Question Eight: The Knowledge of Angels

Primo utrum Angeli videant Deum per essentiam. Secundo utrum intellectus Angeli vel hominis beati essentiam divinam comprehendat. Tertio utrum Angelus ex propriis naturalibus potuerit pertingere ad videndum Deum per essentiam. Quarto utrum Angelus videns Deum per essentiam, omnia cognoscat. Quinto utrum visio rerum in verbo sit per aliquas similitudines rerum in intellectu angelico existentes. Sexto utrum Angelus cognoscat seipsum. Septimo utrum Angelus unus intelligat alium. Octavo utrum Angelus res materiales cognoscat per formas aliquas, an per essentiam sui cognoscentis. Nono utrum formae per quas Angeli cognoscunt res materiales, sint innatae, vel a rebus acceptae. Decimo utrum Angeli superiores habeant cognitionem per formas magis universales quam inferiores. Undecimo utrum Angelus cognoscat singularia. Duodecimo utrum Angeli cognoscant futura. Tertiodecimo utrum Angeli scire possint occulta cordium. Quartodecimo utrum Angeli simul multa cognoscant. Quintodecimo utrum Angeli cognoscant res discurrendo de uno in aliud. Sextodecimo utrum in Angelis distingui debeat cognitio matutina et vespertina. Decimoseptimo utrum cognitio angelica sufficienter per matutinam et vespertinam dividatur.

Do the angels see God through His essence? Do the intellects of beatified angels and men comprehend the divine essence? Can an angel by means of his own natural powers attain the vision of God through His essence? Does an angel, seeing God through His essence, know all things? Is the vision of things in the Word had through likenesses of them existing in the angelic intellects? Does an angel know himself? Does one angel know another? Does an angel know material things through forms or by knowing his own essence? Are the forms by which angels know material things innate or received from things? Do higher angels know by forms more universal than those by which lower angels know? Do angels know singulars? Do angels know the future? Can angels know the heart’s secrets? Can angels know many things at the same time? Is angels’ knowledge of things discursive? Should morning knowledge be distinguished from evening knowledge in angels? Is an angel’s knowledge adequately divided into morning and evening knowledge?

---

ARTICLE I This question treats the knowledge of angels. In the first article we ask: Do the angels see God through his essence? [ARTICLE S.T., I, 12, 1; 12, 4, ad 3; 56, 3; 62, 1; I-II, 3, 8; 5, 1; II Sent., 4, 1, 1; 23, 2, 1; IV Sent., 49, 2, 1; C.G., III, cc. 41,49,51,54,57; Quodl., X, 8, 17; In Math., c. 5 (P. 10:53a); Comp. Theol., I, c. 104; II, cc. 9-10; In Evang. Johannis, c. 1, lect. 11 (P. 10:312a); Q.D. De anima, 17, ad 10; In I Tim., c. 6, lect. 3 (P.13:6 1 8b).]
Quaestio est de cognitione Angelorum. Et primo quaeritur utrum Angeli videant Deum per essentiam	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non.	It seems not, for
Deum nemo vidit unquam; super quo dicit Chrysostomus: sed nec ipsae caelestes essentiae, ipsa dico Cherubim et Seraphim, ipsum ut est unquam videre potuerunt. Sed quicumque videt Deum per essentiam, videt ipsum ut est. Ergo Angelus non videt Deum per essentiam.	1. We read in the Gospel according to St. John (1:18): “No man has seen God at any time.” Commenting on this, Chrysostom writes: “Not even the heavenly essences themselves, I mean the cherubim and seraphim, were able to see God as He is.”’ But whoever sees God through His essence sees Him as He is. Angels, therefore, do not see God through His essence.
Praeterea, Exod. XXXIII, 11, super illud, loquebatur dominus ad Moysem facie ad faciem, etc., dicit Glossa: substantiam Dei nec hominum nec Angelorum quisquam, sicut est unquam videre potuit; et sic idem quod prius.	2. Commenting on that verse in Exodus (33:11), “And the Lord spoke to Moses face to face,” the Gloss reads: “No man, no angel has ever seen the essence of God as it is.” Consequently, our conclusion is the same as before.
Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, desiderium est rei non habitae. Sed Angeli desiderant in Deum respicere, ut dicitur I Petri, II. Ergo Deum per essentiam non vident.	3. According to Augustine, one desires a thing only if one does not have it. But in the first Epistle of St. Peter (1:12), we read that “the angels desire to look upon God.” Therefore, they do not see God through His essence.
Praeterea, Chrysostomus dicit super Ioan.: ipsum quod est Deus, non solum prophetae, sed nec Angeli nec Archangeli videre potuerunt; et sic idem quod prius, quia id quod est Deus, est essentia Dei.	4. Commenting on the first chapter of John, Chrysostom says: “Neither prophets, angels, nor archangels were able to see that which is God. 114 Since that which is God is God’s essence, our conclusion is the same as before.
Praeterea, omne quod videtur ab intellectu, per aliquam formam videtur. Si ergo intellectus Angeli videt essentiam divinam, oportet quod per aliquam formam eam videat. Sed non potest ipsam videre per ipsam divinam essentiam; quia forma qua intellectus intelligit, facit eum intellectum in actu, et sic est actus eius; et sic oportet quod ex ea et intellectu efficiatur unum: quod non potest dici de divina essentia, quae non potest venire ut pars in constitutionem alicuius. Ergo oportet quod Angelus intelligens Deum, videat eum mediante aliqua alia forma; et sic non videt eum per essentiam.	5. Whatever is seen by the intellect is seen through a form. Consequently, if the intellect of an angel were to see the divine essence, it would have to see it through some form. Now, it could not see it through the divine essence itself, because the form by which the intellect understands makes the intellect to be in act and, consequently, is the act of the intellect. Hence, the divine essence and the intellect would be made one. But this cannot be said of the divine essence, which cannot become the constitutive part of anything. Therefore, when an angel knows God, he sees Him through the medium of some other form, and, consequently, does not see Him through His essence.
Praeterea, intellectus debet esse proportionatus intelligibili, cum intelligibile sit perfectio intelligentis. Sed nulla potest esse proportio inter essentiam divinam et intellectum angelicum, cum in infinitum distent, et talium non sit proportio. Ergo Angelus non potest Deum per essentiam videre.	6. The intellect must be proportionate to the intelligible since the intelligible is a perfection of the one who understands. But there can be no proportion between the divine essence and an angelic intellect, for they are separated by an infinite distance, and there is no proportion between such widely separated things. Consequently, an angel cannot see God through His essence.
Praeterea, nullus assimilatur alicui nisi secundum similitudinem eius receptam in ipso. Sed intellectus Angeli cognoscens Deum assimilatur ei, cum omnis cognitio sit per assimilationem. Ergo oportet quod cognoscat eum per similitudinem, et non per essentiam.	7. One thing can be made like another only in so far as it has received likeness of that other into itself. But by knowing God, an angelic intellect is made like God, for all knowledge takes place through assimilation. Consequently, an angel must know God through a likeness, and not through His essence.
Praeterea, quicumque cognoscit aliquid per essentiam, cognoscit de eo quid est. Sed, ut patet per Dionysium, et Damascenum, de Deo non potest sciri quid est, sed quid non est. Ergo intellectus nullus creatus potest Deum per essentiam videre.	8. Whoever knows a thing through its essence knows what that thing is. Now, as is clear from the writings of Dionysius and Damascene, one cannot know what God is, but only what He is not. No created intellect, therefore, can see God through His essence.
Praeterea, sicut dicit Dionysius in epistola ad Gaium, in Deo tenebrae describuntur propter superabundantem eius claritatem; et propter hoc occultatur omni lumini, et absconditur omni cognitioni. Sed claritas divina non solum excedit intellectum nostrum, sed etiam angelicum. Ergo eorum cognitioni claritas divinae essentiae absconditur.	9. As Dionysius says, darkness is said to be in God because of the superabundance of His brightness and because He is hidden from all lights and concealed from all knowledge. Now, God’s brightness exceeds not only our intellect but also the angelic intellect. Consequently, the brightness of the divine essence is hidden from the knowledge of angels.
Praeterea, Dionysius sic arguit in primo capite de Divin. Nomin. Omnis cognitio est existentium. Sed Deus non est existens, sed superexistens. Ergo non potest cognosci nisi a superessentiali cognitione, quae est cognitio divina.	10. Dionysius argues as follows: All cognition is about existing things. God, however, does not exist but is above existence. Therefore, He cannot be known except by transcendent knowledge, which is divine knowledge.
Praeterea, Dionysius dicit in epistola ad Gaium, si quis videns Deum intellexit quod vidit, non ipsum vidit, sed aliquid eorum quae sunt eius. Ergo Deus per essentiam a nullo intellectu creato videri potest.	i 1. Dionysius says: “If a person seeing God understood what he saw, he did not see God but only one of the things belonging to Him.” Therefore, no created intellect can see God through His essence.
Praeterea, quanto visus est fortior, tanto aliquid maius remotum videre potest. Ergo infinite distans videri non potest nisi a visu infinitae virtutis. Sed essentia divina in infinitum distat a quolibet intellectu creato. Cum ergo nullus intellectus creatus sit infinitae virtutis, nullus intellectus creatus poterit videre Deum per essentiam.	12. The stronger sight is, the more it can see something at a distance. Consequently, what is infinitely distant cannot be seen except by a sight that has infinite power. Now, the divine essence stands at an infinite distance from any created intellect. Therefore, since no created intellect has unlimited power, no created intellect can see God through His essence.
Praeterea, ad cognitionem quamlibet requiritur iudicium. Sed iudicium non est nisi superioris de inferiori. Cum ergo nullus intellectus sit superior divina essentia, nullus creatus intellectus poterit Deum per essentiam videre.	13. For any kind of knowledge, a judgment is necessary. A judgment, however, is made only by a superior about something inferior. Therefore, since no intellect is superior to the divine essence, no created intellect will be able to see God through His essence.
Praeterea iudicium, ut Boetius dicit, est actus iudicantis. Ergo iudicatum se habet ad iudicium ut passum. Sed essentia divina non potest se habere ut passum respectu alicuius intellectus creati. Ergo intellectus creatus non potest Deum per essentiam videre.	14. Boethius says: “A judgment is the act of one who judges.” Consequently, what is judged is related to the judgment as something passive. But the divine essence cannot be in the relation of passivity with respect to any created intellect. Therefore, a created intellect cannot see God through His essence.
Praeterea, omne illud quod per essentiam videtur, intellectu attingitur. Sed nullus potest attingere ad id quod in infinitum distat ab eo. Ergo intellectus Angeli non potest videre essentiam Dei, quae in infinitum distat ab eo.	15. Whatever is seen through its essence is reached by the intellect. But no intellect can reach that which stands at an infinite distance from it. Consequently, an angelic intellect cannot see God’s essence, which stands at an infinite distance from it.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Est quod dicitur Matth., cap. XVIII, 10: Angeli eorum (...) semper vident faciem patris et cetera. Sed faciem patris videre, est videre essentiam ipsius. Ergo Angeli vident Deum per essentiam.	1. In the Gospel according to St. Matthew (18:10) we read: “Their angels always see the face of my Father.” Now, to see the face of the Father is to see His essence. Angels, therefore, see God through His essence.
Praeterea, Angeli beati hoc modo vident Deum, sicut promittitur nobis in statu beatitudinis. Sed nos videbimus Deum per essentiam, ut patet per illud Lib. I Ioan., III, 2: cum apparuerit similes ei erimus et videbimus eum sicuti est. Ergo et Angeli vident Deum per essentiam.	2. Beatified angels see God in the way in which we have been promised to see Him when we are beatified. But we will see God through His essence, as is clear from the first Epistle of St. John (3:2): “When he shall appear, we shall be like to him; because we shall see him as he is.” Therefore, angels see God through His essence.
Praeterea, Angeli cognoscunt eum a quo facti sunt. Sed ipsa essentia divina est Angelorum causa. Ergo essentiam divinam vident.	3. Angels know the one who has made them. But the divine essence itself is the cause of angels. Therefore, angels see the divine essence.
Praeterea, omne quod videtur, videtur per similitudinem vel per essentiam. Sed in Deo non est aliquid aliud similitudo ipsius et essentia eius: quia quidquid est in Deo est Deus. Ergo Angeli vident eum per essentiam.	4. Whatever is seen is seen either through its essence or through a likeness. But God’s likeness is not something other than His essence, because whatever is in God is God. Consequently, angels see God through His essence.
Praeterea, intellectus est fortior in cognoscendo quam affectus in diligendo; unde dicit Augustinus: praecedit intellectus, sequitur tardus aut nullus affectus. Sed Angeli diligunt essentiam divinam. Ergo multo magis vident eam.	5. The intellect is stronger when it knows than the will when it loves. Consequently, Augustine says: “The intellect goes first; the will act follows later or not at all.” Now, angels love the divine essence. Therefore, they see it in a much higher degree.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod circa hanc quaestionem quidam erraverunt, dicentes, Deum per essentiam a nullo unquam intellectu creato videri posse, attendentes distantiam quae est inter divinam essentiam et intellectum creatum. Sed haec positio sustineri non potest, cum sit haeretica.	Treating this question, some philosophers have erred by saying that no created intellect can see God through His essence; for they concentrated only on the distance lying between a created intellect and the divine essence. Since this position is heretical, it cannot be held.
Constat enim quod cuiuslibet intellectualis creaturae beatitudo consistit in sua perfectissima operatione. Illud autem quod est supremum in qualibet creatura rationali, est intellectus. Unde oportet quod beatitudo cuiuslibet creaturae rationalis in nobilissima visione intellectus consistat. Nobilitas autem intellectivae visionis est ex nobilitate intellecti; sicut etiam dicit philosophus in X Ethicorum, quod perfectissima operatio visus, est visus bene dispositi ad pulcherrimum eorum quae cadunt sub visu. Si ergo creatura rationalis in sua perfectissima visione non perveniret ad videndum divinam essentiam, beatitudo eius non esset ipse Deus, sed aliquid sub Deo; quod esse non potest: quia ultima perfectio cuiuslibet rei est, quando pertingit ad suum principium. Ipse autem Deus immediate omnes creaturas rationales condidit, ut fides vera tenet. Unde oportet secundum fidem, ut omnis creatura rationalis quae ad beatitudinem pervenit, per essentiam Deum videat.	It is clear that the beatitude of any intellectual creature consists in its most perfect operation. Now, the supreme element of any rational creature is his intellect. Consequently, the beatitude of any rational creature consists in the most noble act of his intellectual vision. The nobility of intellectual vision, however, comes from the nobility of what is understood, just as the Philosopher says that the most perfect operation of sight takes place when it is in good condition and is directed to the most beautiful of all those things that fall under its view. If in its most perfect vision a rational creature would not see the divine essence, then its beatitude would not be God Himself but something inferior to Him. This, however, is not possible, for the ultimate perfection of all things consists in their reaching their principle; and our faith tells us” that God Himself immediately created all rational creatures. Hence, according to faith, all rational creatures who attain beatitude should see God through His essence.
Sed oportet nunc considerare et intelligere quis sit modus videndi Deum per essentiam. In omni siquidem visione oportet ponere aliquid quo videns visum videat; et hoc est vel essentia ipsius visi, sicut cum Deus cognoscit seipsum; vel aliqua similitudo eius, sicut homo videt lapidem. Et hoc ideo, quia ex intelligente et intelligibili oportet aliquo modo in intelligendo unum fieri. Non autem potest dici quod essentia Dei videatur ab intellectu creato per aliquam similitudinem. In omni enim cognitione quae est per similitudinem, modus cognitionis est secundum convenientiam similitudinis ad id cuius est similitudo; et dico convenientiam secundum repraesentationem, sicut species in anima convenit cum re quae est extra animam, non secundum esse naturale. Et ideo, si similitudo deficiat a repraesentatione speciei, non autem a repraesentatione generis, cognoscetur res illa secundum rationem generis, non secundum rationem speciei. Si vero deficeret etiam a repraesentatione generis, repraesentaret autem secundum convenientiam analogiae tantum; tunc nec etiam secundum rationem generis cognosceretur, sicut si cognoscerem substantiam per similitudinem accidentis.	Now, however, we must consider or understand how we can see God through His essence. In all vision there must be posited something by which the one who sees beholds what is seen. This medium is either the very essence of the thing seen, as is true in the case of God’s knowledge of Himself, or some likeness of the thing seen, as is true in the case of a man seeing a stone. This is necessary, because the person who knows and the known should in some manner become one in the act of knowing. God’s essence, however, cannot be seen by a created intellect by means of a likeness. For, in all cognition taking place through a likeness, the perfection of cognition is determined by the conformity which the likeness has with that thing whose likeness it is; and I mean a conformity in representation, such as a species in the soul has with the thing outside the soul even though it does not have a conformity with it in real existence. Consequently, if a likeness represents a genus, but not a species, the thing is known according to the intelligible character of the genus but not according to that of the species. If the likeness were to fail to represent even the genus, however, it would represent the thing only according to a likeness which is merely analogous. In such a case, the thing would not be known even according to the intelligible character of the genus. This would happen, for example, if I were to know a substance through the likeness of an accident.
Omnis autem similitudo divinae essentiae in intellectu creato recepta, non potest habere aliquam convenientiam cum essentia divina nisi analogiae tantum. Et ideo cognitio quae esset per talem similitudinem non esset ipsius Dei per essentiam, sed multo imperfectior quam si cognosceretur substantia per similitudinem accidentis. Et ideo illi qui dicebant quod Deus per essentiam non videtur, dicebant quod videbitur quidam fulgor divinae essentiae, intelligentes per fulgorem illam similitudinem lucis increatae, per quam Deum videri ponebant, deficientem tamen a repraesentatione divinae essentiae, sicut deficit lux recepta in pupilla a claritate quae est in sole; unde non potest defigi acies videntis in ipsam solis claritatem, sed videt inspiciens quosdam fulgores. Restat ergo ut illud quo intellectus creatus Deum per essentiam videt, sit ipsa divina essentia.	Now, any likeness of the divine essence that is received into a created intellect can have no proportion with the divine essence other than that of analogy. Consequently, knowledge which is had through such a likeness is not knowledge of God Himself through His essence. In fact, it is more imperfect than that which would be had if a substance were known through the likeness of an accident. Consequently, those persons who said that God is not seen through His essence taught that only a certain brightness of the divine essence will be seen, meaning by brightness a likeness of the uncreated light through which, they affirmed, God could be seen but which was unable to represent the divine essence—just as the light received by our eyes fails to represent the brightness of the sun, with the result that we cannot fix our vision upon the sun’s brightness but can see only some of its brilliant rays. It remains, therefore, that that by which a created intellect sees God through His essence is the divine essence itself.
Non autem oportet quod ipsa essentia divina fiat forma ipsius intellectus, sed quod se habeat ad ipsum ut forma; ut sicut ex forma, quae est pars rei, et materia efficitur unum ens actu, ita licet dissimili modo, ex essentia divina et intellectu creato fit unum in intelligendo, dum intellectus intelligit, et essentia per seipsam intelligitur.	It is not necessary, however, for the divine essence to become the form of the intellect but only to become related to the intellect after the manner of a form. Consequently, just as one actual being results from matter and a form which is a part of the thing; so, with the necessary differences, the created intellect and the divine essence become one in the act of understanding when the intellect understands and the divine essence is understood through itself.
Qualiter autem essentia separata possit coniungi intellectui ut forma, sic ostendit Commentator in III de anima. Quandocumque in aliquo receptibili recipiuntur duo quorum unum est altero perfectius, proportio perfectioris ad minus perfectum, est sicut proportio formae ad suum perfectibile; sicut lux est perfectio coloris, cum ambo recipiuntur in diaphano. Et ideo, cum intellectus creatus, qui inest substantiae creatae, sit imperfectior divina essentia in eo existente, comparabitur divina essentia ad illum intellectum quodammodo ut forma. Et huius exemplum aliquale in naturalibus inveniri potest. Res enim per se subsistens non potest esse alicuius materiae forma, si in ea aliquid de materia inveniatur, sicut lapis non potest esse alicuius materiae forma; sed res per se subsistens quae materia caret, potest esse forma materiae, sicut de anima patet. Et similiter quodammodo essentia divina, quae est actus purus, quamvis habeat esse omnino distinctum ab intellectu, efficitur tamen ei ut forma in intelligendo. Et ideo dicit Magister in II, dist. 2, sententiarum, quod unio corporis ad animam rationalem est quoddam exemplum beatae unionis rationalis spiritus ad Deum.	How it is possible for a separated essence to be joined to the intellect as a form has been shown by the Commentator. Whenever two things are received in something that can receive, and one of them is more perfect than the other, the proportion of what is more perfect to that which is less perfect is like the proportion of a form to what it perfects—just as light is the perfection of color when both are received in a transparent medium. Consequently, since a created intellect, because present in a created substance, is less perfect than the divine essence, the divine essence bears to it in some way the relation of a form as long as it exists in it. We can find some sort of example of this among natural things. A self-subsistent thing cannot be the form of any matter if it contains matter itself. For example, a stone cannot be the form of any matter. A self-subsistent thing lacking matter, however, can be the form of matter, as is clear in the case of the soul. Similarly and in some way or other, and even though it is pure act and has an act of being entirely distinct from the intellect, the divine essence becomes related to the intellect as its form in the act of understanding. For this reason, Peter Lombard says that the union of the body with a rational soul is, in a way, an example of the beatifying union of a rational spirit with God.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum dicitur: hoc videtur ut est; potest hoc intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo ut modus quo res visa est, cadat sub visione; hoc est dictu, ut videatur in re visa ipse modus quo res est; et hoc modo Deus, ut est, ab Angelis videtur, et videbitur a beatis, quia videbunt essentiam eius habere illum modum quem habet. Et sic intelligitur quod habetur I Ioan., III, 2: videbimus eum sicuti est. Alio modo potest intelligi ut modus praedictus determinet visionem videntis; ut scilicet, talis modus sit visionis ipsius, qualis est modus essentiae rei visae: et sic a nullo intellectu creato potest Deus videri ut est; quia impossibile est ut modus visionis intellectus creati sit ita sublimis sicut modus quo Deus est; et hoc modo intelligendum est verbum Chrysostomi.	1. The statement, “This is seen as it is,” can be understood in two ways. First, it can mean that the very mode of the thing’s existence comes within one’s vision, that is to say, the very mode of the thing’s existence is seen along with the thing. It is in this way that God, as He is, is seen by angels and will be seen by the blessed; for they will see that His essence has that manner of being which it has. That verse in the first Epistle of John, “We shall see him as he is” (3:2), is to be understood in this sense. Second, however, it can mean that the manner mentioned determines the vision of the one who sees. In other words, the manner of the vision itself is the same as the manner of the essence of the thing seen. In this sense, no created intellect can see God as He is; for it is impossible for the mode of a created intellect’s vision to be as sublime as the mode of God’s existence. The statement of Chrysostom should be understood in this sense.
Et similiter dicendum ad secundum et tertium et quartum.	2-3-4. A similar reply should be given to the second, third, and fourth Difficulties.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod forma qua intellectus videntis Deum per essentiam videt Deum, est ipsa essentia divina; non tamen sequitur quod sit forma quae est pars rei in essendo; sed quod se habeat hoc modo in intelligendo sicut forma quae est pars rei in essendo.	5. The form by which an intellect sees God when it sees Him through His essence is the divine essence itself. From this, however, it follows, not that the essence is that form which is a part of a thing in its existence, but only that in the act of knowing it has a relation similar to that of a form which is a part of a thing in its existence.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod proportio, proprie loquendo, nihil est aliud quam habitudo quantitatis ad quantitatem, sicut quod est aequalis una alteri, vel tripla; et exinde translatum est nomen proportionis, ut habitudo cuiuslibet rei ad rem alteram proportio nominetur; sicut dicitur materia esse proportionata formae inquantum se habet ad formam ut materia eius, non considerata aliqua habitudine quantitatis. Et similiter intellectus creatus est proportionatus ad videndam divinam essentiam, inquantum se habet ad ipsam quodammodo ut ad formam intelligibilem; quamvis secundum quantitatem virtutis nulla possit esse proportio, propter distantiam infinitam.	6. Properly speaking, a proportion is nothing else but a relation of a quantity to a quantity, such as arises when one quantity is equal to or three times another. The term proportion was ~hen transferred to signify the relation of one reality to another. For example, even though no relation of quantity is involved, matter is said to be proportioned to form inasmuch as it is related to form as its matter. Similarly, a created intellect is proportionate to the sight of the divine essence inasmuch as, in some way, it is related to the latter as to an intelligible form, even though the perfections of the two are incommensurable because an infinite distance lies between them.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod ad cognitionem non requiritur assimilatio nisi propter hoc ut cognoscens aliquo modo cognito uniatur. Perfectior autem est unio qua unitur ipsa res per essentiam suam intellectui, quam si uniretur per similitudinem suam. Et ideo, quia essentia divina unitur intellectui Angeli ut forma, non requiritur quod ad eam cognoscendam aliqua eius similitudine informetur, qua mediante cognoscat.	7. Assimilation is required for knowledge for this reason only, that the knower be in some way united to what is known. However, when the thing itself is united through its own essence to the intellect, the union is more perfect than if it had taken place through a likeness. Consequently, since the divine essence is united to the angelic intellect as its form, there is no need that the angelic intellect be informed by some likeness which would serve as a medium for knowing the divine essence.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod auctoritas illa Dionysii et Damasceni intelligenda est de visione viae, qua intellectus viatoris videt Deum per aliquam formam; quia illa forma deficit a repraesentatione divinae essentiae, et ideo per eam non potest videri, sed tantum cognoscitur quod Deus est super id quod de ipso intellectui repraesentatur; unde id quod est, remanet occultum. Et hic est nobilissimus modus cognitionis ad quem pervenire possumus in via; et ideo de eo non cognoscimus quid est, sed quid non est. Sed ipsa divina essentia sufficienter repraesentat seipsam; et ideo quando fit intellectui ut forma, de ipso Deo videtur non solum quid non est, sed etiam quid est.	8. The statements of Dionysius and of Damascene should be understood as referring to the vision had in this life, in which a person sees God through some form or other. Since this form falls short of representing the divine essence, the latter cannot be seen through it. All that is known is that God transcends this intellectual representation of Him. Consequently, that which God is remains hidden; and this is the most exalted mode of knowledge that we can attain while we are in this life. Hence, we do not know u hat God is, but only what He is not. Nevertheless, the divine essence represents itself sufficiently. But when it becomes, as it were, the form of the intellect, the intellect knows not only what God is not but also what He is.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod divina claritas intellectum viatoris excedit quantum ad duo. Excedit enim ipsam virtutem intellectivam; et ex hoc sequitur quod non sit tanta perfectio visionis nostrae, quanta est perfectio essentiae suae, quia efficacia actionis mensuratur secundum virtutem agentis. Excedit etiam formam qua intellectus noster nunc intelligit; et ideo Deus nunc per essentiam non videtur, ut ex dictis, in corp. art., patet. Sed in visione beata Deus excedet quidem virtutem intellectus creati, unde non ita perfecte videbitur sicut perfecte est; non autem excedet formam qua videbitur, et ideo ipsum quod est Deus, videbitur.	9. God’s splendor proves too much for the intellects of persons in this life for two reasons. First, it lies beyond the grasp of their intellectual power. From this it follows that the perfection of our vision is not equal to the perfection of His essence, because what an action can accomplish is determined by the agent’s perfection. Second, it transcends the form by which our intellects now understand. Consequently, God is not seen now through His essence, as is clear from what has been said. In the beatific vision, however, while God still transcends the power of a created intellect, and the perfection of our vision still does not equal the perfection of His being, He does not lie beyond the form by which He is seen. Consequently, that which is God will be seen.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod ratio Dionysii procedit de cognitione viae, quae est secundum formas existentium creatorum; et ideo non potest pertingere ad id quod est superexistens. Hoc autem non erit in visione patriae. Et ideo ratio eius non est ad propositum.	10. Dionysius’s argument proceeds from the knowledge had while in this life. This is had from forms in existing creatures, and, consequently, it cannot attain to what is transcendent. Such is not the case, however, of the vision had in heaven. His argument, therefore, is not pertinent to the problem at hand.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod auctoritas illa Dionysii est intelligenda de visione viae, qua cognoscitur Deus per aliquam formam creatam; et hoc ratione iam dicta.	11. That statement of Dionysius should be understood as referring to the vision had in this life, wherein God is known through some created form. Our reason for saying this has been explained above.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod ideo oportet esse maiorem efficaciam visus ad hoc quod a remotiori videatur, quia visus potentia passiva est. Potentia autem passiva quanto est perfectior, tanto a minori potest moveri; sicut e contrario potentia activa quanto est perfectior, tanto maius potest movere. Tanto enim est magis calefactibile, quanto a minori calore calefit; quanto autem aliquid a remotiori videtur, tanto sub minori angulo videtur, et ita minus est quod ad visum de visibili pervenit; sed si aequalis forma perveniret a propinquo et remoto, non minus videretur remotum quam propinquum. Ipse autem Deus quamvis in infinitum distet ab intellectu angelico, tamen tota essentia sua intellectui coniungitur; et ideo non est simile.	12. A sense of sight must be very strong if it sees what is at some distance from it; for sight is a passive power, and the more perfect a passive potency is, the less is required to move it. Conversely, the more perfect an active power is, the more it can move. Again, a thing is more susceptible to being heated, the less heat it requires to become hot. But the more distant a thing seen is, the smaller is the visual angle; consequently, less of the thing seen comes to the sense of sight. However, if an equal form were to come from what is near and from what is far, the near object would not be seen less than the distant object would be. Now, even though an infinite distance lies between God and an angelic intellect, He is nevertheless joined to that intellect by His entire essence. Consequently, the cases are not similar.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod duplex est iudicium. Unum quo iudicamus qualiter res esse debeat; et hoc iudicium non est nisi superioris de inferiori. Aliud est quo iudicatur qualiter res sit; et hoc iudicium potest esse et de superiori et de aequali; non enim minus possum iudicare de rege an stet vel sedeat, quam de rustico; et tale iudicium est in cognitione.	13. There are two kinds of judgments. In the first, we judge how a thing should be; and this kind of judgment can be made only by one who is superior about what is inferior. In the second, we judge how things are; and this kind of judgment can be both about what is superior and about what is equal, for I am equally able to judge if one is standing or sitting, whether he be a king or a peasant. This second kind of judgment is found in cognition.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod iudicium non est actio quae egrediatur ab agente in rem exteriorem quae per eam transmutetur, sed est operatio quaedam in ipso iudicante consistens ut perfectio ipsius. Et ideo non oportet quod id de quo iudicat intellectus vel sensus sit ut passum, quamvis per modum passi significetur; immo magis sensibile et intelligibile, de quo est iudicium, se habet ad intellectum et sensum ut agens inquantum sentire vel intelligere pati quoddam est.	14. A judgment is not an action which passes out from the agent into an exterior thing which is then changed by it. Instead, it is an operation that remains as a perfection in the one who judges. Consequently, that about which the intellect or the sense judges need not be passive, even though it may be signified as passive. As a matter of fact, what is sensed and what is understood (the object of a judgment) are related to intellect and sense more like agents, inasmuch as the operations of sensation and understanding are in a certain sense passive.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod intellectus creatus nunquam pertingit ad essentiam divinam, ut sit eiusdem naturae cum ea; pertingit tamen ad ipsam ut ad formam intelligibilem.	15. A created intellect never attains the divine essence so as to be of the same nature. It does attain it, however, as an intelligible form.

---

ARTICLE II In the second article we ask: Do the intellects of beatified angels and men comprehend the divine essence? [ARTICLE De ver., 2, 2, ad 5-7; 20, 5; S.T., I, 12, 7; I-II, 4, 3, ad 1; III, 10, 1; III Sent., 14, 2, 1; 27, 3, 2; IV Sent., 49, 2, 3; In Ephes., c. 5, lect. 3 (P. 13:490b); In I Tim., c. 6, lect. 3 (P. 13:618b); De div. nom., c. i, lects. 1-2 (P. 15:261b seq.; 269a seq.); De caritate, a. 10, ad 5; In Evang. Johannis, c. 1, lect. 11 (P. 10:312b); Comp. Theol., I, c. 106; C.G., III, 55.]
Secundo quaeritur utrum intellectus Angeli vel hominis beati essentiam divinam comprehendat	Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic.	It seems that they do, for
Simplex enim, si videtur, totum videtur. Sed essentia divina est simplex. Ergo cum Angelus beatus eam videat, totam videt, et sic comprehendit.	1. If what is simple is seen, the whole of it is seen. Now, the divine essence is simple. Therefore, when a beatified angel sees it, he sees the entire essence and consequently comprehends it.
Sed dicebat, quod licet videatur tota, non tamen totaliter.- Sed contra, totaliter dicit quemdam modum. Sed omnis modus divinae essentiae est ipsamet essentia. Ergo si videbitur ipsa essentia tota, videbitur totaliter.	2. It was said, however, that even though the entire essence is seen, it is not seen entirely.—On the contrary, entirely signifies a certain mode, but every mode of the divine essence is the essence itself. Therefore, if the entire essence is seen, it will be seen entirely.
Praeterea, efficacia actionis mensuratur secundum formam quae est principium agendi ex parte ipsius agentis, sicut de calore et calefactione patet. Sed forma qua intellectus intelligit, est principium intellectualis visionis. Ergo tanta erit efficacia intellectus videntis Deum, quanta est perfectio essentiae divinae; ergo comprehendet ipsam.	3. The effectiveness of an action is measured by the form, which is, the principle of action on the part of the agent. This is clear from the case of heat and the process of heating. Now, the form by which the intellect understands is the principle of intellectual vision. Consequently, the effectiveness of the intellect in seeing God will be as great as the perfection of the divine essence. Therefore, the intellect will comprehend the divine essence.
Praeterea, sicut per demonstrationem scire est perfectissimus modus cognoscendi complexa, ita scire quod quid est, est nobilissimus modus cognoscendi incomplexa.	4. just as the most perfect way of knowing composite intelligible objects is to know them by demonstration, so also the most perfect way of knowing the incomposite is to know what they are.
Sed omne complexum quod scitur per demonstrationem, comprehenditur. Ergo omne id de quo scitur quid est, comprehenditur. Sed illi qui vident Deum per essentiam, sciunt de eo quid est, cum nihil aliud sit scire quid est quam scire essentiam rei. Ergo comprehendunt Angeli essentiam Dei.	Now, every composite intelligible object known by demonstration is comprehended. Consequently, if one knows what a thing is, he comprehends it. But those who know God through His essence know what He Is, since to know what a thing is, is to know its essence. Angels, therefore, comprehend the divine essence.
Praeterea, Philipp., III, 12, dicitur: sequor autem, si quo modo comprehendam, sicut et comprehensus sum. Sed Deus perfecte comprehendebat apostolum. Ergo apostolus ad hoc tendebat ut perfecte comprehenderet Deum.	5. In the Epistle to the Philippians (3:12),we read: “But I follow after, hoping I may. comprehend as I am also comprehended.” But God perfectly comprehended the Apostle. The Apostle, therefore, was moving to a stage wherein he would perfectly comprehend God.
Praeterea, Glossa ibidem dicit: ut comprehendam, id est ut cognoscam quae sit immensitas Dei, quae omnem intellectum excedit. Sed non est incomprehensibilis nisi ratione immensitatis. Ergo beati perfecte comprehendunt divinam essentiam.	6. The gloss on the passage cited immediately above says: “‘If I may comprehend’—that is, that I may know the immensity of God that surpasses any intellect.” Now, God is incomprehensible only by reason of His immensity. Therefore, the blessed perfectly comprehend the divine essence.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Est quod Ambrosius dicit super Luc.: eam quae in Deo habitat, plenitudinem bonitatis nemo conspexit, nemo mente aut oculis comprehendit.	1. In his commentary on Luke, Ambrose says: “No one has looked upon the abundance of goodness which lives in God. Neither mind nor eye has comprehended it.”
Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, in eodem Lib., illud comprehenditur cuius fines circumspici possunt. Sed de Deo hoc est impossibile, cum sit infinitus. Ergo non potest comprehendi.	2. In his treatment of the vision of God, Augustine says: “No one has ever comprehended the fullness of God, either with his bodily eyes or with his mind.”
Praeterea Augustinus dicit in Lib. de videndo Deum: Dei plenitudinem non solum oculis corporis, sed nec mente aliquis aliquando comprehendit.	3. According to Augustine in the same work: “A thing is comprehended if its limits can be seen.” Now, this is impossible in the case of God, for He is infinite. Consequently, He cannot be comprehended.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod illud proprie dicitur comprehendi ab aliquo quod ab eo includitur; dicitur enim comprehendere, quasi simul ex omnibus partibus apprehendere, quod est undique inclusum habere. Quod autem includitur ab aliquo, non excedit includens, sed est minus includente, vel saltem aequale. Haec autem ad quantitatem pertinent; unde secundum duplicem quantitatem est duplex modus comprehensionis; scilicet secundum quantitatem dimensivam et virtualem. Secundum dimensivam quidem, ut dolium comprehendit vinum: secundum virtualem autem, ut materia dicitur comprehendere formam, quando nil materiae remanet imperfectum a forma. Et per hunc modum dicitur aliqua vis cognitiva comprehendere suum cognitum, in quantum scilicet cognitum perfecte substat cognitioni ipsius; tunc autem a comprehensione deficit, quando cognitum cognitionem excedit.	Properly speaking, one thing is said to be comprehended by another if it is included within it, for to comprehend means to apprehend something in all its parts simultaneously. This is, as it were, to include it in all its aspects. Now, what is included by another thing does not exceed it; instead, it is less than or at most equal to it. These principles pertain to quantity. Consequently, there are two modes of comprehension according to the two kinds of quantity, namely, dimensional (or extensive) quantity and virtual (or intensive) quantity. According to dimensional quantity, a cask comprehends wine; according to virtual quantity, matter is said to comprehend form when, nothing remains in the matter which has not been perfected by the form. It is in this latter manner that a knowing power is said to comprehend its object, namely, in so far as what is known lies perfectly under its cognition. When the thing known exceeds its grasp, then the knowing power falls short of comprehension.
Sed hic excessus diversimode in diversis potentiis considerandus est. In potentiis enim sensitivis obiectum comparatur ad potentiam non solum secundum quantitatem virtualem, sed etiam secundum quantitatem dimensivam; eo quod sensibilia movent sensum, utpote in magnitudine existentem, non solum ex vi qualitatis propriorum sensibilium, sed etiam secundum quantitatem dimensivam, ut patet de sensibilibus communibus. Unde comprehensio sensus potest impediri dupliciter. Uno modo ex excessu sensibilis secundum quantitatem virtualem; sicut impeditur oculus a comprehensione solis, quia virtus claritatis solis, quae est visibilis, excedit proportionem virtutis visivae quae est in oculo. Alio modo propter excessum quantitatis dimensivae; sicut impeditur oculus ne comprehendat totam molem terrae, sed partem eius videt et partem non, quod in primo impedimento non accidebat; simul enim omnes solis partes videntur a nobis, sed nulla earum perfecte, sicut visibilis est.	This excess must be considered differently in the different powers. To the sensitive powers, the object is related not merely according to virtual quantity but also according to dimensional quantity; for, inasmuch as a sense is in space, the sensibles move it, not only in virtue of the quality of the proper sensibles, but also according to dimensional quantity. This is clear in the case of the common sensibles. As a result, comprehension by sense can be impeded in two ways. First, it can be impeded by an excess in the object considered from the standpoint of virtual quantity. For example, the eye is kept from comprehending the sun because the intensity of the sun’s brightness, by which it is visible, exceeds the proportion of the eye’s ability to see it. Second, it can be impeded by an excess according to dimensional quantity. For example, the eye is kept from comprehending the entire mass of the earth. Part of it the eye sees, part of it it does not. this, however, is not true of the first example given, for we see all the parts of the sun alike, but none of them as perfectly as they might be seen.
Ad intellectum autem comparatur intelligibile per accidens quidem etiam secundum quantitatem dimensivam vel numeralem, in quantum intellectus a sensu accipit; unde etiam intellectus noster impeditur a comprehensione infiniti secundum quantitatem dimensivam, ita quod aliquid eius est in intellectu et aliquid extra intellectum. Per se autem non comparatur ad intellectum intelligibile secundum quantitatem dimensivam, cum intellectus sit virtus non utens organo corporali; sed per se comparatur ad ipsum, solum secundum quantitatem virtualem. Et ideo in his quae per se intelliguntur sine coniunctione ad sensum, non impeditur comprehensio intellectus nisi propter excessum quantitatis virtualis; quando scilicet id quod intelligitur, habet modum intelligendi perfectiorem quam sit modus quo intellectus intelligit; sicut si aliquis cognoscat hanc conclusionem: triangulus habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, per probabilem rationem utpote per auctoritatem, vel quia ita communiter dicitur, non comprehendet ipsam; non quod unam partem eius ignoret, alia scita, sed quia ista conclusio est scibilis per demonstrationem, ad quam cognoscens nondum pervenit, et ideo non comprehendit ipsam, quia non stat perfecte sub cognitione eius.	Now, the intelligible is related to intellect only indirectly according to dimensional or natural quantity, that is, only inasmuch as the intellect receives something from sense. Consequently, our intellect is similarly kept from comprehending what is infinite according to dimensional quantity, so that some of the infinite comes into the intellect, but some of it remains outside. The intelligible is not, however, directly related to the intellect according to dimensional quantity, since the intellect is a power that does not use a physical organ. Instead, the intelligible is related to intellect according to virtual quantity. Consequently, the intellectual comprehension of those things which are understood in themselves without dependence on sense is impeded only because of an excess according to virtual quantity. This occurs, for example, when what is known can be understood in a more perfect way than the intellect understands it. For example, a person can understand the following conclusion: “A triangle has three angles equal to two right angles,” merely because of a probable reason, namely, the authority of another or because the proposition is commonly accepted. Such a person does not comprehend the proposition, not because he is ignorant of one part of it and knows another, but because that conclusion can be known by a demonstration which he does not yet know. Consequently, he does not comprehend the proposition simply because he has not grasped it perfectly.
Constat autem quod in intellectu Angeli, praecipue quantum ad visionem divinam, non habet locum quantitas dimensiva; et ideo consideranda est ibi aequalitas vel excessus secundum quantitatem virtualem tantum. Virtus autem divinae essentiae, qua est intelligibilis, excedit intellectum angelicum, et omnem intellectum creatum, secundum hoc quod est cognoscitivus; veritas enim divinae essentiae, qua cognoscibilis est, excedit lumen cuiuslibet intellectus creati, quo cognoscitivus est. Et ideo impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus divinam essentiam comprehendat; non quia partem eius aliquam ignoret, sed quia ad perfectum modum cognitionis ipsius pertingere non potest.	Now, it is clear that there is no place for dimensional quantity in an angelic intellect, especially in its relation to the vision of God. Consequently, any equality or excess occurring here must be taken as involving virtual quantity only. Moreover, the perfection of the intelligibility of the divine essence lies beyond the grasp of angelic and all created intellects in so far as they have the power of knowing, because the truth by which the divine essence is knowable surpasses the light by which any created intellect knows. Consequently, it is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend the divine essence, not because it does not know some part of the essence, but because it cannot attain the perfect manner of knowing it.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod divina essentia ab Angelo tota videtur, quia nihil eius est non visum ab eo; ut sic ly tota exponatur privative, non per positionem partium: non tamen eam perfecte videt; et ideo non sequitur quod eam comprehendat.	1. The entire divine essence is seen by an angel, for there is nothing in it which he does not see. Consequently, the term entire is to be explained in a privative sense, not in a sense that would suppose parts. He does not, however, see the essence perfectly. Therefore, it does not follow that he comprehends it.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod in visione qualibet triplex modus considerari potest. Primo modus ipsius videntis absolute, qui est mensura capacitatis eius; et sic intellectus Angeli totaliter videt Deum: hoc est dictu, totam vim intellectus sui adhibet ad videndum Deum. Alius modus est ipsius rei visae; et hic modus nihil est aliud quam qualitas rei. Cum autem in Deo non sit aliud qualitas quam substantia, modus eius est ipsa essentia; et sic totaliter vident Deum, quia vident totum modum Dei eodem modo quo totam essentiam. Tertius est ipsius visionis, quae est media inter videntem et rem visam; et ideo dicit modum videntis per comparationem ad rem visam; ut tunc dicatur aliquis totaliter alterum videre, quando scilicet visio habet modum totalem. Et hoc est quando ita est perfectus modus visionis, sicut est modus visibilitatis ipsius rei. Et hoc modo non totaliter videtur divina essentia, ut ex dictis, in corp. art., patet; sicut aliquis qui scit aliquam propositionem esse demonstrabilem, cuius demonstrationem ignorat, scit quidem totum modum cognitionis eius, sed nescit eam secundum totum modum quo cognoscibilis est.	2.We can consider three modes in any vision. The first mode is that of the person who sees, taken absolutely; and it means the extent of his capacity. According to this, the intellect of an angel sees God entirely; for this statement means simply that an angel uses all the force of his intellect in seeing God. The second mode is that of the thing seen; and this mode is nothing other than the thing’s quality. But, since quality in God is nothing other than His substance, His mode is His very essence. Consequently, angels see God entirely in this sense, too, for they see God’s entire mode in the same way in which they see the entire essence. The third mode is that of the vision itself, which is a medium between the one seeing and the thing seen; and therefore it signifies the mode of the one seeing in his relation to the thing seen In this sense, one person is said to see another entirely when his vision is total, as occurs when the mode of the vision is as perfect as the mode of the thing’s visibility. As is clear from what was said above, one cannot see the divine essence entirely in this sense. In this respect, we are like one who knows that a proposition can be demonstrated but does not know the demonstration. Such a person knows the entire mode of its cognition, but he does not know it according to the complete mode in which it is knowable.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit quando forma, quae est principium actionis agenti coniungitur secundum totum modum suum; quod necesse est in omnibus formis non subsistentibus, quarum esse est inesse. Sed divina essentia, quamvis quodammodo sit ut forma intellectus, non tamen capitur ab intellectu nisi secundum modum intellectus capientis, et quia actio non est tantum formae, sed etiam agentis; ideo non potest esse ita perfecta actio sicut est perfecta forma quae est principium actionis, cum sit defectus ex parte agentis.	3. That reasoning follows when the form which is the principle of an action is united to the agent according to its complete mode. Such a union is necessarily true of all non-subsistent forms, whose very existence is to be in another. But, even though the divine essence is, in some way, like a form of the intellect, still, because it is seized by the intellect only according to the manner of the intellect seizing it, and because the action here is not only that of the form but also that of the agent, the action cannot be as perfect as the form which is the principle of the action, because of the defect on the part of the agent.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod res comprehenditur cuius definitio cognoscitur, si tamen ipsa definitio comprehendatur. Sed sicut possibile est cognoscere rem sine comprehensione, ita et definitionem ipsius; et sic res ipsa remanet non comprehensa. Angelus autem, quamvis videat aliquo modo quid est Deus, non tamen hoc comprehendit.	4. A thing whose definition is known is comprehended only if the definition itself is comprehended. It is possible, however, to know a thing or its definition without comprehending either; consequently, the thing itself is not comprehended. Moreover, even though an angel knows in some way what God is, still he does not comprehend this.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod visio Dei per essentiam potest dici comprehensio in comparatione ad visionem viae, quae ad essentiam non pertingit: non tamen est comprehensio simpliciter, ratione iam dicta. Et ideo cum dicitur: comprehendam, sicut et comprehensus sum, et cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum: ly sicut notat comparationem similitudinis, sed non aequalitatis.	5. Vision of God had through His essence can be called comprehension in comparison with the vision had in this life, which does not attain God’s essence. It is not, however, comprehension simply speaking, for the reason already given.* Consequently, in the statements, “Hoping I may comprehend as I am also comprehended” and “I shall know even as I have been known,” the word as signifies a comparison of likeness, not of equality.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod ipsa immensitas Dei videbitur, sed non videbitur immense: videbitur enim totus modus, sed non totaliter, ut dictum est.	6. God’s immeasurableness will be seen, but not in an immeasurable manner; for, as was said previously, His entire mode will be seen, but not entirely.

---

ARTICLE III In the third article we ask: Can an angel by means of his own natural powers attain the vision of god through his essence? [ARTICLE S.T., I, 12, 4. See also readings given for q. 8, a. 1.]
Tertio quaeritur utrum Angelus ex propriis naturalibus potuerit pertingere ad videndum Deum per essentiam	Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic.	It seems that he can, for
Quia, secundum Augustinum super Genesim ad litteram, Angeli in principio suae conditionis, in quo statu fuerunt in naturalibus tantum, ut multi dicunt, viderunt creaturas fiendas in verbo. Sed hoc esse non potuisset, nisi verbum vidissent. Ergo per naturalia pura intellectus Angeli vidit Deum per essentiam.	1. According to Augustine,” in their initial state in which, as many say, the angels had only natural powers, they saw in the Word all the creatures that were to be made. Now, this would not have been possible unless they saw the Word. Therefore, by means of its purely natural powers, an angelic intellect saw God in His essence.
Praeterea, quod potest minus intelligibile intelligere, potest intelligere et maius. Sed essentia divina est maxime intelligibilis, cum sit maxime a materia immunis: ex quo contingit aliquid esse intelligibile actu. Cum ergo intellectus Angeli naturali cognitione possit alia intelligibilia intelligere, multo fortius poterit intelligere ex naturalibus puris divinam essentiam.	2. Whatever can understand what is less intelligible can understand what is more intelligible. Now, the divine essence is most intelligible, because it is most free of matter; and it is because of this condition that a thing becomes actually intelligible. Therefore, since an angelic intellect can by means of its purely natural powers understand other intelligible objects, it can with even greater reason also know the divine essence by means of its purely natural powers.
Sed dicebat, quod licet divina essentia sit in se maxime intelligibilis, non tamen est maxime intelligibilis intellectui angelico. Sed contra, eius quod est magis visibile in se, non esse magis visibile nobis, causa est defectus nostri visus. Sed in intellectu angelico non est aliquis defectus, cum Angelus sit speculum purum, clarissimum, incontaminatum, ut Dionysius dicit in cap. IV de Divin. Nomin. Ergo illud quod est magis in se intelligibile, est magis intelligibile Angelo.	3. But it was said that, even though the divine essence if taken in itself is most intelligible, it is not most intelligible to an angelic intellect.—On the contrary, the fact that what is more visible in itself is not more visible to us is due to a defect in our sight. There is no defect, however, in an angelic intellect; for, as Dionysius says, an angel is “a pure, clean and spotless mirror.” Consequently, that which is more intelligible in itself is more intelligible to an angel.
Praeterea, Commentator dicit in III de anima, quod in intellectu qui est penitus a materia separatus, sequitur hoc argumentum quod Themistius faciebat: hoc est magis intelligibile; ergo magis intelligitur. Sed intellectus Angeli est huiusmodi. Ergo in eo praedictum argumentum sequitur.	4. According to the Commentator, the principle laid down by Themistius, “This is more intelligible; therefore it is more understood,” is applicable to intellects completely separated from matter. Now, an angelic intellect is of this nature. Therefore, the principle can be applied to it.
Praeterea, excellens visibile propter hoc est visibile minus visui nostro, quia corrumpit visum. Sed excellens intelligibile non corrumpit intellectum, sed confortat ipsum. Ergo illud quod est magis in se intelligibile, magis ab intellectu intelligitur.	5. Surpassing visible brilliancy is less visible to our sense of sight because its very brilliancy harms sight. But surpassing intelligible brilliancy does not harm our intellect; indeed, it strengthens it. Consequently, that which is more intelligible in itself is more understood by the intellect.
Praeterea, videre Deum per essentiam est actus intellectus. Sed gratia est in affectu. Ergo gratia non requiritur ad videndum Deum per essentiam; et ita secundum naturalia tantum ad hanc visionem pervenire potuerunt.	6. To see God in His essence is an act of the intellect. But grace lies in the affective power. Grace, therefore, is not needed in order to see God through His essence. Consequently, angels were able to reach the vision of God merely through natural powers.
Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, fides quia praesens est per essentiam in anima, videtur ab anima per sui essentiam. Sed Deus per sui essentiam praesentialiter est in anima, et similiter in Angelo, et in qualibet creatura. Ergo Angelus Deum per essentiam in puris naturalibus videre potuit.	7. According to Augustine, since faith by its essence is present in the soul, it is also seen through its essence by the soul. Now, God by His essence is present to the soul and is present similarly to an angel and to all creatures whatsoever. Consequently, in his purely natural state an angel could see God in His essence.
Praeterea, secundum Augustinum X confessionum, tripliciter est aliquid praesens in anima: scilicet per imaginem, per notionem, et per praesentiam essentiae suae. Si ergo ista divisio est conveniens, oportet haec esse opposita; et ita, cum Deus sit praesens intellectui angelico per essentiam, non erit ei praesens per similitudinem; et ita non potest Deus ab Angelo per similitudinem videri. Si ergo ex naturalibus puris potest eum cognoscere aliquo modo, videtur quod cognoscat eum per essentiam naturaliter.	8. According to Augustine, a thing is present in the soul in three ways: through union, through a notion, and through the presence of its essence. Now, if this division is consistent, it must have been made through opposites. Consequently, since God is present to an angelic intellect through His essence, He is not present to it through a likeness. Hence, God cannot be seen by an angel by means of a likeness. If an angel, therefore, can know God in some way merely by means of his natural powers, it seems that he knows Him through His essence naturally.
Praeterea, si videtur aliquid in speculo materiali, oportet quod ipsum speculum videatur. Sed Angeli in statu suae conditionis viderunt res in verbo quasi in quodam speculo. Ergo viderunt verbum.	9. If a thing is seen in a material mirror, the mirror itself must be seen. Now, in the state in which they were created angels saw things in the Word as in a mirror. Consequently, they saw the Word.
Sed dicebat, quod Angeli non fuerunt creati in puris naturalibus, sed cum gratia gratum faciente, vel cum gratia gratis data. Sed contra, sicut lumen naturae deficit a lumine gloriae, ita etiam lumen gratiae gratis datae, vel gratum facientis. Si ergo existentes in gratia gratis data vel gratum faciente potuerunt videre Deum per essentiam, pari ratione et in statu naturalium existentes.	10. But it was said that the angels were created not in a purely natural condition but with grace—either with sanctifying grace or with charisms.—On the contrary, just as the light of nature falls short of the light of glory, so also does the light of grace given in sanctifying grace and in charisms. Consequently, if persons possessing either of these graces could see God through His essence, they could, for a like reason, do the same in the state of pure nature.
Praeterea, res non videntur nisi ubi sunt. Sed ante conditionem rerum res non erant nisi in verbo. Ergo cum Angeli res fiendas cognoverint, in verbo eas cognoverunt; et ita viderunt verbum.	11. Things are seen only where they are. Now, before things were created, they existed only in the Word. Consequently, when the angels came to know the things that were to be made, they knew them in the Word and thus saw the Word.
Praeterea, natura non deficit in necessariis. Sed attingere finem, maxime est de necessariis naturae. Ergo unicuique naturae provisum est ut possit pertingere ad finem suum. Sed finis propter quem est rationalis creatura, est videre Deum per essentiam. Ergo rationalis creatura ex naturalibus puris potest ad hanc visionem pervenire.	12. Nature does not fail in necessary matters. But to attain its end is one of the most necessary concerns of nature. Consequently, each and every nature has been provided for in such a way that it can attain its end. Now, to see God through His essence is the end for which a rational creature exists. Therefore, by its own purely natural powers a rational creature can attain this vision.
Praeterea, superiores potentiae sunt perfectiores inferioribus. Sed inferiores potentiae per naturam suam possunt in sua obiecta, sicut sensus in sensibilia, et imaginatio in imaginabilia. Cum ergo obiectum intelligentiae sit Deus, ut dicitur in Lib. de spiritu et anima, videtur quod per naturalia possit Deus videri ab intelligentia angelica.	13. Superior powers are more perfect than inferior. Now, by means of their own natures, inferior powers can attain their objects. For example, senses can attain sensibles; the imagination, objects of imagination. Consequently, since God is the object of the intelligence, as is said in Spirit and Soul, it seems that an angelic intelligence can see God through its own natural powers.
Sed dicebat, quod non est simile: quia obiecta aliarum potentiarum non excedunt suas potentias; sed Deus excedit omnem intelligentiam creatam.- Sed contra, quantumcumque perficiatur intelligentia creata lumine gloriae, semper Deus ipsam in infinitum excedit. Si ergo iste excessus impedit visionem Dei per essentiam, nunquam intellectus creatus poterit pervenire in statu gloriae ad videndum Deum per essentiam; quod est absurdum.	14. But it was said that such a comparison cannot be made, because the objects of other powers do not exceed the powers themselves, but God exceeds all created intelligences.—On the contrary, no matter how much a created intelligence is perfected by the light of glory, God always infinitely surpasses it. Consequently, if “excess” prevented one from seeing God through His essence, no created intellect would ever be able to attain a state of glory in which it would see God through His essence. This, however, is absurd.
Praeterea, in Lib. de spiritu et anima, dicitur, quod anima est similitudo totius sapientiae, et eadem ratione Angelus. Sed res naturaliter cognoscitur per suam similitudinem. Ergo naturaliter Angelus cognoscit ea de quibus est sapientia. Sed sapientia est de divinis, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo Angelus naturaliter pervenit ad videndum Deum per essentiam.	15. In Spirit and Soul, we read: “The soul is a likeness of all wisdom,” but so is an angel, for the same reason. Now, things are known naturally by means of their likenesses. Consequently, an angel naturally knows those things which belong to wisdom. But, as Augustine says, wisdom is about divine matters. An angel, therefore, can come to see God through His essence by means of his natural powers.
Praeterea, ad hoc quod intellectus creatus videat Deum per essentiam, non requiritur nisi quod intellectus Deo conformetur. Sed intellectus Angeli per naturam suam est deiformis. Ergo ex naturalibus propriis potest videre Deum per essentiam.	16. In order that a created intellect see God through His essence, all that is required is that it be made like God. Now, by its very nature, the intellect of an angel is godlike. Consequently, it can see God through His essence by means of its own natural powers.
Praeterea, omnis cognitio Dei vel est sicut in speculo, vel est per essentiam, ut patet per hoc quod habetur I Cor., XIII, 12: videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem. Sed Angeli in naturalibus suis existentes non cognoverunt Deum sicut in speculo; quia, ut Augustinus dicit, ex quo creati sunt, aeterna verbi visione perfruuntur, non invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt conspicientes; quod est in speculo videre. Ergo Angeli naturaliter vident Deum per essentiam.	17. All knowledge of God is either as through a mirror or through His essence. This is clear from the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:12): “We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face.” Now, in their natural condition angels do not know God as through a mirror, because, as Augustine says: “From the time they were created they enjoyed the eternal vision of the Word. They did not know the invisible things of God through things that are made.” (This latter type of knowledge is “seeing through a glass.”) Consequently, angels naturally see God through His essence.
Praeterea, illud immediate videtur de quo cogitamus non cogitando de aliquo altero. Sed Angelus naturali cognitione potest cogitare de Deo sine hoc quod cogitet de aliqua creatura. Ergo potest videre Deum immediate; quod est per essentiam videre.	18. We see a thing without a medium if we can think of it without thinking about something else. An angel, however, can by his natural knowledge think of God without thinking about any creature. Consequently, he can see God without any medium; and this is to see Him through His essence.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit quod ea quae sunt essentialiter in anima, cognoscuntur ab ea per essentiam. Sed divina essentia sic est in anima. Ergo et cetera.	19. Augustine says that those realities which are in the soul in their essence are known by the soul through their essence. But the divine essence is in the soul in this manner. Therefore.
Praeterea, illud quod non videtur per essentiam, videtur per speciem, si videatur. Sed divina essentia non potest videri per speciem, quia species est simplicior eo cuius est. Cum ergo naturaliter cognoscatur ab Angelo, per essentiam cognoscitur ab eo.	20. That which is not seen through its essence is seen through a species if it is seen at all. Now, the divine essence cannot be seen through a species, for a species is more simple than that of which it is the species. Consequently, since the divine essence is known naturally by an angel, it is known by him through its essence.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Videre Deum per essentiam, est vita aeterna, ut patet Ioan. cap. XVII, 3: haec est vita et cetera. Sed ad vitam aeternam non potest perveniri per pura naturalia; Roman. VI, 23: gratia Dei vita aeterna. Ergo nec ad visionem Dei per essentiam.	1. To see God through His essence is life eternal. This is clear from the Gospel of St. John (17:3): “This is eternal life, etc.” Now, one cannot attain eternal life through merely natural powers; for, as it is said in the Epistle to the Romans (6:23): “The grace of God is life everlasting.” Consequently, by merely natural powers, one cannot attain the vision of God through His essence.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit quod anima quamvis sit nata cognoscere Deum, non tamen ad actum cognitionis perducitur, nisi perfundatur divino lumine; et sic ex naturalibus non potest aliquis videre Deum per essentiam.	2. Augustine says” that, even though the soul is made to know God, it can be led to this act of knowledge only by the infusion of divine light. Consequently, no one can by his natural power see God through His essence.
Praeterea, natura non transcendit limites suos. Sed essentia divina excedit omnem naturam creatam. Ergo naturali cognitione divina essentia videri non potest.	3. Nature does not transcend its limits. Now, the divine essence surpasses any created nature. Consequently, the divine essence cannot be seen by any natural cognition.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod ad hoc quod Deus per essentiam videatur, oportet quod essentia divina uniatur intellectui quodammodo ut forma intelligibilis. Perfectibile autem non unitur formae nisi postquam est in ipso dispositio, quae facit perfectibile receptivum talis formae, quia proprius actus fit in propria potentia: sicut corpus non unitur animae ut formae, nisi postquam organizatum fuerit et dispositum. Unde oportet et in intellectu esse aliquam dispositionem per quam efficiatur perfectibile tali forma quae est essentia divina, quod est aliquod intelligibile lumen. Quod quidem lumen si fuerit naturale, ex naturalibus puris intellectus Deum per essentiam videre poterit. Sed quod sit naturale est impossibile. Semper enim dispositio ultima ad formam et forma sunt unius ordinis, in hoc quod si unum est naturale, et reliquum. Essentia autem divina non est naturalis forma intelligibilis intellectus creati;	In order that God be seen through His essence, the divine essence must be united with the intellect in some way as an intelligible form. However, what is to be perfected can be united with a form only after a disposition is present which makes the subject to be perfected capable of receiving such a form, because a definite act takes place only in a potency suitable for it. For example, a body is united with a soul as with its form only after it has been organized and disposed. Similarly, there must be some disposition produced in the intellect by which it is made perfectible by this form, the divine essence. This disposition is brought about by an intellectual light; and, were this light natural, an intellect could see God in His essence by its purely natural powers. It is impossible, however, for it to be natural, because the ultimate disposition for a form and the form itself must belong to one order. Consequently, if one is natural, so is the other. The divine essence, however, is not the natural intelligible form of a created intellect.
quod sic patet. Actus enim et potentia semper sunt unius generis; unde potentia in genere quantitatis non respicit actum qui est in genere qualitatis: unde forma naturalis intellectus creati non potest esse nisi sit illius generis in quo est potentia creati intellectus: unde forma sensibilis, quae est alterius generis, non potest esse forma ipsius, sed forma immaterialis tantum, quae est generis sui. Sicut autem forma sensibilis est infra genus intellectivae potentiae creatae, ita essentia divina est supra ipsam; unde essentia divina non est forma ad quam se extendat naturalis facultas intellectus creati. Et ideo lumen illud intelligibile, per quod intellectus creatus fit in ultima dispositione ut coniungatur essentiae divinae ut formae intelligibili, non est naturale, sed supra naturam; et hoc est lumen gloriae, de quo in Ps. XXXV, 10, dicitur: in lumine tuo videbimus lumen.	This is clear from the principle that act and potency always belong to one genus. Hence, potency in the genus of quantity has no relation to an act in the genus of quality; and, similarly, the natural form of a created intellect can belong only to that genus in which the potency of a created intellect exists. As a result, the form of the intellect cannot be a sensible form, since it belongs to another genus, but can be only an immaterial form belonging to the same genus as the intellect. Now, just as a sensible form lies below the genus of created intellectual powers, so does the divine essence lie above it. Consequently, the divine essence is not a form within the ambit of the natural power of the intellect. Therefore, that intellectual light by which a created intellect receives the ultimate disposition for union with the divine essence as with an intelligible form is not a natural light, but a supernatural light. And this is the light of glory of which the Psalmist speaks when he says (35:10): “In your light we shall see light.”
Naturalis igitur facultas cuiuslibet intellectus determinatur ad aliquam formam creatam intelligibilem; aliter tamen in homine et in Angelo: quia in homine ad formam intelligibilem a sensu abstractam, cum omnis eius cognitio a sensu oriatur; in Angelo autem ad formam intelligibilem non a sensu acceptam, et praecipue ad formam quae est essentia sua. Et ideo cognitio Dei, ad quam Angelus naturaliter pervenire potest, est ut cognoscat ipsum per substantiam ipsius Angeli videntis; et ideo dicitur in libro de causis, quod intelligentia intelligit quod est supra se per modum substantiae suae, quia inquantum est causata a Deo, substantia sua est similitudo quaedam divinae essentiae. Sed cognitio Dei ad quam homo potest naturaliter pervenire, est ut cognoscat ipsum per formam sensibilem, quae lumine intellectus agentis est a sensibilibus abstracta; et ideo Rom. cap. I, 20, super illud, invisibilia Dei etc., dicit Glossa, quod homo iuvabatur ad cognoscendum Deum per creaturas sensibiles per lumen naturalis rationis. Cognitio autem Dei quae est per formam creatam, non est visio eius per essentiam: et ideo neque homo neque Angelus potest pervenire ad videndum Deum per essentiam ex naturalibus puris.	Therefore, the natural capacity of any intellect has a determinate relation to some created intelligible form. This relationship, however, differs in man and in angels, since in man it is to an intelligible form abstracted from sense (all man’s knowledge has its origin in sense); however, in angels it is to an intelligible form not received from sense, and especially to that form which is their own essence. Consequently, the knowledge of God that an angel can naturally attain is simply that which he gets when he sees Him through his own substance. Hence, we read in The Causes: “An intelligence understands what lies above it through the mode of its own substance,” because, inasmuch as it is caused by God, its substance is a certain likeness of the divine essence. The knowledge of God that man can naturally attain, however, is had through knowing Him by means of sensible form which, by the light of the active intellect, is abstracted from sensible conditions. Hence, in its commentary on the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans(1:20), “For the invisible things of him, etc.,” the Gloss states that men were given help toward knowing God by sensible creatures and by the natural light of reason. However, knowledge of God had by means of a created form is not vision of Him through His essence. Consequently, neither man nor angel can attain the vision of God through His essence by their own purely natural powers.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod hoc quod dicit Augustinus, quod Angeli viderunt res in verbo, potest intelligi non a principio conditionis, sed ex tunc ex quo beati fuerunt. Vel dicendum, quod quamvis verbum per essentiam non viderint in statu naturalium, viderunt tamen aliquo modo per similitudinem in eis existentem; et ex tali cognitione potuerunt creaturas cognoscere, quas tamen postmodum in verbo multo plenius cognoverunt, quando verbum per essentiam viderunt; secundum enim quod cognoscitur causa, cognoscitur effectus per ipsam.	1. This statement of Augustine, that angels saw things in the Word, can be understood as referring to angels, not as they were immediately after their creation, but as they were when they were beatified. Or the reply might be given that, even though they did not see the Word through His essence when they were in a natural state, they saw Him in some way by means of a likeness existing within them, and it was from this knowledge that they were able to know creatures. Later, however, they knew them much more fully in the Word when they saw the Word through His essence, since, in so far as a cause is known, its effects are known by means of the cause.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis essentia divina sit in se maxime cognoscibilis, tamen non est maxime cognoscibilis intellectui creato, quia est extra genus ipsius.	2. Even though the divine essence, taken in itself, is most knowable, it is not most knowable to a created intellect, because it lies outside the order of the latter.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod intellectus angelicus dicitur esse speculum purum et incontaminatum et sine defectu, quia non patitur defectum intelligibilis luminis, considerata natura sui generis, sicut patitur intellectus humanus, in quo intelligibile lumen obumbratur in tantum ut necesse sit a phantasmatibus accipere, et cum continuo, et tempore, et discurrendo de uno in aliud; propter quod Isaac dicit, quod ratio oritur in umbra intelligentiae: et ideo potentia intellectiva eius potest intelligere omnem formam intelligibilem creatam quae est sui generis. Sed intellectus angelicus comparatus ad essentiam divinam, quae est extra genus suum, invenitur defectivus et tenebrosus; et ideo deficit a visione divinae essentiae, quamvis ipsa sit in se maxime intelligibilis.	3. The angelic intellect is said to be a pure and spotless mirror without defect because in view of its genus it does not suffer from a defect of intelligible light as the human intellect does. The intelligible light of the human intellect is obscured to such an extent that it must be passive in regard to phantasms under the limitations of space and time and progress discursively from one thing to another. This is why Isaac says: “Reason is born in the shadow of intelligence”16 and why its intellectual power can grasp the quiddities only of intelligible created forms belonging to its own genus. But the angelic intellect is also found to be “dark” and defective in its relation to the divine essence, which lies outside its genus. Therefore, it falls short of seeing’the divine essence, even though the latter in itself is most knowable.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod verbum Commentatoris intelligitur de cognitione intelligibilium creatorum, non de cognitione essentiae increatae. Pro tanto enim substantia intelligibilis, quae in se est maxime intelligibilis, fit nobis minus intelligibilis quia excedit formam a sensu abstractam, qua naturaliter intelligimus; et similiter, immo multo amplius, essentia divina excedit formam intelligibilem creatam, qua intellectus Angeli intelligit. Et ideo intellectus Angeli minus intelligit essentiam divinam, quamvis sit magis intelligibilis, sicut et intellectus noster minus intelligit essentiam Angeli, quamvis sit magis intelligibilis, quam res sensibiles.	4. This statement of the Commentator is understood as referring to knowledge of created intelligibles, not to knowledge of the uncreated essence. A created intelligible substance is in itself most intelligible, but is less intelligible to us for this reason, that it exceeds forms abstracted by sense, our natural means of knowledge. Similarly—in fact, even to a much greater extent—the divine essence exceeds the created intelligible form by which angelic intellects know. Consequently, an angelic intellect understands the divine essence less [than created things] even though it is more intelligible in itself, just as our intellect knows less about an angelic essence than it does about sensible things, even though an angelic essence is more intelligible in itself.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod excellentia intelligibilis quamvis non corrumpat intellectum, sed confortet eum, tamen excedit quandoque repraesentationem formae qua intellectus intelligit; et ex hac causa intelligibilis excellentia impedit intellectum. Et secundum hoc est verum quod dicitur in II Metaph., quod intellectus se habet ad manifestissima naturae sicut oculus vespertilionis ad lucem solis.	5. Even though surpassing intelligible brilliancy does not harm the intellect but strengthens it, it sometimes lies beyond the representation of the form by which the intellect understands; and, for this reason, it hinders the intellect. Consequently, the following statement in the Metaphysics that the intellect is related to what is most manifest in nature “as the eye of the bat is to the light of the sun” is true.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod gratia non requiritur ad videndum Deum per essentiam, quasi immediata dispositio ad visionem; sed quia per gratiam homo meretur lumen gloriae sibi dari, per quod Deum in essentia videat.	6. For the vision of God through His essence, grace is not required as some kind of immediate disposition; but by grace man merits that the light of glory be given him, and through this he sees God in His essence.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod fides cognoscitur per essentiam suam, inquantum essentia sua coniungitur intellectui ut forma intelligibilis, et non alio modo. Sic autem non coniungitur essentia divina intellectui creato in statu viae, sed sicut sustinens eum in esse.	7. Faith is known through its essence in so far as its essence is joined to the intellect as an intelligible form, and not for any other reason. But, the divine essence is not joined to a created intellect in this manner during life. It merely sustains the intellect in its act of existence.
Ad octavum dicendum quod divisio illa non est per oppositas res, sed per oppositas rationes; et ideo nihil prohibet aliquid esse per essentiam uno modo in anima, et alio modo per similitudinem vel imaginem; in ipsa enim anima est imago et similitudo Dei, quamvis sit in ea Deus per essentiam.	8. That division is made, not through opposing things, but through opposing formal concepts. Consequently, there is no reason why something cannot be in the soul in one manner, say, through its essence, and in another manner also, as through its likeness or image. For an image and likeness of God exist in the soul, even though God is also present there through His essence.
Ad nonum dicendum sicut ad primum.	9. The answer here is the same as that given to the first difficulty.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod nec gratia gratum faciens nec gratia gratis data sufficit ad videndum Deum per essentiam, nisi sit gratia consummata, quae est lumen gloriae.	10. Neither sanctifying grace nor charisms suffice for vision of God through His essence. Only perfected grace is sufficient, and this is the light of glory.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod res antequam in propria natura essent, non solum fuerunt in verbo, sed etiam in mente angelica; et ita potuerunt videri, quamvis verbum per essentiam non videretur.	i 1. Even before things existed in their own natures they existed not only in the Word but also in the minds of angels. Consequently, they could be seen even though the Word was not seen through His essence.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod sicut dicit philosophus in II caeli et mundi in rebus invenitur multiplex gradus perfectionis. Primus enim gradus et perfectissimus est, ut aliquid habeat bonitatem suam sine motu et sine adminiculo alterius; sicut est perfectissima sanitas in eo qui per se est sanus sine auxilio medicinae; et hic gradus est divinae perfectionis. Secundus gradus est eius quod potest consequi perfectam bonitatem cum modico auxilio et parvo motu, sicut eius qui habet sanitatem cum modico exercitio. Tertius gradus est eius quod acquirit perfectam bonitatem cum multis motibus, sicut ille qui acquirit perfectam sanitatem cum multis exercitiis. Quartus gradus est eius quod nunquam potest acquirere perfectam bonitatem, sed acquirit aliquid de bonitate ex multis motibus. Quintus gradus est eius quod non potest acquirere aliquid de bonitate, nec habet aliquem motum ad hoc, sicut est gradus illius in sanitate qui sanari non potest, unde nullam medicinam accipit.	12. As the Philosopher says, many degrees of perfection are found in things. The first and most perfect degree is that wherein a thing has its own goodness without the motion or the help of another, just as the most perfect health exists in one who is healthy by himself without the help of medicine. This is the degree proper to divine perfection. The second degree is that wherein one can attain perfect goodness with slight help or with a little motion, like a man who can keep his health with only a little exercise. The third degree is that wherein one acquires perfect goodness only through many motions, like a man who acquires perfect health only after much exercise. The fourth degree belongs to him who can never acquire perfect goodness, but can acquire only some goodness by means of many motions. The fifth degree belongs to him who cannot acquire any goodness at all and has no movement towards goodness. He is like a man who has an incurable disease and, consequently, does not take any medicine.
Naturae igitur irrationales nullo modo ad perfectam bonitatem, quae est beatitudo, pertingere possunt; sed pertingunt ad aliquam bonitatem imperfectam, quae est eorum finis naturalis, quam ex vi naturae suae consequuntur. Sed creaturae rationales possunt consequi perfectam bonitatem, id est beatitudinem; tamen ad consequendum indigent pluribus quam naturae inferiores ad consequendum fines suos. Et ideo quamvis sint nobiliores, non tamen sequitur quod ex propriis naturalibus possint attingere ad finem suum, sicut naturae inferiores. Quod enim beatitudinem aliquid attingat per seipsum, solius Dei est.	Now, irrational natures can in no way attain perfect goodness, which is beatitude. They can attain only some imperfect goodness, their natural end, which they achieve through the force of their own natures. Rational creatures, however, can attain perfect goodness, that is, beatitude. Yet, in order to attain this, they need more things than lower natures need in order to obtain their ends. Consequently, even though rational creatures are more noble, it does not follow that they can attain their end by means of their own natural powers as lower natures do. For, to attain beatitude through one’s own power belongs exclusively to God.
Et similiter dicendum ad decimumtertium de ordine potentiarum.	13. A similar reply should be given to this difficulty about the ordering of powers.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod per lumen gloriae quamvis intellectus creatus nunquam tantum elevetur quin in infinitum distet ab eo essentia divina, tamen per lumen illud fit ut intellectus uniatur essentiae divinae sicut formae intelligibili; quod aliter fieri non posset.	14. Even though a created intellect is never elevated by the light of glory to such an extent that the distance between it and the divine essence is no longer infinite, yet, as a result of this light, the intellect is united with the divine essence as with an intelligible form; and this union can happen in no other way.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod ad cognoscendum Deum per similitudinem eius Angelus ex propriis naturalibus potest, sed haec non est visio Dei per essentiam.	15. By his natural powers an angel can know God through a likeness; but this knowledge is not the same as seeing God through His essence.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod conformitas naturalis ad Deum quae est in intellectu Angeli, non est ut intellectus Angeli proportionetur ad essentiam divinam sicut ad formam intelligibilem; sed in hoc quod non accipit cognitionem sensibilium a sensu, sicut nos accipimus; et quantum ad alia in quibus intellectus Angeli convenit cum Deo, et differt ab intellectu humano.	16. The natural conformity which an angelic intellect has with God is not such that it is proportioned to the divine essence as to an intelligible form. It consists rather in this, that an angelic intellect does not receive its knowledge of sensible things from sense as we do; and in other respects, too, the angelic intellect resembles God more than it resembles the human intellect.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod tripliciter aliquid videtur. Uno modo per essentiam suam; sicut quando ipsa essentia visibilis coniungitur visui, sicut oculus videt lucem. Alio modo per speciem; quando scilicet similitudo ipsius rei ab ipsa re imprimitur in visum, sicut cum video lapidem. Tertio modo per speculum; et hoc est quando similitudo rei per quam cognoscitur, non fit in visu immediate ab ipsa re, sed ab eo in quo similitudo rei repraesentatur; sicut in speculo resultant species sensibilium.	17. A thing is seen in three different ways. First, it is seen through its essence, in the way in which a visible essence itself is joined to sight when the eye sees light. Second, it is seen through a species, as takes place when the likeness of a thing is impressed on my sense of sight when I see a stone. Third, it is seen “through a mirror”; and this takes place when the thing’s likeness, through which it is known, is not caused in the sight by the thing itself directly but by that in which the likeness of the thing is represented, just as sensible species are caused in a mirror.
Primo igitur modo videre Deum est naturale soli Deo, supra naturam vero hominis et Angeli; sed secundo modo videre Deum est naturale Angelo; tertio autem modo videre Deum est naturale ipsi homini, qui venit in cognitionem Dei ex creaturis, utcumque Deum repraesentantibus. Unde quod dicitur quod omnis cognitio est vel per essentiam vel in speculo, intelligendum est de cognitione humana; cognitio autem Angeli quam de Deo naturaliter habet, est media inter istas duas.	Now, to see God in the first manner is natural only to God. It lie above the nature of man and angel. To see God in the second manner is natural to an angel. To see God in the third manner, however, is natural to man himself, for he can come to know God from creature inasmuch as they represent Him somehow or other. Consequently, the statement that all knowledge is either through an essence or through a mirror should be taken as referring to human knowledge. The knowledge which an angel naturally has of God lies between these two types.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod imago rei dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo inquantum est res quaedam; et cum sit res distincta ab eo cuius est imago, propter modum istum alius erit motus virtutis cognitivae in imaginem, et in id cuius est imago. Alio modo consideratur prout est imago; et sic idem est motus in imaginem, et in id cuius est imago; et sic quando aliquid cognoscitur per similitudinem in effectu suo existentem, potest motus cognitionis transire ad causam immediate, sine hoc quod cogitetur de aliqua alia re. Et hoc modo intellectus viatoris potest cogitare de Deo, non cogitando de aliqua creatura.	18. An image of a thing can be considered in two ways. First, it can be considered in so far as it is a certain thing; and since as a thing it is distinct from that of which it is an image, under this aspect the motion of the cognitive power to the image will be other than its motion toward that of which it is an image. Second, it can be considered in so far as it is an image. Under this aspect, the motion toward the image will be the same as the motion toward that of which it is an image. Consequently, when a thing is known by means of a resemblance existing in its effect, the cognitive motion can pass over immediately to the cause without thinking about any other thing. This is the way in which the intellect of a person still in this life can think of God without thinking of any creature.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod ea quae sunt essentialiter in anima et coniunguntur ei ut formae intelligibiles, intelliguntur ab anima per essentiam suam; sic autem essentia divina non est in anima viatoris; et ideo ratio non sequitur.	19. Those things which are in the soul in their essence, and are united with it as intelligible forms are understood by the soul through their essences. The divine essence, however, is not present this way in the soul of one still in this life. Consequently, the argument proves nothing.
Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de specie abstracta a re, quam oportet esse simpliciorem re ipsa. Talis autem similitudo non est per quam intellectus creatus cognoscit naturaliter Deum, sed est similitudo impressa ab ipso; et ideo ratio non sequitur.	20. That argument is talking about species abstracted from things, and these must be more simple than the things themselves. A created [angelic] intellect, however, does not know God naturally through such a likeness, but only through a likeness imprinted by Him. Consequently, the argument proves nothing.

---

ARTICLE IV In the fourth article we ask: Does an angel, seeing God through his essence, know all things? [ARTICLE De ver., 20, aa. 4-6; S.T. I, 12, 8; 57, 5; 106, 1, ad 1; III, 10, 2; II Sent., 11, 2, 2, aa. 1-2; III Sent., 14, 2, sols. 2-4; IV Sent., 45, 3, 1; 49, 2, 5; C.G., III, cc. 56, 59.]
Quarto quaeritur utrum Angelus videns Deum per essentiam, omnia cognoscat	Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic.	It seems that he does, for
Quia, sicut dicit Isidorus, Angeli in verbo Dei omnia vident antequam fiant.	1. As Isidore says: “Angels see all things in the Word of God before they come into being.”
Praeterea, uniuscuiusque visus videt illud cuius similitudo est apud ipsum. Sed essentia divina, quae est similitudo omnium, intellectui angelico coniungitur ut forma intelligibilis. Ergo Angelus videns Deum per essentiam, videt omnia.	2. Every faculty of sight sees those things whose likenesses it has within it. But the divine essence, a likeness of all things, is joined to the angelic intellect as an intelligible form. Consequently, when an angel sees God through His essence he sees all things.
Praeterea, si Angelus non cognoscit omnia, oportet quod hoc accidat vel ex defectu intellectus angelici, vel ex defectu rerum cognoscibilium, vel ex defectu medii. Sed non ex defectu intellectus angelici, cum Angelus sit speculum purum et incontaminatum, ut Dionysius dicit; nec etiam ex defectu intelligibilium, quia omnia sunt in divina essentia cognoscibilia; nec etiam ex defectu medii quo cognoscunt, quia divina essentia perfecte omnia repraesentat. Ergo Angelus videns Deum omnia videt.	3. If an angel does not know all things, this is because of a defect in his faculty of knowing or in its objects or in the medium of his cognition. But his lack of knowledge is not due to any defect in the angel’s intellect, for, as Dionysius says, an angel “is a pure and spotless mirror.” Nor is it due to any defect in the objects of this faculty, for all things are knowable in the divine essence. Finally, it is not due to any defect in the medium by which angels know, for the divine essence represents all things perfectly. Consequently, seeing God, an angel sees all things.
Praeterea, intellectus Angeli est perfectior quam intellectus animae humanae. Sed anima habet potentiam ad omnia cognoscendum; ipsa enim est quodammodo omnia, ut in III de anima dicitur, secundum quod est nata omnia cognoscere. Ergo et intellectus angelicus potest omnia cognoscere. Sed nihil est efficacius ad educendum intellectum angelicum in actum cognitionis quam divina essentia. Ergo Angelus videns essentiam divinam, omnia cognoscit.	4. An angel’s intellect is more perfect than the intellect possessed by a human soul. But the human soul has the power to know all things; for as is said in The Soul, it is “all things in some manner” since it is natural for it to know all things. Consequently, an angelic intellect can also know all things. Now, nothing is more effective in bringing an angelic intellect to the act of cognition than the divine essence. Therefore, when an angel sees the divine essence he knows all things.
Praeterea, sicut dicit Gregorius, amor in patria cognitioni aequatur: quia tantum quisque ibi diliget, quantum cognoscet. Sed amans Deum amabit in ipso omnia diligibilia. Ergo videns ipsum videbit omnia intelligibilia.	5. As Gregory says, love in heaven is equated with knowledge, for there one’s love is proportioned to his knowledge. But one who loves God will love in Him all things lovable. Consequently, one who sees God will see all things knowable.
Praeterea, si Angelus videns Deum non videt omnia, hoc non est nisi quia omnia intelligibilia sunt infinita. Sed ipse non impeditur ab intelligendo propter intelligibilis infinitatem, quia essentia divina distat ab eo sicut infinitum a finito. Ergo videtur quod Angelus videns Deum, omnia videre possit.	6. If an angel, seeing God, does not see all things, then this is only because all the intelligibles are infinite. But an angel is not kept from understanding by the fact that the object of his intellect is infinite, for the divine essence itself is distant from him as something infinite from what is finite. Consequently, it seems that when an angel sees God he can see all things.
Praeterea, cognitio comprehensoris excedit cognitionem viatoris, quantumcumque elevetur. Sed viatori alicui possunt omnia revelari: quod quidem de praesentibus patet, quia beato Benedicto totus mundus simul ostensus est, ut dicitur in II dialogorum; de futuris etiam patere potest, quia Deus alicui prophetae aliqua futura revelat, et eadem ratione potest sibi omnia revelare; et similis ratio est de praeteritis. Ergo multo fortius Angelus videns Deum visione patriae omnia cognoscit.	7. The knowledge one has in heaven is greater than that had by one on earth, no matter how much the knowledge of the latter is elevated. Now, all things can be revealed to one still on earth. That all things present can be revealed is clear from the case of Benedict, who, as Gregory says, was shown the whole world at once. That all future things can be revealed is also clear, since God reveals some future events to prophets; and, in the same way, He could reveal all of them to a prophet—and all past things, too. For an even better reason, therefore, an angel seeing God in the heavenly vision knows all things.
Praeterea, Gregorius in IV Dialog. dicit: quid est quod non videant ubi videntem omnia vident? Sed Angeli vident per essentiam Deum scientem omnia. Ergo Angeli cognoscunt omnia.	8. Gregory writes as follows: “What is there that they do not see when they see the one that sees all things?” Now, angels see God, who knows all things, through His essence. Consequently, angels know all things.
Praeterea, potestas Angeli in cognoscendo non est minor quam potestas animae. Sed dicit Gregorius in II Dialog.: animae videnti creatorem angusta est omnis creatura. Ergo et Angelo; et sic idem quod prius.	9. As regards knowledge, the power of an angel is not less than that of a soul. But Gregory says: “Every creature is small for a soul who sees the Creator.” Therefore, every creature is small to an angel; thus our conclusion is the same as before.
Praeterea, lux spiritualis vehementius ingerit se menti quam lux corporalis oculo. Sed si lux corporalis esset sufficiens ratio omnium colorum; ingerens se oculo, omnes colores manifestaret. Ergo, cum ipse Deus, qui est lux spiritualis, et rerum omnium perfecta ratio, menti Angeli videntis eum se ingerat, Angelus eo cognito omnia cognoscet.	10. Spiritual light pours itself into the mind with greater force than physical light does into the eye. But, if physical light were the adequate cause of all colors, then in pouring itself into the eye it would manifest all colors. Consequently, since God Himself, who is spiritual light and the perfect principle of all things, pours Himself into the mind of an angel who sees Him, by knowing God the angel will know all things.
Praeterea, cognitio est quasi quidam contactus cognoscentis et cognoscibilis. Sed si simplex tangitur, tangitur quidquid in ipso est. Sed Deus est simplex. Ergo si cognoscitur, cognoscuntur omnes rerum rationes quae in ipso sunt.	i 1. Cognition is, as it were, a kind of contact between the knower and the knowable. Now, if a simple thing is touched, whatever there is in it is touched. But God is simple. Therefore, if He is known, all things are known, because all their intelligible characters exist within Him.
Praeterea, nullius creaturae cognitio est de substantia beatitudinis. Ergo ad cognitionem beatitudinis aequaliter se habere videntur. Aut ergo beatus omnes creaturas cognoscit, aut nullam. Sed non nullam. Ergo omnes.	12. Knowledge of creatures does not belong to the substance of beatitude. Therefore, creatures seem to be related equally to the knowledge had in that state: one who is beatified knows either all creatures or none at all. But, since he knows some creatures, he must know them all.
Praeterea, omnis potentia non reducta ad actum est imperfecta. Sed intellectus Angeli est in potentia ad omnia cognoscenda; alias esset inferior intellectu humano, in quo est omnia fieri. Si ergo in statu beatitudinis non omnia cognosceret, remaneret eius cognitio imperfecta; quod videtur repugnare beatitudinis perfectioni, quae omnem imperfectionem tollit.	13. Any potency that is not reduced to act is imperfect. But the intellect of an angel is in potency to the knowledge of all things; otherwise, it would be inferior to the human intellect, which has the power to become all things. Consequently, if an angel did not know all things in his state of beatitude, his knowledge would remain imperfect; but this seems repugnant to the perfection of beatitude, which takes away all imperfections.
Praeterea, si Angelus beatus non cognosceret omnia, cum sit in potentia ad omnia cognoscenda, posset postmodum aliquid cognoscere quod prius non cognoverat. Sed hoc est impossibile, quia, sicut dicit Augustinus in XV de Trinitate, in Angelis beatis non sunt cogitationes volubiles; quod esset, si aliquid scirent quod prius nescissent ergo Angeli beati videntes Deum omnia vident.	14. If a beatified angel did not know all things, he would, since he is in potency to knowing all things, at one time know something which he did not know previously. Now, this is impossible; for, as Augustine says, “beatified angels’ thoughts do not change”; and they would change if angels came to know something of which they were previously ignorant. Consequently, beatified angels see all things when they see God.
Praeterea, visio beatitudinis aeternitate mensuratur, unde et vita aeterna dicitur. Sed in aeternitate nihil est prius et posterius. Ergo nec in visione beatitudinis; ergo non potest esse quod aliquid sciatur quod prius scitum non fuerat; et sic idem quod prius.	15. The beatific vision is measured by eternity, and for this reason is called eternal life. Now, since there is no “before” or “after” in eternity, these sequences are not in the beatific vision either. Hence, [in the vision] something cannot be known which was not known previously. Therefore, our conclusion is the same as before.
Praeterea, Ioan. X, 9, dicitur: ingredietur et egredietur, et pascua inveniet; quod in Lib. de spiritu et anima sic exponitur: ingredietur ad contemplandam divinitatem salvatoris, egredietur ad intuendam humanitatem ipsius; et utrobique gloriosam refectionem inveniet. Sed visus exterior ita perfecte pascetur in humanitate salvatoris, quod nihil existens in corpore eius erit ei occultum. Ergo et oculus mentis ita pascetur in divinitate ipsius, quod nihil in ea existens ignorabitur ab eo; et sic cognoscet omnia.	16. In the Gospel according to John (15:9), we read the following: “He shall go in, and go out, and shall find pastures.” This is explained as follows in Spirit and Soul: “He shall go in to contemplate the divinity of the Saviour, and go out to gaze upon His humanity. In both he will find glorious refreshment.” Now, our external sight will nourish itself perfectly upon the humanity of our Saviour, because nothing in His body will be hidden from it. Consequently, the eye of the mind will nourish itself similarly on His divinity, because it will be ignorant of nothing in His divinity, and so will know all things.
Praeterea, ut dicitur III de anima, intellectus intelligens maximum intelligibile, non minus intelligit minus intelligibilia, sed magis. Sed maxime intelligibile est Deus. Ergo intellectus videns Deum, omnia videt.	17. As is said in The Soul, an intellect that understands what is most intelligible does not understand what is less intelligible to a lesser degree but to a greater degree. Now, God is most intelligible. Hence, when an intellect sees God it sees all things.
Praeterea, effectus maxime cognoscitur per cognitionem suae causae. Sed Deus est causa omnium. Ergo intellectus videntis Deum omnia cognoscit.	18. One knows an effect especially by knowing its cause. Now, God is the cause of all things. Consequently, when an intellect sees God it knows all things.
Praeterea, colores in tabula depicti, ad hoc quod visu cognoscerentur, non indigerent nisi lumine eos illustrante, quo fieret visibiles actu. Sed rerum omnium rationes sunt in essentia divina actu intelligibiles, divino lumine illustratae. Ergo intellectus videns essentiam divinam, omnia per omnium rationes videt.	19. Colors painted on a tablet, to become known by sight, would need only a light to shine upon them and make them actually visible. Now, through the illumination of the divine light, the representations of all things are actually intelligible in the divine essence. Consequently, when an intellect sees the divine essence, it sees all things by means of these representations of all things.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Est quod dicitur Ephes. cap. III, 10: ut innotescat principatibus et potestatibus in caelestibus per Ecclesiam multiformis sapientia Dei: ubi dicit Glossa Hieronymi, quod Angeli mysterium incarnationis per praedicationem Ecclesiae sunt edocti. Ergo ante praedicationem illud ignoraverunt, et tamen Deum per essentiam viderunt. Ergo videntes Deum per essentiam non omnia cognoscunt.	1. We read the following in the Epistle to the Ephesians (3:10): “That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the principalities and powers in heavenly places through the church.” Commenting on this passage, Jerome says” that the angels learned the mystery of the Incarnation through the preaching of the Church Consequently, they were ignorant of it before the preaching of the Church, even though they saw God through His essence. Therefore, when they saw God in His essence they did not know all things.
Praeterea, Dionysius dicit in fine Eccl. Hierarch., quod multae sacramentorum rationes latent supernas essentias; et sic idem quod prius.	2. Dionysius writes: “Many aspects of the mysteries are hidden from the celestial essences.”
Praeterea, nihil alteri coaequatur in extensione quae est secundum quantitatem molis, nisi sit ei aequale secundum molis quantitatem. Ergo et nihil aequatur alteri in extensione virtualis quantitatis, nisi coaequetur ei in virtute. Sed intellectus Angeli non coaequatur intellectui divino in virtute. Ergo non potest esse quod intellectus Angeli se extendat ad omnia ad quae se extendit intellectus divinus.	3. Nothing is equal to another’s extension according to dimensional quantity unless it has the same amount of dimensional quantity. Therefore, nothing is equal to another’s extension in virtual quantity unless it has the same amount of efficacy. Now, an angelic intellect is not equal to the divine intellect in perfection. Consequently, it is impossible for an angelic intellect to embrace all things which the divine intellect embraces.
Praeterea, Angeli, cum sint facti ad laudandum Deum, secundum hoc quod cognoscunt eum laudant ipsum. Sed non omnes aequaliter eum laudant, ut patet per Chrysostomum super Ioan. Ergo quidam in eo plura cognoscunt quam alii. Et tamen Angeli minus cognoscentes vident Deum per essentiam; ergo videns Deum per essentiam non omnia videt.	4. Since angels have been made to praise God, they praise Him in so far as they know Him. But, as is clear from what Chrysostom has written, all angels do not praise Him equally. Therefore, some know more things in God than others. Nevertheless, even those who know less see God through His essence. Consequently, when they see God through His essence they do not see all things.
Praeterea, de substantia beatitudinis Angeli est cognitio et gaudium. Sed Angeli bene possunt gaudere de quo prius non gaudebant, sicut de peccatore converso: gaudium enim est Angelis Dei super uno etc.; Lucae XV, vers. 10. Ergo et possunt cognoscere quae prius non cognoscebant. Ergo videntes Deum per essentiam, aliqua ignorant.	5. Knowledge and joy belong to the substance of angelic beatitude. Now, the beatified angels can rejoice over something which they did not rejoice over previously, as, for example, the conversion of a sinner: “There shall be joy before the angels of God upon one (Luke 15:10). Consequently, they can also know something which they did not know previously. Thus, even though they see God through His essence, there are some things which they do not know.
Praeterea, nulla creatura potest esse summe bona vel summe potens. Ergo nec omnia sciens.	6. No created thing can be all-good or all-powerful. Therefore, no created thing can be all-knowing.
Praeterea, cognitio divina in infinitum excedit cognitionem creaturae. Ergo non potest esse ut omnia quae Deus scit, creatura cognoscat.	7. God’s knowledge infinitely surpasses that of a creature. Consequently, it is impossible for a creature to know all that God knows.
Praeterea, Ierem. XVII, 9, dicitur: pravum est cor hominis, et inscrutabile; quis cognoscet illud? Ego dominus. Ex quo videtur quod Angeli videntes Deum per essentiam, non cognoscunt secreta cordium, et ita non cognoscunt omnia.	8. In Jeremiah (17:9-10) we read the following: “The heart is perverse... and unsearchable. Who can know it? I... the Lord.” From this it seems that even though the angels see God through His essence, they nevertheless do not know the heart’s secrets and, therefore, do not know all things.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod Deus videndo essentiam suam, quaedam cognoscit scientia visionis, scilicet praeterita, praesentia et futura; quaedam autem scientia simplicis intelligentiae, omnia scilicet quae potest facere, quamvis nec sint, nec fuerint, nec futura sint. Impossibile autem videtur quod aliqua creatura videns essentiam divinam, omnia sciat quae Deus scit scientia simplicis notitiae.	In seeing His own essence, God knows some things, namely, the present, past, and future, with the knowledge of vision. Other things, namely, all those which He could make but which nevertheless do not exist, have not existed, and will not exist—these He knows with the knowledge of simple understanding. Now, it seems impossible that any creature seeing the divine essence should know all the things which God knows with His knowledge of simple understanding.
Constat enim quod quanto aliquis causam aliquam perfectius cognoscit, ex cognitione causae in plurium effectuum notitiam devenire potest; sicut ille qui perfectius aliquod principium demonstrationis cognoscit, plures conclusiones ex eo deducere potest. Si ergo aliquis intellectus ex cognitione alicuius causae omnes effectus eius cognoscat, oportet quod pertingat ad perfectum modum cognitionis illius causae, et sic quod illam causam comprehendat; quod est impossibile de essentia divina respectu intellectus creati, ut ex dictis patet. Unde impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus videndo divinam essentiam omnia cognoscat quae ex ea causari possunt.	It is clear that the number of effects a person knows of a cause is in proportion to the perfection of his knowledge of that cause. For example, the more perfectly one knows a principle of demonstration, the more conclusions can he draw from it. Consequently, if an intellect is to know from its knowledge of a cause all the effects of that cause, it must attain a perfect knowledge of it and, consequently, must comprehend it. Now, as is evident from what has been said previously, it is impossible for a created intellect to comprehend the divine essence. Therefore, it is impossible for any created intellect in seeing the divine essence to know all the things that can be caused by it.
Possibile tamen est ut aliquis intellectus creatus essentiam Dei videns, omnia cognoscat quae Deus scit scientia visionis, ut de anima Christi ab omnibus tenetur. De aliis autem videntibus Deum per essentiam, est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt, quod omnes Angeli et animae beatorum videndo essentiam Dei, necesse est ut omnia cognoscant, sicut qui videt speculum, videt omnia quae in speculo relucent. Sed hoc dictis sanctorum repugnare videtur, et praecipue Dionysii, qui in cap. VI ecclesiasticae hierarchiae expresse dicit, inferiores Angelos per superiores ab ignorantia purgari; et sic oportet ponere, quaedam superiores Angelos cognoscere quae inferiores ignorant, quamvis omnes communiter Deum contemplentur.	However, it is possible for a created intellect which sees God to know all that God knows with His knowledge of vision. All hold this is true of the soul of Christ. Opinion is split, however, about the others who see God through His essence. Some say that all angels and all the souls of the blessed necessarily know all things by seeing God’s essence because they are like men who look into a mirror and see all that is reflected there. This opinion, however, seems to contradict the sayings of the saints, especially those of Dionysius, who expressly states that the lower angels rid themselves of their ignorance by the help of higher angels. Hence, we must assert that the higher angels know things of which the lower are ignorant, even though all angels without exception contemplate God.
Et ideo dicendum est, quod res non sunt in essentia divina sicut actu distinctae; sed magis in eo omnia sunt unum, ut Dionysius dicit, per modum quo multi effectus uniuntur in una causa. Imagines autem in speculo resultantes sunt ibi in actu distinctae; et ideo modus quo res omnes sunt in essentia divina similior est modo quo sunt effectus in causa, quam modo quo sunt imagines in speculo. Non est autem necessarium quod quicumque cognoscit causam, cognoscat omnes effectus eius qui possunt ex ipsa produci, nisi comprehendat ipsam; quod non contingit alicui intellectui creato, respectu divinae essentiae. Unde in solo Deo necesse est ut ex hoc quod essentiam suam videt, omnia cognoscat quae facere potest. Unde et eorum effectuum qui ex ipsa producti sunt, tanto aliquis plures cognoscit videndo essentiam Dei, quanto plenius eam videt. Et ideo animae Christi, quae super omnes creaturas perfectius Deum videt, attribuitur quod omnia cognoscat, praesentia, praeterita et futura; aliis autem non, sed quod unusquisque secundum mensuram qua videt Deum, videt plures vel pauciores effectus ex ipso.	Consequently, we answer that things do not exist in the divine essence as actually distinct; but, as Dionysius says, in God all things are one in the way in which many effects are united in one cause. Images reflected in a mirror, however, are actually distinct; consequently, the way in which all things are in the divine essence is more like the way in which effects are in a cause than that in which images are in a mirror. Moreover, one who knows a cause will know all the effects which that cause can produce only if he comprehends that cause, but such comprehension is impossible for a created intellect with regard to the divine essence. Hence, in seeing His essence God alone necessarily knows all the things that He can make. The same is true of the effects that can be produced by the divine essence: one knows more of these the more fully he sees God’s essence. Consequently, the soul of Christ, which sees God more perfectly than all other creatures do is said to know all things, present, past, and future. Other creatures however, do not have this knowledge. Each one of them sees more or fewer effects of God in proportion to the knowledge he has of Him.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod sicut Magister in II Senten. dicit, cum dicitur: Angeli in verbo vident omnia antequam fiant; hoc non intelligitur de omnibus Angelis, sed forte de superioribus; nec illi etiam omnia perfecte vident, sed forte in communi, et quasi implicite tantum, aliqua sciunt. Vel potest dici, quod de una re cognoscibili possunt intelligi plures rationes, sicut de triangulo plures demonstrationes fiunt; et potest esse quod aliquis scit triangulum quid est, qui nescit omnia quae de triangulo sciri possunt. Aliud igitur est scire omnes res, aliud autem scire omnia intelligibilia de rebus.	1. As Peter Lombard points out, when one says that angels see all things in the Word before they come into being, his statement should not be understood as referring to all angels, but possibly only to the higher angels. Nor do these see all things perfectly, but, perhaps, only in general. Some things they know, as it were, only implicitly. Or one could also reply that many concepts can be drawn from one object, just as many demonstrations can be made about a triangle; and it is possible for one to know the definition of a triangle and still not know all the things that can be known about a triangle. Therefore, it is one thing to know all things, and another to know all that can be known about things.
Satis autem probabile videtur quod omnes videntes Deum per essentiam omnes creaturas cognoscant ad minus secundum species suas, et hoc est quod Isidorus dicit, quod sciunt in verbo omnia antequam fiant; fieri enim rei est non intelligibilis rationis. Non autem oportet quod Angelus sciens rem aliquam sciat omnes rationes intelligibiles de ipsa; et si forte sciat omnes proprietates naturales quae comprehensione essentiae cognoscuntur, non tamen scit eam secundum omnes rationes quibus substat ordini divinae providentiae, qua una res ordinatur ad varios eventus. Et de his rationibus inferiores Angeli a supremis illuminantur. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, cap. IV de Divin. Nomin., quod superiores Angeli docent inferiores rerum scibiles rationes.	However, it is sufficiently probable that all who see God through His essence know all creatures at least according to their species. This is what Isidore means when he says angels “know all things in the Word before they come into existence,” for coming into existence pertains to things, not to intelligible characters. It is not necessary, however, that an angel know all the intelligible characters of a thing when he knows it; and, even if he were to know all the natural properties which can be known by comprehending its essence, he would not know it according to all the formalities by which it falls under the ordering of divine providence, which ordains one thing to many events. It is about such things that the highest angels enlighten the lower. And this is what Dionysius means when he says that higher angels teach the lower about the intelligible characters of things.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit quando visus similitudini coniungitur secundum totum posse ipsius similitudinis; tunc enim necesse est ut visus cognoscat omne id ad quod similitudo visus se extendit. Sic autem intellectus creatus non coniungitur divinae essentiae; et ideo ratio non sequitur.	2. That argument holds when sight is joined to a likeness according to the entire potentialities of that likeness. Then sight necessarily knows everything to which the likeness extends. However, a created intellect is not joined to the divine essence in this manner. Consequently, the argument does not hold.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod hoc quod Angelus videns Deum non videat omnia, contingit ex defectu intellectus ipsius, qui non unitur essentiae divinae secundum totum posse eius. Hic autem defectus puritati eius non repugnat, ut supra dictum est.	3. The fact that an angel, seeing God, nevertheless does not see all things is due to a defect in his intellect, which is not united to the divine essence according to the total cognoscibility of the essence. But, as mentioned above, this defect is not contrary to the purity of the angelic intellect.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod anima secundum potentiam naturalem non se extendit ad plura intelligibilia quam ad ea quae possunt manifestari per lumen intellectus agentis; quae sunt formae abstractae a sensibilibus. Et similiter potentia intellectus angelici naturalis est ad omnia illa cognoscenda quae manifestantur lumine suo naturali, quod non est sufficiens manifestativum omnium quae in Dei sapientia latent. Et praeterea, illorum etiam quae anima naturaliter cognoscere potest, cognitionem non accipit nisi per medium sibi proportionatum; unde uno et eodem medio apprehenso, aliquis in cognitionem alicuius conclusionis devenit in quam alius tardioris ingenii devenire non potest. Et similiter ex essentia Dei visa superior Angelus multa cognoscit quae inferior cognoscere non potest; in eorum tamen cognitionem reducitur per medium sibi magis proportionatum, sicut per lumen superioris Angeli. Unde necesse est quod unus Angelus alium illuminet.	4. The ambit of a soul’s natural power includes only those objects which can be understood by the light of the active intellect, and these are forms abstracted from sensible objects. Similarly, the natural power of an angelic intellect includes only those objects that are manifested to it by its own natural light, which is not, however, sufficient to manifest all the things hidden in the wisdom of God. Moreover, the soul receives knowledge of those things which it can know naturally only through a medium that is proportioned to itself. Consequently, even though two persons may apprehend a conclusion by one and the same medium, one will come to know it when the other, with a slower intellect, will not. Similarly, when angels see God’s essence, a higher angel will know many things which a lower angel will not. However, the lower angel gets knowledge of these things through a medium that is more proportioned to him, namely, the light of the higher angel. Hence, it is necessary for one angel to enlighten another.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod affectus terminatur ad res ipsas; sed intellectus non solum sistit in rebus, sed res in multas intentiones dividit; unde illae intentiones sunt intellectae, non autem sunt dilectae; sed possunt esse dilectionis principium, sive ratio; dilectum autem proprie est res ipsa. Et quia Angeli videntes Deum per essentiam, omnes cognoscunt creaturas, possunt omnes amare. Quia vero non omnes rationes intelligibiles in eis apprehendunt, non ex omnibus rationibus quibus res diligi possunt, eas diligunt.	5. Affection tends toward things themselves, but intellect not only tends toward things but also divides them up into many concepts. Consequently, these concepts are understood but not loved. They can, however, be the principle of love or the reason for it. But, properly speaking, what is loved is the thing itself. Therefore, since the angels who see God through His essence know all creatures, they can love all creatures. But, because they do not apprehend all the intelligible aspects of creatures, they do not love creatures under all the aspects under which they can be loved.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod quamvis Deus distet ab intellectu angelico sicut infinitum a finito, non tamen cognoscunt eum secundum modum suae infinitatis, quia non cognoscunt eum infinite; et ideo non oportet quod omnia infinita quae ipse cognoscit, cognoscant.	6. Even though God is at an infinite distance from the angelic intellect, angels do not know God according to the mode of His infinity, because they do not know Him infinitely. Consequently, it is not necessary that they know all the infinite things that He knows.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod Deus alicui viatori revelare posset tot, quod plura de creaturis intelligeret quam intellectus comprehensoris; et similiter Deus posset cuilibet comprehensori inferiori revelare omnia quae superior intelligit, aut etiam plura. Sed nunc de hoc non quaerimus; sed solum de hoc an ex hoc quod essentiam Dei videt aliquis intellectus creatus, sequatur quod omnia cognoscat.	7. God could reveal to a person in this life so many things that he would know more about creatures than the intellect of one in heaven knows. Similarly, God could reveal to a person in a lower place in heaven as many things as one in a higher place knows—or even more things. But this is not the point of our present inquiry. The point is: Does it follow that a created intellect knows all things from the fact that it sees God’s essence?
Ad octavum dicendum, quod verbum Gregorii potest intelligi de his quae pertinent ad substantiam beatitudinis. Vel potest dici, quod Gregorius loquitur quantum ad sufficientiam medii, quia ipsa essentia divina est sufficiens medium demonstrativum rerum omnium. Unde per hoc vult habere quod non est mirum si, ea visa, futura cognoscuntur; sed quod non omnia cognoscantur, est ex defectu intellectus eam non comprehendentis.	8. Gregory’s statement can be understood as referring to things that pertain to the substance of beatitude. Or one can reply that Gregory is speaking about the sufficiency of the medium, because the divine essence is a medium that is sufficient to make all things known. Gregory accordingly holds that it is not strange if one who sees the divine essence knows future things; but that he does not know all things comes from a defect in the intellect which does not comprehend it.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod ex illa auctoritate habetur, quod ex quo anima videt divinam essentiam, omnis creatura est ei angusta, id est nulla creatura occultatur ei propter eminentiam ipsius creaturae. Sed alia ratio occultationis esse potest: quia scilicet non coniungitur ei medium proportionatum sibi, per quod illam creaturam cognoscere possit.	9. This statement declares that every creature is small for a soul seeing the divine essence; that is, from such a soul no creature is hidden because of its nobility. There can be another reason, however, why it might remain hidden, namely, the fact that it is not joined to the soul by a proportionate medium through which the soul could know it.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet, si oculus corporalis lucem corporalem secundum totum eius posse in se susciperet; quod patet in proposito non esse.	10. That argument would hold if a physical eye could take upon itself all the potentialities of physical light. In the problem proposed this is clearly not the case.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod intellectus cognitione sua tangens Deum, cognoscit ipsum totum, sed non totaliter; et ideo cognoscit omne id quod actu in ipso est. Non tamen oportet quod cognoscat habitudinem eius ad omnes suos effectus; quod est cognoscere ipsum, secundum quod est ratio omnium suorum effectuum.	11. When an intellect touches God by its cognition; it knows the whole of God, even though it does not know God wholly. Consequently, it does know all that is in God actually. It is not necessary however, that the intellect know the relation God has to all His effects, for this would mean that it knew God in so far as He is the ultimate meaning of all of them.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod quamvis nulla cognitio creaturae sit de substantia beatitudinis quasi beatificans, tamen aliqua creaturae cognitio pertinet ad beatitudinem quasi necessaria ad aliquem actum beati; sicut ad beatitudinem Angeli pertinet ut cognoscat omnes qui suo officio committuntur; et similiter ad sanctorum beatitudinem pertinet ut cognoscant eos qui eorum beneficia implorant, vel etiam alias creaturas de quibus laudare debent Deum.	12. Although the knowledge of creatures does not belong to the substance of beatitude as something that beatifies, nevertheless, some knowledge of creatures pertains to beatitude as being in a way necessary for some act which the beatified person has to perform. For example, to know all who have been placed under his care belongs t the beatitude of an angel. Similarly, it belongs to the beatitude of the saints to know those persons who implore their help and even to know those other creatures from which they ought to rise to the praise of God.
Vel dicendum, quod si etiam nullo modo ad beatitudinem pertineret creaturae cognitio, non tamen sequitur quod omnis cognitio creaturae aequaliter se habeat ad visionem beatitudinis. Cognita enim causa aliqua, in promptu est ut aliqui effectus cognoscantur in ipsa, aliqui vero magis lateant; sicut patet quod ex principiis demonstrationis statim aliquae conclusiones eliciuntur, quaedam vero non nisi per multa media; et ad haec cognoscenda non potest quilibet per se, sed oportet quod ab alio manuducatur. Similiter est etiam cognitio rationum intelligibilium de effectibus respectu essentiae divinae; quia quaedam sunt latentiores, quaedam manifestiores; et ideo ex visione divinae essentiae quaedam cognoscuntur, quaedam non.	Or it might be said that, even if the knowledge of creatures pertain in no way at all to beatitude, it does not follow that all knowledge of creatures is equally related to the beatific vision. For, when a cause is known, some effects are known immediately in it while others still remain rather hidden. For example, some conclusions can be drawn immediately from principles of demonstration while others cannot be except by means of numerous media; and one cannot come to know the latter by himself but must be led to them by someone else. The same is true of knowing the intelligible reasons of effects in their relation to the divine essence: some are hidden but others are manifest. Consequently, when one sees the divine essence he sees some effects but not others.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod aliquid est in potentia ad alterum dupliciter. Uno modo in potentia naturali; et sic intellectus creatus est in potentia ad omnia illa cognoscenda quae suo lumine naturali manifestari possunt; et nihil horum Angelus beatus ignorat; ex horum enim ignorantia remaneret intellectus Angeli imperfectus. Quaedam vero potentia est obedientiae tantum, sicut dicitur aliquid esse in potentia ad illa quae supra naturam Deus in eo potest facere; et si talis potentia non reducatur ad actum, non erit potentia imperfecta: et ideo intellectus Angeli beati non est imperfectus, si non cognoscit omnia quae Deus potest ei revelare.	13. A thing can be in potency to something else in two ways. First, it can be in natural potency; and it is in this way that a created intellect is in potency to knowing all those things that can be manifested to it by its own natural light. A beatified angel is ignorant of none of these things, for were he ignorant of these his intellect would be imperfect. Secondly, a thing can be in merely obediential potency; and it is in this way that a thing is said to be in potency to those things above its nature which God can nevertheless cause in it. If such things are not reduced from potency to act, the potency is not imperfect. Consequently, the intellect of a beatified angel is not imperfect if it does not know all the things which God could reveal to it.
Vel dicendum, quod si aliqua potentia ad duas perfectiones ordinatur, quarum prima sit propter secundam, non erit imperfecta potentia, si habeat secundam sine prima; sicut si habet sanitatem sine adminiculis medicinae, quae sanitatem faciunt. Omnis enim cognitio creaturae ordinatur ad cognitionem Dei. Et ideo ex quo intellectus creatus cognoscit Deum, etiam dato per possibile quod nullam creaturam sciret, non esset imperfectus. Nec etiam intellectus videns Deum, qui plures creaturas cognoscit, ex cognitione creaturarum (perfectior est); sed ex hoc quod perfectius Deum cognoscit: unde dicit Augustinus, in libro confessionum: infelix homo qui scit omnia illa, scilicet creata, te autem nescit: beatus autem qui te scit, etiam si illa nesciat. Si autem te et illa novit, non propter illa beatior, sed propter te solum beatus.	Or one could reply that if a potency is ordered to two perfections, and if the second is the final cause of the first, then that potency would not be imperfect if it should have the second without the first—for example, if one were to have health without the help of medicine which causes health. Now, all knowledge of created things is ordered to the knowledge of God. Consequently, granted the impossible position that a created intellect did not know creatures but still knew God, it would not be imperfect. Moreover, an intellect that sees God and knows more creatures is not more perfect because of this knowledge of creatures but rather by the fact that it knows God more perfectly. For this reason, Augustine says: “Unhappy the man who knows all things,” that is, created things, “but does not know You. Happy is he who knows You, even if he does not know creatures. Moreover, if he knows You and creatures, he is not happier on account of them, but his happiness comes from You alone.”
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod volubilitas cogitationum, quae a beatis Angelis removetur, dupliciter intelligi potest. Uno modo ut cogitatio dicatur volubilis propter discursum de effectibus in causas, vel e converso; qui quidem discursus rationis proprius est, quam claritas intellectus angelici excedit. Alio modo volubilitas potest referri ad successionem eorum quae cogitantur. Et sic sciendum est, quod quantum ad illam cognitionem qua Angeli cognoscunt res in verbo, non potest esse successio, quia per unum diversa cognoscunt. Sed quantum ad ea quae cognoscunt per species innatas, vel per illuminationes superiorum, est ibi successio; unde Augustinus dicit, VIII super Genes. ad Litt., quod Deus movet creaturam spiritualem per tempus: quod est per affectiones mutari.	14. Change in thought, which is not had in beatified angels, can be understood in two different senses. First, thought is said to change as a result of reasoning from effects to causes or from causes to effects. Now, this discursive thinking is proper to reason and is beneath the clarity of angelic intellects. Second, change in thought can mean succession in the things that are thought about; and here we should note that there cannot be any succession in the knowledge by which angels know things in the Word, because they know many different things in one medium. But there is succession with respect to those things which they know through innate species or through the illuminations of higher angels. Hence, Augustine says: “God moves spiritual creatures through time;” that is, they are changed in their affections.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod visio beatitudinis est illa qua videtur Deus per essentiam, et res in Deo. Et in ista non est aliqua successio; nec in ea Angeli proficiunt, sicut nec in beatitudine. Sed in visione rerum per species innatas, vel per illuminationes superiorum, proficere possunt. Et quantum ad hoc, visio illa non mensuratur aeternitate, sed tempore; non quidem tempore quod est mensura motus primi mobilis, de quo philosophus loquitur, sed tempore non continuo, quali creatio rerum mensuratur; quod nihil est aliud quam numeratio prioris et posterioris in creatione rerum vel in successione angelicorum intellectuum.	15. The beatific vision is that by which God is seen through His essence and things are seen in God. There is no succession in this vision, nor do angels make any progress in it or in beatitude. But they can progress in their vision of things through innate species or through the illumination of superior angels; and this vision is measured, not by eternity, but by time—not by that time which is the measure of the first mobile thing’s motion, about which the Philosopher speaks, but by non-continuous time, such as that by which creation is measured. This is nothing other than the difference between “before” and “after” in the creation of things or in the succession of acts of understanding had by angels.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod corpus Christi est finitum, et comprehendi potest visu corporali. Essentia autem divina non comprehenditur visu spirituali, cum sit infinita; et ideo non est simile.	16. Christ’s body is finite and can be comprehended by physical sight. The divine essence, however, cannot be comprehended by spiritual sight, because it is infinite. Hence, no comparison can be made.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet, si intellectus cognosceret maxime cognoscibile, quod est Deus, perfecte; quod quia non est, ratio non sequitur.	17. That argument would conclude if the intellect could know perfectly what is most knowable, namely, God Himself. Since this is not so, the argument does not hold.
Et similiter dicendum ad decimumoctavum de causa et effectu, ut ex praedictis patet.	18. As is clear from what we have said, this difficulty from causes and effects can be answered in a similar way.
Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod non sunt hoc modo rationes rerum in Deo sicut colores in tabula vel pariete, ut ex dictis, in corp. art., patet, et ideo ratio non sequitur.	19. The intelligible representations of things are not in God the way in which colors are on a tablet or wall. This is clear from what we have said above. Hence, the argument proves nothing.
	Answers to Contrary Difficulties
Alia concedimus, quia verum concludunt, quamvis non debito modo.	We concede these arguments, since their conclusions are true even though they are not reached as they should be.

---

ARTICLE V In the fifth article we ask: Is the vision of things in the word had through likenesses of them existing in the angelic intellects? [Parallel readings; S.T., I, 12, 9; III Sent., 14, 1, sols. 4-5.]
Quinto quaeritur utrum visio rerum in verbo, sit per aliquas similitudines rerum in intellectu angelico existentes	Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic.	It seems that it is, for
Omnis enim cognitio est per assimilationem cognoscentis ad cognitum. Si igitur intellectus angelicus cognoscit aliqua in verbo, oportet quod cognoscat ea per aliquas similitudines apud se existentes.	1. All cognition takes place through an assimilation of the knower to the known. Therefore, if an angelic intellect knows things in the Word, it should know them by means of likenesses existing within itself.
Praeterea, sicut se habet corporalis res ad visum corporalem, ita spiritualis ad visum spiritualem. Sed res corporalis non cognoscitur a visu corporali nisi per aliquam impressionem rei in ipso existentem. Ergo similiter est de visu spirituali.	2. A spiritual thing is related to spiritual sight as a physical thing is related to physical sight. But a physical thing is known by physical sight only by means of an impression of the thing existing within it. The same is true, therefore, of spiritual sight.
Praeterea, gloria non destruit naturam, sed perficit. Sed cognitio naturalis Angeli est per aliquas species. Ergo et cognitio gloriae, quae est visio in verbo, est per similitudines rerum.	3. The glory had in heaven does not destroy nature; instead, it perfects it. Now, the natural cognition of angels takes place through species. Therefore, their knowledge in glory, which consists in their vision in the Word, takes place through likenesses of things.
Praeterea, omnis cognitio est per aliquam formam. Sed verbum non potest esse forma intellectus, nisi forte exemplaris, quia nullius rei est forma intrinseca. Ergo oportet quod per aliquas alias formas, cognoscat intellectus Angeli ea quae in verbo cognoscit.	4. All knowledge takes place through some form. But the Word cannot be the form of the intellect, except perhaps the exemplary form, since He cannot be the intrinsic form of anything. Consequently, an angelic intellect must know the things that it knows in the Word through other forms.
Praeterea, Paulus in raptu Deum per essentiam vidit, ut patet II Cor. XIII, 4, in Glossa, et ibi vidit arcana verba, quae non licet homini loqui. Illorum autem verborum non fuit oblitus postquam verbum per essentiam videre desiit. Ergo oportet quod per aliquas similitudines in intellectu remanentes illa cognosceret. Et eadem ratione Angeli, quae cognoscunt in verbo per similitudines aliquas cognoscunt, ut videtur.	5. It is clear from the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:4) that Paul in rapture saw the essence of God and there saw “secret words which it is not granted to man to utter.” Now, he did not forget those words when he no longer saw the Word through His essence. Hence, he must have known them by means of some likenesses, which remained in his intellect. For the same reason, therefore, it seems that angels know through likenesses the things they know in the Word.
Sed dicebat, quod abeunte verbo remanserunt in anima Pauli quaedam reliquiae illius visionis, scilicet impressiones quaedam vel similitudines, quibus reminisci poterat eorum quae in verbo viderat, sicut abeuntibus sensibilibus remanent eorum impressiones in sensu.- Sed contra, res aliqua magis imprimit in alteram in sui praesentia quam in sui absentia. Si ergo verbum in sui absentia reliquit impressionem in intellectu Pauli, ergo et in sui praesentia.	6. But it was said that when the Word departed from Paul, some traces of his vision remained in Paul’s soul, that is, some impressions or likenesses by which he could remember the things that he saw in the Word—just as impressions are left on the senses even after the objects that have been sensed are no longer present.—On the contrary, a thing leaves a greater impression on another when it is present than when it is absent. Therefore, if the Word when absent left an impression on Paul’s intellect, He also left an impression when He was present.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Quidquid est in Deo, est Deus. Si ergo Angelus videns essentiam Dei, non videt eam per aliquam similitudinem, nec ideas rerum in eo existentes per aliquam similitudinem videt.	1. Whatever is in God is God Himself. Consequently, when an angel sees God’s essence he does not see it by means of a likeness, nor does he see through a likeness the ideas of things as they exist in God.
Praeterea, rationes rerum resultant in verbo sicut imagines in speculo. Sed per unam similitudinem speculi videntur omnia quae in speculo relucent. Ergo et per ipsam formam verbi videntur omnia quae in verbo cognoscuntur.	2. The natures of things are reflected in the Word like images in a mirror. Now, all the things reflected in a mirror are seen by means of their one likeness there. Hence, all the things known in the Word are seen through the form of the Word.
Praeterea, intellectus Angeli est sicut tabula picta, eo quod omnis intelligentia est plena formis, ut dicitur in libro de causis. Sed tabulae pictae non superadduntur aliae picturae: propter hoc enim probatur in III de anima, quod intellectus possibilis potest omnia recipere, quia est sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum. Ergo non potest esse quod eorum quae cognoscit Angelus in verbo, aliquas similitudines habeat.	3. An angelic intellect is like a painted tablet, for, as said in The Causes, “every intellect is filled with forms.” Now, other pictures are not added to a tablet that is already painted; hence, it is proved in The Soul that the possible intellect can receive all things because it is “like a tablet on which nothing has been written.” Consequently, an angel cannot have any likenesses of those things which he knows in the Word.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod omnis cognitio est per assimilationem cognoscentis ad scitum. Quidquid autem similatur alicui secundum hoc quod illud est simile tertio, ipsum etiam est tertio simile; ut si filius similatur patri in hoc quod pater similatus est avo, et filius avo similatur. Dupliciter igitur aliquid alicui similatur: uno modo ex hoc quod similitudinem eius immediate ab eo accipit in se; alio modo ex hoc quod assimilatur alicui quod est simile ei. Et sic etiam dupliciter fit cognitio: cognoscimus enim per visum Socratem inquantum visus noster assimilatur ipsi Socrati, et etiam inquantum assimilatur imagini Socratis; et utraque istarum assimilationum sufficit ad cognoscendum Socratem.	All cognition takes place through an assimilation of the knower to the known. Now, whenever one thing is made like a second thing in so far as the second thing is like a third, then the first thing is also like the third. For example, if a son is like his father in so far as the father is like the grandfather, then the son is like the grandfather. Now, one thing can be made like another in two ways: it can get this likeness immediately from the other, or it can get it by being assimilated to a third thing which is like the second. Cognition is had in two ways, also: we can know Socrates by seeing him either because our sense of sight is made like Socrates himself or because it is made like a picture of Socrates. In either case, the assimilation is sufficient for us to know Socrates.
Dico ergo, quod quando aliqua res cognoscitur per similitudinem alterius rei, illa cognitio non fit per aliquam similitudinem aliam, quae sit immediate ipsius rei cognitae; et si cognoscens cognoscat unam et eamdem rem per similitudinem propriam et per similitudinem alterius rei, erunt diversae cognitiones. Quod sic patere potest. Est enim aliqua cognitiva potentia quae cognoscit tantum recipiendo, non autem aliquid ex receptis formando; sicut sensus simpliciter cognoscit illud cuius speciem recipit, et nihil aliud.	I say, therefore, that, when a thing is known by means of the likeness of a second thing, that knowledge does not take place by means of some other likeness derived immediately from the thing known; and if the knower knows one and the same thing by means of its own likeness and also by means of its likeness to another thing, then these cognitions are different. This can be explained as follows.
Aliqua vero potentia est quae non solum cognoscit, secundum quod recipit; sed etiam ex his quae recipit, potest aliquam aliam speciem formare; sicut patet in imaginatione, quae ex forma auri recepta et forma montis, format quoddam phantasma aurei montis. Et similiter est in intellectu, quia ex forma generis et differentiae comprehensis format quidditatem speciei. In huiusmodi igitur potentiis quando una res cognoscitur per similitudinem alterius rei, quandoque contingit quod praeter similitudinem illam formatur alia species, quae est rei immediate; sicut ex statua Herculis visa potest formare quamdam aliam similitudinem quae sit ipsius Herculis immediate; sed haec cognitio iam est alia ab illa qua cognoscebam Herculem in statua sua. Si enim esset eadem, tunc oporteret hoc accidere in qualibet alia potentia; quod manifeste falsum apparet. Cum enim visus exterior videt Herculem in statua sua, non fit cognitio per aliquam aliam similitudinem quam per similitudinem statuae.	Some knowing powers know only by receiving, not by forming something from what they have received. For example, the senses know merely those things whose species they receive and nothing more. Other powers, however, not only know what they receive, but can also form some other species from it. This is clearly the case of the imagination, which, having received the forms of gold and of mountain, forms a phantasm of a golden mountain. The same is true of the intellect, which, having comprehended the forms of genus and difference, forms the definition of a species. Consequently, when these powers know a thing through its likeness existing in another thing, it sometimes happens that a species other than that likeness is formed a species which belongs immediately to the thing. For example, when I have seen a statue of Hercules, I can form another likeness which will belong immediately to Hercules; but this second act of knowing will be other than that by which I knew Hercules by his statue. If it were the same, then the same thing would happen in all other powers—which is manifestly absurd, because, when my external sense of sight sees Hercules in a statue, that knowledge, does not take place through any other likeness than that of the statue.
Sic igitur dico, quod ipsa essentia divina est similitudo rerum omnium; et ideo intellectus Angeli res cognoscere potest et per similitudines ipsarum rerum, et per ipsam essentiam divinam. Sed illa cognitio qua cognoscet per similitudines ipsarum rerum, erit alia a cognitione qua cognoscit res per verbum; quamvis etiam illae similitudines causentur ex coniunctione intellectus angelici ad verbum, sive per operationem ipsius intellectus angelici, ut dictum est de imaginatione, sive, quod est verius, per influxum verbi.	Consequently, I say that the divine essence is itself a likeness of all things. Therefore, an angelic intellect can know things both through their likenesses and through the divine essence. But the act of knowledge by which it knows things through their likenesses is other than the act by which it knows things through the Word, even though those likenesses are caused by a conjunction of the angelic intellect to the Word either through operations of the angelic intellect (similar to those of the imagination) or, as seems more probable, through an outpouring from the Word.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod ex quo essentia divina est rerum similitudo quae cognoscuntur per verbum, intellectus angelicus essentiae divinae coniunctus, est rebus illis sufficienter assimilatus ad eas cognoscendas.	1. Since the divine essence is a likeness of the things known through the Word, the angelic intellect’s union with the divine essence makes it sufficiently assimilated to these things to know them.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod a verbo potest fieri impressio in intellectum Angeli; sed cognitio quae est per illam impressionem, est alia a cognitione quae est per verbum, ut dictum est.	2. The Word can imprint something on an angelic intellect, but, as was said, the knowledge that would result from this impression would be other than that which is had through the Word.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis gloria non destruat naturam, elevat tamen eam ad id quod per se non poterat, hoc est ad hoc quod videat res per ipsam essentiam Dei sine aliqua similitudine media in visione illa.	3. Even though the glory had in heaven does not destroy nature, it elevates it to a level which it could not reach by itself, namely, that level where it can see things through God’s very essence without any likeness acting as a medium in this vision.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod verbum non est alicuius rei forma intra, ita quod sit pars essentiae rei; est tamen intellectui forma intrinseca ut intelligibile per ipsum.	4. The Word is not the intrinsic form of a thing in the sense that it is part of a thing’s essence. It is, however, a form within the intellect, since it is intelligible of its very nature.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod Paulus postquam desiit essentiam Dei videre, memor fuit rerum quae in verbo cognoverat, per similitudines rerum apud se remanentes.	5. When Paul no longer saw God’s essence, he remembered the things he had known in the Word by means of likenesses of things that still remained with him.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod similitudines illae quae remanserunt post absentiam verbi, imprimebantur etiam quando verbum per essentiam videbat; sed tamen illa visio qua videbat per verbum, non erat per illas impressiones, ut ex dictis, in corp. art., patet.	6. Those likenesses which remained even when the Word had departed were imprinted when Paul saw the Word through His essence. But, as is clear from what has been said above, when Paul saw through the Word, the vision itself did not take place through these impressions.

---

ARTICLE VI In the sixth article we ask: Does an angel know himself? [ARTICLE S.T., I, 56, 1; C.G., II, 98; III De anima, lect. 9, n. 721 seq.; De causis, lect. 13 (P. 21:741 a).]
Sexto quaeritur utrum Angelus cognoscat seipsum	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non.	It seems not, for
Quia, ut dicit Dionysius, cap. VI caelestis hierarchiae, Angeli ignorant suas virtutes. Sed si cognoscerent se per essentiam, cognoscerent suas virtutes. Ergo Angelus suam essentiam non cognoscit.	1. As Dionysius says, angels do not know their own power. Now, if they knew themselves by means of their essence, they would know their power. Consequently, angels do not know their own essence.
Praeterea, si Angelus cognoscit seipsum, hoc non est per aliquam similitudinem, sed per essentiam suam: quia in his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed per essentiam suam se cognoscere non potest, quia illud quo intelligitur, est forma intellectus. Essentia autem Angeli non potest esse forma intellectus eius, cum magis intellectus insit essentiae ut proprietas quaedam, sive forma. Ergo Angelus nullo modo cognoscit se.	2. If an angel knows himself, he knows himself, not through a likeness, but through his own essence; for, as is said in The Soul, “in those beings which exist without matter, the knower and the known are one and the same.” But an angel cannot know himself by means of his own essence, since a thing is understood by means of a form within the intellect. Now, the essence of an angel cannot be the form of his own intellect, because the intellect itself inheres in his essence as its property or form. Consequently, an angel cannot know himself at all.
Praeterea, idem non potest esse agens et patiens, movens et motum, nisi hoc modo quod una pars eius sit movens vel agens, et alia mota vel passa; ut patet in animalibus, ut probatur in VIII Physic. Sed intelligens et intellectum se habent ut agens et patiens. Ergo non potest esse quod Angelus totum se intelligat.	3. The same thing cannot be both active and passive, mover and moved, unless one of its parts is a mover or active and its other part is moved or passive. This is clear in the case of animals, as is shown in the Physics. But the knower and the known are related as active and passive. Consequently, it is impossible for an angel to know all of himself.
Praeterea, si Angelus intelligit se per essentiam suam, oportet quod essentia sua sit actus intellectus eius. Sed nulla essentia per se subsistens potest esse actus alicuius, nisi sit actus purus: res enim materialis non potest esse alicuius forma; esse autem actum purum nulli essentiae convenit nisi divinae. Ergo Angelus non potest se per essentiam suam cognoscere.	4. If an angel understands himself through his own essence, his essence must be the act of his intellect. But, unless it is pure act, no subsisting essence can be the act of anything else, for a material thing cannot be the form of another thing. Now, pure act of being belongs only to the divine essence. Consequently, an angel cannot know himself through his own essence.
Praeterea, nihil intelligitur nisi secundum quod denudatur a materia et a conditionibus materialibus. Sed esse in potentia est quaedam materialis conditio, a qua Angelus denudari non potest. Ergo Angelus seipsum intelligere non potest.	5. A thing is understood only if it is stripped of matter and of the conditions of matter. But to be in potency is, in a way, a material condition which cannot be stripped from an angel. Consequently, an angel cannot understand himself.
Praeterea, si Angelus intelligit se per essentiam suam, oportet quod essentia sua sit in intellectu suo. Sed hoc esse non potest; quinimmo intellectus est in essentia: non enim potest esse aliquid esse in altero et e converso. Ergo Angelus non cognoscit se per essentiam suam.	6. If an angel understands himself through his own essence, his essence must be in his intellect. This, however, is impossible; for, as a matter of fact, his intellect is in his essence, and if one thing is in another, this other cannot be in it. Consequently, an angel does not know himself by means of his own essence.
Praeterea, intellectus Angeli habet potentiam admixtam. Nihil autem de potentia in actum reducitur a seipso. Cum ergo intellectus reducatur in actum cognitionis per ipsum cognoscibile, impossibile erit quod Angelus intelligat seipsum.	7. The intellect of an angel is mixed with potentiality. Now, nothing is reduced from potency to act by itself. Consequently, since an intellect is reduced to the act of knowing by the known, it will be impossible for an angel to understand himself.
Praeterea, nulla potentia habet efficaciam agendi nisi ab essentia in qua radicatur. Ergo intellectus Angeli est efficax ad intelligendum ex virtute essentiae suae. Sed non potest idem esse principium agendi et patiendi. Cum igitur id quod intelligitur, sit quodammodo ut passum, videtur quod Angelus essentiam suam cognoscere non possit.	8. Every potency has the perfection of its activity determined by the essence in which it is rooted. Consequently, an angelic intellect can understand because of the power of its essence. Now, the same thing cannot be a principle of acting and of being acted upon; and, since that which is understood is, in a way, acted upon, it seems that an angel cannot know his own essence.
Praeterea, demonstratio actus intellectus est. Sed non potest idem per idem demonstrari. Ergo non potest esse quod Angelus per essentiam suam intelligatur a se.	9. Demonstration is an intellectual act. But a thing cannot be demonstrated by means of itself. Therefore, an angel cannot understand himself by means of his essence.
Praeterea, qua ratione reflectitur in se intellectus, et affectus. Sed affectus Angeli non reflectitur in se nisi per dilectionem naturalem, quae est quidam naturalis habitus. Ergo nec Angelus se cognoscere potest nisi mediante aliquo habitu; et ita non cognoscit se per essentiam suam.	10. There is the same reason for holding that the will reflects upon itself as that the intellect does. But the will of an angel reflects upon itself only by means of its natural love, which is a kind of natural habit. Consequently, an angel can know himself only by means of some habit, and, therefore, he cannot know himself by means of his essence.
Praeterea, operatio cadit media inter agens et patiens. Sed intelligens et intellectum se habent ut agens et patiens. Cum igitur nihil cadat medium inter rem aliquam et seipsam, impossibile videtur quod Angelus seipsum intelligat.	11. Operation lies as a medium between what is active and what is passive. But the knower and the known are related as active and passive. Now, since there is nothing intermediate between a thing and itself, it seems impossible that an angel could know himself.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Quod potest virtus inferior, potest et superior, ut dicit Boetius. Sed anima nostra seipsam cognoscit. Ergo multo fortius Angelus.	1. As Boethius says, what a lower power can do a higher power can. But our soul can know itself. Therefore, it is even more true that an angel can know himself.
Praeterea, haec est ratio quare intellectus noster seipsum intelligit, non autem sensus, ut dicit Avicenna, quia sensus utitur organo corporali, non autem intellectus. Sed intellectus Angeli magis est separatus ab organo corporali quam etiam intellectus noster. Ergo Angelus etiam cognoscit seipsum.	2. As Avicenna says, the reason why our intellect, but not our senses, knows itself is that the senses use a physical organ but the intellect does not. Now, an angelic intellect is even further removed from a physical organ than our intellect is. Therefore, an angel also knows himself.
Praeterea, intellectus Angeli, cum sit deiformis, maxime assimilatur intellectui divino. Sed Deus se per essentiam suam cognoscit. Ergo et Angelus.	3. Since the intellect of an angel is godlike, it greatly resemble God’s intellect. But God knows Himself through His essence. There fore, an angel knows himself also through his essence.
Praeterea, quanto intelligibile est magis proportionatum intellectui, tanto magis potest ipsum cognoscere. Sed nullum intelligibile est magis proportionatum intellectui angelico quam sua essentia. Ergo essentiam suam maxime cognoscit.	4. The more proportionate an intelligible is to an intellect, the more the intellect can know it. Now, there is no intelligible more proportionate to an angelic intellect than its own essence. Therefore, it know its essence in a very high degree.
Praeterea, in Lib. de causis dicitur, quod omnis sciens scit essentiam suam, et redit ad essentiam suam reditione completa. Ergo et Angelus, cum sit sciens.	5. In The Causes it is said: “Whoever knows intellectually know his own essence, and returns to it in a complete reflection.” There fore, angels can do this, for they know intellectually.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod duplex est actio. Una quae procedit ab agente in rem exteriorem, quam transmutat; et haec est sicut illuminare, quae etiam proprie actio nominatur. Alia vero actio est, quae non procedit in rem exteriorem, sed stat in ipso agente ut perfectio ipsius; et haec proprie dicitur operatio, et haec est sicut lucere.	There are two types of action. One proceeds from the agent an goes out to an exterior thing, which it changes. An example of this type is illumination, which can properly be called an action. The second type of action does not go out to an exterior thing but remains in the agent as its perfection. Properly speaking, this is called operation. Shining is an example of this type.
Hae autem duae actiones in hoc conveniunt quod utraque non progreditur nisi ab existente in actu, secundum quod est actu; unde corpus non lucet nisi secundum quod habet lucem in actu; et similiter non illuminat.	Now, these two actions are at one in this, that both issue only from a thing which is actually existing and only in so far as it is in act. Consequently, a body does not shine unless it actually has light; and the same is true of illuminating action.
Actio autem appetitus et sensus et intellectus non est sicut actio progrediens in materiam exteriorem, sed sicut actio consistens in ipso agente, ut perfectio eius; et ideo oportet quidem quod intelligens, secundum quod intelligit, sit actu; non autem oportet quod in intelligendo intelligens sit ut agens, et intellectum ut passum. Sed intelligens et intellectum, prout ex eis est effectum unum quid, quod est intellectus in actu, sunt unum principium huius actus quod est intelligere.	The action of appetite, sense, and intellect is not, however, like the action that goes out to exterior matter; it is like the action that remain in the agent as its perfection. Consequently, in so far as he knows, a knower must be in act. It is not necessary, however, for the knower in knowing to become an efficient cause and for the known to become something passive; but inasmuch as one thing results from the knower and known, namely, an intellect in act, these two are but one principle of this act, which is understanding.
Et dico ex eis effici unum quid, inquantum intellectum coniungitur intelligenti sive per essentiam suam, sive per similitudinem. Unde intelligens non se habet ut agens vel ut patiens, nisi per accidens; inquantum scilicet ad hoc quod intelligibile uniatur intellectui, requiritur aliqua actio vel passio: actio quidem, secundum quod intellectus agens facit species esse intelligibiles actu; passio autem, secundum quod intellectus possibilis recipit species intelligibiles, et sensus species sensibiles. Sed hoc quod est intelligere, consequitur ad hanc passionem vel actionem, sicut effectus ad causam. Sicut ergo corpus lucidum lucet quando est lux actu in ipso, ita intellectus intelligit omne illud quod est actu intelligibile in ipso.	I say that one thing results from them inasmuch as what is understood is joined to the understanding either through its essence or through a likeness. Hence, a knower is not related as active or as passive except for another consideration; that is, activity or passivity is required to some extent in order that the intelligible be united to the intellect. Efficient causality is required, because the active intellect makes species actually intelligible; change is required because the possible intellect receives intelligible species, and the senses, sensible species. But understanding follows upon this change or efficient causality as an effect follows upon a cause. Consequently, just as a bright body shines when light actually exists in it, so also does the intellect understand everything that is actually intelligible in it.
Sciendum est igitur, quod nihil prohibet esse aliquid actu unum et in potentia alterum, sicut corpus diaphanum est actu quidem corpus, sed potentia tantum coloratum; et similiter possibile est esse aliquid actu ens, quod in genere intelligibilium est potentia tantum. Sicut enim est gradus actus et potentiae in entibus, quod aliquid est potentia tantum, ut materia prima; aliquid actu tantum, ut Deus; aliquid actu et potentia ut omnia intermedia; sic est in genere intelligibilium aliquid ut actu tantum, scilicet essentia divina; aliquid ut potentia tantum, ut intellectus possibilis; quod hoc modo se habet in ordine intelligibilium sicut materia prima in ordine sensibilium, sicut dicit Commentator in III de anima. Omnes autem substantiae angelicae sunt mediae, habentes aliquid de potentia et actu, non solum in genere entium, sed etiam in genere intelligibilium.	We must note, however, that there is no reason why a thing cannot be one thing actually and another potentially. For example, a transparent body is actually a body, but it is colored only potentially. Similarly, it is possible for a thing to be in act in the order of existence but only in potency in the order of intelligibility. Now, in beings there are grades of act and potency. One being, prime matter, is in potency only. Another, God, exists only actually. All other intermediate beings exist both actually and potentially. Similarly, in the genus of intelligibles, one being, the divine essence, is in act only; another, the possible intellect, is only in potency, and for this reason the Commentator says that the possible intellect in the order of intelligibles is like prime matter in the order of sensibles. All the angelic substances lie in between; for they have something of potency and of act, not only in the genus of being, but also in the genus of intelligibility.
Sicut igitur materia prima non potest agere aliquam actionem nisi perficiatur per formam; et tunc actio illa est quaedam emanatio ipsius formae magis quam materiae; res autem existentes actu possunt agere actiones, secundum quod sunt actu; ita intellectus possibilis noster nihil potest intelligere antequam perficiatur forma intelligibili in actu. Tunc enim intelligit rem cuius est illa forma; nec potest se intelligere nisi per formam intelligibilem actu in se existentem. Intellectus vero Angeli, quia habet essentiam suam quae est ut actus in genere intelligibilium, sibi praesentem, potest intelligere id quod est intelligibile apud ipsum, id est essentiam suam, non per aliquam similitudinem, sed per seipsam.	Now, prime matter cannot perform any action unless it is perfected by some form (and even then that action is a kind of emanation from the form rather than from the matter); because things that actually exist can perform actions only in so far as they are in act. Similarly, our possible intellect can understand nothing before it is brought into act by an intelligible form. Only then can it understand that thing to which this form belongs. Moreover, it can understand itself only by means of an intelligible form that actually exists in itself. But, since the essence of an angel, which is in act in the genus of intelligibility, is present to it, an angelic intellect can understand this intelligible reality within itself, namely, its own essence—and not through any likeness of it but through the essence itself.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod Angeli cognoscunt virtutem suam, secundum quod in se consideratur, eam comprehendendo; non autem eam comprehendunt secundum quod deducitur ab exemplari aeterno; hoc enim esset ipsum exemplar comprehendere.	1. Angels know their power by comprehending it as it is in itself. They do not comprehend it, however, in so far as it has been modeled upon the eternal archetype, for this would involve comprehension of the archetype itself
Ad secundum dicendum, quod essentia Angeli, quamvis non possit comparari ad intellectum eius ut actus ad potentiam in essendo, comparatur tamen ad ipsum ut actus ad potentiam in intelligendo.	2. Even though in the order of existence an angel’s essence cannot stand in the relation of act to potency with respect to his intellect, in the order of understanding it is related to it as act is to potency.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod intellectum et intelligens non se habent ut agens et patiens; sed ambo se habent ut unum agens, ut patet ex dictis, in corp. art., quamvis quantum ad modum loquendi videantur ut agens et patiens significari.	3. The knower and the known are not related as active and passive but as one principle of activity, as is clear from what has been said above, even though they may seem to be so related from our manner of speaking.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis essentia Angeli non sit actus purus, non tamen habet materiam partem sui; sed secundum hoc est in potentia quod esse non habet a seipso: et ideo nihil prohibet ipsum comparari ad intellectum ut actum in intelligendo.	4. Although an angel’s essence is not pure act, it nevertheless is without matter. It is in potency merely in this respect, that it does not have its act of existence from itself. Consequently, there is no reason why it cannot be related to an angelic intellect as act in the order of understanding.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod id quod intelligitur, non oportet denudari a qualibet materia. Constat enim quod formae naturales nunquam intelliguntur sine materia, cum materia in earum definitione cadat. Sed oportet quod denudetur a materia individuali, quae est materia determinatis dimensionibus substans; unde minus oportet quod separetur a potentia tali, qualis est in Angelis.	5. A thing that is understood need not be stripped entirely of matter; for it is evident that natural forms are never understood without matter, since matter is included in their definition. They must, however, be stripped of individual matter, that is, matter that lies under determinate dimensions. There is no reason, therefore, why angels need be separated from the kind of potency which they possess.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse in altero et illud in eo diversis modis, sicut totum in partibus, et e converso. Et similiter est in proposito: essentia enim Angeli est in intellectu eius sicut intelligibile in intelligente, intellectus autem in essentia sicut potentia in substantia.	6. There is no reason why one thing cannot be in a second and the second in the first if this is in different ways, such as the ways in which a whole is in its parts and the parts are in the whole. The same is true here: the essence of the angel is in his intellect as an intelligible is in a knower, and his intellect is in his essence as a power is in a substance.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod intellectus Angeli non est in potentia respectu essentiae suae, sed respectu eius est semper in actu. Respectu autem aliorum intelligibilium potest esse in potentia: nec tamen sequitur quod, quando intellectus est in potentia, quod per aliud agens reducatur in actum semper; sed solum quando est in potentia essentiali, sicut aliquis antequam addiscat. Quando autem est in potentia accidentali, sicut habens habitum dum non considerat, potest per seipsum exire in actum; nisi dicatur, quod reducitur in actum per voluntatem, qua movetur ad actu considerandum.	7. The intellect of an angel is not in potency with respect to his essence. In this respect, it is always in act. But with respect to other intelligible objects his intellect can be in potency. It does not follow, however, that when his intellect is in potency it is always reduced to act by some other agent. This is true only when it is in essential potency, as a person is before he learns something. When it is in accidental potency, the potency a person is in who has habitual knowledge but. is not using it—then it can go into act by itself, except, that it might be said that his intellect is reduced to act by his will, which moves it to actual consideration.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod illud quod intelligitur, non est ut passum, sed ut principium actionis, ut patet ex dictis, in corp. art., et ideo ratio non sequitur.	8. As is evident from what we have said above, that which is understood is not like something passive but like a principle of action. Consequently, the argument does not hold.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod aliquid potest esse cognitionis causa dupliciter. Uno modo ex parte ipsius cognoscibilis: et sic magis notum est causa cognoscendi minus notum. Et hoc modo medium demonstrationis est causa intelligendi. Alio modo ex parte cognoscentis: et sic causa cognitionis est illud quod facit cognoscibile esse actu in cognoscente. Et sic nihil prohibet aliquid per seipsum cognosci.	9. A thing can be the cause of knowing in two ways. First, it can be what is known. Thus, what is more known is the cause of cognizing what is less known; and in this way the medium of demonstration is a cause of understanding. Second, it can be the one who knows. Then the cause of knowledge is that which makes the intelligible to be present actually in the knower. Taken in this way, there is no reason why a thing cannot be known by means of itself.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod dilectio naturalis non est habitus, sed est actus.	10. Natural love is not a habit but an act.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod operatio intellectualis non est media secundum rem inter intelligens et intellectum, sed procedit ex utroque, secundum quod sunt unita.	11. The act of understanding is not a medium that stands as a reality between the knower and the known; it proceeds from the union of both.

---

ARTICLE VII In the seventh article we ask: Does one angel know another? [ARTICLE S.T., I, 56, 2; 107, 1; C.G., II, 98; II Sent., 11, 2, 3; In I Cor., c. 13, lect. 1 (P. 13:259b).
Septimo quaeritur utrum Angelus unus intelligat alium	Difficulties (First Series)
Et videtur quod non.	It seems not, for
Quia, ut dicit Dionysius VI cap. caelestis hierarchiae, etiam ipsi Angeli suam ordinationem ignorant. Sed si Angelus unus cognosceret alium, suam ordinationem scirent. Ergo unus alium non cognoscit.	1. As Dionysius says, even the angels themselves do not know their mutual relationships. Now, if one angel knew another, angels would know these. Consequently, one angel does not know another.
Praeterea, ut dicitur in libro de causis, omnis intelligentia scit quod est supra se, inquantum est causa ei, et quod est infra se, in quantum est causatum ab ea. Sed secundum fidem, non ponitur quod unus Angelus sit causa alterius. Ergo unus alium non cognoscit.	2. As is said in The Causes: “An intelligence knows what is above it in so far as that is its cause, and it knows what is below it in so far as that is its effect.” But our faith does not teach that one angel is the cause of another. Consequently, one angel does not know another.
Praeterea, sicut dicit Boetius, universale est dum intelligitur, singulare dum sentitur. Sed Angelus est quoddam singulare, cum sit persona. Cum igitur Angelus tantum per intellectum cognoscat, videtur quod Angelus Angelum non cognoscat.	3. As Boethius says: “The universal is had in intellection, the singular in sensation.” Now, since an angel is a person, he is, in a way, a singular. Consequently, it seems that one angel does not know another angel, because he knows merely through intellection.
	Difficulties (Second Series)
Item, videtur quod unus Angelus alium non cognoscat per essentiam Angeli cogniti. Id enim quo intellectus intelligit, oportet esse intrinsecum ipsi intellectui. Sed essentia unius Angeli non potest esse intra intellectum alterius, quia nihil illabitur menti nisi solus Deus. Ergo Angelus non potest cognoscere alium Angelum per essentiam eius.	1. It seems that an angel does not know another angel by means of the latter’s essence, because that by which the intellect understands must be within the intellect. But the essence of one angel cannot come into the intellect of another; only God can be substantially present in the mind of an angel. Consequently, an angel cannot know another angel by means of the latter’s essence.
Praeterea, possibile est unum Angelum cognosci ab omnibus Angelis. Id autem quo aliquid cognoscitur, est coniunctum ipsi cognoscenti. Si ergo Angelus cognosceret alium per essentiam Angeli cogniti, oporteret quod Angelus cognitus esset in pluribus locis, cum Angeli cognoscentes in pluribus locis sint.	2. It is possible for one angel to be known by all angels. Now, that by which a thing is known is joined to the one who knows. So if one angel were to know another angel by means of the latter’s essence, then the angel known could be in many places, because the angels who could know him might be in many places.
Praeterea, Angeli essentia substantia quaedam est; intellectus autem accidens, cum sit potentia quaedam. Sed substantia non est forma accidentis. Ergo essentia unius Angeli non potest esse intellectui alterius forma, qua intelligat.	3. The essence of an angel is a substance; his intellect, being a power, is an accident. Now, a substance is not the form of an accident. Consequently, the essence of one angel cannot be for the intellect of another angel the form by which he knows.
Praeterea, nihil cognoscitur ab intellectu per sui praesentiam quod est separatum ab eo. Sed essentia unius Angeli est separata ab intellectu alterius. Ergo unus Angelus ab alio non cognoscitur per essentiae suae praesentiam.	4. A thing cannot be known to the intellect by its presence if it is separated from it. But the essence of one angel is separated from the intellect of another. Consequently, one angel is not known by another through the presence of his essence.
	Difficulties (Third Series)
Item, videtur quod unus Angelus per essentiam sui cognoscentis non possit alium cognoscere. Sicut enim superioribus Angelis subsunt inferiores, ita et sensibiles creaturae. Si ergo superior Angelus cognoscendo essentiam suam cognoscat alios Angelos, eadem ratione et per essentiam suam cognoscet omnes res sensibiles, et non per aliquas formas, ut dicitur in Lib. de causis.	1. It seems that one angel cannot know another by knowing through his own essence, because the lower angels lie below the higher, as sentient creatures also do. Consequently, if a higher angel could know other angels by knowing his own essence, he could also know all sentient things in the same way, and not, as is said in The Causes, by means of forms.
Praeterea, nihil ducit in cognitionem alterius nisi quod habet similitudinem cum eo. Sed essentia unius Angeli non convenit cum alio nisi in genere. Si igitur unus alium cognoscat solum per essentiam sui cognoscentis, non cognoscet eum nisi in genere; quod est imperfecte cognoscere.	2. One thing leads to the knowledge of another only in so far as it resembles that other. But the essence of one angel is only in generic agreement with that of another angel. Consequently, if one angel were to know another merely by knowing his own essence, then he would know that other only generically, and this would be imperfect knowledge.
Praeterea, illud per quod aliquid cognoscitur, est ratio ipsius. Si ergo unus Angelus per essentiam suam omnes alios cognoscat, essentia sua erit ratio propria omnium; quod videtur soli divinae essentiae convenire.	3. That through which a thing is known is an intelligible representation of it. Now, if one angel knew all others by means of his own essence, then his own essence would be an intelligible representation of what is proper to all angels. But this property seems to belong to the divine essence alone.
	Difficulties (Fourth Series)
Item, videtur quod unus Angelus non cognoscat alium per similitudinem sive per speciem aliquam in se existentem: quia, ut dicit Dionysius, Angeli sunt divina lumina. Sed lumen non cognoscitur per aliquam speciem, sed per se ipsum. Ergo nec Angelus.	1. It seems that one angel does not know another by means of a likeness or species existing within himself, because, as Dionysius says, angels are lofty intelligible lights. Now, a light is not known by means of a species, but only by means of itself. Therefore, an angel cannot be known by means of a species.
Praeterea, omnis creatura tenebra est, ut patet per Origenem, super id Ioan., I, 5: et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt. Sed similitudo tenebrae oportet quod sit tenebra; tenebra autem non est principium manifestationis, sed occultationis. Cum igitur Angelus sit creatura, et sic tenebra, non poterit cognosci per suam similitudinem. Sed si cognoscitur, oportet quod cognoscatur per lumen divinum existens in ipso.	2. Every creature is a shadow. This is evident from Origen’s commentary on that verse in the Gospel of St. John (1:5): “And the darkness [shadows] did not comprehend it.” Now, a likeness of a shadow must itself be a shadow; a shadow, however, is not a principle that manifests but one that conceals. Hence, since an angel is a creature and is therefore a shadow, he cannot be known by means of a likeness. If he is known, he must be known by means of a God-given light existing within him.
Praeterea, Angelus est Deo propinquior quam rationalis anima. Sed secundum Augustinum, anima cognoscit omnia, et iudicat de omnibus, secundum connexionem quam habet ad rationes aeternas, non per aliquas artes quas secum ad corpus detulerit. Ergo multo fortius Angelus non cognoscit alium Angelum per similitudinem eius, sed per rationem aeternam.	3. An angel is closer to God than the rational soul is. Now, according to Augustine, the soul knows all things and judges about all things, not by means of any arts which the soul may have brought with it to the body, but by means of the connection it has with the eternal intelligible representations. Much more so, then, will one angel know another, not indeed by means of a likeness, but by means of an eternal intelligible representation.
	Difficulties (Fifth Series)
Item, videtur quod nec per similitudinem innatam. Quia aequaliter similitudo innata se habet ad praesens et distans. Si igitur unus Angelus alium cognoscat per similitudinem innatam, non cognoscet de eo quando erit praesens, et quando distans.	1. It seems that one angel cannot know another even through an innate likeness. For an innate likeness is similarly related to what is present and to what is absent. Consequently, were one angel to know another by means of an innate likeness, he would not know when that angel was present and when he was absent.
Praeterea, Deus potest de novo facere unum Angelum. Sed Angeli qui non est, formam non habet penes se. Si ergo Angelus naturali cognitione non cognoscit alium Angelum nisi per formam innatam, Angeli qui modo sunt non cognoscerent naturali cognitione Angelum qui de novo fieret.	2. God could make another angel. But an angel would not have within him the form of an angel that does not yet exist. Consequently, if, by his natural cognition, an angel knows other angels only by means of innate forms, the angels that exist now would not know by natural cognition an angel that would come into existence later.
	Difficulties (Sixth Series)
Item, videtur quod nec per formas impressas ab intelligibilibus, sicut sensus per formas impressas a sensibilibus, quia secundum hoc inferiores Angeli non cognoscerentur a superioribus, cum non possint imprimere in eos.	1. It seems that one angel cannot know another through forms impressed by immaterial beings, as the sense knows through forms received from sensible things, because, if this were true, then the lower angels would not be known by the higher, since higher angels do not receive any influence from the lower.
	Difficulties (Seventh Series)
Item videtur quod nec per formas abstractas, sicut intellectus agens abstrahit a phantasmatibus, quia sic inferiores non cognoscerent superiores.	1. It seems that one angel cannot know another even through abstracted forms, such as the agent intellect abstracts from phantasms, because then the lower angels would not know the higher.
Ex quibus omnibus videtur quod unus Angelus alium non cognoscat.	From all this it seems that one angel does not know another.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary (First Series)
In libro de causis dicitur: omnis intelligentia scit res quae non corrumpuntur nec cadunt in tempore. Sed Angeli sunt incorruptibiles et supra tempus. Ergo unus Angelus ab alio cognoscitur.	1. In The Causes we read: “Every intelligence knows the things that do not undergo corruption and are not measured by time.” Now, angels are incorruptible and outside of time. Consequently, one angel is known by another.
Praeterea, similitudo est causa cognitionis. Sed cum intellectu unius Angeli magis convenit alius Angelus quam res materiales. Cum ergo Angeli res materiales cognoscant, multo fortius unus Angelus alium cognoscit.	2. Likeness is a cause of knowledge. But one angel has more in common with the intellect of another than material things have. Consequently, since angels know material things, it is even truer to say they know other angels.
Praeterea, intellectui unius Angeli magis est proportionata essentia alterius Angeli quam essentia divina. Ergo, cum Angeli videant Deum per essentiam, multo fortius unus Angelus alterius essentiam cognoscere potest.	3. The essence of one angel is more proportionate to the intellect of another than the divine essence is. But, since angels see God through His essence, it is even truer to say that they can know the essences of other angels.
Praeterea, ut dicitur in Lib. de intelligentiis, omnis substantia immaterialis et immixta est omnium cognoscitiva. Et haec probatur ex hoc quod habetur III de anima, quod intellectus est immixtus, ut omnia cognoscat. Sed esse immateriales et immixtos maxime convenit Angelis. Ergo ipsi omnia cognoscunt, et ita unus alium.	4. As is said in The Intelligences: “Any substance that is immaterial and free from composition can know all things”; and this is proved in The Soul, where it is shown that the intellect is free from composition “and so can know all things.” Now, to be free from matter and composition belongs especially to angels. Consequently, they know all things, and one knows another.
	To the Contrary (Second Series)
Item, videtur quod unus Angelus alium cognoscat per essentiam Angeli cogniti. Augustinus enim dicit, XII super Genesim ad litteram, quod Angeli sua visa demonstrant per commixtionem spiritus. Sed commixtio non potest esse nisi unus spiritus alii per essentiam coniungatur. Ergo unus Angelus potest alii per essentiam coniungi; et ita per essentiam suam ab alio cognosci.	1. It seems that one angel can know another by means of the latter’s essence. For Augustine says that angels show what they have seen “by one spirit mingling with another.” But such a mingling is possible only if one spirit can be joined to another by means of his essence. Consequently, one angel can be joined to another by means of his essence, and thus, through his essence, be known by that other.
Praeterea, cognitio est actus quidam. Ad actionem autem sufficit contactus. Ergo, cum inter unum Angelum et alium possit esse spiritualis contactus, unus alium per essentiam suam cognoscere poterit.	2. Knowledge is an act. Now, contact is sufficient for action. Since there can be spiritual contact between one angel and another, one angel can know another by means of the latter’s essence.
Praeterea, magis convenit intellectus unius Angeli cum essentia alterius Angeli, quam cum similitudine rei naturalis. Sed intellectus Angeli potest informari similitudine rei ad cognoscendam rem materialem. Ergo et essentia alterius Angeli potest esse forma intellectus angelici qua alium Angelum cognoscat.	3. The intellect of one angel has more in common with the essence of another angel than with the likeness of a material thing. But the intellect of an angel can be informed by the likeness of a material thing so that it knows it. Consequently, the essence of one angel can be the form whereby the intellect of another can know him.
Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, Lib. XII super Genesim ad Litt., intellectualis visio est earum rerum quarum similitudines non sunt aliud quam earum essentiae. Sed unus Angelus non cognoscit alium nisi intellectuali visione. Ergo non cognoscit eum per similitudinem quae sit aliud quam eius essentia; et sic idem quod prius.	4. According to Augustine, intellectual vision is had of those things whose likenesses are the same as their essences. Now, one angel knows another only by means of intellectual vision. Consequently, he does not know that angel by means of a likeness other than that angel’s essence. Hence, the same must be said as was said previously.
	REPLY
Responsio. Dicendum, quod unus Angelus absque dubio alium cognoscit, cum quilibet Angelus sit substantia intelligibilis in actu per hoc quod est a materia immunis. Intellectus autem angelicus non accipit a sensibilibus; et ideo in ipsas formas intelligibiles et immateriales fertur, eas intelligendo. Sed de modo cognitionis videtur esse diversitas in sententia, consideratis diversorum dictis.	There can be no doubt that one angel knows another, because every angel is an actually intelligible substance, since he is entirely free from matter. Now, an angelic intellect does not receive from sensible things. Consequently, it understands these immaterial intelligible forms by directing itself immediately to them. If we consider what various writers have said, however, there seem to have been different opinions about the mode of angelic knowledge.
Commentator enim in XI Metaphys. dicit, quod in substantiis separatis a materia non differt forma quae est in intellectu, a forma quae est extra intellectum. Quod enim apud nos forma domus quae est in mente artificis, sit aliud a forma domus quae est extra, procedit ex hoc quod forma exterior est in materia, forma autem artis est sine materia: et secundum hoc, cum Angeli sint substantiae et formae immateriales, ut Dionysius dicit, videtur sequi quod forma qua unus Angelus intelligitur ab alio, sit idem quod essentia eius, qua in se subsistit. Sed istud non videtur esse possibile universaliter. Forma enim qua intellectus intelligit, cum sit intellectus perfectio, est nobilior intellectu; et propter hoc philosophus in XI Metaph., probat quod Deus non intelligit aliquid extra se, quia illud perficeret intellectum eius et esset eo nobilius. Si igitur superiores Angeli intelligerent inferiores per essentiam inferiorum, sequeretur quod inferiorum essentiae essent perfectiores intellectibus superiorum, et eis nobiliores; quod est impossibile.	According to the Commentator, in substances separated from matter the form in the intellect does not differ from the form outside of it. Now, in the case of men the form of a house existing in the mind of an architect is other than the form of the house existing outside his mind; however, this is because the exterior form is in matter, while the form of the artistic conception is without matter. But, since angels are substances and immaterial forms, as Dionysius says, it seems to follow that the form by which one angel is known by another is the same as the essence by which the former substantially exists. This mode of knowledge, however, does not seem to be possible in all cases. For the form by which an intellect understands is more noble than that intellect, since it is its perfection. With this in mind, the Philosopher proves that God does not know anything outside Himself, since its form would perfect His intellect and consequently be more noble than’ God Himself. Therefore, if higher angels were to know lower angels by means of the essences of the latter, it would follow that these essences were more perfect and more noble than the intellects of the higher angels. This, however, is impossible.
Posset autem forte dici quod hic modus est conveniens quantum ad modum intelligendi quo inferiores intelligunt superiores, ut scilicet inferior superiorem intelligat per essentiam superioris. Et huic videntur consonare verba Dionysii, IV cap. de divinis nominibus, ubi Angelos distinguere videtur in intelligibiles et intellectuales substantias; superiores quidem intelligibiles vocans, inferiores autem intellectuales; ubi etiam dicit, quod inferioribus sunt superiores ut cibus; quod videtur posse intelligi hoc modo, inquantum scilicet superiorum essentiae sunt formae quibus inferiores intelligunt.	One might say, perhaps, that such a way would present no Difficulties as far as the knowledge of higher angels by the lower is concerned, that is, a lower angel could know a higher by means of the latter’s essence; and this seems to be in agreement with Dionysius, who taught that angels seem to be divided into “intelligible and intellectual substances,” the higher called intelligible, the lower, intellectual. For he also taught that the higher angels are “like food” to the lower, and this statement can be understood as meaning that the essences of the higher angels are forms by which the lower angels understand.
Sed haec via fortassis posset sustineri apud philosophos, qui posuerunt superiores intelligentias esse inferiorum creatrices. Sic enim poterant ponere quodammodo quod superior Angelus inferiori intimus esset, quasi causa conservans eum in esse; quod quidem apud nos dici non potest nisi de solo Deo, qui mentibus angelicis et humanis illabitur. Forma autem qua intellectus intelligit, oportet quod sit intra intellectum intelligentem in actu; unde non potest dici de aliqua substantia spirituali, quod per essentiam suam ab alio videatur, nisi de solo Deo.	This opinion, too, might be supported by those philosophers who say that the higher intelligences create the lower; for thus they could assert that a higher angel is in some way intimately linked with the lower, being, as it were, the cause that keeps the lower in existence. We, however, can ascribe such action only to God, who is substantially present in the minds of men and of angels. Moreover, the form by which an intellect understands should be within an intellect that is in act. Consequently, we cannot say that any spiritual substance, except God, is seen by another by means of his essence.
Quod etiam philosophorum opinio non fuerit, quod Angelus per essentiam suam ab alio videatur, hoc manifeste patet eorum dicta intuenti. Dicit enim Commentator in XI Metaphys., quod illud quod intelligit motor orbis Saturni de motore primi orbis, est aliud ab eo quod intelligit de ipso motor orbis Iovis. Quod non potest esse verum nisi quantum ad id quo uterque intelligit. Et hoc non esset, si uterque intelligeret motorem orbis superioris per essentiam eius. In commento etiam libri de causis, dicitur, quod intelligentia inferior scit quod est supra se, per modum substantiae suae, et non per modum substantiae superioris. Avicenna etiam in sua metaphysica dicit, quod intelligentias esse in nobis nihil est aliud quam impressiones earum in nobis esse; non quod per essentiam suam sint in intellectu.	That other philosophers did not think one angel could be seen by another by means of his essence is clear to anyone reading their works. For example, the Commentator says that that which the mover of Saturn understands about the mover of the first sphere is different from that which the mover of Jupiter understands about him. Now, this could be true only if that by which each of them understands [is different]. And this would not be possible if each of them knew t mover of the higher sphere by means of the latter’s essence. Moreover, we read in The Causes that “a lower intelligence knows what is above it according to the manner of its own substance,” not according to the manner of the higher substance; and Avicenna says that “the presence of the intelligences within us” means merely the effects they have caused within us, not that they are in the intellect through their own essence.
Quod vero supra inductum est ex verbis Commentatoris in XI Metaph., intelligendum est, quando aliqua substantia separata a materia intelligit seipsam. Tunc enim non oportet quod sit aliud forma in intellectu, et forma qua res in se subsistit; eo quod ipsa forma, qua talis res in se subsistit, est intelligibilis in actu propter immunitatem suam a materia.	Now, the words of the Commentator, cited above, are to be taken in the following way. When a substance separated from matter know itself, it is not necessary that the form in its intellect be other than the form by which it substantially subsists, since the form by which such a thing substantially subsists is actually intelligible because of its complete freedom from matter.
Dionysii etiam verba non sunt secundum hunc intellectum accipienda; sed eosdem vocat intelligibiles et intellectuales, vel superiores vocat intelligibiles et inferiorum cibum, inquantum in eorum lumine inferiores intelligunt.	The words of Dionysius are likewise not to be taken in the sense assigned to them above. Rather, he calls the same angels intelligible and intellectual, or he calls the higher angels intelligible and the food of the lower because the lower angels understand by means of the light given by the higher.
Ex aliorum autem dictis videtur quod Angelus per essentiam suam, id est videntis, alium Angelum videat. Et hoc videtur ex verbis Augustini, X de Trinitate, ubi dicit sic: mens ipsa sicut corporearum rerum notitias per corporis sensus colligit, ita et incorporearum per semetipsam. Ex quo videtur etiam similiter de mente Angeli, quod cognoscendo seipsam, cognoscat alios Angelos. Huic etiam videtur attestari quod dicitur in libro de causis, quod intelligentia intelligit quod est supra se et infra se, per modum substantiae suae.	From what others have written, however, it seems that one angel sees another by means of his essence, that is, by means of his own essence. This is what Augustine seems to have intended when he wrote: “As the mind collects notions of physical things through the physical senses, so also does it collect notions of spiritual things through itself.” This seems to be true of an angelic mind, for, by knowing itself, it knows other angels. In support of this, one could cite The Causes where it is said, “An intelligence understands what is above and below itself by means of the mode of its own substance.”
Sed istud non videtur sufficere: cum enim omnis cognitio sit per assimilationem, Angelus per essentiam suam non potest de alio Angelo plus cognoscere quam hoc in quo essentiae suae est similis. Unus autem Angelus alteri Angelo non similatur nisi in natura communi: et sic sequeretur quod unus alium non cognosceret cognitione completa, et praecipue quantum ad illos qui ponunt plures Angelos esse unius speciei. Quantum enim ad illos qui ponunt omnes Angelos specie ab invicem differre, forte posset aliquo modo sustineri modus iste. Quilibet enim Angelus cognoscendo essentiam suam, cognoscit perfecte intellectualem naturam. Cognita autem natura intellectuali perfecte, cognoscuntur omnes gradus naturae intellectualis. Diversae autem species in Angelis non distinguuntur nisi secundum gradus perfectionis intellectualis naturae. Et secundum hoc, unus Angelus essentiam suam videns, concipit singulos gradus naturae intellectualis, et per huiusmodi conceptiones de omnibus aliis Angelis completam cognitionem habet.	This explanation does not seem to be sufficient, however; for, since all knowledge takes place through assimilation, by knowing his own essence one angel would know only as much about another angel as his essence resembled the latter’s. Now, one angel resembles another only according to their common nature. Hence, it would follow that the knowledge one angel would have about another would not be complete; and it would be very incomplete according to the opinion of those who hold that there are many angels in one species. This view, however, might be supported to some extent by those who hold that each angel is specifically different; for, by knowing his own essence, each angel would know perfectly what an intellectual nature is, and, having known this perfectly, he would know all the grades an intellectual nature could have. Now, the different species of angels are distinguished only according to grades of perfection found in intellectual natures; consequently, by seeing his own essence, one angel could conceive of the individual grades of perfection found in intellectual natures, and, by means of these conceptions, have complete knowledge of all other angels.
Et sic potest salvari quod alii quidam dicunt, quod unus cognoscit alium per formam acquisitam, ut praedicta conceptio forma acquisita dicatur; sicut si albedo seipsam intelligeret, perfecte cognosceret naturam coloris, et per consequens omnes species colorum secundum gradus coloris distincte, et ulterius etiam omnes individuos colores, si in una specie non esset nisi unum individuum.	In this way, we could save the opinion of those who say that one angel knows another by means of a form he has acquired—if, indeed, the afore-mentioned conceptions could be called acquired forms. It would be as though whiteness understood itself, and, by knowing perfectly the nature of color, knew all species of color distinctly, according to their grades—even all individual colors, too, supposing that there were only one member to a species.
Sed adhuc etiam hic modus non videtur sufficere. Quamvis enim in una specie non sit nisi unus Angelus, tamen in Angelo alicuius speciei aliud erit quod ei conveniet ex ratione suae speciei, et aliud quod ei conveniet inquantum est quoddam individuum, sicut operationes particulares ipsius; et has secundum modum praedictum alius Angelus de eo cognoscere nullatenus posset. Auctoritas autem Augustini, non sonat quod mens per seipsam sicut per medium cognoscendi cognoscat alia, sed sicut per potentiam cognoscitivam: sic enim et per sensus corporalia cognoscit.	But this explanation does not seem sufficient either, because, even though there is only one angel in every species, nevertheless, in any particular angel there will be a difference between what belongs to him according to the intelligible constitution of his specific nature and what belongs to him as an individual, for example, his own particular operations. According to this theory, these special operations could in no way be known by another angel. Moreover, the words of Augustine do not mean that a mind can know other things through itself as through a medium, but merely as through a knowing power, as material things are known through the senses.
Unde alius modus est eligendus: ut dicatur, quod unus Angelus alios cognoscit per similitudines eorum in intellectu eius existentes; non quidem abstractas, aut impressas ab alio Angelo, vel aliquo modo acquisitas, sed a creatione divinitus impressas; sicut et res materiales per huiusmodi similitudines cognoscit: et hoc magis per sequentia patebit.	We must consequently take another explanation and say that one angel knows other angels by means of their likenesses existing within his intellect. These, however, are not abstracted or imprinted by the other angels, or acquired in any way, but are imprinted by God who creates them. Angels know material things also by means of these likenesses. This will become clearer in the following answers.
	Answers to Difficulties (First Series)
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod ordinationem suam in se consideratam Angeli cognoscunt, non autem comprehendunt eam secundum quod providentiae divinae substat; hoc enim esset ipsam providentiam comprehendere.	1. Angels know their order one to another considered in itself, but they do not comprehend it as it stands under God’s providence; for this would mean that they could comprehend providence itself.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio causae et causati non est ratio cognitionis, nisi quatenus causatum habet similitudinem suae causae, et e converso. Unde si in uno Angelo ponamus similitudinem alterius, praeter hoc quod sit causa vel causatum eius, remanebit sufficiens ratio cognitionis, cum cognitio sit per assimilationem.	2. The relation of cause and effect is a source of intelligibility only inasmuch as the effect bears some resemblance to its cause and vice versa. Consequently, if we admit the existence of an angel’s likeness within another angel without admitting that one angel is the cause or effect of another, we will still have a sufficient basis for knowledge, since knowledge takes place through assimilation.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod auctoritas Boetii intelligitur de particularibus materialibus quae sensui substant: huiusmodi autem particulare non est Angelus; et ideo ratio non sequitur.	3. That statement of Boethius should be understood as referring to particular material things that fall under the senses. An angel, however, is not a particular of this type. Consequently, the argument proves nothing.
	Answers to Difficulties (Second and Third Series)
Rationes autem illas quae probant quod Angelus non cognoscat alium Angelum per essentiam Angeli visi vel videntis, concedimus; quamvis ad eas posset responderi aliquo modo.	We concede those arguments that prove one angel does not know another by means of either his own essence or that of the other angel Still, one could make some kind of a reply to them.
	Answers to Difficulties (Fourth Series)
Ad rationes vero illas quae probant quod unus Angelus alium per similitudinem non cognoscit, respondendum est.	We must reply, however, to those arguments that prove one angel does not know another by means of a likeness.
Ad quarum primam dicendum, quod etiam luminis possibile est esse similitudinem aliquam, vel eo deficientiorem, sicut quaedam similitudo eius est color, vel etiam perfectiorem, sicut lux in substantia illuminante. Similiter etiam, cum Angeli dicantur lumina inquantum sunt formae actu intelligibiles, non est inconveniens quod eorum similitudines sint per modum sublimiorem in superioribus, et per modum inferiorem in inferioribus.	1. It is possible to have a likeness even of light. This can be weaker than light, like color, which in a certain sense is a similitude of light, or one more perfect than light, like the light in a substance that illumines. Moreover, since angels are called lights inasmuch as they are forms which are actually intelligible, it is not inconsistent to say that the likenesses they have of other angels exist in a more sublime manner in the higher angels and in a less sublime manner in the lower.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum dicitur quod omnis creatura est tenebra, vel falsa, vel nihil, in se considerata; non est intelligendum quod essentia sua sit tenebra vel falsitas, sed quia non habet nec esse nec lucem nec veritatem nisi ab alio; unde si consideretur sine hoc quod ab alio habet, est nihil et tenebra et falsitas.	2. When one says that every creature, taken in itself, is a shadow or false or nothing, this is not because its essence is dark or false, but because whatever act of existence, light, or truth it has it has from another being. Consequently, only considered apart from what it has from another is it nothing, darkness, and falsity.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod anima connectitur rationibus aeternis inquantum impressio quaedam rationum aeternarum est in mente nostra, sicut sunt principia naturaliter cognita, per quae de omnibus iudicat; et huiusmodi etiam impressiones sunt in Angelis similitudines rerum per quas cognoscunt.	3. The soul is united with the eternal representations inasmuch as there are certain imprints of these on our mind, such as the principles we know naturally and by which we judge all things. In angels these imprints are the likenesses by which they know things.
	Answers to Difficulties (Fifth Series)
Ad quartum dicendum, quod Angelus non cognoscit alium Angelum per similitudinem vel abstractam vel impressam, sed per similitudinem innatam, per quam ducitur in cognitionem alterius Angeli, non solum quantum ad essentiam eius, sed etiam quantum ad omnia accidentia eius. Et ideo per eam scit quando Angelus est distans vel praesens.	1. An angel knows another angel, not by means of a likeness that has been abstracted or imprinted upon his mind, but by means of one that is innate and leads him to the knowledge of the other angel—indeed, to a knowledge not only of the other's essence but also of all his accidental qualities. By means of this likeness, therefore, he knows when the other angel is present or absent.
	[No answers are given for the next three Difficulties.]
	Answers to Contrary Difficulties (First Series)
Rationes autem probantes quod unus Angelus alium cognoscit, concedimus.	We concede the arguments proving that one angel knows another.
	Answers to Contrary Difficulties (Second Series)
Ad rationes vero probantes quod Angelus cognoscitur per essentiam suam ab alio Angelo, respondendum est.	We must reply, however, to the arguments proving that one angel is known by another by means of the essence of the angel known.
Ad quarum primam dicendum, quod illa cognitio de qua Augustinus loquitur, non intelligitur quantum ad essentiam, sed quantum ad operationem, secundum quod superior spiritus illuminat inferiorem.	1. That knowledge Augustine speaks about should be understood as referring not to essences but to operations by which a higher spirit enlightens a lower.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod cognoscens et cognitum non se habent sicut agens et patiens, ut ex dictis, art. 6, ad 5 et in corp. art., patet, sed sicut duo ex quibus fit unum cognitionis principium; et ideo non sufficit ad cognitionem contactus inter cognoscens et cognoscibile; sed oportet quod cognoscibile cognoscenti uniatur ut forma, vel per essentiam suam, vel per similitudinem suam.	2. From what we have said previously, it is clear that the knower and the known are related not as active and passive but as two things from which arises one principle of knowing. Consequently, for knowledge it is not enough that contact take place between the knower and the known. It is necessary, rather, that the intelligible be united to the knower like a form, either by means of its own essence or by means of a likeness.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis essentia Angeli magis conveniat cum intellectu Angeli alterius quam similitudo rei materialis secundum participationem naturae unius, non tamen secundum convenientiam habitudinis quae requiritur inter perfectionem et perfectibile; sicut etiam una anima magis convenit cum alia anima quam cum corpore, et tamen una anima non est forma alterius animae, sicut est corporis.	3. Even though the essence of one angel has more in common with the intellect of another angel than with the likeness of a material thing, because they both participate in one nature, nevertheless, they do not have more in common in regard to that relationship which must exist between a perfection and what is to be perfected. Similarly, a soul has more in common with another soul than it has with a body; yet one soul is not the form of another soul, though it is the form of a body.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod auctoritas Augustini potest dupliciter exponi. Uno modo ut dicatur, quod Augustinus loquitur de illa visione intellectuali qua spiritus creatus videt seipsum vel Deum vel alia quae in ipso sunt per essentiam suam: constat enim quod lapis per essentiam suam non est in anima, quamvis ab anima intelligatur.	4. This statement of Augustine can be explained in two ways. It can mean that Augustine is talking about that intellectual vision by which a created spirit sees himself or God or other things which are within him through their essences. For it is evident that, even though a stone is known by the soul, it is not present in the soul by its essence.
Alio modo potest exponi ut referatur ad obiectum cognitionis, non ad formam qua cognoscitur. Sensus enim et imaginationis obiectum sunt exteriora accidentia, quae sunt similitudines rei, et non res ipsa. Sed obiectum intellectus est quod quid est, id est ipsa essentia rei, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et sic similitudo rei quae est in intellectu, est similitudo directe essentiae eius; similitudo autem quae est in sensu vel imaginatione, est similitudo accidentium eius.	Or this statement can be taken as referring to the thing known, not to the form by which it is known. Now, exterior accidents, which are the object of sense and of imagination, are merely likenesses of a thing, not the thing itself. The object of the intellect, however, is “the quiddity of a thing,” that is, its essence, as is said in The Soul. Consequently, the likeness of the thing in the intellect is a direct likeness of the thing’s essence, but the likeness which is in a sense or in the imagination is merely that of its accidents.

---

ARTICLE VIII In the eighth article we ask: Does an angel know material things through forms or by knowing his own essence? [ARTICLE De ver., 10, 4; S.T., I, 55, 1; 84, 2; 87, 1; I-II, 50, 6; 51, 1, ad 2; II Sent., 3, 39 1; C.G., II, 98.]
Octavo quaeritur utrum Angelus res materiales cognoscat per formas aliquas, an per essentiam sui cognoscentis	Difficulties
Et videtur quod per essentiam sui.	It seems that he knows them by knowing his own essence, for
Unaquaeque enim res sufficienter cognoscitur in suo exemplari. Sed in cap. V de divinis nominibus inducitur Clementis philosophi opinio, qui dixit, quod superiora in entibus sunt inferiorum exemplaria; et sic essentia Angeli est exemplar rerum materialium. Ergo Angeli cognoscunt materialia per essentiam suam.	1. A thing can be known sufficiently by knowing what it is modeled upon. Now, in the opinion of Clement, a philosopher mentioned in The Divine Names, lower beings are modeled upon higher. Consequently, the essences of material things are modeled upon angels. Angels, therefore, know material things by means of their own essences.
Praeterea, res materiales melius cognoscuntur in essentia divina quam in propriis naturis, quia clarius ibi relucent. Sed essentia Angeli est propinquior divinae essentiae quam res materiales. Ergo melius possunt cognosci in essentia Angeli quam in propriis naturis. Cum ergo eas nos in propriis naturis cognoscamus, multo fortius Angeli essentiam suam intuentes, omnia materialia cognoscunt.	2. Material things are known better in the divine essence than they are in their own natures, because there they shine forth more brightly. Now, the essence of an angel is closer to the divine essence than material things are. Consequently, material things can be known better in the essences of angels than in their own nature; and since we human beings know material things in their own nature, still truer is it that angels know them all simply by looking at their own essences.
Praeterea, lumen intellectus angelici est perfectius quam lumen intellectus agentis qui est pars animae nostrae. Sed in lumine intellectus agentis omnia materialia cognoscimus, quia illud lumen est actus omnium intelligibilium. Ergo multo fortius Angelus cognoscendo lumen suum, omnia materialia cognoscit.	3. The light of the angelic intellect is more perfect than the light of the active intellect of our soul. Now, we know all material things in the light of this intellect because it is the act of all intelligibles. Consequently, it is even truer to say that, by knowing their own light, angels know all material things.
Praeterea, cum Angelus res materiales cognoscat, oportet quod eas vel per speciem vel per essentiam suam cognoscat. Sed non per speciem; quia neque per particularem, cum sit immunis a materia, neque per universalem, quia sic non haberet perfectam et propriam cognitionem de eis. Ergo per essentiam suam cognoscit res materiales.	4. Since an angel knows material things, he must know them either by their species or by knowing his own essence. However, he does not know them through species—not through particular species, because an angel is completely free from matter; and not through universal species, because then he would not have perfect knowledge of things in their individuality. Consequently, he knows material things by means of his own essence.
Praeterea, si lux corporalis seipsam cognosceret, omnes colores ex hoc cognosceret, eo quod ipsa est actus omnium colorum. Cum igitur Angelus sit lux spiritualis, cognoscendo seipsum, cognoscet omnia materialia.	5. If physical light could know itself, it would know all colors, because it is the act of all colors. Therefore, since an angel is a spiritual light, by knowing himself he can know all material things.
Praeterea, intellectus Angeli medius est inter intellectum divinum et humanum. Sed intellectus divinus omnia cognoscit per essentiam suam, intellectus autem humanus omnia per species. Ergo intellectus angelicus ad minus quaedam, cognoscendo essentiam suam, cognoscet.	6. An angel’s intellect lies halfway between the divine and the human intellect. Now, the divine intellect knows all things by means of the divine essence, and a human intellect knows all by means of species. Consequently, the intellect of an angel will know at least some things by knowing his essence.
Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, cap. VII de divinis nominibus: Angelos scire dicunt eloquia, scilicet sacra ea quae sunt in terra, non secundum sensus ipsa cognoscentes, sed secundum propriam deiformis mentis virtutem et naturam. Ergo videtur quod cognoscendo virtutem et naturam suam materialia cognoscant.	7. Dionysius says: “Scripture asserts that angels have knowledge of things that are on earth, by seeing them, not through sense, but through the power and nature of their godlike minds.” Hence, it seems that they know material things by knowing their own power and nature.
Praeterea, si speculum materiale cognoscitivum esset, cognosceret res materiales per essentiam suam, nisi a rebus species in ipsum resultarent. Sed in intellectu Angeli non resultant species a rebus materialibus, ut patet per Dionysium, cap. VII de divinis nominibus. Si ergo materialia cognoscat oportet quod per essentiam suam ea cognoscat, cum sit quoddam speculum, ut patet per Dionysium, cap. IV de divinis nominibus.	8. If a physical mirror could know and if the species of material things were not reflected in it, it would know them by means of its own essence. But species of material things are not reflected in the intellect of angels, as is evident from the writings of Dionysius. And since an angel, as Dionysius also says, is a kind of mirror, if he knows material things, he must know them by means of his own essence.
Praeterea, potentia cognitiva in Angelis est perfectior quam potentia naturalis rerum materialium. Sed multae potentiae materialium possunt per seipsas in sua obiecta, sine hoc quod aliquid eis superaddatur. Ergo multo fortius intellectus angelicus poterit cognoscere res materiales per essentiam suam sine aliquibus speciebus.	9. The knowing power of angels is more perfect than the natural power of material things. Now, many of the powers of material things can attain their objects by their own means, without anything being added to them. It is much more true, therefore, to say that the intellect of an angel knows material things by means of his essence and without any species.
Praeterea, efficacior est Angelus in cognoscendo quam ignis in comburendo. Sed ignis comburit sine hoc quod aliquid combustibile sit in ipso. Ergo et Angelus cognoscit per se ipsum sine hoc quod aliqua species cognoscibilis sit in ipso.	10. An angel’s ability to know is much greater than fire’s ability to bum. But fire can bum combustible material without that material entering into the fire. So, likewise, an angel knows through itself without the presence of a cognoscible species within it.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Est quod dicitur in libro de causis, quod omnis intelligentia est plena formis; et in eodem libro dicitur, quod formae sunt in ea per modum intelligibilem. Ergo per huiusmodi formas intelligit res, et non per essentiam suam.	1. It is stated in The Causes that “every intelligence is filled with forms.” Moreover, it is said in the same work that “forms exist in an intelligence in an intelligible manner.” Consequently, an intelligence knows things by means of these forms and not by means of its essence.
Praeterea, magis convenit essentia Angeli cum alio Angelo quam cum re materiali. Sed non potest Angelus ex hoc quod cognoscit essentiam suam, alios Angelos cognoscere. Ergo nec cognoscendo essentiam suam materialia cognoscet.	7. The essence of an angel has more in common with another angel than with a material thing. But an angel cannot know other angels by knowing his own essence. Therefore, he cannot know material things by knowing his own essence.
Praeterea, illud quod principium est unitatis, non potest esse principium distinctionis. Sed essentia Angeli est principium unitatis ipsius, quia per eam Angelus unus est. Ergo non potest esse principium distinctae cognitionis de rebus.	3. That which is the principle of unity cannot be the principle of distinction. Now, the essence of an angel is the principle of his unity, for it is by means of his essence that an angel is one. Therefore, his essence cannot be the principle of knowledge about things distinct from him.
Praeterea, nihil praeter Deum est id quod habet. Sed Angelus habet potentiam intellectivam. Ergo non est potentia intellectiva; ergo multo minus est id quo intelligit; ergo non intelligit res per essentiam suam.	4. Nothing except God is that which it has. But an angel has intellectual power. Therefore, he is not intellectual power. Much less is he that by which he understands. Consequently, he does not understand things by means of his essence.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod omnis cognitio est per assimilationem; similitudo autem inter aliqua duo est secundum convenientiam in forma. Cum autem unitas effectus unitatem causae demonstret, et sic in genere cuiuslibet formae ad unum primum principium illius formae redire oporteat, impossibile est aliqua duo esse ad invicem similia, nisi altero duorum modorum: vel ita quod unum sit causa alterius, vel ita quod ambo ab una causa causentur, quae eamdem formam utrique imprimat; et secundum hoc diversimode ponimus Angelos materialia cognoscere ab eo quod philosophi posuerunt.	All knowing takes place by means of assimilation, and likeness existing between two things is caused by their agreement in a form. Now, since unity in an effect shows unity in a cause, and, since, in consequence, no matter what genus any form may belong to, one must get back to the one first principle of that form, two things can resemble each other for two reasons only: either one is the cause of the other or both have been caused by one cause that has imprinted the same form upon both. Using this principle, we say that angels know material things in a manner different from that in which philosophers say that angels know them.
Nos enim non ponimus, Angelos esse causas materialium rerum, sed Deum creatorem omnium visibilium et invisibilium; et ideo non potest in Angelo esse similitudo materialium rerum nisi ab eo qui est materialium rerum causa. Omne autem quod aliquid non habet a seipso, sed ab altero, est ei praeter essentiam suam. Et per hunc modum probat Avicenna, quod esse cuiuslibet rei praeter primum ens est aliquid praeter essentiam ipsius, quia omnia ab alio esse habent. Unde oportet quod similitudines rerum materialium in Angelo existentes, sint aliud ab essentia ipsius, impressae in ipsum a Deo. Rationes enim rerum materialium in mente divina existentes sunt quidem lux et vita; vita quidem sunt, inquantum procedunt ad rerum constitutionem in esse, sicut forma artis procedit in artificiatum; lux vero sunt, inquantum eaedem impressiones quasdam efficiunt sibi similes in mentibus Angelorum.	For we do not say that angels cause material things. God is the creator of all things, visible and invisible. Consequently, a likeness of the things of nature cannot be within an angel unless it comes from Him who is the cause of material things. Now, whatever one does not have from himself but from another is over and above his own essence. For this reason, Avicenna proves” that the act of being of anything except the First Being is something other than its essence, because all things have their act of existence from another. Consequently, the likenesses of material things existing within an angel must be other than his essence and must be imprinted there by God. Now, the intelligible representations of material things existing in the divine mind are life and light: they are life inasmuch as they come forth to constitute things in their act of existence, as the form of an artistic conception comes forth to constitute a product of art; they are light inasmuch as they cause impressions, resembling themselves, on the minds of angels.
Philosophi autem posuerunt rerum materialium esse Angelos creatores. Et tamen secundum eorum positionem, adhuc oportet quod res materiales non per essentiam suam, sed per formas superadditas cognoscant. Similitudines enim effectuum non sunt in causa nisi per modum quo in ea est virtus ad producendum effectum, ut autem habetur in libro de causis, intelligentia non dat esse rebus inferioribus nisi per virtutem divinam, quae est in ipsa; unde hanc eius operationem dicit divinam; et sic haec virtus est ei non ex principiis essentiae suae prodiens, sed ab alio accepta. Et sic huiusmodi virtus est ei praeter essentiam suam. Unde et similitudines materialium rerum si ponantur eius effectus, erunt praeter essentiam ipsius Angeli.	Philosophers, however, have asserted that angels are the creators of material things. But logically, according to this position, angels should know material things, not by means of their own essences, but by means of forms added to them. For the likeness of an effect is in its cause only in the manner in which the power to produce that effect is there. Now, as is said in The Causes, “An intelligence gives existence to inferior things only by means of God’s power existing within it”; and for that reason the author calls this operation divine. Consequently, this power does not belong to the intelligence as flowing from the principles of its essence, but is something over and above its essence. Therefore, even if material things were caused by an angel, their likenesses would be over and above his essence.
Et sic patet, quocumque modo ponatur, quod Angelus non cognoscit res materiales per essentiam suam, sed per earum formas apud se existentes.	It is clear, therefore, no matter what position is taken, that an angel does not know material things by means of his own essence but only by means of their forms existing within him.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod exemplar, si proprie accipiatur, importat causalitatem respectu exemplatorum: quia exemplar est ad cuius imitationem fit aliud. Unde et Dionysius, ibidem, Clementis sententiam improbat, volens exemplaria rerum dici rationes in Deo existentes. Si tamen exemplar large dicatur omne illud quod aliquo modo ab alio repraesentatur, sic etiam Angelorum essentiae possunt dici exemplaria materialium rerum. Sed sicut essentia divina est proprium exemplar uniuscuiusque rei per rationem idealem eius, quam apud se habet; ita et essentia Angeli est propria similitudo rei materialis secundum formam eius quam apud se habet, quamvis forma ista non sit idem quod essentia, sicut erat idea in Deo.	1. According to its formal nature, an archetype implies a relation of causality to the things modeled upon it; for an archetype is a thing that something else is made to imitate. Consequently, in the passage cited, Dionysius finds fault with Clement’s opinion, and holds that the archetypes of things should be called intelligible representations of things, existing in God. However, if an archetype is taken in a broader sense as meaning a thing that is represented in some way by another thing, then angels’ essences can also be called the archetypes of material things. But the divine essence is the archetype of each and every thing in its individuality, because it contains the exemplary ideas of all things. Similarly, an angelic essence is a likeness of a material thing in its individuality because of the form which the angel possesses of it; though this form is not the same as his essence, as is true of the idea in God.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod essentia divina est infinita; unde non determinatur ad aliquod genus, sed colligit in se perfectiones omnium generum, ut dicit Dionysius, ultimo cap. de divinis nominibus, et philosophus, et Commentator in V metaphysicorum. Et ita potest esse per seipsam propria rerum omnium similitudo, et sic per ipsam possunt omnia perfecte cognosci. Essentia autem Angeli est determinata ad aliquod genus; unde non habet in se unde sit similitudo omnium materialium, nisi ei aliquid superaddatur, quo res in propria natura cognoscat.	2. The divine essence is infinite. Hence, far from being included in any genus, it contains, as Dionysius,” Aristotle, and Averroes say, the perfections of all genera. Consequently, it can be a likeness of all things in their individuality, and through it all things can be known perfectly. The essence of an angel, however, is confined within a particular genus. Consequently, it cannot be, in itself, a likeness of all material things. Hence, to know a thing with all its individual characteristics, an angel must be given a likeness of it, which is over and above his essence.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod intellectu agente non cognoscuntur omnia quasi similitudine sufficiente ad omnia cognoscendum, eo quod non est actus omnium formarum intelligibilium inquantum est haec vel illa forma, sed inquantum solum sunt intelligibilia; sed per intellectum agentem dicuntur cognosci omnia sicut per principium cognitionis activum.	3. All things are not known by means of the agent intellect as though by a likeness sufficient for us to know all things. For the agent intellect is not the act of all intelligible forms in the sense that it is this or that form, but only in so far as these forms are intelligible. For all things are said to be known by means of the agent intellect as through an active principle of knowing.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod Angelus cognoscit res non per species particulares, neque universales eo modo quo formae universales sunt quae a sensibus abstrahuntur; sed sunt universalium et particularium similitudines, ut infra melius apparebit.	4. An angel knows things neither through particular species nor through universal species that are universal forms abstracted from the senses. Instead, he knows them through universal species which represent both universals and particulars. This will become clearer from our discussion later on.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod lux corporalis si seipsam cognosceret, non propter hoc omnes colores determinate cognosceret, sed cognosceret eos solum inquantum sunt visibiles; alias oculus etiam videndo lucem, omnes colores videret, quod est manifeste falsum.	5. Were physical light to know itself, it would not for that reason know all colors determinately. It would know them only in so far as they are visible. Otherwise, even the eye would see all colors by seeing light; and this is clearly false.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod intellectus Angeli quantum ad hoc est medius inter intellectum humanum et divinum, quod res alias cognoscit per formas essentiae superadditas, in quo deficit ab intellectu divino; se autem cognoscit per essentiam suam, in quo excedit intellectum humanum.	6. Since the angelic intellect lies halfway between the divine and the human intellect, it knows things other than itself by means of forms added to its essence; and, in this respect, it falls short of the divine intellect. However, it knows itself by means of its own essence, and, in this respect, it surpasses the human intellect.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod auctoritas Dionysii non est intelligenda quasi virtus et natura Angeli sit medium quo Angelus alia cognoscit; sed quia modus cognitionis angelicae sequitur proprietatem naturae et virtutis ipsius, non autem proprietatem naturae rerum cognitarum; quod patet ex hoc, quia immaterialiter materialia cognoscit, et sensibilia sine sensu.	7. This statement of Dionysius should not be understood as meaning that an angel’s power and nature are the medium by which he knows other things, but that his manner of knowing follows the characteristics of his nature and power and not the characteristics of the natures of the things he knows. This is clear from the fact that he knows material things in an immaterial manner, and sense-objects without the aid of any senses.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod speculum materiale, si seipsum cognosceret, nullo modo, cognoscendo essentiam suam, cognosceret res alias, nisi quatenus cognosceret formas resultantes in ipso; nec differret utrum formae illae essent acceptae a rebus, vel naturaliter inditae.	8. Even if a physical mirror knew itself, it would by no means know other things simply by knowing its own essence. It would know things only by knowing forms reflected in itself. Moreover, it would make no difference whether these forms were received from things or were innate in the mirror.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod potentia cognitiva Angeli ordinatur ad nobiliorem actum quam potentia naturalis rei materialis; unde quamvis pluribus adminiculis indigeat, nihilominus perfectior et dignior remanet.	9. The knowing power of an angel is ordered to a more sublime act than is the natural power of a material thing. Consequently, event though it may need more help, it remains a more perfect and more noble power.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod cognoscens non se habet ad cognoscibile sicut comburens ad combustibile, quorum unum est agens et aliud patiens; sed cognoscens et cognoscibile se habent ut unum principium cognitionis, inquantum ex cognoscibili et cognoscente fit aliquo modo (unum), ut ex praedictis patet; et ideo ratio non sequitur.	10. A knower is not related to the known as what burns is related to the combustible. In this second case, one is active and the other passive; but a knower and the known are related as one principle of knowing inasmuch as the act of knowing in some way comes into being from the known and the knower. This is clear from what was said previously. Hence, the argument proves nothing.

---

ARTICLE IX In the ninth article we ask: Are the forms by which angels know material things innate or received from things? [ARTICLE S.T., I, 55, 2; II Sent., 3, 3, 4; C.G., II, 96.]
Nono quaeritur utrum formae per quas Angeli cognoscunt res materiales, sint innatae, vel a rebus acceptae	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non sint innatae.	It seems that they are not innate, for
In hoc enim differt scientia speculativa a practica, quod practica est ad res, speculativa a rebus. Sed Angeli non habent de rebus materialibus scientiam practicam, cum non sint earum factores, ut Damascenus dicit, sed speculativam tantum. Ergo scientia eorum est a rebus accepta, et non per species innatas.	1. Speculative knowledge differs from practical inasmuch as practical knowledge is directed to things, while speculative is derived from things. Now, as Damascene says, angels do not make material things; consequently, they do not have practical but only speculative knowledge. Their knowledge, therefore, is taken from things, and not from innate species.
Praeterea, Ephes. cap. III, 10, dicitur: ut innotescat principatibus et potestatibus in caelestibus, per Ecclesiam, multiformis sapientia Dei; unde accipit Hieronymus quod Angeli mysterium incarnationis didicerunt ab apostolis. Sed scientia quae est per species innatas, non est ab aliis acquisita. Ergo scientia Angelorum non est per species innatas.	2. In the Epistle to the Ephesians (3:10) we read: “That the manifold wisdom of God may be known to the principalities and power in heavenly places through the church.” Jerome understood this to mean that the angels learned the mystery of the Incarnation from the Apostles. Now, knowledge had through innate species is not received from others. Consequently, angels’ knowledge is not had through innate species.
Praeterea, species innatae Angelis aequaliter se habent ad praesentia et futura. Scientia autem Angelorum non se habet aequaliter ad utraque, cum sciant praesentia, ignorent autem futura. Ergo Angelorum scientia non est per species innatas.	3. Angels’ innate species are equally related to the present and future. Their knowledge, however, is not equally related to the present and future, because they know the present but are ignorant of the future. Consequently, their knowledge is not had through innate species.
Praeterea, Angeli rerum materialium cognitionem distinctam habent. Sed cognitio distincta de rebus haberi non potest nisi per hoc quod est distinctionis principium, cum sit idem principium essendi et cognoscendi. Principium autem distinctionis rerum materialium sunt formae quae sunt in eis. Ergo oportet quod scientia Angelorum de rebus naturalibus sit per formas a rebus acceptas.	4. Angels have distinct knowledge of material things. Now, distinct knowledge of things can be had only through that which is a principle of distinction, because the principle of being and that of knowing are the same. But the principle of distinction in material things is their form, Consequently, the knowledge angels have of material things must be through forms received from things.
Praeterea, ea quae sunt innata vel naturaliter insunt, semper eodem modo se habent. Sed scientia Angelorum non semper eodem modo se habet, quia nunc quaedam sciunt quae prius nescierunt: unde secundum Dionysium, a nescientia aliqui eorum purgantur. Ergo scientia eorum non est per formas innatas.	5. Things that are innate or naturally inborn remain always the same. Angels’ knowledge, however, does not remain always the same, for they know things now which they did not know previously; and, for this reason, Dionysius says that some angels have to be freed of their ignorance. Hence, their knowledge is not had by means of innate forms.
Praeterea, formae quae sunt in Angelis, sunt universales. Sed universale nihil est, aut posterius, ut dicitur in I de anima. Ergo formae illae vel nihil sunt, vel sunt rebus posteriores, velut ab eis acceptae.	6. The forms that exist within angels are universal. But, as is said in The Soul: “A universal is either nothing or posterior [to something ].” Consequently, those forms are either nothing or posterior to things, since they are received from them.
Praeterea, nihil cognoscitur nisi secundum quod est in cognoscente. Si ergo Angelus cognoscit res materiales, oportet quod ipsae res materiales in intellectu Angeli fiant per formas ab eis in intellectu angelico impressas.	7. A thing is known only in so far as it is in the knower. Consequently, if an angel knows material things, these very things must be in his intellect by means of forms which they have imprinted there.
Praeterea, lumen intellectuale in Angelis est efficacius quam lumen animae humanae. Sed per lumen intellectus agentis in nobis abstrahuntur species a phantasmatibus. Ergo et multo magis intellectus Angeli potest formas aliquas a rebus sensibilibus abstrahere.	8. The intelligible light in angels is more powerful than that in a human soul. But we can abstract species from phantasms by means of the light of the active intellect. Therefore, an angel can to an even greater degree abstract forms from sense-objects.
Praeterea, quod potest virtus inferior, potest et superior. Sed anima nostra, quae est Angelis inferior, potest seipsam conformare rebus, formando in se aliquas formas, quae neque ei innatae sunt, neque a rebus acceptae; sicut imaginatio format phantasma montis aurei, quem nunquam vidit. Ergo multo fortius Angelus potest ad praesentiam rerum seipsum rebus conformare, et hoc modo res cognoscere; et sic non oportet quod per species innatas res materiales cognoscat, sed per eas quas faciet apud se.	9. A superior power can do what an inferior can. Now, our soul, which is inferior to angels, can conform itself to things by producing forms within itself that are neither innate nor received from things. For example, our imagination can form a phantasm of a golden mountain, which it has never seen. For a much better reason, therefore, an angel can conform himself to things present to him and know them in this manner. Thus, there will be no need for him to know material things by means of innate species; he can know them by means of species which he will make within himself.
In contrarium.	To the Contrary
Est quod Dionysius dicit, cap. VII de Divin. Nom., quod Angeli non colligunt cognitionem ex sensibus aut ex rebus divisibilibus. Ergo non cognoscunt per formas a rebus acceptas.	1. According to Dionysius, angels do not gather their knowledge by means of sense, or from things subject to division. Therefore, they do not know by means of forms received from things.
Praeterea, Angeli magis excedunt corpora omnia quam corpora superiora excedunt inferiora. Sed superiora propter sui nobilitatem non recipiunt aliquam impressionem a corporibus inferioribus. Ergo multo minus intellectus angelici aliquas formas a rebus corporalibus accipiunt, quibus intelligunt.	2. The superiority of angels over all physical things is greater than that of higher bodies over lower. But, because of their nobility, higher bodies do not receive any influence from the lower. Consequently, much less will angelic intellects receive forms from physical things in order to understand them.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod supposito quod Angeli non cognoscant res materiales per suam essentiam, sed per aliquas formas, de formis illis est triplex opinio.	Taking as already proved” that angels know material things not by means of their own essence but by means of forms, we can now consider three opinions about these forms.
Quidam enim dicunt, quod formae illae per quas Angeli cognoscunt, sunt a rebus materialibus acceptae. Sed hoc esse non potest. Intellectus enim qui recipit formas aliquas a rebus, dupliciter se habet ad res: ut agens scilicet, et ut patiens, largo modo actione et passione acceptis. Formae enim quae sunt in rebus materialibus aut in sensibus vel in phantasia, cum non sint omnino a materia depuratae, non sunt intelligibiles actu, sed potentia tantum; et ideo requiritur quod per actionem intellectus efficiantur actu intelligibiles: et haec est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem in nobis.	Some say that the forms by which angels know material things are received from them. This, however, is impossible; for an intellect that receives forms from things is related to them in two ways, as something active and as something passive—taking active and passive in their broad meaning. Now, forms of material things are only potentially, not. actually, intelligible when they are in the senses or in the imagination, because they are not entirely stripped of matter. Consequently, an intellectual action is required in order that they become actually intelligible. For this reason, we must necessarily affirm the existence of an active intellect within ourselves.
Formis autem intelligibilibus factis, nondum per eas res intelligeremus, nisi formae illae nostro intellectui unirentur, ut sic intelligens et intellectum sint unum. Et ita oportet quod intellectus formas huiusmodi recipiat; et sic a rebus quodammodo patitur, prout scilicet omne recipere, pati quoddam est.	Moreover, even when these forms have been made intelligible, we cannot understand things through them unless they are truly united to our intellect in such a way that the knower and the known become one. Consequently, our intellect must receive the forms of these things; and so, in a way, it is passive in their regard in so far as all reception is a kind of passivity.
Sicut autem forma comparatur ad materiam ut actus ad potentiam, ita agens ad patiens; cum unumquodque agat inquantum est actu, patiatur vero inquantum est potentia. Et quia actus proprius propriam potentiam respicit, ideo et proprio agenti respondet determinatum patiens, et e converso, sicut se habet de forma et materia. Unde oportet quod agens et patiens sint unius generis, cum potentia et actus unumquodque genus entis dividant: non enim album patitur a dulci nisi per accidens, sed a nigro tantum.	Now, just as a form is related to matter as act is to potency, so also is something active similarly related to something passive, because a thing acts in so far as it is in act, and is passive in so far as it is in potency. Moreover, since a definite act has a definite relation to a definite potency, a definite passivity corresponds to a definite agent and vice versa—just as matter and form are mutually related. Consequently, what is active and what is passive must belong to the same class, for potency and act divide every class of being that there is. For example, “the white” is not passive with respect to “the sweet” (except indirectly) but only with respect to “the black.”
Res autem materiales et intelligibiles sunt omnino diversorum generum. Ea enim quae non communicant in materia, non communicant in genere, ut patet per philosophum in V Metaphysic., et in X. Unde non potest esse quod res materialis immediate patiatur ab intellectu aut agat in ipsum. Et ideo in nobis providit naturae conditor sensitivas potentias, in quibus formae sunt medio modo inter modum intelligibilem et modum materialem. Conveniunt siquidem cum formis intelligibilibus inquantum sunt formae sine materia; cum materialibus vero formis, inquantum nondum sunt a conditionibus materiae denudatae: et ideo potest esse actio et passio suo modo inter res materiales et potentias sensitivas, et similiter inter has et inter intellectum.	Now, material things and intelligibles belong to entirely different genera; for, as the Philosopher says, those things that do not have matter do not belong to the same genus as those that do. Consequently, it is not possible for a material thing to be passive immediately in relation to the intellect or to act upon the intellect. The Creator of our nature has therefore provided us with powers of sensation, in which forms exist in a mode between intelligibility and materiality. They have this in common with intelligible forms, that they are forms without matter, and this in common with material forms, that they are not yet stripped of material conditions. Hence, there can be activity and passivity between material things and the sense. faculties in their own proper way, and, similarly, between the sense faculties and the intellect.
Unde si Angeli intellectus a rebus materialibus formas aliquas acciperet, oporteret habere Angelum potentias sensitivas, et ita habere corpus naturaliter sibi unitum. Unde eiusdem sententiae esse videtur Angelos esse animalia, ut quidam Platonici posuerunt, et eos a rebus materialibus formas accipere; quod auctoritati sanctorum et rectae rationi repugnat.	Therefore, if the intellect of an angel were to receive forms from material things, it would have to have sense powers and, consequently, a body naturally united to it. This opinion seems to make angels animals (an actual opinion of certain Platonists) and to have them receive forms from material things. Moreover, it contradicts the authority of the saints and right reason itself.
Et ideo alii dicunt, quod Angelus non acquirit formas quibus cognoscit accipiendo a rebus, neque tamen intelligit per formas innatas; sed quod in potestate eius est conformare essentiam suam cuilibet rei apud eius praesentiam; et ex tali conformitate dicunt sequi rei cognitionem. Sed hoc iterum nihil esse videtur. Non enim potest aliquid alteri conformari nisi secundum quod forma eius apud ipsum fit. Nec potest dici quod ipsa essentia Angeli, eo faciente, fiat forma rei materialis, quia essentia eius est semper unius rationis: unde oportet quod illa forma qua se rei conformat, sit addita essentiae, et quae fuerit primo in potentia in ipso Angelo; non enim conformaret se, nisi prius conformabilis esset. Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum nisi per id quod est actu. Unde oporteret apud Angelum praeexistere aliquas formas secundum quas esset potens se reducere de potentia conformabilitatis in actum conformationis, sicut videmus quod imaginatio nostra format novam speciem, ut montis aurei, ex speciebus quas prius apud se habebat, scilicet montis et auri: et similiter intellectus ex formis generis et differentiae format definitionem speciei. Unde oportet redire in hoc quod aliquae formae praeexistant in Angelo; et has oportet esse vel acceptas a rebus, vel innatas.	Consequently, others say that angels do not know by means of forms received from things or by means of innate forms, but angels are able to conform their essence to anything present to them. These persons hold that knowledge of a thing follows from a conformity of this kind. Their opinion, however, seems to be of little value, because one thing can be conformed to another only if the form of the latter becomes present within it. Now, it cannot be said that the essence of an angel by its own activity becomes the form of a material thing, because its essence retains a single formal character. Hence, the form by which an angel conforms himself to a thing is something added to his essence and was previously in him potentially, because an angel could not have conformed himself to a thing unless he was previously in potency to such a conformity. Indeed, nothing is reduced from potency to act except by that which is in act. Consequently, in an angel, we should assume that forms must pre-exist by which he can reduce himself from being potentially conformable to being actually J conformed, as our imagination forms a new species, say, of a mountain of gold, from species it had previously, namely, of mountain and of gold, and as our intellect forms the definition of a species from the forms it has of genus and of differentia. Hence, we must return to the position holding that forms pre-exist in angels; and these are either innate or received from things.
Et ideo dicendum videtur, secundum quod tertia opinio dicit, quae communior est et verior, quod Angeli res materiales per formas innatas cognoscunt. Sicut enim ex rationibus aeternis in mente divina existentibus procedunt formae materiales ad rerum substantiam, ita procedunt a Deo formae rerum omnium in mentes angelicas ad rerum cognitionem; ut sic intellectus Angeli nostrum intellectum excedat, sicut res formata excedit materiam informem. Unde intellectus noster comparatur tabulae in qua nihil est scriptum; intellectus autem Angeli tabulae depictae, vel speculo, in quo rerum rationes resplendent.	As a result, it seems that we must say what the third opinion says is an opinion more widespread and closer to the truth—namely, that angels know material things by means of innate forms. Therefore, just as from the eternal archetypes existing in the mind of God come the material forms by which things subsist, so also do the forms of all things come from God to the minds of angels in order that they may know things. Hence, an angelic intellect excels our intellect as a thing possessing a form excels matter that is formless. Our intellect may be compared to a tablet on which nothing has been written, but that of an angel, to a painted tablet or to a mirror in which the intelligible characters of things shine forth.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod differentia illa speculativae et practicae scientiae non est per se, sed per accidens, inquantum scilicet sunt humanae: homo enim de rebus quas ipse non facit, non habet cognitionem nisi per formas a rebus acceptas. Secus autem est de Angelo, qui habet a sui creatione formas rerum sibi inditas.	1. That difference between speculative and practical knowledge is not essential but accidental; that is, it arises only in so far as these knowledges are human. Man knows things which he has not made only by means of forms received from things. The case is otherwise with angels, however, because they have the forms of things given them from the moment of their creation.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod mysterium incarnationis primo est scitum ab Angelis quam ab hominibus: unde et homines de ipso per Angelos sunt docti, ut Dionysius dicit cap. IV caelestis Hierar. Ipsi enim incarnationis mysterium in Deo absconditum a saeculis cognoverunt; et per Angelorum Ecclesiam, quae est in caelestibus, principibus et potestatibus huius mundi mysterium praedictum innotuit; et quod ibi dicitur de Ecclesia, referendum est ad Ecclesiam Angelorum, ut Augustinus exponit, V super Genesim ad litteram, quamvis Hieronymus contrarium dicere videatur.	2. The mystery of the Incarnation was known by angels before it was known by men. Indeed, as Dionysius says, men learned of it from angels, who knew this mystery of the Incarnation, hidden from the world for ages; and, as Augustine explains, God revealed this mystery to the princes and powerful ones of this world through the church of the angels, which is in heavenly places. What is said there about the Church should therefore be taken as referring to the church of angels, as Augustine explains—even though Jerome seems to say the contrary.
Sed tamen verba eius non sunt hoc modo intelligenda, quod Angeli ab hominibus scientiam acceperint; sed quia apostolis praedicantibus res iam completas, quae prius fuerant per prophetas praedictae, Angeli eas plenius cognoverunt, sicut plenius sciunt praesentia quam futura, ut infra, articulo 12 huius quaestionis, patebit.	However, Jerome’s words are not to be understood in the sense that angels acquire knowledge from men. He meant that while the Apostles were announcing the things that had taken place and had been previously predicted by the prophets, the angels understood them more fully, just as they know the present more fully than the future—a point that will be clarified later.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod Angeli, quamvis futura non cognoscant aliqua, quae tamen, dum sunt praesentia, sciant, non tamen sequitur ex hoc quod species aliquas a rebus accipiunt quas cognoscunt. Cum enim cognitio sit per assimilationem cognoscentis ad cognitum, hoc modo contingit novam cognitionem de aliquo accipere, quomodo contingit de novo aliquid alicui assimilari. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter: uno modo per motum suum; alio modo per motum alterius ad formam quam ipse iam habet.	3. Even though the angels do not know any future events, they know events when they take place. From this it does not follow, however, that they receive species from the things which they know. For knowing takes place through an assimilation of the knower to the known. Hence, a person will receive new knowledge of a thing in so far as he is assimilated to it in a new manner. This happens in two ways: either through his own motion or through the motion of another with respect to a form which he already possesses.
Et similiter aliquis incipit aliquid de novo cognoscere uno modo per hoc quod cognoscens de novo accipit formam cogniti, sicut in nobis accidit; alio modo per hoc quod cognitum de novo pervenit ad formam quae est in cognoscente. Et hoc modo Angeli de novo cognoscunt praesentia quae prius fuerunt futura; ut puta si aliquid nondum erat homo, ei non assimilabatur intellectus angelicus per formam hominis quam habet apud se, sed cum incipit esse homo, secundum eamdem formam incipit intellectus angelicus sibi assimilari sine aliqua mutatione facta circa ipsum.	Similarly, he begins to know something new in one way by newly receiving a form for the first time from an object which he now knows. This happens with us. Or the object known arrives for the first time at a form already in the knower; and this is how angels have new knowledge of present things that previously were future. For example, if a man did not yet exist, an angelic intellect would not yet be assimilated to him by means of the form of man which it has within itself; but, when he comes into existence, the angelic intellect begins to assimilate itself to him by means of this form, without any change being made within itself with respect to that object.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod sicut in intellectu non est ipsa forma qua res existit, sed similitudo eius: ita distincta cognitio aliquarum rerum non requirit ut apud cognoscentem sint ipsa distinctionis principia; sed sufficit quod apud ipsum sint eorum similitudines: nec differt, undecumque illae similitudines accipiantur, quantum ad cognitionem distinctam.	4. just as it is not the form by which a thing exists but only a likeness of it that is in the intellect, so also distinct knowledge of things does not demand that the very principles of distinction themselves be in the knower but that their likenesses be there. Moreover, as far as distinct knowledge is concerned, it makes no difference where these likenesses come from.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod intellectus Angeli sine hoc quod acquirit novas formas intelligibiles, potest aliquid de novo intelligere dupliciter: uno modo per hoc quod aliquid de novo assimilatur illis formis, ut iam dictum est, in corp. art.; alio modo per hoc quod intellectus confortatur aliquo fortiori lumine ad plures cognitiones ex eisdem formis eliciendas: sicut ex eisdem formis in phantasia existentibus, superveniente lumine prophetiae, aliqua cognitio accipitur, quae accipi non poterat per lumen naturale intellectus agentis.	5. Without acquiring new intelligible forms, an angelic intellect can have new understanding in two ways. First, as was mentioned before, it can have new understanding by something being newly assimilated to those forms [which it already has]. Second, it can be strengthened by some stronger light, enabling it to draw more knowledge from the same forms. Similarly, when the light of prophecy operates from forms already existing in the imagination, knowledge is received which could not be received by means of the natural light of the active intellect.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod verbum philosophi est intelligendum de universali, secundum quod est in comprehensione nostra, qua comprehendimus res naturales: hoc enim est a rebus naturalibus acceptum. Sed universale etiam in nostra comprehensione existens respectu artificialium non est posterius, sed prius, quia per formas artis universales apud nos existentes artificiata producimus. Et similiter per rationes aeternas Deus producit creaturas, a quibus effluunt formae in intellectu angelico. Unde non sequitur quod formae intellectus angelici sint posteriores rebus, sed quod sint posteriores rationibus aeternis.	6. The Philosopher’s statement should be taken as referring to the universal as it exists in the understanding, by which we understand things in nature. This universal is received from things. But even the universal existing in our understanding is prior, not posterior, to artificial things, because we produce artificial things by means of universal forms of art already existing within us. In a similar way, God produces creatures by means of eternal archetypes; and, from these, forms flow down into the angels’ intellects. Hence, it follows that the forms in angels’ intellects are posterior, not to things, but only to the eternal archetypes.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod cognitum est in cognoscente similiter, sive forma cogniti in cognoscente existens sit a cognito accepta, sive non; et ideo ratio non est ad propositum.	7. The known is in the knower in the same way, whether its form, existing in the knower, has been received from the thing known or not. Consequently, the argument does not touch the problem.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod non est proportio inter lumen intellectus angelici et res sensibiles, ut per lumen praedictum efficiantur actu intelligibiles, ut ex praedictis patet; et ideo ratio non sequitur.	8. No proportion exists between the light of an angelic intellect and sensible things that is such as to allow the latter to be rendered intelligible by means of this light. This is clear from what has been said. Hence, the conclusion does not follow.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod anima non format in seipsa aliquas formas nisi aliquibus formis praesuppositis in ipsa; et ideo, ut ex dictis patet, non cogit ratio.	9. The soul does not produce forms within itself unless some forms already exist there. Consequently, as is clear from what has been said, the argument does not hold.

---

ARTICLE X In the tenth article we ask: Do higher angels know by forms more universal than those by which lower angels know? [ARTICLE S.T., I, 55, 3; 89, 1; II Sent., 3, 3, 2; C.G., II, 98; Q.D. De anima, 7, ad 5; 18; De causis, lect. 10 (P. 21:737a).]
Decimo quaeritur utrum Angeli superiores habeant cognitionem per formas magis universales quam inferiores	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non.	It seems not, for
Superiorum enim Angelorum cognitio perfectior est quam Angelorum inferiorum. Sed quod cognoscitur in universali, imperfectius cognoscitur quam quod in particulari. Ergo superiores Angeli non cognoscunt per formas magis universales.	1. The higher angels’ knowledge is more perfect than the lower angels. Now, what is known by universal knowledge is less perfectly known than what is known by particular knowledge. Consequently, the higher angel~ do. not know by means of forms that are more universal.
Praeterea, si cognitio superiorum est universalior quam inferiorum; aut hoc est quantum ad cognitionem, aut quantum ad operationem. Non quantum ad operationem, quia non sunt operatores rerum, ut Damascenus dicit: similiter nec quantum ad cognitionem, quia omnes cognoscunt omnes res naturales, tam superiores quam inferiores. Ergo superiorum Angelorum cognitio non est magis universalis.	2. If the knowledge of the higher angels is more universal than that of the lower angels, this universality pertains either to their causal operations or to the object of their knowledge. It does not, however, pertain to their operations, for, as Damascene says, the higher angels do not make things; nor does it pertain to the object of their knowledge, for both higher and lower angels know the things of nature. Consequently, the higher angels’ knowledge is not more universal.
Praeterea, si omnia quae cognoscunt inferiores Angeli, etiam superiores cognoscunt, et tamen per formas magis universales, oportet quod forma quae est in intellectu superioris, ad plura se extendat. Sed idem non potest esse propria ratio plurium. Ergo Angeli superiores non cognoscunt res in propria natura, et sic imperfectius cognoscent quam inferiores; quod est absurdum.	3. If the higher angels know all that the lower do but through more universal forms, these forms in the higher angels’ intellects must extend to more things. However, one and the same thing cannot represent the individual characteristics of many things. Therefore, the higher angels would not know things in their individual natures, and so their knowledge would be less perfect than that had by lower angels. This, however, is absurd.
Praeterea, cognitio Angelorum est secundum virtutem et naturam cognoscentis, ut dicit Dionysius, cap. VII de Divin. Nomin. Sed natura superioris Angeli est magis actualis quam natura inferioris; ergo et similiter cognitio. Sed cognitio universalis est in potentia, cognitio vero in particulari est actu. Ergo superiores Angeli cognoscunt res per formas minus universales.	4. As Dionysius says, the knowledge of angels is determined by the power and nature of the knower. Now, the nature of a higher angel is more in act than a lower angel’s nature is. Consequently, his knowledge is also more in act. But universal knowledge is in potency, and particular knowledge is in act. Therefore, higher angels know through forms that are less universal.
In contrarium.	To the Contrary
Est quod dicit Dionysius, cap. XII caelestis hierarchiae, ubi dicit, quod superiores Angeli, ut Cherubim, habent scientiam altiorem et universaliorem; inferiores autem Angeli habent particularem et subiectam scientiam.	1. According to Dionysius, higher angels, such as the Cherubim, have higher and more universal knowledge. Lower angels have only particular and inferior knowledge.
Praeterea, in Lib. de causis dicitur, quod intelligentiae superiores continent formas magis universales.	2. In The Causes it is said that “the higher intelligences contain forms that are more universal.”
Praeterea, superiores Angeli sunt simpliciores quam inferiores. Ergo et formae in eis sunt simpliciores; ergo et magis universales, quia quod est universalius est simplicius.	3. Higher angels possess greater simplicity than the lower do. Consequently, their forms are also more simple and, therefore, more universal, for what is more universal possesses greater simplicity.
Responsio.	REPLY.
Dicendum, quod potentia quae ad multa se habet, determinatur ad unum per actum; unde forma et actus invenitur esse principium unionis; sed potentia invenitur esse principium divisionis et multiplicationis. Et quia efficacia rei in operando est ex hoc quod est in actu, inde est quod omnis virtus quanto est magis unita, tanto est efficacior ad operandum; et ideo quanto aliqua virtus est altior, tanto invenitur ex paucioribus operari, quae tamen ad plura se extendunt. Et hoc videmus communiter in operativis et cognitivis virtutibus. Ars enim architectonica, utpote aedificatoris, per unam formam artis dirigitur in omnibus quae ad artem suam spectant; in quibus tamen inferiores artifices, utpote coementarii et caesores lignorum, et alii huiusmodi, per diversa artificia diriguntur. Similiter etiam in cognitivis aliquis qui est elevatioris intellectus, ex paucis principiis penes se retentis habet in promptu procedere ad varias conclusiones, ad quas pervenire non possunt qui sunt hebetioris ingenii, nisi per varias inductiones, et per principia particulariter coaptata conclusionibus.	That which is in potency to many is made determinate to one by act. Consequently, form and act are found to be principles of union, but potency is found to be the principle of multiplicity and division. Now, since the ability of a thing to operate comes from its being in act, the more united a power is, the more it is able to act. Consequently, the higher a power is, the fewer the things it needs for its operation, even though it extends to many things. We see that this is generally true of productive and knowing powers. For, even though a master art, such as architecture, by one form directs all the operations coming within its scope, in these operations the subordinate workmen are directed by diverse arts. The same is true of the cognoscitive powers. A person with a higher intelligence is ready, from a few principles he has within himself, to proceed to various conclusions which those with a less acute intelligence cannot reach without considerable illustrated explanation and without knowing the proximate principles of these conclusions.
Unde, cum in Deo sit perfectissima virtus, et puritas actus, ipse per unum, quod est essentia sua, omnia operatur et omnia cognoscit efficacissime. Ab ipsa autem effluunt rationes rerum intelligibilium in Angelis, ut ex dictis, art. praeced., patet, non quidem ad causandum res, sed ad cognoscendum. Unde quanto in Angelo fuerit plus de actu, et minus de potentia, tanto emanatio huiusmodi rationum minus in ipso multiplicatur, et virtus eius cognitiva, erit efficacior. Et secundum hoc superiores Angeli cognoscunt res per formas magis universales quam inferiores.	Now, since in God there is pure act and a most perfect power, He can do all things, and know all things most perfectly by means of one thing, His own essence. Moreover, as was previously explained, the representations of intelligible things flow from God into the angels, not in order that the angels may cause things, but in order that they may know them. Consequently, the more act and less potency there is in an angel, the fewer are the emanations he receives, and the stronger is his power to know. According to this principle, therefore, the higher angels know through forms more universal than those by which the lower know.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod cognoscere aliquid in universali, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo ut referatur ad cognitionem ex parte cogniti; et sic cognoscere aliquid in universali est cognoscere naturam universalem cogniti. Et sic propositio veritatem habet, quia quando cognoscitur de aliquo natura universalis tantum, imperfectius cognoscitur quam si cognoscantur cum hoc propria ipsius. Alio modo ut referatur ad cognitionem ex parte eius quo cognoscitur; et sic cognoscere aliquid in universali, id est per medium universale, est perfectius dummodo cognitio usque ad propria deducatur.	1. To know something “by universal knowledge” can be understood in two ways. First, it can refer to what is known. If taken this way, then to know something by universal knowledge means to know the universal nature of an object. In this sense, the argument is true, because, if only the universal nature of a thing is known, the thing is known less perfectly than it would be were it known in its individuality. Secondly, the phrase can refer to the medium of cognition. Then to know a thing by universal knowledge, that is, by a medium which is universal, is more perfect, as long as this knowledge extends to the individuality of the thing.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod dicuntur esse formae magis universales quantum ad cognitionem, non quia plurium rerum cognitionem causent, sed quia per pauciores formas ad eadem cognoscenda superior intellectus perficitur, et etiam ad perfectius cognoscendum; utpote si superior Angelus per unam formam animalis omnes species animalium cognoscat, inferior autem non nisi per multas species. Et praeter hoc superior Angelus plures rationes intelligibiles ex eisdem rebus cognoscat.	2. These forms are said to be more universal with respect to knowledge, not because they cause the knowledge of more things, but because a higher intellect, perfected by a few of them, can nevertheless know the same number of things—even more perfectly. For example, a higher angel might know all species of animals by means of one form of animal, but a lower angel would not know them except through many forms. Besides this, a higher angel can draw out many more intelligible characters from the same things.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod id quod est unum, non potest esse propria ratio plurium, si sit eis adaequatum. Sed si sit superexcedens, potest esse plurium propria ratio, quia continet in se uniformiter propria utriusque quae in eis divisim inveniuntur. Et hoc modo essentia divina est propria ratio rerum omnium, quia in ipsa uniformiter praeexistit quidquid divisim in omnibus creaturis invenitur, ut Dionysius dicit.	3. What is one cannot be the intelligible representation of many in their individuality if it is merely equal to them. However, if it excels them, then it can represent their individual characteristics, because, within its own one form, it contains the individual characteristics of each of the elements which these objects have separately. In a similar manner, God’s essence is the intelligible representation of all things in their individuality, for, as Dionysius says, in this one form there preexists all that is found separately in creatures.
Et similiter, cum formae intellectus angelici sint excellentiores rebus ipsis, utpote divinae essentiae propinquiores, non est inconveniens, si una forma intellectus angelici sit ratio propria plurium secundum diversas eius habitudines ad diversas res, sicut et divina essentia est propria ratio plurium secundum diversas habitudines eius ad res, ex quibus habitudinibus consurgit pluralitas idearum. Sed formae intellectus nostri accipiuntur ex rebus; unde non sunt superexcedentes rebus, sed quasi adaequatae quantum ad repraesentationem, licet sint excedentes quantum ad modum essendi, inquantum habent esse immateriale. Unde una forma intellectus nostri non potest esse ratio propria plurium.	Similarly, since the forms in the intellects of angels, being closer to God, excel things, it is not inconsistent to say that one form within an angelic intellect is an intelligible representation of many things in their individuality, according as this form has different relationships to different things, just as the divine essence is the proper representation of many things in their individuality according to its different relationships to things; and from these relationships an angel can have many ideas. The forms in our intellects, however, are received from things. Hence, they do not excel things, and are, as it were, equal to them as far as representation goes, even though they may excel them in mode of being because their act of existence is immaterial. Consequently, one form in our intellect cannot be the intelligible representation of many things in their individuality.
Ad quartum dicendum, sicut ad primum.	4. The answer is the same as for the first difficulty.

---

ARTICLE XI In the eleventh article we ask: Do angels know singulars? [ARTICLE De ver., 10, 5; 19, 2; S.T., I, 57, 2; 89, 4; II Sent., 3, 3, 3; IV Sent., 50, 1, 3; C.G., II, 100; Quodl., VII, 1, 3; Q.D. De anima, 20; De subst. sep., c. 14 (Perr. 1:nn.81-84).]
Undecimo quaeritur utrum Angelus cognoscat singularia	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non.	It seems not, for
Quia, ut dicit Boetius, universale est dum intelligitur, singulare dum sentitur. Sed Angelus non cognoscit nisi per intellectum. Ergo non cognoscit singularia.	1. According to Boethius: “The universal is known in intellection, the singular, in sensation.” But angels do not know except through intellection. Therefore, they do not know singulars.
Sed dicebat, quod auctoritas intelligitur de intellectu nostro, non autem de Angelo.- Sed contra, intellectui nostro convenit non intelligere singularia, ratione suae immaterialitatis. Unde cognitivae potentiae materiales in nobis existentes singularia cognoscunt, ut sensus et imaginatio. Sed intellectus Angeli est immaterialior quam humanus. Ergo non cognoscit singularia.	2. But it was said that this statement referred to our intellect, not to that of an angel.—On the contrary, because it is immaterial, our intellect cannot understand singular things. Consequently, it is our material powers of knowing, such as sense and imagination, that know singulars. But an angel’s intellect is more immaterial than man’s. Hence, it does not know singulars.
Praeterea, omnis cognitio est per assimilationem cognoscentis ad cognitum. Sed intellectus Angeli non potest assimilari singulari inquantum est singulare; quia singulare est singulare per materiam, intellectus autem Angeli est omnino separatus a materia et condicionibus materiae. Ergo intellectus Angeli non cognoscit singularia in sua singularitate.	3. All knowledge takes place through an assimilation of the knower to the known. Now, an angel’s intellect cannot be assimilated to a singular in its singularity because a singular gets its singularity from matter, and an angel’s intellect is entirely removed from matter and from the conditions of matter. Consequently, the intellect of an angel does not know singulars in their singularity.
Praeterea, idem est principium essendi et cognoscendi, secundum philosophum. Sed forma individuata est principium essendi singulari. Ergo ipsa est principium cognoscendi singulare. Sed intellectus angelicus accipit sine materia et conditionibus materiae, ex quibus formae individuantur. Ergo accipit universale tantum, et non singulare.	4. According to the Philosopher, the principle of being and the principle of knowing are one and the same. But the principle of being for a singular is an individuated form. Hence, this is the principle of knowing the singular. An angelic intellect, however, receives [forms] without matter and the conditions of matter which’individuate forms. Therefore, it receives only universals, and not singulars.
Praeterea, omne quod est in altero, est in eo per modum recipientis. Sed intellectus Angeli est simplex et immaterialis. Ergo similitudines particularium in eius intellectu existentes sunt in eo immaterialiter et simpliciter, et ita universaliter; et sic per eas singularia non cognoscit.	5. Whatever is received into another is there after the manner of the recipient. Now, an angelic intellect has a simple and immaterial mode of being. Consequently, the likenesses of particular things existing in an angel’s intellect are there immaterially and simply, and therefore universally. Hence, by their means, he does not know singulars.
Praeterea, diversa, inquantum diversa, non per idem proprie medium cognoscuntur, sed per aliud et aliud, quia cognitio aliquorum per medium commune est eorum inquantum sunt unum. Sed quaelibet forma a materia abstracta, est communis multis particularibus. Ergo non potest esse quod per eam diversa particularia in propria natura proprie cognoscantur. Sed in intellectu Angeli non est aliqua forma nisi immaterialis. Ergo nullo modo potest cognoscere singularia.	6. Different kinds of things cannot be distinctly known in their differences by the same medium. They must be known by separate media, because things known by a common medium are known only in so far as they are one. Now, any form abstracted from matter is common to many particular things. Through such a form, therefore, distinct particulars cannot be known distinctly in their individuality. In an angelic intellect, however, there is no form that is not immaterial. Hence, an angel can in no way know singulars.
Praeterea, universale contra singulare distinguitur, per hoc quod universale est in intellectu, singulare autem extra intellectum. Sed universale nunquam est extra intellectum. Ergo nec singulare unquam est in intellectu; et sic non potest per intellectum cognosci.	7. A universal is opposed to a singular for the reason that it is in the intellect while the singular is outside it. Now, a universal is never outside the intellect. Hence, a singular is never inside it, and, consequently, cannot be known by it.
Praeterea, nulla potentia extenditur ultra suum obiectum. Sed quidditas depurata a materia est obiectum intellectus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo cum essentia singularis sit concreta cum materia sensibili, non potest per intellectum cognosci.	8. No power ever goes beyond its object. Now, as is said in The Soul, the object of the intellect is a quiddity stripped of matter Therefore, since a singular essence is realized in sensible matter, i cannot be known by the intellect.
Praeterea, quod per certitudinem cognoscitur, non potest aliter se habere, quia intellectus est similiter absentium et praesentium. De his autem quae possunt aliter se habere, non est certitudo, cum fiant absentia, ut dicitur in VII Metaphysic. Sed singularia possunt aliter se habere, cum sint motui et variationi subiecta. Ergo non possunt per intellectum cognosci; et sic idem quod prius.	9. What is known with certainty cannot change, because intellectual knowledge is the same whether the object be absent or present. But, as is said in the Metaphysics, certitude cannot be had about things that can change, because such things can become absent. Now, singulars can change, for they are subject to motion and variation. Consequently, they cannot be known by the intellect; and the same must be said as previously.
Praeterea, forma intellectus est simplicior intellectu, sicut perfectio perfectibili. Sed intellectus Angeli est immaterialis. Ergo et formae ipsius sunt immateriales. Sed formae non sunt individuae nisi sint materiales. Ergo formae illae, sunt universales; et ita non sunt principium cognoscendi particulare.	10. The form within the intellect is more simple than the intellect itself, just as a perfection is more simple than what is perfected. Now, an angelic intellect is immaterial. Therefore, its forms are immaterial. But its forms are not individual unless they are material. Consequently, those forms are universal, and not principles for knowing singulars.
Praeterea, mensura, quia est principium cognoscendi mensuratum, debet esse homogenea mensurato, ut dicitur in X Metaph. Ergo et species, quae est principium cognoscendi, debet esse homogenea rei quae per ipsam cognoscitur. Sed forma intellectus angelici non est homogenea singulari, cum sit immaterialis. Ergo per eam non potest Angelus singularia cognoscere.	11. As is said in the Metaphysics, because it is the principle by which the measured is known, a measure must be homogeneous with the measured. Therefore, a species, which is a principle of knowledge, must be homogeneous with the thing that it makes known. But, being immaterial, the form within an angelic intellect is not homogeneous with a singular. Through such a form, therefore, an angel cannot know a singular.
Praeterea, potestas gloriae excedit potestatem naturae. Ergo cognitio intellectus humani glorificati excedit cognitionem Angeli naturalem. Sed intellectus hominis glorificati non cognoscit singularia quae hic sunt, quia ut dicit Augustinus in libro de cura pro mortuis agenda, nesciunt mortui, etiam sancti, quid agant vivi, etiam eorum filii. Ergo nec Angeli singularia cognoscere possunt cognitione naturali.	12. The power had in glory surpasses power had by nature. Therefore, the power of knowing possessed by a glorified human intellect surpasses the natural power had by an angel. But the intellect of a beatified man does not know individual things on earth, for, as Augustine says, the dead—even the saints—do not know what the living, even their sons, are doing. Consequently, angels cannot know singulars by means of their natural knowledge.
Praeterea, si Angelus singularia cognoscit; aut hoc est per species singulares, aut per universales. Sed non per singulares, quia oporteret quod tot essent apud ipsum species, quot sunt singularia. Singularia autem sunt in potentia infinita. Quod praecipue apparet, si ponatur quod mundus in posterum non deficiat ab hoc statu; quod constat Deo esse possibile. Et sic essent infinitae formae in intellectu Angeli; quod est impossibile. Similiter nec per universales, quia sic non haberet distinctam cognitionem de singularibus, et hoc esset cognoscere singularia imperfecte, quod non est Angelis attribuendum. Ergo Angeli nullo modo singularia cognoscunt.	13. Were an angel to know singulars, he would know them through either singular or universal species. But he cannot know them through singular species, because then he would have to have within himself as many species as there are singulars. Singulars, however, are potentially infinite. This is evident if one grants that the world will continue in the future as it has in the past—a possibility clearly within God’s power. But then there would be an infinite number of forms in an angel’s intellect; and this is impossible. Likewise, an angel cannot know singulars by means of universals, because in that case he would not have distinct knowledge of individuals, and this would mean that he knew them imperfectly. But imperfect knowledge is not to be attributed to angels. Consequently, angels do not know singulars.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Nullus custodit illud quod ignorat. Sed Angeli custodiunt singulares homines, ut patet in Psal. XC, 11: Angelis suis Deus etc.; ergo ipsi singularia cognoscunt.	1. No. one can guard what he does not know. But angels guard individual men. This is clear from the Psalms (90:11): “For he has given his angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all your ways.” Therefore, they know singulars.
Praeterea, amor non est nisi cogniti, ut patet per Augustinum in libro de Trin. Sed Angeli, cum habeant caritatem, amant singulares homines, etiam quantum ad sensibilia corpora, quae sunt ex caritate diligenda. Ergo et eos cognoscunt.	2. As is clear from Augustine, one can love only what he knows. Now, since angels have charity, they love individual men—even their sensible bodies, for these, too, are to be loved out of charity. Therefore, angels also know men.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in libro posteriorum, quod sciens universale, scit particulare, sed non convertitur. Sed Angeli sciunt universales rerum causas. Ergo et singularia cognoscunt.	3. According to the Philosopher, one who knows the universal knows the particular; but the opposite is not true. Now, angels know the universal causes of things. Hence, they also know singulars.
Praeterea, quidquid potest virtus inferior potest et superior, ut Boetius dicit in Lib. de Consol. Sed vis sensitiva et imaginativa hominis singularia cognoscit. Ergo multo fortius vis intellectiva ipsius Angeli.	4. As Boethius says, whatever a lower power can do a higher power can. But man’s sensitive and imaginative powers know singulars. Therefore, it is even truer to say that the intellectual power of an angel knows them.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod quidam circa hoc erraverunt, dicentes, Angelos singularia non cognoscere. Sed haec positio et a fide est aliena, quia removet ministeria Angelorum circa homines, et etiam rectae rationi repugnat; quia si Angeli ignorant ea quae nos cognoscimus, ad minus quantum ad hoc imperfectior est eorum cognitio: sicut et philosophus dicit in I de anima, quod accideret Deum insipientissimum esse, si discordiam nesciret, quam alii sciunt.	Some have erred in this matter by saying that angels do not know singulars. Such a position is contrary to faith,” denying as it does the custody of angels over men, as well as opposed to right reason, because, if angels did not know things which we know, their knowledge would, at least in this respect, be less perfect. This would occasion a remark similar to that made by Aristotle, to the effect that God would be most stupid if He were ignorant of disharmony that others knew about.
Unde hoc errore excluso, quatuor modi inveniuntur assignati a diversis, quibus Angeli singularia cognoscant. Quidam enim dicunt quod singularia cognoscunt, singularium species ab eis abstrahendo, sicut et nos ea per sensus cognoscimus. Sed ista positio est omnino irrationabilis. Primo, quia Angeli non habent cognitionem a rebus acceptam, ut patet per Dionysium, et per Augustinum in II super Gen. ad litteram, et ex his quae supra dicta sunt. Secundo, quia dato quod a rebus acciperent, formae tamen receptae essent in intellectu angelico immaterialiter per modum intellectus recipientis: et sic eadem difficultas remaneret qualiter per eas possent singularia cognosci, quae ex materia individuantur.	Once we have excluded this error, we find there are four ways proposed by different philosophers to explain how angels know singulars. Some say that angels know singulars by abstracting species of singulars from things, just as we know singulars by means of our senses. But this position is utterly irrational. First of all, as is clear from Dionysius and Augustine, as well as from what has been said above, angels do not receive their knowledge from things. Second, even granting that they do receive it from things, the forms received would be in an angelic intellect immaterially according to the manner of the intellect receiving them. Consequently, the same difficulty would remain: How could they, by these forms, know singular things, which are individuated by matter?
Alius modus est quem Avicenna ponit in sua metaphysica, dicens, quod Deus et Angeli singularia cognoscunt universaliter, et non singulariter; ut intelligatur aliquid singulariter cognosci quando cognoscitur prout est hic et nunc et secundum omnes conditiones individuantes; universaliter vero quando cognoscitur secundum principia et causas universales; sicut singulariter cognoscit aliquis hanc eclypsim cum eam sensu percipit, universaliter vero cum ex motibus caelestibus eam praenuntiat. Et sic ab Angelis singularia universaliter cognoscuntur, inquantum cognitis causis omnibus universalibus, nihil remanet ignoratum in singularibus effectibus. Sed hic modus cognitionis non videtur sufficere. Ponimus enim, Angelos singularia cognoscere etiam secundum ea quae ad eorum singularitatem pertinent, sicut quod cognoscunt singulares hominum actus, et alia huiusmodi quae spectant ad officium custodiae.	Avicenna proposed another theory and said that God and angels know singulars universally, not individually—meaning that a thing is known individually when it is known as it is here and now, and under all its individuating conditions, and universally, when it is known merely according to its universal principles and universal causes. For example, one knows this eclipse individually when he perceives it with his senses, universally when he foretells it from the motions of the heavens. According to this theory, angels would know singulars universally in a similar fashion; and, because they knew all the universal causes, they would be ignorant of nothing in individual effects. This manner of knowing, however, does not seem to be sufficient; for we assert that angels know singulars even with respect to those things which belong to their singularity, just as they also know men’s individual actions and other things of this sort that pertain to the care of a guardian.
Unde tertius modus assignatur a quibusdam, scilicet qui dicunt, quod Angeli habent penes se formas universales totius ordinis universi a creatione sibi inditas, quas applicant ad hoc vel illud singulare, et sic ex universalibus formis singularia cognoscunt. Sed hic modus etiam non videtur conveniens, quia non potest aliquid ad alterum applicari nisi illud alterum sit aliquo modo praecognitum; sicut nos universalem cognitionem singularibus applicamus, quae in cognitione nostra sensitiva praeexistunt. In Angelis autem non est alia cognitio quam intellectiva, in qua singularium cognitio praeexistat, ut sic universales formae intellectus ipsorum possint singularibus applicari. Unde patet quod applicatio universalis ad particulare, praeexigit cognitionem intellectualem singularium in Angelis, et non est causa ipsius.	Hence, a third theory has been proposed by others, namely, those who say that angels have within themselves universal forms of the entire order of the universe. These forms were given angels at the moment of creation, and they apply them to this or to that singular. In this way, they know singulars by means of universal forms. But this theory also seems to be inconsistent, because one thing cannot be applied to another unless that other has been already known previously in some way. For example, we can apply our universal knowledge to singulars which pre-exist in our sensitive knowledge. In angels, however, there is no knowledge other than intellectual in which the knowledge of singulars could pre-exist and so make it possible for the universal forms of their intellect to be applied to singulars. From this it is clear that the application of the universal to the particular demands intellectual knowledge of singulars in angels as a prerequisite; it cannot cause such knowledge.
Et ideo quarto modo probabilius dicitur quod formae quae sunt in intellectu Angeli, sunt efficaces ad causandum cognitionem non solum universalium, sed etiam particularium nulla applicatione praesupposita; quamvis non sit ita de formis nostri intellectus, quae se habent ad res dupliciter: uno modo ut causae rerum, sicut formae practici intellectus; alio modo ut causatae a rebus, sicut formae intellectus speculativi, quo naturalia speculamur. Per formas autem practici intellectus artifex non operatur nisi formam; unde forma illa est similitudo solius formae. Et quia omnis forma, inquantum huiusmodi, est universalis, ideo per formam artis non habet artifex cognitionem de artificiato nisi universalem; sed cognitionem illius in singulari acquirit per sensum, sicut et quilibet alius. Si autem per formas artis faceret materiam et formam, tunc forma illa esset exemplar formae et materiae; et sic per illam formam cognosceretur res artificiata non solum in universali, sed etiam in singulari, quia principium singularitatis est materia.	Hence, it is more probable to say with the fourth theory that the forms within the intellects of angels can cause knowledge, not only of universals, but also of particulars, without there being any need of such application. This, however, is not true of our intellectual forms, which are related to things in two ways: first, as the cause of things, like the forms of the practical intellect; second, as caused by things, like the forms of the speculative intellect, by which we speculate about natural things. By means of the forms of the practical intellect, however, an artisan makes only a form. Hence, the forms of the practical intellect are likenesses merely of forms; and because every form as a form is universal, an artisan can have only universal knowledge of his product by means of the form of his artistic conception. Knowledge of it as a singular he acquires by means of his senses, just as anyone else does. But were he to make both the matter and the form by means of the forms of his artistic conception, then the latter would be an archetype of both form and matter, and, by its means, he could know the products of his art, not only universally, but also individually, because matter is the principle of individuation.
Formae autem quae sunt in intellectu speculativo, fiunt in nobis quodammodo ex actione ipsarum rerum. Omnis autem actio est a forma; et ideo, quantum ex virtute est agentis, non fit aliqua forma a rebus in nobis nisi quae sit similitudo formae. Sed per accidens contingit ut sit etiam similitudo materialium dispositionum, inquantum recipitur in organo materiali, quod materialiter recipit, et sic retinentur aliquae conditiones materiae. Ex quo contingit quod sensus et imaginatio singularia cognoscunt. Sed quia intellectus omnino immaterialiter recipit, ideo formae quae sunt in intellectu speculativo, sunt similitudines rerum secundum formas tantum.	Forms in the speculative intellect, however, arise in us to some extent as the result of the action of things. Now, all action comes from the form. Hence, as far as the power of the agent is concerned, the form that comes to us from things is a likeness only of the form. True, it is also a likeness of material conditions, but this is because it is received in a material organ, which receives in a material way; consequently, it retains some conditions of matter. This is why sense and imagination know singulars. But, since the intellect receives in a manner that is entirely immaterial, the forms within the speculative intellect are likenesses of things only with respect to their forms.
Rationes vero ideales in Deo existentes, sunt effectivae rerum non solum quantum ad formam, sed et quantum ad materiam, et ideo sunt similitudines rerum quantum ad utrumque. Et propter hoc per eas cognoscitur res a Deo non solum in natura universali ex parte formae, sed etiam in sua singularitate ex parte materiae. Sicut autem ab intellectu divino effluunt res naturales secundum formam et materiam ad essendum ex utraque, ita effluunt formae intellectus angelici ad cognoscendum utrumque; et ideo Angeli per formas innatas cognoscunt res in sua singularitate et universalitate, inquantum sunt similes formis factivis, scilicet ideis in mente divina existentibus, quamvis ipsae non sint rerum factivae.	However, the intelligible archetypes existing in God have a causal relation not only to things’ forms but also to their matter. Hence, they are likenesses of things in both respects. For this reason, God knows a thing through them not only in its universal nature by knowing the form, but also in its singularity by knowing its matter. Moreover, just as natural things come from the divine intellect according to both their form and matter, which constitute them in being, so do the forms within the angelic intellects come from God in order that angels might know both. Consequently, angels know things both in their singularity and universality by means of innate forms since these are similar to the creative forms, namely, the archetypes existing in the divine mind; yet these innate ideas do not create things.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod verbum Boetii intelligitur de intellectu nostro, qui accipit formas ex rebus, non autem de angelico, qui accipit formas immediate a Deo; et hoc ratione iam dicta.	1. The statement of Boethius refers to our intellect, which receives forms from things, not to the angelic intellect, which receives forms immediately from God. The reason for this has already been given.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod quia in intellectu Angeli formae immaterialius recipiuntur quam in intellectu nostro, iam sunt efficaciores; et sic se extendunt ad repraesentandum rem non solum quantum ad principia formalia, sed etiam secundum materialia.	2. Because the forms received in an angelic intellect are more immaterial than those in our intellect, they are by that very fact more powerful. Consequently, they represent a thing not only according to its formal, but also according to its material, principles.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod inter cognoscens et cognitum non exigitur similitudo quae est secundum convenientiam in natura, sed secundum repraesentationem tantum. Constat enim quod forma lapidis in anima est longe alterius naturae quam forma lapidis in materia; sed inquantum repraesentat eam, sic est principium ducens in cognitionem eius. Unde, quamvis formae quae sunt in intellectu Angeli, sint immateriales secundum sui naturam, nihil tamen prohibet quin per eas assimiletur rebus non solum secundum formam, sed etiam secundum materiam.	3. Between the knower and the known there is needed a community, not of nature, but of representation. It is evident that that form of a stone existing within the soul has a far different nature from the form of a stone existing in matter, but, inasmuch as it represents the stone, it is a principle which can lead to knowledge of it. Hence, even though the forms within an angelic intellect are immaterial by their own nature, nothing prevents that intellect from being assimilated by means of them to things in regard to their matter as well as in regard to their forms.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod non oportet formam, quae est principium essendi rem, esse principium cognoscendi rem secundum essentiam suam, sed solum secundum suam similitudinem. Forma enim qua lapis est, non est in anima, sed similitudo eius. Unde non oportet quod forma intellectus angelici, qua singulare cognoscit, sit individuata, sed solum quod sit formae individuatae similitudo.	4. A form is a principle of a thing’s being. But it need not be substantially present in an intellect in order to be a principle for knowing the thing; its similitude in the intellect would suffice. For in the soul there is not the form by which a stone exists but only a likeness of that form. Hence, what is necessary is not that the form by which an angelic intellect knows a singular be individuated, but that it be a likeness of the form that is individuated.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod formae in intellectu angelico sunt immaterialiter, et tamen sunt similitudines rerum materialium, sicut et ideae in Deo existentes, quae sunt multo immaterialiores; et sic per eas possunt singularia cognosci.	S. Forms in an angelic intellect are immaterial; yet they are likenesses of material things, just as are the ideas existing in God, which are much more immaterial. Thus, by their means, singulars can be known.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod una species potest esse propria ratio diversorum inquantum est superexcedens, ut ex supra dictis patet. Per unum autem medium adaequatum non possunt diversa distincte cognosci.	6. One species can be an intelligible representation of different things in their individuality if it excels them. This is clear from what has been said. Through a medium that is merely equal, however, distinct things cannot be known distinctly.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod quamvis universale habeat esse in intellectu, tamen ens in intellectu est in plus quam universale; et ideo in processu est fallacia consequentis.	7. Although it is true that the universal has its act of existence in the intellect, the universal is not the only thing that exists in the intellect. Hence, in this reasoning, the fallacy of the consequent occurs.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod per illam speciem a materia depuratam quam intellectus Angeli penes se habet, intelligit etiam materiales conditiones rei, ut ex dictis, in corp. art., patet.	8. By means of that species stripped of matter, which the angelic intellect has within itself, it can also understand the material conditions of a thing. This is clear from what has been said.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod intellectus Angeli per speciem quam apud se habet, cognoscit singulare non solum in sua substantia, sed etiam secundum omnia accidentia eius; et ideo cognoscit cuicumque accidenti singulare variatum subsit; et sic variatio singularis certitudinem cognitionis angelicae non tollit.	9. By means of the species which it has within itself, an angelic intellect knows a singular, not only according to its substance, but also according to all its accidents. Therefore, it can know a singular no matter how many its accidental variations may be. Consequently, the fact that a singular may vary does not take certitude away from angelic cognition.
Ad decimum, patet responsio ex dictis.	10. Our answer to this can be taken from our replies above.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod mensura, inquantum est principium cognoscendi mensuratum est unius generis cum mensurato, sed non simpliciter; sicut patet quod ulna est mensura panni, et non convenit cum eo nisi in quantitate: sic enim est mensura eius. Sic etiam et forma intellectus angelici non oportet quod conveniat cum singulari extra animam existente, secundum modum existendi; cum singulare sit materialiter, et forma praedicta sit immaterialis.	11. In so far as a measure is a principle for knowing the thing measured, it must belong to the same genus as the latter does, but not in all respects. It is evident, for example, that an elbow length is a measure for cloth, but all it has in common with the cloth is quantity; however, this is enough for it to be a measure for cloth. Similarly, the form in an angelic intellect need not have the same mode of existence that a singular existing outside the soul has, since the singular has a material existence, and the afore-mentioned form is immaterial.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod sancti qui sunt in gloria, cognoscunt in verbo ea quae hic aguntur, ut manifeste Gregorius dicit in moralibus; verbum autem Augustini intelligendum est quantum ad naturalem condicionem nec est simile de Angelo et anima: quia Angelus naturaliter habet formas sibi a creatione inditas, quibus singularia cognoscit.	12. Saints in glory know in the Word the things that are happening here. This is very clear from what Gregory has written. Moreover, this statement of Augustine should be taken as referring to the natural state. Nor is there any parallel between an angel and a soul, because an angel naturally has forms given to him at creation, and, by means of these, he knows singulars.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod formae intellectus angelici neque sunt singulares, sicut formae imaginationis vel sensus, cum sint penitus immateriales; neque sunt hoc modo universales sicut formae intellectus nostri, quibus non nisi natura universalis repraesentatur; sed in se immateriales existentes, exprimunt et demonstrant universalem naturam, et particulares conditiones.	13. Forms in an angelic intellect are neither singular, like the forms in imagination or sense, because they are entirely separated from matter, nor universal, as our intellectual forms are, which can represent only a universal nature. Although they exist immaterially in themselves, they nevertheless indicate and express a universal nature and particular conditions.

---

ARTICLE XII In the twelfth article we ask: Do angels know the future? [ARTICLE S.T., I, 57, 3; 86, 4; II-II, 95, 1; I Sent., 38, 1, 5; II Sent., 7, 21 2; In Isaiam, c. 3 (P. 14:445a); C.G., III, 154; Quodl., VII, 1, 3, ad 1; De spir. creat., a. 5, ad 7; Q.D. De anima, 20, ad 4; De malo, 16, 7; Comp. Theol., I, c. 134.]
Duodecimo quaeritur utrum Angeli cognoscant futura	Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic.	It seems that they do, for
Angeli enim cognoscunt res per formas innatas. Sed formae illae aequaliter se habent ad praesentia et futura. Ergo cum Angeli praesentia cognoscant, cognoscent similiter et futura.	1. Angels know things by means of innate forms. Now, these forms are related equally to the present and future. Consequently, since angels know present things by their means, they also will know the future.
Praeterea, Boetius, in V de consolatione, hanc causam assignat quare Deus futura contingentia infallibiliter praescire potest, quia eius visio est tota simul, cum aeternitate mensuretur. Sed visio beata est tota simul, cum aeternitate participata mensuretur. Ergo Angeli beati futura contingentia cognoscunt.	2. Boethius says that God is able to foreknow future contingent events infallibly, because His vision, being measured by eternity, is entirely simultaneous. But the beatific vision is likewise entirely simultaneous, since it is measured by participated eternity. Consequently, beatified angels know future contingent events.
Praeterea, Gregorius IV dialogorum dicit, quod anima cum recedat a nexibus corporis, vi subtilitatis naturae cognoscit futura. Sed Angelus est maxime a nexibus corporis absolutus, et est subtilissimae naturae. Ergo cognoscunt futura.	3. According to Gregory, when the soul severs its connection with the body, it knows the future by means of its own subtle nature. Now, an angel is completely free of any connection with a body, and its nature is most subtle. Therefore, they can know the future.
Praeterea, intellectus possibilis animae nostrae est in potentia ad omnia cognoscenda, et ita ad cognoscenda futura. Sed potentia intellectus angelici est tota terminata per formas innatas, ut supra, art. 4 et 8 huius quaest., dictum est. Ergo ipsi habent notitiam de futuris.	4. The possible intellect in our soul is in potency to the knowledge of all things, and hence to the knowledge of the future. Now, as was said above, the potentialities of an angelic intellect are completely actuated by means of innate forms. Angels, therefore, have knowledge about future events.
Praeterea, quicumque habet providentiam super aliquem, debet habere et praescientiam eorum quae ad ipsum spectant. Sed Angeli habent curam et providentiam de nobis per officium custodiae. Ergo ipsi cognoscunt ea quae nobis sunt futura.	5. Those who have providence over a person should also have foreknowledge of the things affecting that person. But, as our guardians, the angels have been entrusted with our providence and care. Consequently, they must know things in the future that affect us.
Praeterea, intellectus angelicus excedit intellectum humanum. Sed intellectus humanus cognoscit futura quae habent causas determinatas in natura. Ergo angelicus cognoscit futura contingentia ad utrumlibet quae non habent aliquas causas determinatas; ergo, et cetera.	6. The angelic intellect excels the human. Now, a human intellect can know future events which have determined causes in nature. Therefore, an angelic intellect can know even those future contingent events which, not having any determined causes, can happen in either of two ways.
Praeterea, propter hoc nos aliter nos habemus ad cognoscenda praesentia et futura, quia cognitionem a rebus accipimus; unde oportet res cognitas praeexistere scientiae nostrae. Sed Angeli non accipiunt cognitionem a rebus. Ergo aequaliter se habent ad cognoscenda praesentia et futura; et sic idem quod prius.	7. We are differently related to knowing the future than we are to knowing the present, because we receive our knowledge from things, and, consequently, things must exist before we can know them. Angels, however, do not receive their knowledge from things. Therefore, they are equally related to knowing the future and the present. Consequently, our original thesis stands.
Praeterea, intellectiva cognitio non concernit aliquod tempus, quia abstrahit ab hic et nunc, et sic aequaliter se habet ad omne tempus. Sed Angelus non habet cognitionem nisi intellectivam. Ergo aequaliter se habet ad cognoscenda praesentia et futura; et sic idem quod prius.	8. Intellectual knowledge does not include time, because it abstracts from the “here and now,” and so is equally related to all time. Now the only knowledge an angel has is intellectual. Consequently, an angel is equally related to knowing the present, past, and future. Hence, we conclude as before.
Praeterea, plura cognoscit Angelus quam possit homo cognoscere. Sed homo in statu innocentiae cognoscebat futura; unde et Genes., cap. II, 24: Adam dixit: propter hoc relinquet homo patrem et matrem etc.; ergo et Angeli cognoscunt futura.	9. An angel knows more than a man does. But in the state of innocence man knew future events. This is clear from Genesis (2:24) “Adam said... ‘Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother. Therefore, angels also know the future.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Est quod dicitur Isa., c. XLI, vers. 23: quae ventura sunt annuntiate; et dicemus quia dii estis vos; et sic scire futura, est divinitatis indicium. Sed Angeli non sunt dii. Ergo futura ignorant.	1. In Isaiah (41:23) we read: “Show the things that are to come hereafter: and we shall know that ye are gods.” Thus, knowledge of the future is a sign of divinity. However, angels are not gods. Therefore, they do not know the future.
Praeterea, cognitio certitudinalis haberi non potest nisi eorum quae habent veritatem determinatam. Sed futura contingentia non sunt huiusmodi, ut patet in I Periher. Ergo Angeli futura contingentia non cognoscunt.	2. Knowledge with certitude can be had only of those things which have determinate truth. But, as is clear from Interpretation, future contingent events do not belong to this class of things. Consequently, they are not known by angels.
Praeterea, futura cognosci non possunt nisi vel per speciem artis, sicut artifex cognoscit ea quae facturus est; vel in causis, sicut cognoscitur frigus futurum in signis et dispositionibus stellarum. Sed Angeli non cognoscunt futura per artem, quia ipsi non sunt rerum operatores; nec iterum in causis suis, quia futura contingentia non sunt determinata in suis causis, alias essent necessaria. Ergo Angeli nullo modo futura contingentia cognoscunt.	3. Future events can be known only through a species of an artistic conception like that by which an artist knows the things he is going to make, or in their causes, as a future cold spell is known in the signs and positions of the stars. But angels do not know the future by means of artistic conceptions, because they do not make anything, nor do they know future things in their causes, since future contingent events are not determined in their causes. If they were, they would be necessary. There are no means, therefore, by which angels know future contingent events.
Praeterea, Hugo de sancto Victore dicit in libro de sacramentis, quod monstratum est Angelis quid facturi essent, non autem quid eis esset futurum. Ergo multo minus alia futura cognoscunt.	4. Hugh of St. Victor says that angels were shown what they should do, not what would happen to them in the future. It is even less true, therefore, to say that they know other future events.
	REPLY
Responsio. Dicendum, quod unumquodque hoc modo cognoscitur in aliquo quo modo est in eo. Quaedam igitur futura sunt quae in causis suis proximis determinata sunt hoc modo, ut ex eis necessario contingant, sicut solem oriri cras; et tales effectus futuri in suis causis cognosci possunt. Quidam vero futuri effectus in causis suis non sunt determinate, ut aliter evenire non possit; sed tamen eorum causae magis se habent ad unum quam ad alterum; et ista sunt contingentia, quae ut in pluribus vel paucioribus accidunt; et huiusmodi effectus in causis suis non possunt cognosci infallibiliter, sed cum quadam certitudine coniecturae. Quidam autem effectus futuri sunt quorum causae indifferenter se habent ad utrumque; haec autem vocantur contingentia ad utrumlibet, ut sunt illa praecipue quae dependent ex libero arbitrio.	Anything that is known in another thing is known according to the manner in which it exists in that other. Now, some future events are determined in their proximate causes in such a way as to happen necessarily from them, for example, tomorrow’s rising of the sun. Future effects of this sort can be known in their causes. Other future effects, however, do not exist so determinately in their causes that something else might not happen; their causes are merely disposed more to one effect than to another; and these effects are contingent events, which happen more or less often as the case may be. As a consequence, effects of this type cannot be known in their causes with infallibility, but only with conjectural certitude. Moreover, other future effects come from causes that are indifferently related to opposite effects; and these effects, especially those that depend upon free choice, are called “contingent to opposites.”
Sed quia ex causa ad utrumlibet, cum sit quasi in potentia, non progreditur aliquis effectus, nisi per aliquam aliam causam determinetur magis ad unum quam ad aliud, ut probat Commentator in II Phys.; ideo huiusmodi effectus in causis quidem ad utrumlibet nullo modo cognosci possunt per se acceptis. Sed si adiungantur causae illae quae causas ad utrumlibet inclinant magis ad unum quam ad aliud, potest aliqua certitudo coniecturalis de effectibus praedictis haberi: sicut de his quae ex libero arbitrio dependent, aliqua futura coniicimus ex consuetudinibus et complexionibus hominum, quibus inclinantur ad unum.	Now, as the Commentator proves, an effect cannot come from a cause indifferent to opposites and in a certain respect in potency, unless this cause is determined to one cffcct more than to another by means of another cause. Consequently, an effect of this sort cannot be known in any way through causes indifferent to opposites if these causes be taken merely by themselves. Yet, if we consider these causes, which are indifferent to opposites, together with those things that incline them more to one effect than to another, we can get some conjectural certitude about their effects. For example, we can conjecture about future effects depending upon free choice by considering men’s habits and temperaments, which incline them to one course of action.
Omnes autem huiusmodi effectus, qualescumque sint eorum causae proximae, tamen in causa prima omnes sunt determinati, quae sua praesentia omnia intuetur, et sua providentia omnibus modum apponit. Angeli autem et divinam essentiam intuentur, et per formas innatas cognitionem omnium rerum et causarum naturalium habent. Cognitione igitur naturali quae est per formas innatas illa tantum futura praescire possunt quae in causis naturalibus sunt determinata, vel in una tantum causa, vel in collectione plurium; quia aliquid est contingens respectu unius causae quod respectu concursus plurium causarum est necessarium. Angeli autem omnes naturales causas cognoscunt; unde quaedam quae contingentia videntur, aliquibus causis eorum pensatis, Angeli ut necessaria cognoscunt, dum omnes causas ipsorum cognoscunt. Si autem divinam providentiam comprehenderent, omnes futuros eventus certitudinaliter scirent. Sed quia quidam perfectius aliis divinam providentiam intuentur, quamvis nullus eorum perfecte comprehendat, ideo quidam in verbo plura futura etiam de contingentibus ad utrumlibet, aliis sciunt.	But all these future effects, no matter what their proximate causes may be, exist determinately in the first cause, which by its presence sees them all, and by its providence gives a determinate character to each. Now, the angels see the divine essence and, by means of innate forms, know all thing§ and all natural causes. By their natural knowledge, therefore, they can foreknow by their innate forms only those future events which have determinate existence in a natural cause, whether this cause be merely one thing or a collection of many things —for an effect may be contingent with respect to one cause but necessary with respect to a concurrence of many. And since angels know all natural causes, some effects that seem contingent to us, who consider only a few causes, are known as necessary by the angels, who consider all their causes. Indeed, if angels could comprehend God’s providence, they would know all future events with certainty. None of them, however, comprehends His providence perfectly; but because some of them see it more perfectly than others do, they know more future events in the Word, even those coming from causes indifferent to opposites, than others know.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod species quae sunt in mente Angeli, non se habent aequaliter ad praesentia et futura, quia illa quae sunt praesentia, sunt similia in actu formis in Angelis existentibus, et sic per ea possunt cognosci; illa vero quae sunt futura, nondum sunt similia; et ideo per formas praedictas non cognoscuntur, ut supra declaratum est.	1. Species within an angelic intellect are not related equally to the present and future, because things that are present are actually similar to the forms existing within the angels and, consequently, can be known by their means. Things that are future, however, are not yet similar to these forms and thus, as explained earlier, cannot be known through them.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod quantum ad visionem qua vident res in verbo, indifferenter se habent ad cognoscenda praesentia et futura; non tamen sequitur quod in verbo omnia futura cognoscant, quia verbum non comprehendunt.	2. Angels are related indifferently to the knowledge of the present and future as far as the vision by which they see things in the Word is concerned. Yet it does not follow that they know all future events in the Word, because they do not comprehend the Word.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut Augustinus narrat, XII super Genes. ad litteram, quidam posuerunt quod anima in seipsa quamdam vim divinationis habet. Sed hoc Augustinus ibidem reprobat, quia si per seipsam posset futura praedicere, semper esset praescia futurorum. Nunc autem videmus, quod non est in potestate sua cognitionem futurorum habere quandocumque voluerit, quamvis aliquando praesciat; unde oportet quod adiutorio alicuius eveniat quod futura cognoscit. Adiuvatur autem aliquo superiori spiritu, increato vel creato, bono vel malo. Et quia mole corporis aggravatur, et dum sensibilibus intendit, minus est intelligibilium capax; ideo quando a sensibus abstrahitur vel per somnum vel per aegritudinem, vel quocumque alio modo, fit ex hoc magis idonea ad impressionem superioris spiritus recipiendam. Et ideo dum praedicto modo a nexibus corporis absolvitur, futura praenoscit, aliquo spiritu revelante, qui ea futura revelare potest quae praescit vel naturali cognitione, vel in verbo, ut dictum est.	3. As Augustine tells us, some asserted that “the soul has powers of divination in itself.” He refuted this opinion on the grounds that, if the soul could foretell the future by its own means, it would always know future events; but we know that, even if the soul does have foreknowledge at some times, it is unable to know the future whenever it wishes. Consequently, it must need some help in order to know the future. It can be helped by a higher spirit, created or uncreated, good or evil. Moreover, while it is burdened with the weight of a body and fixes its attention on sense-objects, it is less capable of receiving such thoughts. Hence, when it withdraws from the senses, either in sleep or in sickness or by any other way, it thereby becomes more susceptible to the influence of the higher spirit. So, being severed in this manner from its physical connections, the soul foreknows the future with the help of a revelation by a higher spirit, who can reveal these future things, because, as has been said, he knows them either by his natural knowledge or in the Word.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod duplex est potentia. Una est naturalis quae potest per agens naturale in actum reduci; et talis potentia in Angelis est totaliter completa per formas innatas: sed secundum talem potentiam intellectus possibilis noster non est in potentia ad futura quaelibet cognoscenda. Est autem alia potentia obedientiae, secundum quam in creatura fieri potest quidquid in ea fieri voluerit creator; et sic intellectus possibilis est in potentia ad futura quaelibet cognoscenda, inquantum ei scilicet possunt divinitus revelari. Talis autem potentia intellectus angelici non est totaliter completa per formas innatas.	4. There are two kinds of potency. One is natural and can be reduced to act by a natural agent. This potency in angels is completely actuated by innate forms. It is not according to this kind of potency, however, that our possible intellect is in potency to knowing all future things. But there is another potency, obediential potency, according to which the Creator can cause whatever He wants to cause in a creature. The possible intellect is in this kind of potency to the knowledge of all future things, that is, all things can be divinely revealed to it. However, the obediential potency of the angelic intellect is not totally actuated by means of innate forms.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod ille qui habet aliquorum providentiam, non oportet quod praesciat futuros eventus; sed ut praevideat qui eventus contingere possunt, ut secundum hoc remedia adhibeat.	5. It is not necessary for one who has providence over some persons to foreknow future events. It is enough for him to foresee what might happen so he can take proper steps against it.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod intellectus Angeli excedit humanum in hoc quod contingentium determinatorum in suis causis plura et certius novit; non autem oportet quod excedat quantum ad hoc quod obiectio tangit.	6. An angelic intellect surpasses a human intellect inasmuch as it knows more contingent effects that exist determined in their causes and these with greater certitude. It does not necessarily surpass it in the respect touched upon in the objection.
Ad septimum dicendum sicut ad primum.	7. The reply here should be the same as that given to the first difficulty.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod Angelus per intellectivam cognitionem cognoscit ea quae sunt hic et nunc, quamvis ipse intellectus cognoscens sit abstractus ab hic et nunc, ut ex dictis patet. Et ideo non est mirum si alio modo cognoscit praesentia quam futura; non ex hoc quod ipse aliter ad ea se habeat, sed ex hoc quod illa aliter se habent ad ipsum, ut patet ex dictis.	8. By means of his intellectual knowledge, an angel knows things which are here and now, even though he himself is free from space and time. This is clear from what has been said. Hence, it should not occasion surprise if he should know the present in a manner different from that by which he knows the future. For he knows them differently, not because he has a different relation to them, but because, as explained previously, they are differently related to him.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod homo in statu innocentiae futura contingentia praescire non poterat nisi vel in causis suis, vel in verbo; ut Angeli cognoscunt, ut ex dictis patet.	9. In his state of innocence, man did not know future contingent events except in their causes or in the Word, just as angels know them. This is clear from what has been said.
	Answers to Contrary Difficulties
Ad ea vero quae in contrarium obiiciuntur, inquantum contra veritatem procedunt, patet responsio ex dictis.	To the extent that these Difficulties are contrary to the truth, an answer will be found in what has been said in this article.

---

ARTICLE XIII In the thirteenth article we ask: Can angels know the heart’s secrets? [ARTICLE S.T., I, 57, a. 4; Resp. de art. 42 (Declar. XLII quaest.), a. 38 (P. 16:163); Resp. de art. 36 (Declar. XXXVI quaest.), a. 36 (P. 16:175); De malo, 16, 8; In I Cor.,c. 2, lect. 2 (P. 13:171a).]
Decimotertio quaeritur utrum Angeli scire possint occulta cordium	Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic.	It seems that they can, for
Angelorum enim officium est purgare. Sed impuritas a qua purgamur, est in conscientia. Ergo Angeli conscientias nostras cognoscunt.	1. To cleanse is the duty of angels. But the impurity from which we are cleansed is in our conscience. Therefore, angels know our consciences.
Praeterea, sicut corpus figuratur figura, ita intellectus figuratur specie eius quod actu cogitat. Sed oculus videns corpus, videt simul figuram corporis. Ergo et Angelus videns intellectum alterius Angeli, videt eius cogitationem.	2. As the body receives its shape from its figure, so does the intellect receive its shape from the species of that which it actually thinks about. Now, when the eye sees a body, it simultaneously sees the body’s shape. Therefore, when an angel sees another angel’s intellect, he sees its thought.
Praeterea, species quae sunt in intellectu, cum sint intelligibiles actu, sunt magis intelligibiles quam formae in rebus materialibus existentes, quae sunt intelligibiles in potentia tantum. Sed Angeli per formas quas apud se habent, intelligunt rerum materialium formas. Ergo multo fortius intelligunt formas existentes in intellectu nostro; et sic cognoscunt cogitationes nostras.	3. Since the species in an intellect are actually intelligible, they are more intelligible,than the forms existing in material things, which are merely potentially intelligible. Now, angels understand the forms of material things by means of forms which they have within themselves. Consequently, it is even truer that they understand the forms within our intellect; hence, they know our thoughts.
Praeterea, cognitio hominis nunquam est sine phantasmate. Sed Angeli cognoscunt phantasmata quae sunt in nostra imaginatione; unde Augustinus, dicit, XII super Genesim ad litteram, quod spirituales corporalium similitudines in animo nostro innotescunt spiritibus etiam immundis. Ergo Angeli cogitationes nostras cognoscunt.	4. Man never knows without a phantasm. But angels know the phantasms in our imagination. Consequently, Augustine says: “The spiritual likenesses of material things existing within our soul are known to spirits, even to unclean spirits.” Therefore, angels know our thoughts.
Praeterea, Angelus per formas quas apud se habet, cognoscit quidquid potest per eas facere. Sed ipse potest imprimere in intellectum nostrum, illuminando et purgando nos. Ergo multo fortius potest cogitationes nostras cognoscere.	5. By means of the forms he has within himself an angel can know whatever he can do by these forms. Now, an angel can make an impression on our intellect by enlightening and cleansing us. Therefore, it is even truer that he can know our thoughts.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in Lib. de divinationibus Daemonum, quod Daemones aliquando hominum disputationes non solum voce prolatas, verum etiam cogitatione conceptas, dum ex animo exprimuntur in corpore, tota facilitate perdiscunt. Sed non est aliqua cogitatio quae aliquem motum non relinquat in corpore. Ergo omnes cogitationes nostras Daemones, et multo amplius Angeli sancti cognoscunt.	6. Augustine says: “Demons sometimes learn men’s dispositions with the greatest ease, not only when they are expressed by speech, but even when conceived in thought and expressed by the soul through certain signs in the body.” Now, there is no thought that does not leave a trace on the body. Consequently, the demons know all our thoughts, and much more so do the angels.
Praeterea, Origenes supra illud ad Rom. II, 15: et inter se cogitationum accusantium aut defendentium dicit, quod intelligendum est de cogitationibus quae prius fuerunt, quarum quaedam signacula in cogitantibus remanserunt. Ergo ex cogitatione qualibet aliquod signum in anima relinquitur. Sed hoc signum non potest esse Angelo ignotum, qui totam animam videt. Ergo Angeli cogitationes nostras cognoscunt.	7. Commenting on that verse in the Epistle to the Romans (2:15), “...their thoughts between themselves accusing or also defending one another,” Origen says that this passage should be understood as referring to thoughts which, during their existence, left marks on those who had them. Consequently, every thought leaves some mark on the soul. Now, this mark cannot be unknown to an angel, because he sees the whole soul. Hence, angels know our thoughts.
Praeterea, Angeli in causis cognoscunt effectus. Sed notitia procedit a mente, ut Augustinus Lib. IX de Trinitate dicit; et ex notitia habituali procedit intelligentia actualis. Ergo cum Angeli mentem nostram cognoscant, cognoscent nostram notitiam et cogitationem actualem.	8. Angels know effects in their causes. Now, as Augustine says, knowledge proceeds from the mind, and actual understanding proceeds from habitual knowledge. Consequently, since angels know our mind, they know what we know and what we are actually thinking.
	To the Contrary
Sed contra. Ierem., c. XVII, 9-10: pravum est cor hominis et inscrutabile; quis cognoscet illud? Ego dominus. Ergo solius Dei est secreta cordium scire.	1. We read the following in Jeremiah (17:9-10): “The heart is perverse... and unsearchable. Who can know it? I... the Lord. Therefore, it belongs to God alone to know the heart’s secrets.
Praeterea, in Ps. VII, 10, dicitur: scrutans corda et renes Deus; et ita videtur hoc esse solius Dei proprium.	2. The following is found in the Psalms (7:10): “The searcher of hearts and reins is God.” It seems, therefore, that God alone can search our hearts.
	REPLY
Responsio. Dicendum, quod Angeli cogitationes cordium per se et directe intueri non possunt. Ad hoc enim quod mens aliquid actu cogitet, requiritur intentio voluntatis, qua mens convertatur actu ad speciem quam habet, ut patet per Augustinum in Lib. de Trin. Motus autem voluntatis alterius non potest Angelo notus esse naturali cognitione, quia Angelus naturaliter cognoscit per formas sibi inditas, quae sunt similitudines rerum in natura existentium; motus autem voluntatis non habet dependentiam nec connexionem ad aliquam causam naturalem, sed solum ad causam divinam, quae in voluntatem sola imprimere potest. Unde motus voluntatis et cordis cogitatio non potest cognosci in aliquibus similitudinibus rerum naturalium, sed solum in essentia divina, quae in voluntatem imprimit. Et sic Angeli non possunt cognoscere cogitationes cordium directe, nisi in verbo ei reveletur.	Of themselves angels cannot see the thoughts of the heart directly; for, in order that the mind actually think something, the will must make an intention moving the mind to act with respect to its mental species. This is clear from what Augustine has said. Now, an angel cannot naturally know the motion in the will of another person, because he naturally knows by means of forms that have been given him, and these are likenesses of things existing in nature. The motion of the will, however, has no dependence on or connection with any natural cause. It is the divine cause alone that can influence the will. Consequently, the will’s motion and the heart’s thoughts can be known, not by any likenesses of natural things, but only in the divine essence, which leaves its imprint on the will. Thus, angels cannot know the thoughts of the heart directly, but only if they are revealed to them in the Word.
Sed per accidens potest cognoscere cogitationem cordis quandoque; et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo inquantum ex cogitatione actuali resultat aliquis motus in corpore, dum aliquis gaudio vel tristitia afficitur ex his quae cogitat, et sic cor quodammodo movetur. Per hunc enim modum etiam medici quandoque possunt passionem cordis cognoscere. Alio modo inquantum ex actuali cogitatione aliquis meretur vel demeretur; et sic mutatur quodammodo status agentis vel cogitantis in bonum vel in malum. Et hanc dispositionum mutationem Angeli cognoscunt. Sed tamen ex hoc non cognoscitur cogitatio nisi in generali; ex multis enim diversis cogitationibus eodem modo aliquis meretur vel demeretur, gaudet vel tristatur.	Sometimes, however, an angel can indirectly come to know the heart’s thoughts, and this can happen in two ways. First, it happens inasmuch as a motion in the body results from an actual thought, as when one is affected by joy or sadness from what he thinks, and his heart is moved in some way or other. By this means, even doctors can sometimes know what a heart is experiencing. Second, an angel can know thoughts in so far as a person gains or loses merit from what he is actually thinking; for thus the doer’s or thinker’s condition is somehow changed for good or for evil, and angels can know this change in his condition. But this gives only a general knowledge of what was thought, because, as a result of many different thoughts, a person can merit or demerit, be joyful or sorrowful, in the same way.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod purgatio illa de qua loquitur Dionysius non est intelligenda ab impuritate peccati, sed ab ignorantia.	1. That cleansing of which Dionysius speaks should be understood as being from ignorance, not from the impurity of sin.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex una specie quam intellectus penes se habet, in diversas cogitationes prodit, sicut per speciem hominis varia de homine possumus cogitare. Unde etsi Angelus videat intellectum nostrum figurari secundum speciem hominis, non sequitur quod cogitationem cordis determinate cognoscat.	2. From one species which the intellect has within itself, many distinct thoughts arise—just as we can think many different things about man from the one species we have of man. Consequently, even if an angel sees our intellect shaped to the species of man, it does not follow that he knows determinately what the heart is thinking about.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod non omnia actu cogitamus quorum species apud nos habemus, cum quandoque species sint in nobis in habitu tantum. Unde ex hoc quod species nostri intellectus videntur ab Angelo, non sequitur quod cogitatio cognoscatur.	3. We do not actually think of all the things whose species we have within us, because sometimes species are in us only in the state of habit. Consequently, from the fact that the species in our intellects are seen by angels it does not follow that they know our thoughts.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod ex eisdem phantasmatibus ratio nostra in diversa tendit cogitando; et ideo etiam phantasmatibus cognitis quibus anima intendit, non sequitur quod cogitatio cognoscatur. Unde et ibidem, Augustinus subdit: si Daemones internam virtutum speciem possent in hominibus cernere, non tentarent.	4. By means of the same phantasms, our reason can direct its thought to different objects. Consequently, even should one know the phantasms by which the soul thinks, it would not follow that he knew the thoughts themselves. Thus, Augustine says: “If demons could see clearly a man’s internal thought, arising from his virtues, they would not tempt him.”
Ad quintum dicendum, quod ex actione Angeli efficimur potentes ad aliquid cogitandum; sed ad hoc quod in actum cogitationis prodeamus, requiritur intentio voluntatis, quae nullo modo ab Angelo dependet. Unde, quamvis Angeli possint cognoscere virtutem intellectus nostri, scilicet qua possumus intelligibilia speculari, non tamen sequitur quod actuales cogitationes cognoscant.	5. As a consequence of an angel’s action, we may be made capable of thinking certain things; but in order to think something actually, we must make an act of the will, and this by no means depends upon an angel. Consequently, even though angels can know our intellect’s power, that is, the power by which we can speculate about intelligible things, it does not follow that they know our actual thoughts.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod motus corporis, qui est in passionibus animae, non sequitur quamlibet cogitationem, sed tantum practicam. Cum enim aliquid speculative consideramus, hoc modo habemus nos ad considerata ac si essemus in picturis considerantes, ut dicitur in II de anima. Et tamen quando etiam motus corporales sequuntur, motus illi non indicant cogitationem nisi in generali, ut dictum est.	6. Bodily motion, found in the passions of the soul, does not follow all knowledge but only practical knowledge. For, as is said in The Soul, when we consider something speculatively, we are related to the things we are considering “as though we were looking at them in pictures.” Moreover, even when bodily motion does take place, it indicates thought only in a general way, as we have said.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod signacula illa nihil sunt aliud quam merita vel demerita, per quae cogitatio non nisi generaliter cognosci potest.	7. Those marks are nothing other than merits or demerits; and from these, thoughts can be known only in a general way.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod quamvis mens et notitia habitualis cognoscatur ab Angelo, non tamen sequitur quod cognitio actualis: quia ex una habituali notitia multae considerationes actuales progrediuntur.	8. Even though angels know our mind and our habitual knowledge, it does not follow that they know what we are actually thinking, because many actual thoughts can arise from one thing known habitually.

---

ARTICLE XIV In the fourteenth article we ask: Can angels know many things at the same time? [ARTICLE S.T., I, 12, 10; 58, 2; 85, 4; II Sent., 3,3,4; C.G., II, 101.]
Decimoquarto quaeritur utrum Angeli simul multa cognoscant	Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic.	It seems that they can, for
Quia, ut dicit Augustinus, XV de Trinitate: in patria omnem scientiam nostram simul uno conspectu videbimus. Sed hoc modo vident nunc Angeli sicut nos videbimus in patria. Ergo et nunc Angeli simul multa actu intelligunt.	1. Augustine says: “In heaven we shall behold all our knowledge at the same time by one glance.” But angels see now in the manner in which we will see in heaven. Therefore, angels now actually understand many things at the same time.
Praeterea, Angelus intelligit hominem non esse lapidem. Sed quicumque hoc intelligit, simul intelligit hominem et lapidem. Ergo simul Angelus multa intelligit.	2. An angel understands that a man is not a stone. Now, whoever understands this understands man and stone at the same time. Angels, therefore, understand many things at the same time.
Praeterea, intellectus Angeli est fortior quam sensus communis. Sed sensus communis simul multa apprehendit, quia numerus est eius obiectum, cuius partes sunt multae unitates. Ergo multo fortius Angelus potest simul multa cognoscere.	3. An angel’s intellect is stronger than the common sense. But the common sense apprehends many things at the same time, because its object is number, whose parts are many unities. Consequently, it is even truer to say that an angel can know many things simultaneously.
Praeterea, illud quod convenit Angelo ex virtute suae naturae, convenit ei secundum quodcumque medium intelligat. Sed Angelis ex virtute suae naturae convenit multa simul intelligere: unde dicit Augustinus, IV super Genesim ad litteram: potentia spiritualis mentis angelicae cuncta quae voluerit simul notitia facillima comprehendit. Ergo sive cognoscat res in verbo, sive per species proprias, potest simul multa cognoscere.	4. That which belongs to an angel by reason of his natural power belongs to him no matter by what medium he understands. Now, in virtue of his nature it belongs to an angel to understand many things. For this reason, Augustine says: “The spiritual power of an angelic mind can with ease intellectually comprehend at the same time all that it wills. Therefore, no matter whether an angel knows things in the Word or through individual species, he still can know many things at one time.
Praeterea, intellectus et intelligibile relative ad invicem referuntur. Sed unum intelligibile potest simul conspici a diversis intellectibus. Ergo et unus intellectus potest simul inspicere diversa intelligibilia.	5. The intellect and the intelligible are mutually related. Now, one intelligible can be grasped simultaneously by distinct intellects. Therefore, one intellect can focus on distinct intelligibles simultaneously.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, X de Trinitate, quod mens nostra semper meminit sui, intelligit se, et vult se: et eadem ratio est de mente Angeli. Sed Angelus quandoque intelligit alias res. Ergo simul tunc plura intelligit.	6. Augustine says: “Our mind always remembers, understands, aandd wills itself.”The same is true of an angelic mind. Now, an angel sometimes understands things other than himself. Therefore, when this happens, he understands many things at the same time.
Praeterea, sicut intellectus dicitur ad intelligibile, ita scientia ad scibile. Sed sciens potest simul multa scire. Ergo intellectus potest simul multa intelligere.	7. The relation of the intellect to the intelligible is the same as that of knowledge to the knowable. But one who knows can know many things at the same time. Consequently, the intellect can understand many things at the same time.
Praeterea, mens Angeli est multo spiritualior quam sit aer. Sed in aere propter sui spiritualitatem possunt esse simul diversae formae, ut albi et nigri; sicut si a diversis videntibus album et nigrum videatur tali dispositione existente, quod lineae directae ab oculis ad res visas intersecent se in uno puncto, per quod oportebit simul et semel speciem albi et nigri deferri. Ergo multo fortius intellectus Angeli potest simul formari diversis formis; et ita potest simul multa intelligere.	8. An angel’s mind is much more spiritual than air. But because of air’s spirituality, many distinct forms, such as black and white, can exist in it simultaneously. For example, a black thing and a white thing can be so situated that lines drawn from the eyes of different people to these things will intersect at one point, through which the species of black and of white will pass simultaneously. Therefore, it is even truer to say that an angelic intellect can be simultaneously actuated by distinct forms. Hence, it can know many things at once.
Praeterea, intellectus reducitur in actum intelligendi per species quas apud se habet. Sed in intellectu Angeli sunt simul multae species, cum intelligentia sit plena formis, ut dicitur in Lib. de causis. Ergo Angelus simul multa intelligit.	9. The intellect is reduced to the act of understanding by means of species which it has within itself. Now, many species exist simultaneously in an angelic intellect, for, as is said in The Causes: “an intelligence is filled with forms.” Consequently, an angel understands many things at the same time.
Praeterea, multa, in quantum sunt unum, (simul) possunt intelligi. Sed omnia intelligibilia sunt unum, inquantum sunt intelligibilia. Ergo omnia intelligibilia possunt simul intelligi ab Angelo.	10. Many things can be understood at the same time in so far as they are one. But all intelligibles are one in so far as they are intelligible. Therefore, all intelligibles can be understood at the same time by an angel.
Praeterea, plus distat essentia divina a formis creatis quam una forma creata ab alia. Sed Angelus simul intelligit per essentiam divinam, et per formam creatam; cum enim semper in verbo res videat, nisi simul posset res per species innatas cognoscere, nunquam res per species innatas intelligeret. Ergo multo fortius potest simul per diversas formas concreatas intelligere; et sic potest intelligere multa simul.	11. More distance lies between the divine essence and created forms than between one created form and another. Now, angels understand simultaneously through the divine essence and through a created form, because they always see things in the Word, and, unless they knew things at the same time through innate species, they would never understand them by means of these species. Much more possible is it, then, for an angel to understand by means of different created innate forms at the same time and in this way understand many things simultaneously.
Praeterea, si non intelligit multa simul, in actione eius, qua intelligit hoc et illud, cadit prius et posterius. Sed huiusmodi omnis actio cadit sub tempore. Ergo propria operatio Angeli cadit sub tempore; quod est contra id quod habetur in Lib. de causis, quod intelligentia est res cuius substantia et operatio est supra tempus.	12. If an angel did not understand many things at the same time, before and after would be found in the action by which he understands this and that thing. But every action in which before and after are found involves time; and, therefore, the characteristic action of an angel would be circumscribed by time. This is contrary, however, to The Causes, where we read: “An intelligence is a thing whose substance and operation are above time.”
Praeterea, propter hoc intellectus noster, ut videtur, non potest simul multa intelligere, quia intelligit cum continuo et tempore. Sed hoc intellectui angelico non convenit, cum non accipiat a sensibus. Ergo potest simul multa intelligere.	13. The reason for our intellect’s not being able to know many things simultaneously seems to be this, that it understands things dependently on time and space. Neither of these, however, belongs to an angelic intellect, because it does not receive from the senses. Consequently, it can understand many things at the same time.
Praeterea, formae intellectus, cum sint perfectiones secundae, sunt formae accidentales. Sed plures formae accidentales quae non sunt contrariae possunt esse in eodem subiecto, ut albedo et dulcedo. Ergo et intellectus Angeli potest simul informari diversis formis, cum non sint contrariae, et ita simul multa intelligere.	14. Since forms in the intellect are second perfections, they are accidental forms. Now, many accidental forms can exist in the same subject if they are not contraries, as whiteness and blackness are. Therefore, an angel’s intellect can also be informed by many different forms at the same time, as long as they are not contraries. Thus, it can know many things at the same time.
Praeterea, musica et grammatica sunt formae in uno genere, et simul per eas informatur anima eius qui utrumque habet habitum. Ergo etiam intellectus potest simul formari diversis formis; et sic idem quod prius.	15. Music and grammar are forms belonging to one genus; and they can simultaneously inform the soul of a person who has both habits. It is possible, therefore, for an intellect to be informed simultaneously by different forms. Hence, the conclusion is the same as before.
Praeterea, intellectus Angeli intelligit se intelligere, et sic per consequens intelligit se intelligere aliquid quod est extra ipsum. Simul ergo intelligit se et illud aliquid; et ita simul multa intelligit.	16. By understanding that it understands, an angelic intellect is aware that it understands something other than itself. Therefore, it simultaneously understands itself and something else. Thus, it can understand many things at the same time.
Praeterea, intellectus Angeli, quantum est de se, aequaliter se habet ad omnes formas in ipso existentes. Ergo vel simul per omnes intelligit, vel per nullam. Sed non per nullam. Ergo per omnes simul intelligit; et ita simul multa cognoscit.	17. An angelic intellect is of itself indifferently related to all the forms existing within it. Therefore, it understands either through all of them at the same time or through none of them at all. The latter alternative is impossible; hence, it understands through all of them at one time. Thus, it understands many things simultaneously.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Est quod philosophus dicit quod intelligere est unum tantum, scire vero plura.	1. The Philosopher says: “It may happen that we have habitual knowledge of many things, but we have actual understanding of only one.”
Praeterea, ad hoc quod aliquid actu consideretur, requiritur intentio, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed intentio, cum sit motus quidam, non potest simul ferri in diversa, quia unius motus non est nisi unus terminus ad quem. Ergo Angelus non potest simul multa intelligere.	2. As Augustine says, an intention is required before a thing can be considered actually. But, since intention is a motion, it cannot be directcd to different objects, because one motion can have only one end-term. Consequently, an angel cannot know many things at the same time.
Praeterea, sicut corpus figuratur figura, ita intellectus figuratur specie eius quod actu intelligit, ut dicit Algazel. Sed unum corpus non potest simul figurari diversis figuris. Ergo nec unus intellectus potest simul formari diversis speciebus; et ita nec multa simul intelligere.	3. As a body receives its shape from figure, so does the intellect receive its shape from the species of that which it actually understands, as Algazel says.” Now, one body cannot be shaped by different figures simultaneously. Consequently, an intellect, too, cannot be shaped simultaneously by different species. Therefore, it cannot know many things at the same time.
Praeterea, sicut intelligendo res in propria natura, intelligit eas per formas distinctas; ita intelligendo res in verbo, intelligit eas per distinctas rationes. Ergo nec in propria natura nec in verbo potest simul multa intelligere.	4. Just as [an angel], when understanding things in their own nature, understands them through distinct forms, so also, when understanding them in the Word, he understands them through distinct intelligible representations. Therefore, he cannot understand many things simultaneously either in their own nature or in the Word.
Praeterea, virtus rei non excedit substantiam eius. Sed substantia Angeli non potest simul esse in pluribus locis. Ergo nec secundum virtutem intellectivam potest simul multa intelligere.	5. A thing’s power cannot be greater than its substance. Now, an angel’s substance cannot be in many places at the same time. Hence, his intellectual power cannot understand many things at the same time.
Praeterea, illud quod se extendit ad multa, compositionem quamdam habet. Sed intellectus Angeli est simplex. Ergo non potest se extendere ad multa simul intelligenda.	6. A thing which extends to many things contains some composition. But an angel’s intellect is simple. Therefore, it cannot extend to the simultaneous understanding of many things.
	REPLY
Responsio. Dicendum, quod intellectus, omne quod intelligit, intelligit per aliquam formam; et ideo ex formis intellectus, quibus intelligit, oportet considerari, an simul Angelus multa possit intelligere.	All that an intellect understands it understands by means of some form. Consequently, keeping in mind the kinds of forms by which an angel understands, we must now consider whether or not he can understand many things at one time.
Sciendum est igitur, quod formarum quaedam sunt unius generis; quaedam autem generum diversorum. Formae quidem quae sunt diversorum generum, diversas potentias respiciunt; cum unitas generis ex unitate materiae sive potentiae procedat secundum philosophum. Unde possibile est idem subiectum simul perfici diversis formis diversorum generum: quia tunc una potentia non determinabitur ad diversos actus, sed diversae; sicut si aliquod corpus est simul album et dulce, albedo inest ei secundum quod participat de natura diaphani, dulcedo autem secundum naturam humidi. Formae vero quae sunt unius generis, unam potentiam respiciunt; sive sint contrariae, ut albedo et nigredo; sive non, ut triangulus et quadratum.	It should be observed, therefore, that some forms belong to one genus, others belong to different genera, and the forms belonging to different genera are related to different potencies. Now, as the Philosopher says, the unity of a genus is determined by the unity of matter or of potency. Consequently, it is possible for the same subject to be perfected simultaneously by forms belonging to different genera, because then the one potency would not be terminating in different acts but differently. For example, if a body is both white and sweet at the same time, it has whiteness in it in so far as it shares the nature of the transparent medium, and sweetness in so far as it shares the nature of the moist. But forms belonging to one genus are related to one potency, whether they be contraries (as blackness and whiteness) or not contraries (as triangle and square).
Hae igitur formae in subiecto tripliciter esse dicuntur. Uno modo in potentia tantum; et sic sunt simul, quia una potentia est contrariorum, et diversarum formarum unius generis. Alio modo secundum quod sunt in actu imperfecto, ut cum sunt in fieri; et sic etiam simul esse possunt, ut patet cum aliquis dealbatur: tunc enim toto alterationis tempore albedo inest ut in fieri, nigredo vero ut in corrumpi. Tertio modo ut in actu perfecto, ut cum iam albedo est in termino dealbationis; et sic impossibile est duas formas unius generis esse simul in eodem subiecto. Oporteret enim eamdem potentiam ad diversos actus terminari: quod est impossibile, sicut et unam lineam ex una parte terminari ad diversa puncta.	Now, these forms are said to be in a subject in three ways. In the first, they exist only potentially and, consequently, simultaneously, because one potency has for its object different forms of one genus and their contraries. In the second, they exist in imperfect act, so that they are coming into being. In this manner, they can also exist simultaneously. This is evident in the case of one who becomes white; for, during the whole period of alteration, whiteness inheres in him as something coming into being, and blackness as something going out of being. In the third, they exist in perfect act, as whiteness does when the whitening process is finished. In this manner, it is impossible for two forms belonging to the same genus to be present simultaneously in the same subject, because the same potency would have to terminate in different acts; and this is just as impossible as it is for one line, beginning from one point, to be terminated at different points.
Sciendum igitur est, quod omnes formae intelligibiles sunt unius generis, quantumcumque res quorum sunt, sint generum diversorum. Omnes enim eamdem potentiam intellectivam respiciunt. Et ideo in potentia omnes simul esse possunt in intellectu, et similiter in actu incompleto, qui est medius inter potentiam et actum perfectum. Et hoc est species esse in habitu, qui est medius inter potentiam et operationem;	We should understand, therefore, that all intelligible forms belong to one genus, even if the things, whose forms they are, belong to different genera, because all intelligible forms are related to an intellectual potency. Consequently, in the intellect they can all simultaneously exist in potency, as well as in incomplete act—a mean between potency and perfect act. This latter condition is that had by a species which is present habitually, for habit is a mean between potency and act.
sed in actu perfecto plurium specierum intellectus simul esse non potest. Ad hoc autem quod actu intelligat, oportet quod sit in actu perfecto illius speciei secundum quam intelligit; et ideo impossibile est quod simul et semel secundum diversas formas actu intelligat. Omnia igitur diversa quae diversis formis intelligit, non potest simul intelligere; illa vero quae intelligit per eamdem formam, simul intelliget. Unde omnia quae intelligit per unam verbi essentiam, simul intelligit; ea vero quae intelligit per formas innatas, quae sunt multae, non simul intelligit, si diversis formis intelligat. Quilibet enim Angelus eadem forma multa intelligit, ad minus omnia singularia unius speciei per unam speciei formam. Superiores vero Angeli plura possunt una specie intelligere quam inferiores; unde magis possunt simul multa intelligere.	But many species cannot exist simultaneously in perfect act in an intellect, because, in order to understand actually, an intellect must be in perfect act with respect to that species by which it understands. Hence, it is impossible for the intellect to understand actually according to different forms taken together at one time. Therefore, all the different things which it understands by different forms cannot be understood at one time, but all that is understood by the same form will be understood at one time. Consequently, an angelic intellect can understand simultaneously all that it understands through the one essence of the Word, but the things it understands through innate forms (which are numerous) it cannot understand simultaneously if its understanding is through different forms. Any angel, however, through the same form, can understand many things, at least all the singulars of a species by means of one form of that species. Indeed, the higher angels can understand more through one species than the lower angels can. Hence, they are more able to understand many things at one time.
Sciendum tamen, quod aliquid est unum quodammodo, et multa alio modo; sicut continuum est unum in actu et multa in potentia. Et in huiusmodi intellectus, vel sensus si feratur ut est unum, simul videtur; si autem ut est multa, quod est considerare unamquamque partem secundum se, sic non potest totum simul videri. Et sic etiam intellectus quando considerat propositionem, considerat multa ut unum; et ideo inquantum sunt unum, simul intelliguntur, dum intelligitur una propositio quae ex eis constat; sed inquantum sunt multa, non possunt simul intelligi, ut scilicet intellectus simul se convertat ad rationes singulorum secundum se intuendas. Unde philosophus dicit in VI Metaph. dico autem simul et separatim intelligere affirmationem vel negationem, quasi non deinde, sed unum quid sit. Non enim simul intelliguntur inquantum habent ordinem distinctionis ad invicem, sed inquantum uniuntur in una propositione.	We should remember, however, that a thing can be one in one respect and many in another. For example, a continuum is actually one but potentially many. Now, if the intellect or sense is directed to a thing of this sort in so far as it is one, it is seen at one time, but if the same powers are directed to it in so far as it is many (and this would be to consider each part by itself), then the whole could not be seen simultaneously. Similarly, when our intellect considers a proposition, it considers many things as one. Hence, in so far as the things are one, many things are understood at one time when the one proposition made up of them is understood; but, in so far as they are many, they cannot be understood at one time, because this would mean that the intellect can simultaneously turn itself to understanding the intelligible characters of each one of them taken in itself. Consequently, the Philosopher says: “I mean, however, by understanding things ‘together’ or ‘apart’ in an affirmation or negation that they are not understood in succession but as one thing.” For they cannot be understood simultaneously in so far as a relation of distinctness exists between them, but they can be understood simultaneously in so far as they are united in one proposition.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de cognitione beata, qua cognoscemus omnia in verbo.	1. Augustine is speaking of knowledge had by the blessed. In this they know all things in the Word.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod Angelus cognoscendo hominem non esse lapidem, cognoscit multa et unum, et ex dictis patet.	2. As is clear from what has been said, when an angel, knowing a man, knows that he is not a stone, he knows many things as one.
Et similiter dicendum ad tertium.	3. The same answer should be given here as was given to the second difficulty.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod ex natura mentis angelicae est quod per unam formam possit multa intelligere; et sic cum voluerit, convertendo se ad illam speciem, omnia quae per illam speciem cognoscit, simul intelligere potest.	4. The nature of an angelic mind is such that it can know many things through one form. Thus, by turning to that species, it can, when it wishes, understand at one time all that it knows through that species.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod nihil intellectus est in intelligibili; sed aliquid eius quod intelligitur, est in intellectu; et sic non est eadem ratio intelligendi simul multa ab uno intellectu, et intelligendi unum simul a multis intellectibus.	5. No part of the intellect itself is in the intelligible, but something of what is understood is in the intellect. Consequently, the argument for many things being understood simultaneously by one intellect is not the same as that for one thing being understood by many intellects.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus exponit seipsum in XV de Trinitate, hoc quod dixerat in X libro quod mens nostra semper sui meminit, semper se intelligit, semper se vult, ad interiorem memoriam est referendum. Unde anima nostra non semper actualiter se intelligit; sed mens Angeli semper actualiter se intelligit: quod ideo contingit, quia mens Angeli intelligit se per essentiam suam, qua semper informatur, mens autem nostra forte intelligit quodammodo per intentionem. Nec tamen cum mens Angeli se intelligit et aliquid aliud, intelligit simul multa nisi ut unum; quod sic patet.	6. Augustine himself later explains” that his statement, “Our mind always remembers, understands, and wills itself,” refers to internal memory. Consequently, our soul does not always actually understand itself. An angelic mind, however, always understands itself actually. This is due to the fact that an angelic mind understands itself through its essence, which always informs it. Our act of understanding, however, might be said to depend in a certain sense on the intention of our will. Nevertheless, even though an angel’s mind in some way understands itself and some other thing, it does not simultaneously understand many things except as they are one. This will be clear from the following.
Si enim aliqua duo ita se habeant quod unum sit ratio intelligendi aliud, unum eorum erit quasi formale, et aliud quasi materiale; et sic illa duo sunt unum intelligibile, cum ex forma et materia unum constituatur. Unde intellectus quando intelligit aliquid per alterum, intelligit unum tantum intelligibile, sicut patet in visu: lumen enim est quo videtur color, unde se habet ad colorem ut formale; et sic color et lumen sunt unum tantum visibile, et simul a visu videntur. Essentia autem Angeli est ei ratio cognoscendi omne quod cognoscit, quamvis non perfecta, propter quod formis superadditis indiget: cognoscit enim omnia per modum substantiae suae, ut dicitur in Lib. de causis, et secundum propriam virtutem et naturam, ut dicit Dionysius, cap. VII de Divin. Nomin. Unde cum intelligit se et alia, non intelligit simul multa nisi ut unum.	If any two things are so related that one of them is the reason why the other can be understood, one of them will be, as it were, formal, the other, as it were, material. Thus, those two constitute one intelligible, because matter and form constitute one thing. Consequently, when the intellect understands one thing through another, it understands only one intelligible. This is evidently the case with sight. For light is that by which color is seen, and so is related to color, in a manner of speaking, as its formal element. Thus, color and light constitute only one visible thing and are seen simultaneously by sight. Now, an angel’s essence is his means for knowing all that he knows, even though it is not a perfect means and, for this reason, needs forms to be given it. For he knows all things according to the mode of his substance, as The Causes states, and according to his power and nature, as Dionysius says. Consequently, when he understands himself and other things, he cannot understand many things except as they are one.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod scientia nominat habitum, intelligere vero actum. Formae autem possunt esse plures simul in intellectu ut in habitu, non autem ut in actu perfecto, ut ex dictis patet; et ideo contingit simul multa scire, non autem simul multa intelligere.	7. Knowledge is a habit, knowing is an act. Now, many forms can exist in the intellect at the same time habitually, but not in perfect act, as is clear from what has been said. Hence, one can know many things io’gether, but he cannot understand many things at one time.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod formae illae non sunt in aere nisi ut in fieri: sunt enim in eo ut in medio deferente.	8. Those forms are not in the air except in the stage of coming-to-be, for they are in it as in a medium of transmission.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod species multae sunt simul in intellectu Angeli, sed non ut in actu perfecto.	9. Many species exist simultaneously in an angel’s intellect, but they are not in perfect act.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod sicut omnia sunt unum in quantum sunt intelligibilia, ita simul intelliguntur inquantum sunt intelligibilia; et hoc est dum ipsa intelligibilitas intelligitur.	10. All things are one in so far as they are intelligible, and so they can be understood at the same time in so far as they are intelligibles. This takes place when their intelligibility is understood.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod essentia divina est ratio omnium formarum concreatarum Angelo, cum ex ea velut exemplatae deriventur. Non autem una forma est ratio alterius; et ideo non est simile.	11. The divine essence is the cause of the intelligibility of all the angel’s innate forms, because they are, as it were, modeled upon it. One innate form, however, is not the cause of the intelligibility of another. Hence, there is no parallel.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod illa operatio per se cadit sub tempore quae expectat aliquid in futurum, ad hoc quod eius species compleatur; sicut patet de motu, qui non habet speciem completam quousque ad terminum perducatur: non est enim idem specie motus ad medium et ad terminum. Operationes vero quae statim habent suam speciem completam, non mensurantur tempore, nisi per accidens, sicut intelligere, sentire, et huiusmodi; unde philosophus dicit in X Ethic., quod delectari non est in tempore. Per accidens autem in tempore possunt esse tales operationes, inquantum motui coniunguntur in natura tempori subiecta existentes, quae est natura corporea generabilis et corruptibilis, qua ut organo potentiae sensitivae utuntur, a quibus etiam noster intellectus accipit. Unde patet, quod ipsum intelligere Angeli neque per se neque per accidens cadit sub tempore. Unde in una eius operatione qua intelligit unum intelligibile, non est prius et posterius. Sed hoc non prohibet quin plures operationes possint esse ordinatae secundum prius et posterius.	12. Any operation essentially involves time if it needs some future thing to complete its species. This is evidently the case with motion, which does not have a complete species until it is carried through to a term, because the motion which would end at mid-point would be specifically different from that which would terminate at the extreme. On the other hand, operations which have their complete species immediately are not measured by time except for another reason. Examples of such are understanding, sensing, and the like. For this reason, the Philosopher says14 that delight is not in time. By exception, however, these operations can be in time, in so far as they are joined to motion by existing in natures subject to time, namely, physical natures which come into and go out of existence. Our sensitive powers use organs, which are of this nature, and our intellect receives from them. But it is clear that an angel’s act of understanding involves time neither intrinsically nor extrinsically. Therefore, there is no before and after in an act by which he understands one intelligible. Nevertheless, this does not prevent a number of operations from being ordered accor ing to before and after.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod hoc non est tota ratio quare intellectus possibilis noster non possit simul plura intelligere, quam obiectio tangit, sed quod supra dictum est.	13. The reason given in the objection is not the entire reason for o possible intellect’s not being able to understand many things at one time. The entire reason has been given above.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod formae accidentales non contrariae possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto, si potentias respiciunt diversas; non autem si sint unius generis eamdem potentiam respicientes, sicut patet de triangulo et quadrato.	14. Accidental forms, if not contrary, can exist simultaneously link the same subject if they are related to different powers, but not if they belong to one genus and are related to the same power. This is clear if we consider triangles and squares.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod musica et grammatica, cum sint habitus, non sunt actus completi; sed formae quaedam mediae inter potentiam et actum.	15. Since music and grammar are habits, they are not complete acts, but, as it were, forms standing halfway between potency and act.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod intelligens et intellectum in actu sunt unum quodammodo; unde quando aliquis intelligit se intelligere aliquid, intelligit multa ut unum.	16. The knower:and the actually known are in some way one. Hence, when anyone:understands that he understands something, he understands many things as one.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod intellectus Angeli non similiter se habet ad omnes formas quas penes se habet; quia quandoque est in actu perfecto unius formae, et non aliarum; et hoc est per voluntatem, quae reducit intellectum de tali potentia in actum. Unde etiam Augustinus dicit, quod cum voluerit intelligit, ut patet in auctoritate prius inducta.	17. The angelic intellect is not similarly related to all the forms it has within itself, because sometimes it is in perfect act with regard to one form but not with regard to the others. This takes place by means of the will, which reduces the intellect from this potency to act. Consequently, Augustine says in the statement quoted earlier that an angel understands when he wills.
	Answers to Contrary Difficulties
Ad primum vero quod in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum, quod unum tantum contingit simul intelligere ut unum et per unam formam; nihil tamen prohibet multa ut unum simul intelligi, vel per unam formam.	1. It may happen that only one thing can be understood as one at one time and through one form, but this does not prevent many things from being understood as one at one time or through one form.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod quantitas virtualis attenditur secundum comparationem virtutis ad obiecta. Unde, sicut corpus per quantitatem dimensivam potest ex diversis suis partibus diversa tangere, ita et virtus potest diversis applicari secundum diversas comparationes ad diversa, dummodo sit virtus perfecta in actu; sicut ignis simul undique calefacit diversa corpora. Et ita etiam intellectus perfectus per formam potest simul ferri in diversa, ad quae se extendit repraesentatio illius formae; et erunt multae intentiones ex parte eius in quod fertur intellectus, sed una ex unitate intellectus et formae.	2. Virtual quantity is ascertained by comparing the power with its objects. Consequently, just as a body can, by its different parts, touch different things by means of its dimensional quantity, so can a power be applied to different things according to its different relation to them, as long as it has been perfected in act, just as fire can warm different things on all sides at the same time. Similarly, an intellect perfected by a form can be simultaneously directed to the different things to which that form’s representative power extends. There may be many intelligible characters in the thing to which the intellect is directed, but there will be only one species in the intellect because of the intellect’s unity with the form.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod intellectus non intelligit simul multa ad quae intelligenda requiritur, quod diversis formis figuretur.	3. The intellect does not understand many things at one time if, to understand them, it must be shaped by many different forms.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod rationes ideales non differunt nisi secundum habitudines diversas; unde omnes sunt unum per essentiam: quod non est de formis concreatis Angelo.	4. The intelligible characters in the divine ideas differ only in so far as things have different relations to them. Hence, they are one through the divine essence. This is not true of the innate forms possessed by the angels.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod cum dicitur quod virtus non excedit substantiam, non est sic intelligendum quod nihil conveniat virtuti quod non convenit substantiae; sed quod efficacia virtutis est secundum modum substantiae; ut, si substantia est materialis, et virtus materialiter agit.	5. When one says that a thing’s power cannot be greater than its substance, this statement should not be understood as meaning that nothing belongs to its power that does not belong to its substance, but rather that the strength of a power is determined by the mode of the substance. For example, if a substance is material, its power will act in a material way.
Ad sextum dicendum quod quanto aliquid est simplicius, tanto virtute ad plura se extendit, sed quantitate dimensiva ad pauciora; et sic extensio dimensivae quantitatis ad multa indicat compositionem, extensio vero virtutis indicat simplicitatem.	6. The more simple a thing’s virtual quantity, the greater is the number of objects to which it extends; but the more simple its dimensional quantity, the smaller the number of objects to which it extends. Consequently, extension to many things by reason of dimensional quantity is a sign of composition, but extension by reason of virtual quantity is a sign of simplicity.

---

ARTICLE XV In the fifteenth article we ask: Is angels’ knowledge of things discursive? [ARTICLE De ver., 15, 1; S.T., I, 58, aa. 3-4; 79, 8; 85, 5; De malo, 16, 6, ad 1 s. c.]
Decimoquinto quaeritur utrum Angeli cognoscant res discurrendo de uno in aliud	Difficulties
Et videtur quod sic.	It seems that it is, for
Quicumque enim cognoscit unum per alterum, cognoscit discurrendo. Sed Angeli cognoscunt unum per aliud, dum creaturas in verbo intuentur. Ergo et cognoscunt res discurrendo.	1. Whoever knows one thing through another knows it discursively. Now, angels know one thing through another when they see creatures in the Word. Hence, their knowledge of things is discursive.
Praeterea, sicuti nos scimus quaedam, et quaedam ignoramus, ita etiam et Angeli, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed nos ex notis possumus in ignota devenire. Cum igitur Angeli sint altioris intellectus quam nos, videtur quod ipsi possint ex his quae sciunt in cognitionem ignoratorum devenire. Hoc autem est discurrere. Ergo ipsi de uno in aliud discurrunt.	2. just as we know some things and not others, so do angels also know some things and not others. This is clear from what has been said.’ But we are able to learn what we do not know by means of what we do know. Therefore, since angels possess more profound intellects than we, it seems that they, too, can come to a knowledge of what they do not know by means of what they know already. This, however, is discursive knowledge. Therefore, angels reason from one thing to another.
Praeterea, in operatione intellectus non potest attendi alius motus nisi secundum quod discurrit de uno in aliud. Sed Angeli in intelligendo moventur; unde dicit Dionysius, cap. IV de Divin. Nomin., quod Angeli moventur circa bonum et pulchrum circulariter, oblique et recte, sicut et animae. Ergo sicut animae discurrunt intelligendo, ita et Angeli.	3. No motion can be detected in intellection other than that by which the mind passes from one thing to another. Now, angels are moved when they understand, and that is why Dionysius says that the motion of angels with respect to the good and the beautiful is circular, oblique, and horizontal, just as that of our own souls is. Therefore, angels, as well as our own souls, understand discursively.
Praeterea, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de divinatione Daemonum, Daemones cognoscunt cordium cogitationes ex motibus qui in corpore apparent. Hoc autem est cognoscere causam per effectum, hoc autem etiam est de uno in alterum discurrere.	4. As Augustine says,” demons know the heart’s thoughts by means of the movements that appear on the body. But this is to know the cause through the effect; it is also to reason from one thing to another.
Ergo Daemones cognoscunt res, discurrendo de uno in aliud; et eadem ratione Angeli, cum eadem sit cognitio in eisdem naturalis.	Therefore, demons know things by reasoning from one thing to another; and, by the same argument, angels also know in this manner, because the same kind of natural cognition is found in both angels and demons.
Praeterea, Maximus dicit in expositione cap. VII de Divin. Nomin., quod animae nostrae more Angelorum multa in unum convolvunt. Sed convolvere multa in unum, est per collationem. Ergo Angeli conferendo cognoscunt.	5. Maximus says that our souls roll many things together, just as angels do. Now, to roll many things together means to compare them. Therefore, angels know things by way of comparison.
Praeterea, Angeli cognoscunt causas et effectus naturales ita perfecte sicut et nos. Sed nos in causis videmus effectus, et in effectibus videmus causas. Ergo et Angeli; et ita, sicut nos conferimus, ita et ipsi.	6. Angels know natural causes and elffects as perfectly as we do. Now, we see effects in causes and causes in effects. Therefore, angels do the same. Consequently, they make comparisons, just as we do.
Praeterea, omnis cognitio per experimentum accepta est cognitio collativa, quia est in experimento: ex singularibus memoriis multis una communis acceptio sumitur, ut dicitur in I metaphysicorum. Sed Daemones per experientiam longi temporis multa cognoscunt de naturalibus effectibus, ut dicit Augustinus in Lib. de divinationibus Daemonum, et in XII super Genesim ad litteram. Ergo in eis est cognitio collativa.	7. All knowledge had through experience is knowledge had by a process of comparison, because, as said in the Metaphysics, it is based on experience, and the general apprehension results from the memory of many individual events. Now, as Augustine says, through their long experience demons come to know many things about natural effects. Therefore, demons possess knowledge that is the result of comparison.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Omnis discursus vel est ab universali ad particularia, vel a particularibus ad universalia, quia omnis ratio reducitur ad syllogismum et inductionem. Sed, sicut dicit Dionysius, cap. VII de divinis nominibus, Angeli neque a divisibilibus aut sensibus, congregant divinam cognitionem, neque ab aliquo communi ad ista particularia simul aguntur. Ergo in eis non est aliquis discursus.	1. All discursive knowledge is had by reasoning either from the universal to particulars or from particulars to the universal, for all reasoning is reduced to syllogizing and induction. But, as Dionysius says, angels do not acquire divine knowledge from what is divisible or from senses, nor are they led to these particular things from something common. Therefore, there is no discursive knowledge in angels.
Praeterea, secundum hoc homo rationalis dicitur, quod inquirendo discurrit. Sed Angelus non dicitur rationalis, sed intellectualis, ut patet per Dionysium, cap. IV caelestis Hierarch. Ergo Angeli non cognoscunt discurrendo.	2.Man is said to be rational inasmuch as he reasons by inquiring. As is clear from Dionysius, however, angels are not called rational but intellectual. Therefore, angels do not know discursively.
Praeterea, ut dicitur in Lib. de spiritu et anima ratiocinatio est rationis inquisitio. Sed in Angelis non est ratio, quia ratio ponitur in definitione animae sicut proprium eius, ut patet in eodem Lib. Ergo Angelus non ratiocinatur, et sic non discurrit.	31. As said in Spirit and Soul: “Reasoning is a search made by the reason.” But in angels there is no reason, because, as is clear from the same work, reason is put into the definition of the human soul a being one of its properties. Therefore, angels neither reason nor have discursive knowledge.
Praeterea, in eodem libro dicitur, quod eiusdem est visibilium rationes cognoscere, et invisibilia investigare. Primum autem est hominis inquantum habet sensus. Ergo et secundum. Et sic non videtur Angelo convenire, qui sensibus caret.	4. We read the following in Spirit and Soul: “It belongs to the same person to know the natures of visible things and to investigate invisible things.” Now, the first type of knowledge belongs to man because of his senses, and the second type, too, for the same reason. Therefore, it seems that the second type of knowledge does not belong to angels, because they do not have senses.
Praeterea, Commentator maximus dicit in cap. VII de divinis Nomin., quod Angeli non circumeunt circa existentium varietatem, sicut et nostrae animae. Sed secundum hoc animae circuire dicuntur rerum existentium varietatem, quod de uno in aliud discurrunt. Ergo Angeli non discurrunt intelligendo.	5. Maximus the Commentator writes that angels do not circle about a number of existing things as our souls do. Now, souls are said to circle about a number of existing things in so far as they reason from one thing to another. Therefore, angels do not know discursively.
	REPLY
Responsio. Dicendum, quod discurrere, proprie est ex uno in cognitionem alterius devenire. Differt autem cognoscere aliquid in aliquo, et aliquid ex aliquo. Quando enim aliquid in aliquo cognoscitur, uno motu fertur cognoscens in utrumque, sicut patet quando aliquid cognoscitur in aliquo ut in forma cognoscibili: et talis cognitio non est discursiva. Nec differt, quantum ad hoc, utrum aliquid videatur in specie propria, vel in specie aliena. Visus enim non dicitur conferre neque videndo lapidem per speciem a lapide acceptam, neque videndo lapidem per eius speciem in speculo resultantem.	Properly speaking, to discourse is to come to the knowledge of one thing through another. There is a difference, however, between knowing something in another and knowing it from another. For when one thing is known in another, the knower is, by one motion, directed to both. This is clearly the case when a thing is known in another as in an intelligible form. This kind of knowledge is not discursive. Moreover, in this regard, it makes no difference whether the thing be seen in its own species or in a different one; for sight is not said to know discursively when it sees a stone either by means of a species received from the stone itself or by seeing the stone’s species reflected in a mirror.
Sed tunc dicitur aliquid ex aliquo cognosci, quando non est idem motus in utrumque; sed primo movetur intellectus in unum, et ex hoc movetur in aliud; unde hic est quidam discursus, sicut patet in demonstrationibus. Primo enim intellectus fertur in principia tantum, et secundario per principia fertur in conclusiones. Intellectus autem Angeli a sua creatione per formas innatas est perfectus respectu totius cognitionis naturalis, ad quam se extendit virtus intellectiva; sicut et materia caelestium corporum est totaliter terminata per formam, ita quod non remanet in potentia ad aliam formam; et propter hoc dicitur in libro de causis, quod intelligentia est plena formis. Non enim esset plena, nisi tota sua potentia per formas illas terminaretur; unde nihil eorum quae naturaliter cognoscere potest, est ei ignotum.	A thing is said to be known from another, however, when the motion to both is not the same, but the intellect is first moved to one and from this is moved to the other. Consequently, discourse takes place here,. as it evidently takes place in demonstrations. For the intellect is first directed only to principles, then it is directed through the principles to conclusions. From the moment of their creation, however, the intellects of angels are perfected by innate forms giving them all the natural knowledge to which their intellectual powers extend, just as the matter of celestial bodies is completely terminated by its form, with the result that it no longer remains in potency to another form. For this reason, The Causes states: “An intelligence is filled with forms.” Now, it would not be filled with forms unless its entire potentialities were actuated by forms. Therefore, an intelligence is ignorant of none of the things that it can know naturally.
Sed intellectus noster participans defective lumen intellectuale, non est completus respectu omnium cognoscibilium quae naturaliter cognoscere potest; sed est perfectibilis. Nec posset se de potentia in actum reducere nisi quantum ad aliqua esset eius completa cognitio per naturam. Unde oportet quod in intellectu nostro sint quaedam quae intellectus naturaliter cognoscit, scilicet prima principia, quamvis etiam ista cognitio in nobis non determinetur nisi per acceptionem a sensibus. Unde, sicut intellectus noster se habet ad ista principia, sic se habet Angelus ad omnia quae naturaliter cognoscit. Et cum cognitio principiorum in nobis sit altissimum nostrae scientiae, patet quod in supremo nostrae naturae attingimus quodammodo infimum naturae angelicae. Ut enim dicit Dionysius, VII de Divin. Nomin., divina sapientia fines primorum coniungit principiis secundorum. Unde sicut nos sine discursu principia cognoscimus simplici intuitu, ita et Angeli omnia quae cognoscunt; unde et intellectuales dicuntur; et habitus principiorum in nobis dicitur intellectus.	But because our intellect shares in a defective intellectual light, it is not actuated with regard to all the intelligibles which it can know naturally. It remains perfectible, nor could it reduce itself from potency to act had not its knowledge with respect to some things been actuated by nature. Consequently, there necessarily are some things in our intellect which it knows naturally, namely, first principles—even though in us this knowledge is not caused unless we receive something through our senses. Therefore, the relation of our intellect to those principles is similar to that which an angel has to all that he knows naturally. And since the knowledge we have of principles is the highest form of our knowledge, it is evident that on this summit of our nature we reach to some extent the lowest point of an angel’s. For, as Dionysius says: “The divine wisdom has linked the boundaries of the first creatures to the place where the second begin.” Consequently, just as we know principles by simple intuition without discourse, so do the angels know all they know in the same fashion. This is why they are called “intellectual,” and why our habit of principles has the same name.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod Angeli cognoscunt creaturas in verbo, sicut cognoscitur res in sua similitudine absque omni discursu.	1. Angels know creatures in the Word without any discourse, as things are known in their likenesses.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod Angelis non est ignotum aliquid eorum ad quae possunt per naturalem cognitionem pervenire; sed aliqua ignorant quae naturalem cognitionem excedunt; et in horum cognitionem ex seipsis venire non possunt conferendo, sed solum ex revelatione divina. Sed intellectus noster non novit omnia quae naturaliter cognoscere potest, et ideo ex his quae novit, potest in ignota devenire; non autem in ignota quae naturalem cognitionem excedunt, sicut ea quae sunt fidei.	2. Angels are not ignorant of any of the things whose knowledge they can arrive at naturally; but they are ignorant of some things that surpass their natural knowledge. By themselves, they cannot arrive at a knowledge of these through discourse, but they need divine revelation. Our intellect, however, does not know all that it can know naturally. Hence, from the things it knows it can arrive at what it does not know. But, it cannot arrive at unknown things, such as matters of faith, that surpass our natural powers of knowing.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod motus de quo Dionysius loquitur, non accipitur pro transitu de uno in aliud, sed illo modo quo omnis operatio motus dicitur, sicut intelligere est quidam motus, et sentire. Et sic triplicem motum et in Angelis et in animabus distinguit Dionysius, quantum ad cognitionem divinam: scilicet circularem, obliquum et rectum, secundum hanc similitudinem. Circularis enim motus est totaliter uniformis, tum propter aequidistantiam omnium partium circuli a centro, tum propter hoc quod in motu circulari non est assignare magis ex una parte quam ex altera principium et finem. Motus autem rectus est difformis, tum ex proprietate lineae (cum partes non aequaliter distant ab uno puncto signato), tum ex parte motus qui habet principium et finem signatum. Obliquus autem motus habet aliquid uniformitatis, secundum quod convenit cum motu circulari, et aliquid difformitatis, secundum quod convenit cum motu recto.	3. The motion of which Dionysius speaks is not taken to mean the passage from one thing to another. It is motion merely in that sense in which all operations are called motions, just as understanding and sensing are called motions. Consequently, Dionysius distinguishes three kinds of motions in souls and in angels as regards their knowledge of God:circular, oblique, and straight—using these as metaphors. Now, circular motion is perfectly uniform, because all the parts of a circle are equidistant from its center, and because it cannot be said that one part of a circular motion is its beginning or end more than any other. Straight motion, however, is not uniform, because as a line its parts are not equidistant from a designated point, and as motion it has a designated beginning and end. Oblique motion possesses uniformity in so far as it agrees with circular motion, but lacks uniformity in so far as it agrees with straight motion.
Non est autem idem motus uniformitatis et difformitatis in Angelo et anima; unde diversimode hos motus in utroque distinguit. Angelus enim in ipso actu cognitionis divinae non se extendit ad diversa, sed in ipso uno Deo figitur; et secundum hoc dicitur circa Deum moveri quasi motu circulari, non deveniens in ipsum sicut in finem cognitionis ex aliquo cognitionis principio, sicut circulus non habet principium neque finem. Et ideo dicit quod Angeli moventur circulariter, unite, sine principiis, et interminabilibus illuminationibus pulchri et boni;	Now, there is not the same manner of uniformity and non-uniformity in an angel and in a soul. Consequently, Dionysius distinguishes between these motions as found in each. In the act of knowing God, an angel does not direct his cognition to many different things but fixes it on God alone. In this regard, he is said to be moved about God, as it were, in a circular motion, because he does not arrive at God as at the end of cognition that had its beginning from some principle of cognition, but [his knowledge is] like a circle, without a beginning or end. Hence Dionysius says that angels are moved “in a circular motion which is simple, without beginnings, and rich with everlasting illuminations of the good and the beautiful.”
ut intelligamus ipsas illuminationes divinas in mentes angelicas pervenientes, sicut lineas pervenientes a centro ad circumferentiam, quibus quodammodo substantia circumferentiae constituitur: ut sic cognitio Dei quam de seipso habet, comparetur centro; cognitio autem quam Angelus habet de ipso, comparetur circulo, qui imitatur unitatem centri, sed deficit ab ea.	These divine illuminations coming into the minds of the angels are to be understood as though they were lines coming from the center of a circle to its circumference and in some way constituting the substance of the circumference. Then, the knowledge which God has of Himself is compared to the center of the circle, and the knowledge which the angel has of God is compared to the circle itself, which imitates the unity of its center but falls short of achieving it.
Sed difformitas in Angelo respectu divinae cognitionis non invenitur quantum ad ipsam cognitionem, sed solum quantum ad cognitionis communicationem, secundum quod diversis divinam cognitionem tradit; et quantum ad hoc ponit rectum motum in Angelis; unde dicit, quod in directum moventur, quando procedunt ad subiectorum providentiam recta omnia transeuntes. Obliquum vero motum ponit quasi compositum ex utroque: inquantum scilicet, ipsi in unitate divinae cognitionis permanentes exeunt per actionem in alios reducendos in Deum; unde dicit quod oblique moventur, quando providentes minus habentibus, inegressibiliter manent in identitate circa identitatis causam.	Non-uniformity in an angel’s knowledge of God is not to be found in the knowledge itself but only in its communication, that is, in so far as he passes on his knowledge of God to others. This action Dionysius assigns to the angels’ straight movement, saying: “Their motion is straight when, passing directly over all things, they go forth to provide for all who are entrusted to them.” Moreover, he calls that motion of theirs oblique which is, as it were, made up of both of the afore-mentioned motions—the motion which occurs when, remaining united to God in knowledge, they go forth in action to lead others back to Him. Hence, he says: “They are moved obliquely when, while caring for those who have less, they nevertheless remain unmoved in uninterruptible union with the cause of union.”
Sed in anima etiam quantum ad ipsam divinam cognitionem invenitur uniformitas et difformitas. Tribus enim modis anima movetur in Deum. Uno modo invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, visibilia conspiciens; et iste est motus rectus. Unde dicit, quod in directum movetur anima, quando ad ea quae sunt circa seipsam progreditur, et ab exterioribus, sicut a quibusdam signis variatis et multiplicatis ad simplices et unitas sursum agitur contemplationes. Alio modo movetur in Deum ex illuminationibus a Deo receptis; quas tamen recipit secundum modum suum sensibilibus figuris velatas, sicut Isaias vidit dominum sedentem super solium excelsum et elevatum: et hic motus est obliquus, habens aliquid de uniformitate ex parte divinae illuminationis, et aliquid de difformitate ex parte sensibilium figurarum. Unde dicit, quod oblique movetur anima, inquantum secundum proprietatem suam divinis illuminatur cognitionibus, non intellectualiter et singulariter, sed rationaliter et diffuse. Tertius modus est quando anima a se omnia sensibilia abiicit, supra omnia Deum cogitans, et etiam supra seipsam; et sic ab omni difformitate separatur; unde est motus circularis. Unde dicit, quod animae circularis motus est introitus ad seipsam ab exterioribus, et intellectualium virtutum ipsius convolutio; et quod deinde, iam uniformis facta, unitur unitis virtutibus, et sic manuducitur ad id quod est super omnia.	However, uniformity and non-uniformity are also found in the soul’s knowledge of God, because a soul is moved towards God in three ways. In the first, by looking upon the visible things that have been made, the soul sees the invisible things of God. This motion is straight. Consequently, Dionysius says: “The motion of the soul is straight when the soul goes forth to the things which lie around it, and from external things, as from varied and multiple signs, is lifted up to simple and unified contemplation.” The soul is moved toward God in a second way by the illuminations it receives from Him. These, however, it receives in accordance with its own manner of existence, that is, they are veiled in sensible figures. For example, Isaiah saw “the Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated” (Isaiah 6:1). This motion is oblique, having something of uniformity from God’s illumination and something of non-uniformity from the sensible figures. Hence, Dionysius says: “The soul is moved obliquely in so far as it is illumincd by divine thoughts according to its nature—not, indeed, intellectually and intuitively, but rationally and discursively.” Moreover, the soul is moved in a third way when it turns away from all sense objects by thinking of God as being above all things, even above itself. In this way, it is separated from any non-uniformity, and therefore it is circular motion. Hence, Dionysius says: “The circular motion of the soul takes place when, withdrawing from external things, the soul enters into itself and reflects by its intellectual powers. Finally, it is made uniform and enters into union with its united powers. In this way, it is led to that which is above all things.”
Ad quartum dicendum, quod cordis abscondita in motibus corporis intuentur Angeli, sicut causae videntur in similitudinibus suorum effectuum absque omni discursu. Nec per hoc quod illos motus de novo percipiunt, aliqua collatione indigent; statim enim ut res sensibiles fiunt, similes sunt Angelorum formis, et sic ab Angelis cognoscuntur. Et sic sine discursu sensibilia de novo facta cognoscunt.	4. Angels see thoughts hidden in hearts by means of bodily movements, just as causes are seen without discourse by means of their likeness in their effects. However, this does not mean that angels need to reason discursively when they know these motions for the first time, because, as soon as sensible things come into being, they become similar to forms in the angels and so are known by the angels. Hence, without discourse, angels know new sensible things.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod convolutio illa non significat collationem, sed magis quandam circularem unitionem animae et ipsius Angeli.	5. That rolling together does not mean comparison, but rather a kind of circular union of the soul with itself, and of the angel with itself.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod vident causas in effectibus, et effectus in causis, non quasi discurrendo ex uno in aliud, sed sicut res videtur in sua imagine sine discursu.	6. [Angels] see causes in their effects and effects in their causes, not by reasoning discursively, as it were, from one thing to another, but in the manner in which a thing is seen in its image, without any discourse being needed.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod experimentalis cognitio in Daemonibus non fit per collationem, sed secundum quod vident effectus in causis, vel causas in effectibus, modo praedicto; et quanto sunt tempore diuturniores, tanto plures numero effectus alicuius causae cognoverunt. Et sic de ipsa causa maiorem cognitionem habent quodammodo, non quidem intensive, sed extensive, secundum quod in pluribus effectibus eius virtutem viderunt.	7. Demons’ experiential knowledge is not had by making comparisons but by seeing effects in their causes or causes in their effects in the manner described. The longer they have existed, the greater the number of effects they know of a given cause. Thus, they come to know, in some way, more about a cause, not intensively but extensively, the more.they see its power manifested in effects.

---

ARTICLE XVI In the sixteenth article we ask: Should morning knowledge be distinguished from evening knowledge in angels? [ARTICLE S.T., I 58, aa. 6-7; 62, 1, ad 3; 64, 1, ad 3; II Sent., 12, 1, 3; In Ephes., c. 3, lect. 3 (P. 13:470b); De Pot., 4, 2, ad 2, 8,10,12-21, 24-25.]
Decimosexto quaeritur utrum in Angelis distingui debeat cognitio matutina et vespertina	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non.	It seems not, for
Vespere enim et mane diei sunt tenebris admixta. Sed in intellectu Angeli nullae sunt tenebrae, cum sint specula clarissima, ut Dionysius dicit. Ergo in Angelis non debet distingui cognitio matutina et vespertina.	1. There are shadows in the morning and evening. In an angelic intellect, however, there are no shadows; for, as Dionysius says,, angels are very bright mirrors. Therefore, in angels morning knowledge should not be distinguished from evening knowledge.
Praeterea, cognitio matutina secundum Augustinum, IV super Genes. ad Litt., dicitur qua Angeli cognoscunt res fiendas in verbo; vespertina autem qua cognoscunt res in propria natura. Sed non aliter cognoscunt res antequam sint, et aliter postquam sunt, cum intellectum habeant deiformem, et a rebus cognitionem non accipiant. Ergo in eis cognitio matutina et vespertina distingui non debet.	2. According to Augustine, that knowledge is called morning knowledge by which an angel knows in the Word the things that are to be created; and that is called evening knowledge by which he knows things in their own natures. Now, angels do not know things differently before they exist than after they exist, since their intellects are like God’s intellect and do not receive their knowledge from things. Therefore, their morning knowledge should not be distinguished from their evening knowledge.
Praeterea, cognitio vespertina est qua res cognoscuntur in propria natura. Sed res in verbo, in propria natura cognoscuntur; verbum enim expressius propriam naturam rei repraesentat quam etiam ipsae formae. Cum ergo cognitio matutina sit cognitio in verbo, videtur quod vespertina cognitio a matutina in Angelis non distinguatur.	3. Evening knowledge is that by which things are known in their own nature. But things are known in their own nature in the Word, btcause the Word represents things in their individuality even more expressly than the forms within the angels do. Therefore, since morning knowledge is knowledge in the Word, it seems that angel’s evening knowledge should not be distinguished from their morning knowledge.
Praeterea, Genes. I, 5, dicitur, quod factum est vespere et mane dies unus. Sed dies accipitur ibi pro ipsa Angeli cognitione, ut Augustinus dicit, IV super Genes. ad litteram. Ergo una et eadem cognitio est in Angelis matutina et vespertina.	4. We read in Genesis (1:5): “And there was evening and morning one day.” Now, as Augustine says, day is taken there as meaning angels. knowledge. Consequently, angels’ morning and evening knowledge are one and the same.
Praeterea, lux matutina crescit in meridianam. Sed cognitio quae est rerum in verbo, non potest crescere in aliam ampliorem cognitionem. Ergo cognitio rerum in verbo non potest dici proprie matutina; et sic non distinguitur in Angelis cognitio matutina et vespertina per hoc quod est cognoscere res in verbo et in propria natura.	5. The light of morning grows until noon. However, knowledge of things had in the Word cannot grow into another, fuller knowledge. Therefore, knowledge of things in the Word cannot properly be called morning knowledge. Hence, angels’ morning and evening knowledge cannot be distinguished by the fact that one is knowledge of things in the Word, the other, knowledge of them in their own nature.
Praeterea, prius est cognitio rei fiendae quam factae. Sed cognitio vespertina praecedit matutinam, ut patet Genesi I, 5: factum est vespere et mane, dies unus. Ergo non convenienter distinguitur cognitio matutina a vespertina, ut cognitio vespertina sit cognitio rei iam factae, cognitio vero matutina rei fiendae.	6. Knowledge of things that are to be created comes before that of things that are already created. Now, evening knowledge comes before morning knowledge, as is clear from the words of Genesis (1:5): “There was evening and morning one day.” Consequently, it is not proper to distinguish evening knowledge from morning knowledge so that the former means knowledge of things already made, and the latter, of things to be made.
Praeterea, Augustinus comparat cognitionem rerum in verbo et in propria natura cognitioni artis et operis, et cognitioni lineae quae intelligitur, et quae in pulvere scribitur. Sed istud non patitur diversa cognitionis genera. Ergo nec cognitio rerum in verbo et in propria natura sunt duae cognitiones; et sic matutina et vespertina cognitio non distinguuntur.	7. Augustine compares the knowledge of things in the Word to the knowledge had from an artistic concept, and that of them in their own nature to the knowledge had from the work of art itself. He also compares these two types of knowledge to the knowledge had of a line which is mentally conceived and to that which is had of a line written in dust. But these distinctions do not involve different genera of knowledge. Consequently, knowledge of things in the Word and in their proper nature are not two types of knowledge. Hence, morning and eveninLy knowledue are not distinct.
Praeterea, Angelus in principio suae creationis cognovit cognitione matutina. Non autem cognovit verbum, quia non fuit creatus beatus; videre autem verbum est actus beatitudinis. Ergo cognitio rerum in verbo non est cognitio matutina; et sic idem quod prius.	8. As soon as he was created, an angel knew with morning knowledge. However, he did not know the Word, because he was not created in the state of beatitude, and the sight of the Word is the act of beatitude. Consequently, knowledge of things in the Word is not morning knowledge. Hence, we conclude as before.
Sed dicebat, quod quamvis non cognoverit verbum per essentiam, cognovit tamen per aliquam similitudinem creatam; et sic cognovit res in verbo.- Sed contra. Omnis cognitio quae est per formas creatas, est cognitio umbrata, quia omnis creatura in se considerata est tenebra. Sed cognitio obumbrata, est cognitio vespertina. Ergo cognoscere res in verbo, vel verbum modo praedicto, esset cognitio non matutina, sed vespertina.	9. But it has been said that, even though an angel did not know the Word through its essence, he knew it through some created likeness and, therefore, did, know things in the Word.—On the contrary, all knowledge through,created forms is obscure, because all creatures, taken in themselves, ‘are shadowy. But evening knowledge is obscure knowledge. Therefore, to know things in the Word, or to know the Word in the manner just described, would not be morning but evening knowledge.
Praeterea, Augustinus contra Manichaeos dicit, quod mens fortis et vegeta, cum illam primam veritatem conspexit, cetera obliviscitur. Ergo videndo verbum, nihil aliud videt in verbo; et sic matutina cognitio non potest dici in Angelis cognitio rerum in verbo.	10. Augustine says: “When a mind, strong and vigorous, sees that first truth, it forgets all other things.” Therefore, when it sees the Word, it sees nothing else in it. Consequently, the morning knowledge of angels cannot be called the knowledge of things in the Word.
Praeterea, cognitio matutina est clarior quam vespertina. Sed cognitio rerum in verbo est minus clara quam cognitio rerum in propria natura quia res in verbo sunt secundum quid, in propria autem natura sunt simpliciter. Melius autem cognoscitur aliquid ubi est simpliciter, quam ubi est secundum quid. Ergo hoc modo distingui non potest, ut cognitio rerum in verbo dicatur matutina, in proprio autem genere dicatur vespertina.	11. Morning knowledge is clearer than evening knowledge. But knowledge of things had in the Word is less clear than that of things in their own nature, because things are in the Word only in a certain respect, but in their own nature without any qualification. It is better, however, to know a thing where it exists simply than to know it where it exists only in a certain respect. Consequently, a distinction canno be made whereby knowledge of things had in the Word will be called morning knowledge, and that of things in their own nature, evening knowledge.
Praeterea, cognitio quae est ex propriis et immediatis, est perfectior quam quae est ex causa communi. Sed Deus est causa communis rerum omnium. Imperfectior ergo est illa cognitio qua res cognoscuntur in verbo, quam illa qua cognoscuntur in propria natura.	12. Knowledge had from a thing’s individual immediate causes is more perfect than that had from a general cause. But God is the general cause of all things. Consequently, that knowledge by which things are known in the Word is more imperfect than that by which they are known in their own nature.
Praeterea, res cognoscuntur in verbo sicut in quodam speculo. Sed perfectius cognoscuntur res in seipsis quam in speculo. Ergo et perfectius in propria natura cognoscuntur quam in verbo; et sic idem quod prius.	13. Things are known in the Word as in a mirror. But things are known more perfectly in themselves than in a mirror. Consequently, they are known more perfectly in their own nature than in the Word. Hence, the same must be said as before.
In contrarium	To the Contrary
est quod Augustinus, Lib. IV et V super Genes. ad Litt., has cognitiones distinguit modo praedicto.	Augustine distinguishes these types of knowledge in the manner described.
Responsio.	REPLY
Dicendum, quod hoc quod dicitur de matutina et vespertina Angelorum cognitione, introductum est ab Augustino hac necessitate, ut posset ponere, ea quae in sex primis diebus facta leguntur, sine successione temporum esse completa; unde per dies illos non temporum distinctiones vult intelligi, sed Angelorum cognitionem. Sicut enim praesentatio lucis corporalis super haec inferiora diem facit temporalem, sic praesentatio vel comparatio luminis intellectus angelici ad res creatas diem spiritualem facit. Et secundum hoc multi dies distinguuntur, quod intellectus Angeli diversis rerum generibus cognoscendis comparatur, ut sic ordo dierum non sit ordo temporis, sed ordo naturae, qui in cognitione Angeli attenditur secundum ordinem cognitorum ad invicem, prout alterum altero est prius natura. Sicut autem in die temporali mane est diei principium, vespere vero finis, ita in cognitione Angeli respectu eiusdem rei est considerare principium et finem secundum ordinem rei cognitae. Principium autem cuiuslibet rei est in sua causa a qua fluit; terminus autem esse ipsius est in ipsa re ad quam actio causae producentis terminatur. Unde primitiva alicuius rei cognitio est secundum quod consideratur in causa sua, quae est verbum aeternum; unde cognitio rerum in verbo dicitur cognitio matutina. Ultima autem rei cognitio est secundum quod cognoscitur in seipsa; et talis cognitio dicitur vespertina.	The expression “morning and evening knowledge” was introduced by Augustine so that he could hold that the things we read about as having been made in the first six days were really completed without any succession of time. Consequently, he wanted those days to be understood as referring, not to distinct times, but to distinct angelic cognitions. For, just as the presence of physical light on things here below makes a day in the temporal sense, so does the presence or operation of light from an angelic intellect on created things make a day in the spiritual sense. Consequently, as many days can be distinguished as there are relations from angelic intellects to the different classes of things to be known. Taken in this way, the order of a day would not be an order of time but an order of nature, and this would be found in angelic knowledge according to the order that the known things have to each other, that is, according as one thing is prior by nature to another. Moreover, just as morning is the beginning of a temporal day and evening its end, so the beginning and end of an angel’s knowledge of some one thing would be determined by the order in that thing. Now, the beginning of anything is to be found in the cause from which it issues; its end, in the thing itself, because it is in this that the action of the productive cause terminates. Hence, the first knowledge to be had of a thing is that in which it is considered in its cause, the eternal Word. For this reason, the knowledge of things in the Word is called morning knowledge. The last knowledge to be had of a thing is that in which it is known in itself. This is called evening knowledge.
Sciendum tamen, quod ista distinctio potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo ex parte rei cognitae; alio modo ex parte medii cognoscendi. Ex parte quidem rei cognitae, ut dicatur res in verbo cognosci, quando cognoscitur esse eius quod habet in verbo; in propria vero natura secundum quod cognoscitur ipsum esse rei quod habet in seipsa: et hic non est conveniens intellectus; quia esse rei quod habet in verbo, non est aliud ab esse verbi; quia, ut Anselmus dicit, creatura in creatore est creatrix essentia; unde cognoscere hoc modo creaturam in verbo non esset cognitio creaturae, sed magis creatoris. Et ideo oportet hanc distinctionem intelligi ex parte medii cognoscendi; ut dicatur res cognosci in verbo, quando per verbum ipsa res in propria natura cognoscitur; in propria vero natura, quando cognoscitur per formas aliquas creatas rebus creatis proportionatas, sicut cum cognoscit per formas sibi inditas; vel etiam si per formas acquisitas cognosceret, quantum ad hoc pertinet, nihil differret.	It should be understood, however, that that distinction can have two meanings. First, it can refer to a distinction in the thing known; second, it can refer to a distinction in the medium of knowledge. Taking the distinction in the first way, we can say that a thing is said to be known in the Word when the being it has in the Word is known; and it is said to be known in its own nature in so far as the being which it has in itself is known. But this way of understanding causes Difficulties, because the being which it has in the Word is not other than that of the Word itself, since, as Anselm says, the creature in the Creator is simply the creative essence. Hence, to know a creature in the Word in this manner is to know, not the creature, but rather the Creator Consequently, this distinction between morning and evening knowl edge must be referred to the medium of knowledge. Accordingly, a thing will be said to be known in the Word when it is known in its own nature through the Word; and it will be said to be known in its own nature when it is known by means of some created forms proportioned to created things, as things are known [to angels] by innate forms or by acquired forms—if, indeed, angels did know by acquired forms, but it would make no difference as far as the present problem is concerned.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod non accipitur similitudo in cognitione Angeli vespere et mane, secundum hoc quod vespere et mane diei temporalis sunt cum tenebrarum admixtione; sed magis secundum rationem principii et termini, ut dictum est, in corpore art. Vel potest dici, quod omnis intellectus creatus, inquantum est ex nihilo, tenebrosus est, comparatus claritati intellectus divini; habet autem lucis admixtionem inquantum divinum intellectum imitatur.	1. The figure of evening and morning in angelic knowledge is not based on the fact that there are shadows in the morning and evening of a temporal day, but, as has been said, on the fact that these two have the nature of a beginning and end. Or it can be said that all intellects, being created from nothing, are shadowy in comparison with the brightness of God’s intellect. They do, however, have some brightnes in so far as they imitate His intellect.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis per verbum eodem modo cognoscant Angeli res fiendas et factas, tamen alio modo cognoscunt res fiendas per verbum et alio modo res factas per propriam naturam secundum similitudinem eius, quam penes se habet; et secundum hoc matutina cognitio a vespertina distinguitur.	2. In the Word the angels know in the same way the things that are to be created and the things already created. But the way in which they know in the Word the things to be created differs from the way in which they know the individual natures of things already created when they know these latter by means of a similitude within them selves. It is according to this difference that their morning and evening knowledge are distinguished.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis res expressius repraesententur in verbo quam in formis intellectus angelici, tamen formae intellectus angelici sunt magis rebus proportionatae, et quasi eis adaequatae; et ideo ista cognitio dicitur esse rerum in propria natura, et non prima.	3. Even though things are more expressly represented in the Word than they are by the forms within an angel’s intellect, nevertheless, these forms are more proportioned to things and, in a way, conformed to them. Hence, this kind of knowledge, and not knowledge in the Word, is said to be of things in their own nature.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod sicut una tota scientia comprehendit sub se diversas scientias particulares, quibus conclusiones diversae cognoscuntur; ita etiam ipsa una cognitio Angeli, quae est quasi quoddam totum, comprehendit sub se cognitionem matutinam et vespertinam quasi partes, sicut mane et vespere sunt partes diei temporalis.	4. Just as one general science contains within itself different particular sciences by which different conclusions can be known, so also all the knowledge an angel has, being in some sense a whole, contains within itself morning and evening knowledge as, in a way, its parts—as a temporal day has morning and evening for its parts.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod non oportet quantum ad omnia, spiritualia corporalibus similia esse. Non igitur propter hoc cognitio rerum in verbo dicitur matutina, quia in aliquam maiorem cognitionem crescat: sed quia ad aliquam cognitionem inferiorem terminatur, ut dictum est, in corp. art.	5. It is not necessary that spiritual things be like material things in all respects. Hence, knowledge of things in the Word is not called morning knowledge because it grows into greater knowledge, but, as has been said, because of its relation to an inferior knowledge.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod cognitio matutina praecedit vespertinam ordine naturae respectu unius et eiusdem rei; sed respectu diversarum rerum vespertina cognitio prioris intelligitur esse prior cognitione matutina posterioris, prout in cognitione attenditur ordo ex parte rerum cognitarum. Et ideo Genesi I vespere ante mane ponitur hac necessitate, quia opus primae diei est lux, quam Augustinus intelligit spiritualem, quae illuminatur per conversionem ad verbum. Angelus autem seipsum primo in seipso cognovit naturali cognitione; et se cognito, non in seipso permansit, quasi seipso fruens et in se finem ponens (sic enim nox factus esset, ut Angeli qui peccaverunt), sed cognitionem suam in Dei laudem retulit; et sic ex sui contemplatione conversus est in verbi contemplationem, in quo est mane sequentis diei, secundum quod in verbo accepit cognitionem sequentis creaturae, scilicet firmamenti. Sicut autem videmus in tempore continuo, quod idem nunc est duorum temporum, prout est finis praeteriti et principium futuri; ita matutina cognitio secundae diei est primae diei terminus, et secundae diei initium, et sic deinceps usque ad diem septimam.	6. Morning knowledge comes before evening knowledge if we consider the natural ordering found in one and the same thing. But, if we consider different things, evening knowledge of what is prior precedes morning knowledge of what is posterior, that is, as long as knowledge is considered from the viewpoint of what is prior and posterior in the things known. Consequently, in Genesis, evening is put before morning, because the work of the first day was light, which Augustine understands as a spiritual light enkindled by knowledge of the Word. By their natural knowledge, however, angels first knew themselves in themselves, and, having known themselves, they did not remain there to enjoy their own selves and, as it were, make themselves their own ends (for then they would have become “night”—as angels who sinned); instead, they turned their knowledge back to the praise of God. Hence, from contemplation of themselves angels turned to a contemplation of the Word, in whom existed the morning of the following day, inasmuch as the angels received knowledge in the Word of the creature that was to follow, namely, the firmament. Therefore, just as we see that in continuous time the same now belongs to two times, that is, it is the end of the past and the beginning of the future, so morning knowledge of the second day is the end of the first day and the beginning of the second, and so on until the seventh day is reached.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod non est eadem cognitio artificiati secundum quod cognoscitur ex forma artis, et secundum quod cognoscitur ex ipsa re iam facta. Prima enim cognitio est universalis tantum; secunda autem potest esse etiam particularis, sicut cum intueor aliquam domum factam.	7. The knowledge had of a work of art from its artistic concept is not the same as that had from the thing already made. The first knowledge is universal only; the second can also be particular, as, for example, when I look at a particular house that has been made.
Et praeterea non est simile omnino: ars enim creata magis est proportionata et adaequata rebus artificiatis quam ars increata rebus creatis.	Besides, there is no parallel at all, because created art is more proportioned and conformed to artificial things than uncreated art is to created things.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod Angelus in principio suae creationis non fuit beatus, nec verbum per essentiam vidit: unde nec cognitionem matutinam habuit; sed primo habuit vespertinam, et ex vespertina profecit in matutinam. Unde signanter primus dies mane non dicitur habuisse, sed primo vespere, et de vespere transivit in mane: quia lux illa spiritualis, quae primo die facta dicitur, scilicet substantia angelica, statim facta seipsam cognovit, quod fuit cognitionis vespertinae; et hanc cognitionem retulit ad laudem verbi, in quo facta est ei cognitio matutina; et propter hoc dicitur Genes. I, 5: factum est vespere et mane dies unus.	8. At the moment of his creation, an angel was not beatified and did not see the Word through His essence. Hence, he did not have morning knowledge, but first he had evening knowledge and from this progressed to morning. For this reason, the first day is expressly said not to have had a morning, but began as evening, and from evening passed into morning. The reason for this was that that spiritual light, namely, the angelic substance, made on the first day, knew himself as soon as he was made. This was his evening knowledge. Then he turned this knowledge to the praise of the Word, and in the Word his knowledge became morning knowledge. This is why Genesis (1:5) says: “And there was evening and morning one day.”
Ad nonum dicendum, quod cum cognitio vespertina a matutina distinguatur ex parte medii cognitionis, et non ex parte rei cognitae: cognitio creatoris per creaturam est vespertina, sicut e contrario cognitio creaturae per creatorem est matutina. Unde quantum ad hoc ratio recte procedit.	9. Evening and morning knowledge must be distinguished with respect to the medium of knowledge, not with respect to the thing that is known. Knowledge of the Creator through creatures, therefore, is evening knowledge, just as, conversely, knowledge of creatures through the Creator is morning knowledge. To this extent, the argument is correct.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod mens fortis rebus divinis intenta dicitur aliorum oblivisci, non quidem quantum ad scientiam, sed quantum ad rerum aestimationem: quia illa quae nobis in creaturis maxima videbantur, divina celsitudine considerata, minima iudicamus.	10. A strong mind intent on divine things is said to forget other things, not in the sense that it does not know them, but in the sense that it no longer esteems them. For, when we see God’s majesty, we consider as of little value creatures that previously seemed to be of very great worth.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod cognitio rerum in verbo est perfectior quam cognitio earum in propria natura; inquantum verbum clarius repraesentat unamquamque rem quam creata species. Res autem esse in seipsis verius quam in verbo, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo ut habeant in se esse nobilius quam esse quod habent in verbo; quod falsum est: quia in seipsis habent esse creatum, in verbo autem increatum: et ita esse quod habent in seipsis, est secundum quid respectu illius quod habent in verbo. Alio modo ut res sit perfectius haec in seipsa quam in verbo; et hoc quodammodo verum est. Res enim in seipsa est materialis, quod est de ratione quarumdam rerum; in verbo autem non est materialis, sed est ibi similitudinem habens quantum ad formam et materiam. Et tamen, quamvis secundum hoc quod est talis res in verbo, sit secundum quid; tamen perfectius cognoscitur per verbum quam per seipsam, etiam inquantum est talis; quia perfectius repraesentatur etiam propria rei ratio in verbo quam in seipsa, quamvis secundum propriam rationem existendi verius sit in seipsa. Cognitio autem sequitur formae repraesentationem; unde res, cum non sit in anima nisi secundum quid, per suam similitudinem, simpliciter tamen cognoscitur.	11. Knowledge of things in the Word is more perfect than that of them in their own nature, because the Word expresses each one of them more clearly than a created species does. Moreover, the statement that things exist more truly in themselves than they do in the Word can be understood in two ways. First, it can mean that the existence they have in themselves is more perfect than that which they have in the Word. But this is false, because in themselves they have a created act of existence, and in the Word, uncreated being. Consequently, the existence they have in themselves is existence only in a certain sense as compared with that which they have in the Word. Second, it can mean that the thing can be its individual self more perfectly in its own being than in the Word. This, to a certain extent, is true. For in itself a thing is material (at least materiality belongs to the’ nature of some things); in the Word, however, it is not material. There is merely a likeness of the thing’s matter and form in the Word. Although it is true that a thing in so far as it is such and such exists only in a certain fashion in the Word, nevertheless, it is known more perfectly through the Word than through itself, even in so far as it is such and.such a thing. The reason for this is that a thing’s own nature is more perfectly represented in the Word than it is in itself, and this despite the fact that it exists more truly in itself when it exists according to its own mode of existence. For knowledge follows the representation of the form. Hence, even though a thing is not in the soul except in a qualified sense, that is, by its likeness, it is known simply as a thing.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod ipse Deus est propria et immediata causa uniuscuiusque rei, et quodammodo magis intima unicuique quam ipsum sit intimum sibi, ut Augustinus dicit.	12. God Himself is the proper and immediate cause of each and every thing, and, as Augustine says, in some way He is more closely united to each thing than the thing is to itself.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod formae non transfunduntur a speculo in res, sed e converso; a verbo autem transfunduntur in res; unde non est simile de cognitione rerum in speculo, et in verbo.	13. Forms do not flow into things from a mirror; rather, they flow into a mirror from things. From the Word, however, forms flow into things. Consequently, no parallel can be drawn between knowledge of things had from a mirror and that of them had in the Word.

---

ARTICLE XVII In the seventeenth article we ask: Is anangel’s knowledge adequately divided into morning and evening knowlege? [ARTICLE See readings given for preceding article.]
Decimoseptimo quaeritur utrum cognitio angelica sufficienter per matutinam et vespertinam dividatur	Difficulties
Et videtur quod non.	It seems not, for
Ut enim dicit Augustinus, IV super Genesim ad litteram, cognitio vespertina est qua res cognoscitur in seipsa; matutina vero, cum refertur in laudem creatoris; et sic cognitio matutina videtur a vespertina distingui per relatum et non relatum. Sed praeter cognitionem creaturae in seipsa relatam ad verbum et non relatam, est accipere aliam creaturae cognitionem magis differentem ab eis quam altera istarum differat ab altera: scilicet cognitionem creaturarum in verbo. Ergo matutina et vespertina cognitio non sufficienter dividunt cognitionem angelicam.	1. Augustine says, that evening knowledge is that by which things are known in themselves, morning knowledge, that whereby things are referred to the praise of the Creator. Thus, morning knowledge seems to be distinguished from evening by means of distinguishing between related and non-related. But, besides this division of knowledge of creatures in themselves into knowledge related and not related to the Word, there is another knowledge of creatures—a knowledge that differs more from creatures than one of them differs from another—namely, the knowledge of creatures in the Word. Therefore, the division of angels’knowledge into morning and evening is not adequate.
Praeterea, Augustinus, II super Genes. ad litteram, ponit triplex esse creaturae: unum quod habet in verbo, aliud quod habet in propria natura, tertium quod habet in mente angelica. Sed penes primum esse et secundum accipitur cognitio matutina et vespertina. Ergo penes tertium debet accipi tertia eius cognitio.	2. Augustine says that a creature has three existences:one in the Word, a second in its own nature, a third in the mind of an angel. Now, the first two existences are included by morning and evening knowledge. Hence, the third should be included by a third type of knowledge.
Praeterea, cognitio matutina et vespertina distinguitur per hoc quod est cognoscere res in verbo, et res in propria natura; et per hoc quod est cognoscere res factas et fiendas. Sed haec possunt quadrupliciter diversificari. Uno modo, ut dicantur cognoscere res fiendas in verbo; alio modo factas in verbo; tertio modo factas in propria natura; quarto fiendas in propria natura, quae quidem videtur esse inutilis coniugatio, quia in propria natura non cognoscitur aliquid antequam sit. Ergo saltem oportet tres esse cognitiones angelicas; et sic insufficienter distinguitur per duas.	3. Morning and evening knowledge are distinguished by this, that the first is knowledge of things in the Word, the second, knowledge of them in their own nature. They are also distinguished in so far as one is the knowledge of things to be created, the other, of things already created. This latter division, however, can be further divided in four ways. First, we can speak of knowing in the Word the things that will be created; second, of knowing in the Word things already created; third, of knowing in their own nature the things that are already created; fourth, of knowing in their own nature things that will be created. The last division, however, seems to be a useless addition, because a thing cannot be known in its own nature before it exists. At any rate, there should be at least three kinds of angelic knowledge. Hence, the twofold division is inadequate.
Praeterea, vespere et mane dicuntur in cognitione angelica ad similitudinem diei temporalis. Sed in die temporali inter mane et vespere est meridies. Ergo et in Angelis inter cognitionem matutinam et vespertinam debet poni meridiana.	4. Angels’ morning and evening knowledge get their names from their resemblance to a temporal day. Now, in a temporal day, noon lies between morning and evening. Therefore, a noonday knowledge should be placed between morning and evening knowledge.
Praeterea, Angelus non solum cognoscit creaturas, sed etiam ipsum creatorem. Sed cognitio matutina et vespertina in Angelis distinguitur quantum ad cognitionem creaturae. Ergo praeter cognitionem vespertinam et matutinam est assignare cognitionem tertiam in Angelis.	5. Angels know not only creatures but the Creator Himself. But angels’ knowledge is divided into morning and evening only with reference to their knowledge of creatures. Consequently, we must assign a third knowledge to angels that is other than their morning and evening knowledge.
Praeterea, cognitio matutina et vespertina non pertinet nisi ad cognitionem gratiae; alias Angeli mali haberent cognitionem matutinam vel vespertinam: quod non videtur esse verum, cum in Daemonibus non sit dies, vespere autem et mane sint diei partes. Ergo, cum cognitio naturalis sit in Angelis praeter gratuitam, videtur quod sit in eis ponere tertiam cognitionem.	6. Morning and evening knowledge pertain only to knowledge had by grace; otherwise, bad angels would also have morning or evening knowledge. This does not seem true, however, because there is no day for demons, and evening and morning are parts of a day. Consequently, since angels’ natural knowledge is other than that which they have as a result of grace, it seems that we must assign a third type of knowledge to them.
Sed contra.	To the Contrary
Cognitio matutina et vespertina distinguuntur per creatum et increatum. Sed inter haec nihil est medium. Ergo nec inter cognitionem matutinam et vespertinam.	Morning and evening knowledge are divided according to created and uncreated. Now, there is no mean between these two. Therefore, there is none between morning and evening knowledge.
	REPLY
Responsio. Dicendum, quod de cognitione matutina et vespertina dupliciter loqui possumus. Uno modo quantum ad id quod cognitionis est; et sic inter utramque cognitionem nihil cadit medium. Cognitio enim vespertina a matutina distinguitur, ut supra dictum est, per medium cognoscendi: quod quidem si creatum est, facit cognitionem vespertinam quocumque modo; si autem increatum, facit cognitionem matutinam. Non potest autem aliquid esse medium inter creatum et increatum.	We may speak of morning and evening knowledge in two ways First, we may speak of them simply in so far as they are knowledge. No mean can fall between the two types of knowledge, considered in this manner. For, as said previously, morning is distinguished from evening knowledge by means of the medium of knowing. If the medium is created, it causes evening knowledge, no matter how it is had. If the medium is uncreated, it causes morning knowledge. And there can be no mean between created and uncreated.
Si autem considerentur quantum ad rationem matutini et vespertini, sic cadit inter eas aliquod medium, duplici ratione. Primo, quia mane et vespere sunt partes diei; dies autem est in Angelis per illustrationem gratiae, secundum Augustinum: unde non se extendunt ultra cognitionem gratuitam bonorum Angelorum; et sic naturalis cognitio est praeter has duas. Secundo, quia vespere, inquantum huiusmodi, terminatur ad mane, et mane ad vespere; unde cognitio rerum in propria natura, non quaelibet potest dici vespertina, sed illa tantum quae refertur in laudem creatoris: sic enim vespere redit ad mane. Et sic cognitio Daemonum quam habent de rebus, nec est matutina, nec vespertina; sed solummodo cognitio gratuita, quae est in Angelis beatis.	On the other hand, if we consider the nature of morning and evening alone, then a mean can fall between the two for two reasons. First, morning and evening are parts of a day; and, according to Augustine, “day” exists in angels by means of the illuminating effects of grace. Consequently, morning. and evening do not extend beyond the knowledge good angels have because of grace. Hence, their natural knowledge will be a third type. Second, evening as evening ends with morning, and morning ends with evening. Hence, not any knowledge of things in their own nature can be called evening knowledge, but only that which is referred to the praise of the Creator, because, in this sense, evening returns to morning. Consequently, the knowledge demons have of things is neither morning nor evening. Therefore, these terms can be applied only to the knowledge angels have as a result of grace, and this knowledge is found only in the beatified angels.
	Answers to Difficulties
Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod cognitio rerum in propria natura semper est vespertina; nec relatio eius ad cognitionem in verbo facit eam matutinam, sed facit eam terminari ad matutinam. Non ergo dicitur quod ex hoc Angelus matutinam cognitionem habeat quod cognitionem rerum in propria natura ad verbum referat, quasi ipsa cognitio relata sit cognitio matutina; sed quia ex hoc quod refert, meretur matutinam cognitionem accipere.	1. Knowledge of things in their own nature is always evening knowledge. Its relation to knowledge in the Word does not make it morning, but makes it merely terminate in morning knowledge. Consequently, it should not be said that an angel has morning knowledge because he refers the knowledge he has of things in their own natures to the Word, as though this knowledge, being thus related, is morning knowledge. Rather, it is because he refers this knowledge that he merits to receive morning knowledge.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet, si matutina cognitio et vespertina distinguerentur ex parte rei cognitae; sic enim esset triplex cognitio secundum triplex esse cognoscibile de rebus. Cum autem cognitio matutina distinguatur a vespertina penes medium cognoscendi, quod est creatum vel increatum, per utrumlibet istorum mediorum cognoscitur quodlibet illorum esse; et sic non oportet tertiam cognitionem ponere.	2. That argument proceeds as though morning were distinguished from evening knowledge on the part of the thing known. Then there would be three kinds of knowledge based on the three kinds of intelligible existence things have. However, morning is distinguished from evening knowledge entirely on the basis of the medium of knowledge, which is either created or uncreated, and the existence of things can be known through either of these mediums. Hence, there is no need for postulating a third kind of knowledge.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnis cognitio quae est in verbo, vocatur cognitio matutina, sive sit res iam facta, sive non sit facta; quia talis cognitio est conformis divinae cognitioni, qui cognoscit omnia similiter antequam fiant et postquam facta sunt.	3. All knowledge had in the Word is called morning knowledge, whether the thing known is already created or not. The reason for this is that such knowledge is similar to God’s knowledge who without difference of manner knows all things before they are created just as He knows them after they are created.
Et tamen omnis cognitio rei in verbo est rei ut fiendae, sive res iam sit facta, sive non: ut ly fiendum non dicat tempus, sed exitum creaturae a creatore; sicut est cognitio artificiati in arte est eius secundum suum fieri, quamvis etiam ipsum artificiatum iam sit factum.	However, all knowledge of things in the Word is of them as they are to be created, whether they are already created or not. Consequently, are to he created does not signify time but merely the fact that a creature has to leave the hands of its Creator. It is like the knowledge had of a work of art by means of an artistic conception:it concerns the thing in its coming to be, even after the thing has been made.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod Augustinus nominat matutinam cognitionem quae est in plena luce, unde continet sub se meridianam; unde quandoque nominat eam diurnam, quandoque autem matutinam. Vel potest dici, quod omnis cognitio intellectus angelici habet tenebras admixtas ex parte cognoscentis. Unde nulla cognitio alicuius intellectus creati potest dici meridiana, sed sola cognitio qua Deus cognoscit omnia in seipso.	4. Augustine calls that knowledge morning which is in full light and, for this reason, includes noon. Consequently, he sometimes calls it day knowledge, sometimes morning knowledge. Or, one could reply that all the intellectual knowledge had by angels is mixed with shadows as far as the knower is concerned. Consequently, no knowledge had by an angelic intellect should be called noonday knowledge, but only that by which God knows all things in Himself.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod eadem cognitione verbum et res in verbo (cognoscuntur); unde etiam cognitio verbi dicitur matutina. Et hoc patet, quia septimus dies, qui significat quietem Dei in seipso, habet mane; unde matutina cognitio est secundum quod Angelus Deum cognoscit.	5. The Word and things in the Word are known by the same knowledge. Hence, knowledge of the Word is also called morning knowledge. This is evident, because the seventh day, which signifies the day when God rested in Himself, has a morning. Hence, morning knowledge is had in so far as an angel knows God.
Ad sextum patet responsio ex dictis.	6. The answer is clear from what has been said.

---