging to the nature of the thing whose name is being applied. For example, the word lion is applied to God, not because of a resemblance between two natures possessing sensation, but because of a resemblance based on one property of the lion. Consequently, the book of life is not predicated of God according to what is common to all products of art, but only according to that which is proper to a book as a book. Now, to come from an author does not belong to a book as a book but only as it is a product of art; and, in a similar manner, a house is from a builder, and a knife is from a cutler. On the other hand, to represent the things written about in the book belongs to the notion of a book as such. Consequently, as long as this representation remains, the book remains a book, even though it is not written by another and is not a product of art. Fro’ m this it is clear that book is applied to God, not in so far as a book is written by another, but in so far as a book represents the things which are written in it. Therefore, since representation is common to the entire Trinity, book is predicated, not personally of God, but only essentially.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod ea quae in divinis essentialiter dicuntur, aliquando pro personis supponunt; unde hoc nomen Deus quandoque supponit pro persona patris et quandoque pro persona filii, ut cum dicitur Deus generans, vel Deus genitus; et ita etiam liber, quamvis essentialiter dicatur, tamen potest supponere pro persona filii; et secundum hoc dicitur habere caput vel principium in divinis. 1. Words that are predicated essentially of God sometimes stand for the persons. Hence, God sometimes stands for the person of the Father, sometimes for the person of the Son, as when we say “God begets” or “God begotten.” Similarly, even though book is predicated essentially, it can sometimes stand for the person of the Son. In this sense, in matters pertaining to divinity, the book of life can be said to have a head or principle.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod verbum, secundum suam rationem qua in divinis dicitur, importat originem ex alio, ut in quaest. de verbo, art. 1 et 2, dictum est; liber autem non importat originem ex sua ratione, secundum quam ad divina transumitur; et ideo non est simile. 2. According to its intelligible character, the term word when used of God implies origin from another. This has already been discussed. But book does not imply the notion of origin when the term is applied to God. Hence, no parallel can be drawn.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis liber apud nos realiter procedat a scriptore, sicut verbum a prolatore, tamen ista processio non importatur in nomine libri, sicut importatur in nomine verbi; non enim plus importatur in nomine libri processio a scriptore quam in nomine domus processio ab aedificatore. 3. Although in the case of creatures a book really proceeds from a writer, just as a word does from a speaker, nevertheless, that procession is not implied by book as it is implied by word. For procession from a writer is not implied any more by book than a procession from a builder is implied by house.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet, si in ratione libri esset ratio verbi scripti; hoc autem non est verum; unde ratio non sequitur. 4. That argument would hold if the notion of the written word belonged to the very notion of book. This, however, is not true. Hence, the argument proves nothing.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod ratio illa tenet in his quae proprie dicuntur; in his autem quae metaphorice dicuntur, sicut liber, non oportet quod conveniat ei de quo praedicatur secundum omnia praedicta quae ei conveniunt proprie; alias oporteret quod Deus, qui dicitur leo metaphorice, haberet ungulas et pilos. 5. That argument holds for words that are used literally. But when words are used metaphorically, as book is used here, it is not necessary that the term predicated express of its subject everything implied by that term taken literally. Otherwise, God, who is called a lion in the metaphorical sense, would have to have claws and a mane.
Ad sextum patet ex dictis, 6. The reply to this difficulty is clear from what has been said.
et similiter ad septimum. 7. The same holds for the seventh difficulty.
ARTICLE III

In the third article we ask:
Can the book of life be appropriated to the son?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 39, 8; III Sent., 31, 1, 2, sol. 1.]
Tertio quaeritur utrum liber vitae approprietur filio Difficulties
Et videtur quod non. It seems not, for
Liber enim vitae ad vitam pertinet; sed vita spiritui sancto attribuitur in Scripturis; Ioan., VI, 64: spiritus est qui vivificat. Ergo et liber vitae spiritui sancto appropriari debet, et non filio. 1. The book of life pertains to life. But life is attributed in Scripture to the Holy Spirit, as, for example, in John (6:64): “It is the spirit that quickens.” Hence, the book of life should be appropriated to the Holy Spirit, not to the Son.
Praeterea, principium in unoquoque potissimum est. Sed pater dicitur caput sive principium libri, ut patet in Psalmo XXXIX, 9: in capite libri scriptum est de me. Ergo patri appropriari debet nomen libri. 2. In everything, the beginning is the most important. But the Father is called the head or the beginning of the book, as is clear in the Psalms (39:8), where we read: “In the head of the book it is written of me...” Therefore, the term book should be appropriated to the Father.
Praeterea, illud in quo aliquid scribitur, habet proprie rationem libri. Sed in memoria dicitur aliquid scribi. Ergo memoria habet rationem libri. Sed memoria appropriatur patri, sicut intelligentia filio, et sicut voluntas spiritui sancto. Ergo liber vitae debet patri appropriari. 3. That in which something is written has the proper nature of a book. Now, a thing is said to be written in the memory; hence, the memory has the nature of a book. But memory is appropriated to the Father, just as intelligence is to the Son, and will is to the Holy Spirit. Consequently, the book of life should be appropriated to the Father.
Praeterea, caput libri pater est. Sed in capite libri, ut in Psalm. habetur, scribitur de filio. Ergo pater est liber filii, et sic patri debet liber appropriari. 4. The Father is the head of the book. But, as we read in the Psalms (39:8), in the head of the book there is writing about the Son. Consequently, the Father is the book of the Son. Therefore, the book [of life] should be appropriated to the Father.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Est Augustinus dicit, quod liber vitae, est praescientia Dei. Sed scientia filio appropriatur, I Corinth., cap. I, 24: Christum Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam. Ergo et liber vitae filio appropriatur. 1. Augustine says that the book of life is God’s foreknowledge. But knowledge is appropriated to the Son: “...Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God” (1 Corinthians 1:24). Therefore, the book of life is also appropriated to the Son.
Praeterea, liber repraesentationem importat, sicut et speculum et imago et figura et character. Sed omnia ista filio attribuuntur. Ergo et liber vitae filio appropriari debet. 2. Book implies a representation, just as mirror, image, stamp, and, figure. But all these terms are attributed to the Son. Consequently, the book of life should also be appropriated to Him.
REPLY
Responsio. Dicendum, quod appropriare nihil est aliud, quam commune trahere ad proprium. Illud autem quod est commune toti Trinitati, non potest trahi ad proprium alicuius personae, ex hoc quod magis uni personae quam alii conveniat: hoc enim aequalitati personarum repugnaret; sed ex hoc quod id quod est commune, habet maiorem similitudinem cum proprio unius personae quam cum proprio alterius; sicut bonitas habet quamdam convenientiam cum proprio spiritus sancti, qui procedit ut amor (est enim bonitas obiectum amoris) unde spiritui sancto appropriatur; et similiter potentia patri, quia potentia inquantum huiusmodi est quoddam principium: patri autem proprium est esse principium totius deitatis; et eadem ratione sapientia appropriatur filio, quia habet convenientiam cum proprio eius: procedit enim filius a patre ut verbum, quod nominat processionem intellectus. Unde, cum liber vitae ad notitiam pertineat, filio appropriari debet. To appropriate means nothing else than to contract something common, making it something proper. Now, what is common to the entire Trinity cannot be appropriated to a single Person on the grounds that this belongs more to this Person than it does to another. Such an action would deny the equality of the Persons. However, appropriation may be made on the grounds that what is common nevertheless has a greater resemblance to what is proper to one person than it has to what is proper to another. For example, goodness resembles what is proper to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds as love, because goodness is the object of love, and so is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Again, power is appropriated to the Father because power as such is a principle, and being the principle of all divinity is proper to the Father. Similarly, wisdom is appropriated to the Son, because it resembles what is proper to the Son, since the Son proceeds from the Father as His Word, and word describes an intellectual procession. Consequently, because the book of life pertains to knowledge, it should be appropriated to the Son.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod quamvis vita approprietur spiritui sancto, cognitio vitae appropriatur filio: hanc autem liber vitae importat. 1. Although life is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, knowledge of life is appropriated to the Son; and it is this that the book of life implies.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod pater dicitur caput libri, non quia sibi ratio libri magis conveniat quam filio, sed quia filius, cui appropriatur liber vitae, a patre oritur. 2. The Father is called the head of the book, not because the notion of book has more in common with Him than with the Son, but because the Son, to whom the name of book of life is appropriated, has His origin from the Father.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod non est inconveniens aliquid appropriari diversis personis ratione diversa, sicut donum sapientiae appropriatur spiritui sancto inquantum est donum: omnis enim doni principium est amor; sed appropriatur filio inquantum est sapientia. Similiter etiam memoria appropriatur patri inquantum est principium intelligentiae; secundum autem quod est quaedam potentia cognitiva, appropriatur filio. Et hoc modo in memoria dicitur aliquid scribi: et sic memoria potest habere rationem libri. Unde et liber magis appropriatur filio quam patri. 3. There is no inconsistency in something being appropriated to different persons if this is done under different formalities. For example, the gift of wisdom is appropriated to the Holy Spirit in so far as it is a gift, because love is the reason for all gifts, but it is also appropriated to the Son in so far as it is wisdom. Similarly, memory is appropriated to the Father in so far as it is a principle of understanding; but, in so far as it is a power of knowing, it is appropriated to the Son. Now, it is in the memory as a knowing power that a thing is said to be written in it. Hence, in this sense, memory can have the nature of a book. Consequently, being the book of life is appropriated more to the Son than to the Father.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis liber approprietur filio, tamen etiam convenit patri, cum sit commune, non proprium; et ideo non est inconveniens, si in patre aliquid scribi dicatur. 4. Although being the book of life is appropriated to the Son, this also belongs to the Father, since it is a property of all the Persons, not of only one of them. Hence, there is no inconsistency in saying that something is written in the Father.
ARTICLE IV

In the fourth article we ask:
Is the book of life the same as predestination?

[ARTICLE See readings given for q. 7, a. 1.]
Quarto quaeritur utrum liber vitae sit idem quod praedestinatio Difficulties:
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that it is, for
Augustinus enim dicit, quod liber vitae est praedestinatio eorum quibus debetur vita aeterna. 1. Augustine says’ that the book of life is the predestination of those to whom eternal life is due.
Praeterea, attributa divina per effectus eorum cognoscimus. Sed idem est effectus praedestinationis et libri vitae, scilicet finalis gratia et gloria. Ergo idem est praedestinatio, quod liber vitae. 2.We know God’s attributes through their effects. But the effect of predestination is the same as that of the book of life, namely, final grace and glory. Therefore, predestination and the book of life are the same.
Praeterea, quidquid dicitur metaphorice in divinis, oportet reduci ad aliquid proprie dictum. Sed liber vitae dicitur metaphorice in divinis ut ex dictis patet. Ergo oportet ad aliquid proprie dictum reducere. Sed non potest ad aliud reduci quam ad praedestinationem. Ergo liber vitae est idem quod praedestinatio. 3. Whatever is predicated metaphorically of God should be reduced to what is predicated literally. Now, the book of life is predicated metaphorically of God, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, it should be reduced to something predicated literally of Him. However, it cannot be reduced to anything else except predestination. Therefore, the book of life is the same as predestination.
ed contra. To the Contrary
Liber dicitur ex hoc quod in eo aliquid scribitur. Sed ratio Scripturae ad praedestinationem non pertinet. Ergo praedestinatio non est idem quod liber vitae. 1. A thing is called a book because something is written in it. But the notion of writing does not pertain to predestination. Consequently, predestination and the book of life are not the same.
Praeterea, liber, de sui ratione, nullam causalitatem importat respectu eorum ad quae dicitur; praedestinatio autem importat. Ergo praedestinatio non est idem cum libro vitae. 2. A book, of its very nature, implies no causality regarding the things to which it is referred. Predestination, however, implies causality. Therefore, it is not the same as the book of life.
REPLY
Responsio. Dicendum, quod sicut ex dictis, patet, liber vitae dicitur in divinis ad similitudinem Scripturae, per quam princeps civitatis dirigitur in admittendis vel excludendis a suae civitatis consortio. Haec autem Scriptura inter duas operationes media invenitur. Sequitur enim determinationem ipsius principis, qui eligit eos quos vult admittere ab his quos excludit, et praecedit ipsam admissionem vel exclusionem: Scriptura enim praedicta non est nisi quaedam repraesentatio suae praedestinationis. Ita etiam et liber vitae nihil aliud esse videtur quam quaedam conscriptio divinae praedestinationis in mente divina: praedestinando enim praedeterminat Deus qui sint ad vitam gloriae admittendi. Huius autem praedestinationis notitia semper apud ipsum manet; et hoc quod est cognoscere se praedestinasse aliquos, est suam praedestinationem in eo esse scriptam quasi in libro vitae. As is clear from what has been said previously, the book of life is used of God because of its resemblance to the document which directs a chief of state in admitting persons to and excluding them from citizenship. Now, this document lies between two operations, for it is subsequent to the decision of the head of the state, who selects those whom he wishes to admit in preference to those whom he excludes, and it is anterior to the admission or exclusion. Moreover, this document is merely a kind of representation of his antecedent decision. Similarly, the book of life is also nothing more than an inscription in the divine mind of God’s predestination, for by this act of predestining God predetermines who are to be admitted to the life of glory. Moreover, His knowledge of this predestination is always with Him; and His knowledge that He has predestined some is, as it were, His predestination written in Him as in a book of life.
Liber ergo vitae et praedestinatio, formaliter loquendo, non sunt idem; sed materialiter est liber vitae ipsa praedestinatio; sicut dicimus, materialiter loquendo, quod liber iste, est doctrina apostoli, quia doctrina apostoli in eo conscripta continetur. Et hoc modo loquitur August. cum dicit, librum vitae esse praedestinationem. Considered formally, therefore, the book of life and predestination are not the same, even though, considered materially, the book of life is predestination—just as we say that a certain book, considered materially, is the teaching of the Apostle because it contains the Apostle’s teaching. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks when he says that the book of life is predestination.
Answers to Difficulties
Unde patet responsio ad primum. 1. The answer is clear from what was said above in the reply.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis eumdem effectum respiciat liber vitae et praedestinatio, non tamen eodem modo; sed praedestinatio respicit illum effectum immediate, liber autem vitae mediante praedestinatione; sicut etiam in anima sunt rerum similitudines immediate, sed in libro conscribuntur signa vocum, quae sunt notae in anima passionum; et ita liber mediate est signum rei. 2. The book of life and predestination are related to the same effect but not in the same manner. Predestination regards that effect without any intervening medium; the book of life regards it through the medium of predestination. Similarly, the likenesses of things in our soul are direct likenesses; but the words written in a book indicate merely what the soul has received. Hence, a book is only mediately a sign of things.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod liber vitae ad aliquid proprie in divinis dictum reducitur: hoc autem non est praedestinatio, sed praedestinationis cognitio, qua Deus aliquos se praedestinasse cognoscit. 3. The book of life can be reduced to something predicated literally of God; this something, however, is not predestination but that knowledge of predestination by which God knows that He has predestined certain persons.
Answers to Contrary Difficulties
Ad ea quae contra obiiciuntur, non esset difficile respondere. 1.-2. It is not difficult to answer these arguments.
ARTICLE V

In the fifth article we ask:
Is the book of life spoken of in relation to uncreated life?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 24, 1; III Sent., 31, 1,2, sol. 2.]
Quinto quaeritur utrum liber vitae dicatur respectu vitae increatae Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that it is, for
Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, liber vitae est notitia Dei. Sed Deus sicut cognoscit vitam alienam, ita cognoscit suam. Ergo liber vitae respicit etiam vitam increatam. 1. As Augustine says, the book of life is God’s knowledge. But God knows His own life, just as He knows that of others. Consequently, the book of life concerns uncreated life also.
Praeterea, liber vitae est repraesentativus vitae. Sed non vitae creatae: primum enim non repraesentat secundum, sed e converso. Ergo liber vitae est repraesentativus vitae increatae. 2. The book of life represents life, but not created life; for what is first does not represent what is second, but what is second represents what is first. Consequently, the book of life represents uncreated life.
Praeterea, quod de pluribus dicitur, de uno per prius, de alio per posterius dictum, simpliciter intelligitur de eo quod per prius dicitur. Sed vita per prius de Deo dicitur quam de creaturis, quia eius vita omnis vitae est origo, ut ostendit Dionysius de divinis Nomin. Ergo cum in libro vitae, vita simpliciter nominetur, intelligi debet de vita increata. 3. What is predicated of several, but predicated primarily of one and secondarily of the others, is understood simply in its primary predication. Now, life is predicated primarily of God rather than of creatures, because His life, as Dionysius has shown, is the origin of all life. Therefore, since life is used simply in the phrase the book of life, it should be understood as referring to uncreated life.
Praeterea, sicut liber repraesentationem importat, ita et figura; maxime cum liber figuris quibusdam repraesentet. Sed filius dicitur figura patris, ut patet Hebr. I, 3. Ergo et filius potest dici liber respectu vitae patris. 4. Just as a book implies a representation, so also does a figure, especially when a book represents something by means of figures. But the Son is said to be the figure of the Father (Hebrews 1:3). Therefore He can be said to be a book with respect to the life of the Father.
Praeterea, liber dicitur respectu eius quod in libro scribitur. Sed in libro scribitur de filio, iuxta illud in Psalmo XXXIX, 9: in capite libri scriptum est de me. Vita autem filii est increata. Ergo liber vitae potest respicere vitam increatam. 5. Book is predicated as being in a relation to that about which the book is written. But the Son is written about in the book of life, for we read in the Psalms (39:8): “In the head of the book it is written of me...” Now, the life of the Son is not created. Hence, the book of life is concerned with uncreated life.
Praeterea, non potest esse idem liber et cuius est liber, respectu eiusdem. Sed creatura est liber respectu Dei. Ergo Deus non potest dici liber respectu vitae creatae; ergo restat quod dicatur liber vitae respectu vitae increatae. 6. A book and the subject treated there cannot be identical in regard to the same thing. Now, a creature is a book revealing God. Therefore, God cannot be a book revealing created life. Hence, the book of life can be spoken of only in relation to uncreated life.
Praeterea, sicut liber ad cognitionem pertinet, ita et verbum. Sed verbum per prius est divinae essentiae ipsius quam creaturae: pater enim, dicendo se, dicit omnem creaturam. Ergo et liber vitae per prius respicit vitam increatam quam creatam. 7. Words, like books, pertain to knowledge. Now, Word is predicated primarily of the divine essence rather than of a creature, because, by uttering Himself, the Father utters all creatures. Consequently, the book of life is primarily concerned with uncreated life rather than with created life.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Secundum Augustinum, liber vitae est praedestinatio. Praedestinatio autem non respicit nisi creaturas. Ergo nec liber vitae. 1. According to Augustine, the book of life is predestination, However, predestination regards only creatures. Therefore, the book of life regards only creatures.
Praeterea, liber non repraesentat aliquid nisi per aliquas figuras et similitudines. Sed Deus non cognoscit seipsum per aliquas similitudines, sed per essentiam suam. Ergo ipse non est liber respectu sui ipsius. 2. A book represents a thing only by means of figures and likenesses. Now, God knows Himself, not by means of likenesses, but by means of His own essence. Therefore, He is not a book with respect to Himself.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod sicut ex dictis patet, liber vitae est quaedam conscriptio, per quam dirigitur conferens vitae in vitae collatione, secundum quod de aliquo praeordinatum erat; et ideo vita respectu cuius liber vitae dicitur, duo habet. Unum est, quod est acquisita per collationem alicuius; aliud est, quod consequitur conscriptionem praedictam dirigentem in ipsam. As is clear from what has been said previously, the book of life is an enrollment which directs the one who confers life in his bestowal of it, in accordance with what has been preordained concerning a certain person. Therefore, the life from which the book of life is named has two aspects. The first is that this life is acquired through someone’s grant; the second is that it follows upon the afore-mentioned enrollment which directs its being granted.
Utrumque autem horum deest vitae increatae, vita enim gloriae non inest Deo per acquisitionem, sed per naturam; nec aliqua notitia vitam eius praecedit, sed ipsa Dei vita praecedit, secundum modum intelligendi, etiam ipsius notitiam. Unde liber vitae non potest dici respectu vitae increatae. Neither of these features is found in uncreated life. God does not acquire His life of glory but has it by His very nature. Moreover, no knowledge precedes His life, but, according to our manner of understanding, His life precedes even His knowledge. Consequently, the book of life cannot be spoken of in relation to uncreated life.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod non quaelibet Dei notitia dicitur liber vitae; sed illa quae est de vita quam habituri sunt praedestinati, ut ex sequentibus verbis haberi potest. 1. Not all of God’s knowledge is called the book of life, but only that concerning the life which the elect are to possess. This can be gathered from the words that follow the section quoted.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod repraesentare aliquid est similitudinem eius continere. Duplex autem est rei similitudo. Una quae est factiva rei, sicut quae est in intellectu practico; et per modum huius similitudinis primum potest repraesentare secundum. Alia autem est similitudo accepta a re cuius est; et per hunc modum posterius repraesentat primum, et non e converso. Liber autem vitae non hoc modo, sed primo, vitam repraesentat. 2. To represent a thing means to bear its likeness. There are two kinds of likenesses, however. The first kind, like the likeness in the practical intellect, produces a thing. Through a likeness of this kind, what is first can represent what is second. The second kind of likeness comes from the thing whose likeness it is. Through a likeness of this kind, what comes later represents what comes first, and not conversely. However, the book of life represents life, not by means of the second type of likeness, but by means of the first.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliquid simpliciter dictum intelligitur quandoque de eo quod per posterius dicitur, ratione alicuius adiuncti; sicut ens in alio intelligitur accidens; et similiter vita ratione eius quod adiungitur, scilicet liber, intelligitur de vita creata, quae per posterius vita dicitur. 3. What is predicated simply is sometimes understood as applying to that about which it is predicated only secondarily, because some qualification has been added. For example, being [with the added qualification] in another is understood as signifying an accident. Similarly, life, because of the added qualification book, is understood as signifying created life, which is life only secondarily.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod figura repraesentat id cuius est figura, quodammodo ut principium, eo quod figura et imago deducitur ab exemplari sicut a principio; sed liber vitae repraesentat vitam ut principiatam ab ipso. Deo autem competit esse principium filii, qui est figura patris, sed non competit vitae eius quod aliquid sit ipsius principium; et ideo non est simile de vita et figura. 4. A figure represents its original as its principle, because a figure and an image are drawn from the archetype as from a principle. The book of life, however, represents life as something that it itself has caused. Now, it belongs to God the Father to be the principle of the Son, who is the figure of the Father, but the life of the Father cannot have anything as its principle. Therefore, there is no parallel between life and a figure.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod illud Psalmi intelligitur de filio secundum humanam naturam. 5. That text of the Psalms is understood of the Son according to His human nature.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod et causa repraesentat effectum, et effectus causam, ut ex dictis patet; et secundum hoc Deus potest dici liber creaturae, et e converso. 6. A cause represents its effect, and the effect its cause. This is clear from what has been said. Accordingly, God can be called a book with respect to creatures, and creatures a book with respect to God.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod verbum non significatur ut principium eius quod per verbum dicitur, sicut liber vitae, prout hic accipitur; et ideo non est simile. 7. By the force of its own proper signification, Word does not denote the principle of that which is expressed by the word; but the book of life as taken here does. Hence, the two are not similar.
ARTICLE VI

In the sixth article we ask:
Is the book of life spoken of in relation to the natural life of creatures?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 24, 2; III Sent., 31, 1, 2, sols. 1-2.]
Sexto quaeritur utrum liber vitae dicatur respectu vitae naturae in creaturis Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that it is, for
Quia sicut vita gloriae repraesentatur in Dei notitia, ita et vita naturae. Sed Dei notitia dicitur liber vitae respectu vitae gloriae. Ergo et debet dici liber respectu vitae naturae. 1. Natural life, as well as the life of glory, is represented in God’s knowledge. Now, God’s knowledge of the life of glory is called the book of life. Therefore, His knowledge of natural life should be similarly called.
Praeterea, divina notitia continet omnia per modum vitae; quia, ut dicitur Ioan. I, 3, quod factum est, in ipso vita erat. Ergo debet dici liber vitae respectu omnium, et maxime viventium. 2. God’s knowledge contains all things according to the manner of life, because we read in John (1:3-4): “What was made, in Him was life...” Therefore, His knowledge should be called the book of life with respect to all things, especially living things.
Praeterea, sicut ex divina providentia aliquis praeordinatur ad vitam gloriae, ita et ad vitam naturae. Sed notitia praeordinationis ad vitam gloriae dicitur liber vitae, ut dictum est prius. Ergo et notitia praeordinationis ad vitam naturae dicitur liber vitae. 3. Just as a person is preordained by God’s providence to the life of glory, so is he also preordained to natural life. Now, as mentioned previously, the knowledge of those preordained to the life of glory is called the book of life. Therefore, the knowledge of those preordained to natural life also is called the book of life.
Praeterea, Apoc. III, 5, super illud: non delebo nomina eorum de libro vitae, dicit Glossa: liber vitae est divina notitia, in qua omnia constant. Ergo liber vitae dicitur respectu omnium; et ita etiam respectu vitae naturae. 4. In its explanation of that verse in the Apocalypse (3:5), “I will not blot out his name out of the book of life,” the Gloss reads: “The book of life is God’s knowledge, in which all things are clear.” Consequently, the book of life is said to concern all things, hence, even natural life.
Praeterea, liber vitae est notitia quaedam de vita gloriae. Sed non potest cognosci vita gloriae nisi cognoscatur vita naturae. Ergo liber vitae respicit similiter vitam naturae. 5. The book of life is, as it were, knowledge of the life of glory. But the life of glory cannot be known unless natural life is also known. Therefore, the book of life likewise concerns natural life.
Praeterea, nomen vitae translatum est a vita naturae ad vitam gloriae. Sed verius dicitur aliquid de eo quod proprie dicitur, quam de eo quod ad hoc transumitur. Ergo liber vitae magis respicit vitam naturae quam gloriae. 6. The word life has been taken from natural life and applied to the life of glory. Now, a thing is said more truly of that of which it is said properly than of that to which it is merely applied. Therefore, the book of life concerns natural life more than it concerns the life of glory.
Praeterea, illud quod est permanentius et communius, est nobilius. Sed vita naturae est permanentior quam vita gloriae vel gratiae; et similiter communior, quia vita naturae sequitur ad vitam gratiae et gloriae, sed non convertitur. Ergo vita naturae est nobilior quam vita gratiae vel gloriae; ergo liber vitae magis respicit vitam naturae quam gratiae vel gloriae. 7. What is more permanent and common is more noble. Now, natural life is more permanent than the life of glory or of grace. Similarly, it is more common, because natural life continues with the life of grace or of glory; but the opposite is not true. Therefore, natural life is more noble than the life of grace and glory. Hence, the book of life concerns the life of nature more than it concerns the life of grace or of glory.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Liber vitae quodammodo est praedestinatio, ut per Augustinum patet. Sed praedestinatio non est de vita naturae. Ergo nec liber vitae. 1. As Augustine says, the book of life is, in a sense, predestination. But predestination does not concern natural life. Hence, neither does the book of life.
Praeterea, liber vitae est de illa vita quae immediate a Deo datur. Sed vita naturae datur a Deo mediantibus naturalibus causis. Ergo liber vitae non est de vita naturae. 2. The book of life concerns the life which is given by God directly. Natural life, however, is given by God through the medium of natural causes. Therefore, the book of life is not about natural life.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod liber vitae est quaedam notitia dirigens datorem vitae in vitae collatione, ut dictum est. In collatione autem aliqua non indigemus directione nisi propter hoc quod oportet discernere eos quibus dandum est, ab his quibus dandum non est. Unde liber vitae non est nisi respectu illius vitae quae cum electione datur. Vita autem naturae sicut et alia bona naturalia, communiter omnibus exhibetur, secundum quod unusquisque est capax; et ideo respectu vitae naturae non est liber vitae, sed solum respectu illius vitae quae, secundum propositum Dei eligentis, quibusdam datur et quibusdam non. The book of life, as mentioned previously, is that knowledge which directs the giver of life in His bestowal of it. Now, when we give anything, we need no direction unless it is necessary to separate those to whom bestowal is to be made from those to whom it is not to be made. Hence, the book of life concerns only that life which is to be granted by choice. Natural life, however, like all other natural goods, is supplied to all in general, according to each one’s capacity. The book of life, therefore, does not concern natural life but only that life which, according to a choice made by God’s will, is given to some and not to others.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod quamvis vita naturae repraesentetur in Dei notitia, sicut et vita gloriae, non tamen notitia vitae naturae habet rationem libri vitae, sicut notitia vitae gloriae, ratione praedicta. 1. Although natural life and the life of glory are represented in God’s knowledge, His knowledge of natural life does not fulfill the notion of the book of life as does His knowledge of the life of glory for the reason given.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod liber vitae non dicitur liber qui vivit; sed liber qui est de vita ad quam aliqui per electionem praeordinantur, qui sunt conscripti in libro. 2. The book of life gets its name, not from the fact that it has life, but because it is a book about the life to which some are preordained by God’s election, and because the names of these persons are written down in it.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod providentia Dei vitam aliquibus providet ut debitum naturae ipsorum; sed vitam gloriae non providet nisi ex beneplacito suae voluntatis; et ideo vitam naturae dat omnibus qui capere possunt, non autem vitam gloriae. Et propter hoc non est aliquis liber vitae naturae, sicut vitae gloriae. 3. In His providence, God gives life to some as a thing due to their nature, but He grants the life of glory only according to the good pleasure of His will. Consequently, He gives natural life to everything which can receive it, but not the life of glory. Hence, there is no book of natural life as there is a book of the life of glory.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod Glossa illa non est intelligenda hoc modo quod omnia constent, id est contineantur in libro vitae; sed quia omnia quae in eo scribuntur, constant, id est firma sunt. 4. The Gloss is not to be understood as meaning that all things are clear—that is, all things are contained—in the book of life. It means, rather, that all which is written in it is clear, that is, all is determined.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod liber vitae non solum importat notitiam respectu vitae gloriae, sed etiam quamdam electionem; non autem respectu vitae naturae, ut dictum est. 5. The book of life implies, as has been said, not only knowledge of the life of glory but also God’s choice—not, however, with respect to merely natural life.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod vita gloriae est minus nota nobis quam vita naturae; et ideo ex vita naturae devenimus in cognitionem vitae gloriae; et similiter ex vita naturae vitam gloriae nominamus, quamvis vita gloriae plus habeat de ratione vitae; sicut et ex his quae sunt apud nos, nominamus Deum. Unde non oportet quod nomen vitae intelligatur de vita naturae, quando simpliciter profertur. 6. The life of glory is less known to us than natural life is. Consequently, we come to know the life of glory after knowing natural life. Similarly, we name the life of glory from natural life, even though more of the nature of life belongs to the life of glory than belongs to natural life. This is true of all the names that we give God which are taken from creatures. Consequently, when the word life is used by itself, it need not be understood as necessarily referring to natural life.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod vita gloriae, quantum est in se, est permanentior quam vita naturae, quia per vitam gloriae naturae vita stabilitur; sed per accidens vita naturae est permanentior quam vita gloriae; inquantum, scilicet, est propinquior viventi, cui secundum essentiam suam debetur vita naturae, non autem vita gratiae. 7. The life of glory, taken by itself, is more permanent than natural life, because it makes natural life stable. Accidentally, however, natural life is more permanent than the life of grace; that is, it is more closely related to the living thing, to which natural life, but not the life of glory, is due by reason of its essence.
Communior autem est quodammodo vita naturae, et quodammodo non. Dupliciter enim dicitur aliquid commune. Uno modo per consecutionem vel praedicationem; quando, scilicet, aliquid unum invenitur in multis secundum rationem unam; et sic illud quod est communius, non est nobilius, sed imperfectius, sicut animal homine; et hoc modo vita naturae est communior quam vita gloriae. Alio modo per modum causae, sicut causa quae, una numero manens, ad plures effectus se extendit; et sic id quod est communius, est nobilius, ut conservatio civitatis quam conservatio familiae. Hoc autem modo vita naturae non est communior quam vita gloriae. Moreover, while natural life is more common in one sense than the life of glory, in another sense it is less common. For a thing is said to be common in two senses. First, it is said to be common through effect or predication; that is, it is found in many things according to one intelligible character. In this sense, that which is more common is not more noble but more imperfect, as animal is, which is more common than man. Now, it is in this sense that natural life is more common than the life of glory. Second, a thing is said to be common after the manner of a cause; that is, it resembles a cause which, while remaining numerically one, extends to many effects. In this sense, what is more common is more noble. For example, the preservation of a city is more noble than the preservation of a family. In this sense, natural life is not more common than the life of glory.
ARTICLE VII

In the seventh article we ask:
Does the book of life used without qualification refer to the life of grace?

[ARTICLE See readings given for preceding article.]
Septimo quaeritur utrum liber vitae dicatur simpliciter respectu vitae gratiae Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that it does, for
Quia quod est in effectu, nobilius invenitur in causa, ut patet per Dionysium in libro de divinis nominibus. Sed gloria est effectus gratiae. Ergo vita gratiae est nobilior quam vita gloriae; ergo liber vitae principalius respicit vitam gratiae quam vitam gloriae. 1. As is evident from what Dionysius has written, what is in the effect is found in a nobler manner in the cause. Now, glory is the effect of grace. Consequently, the life of grace is more noble than the life of glory. Hence, the book of life concerns the life of grace more than it does the life of glory.
Praeterea, liber vitae est quaedam praedestinationis conscriptio, ut supra, art. 1 et 5 huius quaest. dictum est. Sed praedestinatio est communiter praeparatio gratiae et gloriae. Ergo et liber vitae utramque vitam communiter respicit. 2. As mentioned earlier, the book of life is the enrollment of those who are predestined. But predestination, in general, is the preparation of grace and glory. Therefore, the book of life concerns, in general, the life of grace as well as the life of glory.
Praeterea, per librum vitae aliqui designantur ut cives illius civitatis in qua est vita. Sed, sicut per vitam gloriae aliqui efficiuntur cives Ierusalem caelestis, ita per vitam gratiae aliquis efficitur civis Ecclesiae militantis. Ergo liber vitae respicit vitam gratiae sicut et vitam gloriae. 3. The book of life designates certain persons as citizens of that city in which there is life. But, just as some are made citizens of the heavenly Jerusalem through the life of glory, so some are made citizens of the Church militant through the life of grace. Therefore, the book of life concerns the life of grace as well as the life of glory.
Praeterea, quod de pluribus dicitur, dictum simpliciter intelligitur de eo de quo per prius dicitur. Sed vita gratiae est prior quam vita gloriae. Ergo, cum dicitur liber vitae, intelligitur de vita gratiae. 4. What is predicated of many is understood as predicated without qualification of that of which it is predicated first. Now, the life of grace is prior to the life of glory. Therefore, when the book of life is mentioned, it is understood as referring to the life of grace.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Ille qui habet praesentem iustitiam, simpliciter habet vitam gratiae. Non autem dicitur simpliciter scriptus in libro vitae, sed solum secundum quid, scilicet secundum praesentem iustitiam. Ergo liber vitae non respicit simpliciter vitam gratiae. 1. One who is in the state of grace possesses the life of grace without qualification. His name, however, is not said to be written in the book of life without qualification; it is written there only in a certain respect, namely, in so far as he is in the state of grace. Therefore, the book of life is not concerned simply with the life of grace.
Praeterea, finis est nobilior his quae sunt ad finem. Sed vita gloriae est finis gratiae. Ergo est nobilior; ergo vita simpliciter dicta intelligitur de vita gloriae, et ita liber vitae simpliciter non respicit nisi vitam gloriae. 2. The end is more noble than the means to the end. But the life of glory is the end of grace. Therefore, it is more noble. Consequently, when used without qualification, life should be understood as referring to the life of glory. Hence, the book of life used without qualification is concerned only with the life of glory.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod liber vitae significat quamdam conscriptionem alicuius ad vitam obtinendam quasi quoddam praemium, et quasi possessionem quamdam, ad huiusmodi enim homines conscribi consueverunt. Illud autem proprie dicitur haberi ut possessio quod habetur ad nutum; et hoc est illud in quo nullum defectum patitur. Unde philosophus dicit in principio metaphysicorum, quod scientia quae est de Deo, non est humana possessio, sed divina, quia solus Deus perfecte seipsum cognoscit; homo autem ad cognoscendum ipsum deficiens invenitur. Et ideo tunc vita habetur ut possessio, quando per vitam omnis defectus vitae oppositus excluditur. Hoc autem facit vita gloriae, in qua mors omnis et corporalis et spiritualis penitus absorbebitur, ut nec etiam remaneat potentia moriendi; non autem vita gratiae. Et ideo liber vitae non respicit simpliciter vitam gratiae, sed vitam gloriae tantum. The book of life means the enrollment of someone who will obtain life as a kind of reward and possession, for men of this sort are customarily enrolled in something. Now, a thing is said to be a possession, properly speaking, when it can be had at one’s command; and such a thing has no defects. Consequently, the Philosopher says that knowledge had about God “is not a human possession” but divine, because only God knows Himself perfectly, while man’s knowledge of God is necessarily defective. Thus, life will be had as a possession when through life all the defects opposed to life are excluded. Now, this is what the life of glory does; it excludes all death, spiritual as well as physical, so that there remains not even the possibility of dying. The life of grace does not do this. Consequently, the book of life does not concern the life of grace without qualification, but only the life of glory.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quaedam causae sunt nobiliores his quorum sunt causae, sicut efficiens, forma et finis; et ideo quod est in talibus causis, nobilius est in eis quam in his quorum sunt causae. Sed materia est imperfectior eo cuius est causa; et ideo aliquid est in materia minus nobiliter quam in materiato; in materia enim est incomplete et in potentia, et in materiato est actu. 1. Certain causes are more noble than their effects, namely, the efficient, formal, and final causes. Hence, what exists in these causes exists in a more noble manner than what exists in their effects. On the other hand, matter is less perfect than its effects. Consequently, a thing exists in a material cause in a less noble manner than it does in the effect of this cause; for in matter it is incomplete and potential, but in the effect of the material cause its existence is actual.
Omnis autem dispositio, quae praeparat subiectum ad aliquam perfectionem recipiendam, reducitur ad causam materialem; et hoc modo gratia est causa gloriae; et ideo vita est in gloria nobilius quam in gratia. Now, every disposition that prepares a subject to receive a perfection can be reduced to the material cause; and it is in this way that grace is the cause of glory. Consequently, life exists in glory in a more noble way than it does in grace.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod praedestinatio non respicit gratiam nisi secundum quod ordinatur ad gloriam; unde esse praedestinatum non convenit nisi his qui habent finalem gratiam, quam sequitur gloria. 2. Predestination does not concern grace except as grace is ordained to glory. Hence, to be predestined belongs only to those who have final grace, upon which glory follows.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis illi qui habent vitam gratiae, sint cives Ecclesiae militantis, tamen status Ecclesiae militantis non est status in quo vita plene habeatur, cum adhuc remaneat potentia ad mortem; et ideo respectu huius non dicitur liber vitae. 3. Although those who possess the life of grace are citizens of the Church militant, the condition of the Church militant is not one in which life is possessed fully, because the possibility of dying still remains. Hence, the book of life is not spoken of in relation to these individuals.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis vita gratiae sit prior in via generationis quam vita gloriae; tamen vita gloriae est prior secundum viam perfectionis, ut finis his quae sunt ad finem. 4. Although in the line of generation, the life of grace is prior to the life of glory, nevertheless, in the line of perfection the life of glory is prior—just as the end is prior to the means to the end.
ARTICLE VIII

In the eighth article we ask:
Can we speak of a book of death as we speak of the book of life?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 24, 1; III Sent., 31,1, 2, sols. 1-2.]
Octavo quaeritur utrum possit dici liber mortis, sicut dicitur liber vitae Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that we can, for
Luc. X, 20, super illud: gaudete, quia nomina vestra etc., dicit Glossa: si quis caelestia sive terrestria opera gesserit, per haec quasi litteris annotatus apud Dei memoriam aeternaliter est affixus. Sed sicut per opera caelestia, quae sunt opera iustitiae, aliquis ordinatur ad vitam; ita per opera terrestria, quae sunt opera peccati, aliquis ordinatur ad mortem. Ergo sicut in Deo est conscriptio ordinata ad vitam, ita est ibi conscriptio ordinata ad mortem; ergo sicut in Deo dicitur liber vitae, ita debet ibi dici liber mortis. 1. In its comment on Luke (10:20), “Rejoice in this, that your names are written...,” the Gloss reads: “By means of his heavenly or earthly deeds, a person is, as it were, engraved on God’s memory forever.”’ Now, just as a person is ordained to life through heavenly deeds, that is, through works of justice, so is he also ordained to death through earthly deeds, that is, through works of sin. Hence, as there is in God an enrollment of those ordained to life, so is there also in Him an enrollment of those ordained to death. Consequently, just as there is said to be a book of life in God, so should there also be said to be in Him a book of death.
Praeterea, liber vitae ideo ponitur inquantum ipse (Deus) apud se conscriptos habet quos ad aeterna praemia praeparavit, ad similitudinem eius quod princeps terrenus conscriptos habet illos quos ad aliquas dignitates determinavit. Sed sicut princeps civitatis habet descriptas dignitates et praemia, ita etiam poenas et supplicia. Ergo et similiter apud Deum debet poni liber mortis. 2. The book of life is said to be in God only inasmuch as He has a list of those for whom He has prepared an eternal reward—a list resembling that which a ruler on earth has, containing the names of those whom he has decided to honor. But a ruler on earth has a list of punishments and tortures as well as a list of honors and rewards. Therefore, God also has a book of death.
Praeterea, sicut Deus cognoscit praedestinationem suam, qua aliquos praeparavit ad vitam; ita cognoscit reprobationem suam, qua aliquos praeparat ad mortem. Sed ipsa notitia quam Deus habet de sua praedestinatione, dicitur liber vitae, ut dictum est art. 1 huius quaest. Ergo et notitia reprobationis debet dici liber mortis. 3. just as God knows the predestination by which He prepares some for life, so does He also know His reprobation by which He prepares others for death. Now, the knowledge which God has of His predestination is called the book of life, as mentioned earlier. Therefore, His knowledge of reprobation should be called the book of death.
Sed contra. To the Contrary
Secundum Dionysium in libro de divinis nominibus in principio, de divinis non est audendum aliquid dicere nisi quod est per auctoritatem sacrae Scripturae introductum. Sed liber mortis non invenitur in Scriptura dici sicut liber vitae. Ergo non debemus ponere librum mortis. According to Dionysius, “We should not venture to say anything about God unless we can support what we are saying from Scripture.” Now, we do not find anything in Scripture that refers to a book of death as it refers to the book of life. Therefore, we should not affirm the existence of a book of death.
Responsio. REPLY
Dicendum, quod de eo quod in libro scriptum habetur, habet quis aliquam notitiam prae aliis privilegiatam; unde et respectu illorum a Deo scitorum liber dici debet de quibus aliquam specialem notitiam habet prae aliis. A person’s knowledge about matters written in a book is superior to his knowledge of other matters. Hence, in connection with God’s knowledge of things, the term book is used of knowledge that is superior in kind to His knowledge of other truths.
Est autem in Deo duplex cognitio: scilicet scientia simplicis notitiae, et scientia approbationis. Scientia simplicis notitiae omnibus communis est et bonis et malis; scientia autem approbationis est bonorum tantum: et ideo bona habent in Deo aliquam privilegiatam cognitionem prae aliis, ratione cuius in libro conscribi dicuntur; non autem mala. Et ideo non dicitur liber mortis, sicut dicitur liber vitae. Now, there are two kinds of knowledge in God, namely, knowledge of simple understanding and knowledge of approval. His knowledge of simple understanding concerns all things, both the good and the evil; but His knowledge of approval concerns only the good. Hence, the good are known to God in a more special way than the others; and for this reason they are said to be written in a book, while the evil are not. Consequently, a book of death is not spoken of as the book of life is.
Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod quidam exponunt opera caelestia de operibus contemplativae vitae, opera autem terrestria de operibus vitae activae. Per utraque autem aliquis conscribitur ad vitam, non ad mortem; et ita utraque conscriptio ad librum vitae pertinet, et neutra ad librum mortis. Quidam vero per opera terrestria intelligunt opera peccati, per quae quamvis aliquis, per se loquendo, ordinetur ad mortem, tamen per accidens aliquis ordinatur ad vitam, inquantum aliquis post peccatum resurgit cautior et humilior. 1. Some explain “heavenly deeds” as meaning the labors of the contemplative life, and “earthly deeds” as meaning the labors of the active life. If a person performs one or the other, however, he is enrolled for life and not for death. Therefore, both enrollments pertain to the book of life and neither to a book of death. Others understand “earthly deeds” as meaning works of sin, which, taken by themselves, simply ordain a person to death, although he may, for another reason, be ordained to life inasmuch as he may rise again after his fall, more cautious and humble.
Vel potest dici, et melius, quod cum dicitur aliquid per alterum cognosci, hoc potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo ut praepositio designet causam cognitionis ex parte cognoscentis; et sic non potest intelligi in proposito, quia opera quae quis facit, bona vel mala, non sunt causa neque divinae praescientiae vel praedestinationis, neque reprobationis aeternae. Alio modo ut designet causam ex parte cogniti; et sic intelligitur in proposito. Dicitur enim aliquis esse annotatus apud Dei memoriam per opera quae gessit, non quia huiusmodi opera sint causa quare Deus cognoscat, sed quia Deus cognoscit quod propter huiusmodi opera aliquis habiturus est mortem vel vitam. One might also answer—and this is the better explanation—that when a thing is said to be known by means of some other thing, this statement can be understood in two ways. First, by means of may signify the cause of the knowledge on the part of the knower. This cannot be its meaning in the Gloss, however, because the works one does’ whether they be good or bad, are not a cause of God’s foreknowledge ‘ of His predestination, or of His eternal reprobation. Second, by means of may signify the cause on the part of what is known. This is its meaning in the Gloss. For a person is engraved on God’s memory by means of the works he has done, not because his works of the kind described are the cause of God’s knowing him, but because God knows that on account of these works he will possess life or death.
Unde patet quod Glossa illa non loquitur de conscriptione quae pertinet ad librum vitae, quae est ex parte Dei. It is clear from this that the Gloss is not speaking of that enrollment for life which pertains to the book of life and is on the part of God.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliqua conscribuntur in libro, ut perpetuo in notitia maneant. Illi autem qui puniuntur, per poenas ipsas exterminantur a notitia hominum; et ideo non conscribuntur, nisi forte ad tempus, quousque eis poena infligatur. Sed illi qui deputantur ad dignitates et praemia, conscribuntur simpliciter, ut quasi in perpetua memoria habeantur. 2. Things are written in a book so that they may be known forever. Men who are punished, however, are kept by their very punishments from being known by other men. Hence, their names are written down only. temporarily until the time when their punishment is inflicted upon them. But those who are thought worthy of honors and rewards have their names written down unconditionally in order that they may be kept, as it were, in everlasting memory.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod de reprobis Deus non habet aliquam notitiam privilegiatam, sicut de praedestinatis; et ideo non est simile. 3. God does not have a special knowledge of the reprobate as He has of the predestined. Hence, no comparison can be made.