translated by Lottie H. Kendzierski
Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1960
- Et primo enim quaeritur, utrum caritas sit aliquid creatum in anima, vel sit ipse spiritus sanctus.
- Secundo utrum caritas sit virtus.
- Tertio utrum caritas sit forma virtutum.
- Quarto utrum caritas sit una virtus.
- Quinto utrum caritas sit virtus specialis.
- Sexto utrum caritas possit esse cum peccato mortali.
- Septimo utrum obiectum diligibile ex caritate sit rationalis natura.
- Octavo utrum diligere inimicos sit de perfectione consilii.
- Nono utrum ordo aliquis sit in caritate.
- Decimo utrum sit possibile caritatem esse perfectam in hac vita.
- Undecimo utrum omnes teneantur ad perfectam caritatem.
- Duodecimo utrum caritas semel habita possit amitti.
- Tertiodecimo utrum per unum actum peccati mortalis caritas amittatur.
- Whether Charity Is Something Created in the Soul, or Is it the Holy Spirit Itself?
- Whether Charity Is a Virtue?
- Whether Charity Is the Form of the Virtues?
- Whether Charity Is One Virtue?
- Whether Charity Is a Special Virtue Distinct From the Other Virtues?
- Whether There Can Be Charity With Mortal Sin?
- Whether the Object to Be Loved Out of Charity Is a Rational Nature?
- Whether Loving One's Enemies Arises From the Perfection of a Counsel?
- Whether there is an order in charity?
- Whether Charity Can Be Perfect In This Life?
- Whether All Are Bound to Perfect Charity?
- Whether Charity, Once Possessed, Can Be Lost?
- Whether Charity Can Be Lost Through One Act of Mortal Sin?
Et primo quaeritur utrum caritas sit aliquid creatum in anima vel sit ipse spiritus sanctus
Whether Charity Is Something Created in the Soul, or Is it the Holy Spirit Itself?
Et videtur quod caritas non sit aliquid creatum in anima. It seems that charity is not something created in the soul. Sicut enim dicit Augustinus, sicut anima est vita corporis, ita Deus est vita animae. Sed anima est vita corporis sine medio. Ergo et Deus est vita animae sine medio. Cum igitur vita animae sit ex hoc quod est in caritate: quia qui non diligit, manet in morte, ut dicitur I Ioan. III, 14, homo non est in caritate per aliquid quod sit medium inter Deum et hominem, sed per ipsum Deum. Caritas ergo non est aliquid creatum in anima, sed ipse Deus. 1. For, as Augustine says, just as the soul is the life of the body, so God is the life of the soul. But the soul is immediately the life of the body. Therefore God is immediately the life of the soul. Therefore, since a soul is said to be alive from the fact that it has charity, as is said (1 John iii. 14), He that loveth not, abideth in death, man is not in charity through something which is a medium between God and man, but through God Himself. Charity, therefore, is not something created in the soul, but is God Himself. Sed dicebatur, quod similitudo illa attenditur quantum ad hoc quod anima est vita corporis hominis ut motor, non quantum ad hoc quod est vita corporis ut forma. —Sed contra, quanto aliquod agens est virtuosius, tanto minorem dispositionem requirit in patiente: ignis enim magnus sufficiens est etiam ligna minus desiccata comburere. Sed Deus est agens infinitae virtutis. Ergo si est vita animae, sicut movens ipsam ad diligendum; videtur quod non requiratur aliqua dispositio creata ex parte ipsius animae. 2. But it was objected that the comparison is applied only in this respect, that the soul is the life of the body as a mover, and not insofar as it is the life of the body as a form. But on the contrary, in proportion as any agent is more powerful, to that extent it requires less of a disposition in the patient; e.g., the less dry the wood is, the greater must be the fire sufficient to burn it. But God is an agent of infinite power. Therefore, if He is the life of the soul, as moving it to love, it seems that no created disposition on the part of this soul is required. Praeterea, inter ea quae sunt idem, non cadit medium. Sed anima diligens Deum est idem cum Deo: quia, ut dicitur I ad Corinth. cap. VI, 17, qui adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus est. Ergo non cadit aliqua caritas creata media inter animam diligentem et Deum dilectum. 3. Moreover, there is no medium among those things which are the same. But the soul loving God is the same as God, as is said (1 Cor. vi. 17), He who is joined to the Lord, is one in spirit. Therefore no created charity comes as a medium between the soul loving and God being loved. Praeterea, dilectio qua diligimus proximum caritas est. Sed dilectio qua diligimus proximum, ipse Deus est; dicit enim Augustinus in VIII de Trinit.: qui proximum diligit, consequens est ut ipsam dilectionem diligat. Deus autem dilectio est. Consequens ergo est ut praecipue Deum diligat. Ergo caritas non est aliquid creatum, sed ipse Deus. 4. Moreover, the love by which we love our neighbor is charity. But the love by which we love our neighbor is God Himself, for Augustine says in Book VIII of the De Trinitate, He who loves his neighbor loves the same love. But God is love. It follows, therefore, that he especially loves God. Therefore charity is not something created, but is God Himself. Sed dicebatur, quod Deus est dilectio qua diligimus proximum causaliter. —Sed contra, Augustinus in eodem dicit, quod cum testimonio verborum Ioannis aperte declarat, ipsam supernam dilectionem, qua nos diligimus invicem, non solum ex Deo esse, sed etiam Deum esse. Non solum ergo causaliter, sed essentialiter dilectio Deus est. 5. But it was said that God, as a cause, is the love by which we love our neighbor. On the contrary, Augustine says in the same place, and he clearly proved it with the testimony of the words of St. John, that that very celestial love by which we love each other is not only from God but also is God. Therefore God is love not only causally, but essentially. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in V de Trinitate: non dicturi sumus caritatem non propterea esse dictam Deum, quod ipsa caritas sit ipsa substantia quae Dei digna sit nomine; sed quod donum sit Dei, sicut dictum est de eo: tu es patientia mea; quia ab ipso nobis est. Non autem sic dictum est: domine, tu caritas mea; sed ita dictum est: Deus caritas est; sicut dictum est: Deus spiritus est. Videtur ergo quod Deus dicatur caritas non solum causaliter, sed essentialiter. 6. Moreover, Augustine says in Book V of the De Trinitate, For we are not going to say that God is called Love because love itself is a substance worthy of the name of God, but because it is a gift of God, as it is said of God, "Thou art my patience," in that He Himself gives it to us. For it is not said, 0 Lord You are my love; but it is said thus, "God is love," as it is said, "God is a Spirit." Therefore it is that God is called charity not only causally, but also essentially. Praeterea, cognito effectu Dei, non propter hoc ipse Deus cognoscitur. Sed per cognitionem dilectionis supernae ipse Deus cognoscitur. Dicit enim Augustinus, VIII de Trinit.: magis quis novit dilectionem qua diligit, quam fratrem quem diligit. Ecce iam potest notiorem Deum habere quam fratrem. Amplectere dilectionem, et dilectione amplectere Deum. Non igitur Deus dicitur dilectio fraterna solum per causam. 7. Moreover, when the effect of God is known, He Himself is not known because of this, but He is known through the knowledge of the highest love. For Augustine says in Book VIII of the Dc Trinitate, For he knows the love with which he loves, more than the brother whom he loves. So now he can know God more than he knows his brother. Embrace the love of God, and by love embrace God. Therefore God is called fraternal love not solely as a cause. Sed dicebatur, quod fraterna dilectione cognita, cognoscitur Deus sicut in sua similitudine. Sed contra, homo secundum ipsam substantiam animae factus est ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei. Sed similitudo ista obscuratur per peccatum. Ad hoc igitur quod Deus possit in anima sicut in sua similitudine cognosci, requiritur solum quod peccatum tollatur; et non quod aliquid creatum animae superaddatur. 8. But it was objected that when fraternal love is recognized, God is recognized as in His own likeness. On the contrary, man is made in the image and likeness of God according to the very substance of his soul. But this likeness is obscured through sin. Therefore, in order that God be able to be recognized in the soul as in His own image, it is only necessary that sin be taken away, and not that some created thing be superadded to the soul. Praeterea, omne quod est in anima, vel est potentia, vel passio, vel habitus, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Sed caritas non est potentia animae, quia esset naturalis; nec est passio, quia non est in potentia sensitiva, in qua sunt omnes passiones; nec est habitus, quia habitus est difficile mobilis; caritas autem de facili amittitur, quia per unum actum peccati mortalis. Ergo caritas non est aliquid creatum in anima. 9. Moreover, everything that is in the soul is either a potency, or a passion, or a habit, as is said in Book III of the Ethic. But charity is not a potency of the soul, because if it were it would be natural. Nor is it a passion, because it is not in a sensitive potency in which are all passions. Nor is it a habit, because a habit is removed with difficulty; charity, however, is easily lost through one act of mortal sin. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul. Praeterea, nullum creatum habet virtutem infinitam. Sed caritas habet virtutem infinitam, quia coniungit infinite distantia, scilicet animam Deo, et meretur bonum infinitum. Ergo caritas non est aliquid creatum in anima. 10. Moreover, no created thing has infinite power. But charity has infinite power because it joins what is infinitely far apart, viz., the soul to God, and it merits an infinite good. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul. Praeterea, omnis creatura vanitas est, ut patet Eccle. I. Vanitas autem non coniungit veritati. Cum ergo caritas coniungat nos primae veritati, videtur quod caritas non sit creatura. 11. Moreover, every creature is vanity, as is shown (Eccle. i. 2). Vanity, however, does not unite with truth. Therefore, since charity unites us to the First Truth, charity is not something created. Praeterea, omne creatum est natura quaedam, cum sit in aliquo decem generum. Si igitur caritas est aliquid creatum in anima, videtur quod sit natura quaedam. Cum igitur caritate mereamur: si caritas est aliquid creatum, sequetur quod natura sit principium merendi; quod est erroneum secundum sententiam Pelagii. 12. Moreover, every created thing is a certain nature since it falls within one of the ten genera. Therefore, if charity is something created in the soul, it is a certain nature. Therefore, since we merit by charity, and if charity is a created thing, it follows that nature is the principle of meriting. This is the erroneous opinion of Pelagius. Praeterea, homo secundum esse gratiae est propinquior Deo quam secundum esse naturae. Sed Deus creavit hominem secundum esse naturae sine medio. Ergo nec in esse gratiae utitur medio, scilicet caritate creata. 13. Moreover, man is closer to God according to his existence in grace than he is according to his existence in nature. But God created man without a medium according to his existence in nature. So, neither in man's existence in grace does God use a medium, viz., a created charity. Praeterea, agens quod agit sine medio, est perfectius quam agens quod agit cum medio. Sed Deus est perfectissimum agens. Ergo agit sine medio: non ergo iustificat animam mediante aliquo creato. 14. Moreover, an agent which acts without a medium is more perfect than an agent which acts through a medium. But God is the most perfect agent. Therefore He acts without a medium. He does not, therefore justify the soul through the medium of any created thing. Praeterea, creatura rationalis est nobilior aliis creaturis. Sed aliae creaturae consequuntur suum finem absque aliquo alio superaddito. Multo magis igitur creatura rationalis movetur a Deo ad suum finem absque aliquo creato ei superaddito. 15. Moreover, a rational creature is more excellent than other creatures But other creatures attain their own end without anything superadded Therefore even more is a rational creature moved by God to its end with out some created thing superadded to it. Sed dicebatur, quod creatura rationalis non est proportionata ad suum finem per sua naturalia; et ideo indiget aliquo superaddito. Sed contra, finis hominis est bonum infinitum. Sed nullum creatum est proportionatum bono infinito. Ergo id per quod homo ordinatur in suum finem, non est bonum creatum in anima. 16. But it was objected that a rational creature is not, through its own nature, proportionate to its end, and therefore it needs something super added. On the contrary, the end of man is the infinite good. But no created thing is proportionate to an infinite good. Therefore that by which man is ordered to his end is not a good created in the soul. Praeterea, sicut Deus est lumen primum, ita est et bonum summum. Sed lumen quod Deus est, praesens est animae; quia de eo dicitur, Psal. XXXV, 10: in lumine tuo videbimus lumen. Ergo et summum bonum, quod Deus est, praesens est animae. Sed bonum est quo aliquid diligimus. Ergo id quo diligimus, est Deus. 17. Moreover, as God is the first light, He is also the highest good. But the light which is God is present to the soul, because of which it is said (Ps. xxxv. 10), In thy light we shall see light. Therefore the highest good, which is God, is also present to the soul. But the good is that by which we love something. Therefore that by which we love is God. Sed dicebatur, quod bonum quod Deus est, est praesens animae non formaliter, sed effective.- Sed contra, Deus est pura forma. Ergo formaliter adest his quibus adest. 18. But it was objected that the good which is God is present to the soul not formally but efficiently. On the contrary, God is pure form. Therefore He is present formally in those things in which He is present. Praeterea, nihil diligitur nisi cognitum, ut dicit Augustinus, X de Trinitate. Ergo secundum hoc aliquid est diligibile secundum quod est cognoscibile. Sed Deus est per seipsum cognoscibilis, sicut primum principium cognoscendi. Ergo est per seipsum diligibilis: non ergo per aliquam caritatem creatam. 19. Moreover, nothing is loved unless it is known, as Augustine say in Book X of the De Trinitate. Therefore according to this, a thing is lovable according as it is knowable. But God is, through Himself, knowable as the first principle of knowledge. Therefore He is lovable throngh Himself and not through any created charity. Praeterea unumquodque, secundum hoc est diligibile, secundum quod est bonum. Sed Deus est infinitum bonum. Ergo est in infinitum diligibilis. Sed nullus amor creatus est infinitus. Ergo cum aliqui qui sunt in caritate, diligant eum secundum quod diligibilis est; videtur quod dilectio qua diligimus Deum, non sit aliquid creatum. 20. Moreover, a thing is lovable according as it is good. But God is infinite good. Therefore He is infinitely lovable. But no created love is infinite. Therefore, since some who have charity love God because He is lovable, the love by which we love God is not something created. Praeterea, Deus diligit omnia quae sunt, ut dicitur Sapient. XI, 25. Sed non diligit creaturas irrationales per aliquid eis superadditum. Ergo nec creaturas rationales. Et ita videtur quod caritas et gratia propter quas homines diliguntur a Deo, non sint aliquid creatum superadditum animae nostrae. 21. Moreover, God loves all things which exist, as is said (Wis. xi. 25). But He does not love irrational creatures through something superadded to them; therefore neither does He love rational creatures in this way. Thus the charity and grace according to which man is loved by God is not something created and superadded to the soul. Praeterea, si caritas sit aliquid creatum, oportet quod sit accidens. Sed caritas non est accidens: quia nullum accidens est dignius suo subiecto; caritas autem est dignior quam natura. Ergo caritas non est aliquid creatum in anima. 22. Moreover, if charity is something created, it must be an accident. But charity is not an accident because no accident is more worthy than its subject. Charity, however, is more worthy than nature. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul. Praeterea, sicut Bernardus dicit, eadem lege diligimus Deum et proximum qua pater et filius se diligunt. Sed pater et filius se diligunt dilectione increata. Ergo nos diligimus Deum dilectione increata. 23. Moreover, as Bernard says, we love God and our neighbor by the same law by which the Father and the Son love Themselves. But the Father and the Son love Themselves with an uncreated love. Therefore we love God with an uncreated love. Praeterea, illud quod suscitat a morte, est infinitae virtutis. Sed caritas suscitat a morte; dicitur enim I Ioan. III, 14: nos scimus quoniam translati sumus de morte ad vitam, quoniam diligimus fratres. Ergo caritas est virtutis infinitae; ergo non est aliquid creatum. 24. Moreover, that which can raise from death is of infinite power. But charity raises from death, for it is said (1 John iii. 14), We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. Therefore charity is of infinite power and is not something created. Sed contra, omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis. Si ergo caritas recipitur in nobis a Deo, oportet quod recipiatur a nobis finite secundum modum nostrum. Omne autem finitum est creatum. Ergo caritas est aliquid creatum in nobis. On the contrary, everything which is received in a thing is received in it according to the mode of the receiver. If, therefore, charity is received in us from God, it must be received finitely by us, according to our proper mode. However, every finite thing is created. Therefore charity is something created in us. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod quidam posuerunt, quod caritas in nobis, qua diligimus Deum et proximum, non sit aliud quam spiritus sanctus, ut patet per Magistrum in 17 dist. I Sent. Et ut huius opinionis intellectus plenius habeatur, sciendum est, quod actum dilectionis quo Deum et proximum diligimus, Magister posuit quoddam creatum in nobis, sicut et actus ceterarum virtutum; sed ponebat differentiam inter actus caritatis et actus aliarum virtutum: quod spiritus sanctus ad actus aliarum virtutum movet animam mediantibus quibusdam habitibus, qui virtutes dicuntur; sed ad actum dilectionis movet voluntatem immediate per seipsum absque aliquo habitu, ut patet in 17 dist. I Lib. Et ad hoc ponendum movet ipsum excellentia caritatis, et verba Augustini in obiiciendo inducta, et quaedam similia. Ridiculum autem fuisset dicere, quod ipse actus dilectionis, quem experimur dum diligimus Deum et proximum, sit ipse spiritus sanctus. I answer. It must be said that there are some who have maintained that the charity in us by which we love God and our neighbor is nothing more than the Holy Spirit, as is clear from the Master in the First Book of the Sentences, dist. 17. In order that this opinion might be more clearly understood, it should be known that the Master placed this act of love by which we love God and our neighbor as a created thing in us, like the acts of the other virtues. But he set a difference between the act of charity and the acts of the other virtues. For, the Holy Spirit moves the soul to the acts of the other virtues by means of certain habitual means which are called virtues, but He moves the will immediately to the act of love through Himself without any habit, as is clear in Book I, dist. 17. It was the excellence of charity which moved him to posit this theory, and the words of Augustine and others were used in objections. However, it was ridiculous to say that the very act of love which we express when we love God and our neighbor is the Holy Spirit Itself. Sed haec opinio omnino stare non potest. Sicut enim naturales actiones et motus a quodam principio intrinseco procedunt, quod est natura; ita et actiones voluntariae oportet quod a principio intrinseco procedant. Nam sicut inclinatio naturalis in rebus naturalibus appetitus naturalis nominatur, ita in rationalibus inclinatio apprehensionem intellectus sequens, actus voluntatis est. This opinion clearly cannot stand. For, just as natural actions and movements proceed from a certain intrinsic principle which is nature, so also it is necessary that actions of the will proceed from an intrinsic principle. And, just as the natural inclination in natural things is called the natural appetite, so also in rational beings, the inclination which follows the apprehension of the intellect is the act of the will. Possibile autem est quod res naturalis ab aliquo exteriori agente ad aliquid moveatur non a principio intrinseco, puta cum lapis proiicitur sursum. Sed quod talis motus vel actio non a principio intrinseco procedens, naturalis sit, hoc omnino est impossibile, quia in se contradictionem implicat. Unde, cum contradictoria esse simul non subsit divinae potentiae; nec hoc a Deo fieri potest, ut motus lapidis sursum, qui non est a principio intrinseco, sit ei naturalis. Potest quidem lapidi dare virtutem, ex qua sicut ex principio extrinseco sursum naturaliter moveatur; non autem ut motus iste sit ei naturalis, nisi ei alia natura detur. Et similiter non potest hoc divinitus fieri ut aliquis motus hominis vel interior vel exterior qui sit a principio extrinseco, sit voluntarius; unde omnes actus voluntatis reducuntur, sicut in primam radicem, in id quod homo naturaliter vult, quod est ultimus finis. Quae enim sunt ad finem, propter finem volumus. It is, however, possible that a natural thing be moved not by an intrinsic principle but by some extrinsic agent, as for instance when a stone thrown into the air. But it is certainly impossible that such a movement or action which does not proceed from an intrinsic principle be called natural, for this would imply a contradiction in itself. Whence, since for contradictories to exist at the same time does not lie within the divine power, it cannot even be effected by God that the upward motion of a stone, which does not proceed from an intrinsic principle, be natural to it. Now it is possible to give a stone that power by which it would naturally move upward as from an intrinsic principle, but that motion would not be natural to the stone unless another nature be given to it. And likewise, it cannot be effected by God that any movement of man, either interior or exterior, which proceeds from an extrinsic principle is voluntary. Whence, all the acts of the will are reduced, as to a pristine root, to that which man naturally wishes, which is the last end; and he wishes the means for the sake of the end. Actus igitur qui excedit totam facultatem naturae humanae, non potest esse homini voluntarius, nisi superaddatur naturae humanae aliquid intrinsecum voluntatem perficiens, ut talis actus a principio intrinseco proveniat. Si igitur actus caritatis in homine non ex aliquo habitu interiori procedat naturali potentiae superaddito, sed ex motione spiritus sancti, sequetur alterum duorum: vel quod actus caritatis non sit voluntarius; quod est impossibile, quia hoc ipsum diligere est quoddam velle; aut quod non excedat facultatem naturae, et hoc est haereticum. Therefore an act which exceeds the entire capabilities of human nature cannot be voluntary to man unless there be added to human nature something intrinsic, perfecting the will, so that such an action would proceed from an intrinsic principle. If, therefore, the act of charity in man does not proceed from an interior habit superadded to a natural potency, but proceeds from the movement of the Holy Spirit, then one of these two alternatives follow: either an act of charity is not voluntary, which is impossible because to love something is to will it; or it does not exceed the capability of nature, and this view is heretical. Hoc igitur remoto, sequetur primo quidem, quod actus caritatis sit actus voluntatis; secundo, dato quod actus voluntatis possit esse totaliter ab extrinseco, sicut actus manus vel pedis, sequetur etiam, si actus caritatis est solum a principio exteriori movente, quod non sit meritorius. Omne enim agens quod non agit secundum formam propriam, sed solum secundum quod est motum ab altero, est agens instrumentaliter tantum; sicut securis agit prout est mota ab artifice. This difficulty being removed, it will follow, first, that the act of charity is an act of the will. Secondly, if it is granted that the act of the will can be entirely from an extrinsic principle, as acts of the hands or feet, it will also follow that if the act of charity is only from the movement of extrinsic principle, it cannot be meritorious. For, every agent which does not act according to its proper form but only because it is moved by a another, is an agent only instrumentally, as an axe is an agent only inasmuch as it is moved by a woodsman. Sic igitur si anima non agit actum caritatis per aliquam formam propriam, sed solum secundum quod est mota ab exteriori agente, scilicet spiritu sancto; sequetur quod ad hunc actum se habeat sicut instrumentum tantum. Non ergo in homine est hunc actum agere vel non agere; et ita non poterit esse meritorius. Haec enim solum meritoria sunt quae in nobis aliquo modo sunt; et sic totaliter tollitur meritum humanum, cum dilectio sit radix merendi. Therefore if the soul does not effect an act of charity through some proper form, but only because it is moved by an extrinsic agent, i.e., by the Holy Spirit, then it will follow that it is considered only as an instrument for this act. There would not be, then, in man the power to act or not to act, and he would not be able to gain merit. For, only those things are meritorious which are in us according to a certain manner. Thus human merit is entirely taken away, since love is the basis of meriting. Tertium inconveniens est, quia sequeretur quod homo qui est in caritate, ad actum caritatis non sit promptus, neque ipsum delectabiliter agat. Ex hoc enim actus virtutum sunt nobis delectabiles, quod secundum habitus conformamur ad illos, et inclinamur in illos per modum inclinationis naturalis. Et tamen actus caritatis est maxime delectabilis et maxime promptus existenti in caritate; et per eumdem omnia quae agimus vel patimur, delectabilia redduntur. Thirdly it cannot hold, because it would follow that a man who is in charity would not be inclined to an act of charity, nor would he perform it with any pleasure. For, the acts of virtue are enjoyable to us because we are conformed to them according to a habit, and we are inclined toward them through the manner of a natural inclination. However, the act of charity is especially enjoyable and especially inclines one to remain in charity, and through it everything we do or suffer is rendered pleasing. Relinquitur igitur quod oporteat esse quemdam habitum caritatis in nobis creatum, qui sit formale principium actus dilectionis. Nec tamen per hoc excluditur quin spiritus sanctus, qui est caritas increata, sit in homine caritatem creatam habente, movens animam ad actum dilectionis, sicut Deus movet omnia ad suas actiones, ad quas tamen inclinantur ex propriis formis. Et inde est quod omnia disponit suaviter, quia omnibus dat formas et virtutes inclinantes in id ad quod ipse movet, ut in illud tendant non coacte, sed quasi sponte. The conclusion, therefore, is that there must be a certain habit of charity created in us, which is the formal principle of the act of love. By this opinion it is not denied that the Holy Spirit, Who is Uncreated Charity, exists in man who has created charity, or that He moves man's soul to the act of love, as God moves all things to their own actions to which they are inclined by their own proper forms. And thus it is that He disposes all things sweetly, because to all things He gives forms and powers inclining them to that which He Himself moves them; so that they tend toward it not by force, but as if it were by their own free accord. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deus est vita animae per modum moventis, et non per modum formalis principii. To the first, it must be said that God is the life of the soul in the manner of a mover, and not in the manner of a formal principle. Ad secundum dicendum, quod licet ad efficaciam moventis pertineat ut dispositionem non praeexigat in subiecto; tamen efficaciam eius demonstrat, si dispositionem fortem imprimat in passo vel moto. Fortis enim ignis non solum formam substantialem, sed et fortem dispositionem inducit. Unde fortius est agens quod sic ad agendum movet, quod etiam formam imprimit per quam agat, quam id movens quod sic movet ad agendum, ut tamen nullam imprimat formam. Unde cum spiritus sanctus sit virtuosissimum movens; sic movet ad diligendum, quod etiam habitum caritatis inducit. To the second, it must be said that although it pertains to the effectiveness of a mover that it does not require any disposition in the subject, however, that mover displays its effectiveness if it impresses a strong disposition in that which receives or is moved. For, a great fire causes not only substantial form to appear, but also a strong disposition. That agent which moves to action, and which also impresses a form through that which it moves, is stronger than that mover which so moves to action that it impresses no form. Therefore, because the Holy Spirit is the most powerful mover, He so moves to love that He also causes a habit of charity. Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum dicitur, qui adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus est; non designatur unitas substantiae; sed unitas affectus, quae est inter amantem et amatum. In qua quidem unione habitus caritatis magis se habet ut principium amationis quam ut medium inter amantem et amatum; nam actus dilectionis immediate transit in Deum ut in amatum, non autem immediate in habitum caritatis. To the third, it must be said that when it is written (1 Cor. vi. 17), He who is joined to the Lord, is one in spirit, this is not meant a unity of substance, but a unity of affection between the lover and the loved. By this union the habit of charity is regarded more as a principle of love than as a medium between the lover and the loved, for the act of love pass immediately to God as to the loved, but not immediately into the habit of charity. Ad quartum dicendum, quod licet dilectio qua diligimus proximum, sit Deus; non tamen excluditur quin praeter hanc dilectionem increatam, sit etiam in nobis dilectio creata, qua formaliter amamus, ut dictum est. To the fourth, it must be said that although the love by which we love our neighbor is God, it is however not denied that in addition to this created love there is in us a created love by which we love formally, has been said. Ad quintum dicendum, quod Deus non solum causaliter dicitur dilectio vel caritas, sicut causaliter tantum dicitur spes vel patientia; sed etiam essentialiter. Non tamen excluditur quin praeter illam dilectionem quae essentialiter Deus est, sit etiam in nobis dilectio creata. To the fifth, it must be said that God is said to be love or charity only causally, as He is said to be hope or patience only causally, but also essentially. This, however, does not deny that besides that love which God is essentially, there is also in us a created love. Et per hoc etiam patet solutio ad sextum. The answer to the sixth objection is clear from the above. Ad septimum dicendum, quod auctoritas illa eamdem difficultatem habet, sive ponatur creatus habitus caritatis in nobis, sive non. Cum enim dicit Augustinus, quod qui diligit proximum, magis cognoscit dilectionem qua diligit, quam proximum quem diligit, intelligere videtur de ipso actu dilectionis. Quem quidem actum nullus ponit esse aliquid increatum; unde ex hoc concludi non potest quod ipsa dilectio sic nota, sit Deus; sed quod in hoc quod percipimus actum dilectionis in nobis, sentimus in nobis ipsis quamdam Dei participationem, quia ipse Deus dilectio est; non quod sit ipse actus dilectionis quem percipimus. To the seventh, it must be said that this text has the same difficulty whether a created habit of charity is posited in us or not. For, when Augustine said that he who loves his neighbor knows the love by which he loves more than he knows the neighbor whom he loves, he seems to understand the very act of love. Now no one holds that this act is something uncreated; therefore it cannot be concluded that the love thus known is God. Therefore when we perceive in ourselves an act of love, we feel a certain participation of God because God Himself is love, not because He is that very act of love which we perceive. Ad octavum dicendum, quod creatura secundum quod magis perficitur, magis ad similitudinem Dei accedit. Unde, licet quaelibet creatura habeat quamdam Dei similitudinem in eo quod est et bona est; creatura tamen rationalis superaddit aliquam rationem similitudinis in eo quod intellectualis est; et adhuc aliam in hoc quod facta est: et sic in actu caritatis expressius percipitur Deus sicut in propinquiori similitudine. To the eighth, it must be said that a creature, insofar as it is more perfect, approaches more to a likeness to God. Whence, although any creature has a certain likeness to God in this, that it exists and is good, however a rational creature has, in addition, a further cause for similitude in this, that it is intellectual, and another in what it has been made. Thus in the act of charity God is more expressly perceived as in a closer likeness. Ad nonum dicendum, quod caritas habitus est; et difficile mobilis; quia non de facili, qui habet caritatem, inclinatur ad peccandum; licet ex peccato caritas amittatur. To the ninth, it must be answered that charity is a habit and is moved with difficulty. For he who has charity is not easily inclined to sin, even though charity is lost through sin. Ad decimum dicendum, quod caritas coniungit bono infinito, non effective, sed formaliter; unde virtus infinita non competit caritati, sed caritatis auctori. Competeret autem caritati virtus infinita, si homo ad infinitum bonum per caritatem infinite ordinaretur: quod patet esse falsum. Modus enim sequitur formam rei. To the tenth, it must be said that charity unites one to the infinite good not efficiently but formally, whence infinite power does not strive after charity, but rather the author of charity. However, infinite power would strive after charity if man were infinitely ordered to the infinite good through charity, which is clearly false. For, the manner follows the form of the thing. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod creatura est vanitas in quantum est ex nihilo, non autem in quantum est similitudo Dei; et ex hac parte est quod caritas creata veritati primae coniungit. To the eleventh, it must be said that a creature is vanity because it is from nothing, not because it is a likeness of God; and it is for this reason that created charity unites to First Truth. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod ad haeresim Pelagianam pertinet quod principia naturalia hominis sufficiant ad merendum vitam aeternam. Non est autem hoc haereticum, quod aliquo creato, quod est natura quaedam in aliquo praedicamento, mereamur. Manifestum est enim quod actibus meremur; et tamen actus, cum sint quaedam creata, in genere aliquo sunt, et natura quaedam sunt. To the twelfth, it must be said that according to the Pelagian heresy, natural principles of man are sufficient for meriting eternal life. It is not, however, heretical that we merit by something which exists as a certain nature in some category. For it is clear that we merit by our acts, and our acts, as created things, exist in some genus and are of a certain nature. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod Deus esse naturale creavit sine medio efficiente, non tamen sine medio formali. Nam unicuique dedit formam per quam esset. Et similiter dat esse gratiae per aliquam formam superadditam. Et tamen non est omnino simile; quia, ut dicit Augustinus super Ioan., qui creavit te sine te, non iustificabit te sine te. In iustificatione ergo requiritur aliqua operatio iustificantis; et ideo requiritur quod sit ibi principium activum formale: quod non habet locum in creatione. To the thirteenth, it must be said that God created natural being without an efficient medium, but not without a formal medium. For, to each thing He gave the form through which it exists. And likewise He gives existence in grace through some superadded form. But existence in nature and existence in grace are not entirely similar for, as St. Augustine says in Super Joan., He who created thee without thee will not justify thee without thee. Therefore in justification, some operation of justifying is needed and thus it is necessary that there be present an active formal principle which is not present in creation. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod agens per medium est minus efficax in agendo, si utatur medio propter suam necessitatem. Sic autem non utitur Deus medio in agendo, quia nullius creaturae auxilio indiget; sed utitur mediis agentibus, ut servetur ordo in rebus. Sed si loquamur de medio formali, manifestum est quod quanto agens est perfectius, tanto magis formam inducit. Nam agens imperfectum non inducit formam, sed dispositionem tantum; et tanto debiliorem quanto est debilius. To the fourteenth it must be said that an agent acting mediately is less effective if he uses that medium because of its necessity. But God does not use a medium because He is in need of the help of any creature; He acts mediately in order that He might preserve order in things. But if we speak of a formal medium, it is clearthat as the agent is more perfect, so much more will he induce a form. For an imperfect agent does not induce a form but only a disposition to the form, and the less perfect the agent is, the less is his power to induce that disposition. Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod homo et aliae rationales creaturae consequi possunt altiorem finem quam aliae creaturae; unde, licet ad hunc finem consequendum pluribus indigeant, nihilominus perfectiores sunt: sicut homo est melius dispositus qui potest consequi perfectam sanitatem per plures medicinas, quam ille qui non potest sanari perfecte, et ideo non indiget nisi paucis medicinis. To the fifteenth, it must be said that man and rational creatures are able to attain a higher end than other creatures. Whence, although they lack more things necessary to attain this end, nevertheless they are more perfect; just as a man who can attain hea1th through the use of several medicines is better disposed than one who is not able to be completely cured, even though he needs only a few prescriptions. Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod per caritatem creatam elevatur anima supra posse naturae, ut perfectius ordinetur ad finem, quam habeat facultas naturae; sed tamen non sic ordinatur ad consequendum Deum perfecte, sicut ipse perfecte se fruitur. Et hoc contingit ex hoc quod nihil creatum sit Deo proportionatum. To the sixteenth it must be said that the soul through created charity is raised above the possible limit of nature so that he can be ordered to a more perfect end than the capability of nature would supply. However, it is not so ordered to attain God perfectly, as He enjoys Himself, from the fact that no creature is proportionate to God. Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod licet bonum quod est Deus, sit praesens animae per seipsum; tamen requiritur medium formale ad hoc, quod anima perfecte ordinetur in ipsum ex parte animae, non autem ex parte ipsius Dei. To the seventeenth, it must be said that although the good which is God is through itself present to the soul,nevertheless there is need of a formal medium—on the part of the soul, not however on the part of God—for the soul to be ordered perfectly to Him. Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod Deus est forma per se subsistens; non autem ita quod formaliter alicui coniungatur. To the eighteenth, it must be replied that God is form subsisting essentially; He is not that which is joined as form to something else. Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod dato quod Deus per seipsum cognoscatur ab anima (quia hoc aliam quaestionem habet); eodem modo per seipsum diligitur, sicut per seipsum cognoscitur; ut hoc quod dico per se accipiatur ex parte diligibilis, non autem ex parte diligentis. Non enim Deus propter aliquid aliud diligitur ab anima, sed propter seipsum; et tamen anima indiget aliquo formali principio ad perfecte diligendum Deum. To the nineteenth, it must be said that, granted that God is known through Himself by the soul—but this introduces another question—He is loved through Himself in the same way as He is known through Himself. When I say through Himself, this is understood on the part of the one loved, not of the one loving. For, God is loved by the soul not because of some other thing, but only because of Himself; and still the soul needs some formal principle in order to love God perfectly. Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod Deus non potest tantum diligi a nobis quantum diligibilis est; unde non sequitur quod amor caritatis qua diligimus Deum infinitus sit. Hoc enim non minus sequeretur de actu quam de habitu; et tamen nullus dicere potest actum dilectionis, quo diligimus Deum, esse aliquid increatum. To the twentieth, it must be said that God cannot be loved by us to the extent that He is lovable, so that it does not follow that the love of charity by which we love God is infinite. This argument applies no less to an act than to a habit; but no one can say that the act of love by which we love God is something uncreated. Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum, quod habitus caritatis requiritur in nobis in quantum diligimus Deum; quod aliis creaturis non convenit, licet omnes creaturae diligantur a Deo. To the twenty-first, it must be said that we have need of a habit of charity insofar as we love God; this is not necessary for other creatures, although all creatures are loved by God. Ad vicesimumsecundum dicendum, quod nullum accidens est dignius subiecto quantum ad modum essendi; quia substantia est ens per se, accidens vero ens in alio. Sed in quantum accidens est actus et forma substantiae, nihil prohibet accidens esse dignius substantia; sic enim comparatur ad ipsam ut actus ad potentiam, et perfectio ad perfectibile; et sic est caritas dignior anima. To the twenty-second, it must be answered that no accident is more worthy than its subject as regards its manner of existing, because substance is being through itself, while accident is being existing in another. But when the accident is an act and the form of the substance, there is nothing to prevent the accident from being more worthy than the substance. For in this way the accident is related to the substance as act to potency, as the perfect to the perfectible; and it is thus that charity is more worthy than the soul. Ad vicesimumtertium dicendum, quod licet lex qua diligimus Deum et proximum, sit increata; tamen id quo formaliter Deum et proximum diligimus, est aliquid creatum. Lex enim increata est prima mensura et regula nostrae dilectionis. To the twenty-third, it must be said that although the law by which we love God and our neighbor is uncreated, that by which we formally love God and our neighbor is something created. For, the uncreated law is the first measure and rule of our love. Ad vicesimumquartum dicendum, quod caritas resuscitat spiritualiter mortuos, formaliter, sed non effective; unde non oportet quod sit virtutis infinitae; sicut nec anima Lazari, quae formaliter Lazarum resuscitavit, in quantum, per unionem eius ad corpus, Lazarus est resuscitatus. To the twenty-fourth, it must be said that charity revives the dead in a spiritual way, formally, but not as an effective agent. Therefore it is not necessary that it be of infinite power, since neither was the soul of Lazarus which, as a form, revived Lazarus inasmuch as he was revived through a union of his soul with his body.
Secundo quaeritur utrum caritas sit virtus
Whether Charity Is a Virtue?
Et videtur quod non. It seems that charity is not a virtue. Virtus enim est circa difficile, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic. Sed caritas non est circa difficile, quinimmo, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de verbis domini: omnia gravia et immania, facilia et prope nulla facit amor. Ergo caritas non est virtus. 1. A virtue concerns what is difficult, according to the Philosopher in Book VI of the Ethics. But charity does not pertain to the difficult; rather, as Augustine says in the De Verbis Domini, Love makes all hard and repulsive tasks easy and next to nothing. Therefore charity is not a virtue. Sed dicebatur, quod illud quod est virtutis, est difficile in principio, sed facile est in fine.- Sed contra, in principio nondum est virtus. Si igitur solum in principio sit difficile, virtus non erit circa difficile. 2. But it was objected that what is done through virtue is difficult in the beginning but easy in the end. On the contrary, in the beginning there is not yet a virtue. If, therefore, it is difficult only in the beginning, virtue will not pertain to what is difficult. Praeterea, difficultas in virtutibus accidit ex contrarietate; inde enim fit difficile temperantiam servare propter contrarias concupiscentias. Sed caritas est circa summum bonum, cui non est aliquid contrarium. Ergo id quod est caritatis, non est difficile neque in fine neque in principio. 3. Moreover, the difficulty in virtues arises from contraries, for it becomes difficult to preserve temperance because of the contrary concupiscences. But charity pertains to the highest good for which there is no contrary. Therefore that which pertains to charity is neither difficult in the end nor in the beginning. Praeterea, diligere vel amare quoddam velle est. Sed apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, 18: velle adiacet mihi. Ergo diligere adiacet nobis; non ergo ad hoc aliqua virtus caritatis requiritur. 4. Moreover, to esteem or to love is to wish a certain thing. But the Apostle says (Rom. vii. 18), To will, is present with me. Therefore to love is present to us. There is, therefore, required for this no other virtue of charity. Praeterea, in mente nostra non est nisi intellectus et appetitus. Sed intellectus elevatur in Deum per fidem, affectus per spem. Non ergo oportet ponere tertiam virtutem caritatis ad elevandum mentem in Deum. 5. Moreover, in our mind there is only intellect and appetite. But the intellect is elevated to God by faith; the affective power by hope. It is, therefore, not necessary to posit a third virtue of charity to elevate the mind to God. Sed dicendum, quod spes elevat, sed non coniungit; unde necessaria est caritas, quae coniungat.- Sed contra, spes, quia non coniungit, semper distantis est; unde illis qui per beatitudinis fruitionem coniunguntur Deo, non congruit spes. Si ergo caritas coniungit, pari ratione non competit illis qui nondum sunt coniuncti, scilicet existentibus in via. Sed virtus perficit nos in via; est enim dispositio perfecti ad optimum. Ergo caritas non est virtus. 6. But it should be objected that hope elevates but does not join together, whence there is need for charity which will unite. On the contrary, hope, because it does not join, always concerns that which is not joined. Hope is not necessary for those who are united to God through the enjoyment of beatitude. If charity unites, by the same reasoning it does not belong to those who are not yet united, i.e., to those living in this life. But virtue perfects us in this life, for it is a disposition of that which is perfect to that which is best. Therefore charity is not a virtue. Praeterea, gratia sufficienter coniungit nos Deo. Non igitur requiritur virtus caritatis ad hoc quod per ipsam Deo coniungamur. 7. Moreover, grace adequately joins us to God. Therefore the virtue of charity is needed to unite us to God. Praeterea, caritas est quaedam amicitia hominis ad Deum. Sed amicitia hominis ad hominem non numeratur a philosophis inter virtutes politicas. Ergo nec caritas Dei debet numerari inter virtutes theologicas. 8. Moreover, charity is a certain friendship of man to God. But friendship of man to man is not included by philosophers among the political virtues. Therefore the love of God ought not to be numbered among the theological virtues. Praeterea, nulla passio est virtus. Amor est passio. Ergo non est virtus. 9. Moreover, no passion is a virtue. Love is a passion, therefore it is not a virtue. Praeterea, virtus est in medio secundum philosophum. Sed caritas non est in medio; quia in amore Dei non potest esse aliquid superfluum. Ergo caritas non est virtus. 10. Moreover, virtue, according to the Philosopher, is a mean. But charity is not a mean because there can be nothing beyond the love of God. Therefore charity is not a virtue. Praeterea, affectus est magis corruptus per peccatum quam intellectus; quia peccatum in voluntate est, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed intellectus noster non potest Deum videre immediate per seipsum in statu viae. Ergo nec affectus noster potest diligere Deum immediate per seipsum in statu viae. Sed diligere Deum per seipsum attribuitur caritati. Ergo caritas non debet inter virtutes quae perficiunt nos in via numerari. 11. Moreover, the affective power is corrupted more through sin that is the intellect, because sin is in the will, as Augustine says. But our intellect is not able to see God in this state of life immediately as He is in Himself. Neither is our affective power able to love God in this state of life immediately as He is in Himself. But to love God as He is in Himself is attributed to charity. Therefore charity ought not to be numbered among the virtues which perfect us in this life. Praeterea, virtus est ultimum de potentia rei, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Sed delectatio est ultimum quod pertinet ad affectum. Ergo magis delectatio debet esse virtus quam amor. 12. Moreover, virtue is the ultimate limit of a power, as is said in Book I of the De Caelo. But enjoyment is the ultimate limit which pertains to the affective power. Therefore enjoyment ought to be a greater virtue than love. Praeterea, omnis virtus habet debitum modum; unde dicit Augustinus, quod peccatum, quod opponitur virtuti, est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis. Sed caritas non habet modum; quia, sicut dicit Bernardus, modus caritatis est sine modo diligere. Ergo caritas non est virtus. 13. Moreover, every virtue has its proper measure; whence Augustine says that sin, which is the opposite of virtue, is a privation of mode, species and order. But charity does not have a measure, because as Bernard says, the measure of charity is to love without measure. Therefore charity is not a virtue. Praeterea, una virtus non denominatur ab alia; quia omnes species eiusdem generis ex opposito dividuntur. Sed caritas denominatur ab aliis virtutibus; dicitur enim I ad Corinth. XIII, 4: patiens est, benigna caritas est. Ergo caritas non est virtus. 14. Moreover, one virtue is not designated by another, because all the species of the same genus are divided through opposition. But charity is designated by the other virtues, for it is written (1 Cor. xiii. 4), Charity is patient, is kind. Therefore charity is not a virtue. Praeterea, secundum philosophum in VIII Ethic., amicitia in quadam aequalitate consistit. Sed Dei ad nos est maxima inaequalitas, sicut infinite distantium. Ergo non potest esse amicitia Dei ad nos, vel nostri ad Deum; et ita caritas, quae huiusmodi amicitiam designat, non videtur esse virtus. 15. Moreover, according to the Philosopher in Book VIII of the Ethics, friendship consists in a certain equality. But there is the greatest innequality between God and us, as between beings who are infinitely separated. Therefore there can be no friendship of God for us, or of us for God. So charity, which designates friendship of this kind, does not seem to be a virtue. Praeterea, amor summi boni est nobis naturalis. Sed nullum naturale est virtus; quia virtutes non insunt nobis a natura, ut patet in II Ethic. Ergo amor summi boni, quod est caritas, non est virtus. 16. Moreover, love of the highest good is natural to us. But virtue is not natural, because virtues are not in us by nature, as is clear from Book II of the Ethics. Therefore love of the highest good, which is charity, is not a virtue. Praeterea, amor est excellentius timore. Sed timor, propter sui excellentiam, non est virtus, sed donum, quod est excellentius virtute. Ergo neque caritas est virtus, sed donum. 17. Moreover, love is more excellent than fear. But fear, because of its own excellence, is not a virtue but a gift, which is more excellent than a virtue. Therefore neither is charity a virtue but a gift. Sed contra, praecepta legis sunt de actibus virtutum. Sed actus caritatis praecipitur in lege; dicitur enim Matth. XXII, 37, quod primum et maximum mandatum est: dilige dominum Deum tuum. Ergo caritas est virtus. On the contrary, the precepts of the law are about the acts of the virtues. Now the act of charity is commanded in the law, for it is written (Matt. xii. 37), that the first and greatest commandment is, Love the Lord thy God. Therefore charity is a virtue. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod caritas absque dubio virtus est. Cum enim virtus sit quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit; manifestum est quod secundum propriam virtutem homo ordinatur ad proprium bonum. Proprium autem bonum hominis oportet diversimode accipi, secundum quod homo diversimode accipitur. Nam proprium bonum hominis in quantum homo, est bonum rationis, eo quod homini esse est rationale esse. Bonum autem hominis secundum quod est artifex, est bonum artis; et sic etiam secundum quod est politicus, est bonum eius bonum commune civitatis. Cum ergo virtus operetur ad bonum; ad virtutem cuiuslibet requiritur quod sic se habeat quod ad bonum bene operetur, id est voluntarie et prompte et delectabiliter, et etiam firmiter: hae enim sunt conditiones operationis virtuosae, quae non possunt convenire alicui operationi, nisi operans amet bonum propter quod operatur, eo quod amor est principium omnium voluntariarum affectionum. Quod enim amatur, desideratur dum non habetur, et delectationem infert quando habetur et tristitiam ingerunt ea quae ad habendo amatum impediunt. Ea etiam quae ex amore fiunt, et firmiter et prompte et delectabiliter fiunt. Ad virtutem igitur requiritur amor boni ad quod virtus operatur. I answer. It must be said that charity is, without a doubt, a virtue. Now since a virtue is that which makes its possessor good and renders his works good, it is clear that man is ordered to his proper good according to the proper virtue. But the proper good of man must be considerd in various ways, according as man is understood under various aspects. The proper good of man as man is the good of reason, in that to be a man is to be rational. But the good of man considered as an artist is the good of art; so also considered in his political character, his good is the common good of the state. Since virtue operates for good, it is necessary for virtue of any kind that it operate well for the good, i.e., voluntarily, readily, with delight and firmly. These are the conditions of virtuous operation which are not found in any operation unless the agent love the good for which he is working, because love is the principle of all the voluntary affective powers. For, that which is loved is desired when it is not possessed; there is pleasure when it is possessed; and those things which prevent one from having what has been loved cause sadness. Also, those things which are done out of love are done steadily, rapidly and with delight. Therefore love of the good, for which virtue operates, is necessary for virtue. Bonum autem ad quod operatur virtus quae est hominis in quantum homo, est homini connaturale; unde voluntati eius naturaliter inest huius boni amor, quod est bonum rationis. Sed si accipiamus virtutem hominis secundum aliquam aliam considerationem non naturalem homini, oportebit ad huiusmodi virtutem amorem illius boni, ad quod talis virtus ordinatur, esse aliquid superadditum circa naturalem voluntatem. Non enim artifex bene operatur nisi superveniat ei amor boni quod per operationem artis intenditur; unde philosophus dicit in VIII Polit., quod ad hoc quod aliquis sit bonus politicus, requiritur quod amet bonum civitatis. Si autem homo, in quantum admittitur ad participandum bonum alicuius civitatis, et efficitur civis illius civitatis; competunt ei virtutes quaedam ad operandum ea quae sunt civium, et ad amandum bonum civitatis; ita cum homo per divinam gratiam admittatur in participationem caelestis beatitudinis, quae in visione et fruitione Dei consistit, fit quasi civis et socius illius beatae societatis, quae vocatur caelestis Ierusalem secundum illud, Ephes. II, 19: estis cives sanctorum et domestici Dei. Unde homini sic ad caelestia adscripto competunt quaedam virtutes gratuitae, quae sunt virtutes infusae; ad quarum debitam operationem praeexigitur amor boni communis toti societati, quod est bonum divinum, prout est beatitudinis obiectum. But that virtue which belongs to man as man operates for a good that is connatural to man. Therefore the love of this good, which is the good of reason, is by nature in his will. But if we accept the virtue of man according to some other consideration that is not natural to man, it will be necessary for virtue of this kind that love of that good to which such a virtue is ordered be something superadded to the nature of the will. For the artist does not operate well unless the love of the good which is intended through the operation of his art be added to him. Whence the Philosopher says in Book VIII of the Politics, for one to be considered politically good, he must love the good of the state. But when man becomes a citizen of a state and is admitted to participating in the good of some state, certain virtues are suitable, necessary even, for doing those things which are a citizen's duty and for loving the good of the state. Therefore man, through grace, becomes as it were a citizen and a sharer in this blessed society which is called the heavenly Jerusalem (Ephes. ii. 19), You are fellow-citizens with the saints, and the domestics of God. And in this way, man is admitted to participating in celestial beatitude which consists in the vision and enjoyment of God. Therefore certain gratuitous virtues, which are infused, are necessary for man when he is enrolled in the heavenly state; for the proper operation of these virtues there is required the love of the common good for the whole society, which is the divine good considered as the object of beatitude. Amare autem bonum alicuius civitatis contingit dupliciter: uno modo ut habeatur; alio modo ut conservetur. Amare autem bonum alicuius civitatis ut habeatur et possideatur, non facit bonum politicum; quia sic etiam aliquis tyrannus amat bonum alicuius civitatis ut ei dominetur: quod est amare seipsum magis quam civitatem; sibi enim ipsi hoc bonum concupiscit, non civitati. Sed amare bonum civitatis ut conservetur et defendatur, hoc est vere amare civitatem; quod bonum politicum facit: in tantum quod aliqui propter bonum civitatis conservandum vel ampliandum, se periculis mortis exponant et negligant privatum bonum. Sic igitur amare bonum quod a beatis participatur ut habeatur vel possideatur, non facit hominem bene se habentem ad beatitudinem, quia etiam mali illud bonum concupiscunt; sed amare illud bonum secundum se, ut permaneat et diffundatur, et ut nihil contra illud bonum agatur, hoc facit hominem bene se habentem ad illam societatem beatorum. Et haec est caritas, quae Deum per se diligit, et proximos qui sunt capaces beatitudinis, sicut seipsos; et quae repugnat omnibus impedimentis et in se et in aliis; unde nunquam potest esse cum peccato mortali, quod est beatitudinis impedimentum. Sic igitur patet quod caritas non solum est virtus, sed potissima virtutum. But to love the good of any society involves a twofold consideration: first, the manner in which it is obtained; secondly, the manner in which it is preserved. But to love the good of any society so that it might be had or possessed, does not constitute the political good. Thus does a tyrant love the good of the state in order to dominate it, which is to love himself more than the state; for he desires this good for himself, not for the state. But to love the good of the state so that it might be preserved and defended, this is indeed to love the state, and this constitutes the political good. So much is this so, that men would expose themselves to dangers of death or neglect their own private good, in order to preserve or increase the good of the state. Therefore, to love the good in which the blessed participate so that it might be had or possessed does not make man well-disposed toward beatitude, because the wicked also desire this good. But to love that good for its own sake in order that it might remain and be made wide-spread, and that nothing might act against that good, this does dispose man well toward that society of the blessed. This is charity, which loves God for His own sake, and loves fellow-men who are capable of attaining beatitude as it loves itself; charity resists every hindrance both in itself and in others; charity can never exist with mortal sin, that obstacle to beatitude. Therefore it is clear that charity is not only a virtue, but even the most powerful of the virtues. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtus est circa illud quod in se difficile est, sed tamen habenti virtutem fit facile. To the first, it must be said that virtue does concern that which is difficult in itself, but it nevertheless becomes easy to one possessing virtue. Et per hoc patet etiam solutio ad secundum. Non enim probat: manet enim, quantum in se est, difficile illud circa quod est virtus, adveniente virtute, sed quod facile fiat virtuoso, hoc est ex perfectione virtutis. The answer to the second objection is clear from the above. But this remains: considered in itself, that with which virtue is concerned is difficult while it is in the process of coming to virtue. When it is virtuous it becomes easy, and this arises from the perfection of virtue. Ad tertium dicendum, quod difficultas non solum est ex contrarietate, sed etiam est ex excellentia obiecti; sic enim aliquid dicitur esse difficile ad intelligendum quoad nos propter excellentiam intelligibilis, non propter aliquam contrarietatem. To the third, it must be said that the difficulty is not only from contranies, but it is also from the excellence of the object. For, a thing is said to be difficult to understand for us because of the excellence of the intelligible, not because of some contrary. Ad quartum dicendum, quod illud velle quod adiacet nobis a natura, est imperfectum et infirmum quantum ad spiritualia et gratuita; unde et apostolus ibidem subdit: non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago; et ideo requiritur auxilium gratuiti doni. To the fourth, it must be answered that the tendency which is present to us from nature is imperfect and weak as regards its freely obtaining things spiritual and gratuitous. For the Apostle also wrote in the same chapter (Rom. vii. 15), I do not that good which I will. Therefore there is need for the help of a gratuitous gift. Ad quintum dicendum, quod spes elevat affectum hominis in summum bonum ut adipiscendum; sed super hoc requiritur quod illud bonum ametur ad bonum esse hominis, ut supra, in corp. art., dictum est. To the fifth, it must be said that hope lifts the affective power of man to the highest good so that it might be attained; but in addition, it is necessary that this good be loved in order for it to be a good of man, as was said above in the body of the Article. Ad sextum dicendum, quod de ratione caritatis seu amoris est, quod coniungat secundum affectum; quae scilicet coniunctio intelligitur quantum ad hoc quod homo amicum reputat quasi alterum se, et vult ei bonum sicut et sibi. Sed coniungere secundum rem, non est de ratione caritatis, et ideo potest esse et habiti et non habiti. Sed non habitum facit desiderare; in habito vero, facit delectari. To the sixth, it must be said that, concerning the nature of charity or love, it is that which unites in affection. For example, this union is considered in this respect: that a man consider his friend as another self, and wishes good for him as he does for himself. But to unite in reality, this is not the nature of charity. Therefore there can be a love both of what is possessed and what is not possessed. It makes one desire what is not possessed, and be delighted with what is possessed. Ad septimum dicendum, quod gratia coniungit nos Deo per modum assimilationis; sed requiritur quod uniamur ei per operationem intellectus et affectus, quod fit per caritatem. To the seventh, it must be said that grace unites us with God in the manner of assimilation. But it is necessary that we be made one with Him through the operation of the intellect and the will, which is done by charity. Ad octavum dicendum, quod amicitia non ponitur virtus, sed consequens virtutem; quia ex hoc ipso quod aliquis habet virtutem et amat bonum rationis, consequitur ex ipsa inclinatione virtutis quod diligat sibi similes, scilicet virtuosos, in quibus bonum rationis viget. Sed amicitia quae est ad Deum, in quantum est beatus et beatitudinis auctor, oportet praestitui ad virtutes quae in illam beatitudinem ordinant; et ideo, cum non sit consequens ad alias virtutes, sed praeambulum, ut ostensum est, oportet quod ipsa sit per se virtus. To the eighth, it must be answered that friendship is not posited as a virtue, but as something following virtue. For one who has virtue and loves the good of reason, it follows from the inclination of virtue that he loves what is like himself, i.e., virtuous men in whom the good of reason is strong. But the friendship which is for God, Who is blessed and the author of beatitude, ought to be included among the virtues which order men to beatitude. Therefore, since it is not consequent to the other virtues, but precedes them, as has just been shown, friendship must be in itself a virtue. Ad nonum dicendum, quod amor, secundum quod est in sensitiva parte, est passio: qui quidem amor est boni secundum sensum. Talis autem amor non est amor caritatis; unde ratio non sequitur. To the ninth, it must be said that love, considered in its sensitive part, is a passion; indeed, this is the love of the good through the senses. But such a love is not the love of charity, therefore the argument does not apply. Ad decimum dicendum, quod hoc quod dicit philosophus, virtutem esse in medio; intelligitur de virtutibus moralibus; non autem est verum de virtutibus theologicis, inter quas est caritas, ut alibi, quaest. praeced., art. 10, ostensum est. To the tenth, it must be replied that when the Philosopher said that virtue is a mean between two extremes, he was referring to the moral virtues. This is not true of the theological virtues, among which is included charity, as has been shown in the preceding Question, Article 13. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod bonum intellectum movet voluntatem; et ideo licet intellectus per aliqua media Deum intelligat ut summum bonum, ex hoc ipso movet voluntatem, ut sic possit immediate amari, licet per media cognoscatur: quia hoc ipsum quo determinatur cognitio intellectus, movet affectum. To the eleventh, it must be answered that something understood as good moves the will; and therefore, although the intellect knows God as the highest good through some medium, from this it moves the will so that He can be loved immediately although He is understood through some medium. For, that by which the knowledge of the intellect is determined, moves the will. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod delectatio non importat operationem, sed aliquid consequens ad operationem; unde, cum virtus sit operationis principium, delectatio non ponitur inter virtutes, sed inter fructus, ut patet Galat. V, 22: fructus autem spiritus est caritas, gaudium, pax, patientia. To the twelfth, it must be answered that enjoyment does not express the operation, but something consequent upon the operation. Now, since virtue is the principle of operation, enjoyment is not listed among the virtues, but among the fruits, as is shown (Galat. v. 22), The fruit of the Spirit is, charity, joy, peace, patience. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod obiectum caritatis transcendit omnem facultatem humanam, scilicet Deus; unde quantumcumque voluntas humana conetur ad amandum Deum, non potest attingere ut amet eum quantum est amandus. Et ideo dicitur non habere modum caritas, quia non est aliquis terminus fixus divinae dilectionis ultra quem, si diligatur, sit contra rationem virtutis, sicut accidit in virtutibus moralibus, quae consistunt in medio; hoc enim ipsum quod est non habere sic modum, est caritatis modus. Ex hoc igitur non potest concludi quod caritas non sit virtus; sed quod non consistat in medio, sicut virtutes morales. To the thirteenth, it must be said that the object of charity, viz., God, transcends every human capability. Whence, however the human will tries to love God, it is unable to reach Him so that it might love Him as much as He ought to be loved. Therefore it is said that charity has no measure, because there is no fixed terminus of divine love which, if love would exceed, would go against the nature of the virtue. But this can happen with the moral virtues which are means between extremes. The measure of charity is this, that it has no such measure. It cannot be concluded from this that charity is not a virtue, but only that it does not stand as a mean like the moral virtues. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod caritas dicitur patiens et benigna, quasi denominata ab aliis virtutibus, in quantum producit actus omnium virtutum. To the fourteenth, it must be said that charity is called patient and kind, as if named from the other virtues, inasmuch as it produces the acts of all the virtues. Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod caritas non est virtus hominis in quantum est homo, sed in quantum per participationem gratiae fit Deus et filius Dei, secundum illud I Ioan. III, 1: videte qualem caritatem dedit nobis pater, ut filii Dei nominemur et simus. To the fifteenth, it must be said that charity is not a virtue of man considered as man, but of man as considered as becoming, through participation in grace, like to God and the Son of God, according to which it is written (1 John iii. 1), Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and should be the sons of God. Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod amor summi boni, prout est principium esse naturalis, inest nobis a natura; sed prout est obiectum illius beatitudinis quae totam capacitatem naturae creatae excedit, non inest nobis a natura, sed est supra naturam. To the sixteenth, it must be said that the love of the highest good, considered as the principle of natural being, is in us from nature. However, considered as the object of that beatitude which exceeds the total capacity of created nature, it is not in us from nature but is above nature. Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod dona perficiunt virtutes elevando eas supra modum humanum, sicut donum intellectus virtutem fidei, et donum timoris virtutem temperantiae in recedendo a delectabilibus ultra humanum modum. Sed circa amorem Dei non inest aliqua imperfectio, quam oporteat per aliquod donum perfici; unde caritas non ponitur donum virtutis, quae tamen excellentior est omnibus donis. To the seventeenth, it must be answered that the gifts perfect the virtues by raising them above the human way of acting. Thus, the gift of understanding perfects the virtue of faith; and the gift of fear perfects the virtue of temperance from excesses that are beyond the human way of acting. But in the love of God, there is no such imperfection which needs to be perfected by a gift. Therefore charity, which is more excellent than all the gifts, is not considered as the gift of virtue.
Tertio quaeritur utrum caritas sit forma virtutum
Whether Charity Is the Form of the Virtues?
Et videtur quod non. It seems that charity is not the form of the virtues. Forma enim dat esse et speciem ei cuius est forma. Sed caritas non dat esse et speciem cuilibet virtuti. Ergo caritas non est forma aliarum virtutum. 1. For, the form confers being and species on that of which it is the form. But charity does not give being and species to any virtue. Therefore charity is not the form of the other virtues. Praeterea, formae non est forma. Sed omnes virtutes sunt formae; sunt enim perfectiones quaedam. Ergo caritas non est forma virtutum. 2. Moreover, there is no form of a form. All virtues are forms, for they are certain perfections. Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues. Praeterea, ea quae dividuntur ex opposito, non ita se habent, quod unum sit forma alterius. Sed caritas ex opposito dividitur aliis virtutibus, ut patet I ad Cor. XIII, 13: nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec. Ergo caritas non est forma virtutum. 4. Moreover, those things which are separated by opposition are not so related that one is the form of the other. But charity is separated by opposition from the other virtues, as is clear (1 Cor. xiii. 13), And now there remain faith, hope, and charity, these three. Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues. Sed dicendum, quod caritas non est forma intrinseca virtutum, sed exemplaris.- Sed contra, exemplatum trahit speciem ab exemplari. Si igitur caritas est forma exemplaris omnium virtutum, omnes virtutes trahunt speciem ab ipsa. Ergo omnes virtutes essent unius speciei; quod est falsum. 5. But it must be objected that charity is not the intrinsic form of the virtues, but the exemplar. On the contrary, that which is in imitation of something derives its species from the exemplar. Therefore, if charity is the exemplary form of all the virtues, all the virtues derive their species from it. Therefore all the virtues would be of one species, which is false. Praeterea, forma exemplaris est ad quam aliquid fit. Non ergo est necessaria nisi ad hoc quod res fiat. Si ergo caritas est forma exemplaris virtutum, non erit necessaria caritas nisi ad generationem virtutum. Et ideo virtutibus habitis, non erit necessarium habere caritatem; quod patet esse falsum. 6. Moreover, the form of the exemplar is that in imitation of which something is made; therefore it is necessary only in order that a thing be made. If charity is the exemplary form of the virtues, charity itself will be necessary only for the generation of the virtues. Therefore, when the virtues are possessed, it will not be necessary to have charity, which is clearly false. Praeterea, exemplar est necessarium facienti, non autem utenti iam facto; sicut exemplar est necessarium ad transcribendum librum, non autem ad utendum libro iam scripto. Si igitur caritas est forma exemplaris virtutum, non competit nobis, qui virtutibus utimur, sed Deo, qui in nobis virtutes operatur. 7. Moreover, the exemplar is necessary to make something, but not to use what has already been made; just as the exemplar is necessary in transcribing a book, but not in using the book after it has been written. Therefore, if charity is the exemplary form of the virtues, it does not belong to us who use these virtues, but to God Who causes the virtues in us. Praeterea, exemplar potest esse sine exemplato. Si igitur caritas sit forma exemplaris virtutum, sequitur quod possit esse sine aliis virtutibus; quod est falsum. 8. Moreover, the exemplar can exist without what it exemplifies. Therefore if charity is the exemplary form of the virtues, it follows that it could exist without the other virtues, which is false. Praeterea, quaelibet virtus habet formam a suo fine et obiecto. Quod autem est per se formatum, non indiget formari ab alio; et ita caritas non est forma virtutum. 9. Moreover, every virtue has its form from its end and object. But what is formed by itself does not need to be formed by another; and so charity is not the form of the virtues. Praeterea, natura semper facit quod melius est. Multo igitur magis Deus. Sed melius est aliquid esse formatum quam informe. Cum igitur virtutes in nobis operetur Deus, videtur quod faciat eas formatas; et ita non indigent formari a caritate. 10. Moreover, nature always does what is best. Therefore God does so all the more. But it is best for something to be formed than unformed. So, since God activates virtues in us, it seems that He makes them formed, and they do not need to be formed by charity. Praeterea, fides est quoddam spirituale lumen. Sed lumen est forma eorum quae videntur in lumine. Ergo, sicut lux corporalis est forma colorum, sic fides est forma caritatis et aliarum virtutum; non autem caritas. 11. Moreover, faith is a kind of spiritual light. But light is the form of what is seen in light. Therefore, just as physica. light is the form of colors, so faith, and not charity, is the form of charity and of the other virtues. Praeterea, ordo perfectionum est secundum ordinem perfectibilium. Sed virtutes sunt perfectiones potentiarum animae. Ergo secundum ordinem potentiarum est ordo virtutum. Sed inter alias potentias animae altior est intellectus ipsa voluntate. Ergo et fides est altior caritate; et ita fides magis est forma caritatis quam e converso. 12. Moreover, the order of perfections corresponds with the order of perfectibles. But virtues are perfections of the powers of the sould. Therefore the order of virtues follows the order of the powers. But among the powers of the soul, the intellect is higher than the will. Therefore faith is higher than charity, and so faith is rather the form of charity than the other way around. Praeterea, sicut se habent virtutes morales ad invicem, ita et theologicae. Sed prudentia, quae est in vi cognitiva, informat alias virtutes quae sunt in vi appetitiva, scilicet iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam et huiusmodi. Ergo et fides, quae in cognitiva est, informat caritatem, quae est in appetitiva, et non e converso. 13. Moreover, as moral virtues are related to one another, so are theological virtues. But prudence, which is in the cognitive power, informs the other virtues which are in the appetitive power, such as justice, fortitude, temperance and the like. Theefore faith, which is in the cognitive power, gives form to charity, which is in the appetitive power, and not the other way around. Praeterea, forma virtutis est modus eius. Sed rationis est imponere modum appetitui, et non e converso. Ergo fides, quae est in ratione, magis est forma caritatis, quae est in parte appetitiva, quam e converso. 14. Moreover, the form of a virtue is is mode. But it belongs to reason to impose mode on the appetite, and not the other way around. Therefore, faith, which resides in reason, is the form of charity, which is in the appetitive part, rather than the other way around. Praeterea, Matth. I, 2, super illud, Abraham genuit Isaac, Isaac genuit Iacob, dicit Glossa, quod fides genuit spem et spes caritatem. Sed omne genitum recipit formam a generante. Ergo caritas recipit formam a fide et spe, et non e converso. 15. Morover, on Matthew 1:2, "Abraham begot Isaac, Isaac begot Jacob", the Gloss says that faith begets hope, and hope charity. But everything generated receives its form from the generator. Therefore charity receives its form from faith and hope, and not the other way around. Praeterea, in uno et eodem, potentia praecedit actum tempore. Si igitur caritas comparetur ad alias virtutes ut actus et forma, sequetur quod aliae virtutes prius tempore sint in homine quam caritas; quod est falsum. 16. Moreover, in one and the same thing, potency precedes act in time. Therefore if charity is compared to the other virtues as their act and form, it would follow that the other virtues must exist in man at an earlier time than charity, which is false. Praeterea, informatio in moralibus est ex fine. Sed omnes virtutes ordinantur, sicut in finem ultimum, in visionem Dei, quae est tota merces, ut Augustinus dicit, et quae succedit fidei. Ergo omnes aliae virtutes formam recipiunt ex fine fidei; et sic videtur quod fides sit forma caritatis magis quam e converso. 17. Moeover, the designation of form in moral matters comes from the end. But all virtues are ordered, for their ultimate end, to the vision of God, which is the complete reward, as Augustine says, and which follows upon faith. Therefore al the other virtues receive their form from the end of faith. Thus it seems that faith is the form of charity, rather than the other way around. Praeterea, finis efficiens et forma non incidunt in idem numero, secundum philosophum in II Phys. Sed caritas est finis virtutum et motor earum. Ergo non est forma ipsarum. 18. Moreover, the the final, efficient and formal causes do not exist in the same numerical thing, according to the Philosopher in II Physics. But charity is the end and motivator of the virtues. Therefore it is not their form. Praeterea, illud a quo est principium essendi, est forma. Sed principium esse spiritualis est gratia, secundum illud I Corinth. c. XV, 10: gratia Dei sum id quod sum. Ergo gratia Dei est forma virtutum, et non caritas. 19. Moreover, that which is the principle of existence is the form. But the principle of spiritual existence is grace, according to 1 Cor. 15:10: "By the grace of God I am what I am." Therefore the grace of God is the form of the virtues, and not charity. Sed contra, est quod Ambrosius dicit, quod caritas est forma et mater virtutum. On the contrary, Ambrose says that charity is the form and mother of the virtues. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod caritas est forma virtutum, motor et radix. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod de habitibus oportet nos secundum actus iudicare; unde quando id quod est unius habitus, est ut formale in actu alterius habitus, oportet quod unus habitus se habeat ad alium ut forma. In omnibus autem actibus voluntariis id quod est ex parte finis, est formale: quod ideo est, quia unusquisque actus formam et speciem recipit secundum formam agentis, ut calefactio secundum calorem. Forma autem voluntatis est obiectum ipsius, quod est bonum et finis, sicut intelligibile est forma intellectus; unde oportet quod id quod est ex parte finis, sit formale in actu voluntatis. Unde idem specie actus, secundum quod ordinatur ad unum finem, cadit sub forma virtutis; et secundum quod ordinatur ad alium finem, cadit sub forma vitii; ut patet de eo qui dat eleemosynam vel propter Deum, vel propter inanem gloriam. Actus enim unius vitii, secundum quod ordinatur ad finem alterius vitii, recipit formam eius; utpote qui furatur ut fornicetur, materialiter quidem fur est, formaliter vero intemperatus. Manifestum est autem quod actus omnium aliarum virtutum ordinatur ad finem proprium caritatis, quod est eius obiectum, scilicet summum bonum. Et de virtutibus quidem moralibus manifestum est: nam huiusmodi virtutes sunt circa quaedam bona creata quae ordinantur ad bonum increatum sicut ad ultimum finem. Sed de virtutibus aliis theologicis idem manifestum est: nam ens increatum est quidem obiectum fidei, ut verum; et in quantum est appetibile, habet rationem boni. Et sic tendit fides in ipsum, in quantum est appetibile, cum nullus credat nisi volens. Spei autem obiectum licet sit ens increatum, in quantum est bonum, tamen dependet ab obiecto caritatis: est enim bonum, obiectum spei, in quantum est desiderabile et consequibile: nullus enim desiderat consequi aliquod bonum nisi per hoc quod amat ipsum. I answer. Charity is the form, moving power and root of the virtues. This can be shown by the fact that we must judge habits by their acts. So when what belongs to one habit is formal in the act of another habit, that habit must be related to the other as its form. But in all voluntary acts the end is what gives the form. That is because every act takes its form and species according to the form of the agents, such as heating from heat. But the form of thewill is its object, which is the good and the end, just as the intelligible is the form of the intellect. So that which has relation to the end must be formally in the act of the will. Thus in species, the same act is considered under the form of a virtue if it is ordered to one end, or under the form of a vice if it is ordered to another end. This is clear from the example of one who gives alms either for the sake of God or for the sake of vainglory. For, the act of one vice, according as it is ordered to the end of another vice, receives the form of the second vice; e.g., he who would steal in order to commit adultery is a thief materially, but formally he is considered intemperate. It is clear that the act of all the other virtues is ordered to the proper end of charity, which is its object, viz., the highest good. This is certainly clear regarding the moral virtues, for virtues of this kind are concerned with certain created goods which are ordered to the uncreated good as to their final end. And the same is clearly evident regarding the theological virtues; for uncreated being as true is indeed the object of faith; and insofar as it is desirable, it has the aspect of the good. Thus faith is directed toward that good insofar as it is desirable, since no one believes unless he wishes to believe. Even though the object of this species (i.e., the theological virtues) is uncreated being considered as good, nevertheless the object is still derived from the object of charity; for, the good is the object of hope insofar as it can be desired and obtained, since no one desires to obtain some good unless he loves it. Unde manifestum est quod in actibus omnium virtutum est formale id quod est ex parte caritatis; et pro tanto dicitur forma omnium virtutum, in quantum scilicet omnes actus omnium virtutum ordinantur in summum bonum amatum, ut ostensum est. Et quia praecepta legis sunt de actibus virtutum; inde est quod apostolus dicit, I Timoth. cap. I, 5, quod finis praecepti est caritas. Et hinc etiam apparet, quomodo caritas sit motor omnium virtutum; in quantum scilicet importat actus omnium aliarum virtutum. Omnis enim virtus vel potentia superior dicitur movere per imperium inferiorem, ex eo quod actus inferioris ordinatur ad finem superioris; sicut aedificativa imperat caementariae, eo quod actus caementariae artis ordinatur ad formam domus, quae est finis aedificativae. Unde cum omnes aliae virtutes ordinentur ad finem caritatis, ipsa imperat actus omnium virtutum, et ex hoc dicitur motor earum. Et quia mater dicitur quae in se accipit et concipit; ideo dicitur caritas mater omnium virtutum, in quantum ex conceptione sui finis producitur actus omnium virtutum; et eadem etiam ratione dicitur radix virtutum. Therefore it is evident that in the acts of all the virtues there is the formal element which comes from charity; and it is called the form of all the virtues in that every act of all the virtues is ordered to the highest good that is loved, as has just been shown. And because the precepts of the law are concerned with the acts of the virtues, so it is that the Apostle writes (1 Tim. i. 5), The end of the commandment is charity. Thus it is apparent how charity can be the mover of all the virtues; it is the mover because it influences the acts of all the other virtues. For, every higher act or power is said to move a lower act or power, so that the act of the lower is ordered to the end of the higher. For example, a house-builder commands a stone-mason so that the act of the stone-mason is ordered to the form of the house, which is the end of the builder. Since all the other virtues are ordered to the end of charity, charity commands the acts of all the virtues; and for this reason it is called their mover. And because the word "mother" signifies someone who receives and conceives within herself, charity is called the mother of the virtues. For this same reason, charity is called the root of the virtues. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod licet caritas non det unicuique virtuti propriam speciem, dat tamen unicuique virtuti communem speciem virtutis, secundum quod loquimur de virtute prout est principium merendi. To the first, it must be said that although charity does not give the proper species to any virtue, it gives, however, a common species to each virtue, on account of which we speak of virtue considered as the principle of meriting. Ad secundum dicendum, quod formae non est forma, ita quod una forma praestet subiectum alteri. Nihil tamen prohibet plures formas in eodem subiecto esse secundum quemdam ordinem; scilicet ut una sit formalis respectu alterius, sicut color est formalis respectu superficiei. Et hoc modo caritas potest esse forma aliarum virtutum. To the second, it must be said that there is no form of a form in the sense that one form is superior to the subject of another. But there is nothing to prevent several forms from existing in the same subject according to a certain order; so that one might be a proper form in respect to another, as color is the proper form in respect to what can be seen. It is in this way that charity can be the form of the other virtues. Ad tertium dicendum, quod caritas cadit in definitione virtutis meritoriae, ut patet per definitionem Augustini, dicentis, quod virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur: non enim recte vivitur nisi per hoc quod vita nostra ordinatur in Deum; quod caritas facit. To the third, it must be said that charity is included in the definition of a meritorious virtue, as is shown by the definition of Augustine, who says that virtue is a good quality of the mind by which it lives rightly; for it does not live rightly unless it is through that which orders our life to God. This charity does. Ad quartum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de forma quae intrat constitutionem rei. Sic autem caritas non dicitur forma virtutum, sed alio modo; ut supra dictum est. To the fourth, it must be said that this argument follows from the form which enters into the constitution of a thing. Charity is not called the form of the virtues in this way but in another way, as has been shown above. Ad quintum dicendum, quod caritas, cum sit communis forma virtutum, trahit quidem virtutes in unam speciem communem, non autem in unam speciem propriam, quae dicitur species specialissima. To the fifth, it must be replied that charity, since it is the common form of the virtues, does indeed bring the virtues into one common species, a very special species, but not, however, into a proper species. Ad sextum dicendum, quod caritas potest dici forma exemplaris virtutum, non ad cuius similitudinem virtutes generentur, sed in quantum ad eius similitudinem quodammodo operantur; et ideo, quamdiu necesse est operari secundum virtutem, necessaria est caritas. To the sixth, it must be said that charity can be called the exemplary form of the virtues; not an exemplar in whose likeness the virtues are generated, but an exemplar according to whose likeness the virtues operate in a certain way. Thus, whenever it is necessary to act according to virtue, charity is necessary. Ad septimum dicendum, quod licet creare virtutes sit Dei tantum, tamen operari secundum virtutem, est etiam hominis habentis virtutem; et ideo indiget caritate. To the seventh, it must be said that, although to create the virtues belongs only to God, however, to act according to virtue belongs also to a man possessing virtue. Therefore he needs charity. Ad octavum dicendum, quod caritas quantum ad actum non solum habet exemplaritatem, sed etiam virtutem motivam et effectivam. Exemplar autem effectivum non est sine exemplato, quia producit illud in esse; et sic caritas non est sine aliis virtutibus. To the eighth, it must be said that charity, considered as an act, not only is regarded as an exemplar, but also as a virtue which moves and causes. But the exemplar does not cause without producing that which is made in imitation of it, because it produces it in existence. And thus charity does not exist without the other virtues. Ad nonum dicendum, quod a proprio fine et a proprio obiecto quaelibet virtus habet formam specialem, per quam est haec virtus; sed a caritate habet quamdam formam communem, secundum quam est meritoria vitae aeternae. To the ninth, it must be said that each virtue has a special form from its proper end and its proper object, by which it becomes this virtue. But it has from charity a certain common form, by which it can merit eternal life. Ad decimum dicendum, quod Deus facit in nobis virtutes formatas speciali forma et generali: speciali quidem ex obiecto et fine, generali autem ex caritate. To the tenth, it must be answered that God makes the virtues in us that are formed with a special form and a general form. The special form is derived from the object and the end, but the general form is derived from charity. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod lumen est forma colorum, in quantum sunt visibiles actu per lucem, et similiter fides est forma virtutum, in quantum sunt a nobis cognoscibiles: quod enim est virtuosum vel contra virtutem per fidem cognoscimus. Sed in quantum virtutes sunt operativae, per caritatem informantur. To the eleventh, it must be said that light is the form of colors considered as visible in act through light; likewise, faith is the form of the virtues considered as knowable by us. For, we know by faith what is virtuous and what is not virtuous. But the virtues, insofar as they are operative, are informed by charity. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod intellectus simpliciter est prior voluntate, quia bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis. Sed tamen in operando et movendo prior est voluntas. Non enim intellectus intelligit et movet nisi voluntate accedente; unde etiam ipsum intellectum movet voluntas, in quantum est operativus: utimur enim intellectu quando volumus. Unde, cum credere sit intellectus a voluntate moti (credimus enim aliquid quia volumus); sequitur quod magis caritas det formam fidei quam e converso. To the twelfth, it must be said that the intellect, considered in itself, is prior to the will, because the known good is the object of the will. But in its operation and moving, the will is prior. For, the intellect does not understand or move unless the will gives its consent. Thus does the will move the intellect insofar as it is operative; for we use our intellect when we will. Therefore, since to believe is an act of the intellect as moved by the will—for we believe something because we wish to—it follows that charity gives form to faith more so than faith to charity. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod actus voluntatis est secundum ordinem volentis ad res ipsas prout in se sunt. Actus autem intellectus est secundum quod res intellectae sunt in intelligente: unde quando res sunt infra intelligentem, intellectus illarum est dignior voluntate: quia tunc altiori modo sunt in intellectu res quam in seipsis, cum omne quod est in altero, sit in eo per modum eius in quo est; sed quando res sunt altiores intelligente, tunc voluntas altius ascendit quam possit pertingere intellectus. Et inde est quod in moralibus quae sunt infra hominem, virtus cognoscitiva informat virtutes appetitivas, sicut prudentia alias virtutes morales; in virtutibus autem theologicis, quae sunt circa Deum, virtus voluntatis, scilicet caritas, informat virtutem intellectus scilicet fidem. To the thirteenth, it must be said that the act of the will is considered according to the one who wills in relation to things as they are in themselves. But the act of the intellect is considered according as things known are in the one who understands. Whence, when things are below the one who understands, then the intellect is higher than the will, because things exist in a higher manner in the intellect than in themselves, since everything which is in another is in it according to the manner of that in which it is. But when the things are above the one who understands, then the will rises higher than the intellect is able to attain. Thus it is that in moral matters, which concern things below man, the cognitive virtue informs the appetitive virtues, just as prudence informs the other moral virtues. But in the theological virtues which concern God, the virtue of the will, viz., charity, informs the virtue of the intellect, viz., faith. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod rationalis vis dat modum appetitivae in his quae sunt infra nos, non autem in his quae sunt supra nos, ut dictum est art. 1 huius quaest., et quaest. praeced. art. 10 et 11. To the fourteenth, it must be said that rational power confers a way of desiring on those things which are below us, but not in those which are above us, as was said in Article I of this Question and in the preceding Question, Articles 10 and 11. Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod fides praecedit spem, et spes caritatem, ordine generationis, sicut imperfectum praecedit perfectum; sed caritas in ordine perfectionis praecedit et fidem et spem; et propter hoc dicitur esse forma earum, sicut perfectum imperfecti. To the fifteenth, it must be answered that faith precedes hope, and hope precedes charity in the order of generation, as the imperfect precedes the perfect. But charity precedes both faith and hope in the order of perfection. For this reason charity is said to be the form of them, as the perfect is the form of the imperfect. Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod caritas non est forma virtutum quae sit pars essentiae virtutum, ut oporteat eam sequi tempore virtutes, vel aliquam materiam virtutum, sicut in formis rerum generatarum: sed est forma quasi informans; unde oportet esse naturaliter priorem aliis virtutibus. To the sixteenth, it must be said that charity is not that form of the virtues which is a part of the essence of the virtues, so that it must follow the virtues or some matter of the virtues in time, as in the form of things generated. But charity is the form considered as informing; whence it must be, by its nature, prior to the other virtues. Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod ipsa visio, in quantum est finis ut bonum quoddam, est obiectum caritatis. To the seventeenth, it must be said that the vision of God, inasmuch as it is the end considered as a certain good, is the object of charity. Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod forma intrinseca non potest esse finis rei, licet sit finis generationis rei. Caritas autem non est forma intrinseca, ut dictum est, sed ex hoc ipso quod trahit alias virtutes ad suum finem, format virtutes, ut ex dictis patet. To the eighteenth, it must be said that the intrinsic form cannot be the end of a thing, although it is the end of the generation of a thing. But charity is not the intrinsic form, as has been said; but from the fact that it brings the other virtues to their end, it forms the virtues, as is clear from what has been said. Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod gratia Dei dicitur esse forma virtutum, in quantum dat esse spirituale animae, ut sit susceptiva virtutum; sed caritas est forma virtutum in quantum format operationes earum ut dictum est in corpore articuli. To the nineteenth, it must be said that the grace of God is called the form of the virtues according as it gives spiritual existence to the soul, so that it is able to receive the virtues. But charity is the form of the virtues according as it forms their operations, as was said in the body of the Article.
Quarto quaeritur utrum caritas sit una virtus
Article 4: Whether Charity Is One Virtue? Et videtur quod non. It seems that charity is not one virtue. Habitus enim distinguuntur per actus, et actus per obiecta. Sed caritas habet duo obiecta: Deum et proximum. Ergo non est una virtus, sed duae. 1. Habits are distinguished by their acts; acts by their objects. But charity has two objects; God and neighbor. Therefore charity is not one virtue but two. Sed dicebatur, quod unum illorum obiectorum est principalius, scilicet Deus; non enim diligit caritas proximum nisi propter Deum.- Sed contra, philosophus dicit in IX Ethicor., quod amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum, venerunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt ad seipsum. Sed id quod est principium et causa, est potissimum in unoquoque genere. Ergo homo ex caritate diligit seipsum tamquam principale obiectum, et non Deum. 2. It has been objected that one of these objects is more primary, viz., God, for charity loves fellow-man only on account of God. On the contrary, the Philosopher says in Book IX of the Ethics, that friendly relations with another come from a man's relations to himself. But that which is a principle and cause is the most powerful in any genus. Therefore through charity man loves himself principally and God secondarily. Praeterea, I Ioan., IV, 20, dicitur: qui fratrem suum, quem videt, non diligit; Deum, quem non videt, quomodo potest diligere? Magis ergo videtur quod debeat diligere proximum quam Deum. Proximus ergo est magis diligibilis quam Deus; et ita videtur esse principalius obiectum caritatis. 3. Moreover, it is written (1 John iv. 20), He that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth, how can he love 'God, whom he seeth not? Therefore we ought to love our neighbor more than God. Since our neighbor is to be loved more than God, he is the more primary object of charity. Praeterea, nihil amatur nisi cognitum, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de Trin. Sed proximus magis cognoscitur quam Deus. Ergo etiam magis diligitur; et sic videtur quod caritas non sit una virtus. 4. Moreover, nothing is loved unless it is known, as Augustine says in the De Trinitate. But our neighbor is better known than God; therefore he is also loved more than God. Thus it seems that charity is not one virtue. Praeterea, omnis virtus habet proprium modum quem in suis actibus ponit: iustus enim est qui non solum iusta, sed iuste operatur. Sed caritas ponit duos modos in suis actibus; nam caritate diligit Deum aliquis ex toto corde, proximum autem sicut seipsum. Ergo caritas non est una virtus. 5. Moreover, every virtue has its own proper mode which it employs in regard to its acts; for a just man not only does just deeds, but also acts justly. Charity uses two modes in its acts; for in charity one loves God with his whole heart, and he loves his neighbor as himself. Therefore charity is not one virtue. Praeterea, praecepta legis ordinantur ad virtutes, quia intentio legislatoris est facere homines virtuosos, ut dicitur in II Ethicor. Sed de caritate dantur duo praecepta, scilicet: diliges dominum Deum tuum, et diliges proximum tuum. Ergo caritas non est una virtus. 6. Moreover, precepts of the law are ordered to the virtues, for the intention of the law-giver is to make men virtuous, as is seen in Book II of the Ethics. But two precepts are given for charity: Love the Lord thy God, and love your neighbor. Therefore charity is not one virtue. Praeterea, sicut diligimus Deum et proximum, ita et honorare debemus. Sed alio honore honoramus Deum et proximum nam Deum honoramus latria, proximum dulia sola. Ergo alia est caritas qua diligimus Deum, et alia qua diligimus proximum. 7. Moreover, as we love God and our neighbor, so ought we to honor them. But we honor God and neighbor with different forms of honor; we honor God with adoration (latria), and our neighbor only with veneration (dulia). Therefore there is one kind of charity by which we love God and another by which we love our fellow-men. Praeterea, virtus est qua recte vivitur. Sed ad aliam vitam pertinet diligere Deum, et ad aliam diligere proximum; nam diligere Deum videtur ad contemplativam vitam pertinere, diligere proximum ad activam. Ergo caritas Dei et proximi non est una virtus. 8. Moreover, virtue is that by which we love rightly. But to love God pertains to one life, to love neighbor pertains to another life; for to love God seems to belong to the contemplative life, while loving one's neighbor belongs to the active life. Therefore love of God and of our neighbor is not a single virtue. Praeterea, secundum philosophum in I Physic., unum dicitur tripliciter: continuitate, indivisibilitate et ratione. Sed caritas non est una continuitate, quia neque est corpus, neque forma corporis; neque est una indivisibilitate quia sic neque finita neque infinita esset; nec ratione, quia sic synonyma sunt unum, ut vestis et indumentum. Ergo caritas non est una. 9. Moreover, according to the Philosopher in Book I of the Physics, one is considered in three ways: as the continuous, as the indivisible, and as having the same essence. But charity does not have the unity of continuity because it is neither a body nor the form of a body. Nor has it the unity of indivisibility because then it would be neither finite nor infinite. Nor is it one in definition because synonymous things are one in this way, as raiment and dress. Therefore charity is not one. Praeterea, minime habent de ratione unius quae sunt unum proportione tantum: unde quae non sunt proportione unum, neque sunt unum specie neque genere neque numero, ut dicitur in V Metaph. Sed caritas est circa aeternum, scilicet Deum et proximum; quae sunt improportionalia. Ergo caritas nullo modo est una virtus. 10. Moreover, what is one by analogy is neither one in species nor in genus nor in number, as is said in Book V of the Metaphysics; even less are those things which are one only by analogy considered in the definition of the one. But charity is directed toward the eternal, viz., God and neighbor, who are not in the same relationship. Therefore in no way is charity considered one virtue. Praeterea, secundum philosophum in VIII Ethic., amicitia perfecta non habetur ad multos. Sed caritas qua diligitur Deus et proximus, est perfectissima amicitia. Ergo non habetur ad multos; et ita non eadem caritate diligitur Deus et proximus. 11. Moreover, according to the Philosopher in Book VIII of the Ethics, perfect friendship cannot be had for many. But charity, by which God and neighbor are loved, is the most perfect friendship. Therefore it is not directed to many. Thus God and neighbor are not loved with the same charity. Praeterea, virtus in cuius actu sufficit non tristari, est alia a virtute quae delectabiliter operatur, sicut fortitudo a iustitia. Sed in actu caritatis quantum ad aliqua obiecta sufficit non tristari, sicut cum diligimus inimicos: in aliquibus etiam oportet delectari, sicut cum diligimus Deum et amicos. Ergo caritas non est una virtus, sed alia et alia. 12. Moreover, a virtue, by the performance of which it is sufficient that we be not saddened, is different from a vitrue which is performed with pleasure; as fortitude is different from justice. But in the act of charity, it is sufficient that we act without sadness in regard to some objects, as when we love our enemies; but it is necessary that we act with enjoyment in regard to others, as when we love God and our friends. Therefore charity is not one virtue, but different for each object. Sed contra. On the contrary, Quaecumque ita se habent quod unum intelligitur in alio, illa sunt unum. Sed in dilectione proximi intelligitur dilectio Dei, et e converso, ut dicit Augustinus, VII de Trinit. Ergo est eadem caritas qua diligimus Deum et proximum. (1) those things are one when they are so regarded that one thing is understood in another. But in loving our neighbor is understood the love of God, and vice versa, as Augusti ne says in Book VII of the De Trinitate. Therefore it is the same charity by which we love God and our neighbor. Praeterea, in quolibet genere est unum primum movens. Sed caritas est motor omnium virtutum. Ergo est una. (2) Moreover, in any genus, there is one first mover. But charity is the mover of all the virtues. Therefore it is one. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod caritas est una virtus. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod unitas cuiuslibet potentiae vel habitus ex obiecto consideranda est; et hoc ideo, quia potentia hoc ipsum quod est, dicitur in ordine ad possibile, quod est obiectum. Et sic ratio et species potentiae ex obiecto accipitur; et similiter est de habitu, qui nihil est aliud quam dispositio potentiae perfectae ad suum obiectum. Sed in obiecto consideratur aliquid ut formale et aliquid ut materiale. I answer. It must be said that charity is one virtue. To understand this, it must be said that any unity of power or of habit should be considered from the object, and this is because the potency is that which is said to have an order to the possible, which is the object. And thus the formal notion and the species of potency is taken from the object. It is the same for a habit, which is nothing more than a disposition of a perfected potency toward its object. Formale autem in obiecto est id secundum quod obiectum refertur ad potentiam vel habitum; materiale autem id in quo hoc fundatur: ut si loquamur de obiecto potentiae visivae, obiectum eius formale est color, vel aliquid huiusmodi, in quantum enim aliquid coloratum est, in tantum visibile est; sed materiale in obiecto est corpus cui accidit color. In the object, however, something is considered as form, and something else as matter. The form in an object is that according to which the object is related to a potency or to a habit; but the matter is that in which the formal notion has its foundation. Thus, if we speak of the object of the power of sight, its formal object is color, or something of this kind, for according as a thing is colored, thus is it visible. Materially, however, it is the body in which the color exists. Ex quo patet quod potentia vel habitus refertur ad formalem rationem obiecti per se; ad id autem quod est materiale in obiecto, per accidens. Et ea quae sunt per accidens non variant rem, sed solum ea quae sunt per se: ideo materialis diversitas obiecti non diversificat potentiam vel habitum, sed solum formalis. Una est enim potentia visiva, qua videmus et lapides et homines et caelum, quia ista diversitas obiectorum est materialis, et non secundum formalem rationem visibilis. Sed gustus differt ab olfactu secundum differentiam saporis et odoris, quae sunt per se sensibilia. From this it is clear that a power or habit is related essentially to the formal notion of the object and only accidentally to the matter of the object. Whatever is accidental does not cause a change in the thing, but only that which is essential; therefore a material diversity in the object does not cause a diversity of power or habit because only a formal diversity causes this. There is one power of sight by which we see stones and men and the sky, because this diversity of objects is material and does not come from the formal notion of the visible. The sense of taste, however, differs from the sense of smell insofar as there is a difference between flavor and odor, which are sensibles in themselves. Et hoc etiam oportet in caritate considerare. Manifestum est enim quod aliquem possumus diligere dupliciter: uno modo ratione sui ipsius, alio modo ratione alterius. Ratione autem sui ipsius aliquem diligimus, quando cum ratione boni proprii diligimus, utpote quia est in se honestus, vel nobis delectabilis, aut utilis. Ratione autem alterius diligimus aliquem quando diligimus ipsum quia attinet alii quem diligimus. Ex hoc enim ipso quod diligimus aliquem secundum se, diligimus omnes et familiares et consanguineos et amicos ipsius, in quantum ei attinent; sed tamen in omnibus illis est una ratio formalis dilectionis, scilicet bonum illius, quem ratione sui diligimus, et ipsum quodammodo in omnibus aliis diligimus. Now this consideration is necessary in regard to charity. It is evident that we can love something in a twofold way; in the first, by reason of its very self, and in the second by reason of another. We love someone for himself when we love him because of his proper good, viz., because he is essentially noble or because he is pleasing or useful to us. But we love someone for the sake of another when we love him because he is related to someone else whom we love. If we love someone on his own account, we love his entire family, his relatives, his friends, inasmuch as they are related to him; but in all of these, there is only one formal notion of love, viz., the good of the one whom we love for his own sake. And, in a certain way, we love him in all these others. Sic igitur dicendum, quod caritas diligit Deum ratione sui ipsius; et ratione eius diligit omnes alios in quantum ordinantur ad Deum: unde quodammodo Deum diligit in omnibus proximis; sic enim proximus caritate diligitur, quia in eo est Deus, vel ut in eo sit Deus. Unde manifestum est quod est idem habitus caritatis quo Deum et proximum diligimus. Therefore it must be said that charity loves God for His own sake; and because of Him, it loves all others according as they are ordered to God. Thus, in a way, charity loves God in all fellow-men, for our neighbor is loved by charity because God is in him or God might be in him. It is evident that it is the same habit of charity by which we love God and our neighbor. Sed si diligeremus proximum ratione sui ipsius, et non ratione Dei, hoc ad aliam dilectionem pertineret: puta ad dilectionem naturalem, vel politicam, vel ad aliquam aliarum quas philosophus tangit in VIII Ethic. But if we love our neighbor for his own sake and not for the sake of God, this pertains to some other love, e.g., to a natural love, or a political love, or some other kind which the Philosopher discusses in Book VIII of the Ethics. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod proximus non diligitur nisi ratione Dei; unde ambo sunt unum obiectum dilectionis, formaliter loquendo, licet materialiter sint duo. To the first, it must be said that our neighbor is not loved except for the sake of God; whence formally considered, both are one object of love, although materially they are two. Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum amor respiciat bonum, secundum diversitatem boni est diversitas amoris. Est autem quoddam bonum proprium alicuius hominis in quantum est singularis persona; et quantum ad dilectionem respicientem hoc bonum, unusquisque est sibi principale obiectum dilectionis. Est autem quoddam bonum commune quod pertinet ad hunc vel ad illum in quantum est pars alicuius totius, sicut ad militem, in quantum est pars exercitus, et ad civem, in quantum est civitatis; et quantum ad dilectionem respicientem hoc bonum, principale obiectum dilectionis est illud in quo principaliter illum bonum consistit, sicut bonum exercitus in duce, et bonum civitatis in rege; unde ad officium boni militis pertinet ut etiam salutem suam negligat ad conservandum bonum ducis; sicut etiam homo naturaliter ad conservandum caput, brachium exponit. Et hoc modo caritas respicit sicut principale obiectum, bonum divinum, quod pertinet ad unumquemque, secundum quod esse potest particeps beatitudinis; unde ea sola ex caritate diligimus quae nobiscum beatitudinem participare possunt, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de doctrina Christiana. To the second, it must be said that since love looks to the good, there is a diversity of love according as there is a diversity of the good. There is, however, a certain good proper to each man considered as one person, and as far as loving this good is concerned, each one is the principal object of his own love. But there is a certain common good which pertains to this man or that man insofar as he is considered as part of a whole; thus there is a certain common good pertaining to a soldier considered as part of the army, or to a citizen as part of the state. As far as loving this common good is concerned, the principal object of love is that in which the good primarily exists; just as the good of the army is in the general, or the good of the state is in the king. Whence, it is the duty of a good soldier that he neglect even his own safety in order to save the good of his general. Thus also does a man naturally endanger his arm in order to save his head. And in this way charity regards the divine good as its principal object, which pertains to every one according as he is able to be a sharer in beatitude; thus we love out of charity only those objects which are able to participate in eternal happiness with us, as Augustine says in the De Doctrina Christiana. Ad tertium dicendum, quod Ioannes argumentatur a maiori, negando, non quod proximus magis debeat diligi; sed quia magis est in promptu ut diligatur, quia homines proniores sunt ad diligendum visibilia quam invisibilia. To the third, it must be said that St. John, denying the major premise, argues not that one's fellow-men ought to be loved more, but that they are more accessible to one's love, because men are more inclined to love what can be seen rather than the unseen. Ad quartum dicendum, quod licet cognitum diligatur, tamen non sequitur quod magis cognitum magis diligatur. Non enim ea ratione aliquid diligitur quia cognoscitur, sed quia est bonum; unde quod est magis bonum, magis est diligibile, licet non sit magis cognitum; sicut homo minus diligit aliquem servum, vel etiam equum, quem in continuo usu habet, quam aliquem bonum hominem quem tantum fama cognoscit. To the fourth, it must be said that although what is known is loved, it does not follow that what is more known is also more loved. For, a thing is not loved because it is known, but because it is good; thus that which is better is more lovable, even though it is not better known. For example, a man loves his servant or even his horse which he has had in constant use less than he loves some good man whom he knows only by reputation. Ad quintum dicendum, quod caritas respicit ut formale obiectum, bonum divinum, sicut dictum est, art. praec. et in corp. huius art., quod quidem bonum diversimode se habet ad ipsum Deum et ad proximum, et ideo oportet quod habeat diversum modum circa principale obiectum et secundarium; unde circa principale obiectum habet unum modum tantum. To the fifth, it must be said that charity regards the divine good as its formal object, as has been said in the previous Article and in the body of this Article. This good is related differently to God and to one's neighbor, therefore it is necessary that charity have a different mode as regards its primary and secondary objects. However, it has only one mode of operation in relation to its primary object. Ad sextum dicendum, quod praecepta legis sunt de actibus virtutum, et non de habitibus; unde ex diversitate praeceptorum non potest concludi diversitas habituum, sed diversitas actuum; qui tamen pertinent ad unum habitum, propter rationem formalem. To the sixth, it must be said that the precepts of the law concern the acts of the virtues and not the habits. Therefore, from a diversity of precepts it does not follow that there is a diversity of habits, but only a diversity of acts. These acts pertain to one habit because of the formal notion. Ad septimum dicendum, quod in proximo honoratur etiam bonum proprium ipsius; et ideo alius honor debetur proximo, et alius Deo. To the seventh, it must be said that in honoring our neighbor we also honor his proper good; and thus one kind of honor is due to him, another kind to God. Ad octavum dicendum, quod tam dilectio proximi quam dilectio Dei continetur sub contemplativa vita, ut Gregorius dicit super Ezechiel. Nam oratio, quae maxime ad contemplativam vitam pertinere videtur, ad Deum pro proximis fit. Sed tamen principium vitae activae praecipue est amor Dei in seipso. Nec tamen sequitur, si caritas est principium diversorum, quod caritas non sit una. To the eighth, it must be said that the love of neighbor as well as the love of God is included within the contemplative life, as Gregory writes in Super Ezechiel. For prayer to God, which seems especially to pertain to the contemplative life, becomes prayer for fellow-man. So, too, the principle of the active life is, in a special way, the love of God in Himself. It does not follow, then, that if charity is the principle of different actions, it is not one. Ad nonum dicendum, quod caritas non est una continuitate; sed potest dici una indivisibilitate, in quantum est una forma simplex. Non enim dicitur finita vel infinita secundum quantitatem dimensivam, sed secundum quantitatem virtutis. Sed sic non agimus hic de virtute caritatis, sed secundum quod est una ratione: non quidem una numero, ut tunica et vestis; sed ratione speciei, sicut Socrates et Plato sunt unum in ratione hominis. To the ninth, it must be said that charity is not one by the unity of continuity, but it can be considered one by the unity of indivisibility inasmuch as it is one simple form. It is not called finite or infinite considered as a quantity with dimensions, but considered as the quantity of virtue. Here we are not treating of charity in this manner, but only insofar as it is considered one in essence; not indeed a numerical unity as is tunic and dress, but a unity of species, as Socrates and Plato are one in their human nature. Ad decimum dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet, si temporale ratione sui esset obiectum caritatis, et non ratione aeterni, ut dictum est. To the tenth, it must be answered that this argument would hold if the object of charity be considered in its temporal aspect, not in its eternal aspect, as has been said. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod amicitia perfecta non habetur ad multos, ita quod ad unumquemque sit ratione sui ipsius; sed quanto amicitia est perfectior ad unum ratione eius, tanto ad plures se posset extendere ratione ipsius. Et sic caritas, quia perfectissima amicitia est, ad Deum se extendit, et ad omnes qui possunt percipere Deum; et non solum ad notos, sed etiam ad inimicos. To the eleventh, it must be said that perfect friendship is not directed towards many, so that to each one it would be something proper to himself. But inasmuch as friendship towards one becomes more perfect as regards that one, the more perfect the love we have toward one, the better able are we to love others. Thus charity, because it is the most perfect friendship, extends itself to God and to all who are able to know God; it includes not only those whom we know, but also our enemies. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod virtus quae delectabiliter operatur circa principale obiectum, potest eadem circa aliquod accessorium non delectabiliter, sed sine tristitia, operari; et hoc modo caritas delectabiliter operatur in principali obiecto, licet difficultatem patiatur in aliquo secundario obiecto, ita ut sufficiat sine tristitia operari. To the twelfth, it must be said that virtue, which acts for its principal object with enjoyment, is able in the same way to act for some secondary object; not with pleasure, but without sadness. And in this way charity acts with pleasure towards its principal object, although with regard to a secondary object it endures difficulty in such a way that it is able to act without sadness.
Quinto quaeritur utrum caritas sit virtus specialis distincta ab aliis virtutibus vel non
Whether Charity Is a Special Virtue Distinct From the Other Virtues?
Et videtur quod non. It seems that charity is not a special virtue. Illud enim quod ponitur in definitione cuiuslibet virtutis, non est virtus specialis: quia virtus generalis ponitur in definitione cuiuslibet specialis virtutis. Sed caritas ponitur in definitione cuiuslibet virtutis: dicit enim Hieronymus: ut breviter communem definitionem virtutis complectar; virtus est caritas, qua diligimus Deum et proximum. Ergo caritas non est virtus specialis, ab aliis distincta. 1. That which is put in the definition of any virtue is not a special virtue, because a general virtue is included in the definition of each special virtue. But charity is included in the definition of each virtue, for Jerome says, Let me briefly define all virtue as the charity by which we love God and our neighbor. Therefore charity is not a special virtue distinct from the others. Praeterea, caritas qua diligimus proximum, non est virtus distincta a caritate qua diligimus Deum, quia caritas diligit proximum propter Deum. Sed omnis virtus diligit proximum propter Deum. Ergo nulla virtus distinguitur a caritate. 2. Moreover, charity by which we love our neighbor is not a virtue distinct from charity by which we love God; because charity loves fellow-man because of God. But every virtue loves fellow-man because of God. Therefore no virtue is distinguished from charity. Praeterea, distinctiones habituum attenduntur secundum actus virtutum. Sed caritas operatur actus omnium aliarum virtutum: caritas est patiens, est benigna, ut dicitur I ad Corinth., XIII, 4. Ergo caritas non est virtus ab aliis distincta. 3. Moreover, the distinctions of habits are marked by the acts of the virtues. But charity carries into effect the acts of all the other virtues, as is said (1 Cor. xiii. 4), Charity is patient, is kind. Therefore charity is not a virtue distinct from the others. Praeterea, bonum est obiectum generale omnium virtutum: nam virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit. Sed bonum est obiectum caritatis. Ergo caritas habet obiectum generale; et ita est generalis virtus. 4. Moreover, the good is the general object of all the virtues, for virtue is that which makes its possessor good and renders his works good. But the good is the object of charity. Therefore charity has a general object, and thus it is a general virtue. Praeterea, una perfectio est unius perfectibilis. Sed caritas est perfectio multorum perfectibilium, id est omnium virtutum. Ergo non est una. 5. Moreover, a single perfection is of one perfectible. But charity is the perfection of many perfectibles, i.e., of all the virtues. Therefore charity is not one. Praeterea, idem habitus non potest esse in diversis subiectis. Sed caritas est in diversis subiectis: iubemur enim Deum diligere ex tota mente, ex tota anima, ex toto corde, ex tota fortitudine. Ergo caritas non est virtus una. 6. Moreover, the same habit cannot be in diverse subjects. But charity is in diverse subjects, for we are commanded to love God with our whole mind, with our whole soul, with our whole heart, and with our whole strength. Therefore charity is not one virtue. Praeterea, virtus ad tollenda peccata ordinatur. Sed caritas sufficit ad tollenda omnia peccata; quia minima caritas resistere potest cuilibet tentationi. Ergo caritas facit id quod est omnium virtutum; et ita non videtur esse virtus specialis. 7. Moreover, charity is directed toward the removing of sins. But charity is sufficient to take away all sins, because the least bit of charity can resist any temptation. Therefore charity does that which belongs to all the virtues, and so does not seem to be a special virtue. Praeterea, unicuique virtuti speciali opponitur aliquod peccatum speciale. Sed caritati contrariantur omnia peccata: quia per quodlibet peccatum mortale perditur caritas. Ergo caritas non est virtus specialis. 8. Moreover, some special sin is opposed to each special virtue. But all sins are contrary to charity, because charity is lost through each mortal sin. Therefore charity is not a special virtue. Praeterea, nulla virtus est necessaria nisi ad recte operandum. Sed sola caritas sufficienter nos dirigit ad recte operandum; dicit enim Augustinus: habe caritatem, et fac quidquid vis. Ergo praeter caritatem non est aliqua alia virtus; et ita non est virtus specialis distincta ab aliis. 9. Moreover, no virtue is necessary except in acting uprightly. But charity alone sufficiently directs us in right acting, for Augustine says, Have charity and do what you wirh. Therefore there is no other virtue outside of charity; and charity is not a special virtue distinct from the others. Praeterea, habitus virtutum necessarii sunt ad hoc quod homo prompte et delectabiliter operetur: nullus enim est iustus qui non gaudet iusta operatione, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed ad omnia prompte et delectabiliter operanda sufficit caritas: quia dicit Augustinus in Lib. de verbis domini: omnia gravia et immania, facilia et prope nulla facit amor. Ergo praeter caritatem non est necessaria aliqua alia virtus. 10. Moreover, the habits of the virtues are necessary in order that a man might act promptly and with enjoyment, for no one is just who does not rejoice in just works, as is said in Book I of the Ethics. But charity is sufficient for the prompt and enjoyable operation of all works, for Augustine writes in the De Verbis Domini, Love makes all hard and repulsive tasks easy and next to nothing. Therefore there is no need for any virtue outside of charity. Praeterea, ea quae sunt distincta ad invicem, habent distinctam generationem et corruptionem. Sed caritas et aliae virtutes non habent distinctam generationem et corruptionem; quia simul cum caritate et infunduntur et perduntur aliae virtutes. Ergo caritas non est specialis virtus. 11. Moreover, those things which are distinct from each other have a distinct generation and a distinct corruption. But charity and the other virtues do not have distinct generations and corruptions because all the other virtues are communicated along with charity and they are lost when charity is lost. Therefore charity is not a special virtue. Sed contra, est quod apostolus, I ad Cor., cap. XIII, 13, condividit eam aliis virtutibus, dicens: nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec. On the contrary, opposed to this is the fact that the Apostle (1 Cor. xiii. 13) divides charity from the other virtues saying, Now there remain faith, hope and charity, these three. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod caritas est quaedam virtus specialis, distincta ab aliis virtutibus. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est, quod quandocumque aliquis actus dependet a pluribus principiis, secundum ordinem se habentibus, ad perfectionem illius actus requiritur quod quodlibet illorum principiorum sit perfectum. Si enim sit imperfectio in primo, sive in medio, vel in ultimo, sequitur actus imperfectus; sicut, si desit peritia artis artifici, sive recta dispositio in instrumento, opus sequitur imperfectum. Et hoc etiam in ipsis potentiis animae considerari potest. Si enim sit recta ratio, quae est motiva inferiorum potentiarum, et concupiscibilis sit indisposita, operabitur quidem aliquis secundum rationem, sed operatio erit imperfecta, quia habebit impedimentum ex concupiscibili indisposita ad contrarium trahente; sicut circa continentem apparet: et ideo praeter prudentiam, quae perficit rationem, necesse est, ad hoc quod homo recte se habeat circa concupiscibilia, quod habeat temperantiam, ad hoc quod prompte operetur et sine impedimento. I answer. It must be said that charity is a special virtue, distinct from the other virtues. To understand this, it must be considered that whenever any act depends upon several principles that are constituted according to a certain order, it is necessary for the perfection of this act that each of the principles be perfect. For, if there be an imperfection in the beginning, or in the middle, or in the end, an imperfect act follows; just as if knowledge of art is lacking in the artist, Or a right disposition be lacking in the instrument, an imperfect work will follow. And this can also be considered in the very powers of the soul. For, if right reason, which is the mover of the inferior powers, be correct, and the concupiscible attitude is disordered, one will indeed act according to reason, but the operation will be imperfect, for he will have hindrance from the ill-disposed concupiscence tending toward its contrary. This is clear in the example of the continent man. Therefore in addition to prudence, which perfects reason, it is necessary in order that man be rightly constituted with regard to the objects of the concupiscible appetite, that he possess temperance in order that he might act readily and without hindmance. Et sicut est in diversis potentiis, quarum una movet aliam; idem est etiam considerare secundum diversa obiecta quorum unum ordinatur ad alterum sicut ad finem: una enim et eadem potentia, secundum quod est finis, non solum aliam potentiam, sed etiam seipsam, movet in ea quae sunt ad finem. Et ideo ad rectam operationem, aliquem non solum oportet bene dispositum esse ad finem, sed etiam bene dispositum ad ea quae sunt ad finem: alias sequitur operatio impedita; ut patet in eo qui bene est dispositus ad bene appetendam sanitatem, sed male est dispositus ad sumendum ea quae sunt sanativa. Et sic manifestum est quod, cum per caritatem homo disponatur ut bene se habeat ad ultimum finem, necesse est ut habeat alias virtutes, quibus bene disponatur ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Just as among diverse powers, one of which moves the other, so one may consider diverse objects, one of which is ordered to the other as to an end. For, one and the same power, insofar as it is an end, not only moves another power, but even moves itself regarding the means to the end. Therefore, for right operation it is necessary that something not only be well-disposed toward the end, but also that it be well-disposed toward the means to the end. Otherwise, an impeded operation follows, as is clear in the case of one who is well-disposed toward attaining good health, but is ill-disposed toward undertaking the means which bring about health. Thus it is clear that, since man is disposed through charity to be well-ordered toward his final end, it is necessary to have other virtues by which he will be well-disposed toward the means which pertain to the end. Est ergo caritas alia ab his quae ordinantur ad ea quae sunt ad finem, licet illa quae ordinatur ad finem, sit principalior, et architectonica, respectu earum quae ordinantur in ea quae sunt ad finem; sicut medicinalis respectu pigmentariae, et militaris respectu equestris. Charity, therefore, is different from the virtues which are ordered to the means to the end; even though that virtue which is ordered to the end is more primary and architectonic with respect to the other virtues, which are ordered to the means to the end. In this way, medical knowledge is related to the art of applying unguents, or the military art is related to horsemanship. Unde manifestum fit quod necesse est caritatem esse quamdam virtutem specialem distinctam ab aliis virtutibus, sed principalem et motivam respectu earum. It becomes clear, therefore, that it is necessary for charity to be a special virtue, distinct from the other virtues, but yet the most important virtue and the mover of the other virtues. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa definitio datur per causam, in quantum caritas est causa omnium aliarum virtutum. To the first, it must be said that this is a causal definition inasmuch as charity is the cause of the other virtues. Ad secundum dicendum est, quod caritas in diligendo proximum habet Deum ut rationem formalem obiecti, et non solum ut finem ultimum, ut ex supradictis, art. praec., patet: sed aliae virtutes habent Deum non ut rationem formalem obiecti, sed ut ultimum finem. To the second, it must be answered that charity in loving fellow-man has God as the formal notion of the object, and not only as the final end, as it clear from the preceding Article. The other virtues have God, not as the formal notion of the object, but as their final end. Et ideo, cum dicitur quod caritas diligit proximum propter Deum, illud propter denotat non solum causam materialem, sed quodammodo formalem. Cum autem dicitur de aliis virtutibus quod operantur propter Deum, illud propter denotat causam finalem tantum. Thus, when it is said that charity loves neighbor on account of God, the on account of denotes not only the material cause, but in a way the formal cause. But when it is said of the other virtues that they operate on account of God, the on account of denotes only the final cause. Ad tertium dicendum, quod caritas non producit actus aliarum virtutum elicitive, sed imperative tantum. Elicit enim virtus illos actus tantum qui sunt secundum rationem propriae formae, sicut iustitia recte facere, et temperantia temperanter; sed imperare dicitur omnes actus quos ad finem suum advocat. To the third, it must be said that charity does not produce the acts of the other virtues by eliciting them, but only by commanding them. For, the virtue draws out only those acts which are according to the notion of proper form, as justice acts rightly or temperance acts temperately. But virtue is said to command all the acts which it summons up to its end. Ad quartum dicendum, quod bonum commune non est obiectum caritatis, sed summum bonum; et ideo non sequitur quod caritas sit generalis virtus sed quod sit summa virtutum. To the fourth, it must be said that the good in general is not the object of charity, but the highest good. Therefore it does not follow that charity is a general virtue, but that it is the highest virtue. Ad quintum dicendum, quod caritas non est perfectio intrinseca aliarum virtutum, sed extrinseca, ut supra, art. 3 huius quaest., dictum est; unde ratio non sequitur. To the fifth, it must be said that charity is not the intrinsic perfection of the other virtues, but the extrinsic perfection, as was said in Article III of this Question. Therefore the objection does not follow. Ad sextum dicendum, quod caritas est, sicut in subiecto, in una tantum potentia, scilicet in voluntate, quae per imperium movet alias potentias; et secundum hoc Deum iubemur ex tota mente et anima diligere, ut omnes vires animae nostrae advocentur in obsequium divini amoris. To the sixth, it must be said that charity exists as in a subject in only one power, viz., the will which, through its command, moves the other powers. According to this, we are commanded to love God with our whole mind and our whole soul in order that all the powers of our soul might be summoned in submission to divine love. Ad septimum dicendum, quod sicut caritas imperat aliarum virtutum actus, ita per modum imperii excludit peccata eis contraria; et secundum hunc modum caritas resistit tentationibus; sed tamen necesse est esse alias virtutes, quae directe et elicitive peccata excludant. To the seventh, it must be said that, just as charity commands the acts of the other virtues, so through this manner of commanding does it exclude the sins which are contrary to these virtues; and in this way charity resists temptations. However, it is necessary that there be other virtues which directly and in an elicited way drive out sins. Ad octavum dicendum est, quod sicut actus aliarum virtutum ordinantur ad finem quod est obiectum caritatis; ita et peccata quae sunt contra alias virtutes, habent oppositionem ad finem, qui est obiectum caritatis: et ex hoc contingit quod contraria aliarum virtutum, scilicet peccata, caritatem expellant. To the eighth, it must be said that, just as the acts of the other virtues are ordered to the end which is the object of charity, so also do sins, which are contrary to those virtues, oppose the end which is the object of charity. From this it happens that the contraries of the other virtues, viz., sins, drive out charity. Ad nonum dicendum, quod licet caritas sufficienter per modum imperii in omnibus nos dirigat quae ad rectam vitam pertinent; tamen requiruntur aliae virtutes quae eliciendo actus exequantur imperium caritatis, ad hoc quod homo prompte et sine impedimento operetur. To the ninth, it must be said that, although charity adequately directs us through its manner of commanding in all things which pertain to a righteous life, nevertheless other virtues are required which, by eliciting their acts, carry out the command of charity so that man will act readily and without impediment. Ad decimum dicendum, quod contingit aliquid esse propter finem quod tamen secundum se est difficile et triste; sicut cum aliquis accipit medicinam amaram libenter propter sanitatem, licet in ipsa sumptione multum affligatur. Caritas igitur facit omnia esse delectabilia ex fine; sed requiruntur aliae virtutes, quae faciant ea quae sunt virtuosa secundum se delectabilia, ad hoc quod facilius operemur. To the tenth, it must be said that it sometimes happens that a thing which in itself is difficult and causes sadness may exist for the sake of an end; as one freely takes a bitter medicine for the sake of health, although he is much afflicted by its consumption. Charity, therefore, makes all things pleasing in respect to the end, but the other virtues are needed which make those things which are good in themselves more enjoyable, in order that we may more easily do them. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod caritas simul habet generationem cum aliis virtutibus, non quia sit indistincta ab aliis, sed quia Dei perfecta sunt opera; unde infundens caritatem simul infundit omnia illa quae sunt necessaria ad salutem. Corrumpitur autem simul cum omnibus virtutibus: quia quaecumque contrariantur aliis virtutibus, contrariantur caritati, ut dictum est. To the eleventh, it must be said that charity is generated at the same time as the other virtues, not because it is not distinct from the others, but because the works of God are perfect. Whence, when charity is communicated, all the virtues which are necessary for salvation are communicated at the same time. However, charity is corrupted at the same time as the virtues because whatever is opposed to the other virtues is opposed to charity, as has been said.
Sexto quaeritur utrum caritas possit esse cum peccato mortali
Whether There Can Be Charity With Mortal Sin?
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that charity can exist with mortal sin. Dicit enim Origenes in I periarchon: non arbitror quod aliquis ex his qui in summo perfectoque perstiterunt gradu, ad subitum evacuetur ac decidat; sed per partes et paulatim eum diffluere necesse est. Subito autem aliquis committit peccatum mortale per solum consensum. Ergo qui est in perfecto statu per caritatem, non decidit a caritate per unum actum peccati mortalis; et sic caritas potest esse cum peccato mortali. 1. Origen says in 1 Periarchon, 2: I do not think that anyone who has continually stayed in the highest and perfect state would suddenly fall from that height, but he must needs fall away little by little. But one commits mortal sin suddenly, through his consent alone. Therefore he who is in a perfect state through charity cannot fall away from charity through one act of mortal sin. Thus charity can exist along with mortal sin. Praeterea, Bernardus dicit, quod caritas in Petro, quando Christum negavit, non fuit extincta, sed sopita. Sed Petrus negando Christum peccavit mortaliter. Ergo caritas potest remanere cum peccato mortali. 2. Moreover, Bernard says that the charity in Peter when he denied Christ was not wiped out, but only rendered inactive. But Peter, by denying Christ, sinned mortally. Therefore charity can remain with mortal sin. Praeterea, caritas est fortior quam habitus virtutis moralis. Sed habitus virtutis non tollitur per unum actum vitiosum, cum non per unum actum generetur: ex eisdem enim contrario modo factis generatur virtus et corrumpitur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo multo minus habitus caritatis tollitur per unum peccatum mortale. 3. Moreover, charity is stronger than the habit of a moral virtue. But the habit of virtue is not taken away through one act of vice, since it is not generated through one act; for virtue is generated and corrupted by doing the same things in a contrary manner, as is said in Book II of the Ethics. Therefore much less is the habit of charity taken away through a single mortal sin. Praeterea, unum uni opponitur. Sed caritas est una virtus specialis, ut ostensum est. Ergo sibi opponitur unum vitium speciale. Non ergo per alia peccata mortalia tollitur; et sic videtur quod possit peccatum mortale simul esse cum caritate. 4. Moreover, to each thing there is one thing in opposition. But charity is a special virtue, as has been shown. Therefore there is opposed to it one special vice. Thus charity is not taken away by other mortal sins, and so it seems that it is possible for mortal sin to exist along with charity. Praeterea, opposita non se expellunt nisi circa idem subiectum. Sed quaedam peccata non sunt in eodem subiecto cum caritate: nam caritas est in superiori parte rationis, quae convertitur ad Deum; potest autem peccatum mortale esse etiam in inferiori parte rationis, ut dicit Augustinus in Lib. de Trinit. Ergo non omne peccatum mortale excludit caritatem. 5. Moreover, things in opposition cannot be in the same subject, for one drives out the other. But some sins are not in the same subject with charity, for charity is in the higher reason which is turned to God; but mortal sin can exist in the lower reason, as Augustine says in the De Trinitate 7 Therefore not every mortal sin drives out charity. Praeterea, illud quod est fortissimum, non potest expelli a debilissimo. Sed caritas est fortissima: fortis enim est ut mors dilectio, ut dicitur Cantic., VII, 6: peccatum autem est debilissimum, quia malum est infirmum et impotens, ut Dionysius dicit. Ergo peccatum mortale non expellit caritatem; et sic potest esse simul cum ea. 6. Moreover, that which is the strongest is not able to be driven out by what is the weakest. But charity is the strongest, for it is said (Cantic. viii. 6), Love is strong as death. But sin is the weakest because evil is infirm and powerless, as Dionysius says. Therefore mortal sin does not drive out charity, and so it can exist along with it. Praeterea, habitus secundum actus cognoscuntur. Sed actus caritatis potest esse cum peccato mortali: homo enim peccans diligit Deum et proximum. Ergo caritas potest esse cum peccato mortali. 7. Moreover, habits are known through their acts. But the act of charity is able to exist with mortal sin, for a man sinning loves God and his neighbor. Therefore charity can exist with mortal sin. Praeterea, caritas praecipue facit delectari in contemplatione Dei. Sed delectationi quae est in considerando, nihil est contrarium, ut dicit philosophus in I Topic. Ergo caritati nihil est contrarium: et ita non potest expelli per peccatum mortale. 8. Moreover, charity especially causes one to take delight in the contemplation of God. But there is no contrary to that delight which comes from speculative knowledge, as the Philosopher says in Book I of the Topics. Therefore there is no contrary to charity, and so it is not able to be driven out by mortal sin. Praeterea, universale movens potest impediri in uno mobili, et non impediri in alio. Sed caritas est universalis motor omnium virtutum, ut supra, art. 3, dictum est. Ergo non oportet quod sic impediatur in una virtute in quantum alias movet: potest igitur cum peccato opposito temperantiae caritas remanere, prout est motiva aliarum virtutum. 9. Moreover, a universal mover can be hindered in regard to one object that is potentially movable, and not in regard to another. But charity is the universal mover of all the virtues, as was said above in Article III. Therefore it is not necessary that its operation towards one virtue be hindered insofar as it moves the others. Thus charity is able to exist with the sin which is opposed to temperance, according as it is the mover of the other virtues. Praeterea, sicut caritas habet Deum pro obiecto, ita fides et spes. Sed fides et spes possunt esse informes. Ergo eadem ratione et caritas; et sic potest esse cum peccato mortali. 10. Moreover, just as charity has God as its object, so too do faith and hope. But faith and hope are able to exist without form; so too, therefore, is charity. Thus it is able to exist with mortal sin. Praeterea, omne illud quod non habet perfectionem quam natum est habere, est informe. Sed caritas non habet perfectionem hic in via quam nata est habere in patria. Ergo est informis; et sic videtur quod possit esse cum peccato mortali. 11. Moreover, everything which does not have the perfection it was meant to have by nature is without form. But charity does not have here in this life the perfection that it is destined to have in heaven. Therefore it is without form, and thus it seems that it can exist with mortal sin. Praeterea, habitus cognoscuntur per actus. Sed aliqui actus habentium caritatem possunt esse imperfecti: nam multoties aliqui caritatem habentes moventur aliquo motu impatientiae, vel inanis gloriae. Ergo et habitum caritatis contingit esse imperfectum et informem; et sic videtur quod cum caritate possit esse peccatum mortale. 12. Moreover, habits are known through acts. But some acts of those who have charity can be imperfect; for oftentimes those who have charity are moved by another movement to impatience, or to vainglory. Therefore it may happen that the habit of charity is imperfect and without form, and thus it seems that mortal sin can exist with charity. Praeterea, sicut virtuti opponitur peccatum, ita ignorantia opponitur scientiae. Sed non quaelibet ignorantia tollit totam scientiam. Ergo nec quodlibet peccatum mortale tollit totam virtutem; unde, cum caritas sit radix virtutum, non videtur quod quodlibet peccatum mortale tollat caritatem. 13. Moreover, just as sin is opposed to virtue, so is ignorance opposed to science. But not every ignorance takes away complete science. Therefore not every mortal sin takes away all virtue. Whence, since charity is the root of the virtues, it does not seem that every mortal sin takes away charity. Praeterea, caritas est amor Dei. Sed manente amore ad rem aliquam, aliquis propter incontinentiam operatur contra illam; sicut aliquis amans seipsum, contra bonum agit per incontinentiam; et similiter aliquis amans aliquam communitatem, contra eam agit propter incontinentiam, ut philosophus dicit in V Politic. Ergo aliquis potest peccando contra Deum agere, manente caritate. 14. Moreover, charity is the love of God. But a person who keeps his love towards a thing can act against it through incontinence; just as one loving himself acts against his good through incontinence; and another loving his community acts against it through incontinence, as the Philosopher says in Book V of the Politics. Therefore one can act against God by sinning and still remain in charity. Praeterea, aliquis habet se bene in universali, qui tamen deficit in particulari, sicut incontinens rectam rationem habet circa universalia, utpote quod fornicari est malum, et tamen in singulari eligit nunc fornicari, ut bonum, ut dicit philosophus in VI Ethic. Sed caritas facit hominem bene se habere circa universalem finem. Ergo manente caritate, potest aliquis peccare circa aliquod particulare; et sic caritas potest esse cum peccato mortali. 15. Moreover, one can be well-disposed toward the universal, and yet fail in the particular. For example, the incontinent man has right reason toward the universal, viz., that it is wrong to commit fornication; but yet in regard to the particular, he chooses here and now to commit fornication as a good, as is explained by the Philosopher in Book VI of the Ethics. But charity causes man to keep himself well-disposed toward the universal end. Therefore, remaining in charity, one can sin in regard to some particular act, and thus charity can exist with mortal sin. Praeterea, contraria sunt in eodem genere. Sed peccatum est in genere actus: quia peccatum est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem Dei: caritas autem est in genere habitus. Ergo peccatum non contrariatur caritati; et sic non expellit ipsam: potest ergo simul esse cum ea. 16. Moreover, contraries are in the same genus. But sin is in the genus of act because sin is something said, done, or desired contrary to the law of God. But charity is in the genus of habit. Therefore sin is not contrary to charity, and so does not drive out charity. It is, therefore, able to exist with charity. Sed contra. On the contrary, Est quod dicitur Sap., I, 5: spiritus sanctus disciplinae effugiet fictum, et avertet se a cogitationibus quae sunt sine intellectu, et corripietur, id est expelletur, a superveniente iniquitate. Sed spiritus sanctus est in homine quamdiu habet caritatem; quia per caritatem habitat in nobis spiritus Dei. Ergo a superveniente iniquitate expellitur caritas; et sic non potest esse simul cum peccato mortali. (1) it is said (Wis. i. 5), For the Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful, and will withdraw himself from thoughts that are without understanding, he shall not abide when iniquity cometh in. But the Holy Spirit is in man as long as he has charity, because the Spirit of God dwells in us through charity. Therefore charity is driven out when sin enters, and thus it is not able to exist along with mortal sin. Praeterea, quicumque habet caritatem, dignus est vita aeterna, secundum illud apostoli, II Tim., IV, 8: in reliquo reposita est mihi corona iustitiae, quam reddet mihi dominus in illa die, iustus iudex; non solum autem mihi, sed et his qui diligunt adventum eius. Quicumque autem peccat mortaliter, dignus est poena aeterna, secundum illud Rom., cap. VI, 23. Stipendia peccati mors. Sed aliquis non potest esse simul dignus vita aeterna et poena aeterna. Ergo non potest simul caritas cum peccato mortali haberi. (2) Moreover, whoever has charity is worthy of eternal life, according to the Apostle (1I Tim. iv. 8), There is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord the /ust judge will render to me in that day: and not only to me, but to them also that love his coming. However, whoever sins mortally is worthy of eternal punishment, according to what is written (Rom. vi. 23), The wages of sin is death. But no one can at the same time be worthy of eternal life and of eternal punishment. Therefore charity cannot be retained with mortal sin. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod caritas nullo modo potest simul esse cum peccato mortali. Ad cuius evidentiam primo considerandum est, quod omne peccatum mortale directe opponitur caritati. Quicumque enim praeeligit aliquid alteri, illud quod praeeligit, magis amat; unde quia homo magis amat propriam vitam et sui consistentiam quam voluptatem, quantumcumque sit magna voluptas, homo retraheretur ab ea, si eam existimaret esse suae vitae infallibiliter peremptivam; propter quod dicit Augustinus in Lib. LXXXIII quaestionum, quod nemo est qui non magis dolorem metuat quam appetat voluptatem; quandoquidem videmus etiam immanissimas bestias a maximis voluptatibus abstinere dolorum metu. Ex hoc autem aliquis mortaliter peccat quod aliquid magis eligit quam vivere secundum Deum, et ei inhaerere. Unde manifestum est quod quicumque mortaliter peccat, ex hoc ipso magis amat aliud bonum quam Deum. Si enim amaret magis Deum, praeeligeret vivere secundum Deum quam quocumque temporali bono potiri. Hoc autem est de ratione caritatis quod Deus super omnia diligatur, ut ex superioribus patet; unde omne peccatum mortale caritati contrariatur. I answer. It must be said that charity can, in no way, exist along with mortal sin. To prove this, it must be considered, first, that every mortal sin is directly opposed to charity. Whoever chooses something in preference to something else, loves better that which he first chooses. Whence, because man loves his own life itnd his own continuance more than pleasure, however great that pleasure may be, he is drawn away from pleasure if he thinks that it is infallibly destructive of his own life. This is explained by Augustine when he writes in the LXXXIII Quaestionum, that there is no one who fears pain more than he who seeks pleasure. Sometimes we even see that the most savage of beasts will avoid the greatest pleasures because of the fear of pain. However, one sins mortally in this, that he prefers something other than to live according to God and to cling to God. Thus it is clear that whoever sins mortally, by this fact he loves some other good more than he loves God; for if he would love God, he would choose to live according to God more than to obtain some temporal good. However, it is of the very essence of charity that God be loved above all things, as is clear from what is said above. Therefore every mortal sin is contrary to charity. Caritas enim hominibus a Deo infunditur. Quae autem ex infusione divina causantur, non solum indigent actione divina in sui principio, ut esse incipiant, sed in tota sui duratione, ut conserventur in esse; sicut illuminatio aeris indiget praesentia solis, non solum cum primo aer illuminatur, sed quamdiu illuminatus manet: et propter hoc, si aliquod obstaculum interponatur intercipiens directum aspectum ad solem, desinit esse lumen in aere; et similiter quando peccatum mortale advenit, quod impedit directum aspectum animae ad Deum, per hoc quod aliquid aliud praefert Deo, intercipitur influxus caritatis, et desinit esse caritas in homine, secundum illud Is., LIX, 2: peccata nostra diviserunt inter nos et Deum nostrum. Charity is founded in man by God. But those things which are caused by divine infusion are in need of divine action not only in the beginning so that they might begin to exist, but also in their entire duration so that they might be preserved in existence. For example, the illumination of the air needs the presence of the sun not only when the air is first lighted, but as long as it remains lighted. And for this reason, if any intervening obstacle prevents the direct rays of the sun, the light in the air fails. Likewise, when mortal sin enters, which obstructs the soul's direct sight of God—and through this something else is preferred to God—the flow of charity is stopped, and charity is then lacking in man, as is said (Isaiah. lix. 2), Your iniquities have divided between you and your God. Sed cum rursus mens hominis redit ut recte in Deum aspiciat, eum super omnia diligendo (quod tamen sine divina gratia esse non potest), iterato ad statum caritatis redit. But when the mind of man again returns to God by regarding Him rightly and by loving Him above all things—which, however, cannot be done without divine grace—man immediately returns again to charity. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum Origenis non sic est intelligendum, quod homo peccans mortaliter, quantumcumque perfectus, non subito caritatem amittat sed quia non contingit de facile quod homo perfectus statim a principio mortaliter peccet, sed per negligentiam et diversa peccata venialia, disponitur ut tandem labatur in peccatum mortale. To the first, it must be said that the words of Origen should not be understood to mean that a man sinning mortally, howsoever perfect he was, does not suddenly lose charity. The words are to be interpreted to mean that it does not easily happen that a perfect man would suddenly commit a mortal sin at once, but through negligence; and many venial sins would be disposed finally to fall into mortal sin. Ad secundum dicendum, quod verbum Bernardi non videtur sustinendum, nisi intelligatur caritas in Petro non fuisse extincta, quia cito resurrexit; ea enim quae parum distant, quasi nihil distare videntur, ut dicitur in II Physic. To the second, it must be answered that the text of Bernard does not seem to hold unless it be understood that charity was not extinct in Peter, only because it was soon resurrected; for those things which are not very far apart seem as if they are not separated at all, as is said in Book II of the Physics. Ad tertium dicendum, quod virtus moralis, quae acquiritur ex actibus, consistit in inclinatione potentiae ad actum; quae quidem inclinatio non tollitur totaliter per unum actum. Sed influentia caritatis a Deo intercipitur per unum actum; et ideo unus actus peccati tollit caritatem. To the third, it must be said that a moral virtue which is acquired by acts consists in an inclination of power to act; and that inclination is not entirely taken away by one act. But by one act, the influence that God exerts in the operation of charity is taken away; therefore one act of sin takes away charity. Ad quartum dicendum, quod caritatis oppositum generale est odium; sed indirecte omnia peccata caritati opponuntur, in quantum pertinent ad Dei contemptum, qui est super omnia diligendus. To the fourth, it must be said that, in general, the opposite of charity is hate; but indirectly all sins are opposed to charity insofar as they pertain to the contempt of God Who ought to be loved above all things. Ad quintum dicendum, quod superior ratio, in qua est caritas, movet inferiorem; unde peccatum, in quantum in inferiori parte opponitur motui caritatis, caritatem excludit. Vel dicendum, quod peccatum mortale non est sine consensu, qui attribuitur superiori parti rationis, in qua est caritas. To the fifth, it must be said that the higher reason, in which charity exists, moves the lower reason. Therefore sin, inasmuch as it is opposed to the movement of charity in the lower part of the soul, drives out charity. Or, it can be answered that mortal sin does not exist without consent, which is attributed to the higher faculty of reason in which charity exists. Ad sextum dicendum, quod peccatum non expellit caritatem ex sua virtute; sed ex eo quod homo voluntarie se peccato subiicit. To the sixth, it must be said that sin does not drive out charity by its own power, but only in virtue of the fact that man voluntarily subjects himself to sin. Ad septimum dicendum, quod homo qui peccat mortaliter, non diligit Deum super omnia, sicut diligendus est ex caritate; sed est aliquid aliud quod praefert amori Dei, propter quod Dei mandatum contemnit. To the seventh, it must be said that a man who sins mortally does not love God above all things, as He ought to be loved in charity; but there is something else that he prefers to the love of God, and on account of this thing, he despises the law of God. Ad octavum dicendum, quod delectatio quae est in considerando, non habet contrarium in eodem genere, ut scilicet aliqua alia consideratio sit ei contraria; et hoc ideo quia species contrariorum in intellectu non sunt contrariae; unde delectationi quae est in considerando album, non contrariatur delectatio quae est in considerando nigrum. Sed quia actus voluntatis consistit in motu animae ad rem, sicut res in seipsis sunt contrariae, ita motus voluntatis in contraria sunt contrarii: desiderium enim dulcis contrariatur desiderio amari. Et secundum hoc amor Dei contrariatur amori peccati, quod excludit a Deo. Consideratio autem in qua non est contrarietas, non est proprius actus caritatis, qui ab ipsa elicitur, sed solum ab ipsa imperatur quasi eius effectus. To the eighth, it must be said that delight, which comes from speculative knowledge, does not have a contrary in the same genus so that the consideration of some other thing would be contrary to it. This is because the species of contraries are not contrary in the understanding; whence, the delight which comes from a consideration of white is not contrary to the delight which comes from a consideration of black. Since the act of the will consists in the movement of the soul toward the thing willed, and just as things in themselves are contraries, so the movements of the will towards these contraries are contraries. For, the desire of sweetness is contrary to the desire of the bitter. According to this, the love of God is contrary to the love of sin which excludes one from God. However, speculative knowledge, insofar as there is no contrary, is not a proper act of charity which is elicited by it, but charity is only commanded by it as its effect. Ad nonum dicendum, quod caritas quae est universalis motor virtutum, cum impeditur in his quae pertinent ad unam virtutem, per peccatum mortale, impeditur in suo universali obiecto; et ob hoc universaliter in omnibus impeditur. Non est autem sic cum universale mobile sic impeditur in particulari effectu, quod non impeditur in his quae pertinent ad universalem virtutem. To the ninth, it must be said that charity which is the universal mover of the virtues, when it is impeded through mortal sin in regard to those things which pertain to one virtue, is impeded in regard to its own universal object; and because of this it is universally impeded in regard to all. However, this is not true when the object that is potentially movable is so hindered in regard to its particular effect, so that it is not hindered in regard to those things which pertain to universal virtue. Ad decimum dicendum, quod licet spes et fides habeant Deum pro obiecto, non tamen eis competit quod sint forma aliarum virtutum, sicut competit caritati ratione supradicta, art. 3; et ideo, licet caritas non sit informis, spes tamen et fides esse possunt informes. To the tenth, it must be said that although hope and faith have God as their object, they are not the form of the other virtues; as is true of charity and as was proved above in Article III. Therefore, although charity is not without form, hope and faith can exist without form. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod non facit virtutem informem defectus cuiuscumque perfectionis, sed ille tantum defectus qui tollit ordinem ultimi finis; qui quidem ordo existit in caritate viae, licet caritas viae non habeat perfectionem patriae, quae est secundum fruitionem propriam et perfectam. To the eleventh, it must be said that a defect of any perfection doesnot render virtue without form, but only that defect which removes the order to the final end. Indeed, there is an order in the charity of this life, although the charity of this life does not have the perfection of the charity of heaven which is in accord with its proper and perfect enjoyment of God. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod actus imperfecti possunt esse habentis caritatem, sed non sunt caritatis; non enim quilibet actus agentis est actus cuiuslibet formae in agente existentis, et praecipue in rationali natura, quae habet libertatem ad hoc quod utatur habitu in ea existente. To the twelfth, it must be said that imperfect acts can be performed by one possessing charity, but they do not follow from charity. For, not every act of the agent is the act of each form in the agent, and this is especially true in a rational nature which possesses freedom to exercise those habits in it. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod licet non quaelibet ignorantia propriorum principiorum excludat scientiam, tamen ignorantia principiorum communium tollit scientiam; eis enim ignoratis, necesse est ignorare artem, ut dicitur in I Elench. Ultimus autem finis se habet sicut principium communissimum; et ideo huius deordinatio ab ultimo fine per peccatum mortale, tollit totaliter caritatem; non autem quaelibet deordinatio particularis, ut patet in peccatis venialibus. To the thirteenth, it must be said that although not every ignorance of proper principles excludes science, however the ignorance of common principles does take away science, and when these principles are unknown, it follows that there is an ignorance of art, as is said in Book I of the Elench. However, the final end is regarded as the most common principle to all. Therefore, a de-ordination from the final end through mortal sin completely removes charity. But every de-ordination of particular principles does not remove charity, as is clear with venial sins. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod quicumque per incontinentiam agit contra bonum quod amat, existimat bonum non totaliter perdi per hoc quod incontinenter agit. Si enim aliquis amans civitatem aliquam, vel proprii corporis salutem, existimaret se alterum horum perdere per hoc quod agit: vel totaliter abstineret, vel illud quod ageret, plus diligeret quam propriam salutem vel civitatis. Unde cum aliquis sciens se amittere Deum per peccatum mortale (quod est scire se peccare mortaliter), nihilominus hoc incontinenter agit: convincitur plus amare quod agit quam Deum. To the fourteenth, it must be said that whoever acts incontinently against a good which he loves, thinks that the good is not completely lost through that incontinent act which he is doing. For, if anyone who loves a certain state, or the health of his own body, would think that he would lose either of these through what he is doing, he would either abstain totally from those acts, or he would love that which he did more than his health or the good of the state. Whence, although one knows that he loses God through mortal sin—which is to know that he has sinned mortally—and nevertheless is doing that incontinent act, he clearly loves what he is doing more than he loves God. Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod caritas non solum requirit hoc haberi in universali acceptione, quod Deus sit super omnia diligendus; sed quod etiam in hoc actus electionis et voluntatis tendat sicut in quoddam aliud particulare eligibile. Et haec particularis electio excluditur per electionem contrarii, scilicet peccati excludentis a Deo. To the fifteenth, it must be said that charity requires not only that there be a disposition to the universal, that God be loved above all things, but also that the act of choice and of the will be so disposed toward any particular that is chosen. And this particular choice is excluded through the choice of the contrary, viz., sin, which excludes one from God. Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod licet actus directe contrarientur actibus, sicut et habitus habitibus; tamen indirecte etiam actus contrariantur habitibus secundum conformitatem quam habent contrariis habitibus; nam actus similes ex similibus habitibus generantur, et similes etiam actus causant, licet non omnes habitus causentur ex actibus. To the sixteenth, it must be answered that although acts are directly contrary to acts, and habits to habits, acts are also indirectly contrary to habits according as they conform to contrary habits. For, similar acts are generated from similar habits, and similar acts cause similar habits; although not all habits are caused by acts.
Septimo quaeritur utrum obiectum diligibile ex caritate sit rationalis natura
Whether the Object to Be Loved Out of Charity Is a Rational Nature?
Et videtur quod non. It seems that the object to be loved out of charity is not a rational nature. Quia propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis. Sed homo ex caritate diligitur propter virtutem et propter beatitudinem. Ergo virtus et beatitudo, quae non sunt creaturae rationales, sunt magis ex caritate diligendae et sic creatura rationalis non est proprium obiectum caritatis. 1. That because of which a thing is so is itself more so. But man is loved in charity because of his virtue and blessedness. Therefore virtue and blessedness, which are not rational creatures, are more to be loved in charity; and thus a rational creature is not the proper object of charity. Praeterea, per caritatem maxime conformamur Deo in diligendo. Sed Deus diligit omnia quae sunt, ut dicitur Sapient., XI, 25, ex caritate diligendo seipsum, qui est caritas. Ergo omnia sunt diligenda ex caritate, et non solum rationalis natura. 2. Moreover, through charity we are made especially like to God in our loving. But God loves all things that are, as is said (Wis. xi. 25), by loving Himself, Who is Love, in charity. Therefore not only a rational nature, but all things are to be loved in charity. Praeterea, Origenes dicit super cantica, quod unum est diligere Deum et quaecumque bona. Sed Deus diligitur ex caritate. Ergo, cum omnes creaturae sint bonae, omnes sunt diligendae ex caritate, et non solum rationalis natura. 3. Moreover, Origen says in Super Cantica, that it is one thing to love God and every other good. But God is loved in charity. Therefore, since all creatures are good, not only the rational nature but all creatures are to be loved in charity. Praeterea, sola dilectio caritatis est meritoria. Sed in dilectione cuiuslibet rei possumus mereri. Ergo quamlibet rem possumus diligere ex caritate. 4. Moreover, only the love of charity is meritorious. But we can merit in the love of any thing. Therefore we can love any thing out of charity. Praeterea, Deus ex caritate diligitur. Ergo oportet magis ex caritate diligi quod ab eo maxime diligitur. Sed inter omnia creata maxime diligitur a Deo bonum universi, in quo omnia comprehenduntur. Ergo omnia sunt ex caritate diligenda. 5. Moreover, God is loved out of charity. Therefore that ought to be more loved out of charity which is especially loved by Him. But among all created things, the good of the universe, in which all things are included, is especially loved by God. Therefore all things are to be loved in charity. Praeterea, diligere magis pertinet ad caritatem quam credere. Sed caritas omnia credit, ut dicitur I ad Cor., XIII, 8. Ergo multo magis omnia diligit. 6. Moreover, to love more pertains to charity than does to believe. But charity believes all things, as is said (1 Cor. xiii. 7). Therefore much more should charity love all things. Praeterea, natura rationalis perfectissime invenitur in Deo. Si igitur natura rationalis sit obiectum caritatis, oporteret quod Deum ex caritate diligeremus. Sed hoc videtur esse impossibile, quia amor caritatis est amor perfectus; deinde, quia Deum perfecte in hac vita diligere non possumus, quia in hac vita ipsum perfecte non cognoscimus: non enim cognoscimus de Deo quid est, sed solum quid non est. Dilectio autem praesupponit cognitionem, cum nihil diligatur nisi cognitum. Ergo rationalis vel intellectualis natura non est proprium obiectum caritatis. 7. Moreover, rational nature is found most perfectly in God. If, therefore, a rational nature is the object of charity, it would be necessary that we love God in charity. But this seems impossible, since the love of charity is a perfect love. We cannot love God perfectly in this life because we do not know Him perfectly in this life; and we do not know what God is but only what He is not. But love presupposes knowledge, since nothing is loved unless it is known. Therefore a rational or intellectual nature is not the proper object of charity. Praeterea, plus distat ab homine Deus quam quaelibet alia creatura. Si ergo aliquas creaturas non diligimus ex caritate, multo minus Deum ex caritate diligere possumus. 8. Moreover, God is farther from man than is any creature other than man. If, then, we do not love other creatures in charity, much less are we able to love God out of charity. Praeterea, in Angelis etiam est intellectualis natura. Sed Angeli non sunt ex caritate diligendi, ut videtur. Ergo intellectualis natura non est proprium obiectum caritatis. Probatio mediae. Amicitia in aliqua communicatione vitae consistit; nam convivere est proprium amicorum, secundum philosophum in Lib. Ethicor. Sed non videtur esse aliqua communicatio vitae nobis et Angelis; non enim communicamus in vita naturae cum Angelis, cum sint multo praestantioris naturae quam homo; neque iterum in vita gloriae, quia dona gratiae et gloriae dantur a Deo secundum virtutem recipientis, secundum illud Matth., XXV, 15: dedit unicuique secundum propriam virtutem; virtus autem Angeli est multo maior quam hominis. Ergo Angeli non communicant in aliqua vita cum hominibus. 9. Moreover, intellectual nature is also found in angels. But it seems that angels do not have to be loved out of charity. Therefore intellectual nature is not the proper object of charity. The proof of the minor is given: friendship consists in a sharing of life, for, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, to live together is proper to friends. But there does not seem to be any sharing of life between the angels and us, because we do not share with the angels in the life of nature, for they are more excellent in nature than man. Nor, again, do we share with them in the life of glory, for the gifts of grace and of glory are given by God according to the active capacity of the one receiving, as is said (Matt. xxv. 15), To every one He gave according to his proper ability. But the capacity for action of the angel is much greater than that of man. Therefore the angels do not share with men in any life. Praeterea, natura rationalis invenitur etiam in ipso homine ex caritate diligente. Sed homo seipsum non debet ex caritate diligere ut videtur. Ergo caritatis obiectum non est rationalis natura. Probatio mediae. De actibus virtutum dantur praecepta legis. Sed non datur aliquod praeceptum legis de hoc quod aliquis diligat seipsum. Ergo diligere non est actus caritatis. 10. Moreover, rational nature is also found in the same man loving out of charity. But it seems that man ought not to love himself out of charity. Therefore the object of charity is not a rational nature. The proof of the minor: the precepts of the law are given concerning the acts of the virtues. But there is no precept given that one should love himself. Therefore to love is not an act of charity. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit in quadam Homil., quod caritas minus quam inter duos haberi non potest. Non potest ergo quis seipsum ex caritate diligere. 11. Moreover, Gregory says in one of his Homilies, it is not possible that there be charity between less than two. Therefore it is not possible for a person to love himself out of charity. Praeterea, sicut iustitia consistit in communicatione, ita et amicitia, secundum philosophum in IV Ethic. Sed iustitia, proprie loquendo, non est hominis ad seipsum ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo neque amicitia, et ita neque caritas. 12. Moreover, just as justice consists in a sharing, so does friendship, according to the Philosopher in Book VI of the Ethics. But justice, properly speaking, is not of a man toward himself, as is said in Book V of the Ethics. Therefore neither is friendship, and neither is charity. Praeterea, nihil quod computatur in vitium, est actus caritatis. Sed amare seipsum computatur homini in vitium secundum illud II Timoth., III, 1: instabunt tempora periculosa, et erunt homines seipsos amantes. Ergo diligere seipsum non est actus caritatis; et ita natura rationalis non est proprium obiectum caritatis. 13. Moreover, nothing which is reckoned among the vices is an act of charity. But to love self is considered a vice in man, as is said (2 Tim. iii. 1), In the last days, shall come dangerous times. Men shall be lovers of themselves. Therefore to love self is not an act of charity, and so rational nature is not the proper object of love. Praeterea, corpus humanum est pars rationalis naturae, scilicet humanae. Sed corpus humanum non videtur esse diligendum ex caritate; quia secundum philosophum in IX Ethic., vituperantur qui amant seipsos secundum exteriorem naturam. Ergo natura rationalis non est obiectum caritatis. 14. Moreover, the human body is a part of rational nature, viz., human nature. But it does not seem that the human body ought to be loved out of charity, since according to the Philosopher in Book IX of the Ethics., those who love themselves for what is exterior to their nature ought to be censured. Therefore rational nature is not the object of love. Praeterea, nullus habens caritatem refugit illud quod ex caritate diligit. Sed sancti habentes caritatem refugiunt corpus, secundum illud Roman., VII, 24: quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Et sic corpus non est diligendum ex caritate; et sic idem quod prius. 15. Moreover, no one who has charity flees from that which he loves out of charity. But the saints having charity flee the body, as is said (Rom. vii. 24), Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? Thus the body is not to be loved out of charity, and the same argument follows as in the previous objection. Praeterea, nullus tenetur ad implendum quod non potest. Sed nullus potest scire se habere caritatem. Ergo nullus tenetur ad diligendum creaturam rationalem ex caritate. 16. Moreover, no one is bound to fulfill that of which he is not capable. But no one can know that he has charity. Therefore no one is bound to love rational creatures out of charity. Praeterea, cum dicitur: creatura rationalis diligitur ex caritate; haec praepositio ex designat habitudinem alicuius causae. Sed non potest designare habitudinem causae materialis, quia caritas non est aliquid materiale, sed spirituale; neque iterum habitudinem causae finalis, quia finis diligendi ex caritate est Deus, non autem caritas; similiter etiam neque habitudinem causae efficientis, quia spiritus sanctus est qui nos ad diligendum movet, secundum illud Rom., V, 5: caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis; neque iterum habitudinem causae formalis, quia caritas nec est forma intrinseca, cum non sit de essentia rei; neque est forma extrinseca exemplaris, quia sic omnia quae diliguntur ex caritate, traherentur in speciem caritatis, sicut exemplata trahuntur ad speciem exemplaris. Ergo creaturae rationales non sunt diligendae ex caritate. 17. Moreover, when it is said that a rational creature is loved out of charity, this preposition out of designates the relation of a cause of some sort. But it cannot indicate the relation of a material cause, since charity is not something material, but is spiritual. Again, it does not indicate the relation of a final cause, because the end of the one loving out of charity is not charity, but rather it is God. Likewise, neither does it indicate the relation of an efficient cause, because it is the Holy Spirit Who moves us to love, as is said (Rom. v. 5), The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us. And again, it does not indicate the relation of a formal cause, because charity is not an intrinsic form since it does not come from the essence of a thing; nor is it the extrinsic exemplary form, for then all things which are loved out of charity would be located in the species of charity, just as imitations are located in the species of the exemplar. Therefore rational creatures are not to be loved out of charity. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in I de Doctr. Christ., quod proximus est ille a quo nobis beneficium impenditur. Sed a Deo nobis beneficia impenduntur. Ergo Deus est proximus nobis; et ita inconvenienter ponitur ab Augustino Deus aliud diligibile ex caritate, et aliud proximus. 18. Moreover, Augustine says in I De Doctrina Christiana, that our neighbor is he from whom some favor is received. But we receive favors from God. Therefore God is our neighbor. Thus it was not correctly posited by Augustine that God is one object of love out of charity, neighbor another. Praeterea, cum Christus sit mediator inter Deum et hominem, videtur quod debeat poni aliud diligibile quam Deus et quam proximus; et sic sunt quinque in caritate diligibilia, et non tantum quatuor, ut Augustinus dicit. 19. Moreover, since Christ is the Mediator between God and man, it seems that He ought to be posited as another object of love, in addition to God and neighbor. There are, therefore, five objects to be loved in charity, and not just four, as Augustine says. Sed contra, est quod dicitur Levit., XIX, 18: diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum. Glossa: proximum non tantum propinquitate sanguinis, sed societate rationis. Ergo secundum quod aliquid habet societatem nobiscum in natura rationali, sic est diligibile ex caritate. Natura ergo rationalis est obiectum caritatis. On the contrary, it is said (Levit. xix. 18), Love your neighbor as yourself. The Gloss is: Your neighbor is such not only by closeness of blood-relationship, but also by way of the fellowship of reason. Therefore, according as anything shares with us in the society of rational natures, so it is lovable out of charity. Therefore rational nature is the object of charity. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur de his quae subiiciuntur actui alicuius potentiae vel habitus, oportet considerare formalem rationem obiecti illius potentiae vel habitus. Secundum enim quod aliqua se habent ad illam rationem, sic se habent ad hoc quod subiiciantur illi potentiae vel habitui: sicut visibilia secundum quod se habent ad rationem visibilis, secundum eamdem rationem habent visibilia quod sint visibilia per se vel per accidens. I answer. It must be said that when there is question of those things which come under the act of any power or habit, the formal notion of the object of that power or habit must be considered. For, it is in terms of their relation to that notion that things come under that power or habit; just as in the case of things visible, it is in terms of their relationship to one and the same notion of being able to be seen, that they are either essentially or accidentally visible. Cum autem amoris universaliter sumpti obiectum sit bonum communiter sumptum, necesse est quod cuiuslibet specialis amoris sit aliquod speciale bonum obiectum: sicut amicitiae naturalis, quae est ad consanguineos, proprium obiectum est bonum naturale, secundum quod trahitur a parentibus; in amicitia autem politica obiectum est bonum civitatis. Unde et caritas habet quoddam speciale bonum ut proprium obiectum, scilicet bonum beatitudinis divinae, ut supra, art. 4 huius quaest., dictum est. Secundum igitur quod aliqua se habent ad hoc bonum, sic se habent ad hoc quod sint diligibilia ex caritate. Sed considerandum est, quod cum amare sit velle bonum alicui, dupliciter dicitur aliquid amari: aut sicut id cui volumus bonum, aut sicut bonum quod volumus alicui. However, since the object of love taken universally is the good taken commonly, it is necessary that there be some special good as the object of each special love. For example, the proper object of natural friendship, which is friendship toward blood-relatives, is a natural good considered as something produced from parents; in a political friendship, however; the object is the good of the state. Charity, therefore, has a certain special good as its proper object, viz., the good of divine beatitude, as was said above in Article IV of this Question. Thus, according as things are related to this good, so also are they lovable out of charity. But it should be considered that, since to love is to wish the good of someone, that which is said to be loved has a twofold consideration: it is considered either as one for whom we wish the good; or as the good which we wish for someone. Primo ergo modo illa tantum possunt ex caritate amari quibus possumus velle bonum beatitudinis aeternae; haec autem sunt quae nata sunt huiusmodi bonum habere. Unde, cum sola intellectualis natura sit nata habere bonum beatitudinis aeternae; sola intellectualis natura est ex caritate diligibilis, secundum quod diligi dicuntur ea quibus volumus bonum. Therefore, in this first way, only those things can be loved out of charity for which we are able to wish the good of eternal beatitude, for they are the things which were begotten to enjoy a good of this kind. Whence, since only intellectual nature was begotten to enjoy the good of eternal beatitude, then only intellectual nature is to be loved out of charity, according as those things for which we wish this good are said to be loved. Et propter hoc, secundum quod diversimode aliqua possunt habere beatitudinem aeternam, secundum hoc distinguuntur ab Augustino quatuor diligenda ex caritate. And for this reason, Augustine distinguishes four objects to be loved out of charity according as various things can have eternal beatitude in various ways. Est enim aliquid habens beatitudinem aeternam per suam essentiam, et hoc est Deus; et aliquid habens per participationem, et hoc est creatura rationalis; tam illa quae diligit, quam aliae creaturae, quae ei associari possunt in participatione beatitudinis. Aliquid autem est ad quod pertinet habere beatitudinem aeternam per solam redundantiam quamdam, sicut corpus nostrum, quod glorificatur per redundantiam gloriae ab anima in ipsum. Unde diligendus est ex caritate Deus ut radix beatitudinis; quilibet autem homo debet seipsum ex caritate diligere, ut participet beatitudinem; proximum autem ut socium in participatione beatitudinis; corpus autem proprium secundum quod ad ipsum redundat beatitudo. For, there is that which has eternal beatitude through its own essence, and this is God; and that which has it through participation, and this is the rational creature; both that one that loves, as well as other creatures which can be associated with it in the sharing in beatitude. However, there is something else to which it pertains to have an eternal beatitude, but only through a certain return, viz., our body which is glorified through a redundance of glory from the soul to itself. Therefore God ought to be loved out of charity as the root of beatitude; however each man ought to love himself in charity in order that he may share in beatitude. He should also love his neighbor as his associate in the participation of beatitude, and his own body according as beatitude redounds to it. Secundo vero modo, prout scilicet dicuntur diligi illa bona quae volumus aliis, diligi possunt ex caritate omnia bona, in quantum sunt quaedam bona eorum qui possunt habere beatitudinem. Omnes enim creaturae sunt homini via ad tendendum in beatitudinem; et iterum omnes creaturae ordinantur ad gloriam Dei, in quantum in eis divina bonitas manifestatur. Nunc igitur omnia ex caritate diligere possumus, ordinando tamen ea in illa quae beatitudinem habent, vel habere possunt. But in the second way, i.e., considered as those goods which we wish for others are said to be loved, everything can be loved out of charity insofar as these are goods of those who are able to enjoy beatitude. For, all creatures are a means for man to tend towards his beatitude, and, further, all creatures are ordered to the glory of God inasmuch as the divine goodness is manifested in them. At this time, therefore, we can love all things out of charity, but only by ordering them to those beings which have, or can have, beatitude. Considerandum etiam est, quod sic se habent dilectiones ad invicem, sicut et bona quae sunt earum obiecta. Unde, cum omnia bona humana ordinentur in beatitudinem aeternam sicut in ultimum finem, dilectio caritatis sub se comprehendit omnes dilectiones humanas, nisi tantum illas quae fundantur super peccatum, quod non est ordinabile in beatitudinem. Unde quod aliqui consanguinei diligant se invicem, vel aliqui concives, vel simul peregrinantes, vel quicumque tales, potest esse meritorium et ex caritate; sed quod aliqui ament se invicem propter communicationem in rapina vel adulterio, hoc non potest esse meritorium neque ex caritate. Now it must also be considered that loves are related to one another in accord with the relation among goods which are their objects. Accordingly, since all human goods are ordered to eternal beatitude as the ultimate end, the love of charity includes within itself all human loves, with the exception of those which are based on sin, which cannot be ordered to beatitude. Whence, that some who are relatives, or fellow-citizens, or fellow pilgrims, or any such, should love (diligant) one another, can be meritorious and out of charity; but that some be bound together (ament se invicem) for the sake of sharing in robbery or adultery, this cannot be meritorious nor out of charity. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod virtutem et beatitudinem diligimus ex caritate, in quantum hoc volumus his quibus competit habere beatitudinem. To the first, it must be said that we love virtue and beatitude out of charity inasmuch as we wish them for those for whom it is possible to have beatitude. Ad secundum dicendum, quod Deus diligit omnia ex caritate, non ita quod velit eis beatitudinem, sed ordinans ea ad seipsum, et ad alia quae beatitudinem habere possunt. To the second, it must be said that God loves all things out of charity, not because He wishes beatitude for them, but He orders these things to Himself and to the other creatures which are able to enjoy beatitude. Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnia bona sunt in Deo sicut in primo principio; et sic Origenes intellexit, quod unum est diligere Deum et quaecumque bona. To the third, it must be said that all goods are in God as in a first principle. In this way, Origen meant that it is one thing to love God and every other good. Ad quartum dicendum, quod omnia diligere possumus meritorie, ordinando ea in illa quae sunt capacia beatitudinis, non autem volendo eis beatitudinem. To the fourth, it must be said that all things can be loved meritoriously by ordering them to those which have a capacity for beatitude, not by wishing beatitude for them. Ad quintum dicendum, quod in bono universi sicut principium continetur rationalis natura, quae est capax beatitudinis, ad quam omnes aliae creaturae ordinantur; et secundum hoc competit et Deo et nobis bonum universi maxime ex caritate diligere. To the fifth, it must be said that there is contained, as a principle, in the good of the universe, rational nature which is capable of beatitude, and to which all other creatures are ordered. According to this, it is fitting both for God and for us to especially love the good of the universe out of charity. Ad sextum dicendum, quod sicut caritas credit omnia credibilia, ita diligit omnia secundum quod sunt ex caritate diligibilia. To the sixth, it must be said that, just as charity believes all things that are worthy of belief, so does it love all things according as they are lovable out of charity. Ad septimum dicendum, quod Deum non possumus hic illa perfectione diligere qua diligemus eum in patria, per essentiam videntes. To the seventh, it must be said that we are not able to love God here with that perfection with which we will love Him in our home-land, seeing Him through His essence. Ad octavum dicendum, quod distantia creaturarum aliquarum non est causa cur non diligantur ex caritate, sed quia non sunt capaces beatitudinis. To the eighth, it must be said that the distance separating other creatures is not the reason why they are not loved in charity, but it is because they are not capable of beatitude. Ad nonum dicendum, quod Angeli non communicant nobiscum in vita naturae quantum ad speciem, sed solum quantum ad genus rationalis naturae; sed possumus cum eis communicare in vita gloriae. Quod autem dicitur: dedit unicuique secundum propriam virtutem, non est referendum tantum ad virtutem naturae: erroneum est enim dicere, quod dona gratiae et gloriae dentur secundum mensuram naturalium; sed intelligenda est virtus quae est etiam per gratiam, per quam datur hominibus ut possint mereri aequalem gloriam Angelis. To the ninth, it must be said that angels do not share with us in the life of nature as regards our species, but only as regards the genus of rational nature; but we are able to share with them in the life of glory. As to that which is said (Matt. xxv. 15), To every one He gave according to his proper ability, this must not be referred only to natural ability, for it is erroneous to say that the gifts of grace and glory are given according to natural measure, but rather here [in this text] must be understood also that ability which is by way of grace, through which it is granted to men that they can merit glory equal to that of the angels. Ad decimum dicendum, quod lex scripta data est in auxilium legis naturae quae erat obtenebrata per peccatum. Non autem erat sic obtenebrata quin moveret ad diligendum, ad hoc quod homo diligeret seipsum et corpus suum; sed erat obtenebrata quantum ad hoc quod non movebat in dilectionem Dei et proximi. Et ideo in lege scripta danda fuerunt praecepta de dilectione Dei et proximi, in quibus tamen comprehenditur etiam quod aliquis diligat seipsum: quia cum inducimur ad diligendum Deum, inducimur ad desiderandum Deum, per quod maxime nos ipsos amamus, volentes nobis summum bonum. In praecepto autem de dilectione proximi dicitur: diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum; in quo includitur dilectio sui ipsius. To the tenth, it must be said that the written law has been given as an aid to the law of nature, which had been obscured by sin. But the law was not rendered so obscure that it would not move one to love, so that man would not love himself or his body; but it was obscured to this extent that it was not moving man to love God and his neighbor. Therefore, in the written law, there had to be given precepts about loving God and neighbor, in which is, nevertheless, also included the precept that each one love himself. The reason for this is that as we are induced to love God, we are induced to desire Him, by which we especially love ourselves and wish for ourselves the highest good. But in the precept of loving neighbor, it is said, Love your neighbor as yourself. In this is included the love of self. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod licet amicitia non possit haberi ad seipsum, proprie loquendo; tamen amor ad seipsum habetur: ut enim dicitur in IX Ethic., amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum, venerunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt ad seipsum. Secundum vero quod caritas significat amorem, sic aliquis seipsum ex caritate diligere potest. Sed Gregorius loquitur de caritate secundum quod includit rationem amicitiae. To the eleventh, it must be said that although, properly speaking, friendship cannot be had for self, on the other hand love is had for self. For, it is written in Book IX of the Ethics, that the feelings that constitute friendship for others are an extension of regard for self. But as charity signifies love, thus is one able to love himself in charity. But Gregory speaks of charity considered as it includes the aspect of friendship. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod licet amicitia sit in communicatione ad alterum, sicut et iustitia, tamen amor non de necessitate est ad alterum, qui sufficit ad rationem caritatis. To the twelfth, it must be said that although friendship consists in a sharing with another, just as does justice; love, however, does not necessarily relate to another, which is sufficient for the notion of charity. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod amantes seipsos vituperantur, in quantum plus debito seipsos diligunt: quod quidem non contingit quantum ad bona spiritualia, quia nullus potest nimis amare virtutes; sed quantum ad bona exteriora et corporalia potest aliquis nimis amare seipsum. To the thirteenth, it must be said that those who love self are censured inasmuch as they love themselves more than they ought. Reproach, indeed, does not pertain to spiritual goods because no one is able to love virtue too much. But one can love himself to excess inasmuch as he loves external and corporeal goods. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod non quicumque amat seipsum secundum exteriorem naturam, culpatur, sed qui exteriora bona quaerit ultra modum virtutis; et sic ex caritate corpus nostrum diligere possumus. To the fourteenth, it must be said that not everyone who loves himself in terms of his exterior nature is at fault, but rather he who seeks exterior goods beyond the measure of virtue. Thus we are able to love our body in charity. Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod caritas non refugit corpus, sed corporis corruptionem, in quantum corpus, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam, ut dicitur sapientiae IX, 15; et propter hoc apostolus significanter dixit, de corpore mortis huius. To the fifteenth, it must be said that charity does not flee the body but the corruption of the body, inasmuch as it is said (Wis. ix. 15), For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul. Because of this the Apostle clearly has said the body of this death (Rom. vii. 24). Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod ex hoc quod homo nescit pro certo se habere caritatem, non sequitur quod non possit ex caritate diligere, sed quod non possit iudicare an ex caritate diligat. Unde a nobis requiri potest quod ex caritate diligamus, non autem quod iudicemus nos ex caritate diligere. Unde apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. cap. IV, 3: neque meipsum iudico; sed qui iudicat me, dominus est. To the sixteenth, it must be said that it does not follow from the fact that man does not know for certain whether he has chariy that he is not able to love out of charity, but it does follow that he is not able to judge whether he loves out of charity. Thus, it can be required of us that we love out of charity, but not that we judge that we are loving out of charity. Whence the Apostle says (1 Cor. iv. 3), Neither do I judge my own self... but he that judgeth me, is the Lord. Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod cum dicitur aliquis diligere proximum ex caritate, haec praepositio ex potest designare habitudinem causae finalis, efficientis et formalis. Finalis quidem, in quantum dilectio proximi ordinatur ad dilectionem Dei sicut ad finem; unde dicitur I ad Timoth. I, 5: finis praecepti est caritas, quia scilicet dilectio Dei est finis observationis praeceptorum. In habitudine autem causae efficientis, in quantum caritas est habitus inclinans ad diligendum, sic se habens ad actum dilectionis, sicut calor ad calefactionem. In habitudine autem causae formalis, in quantum actus recipit speciem ab habitu, sicut et calefactio a calore. To the seventeenth, it must be said that when one is said to love his neighbor out of charity, this preposition out of can designate a relation of final, efficient and formal causes; the final cause inasmuch as the love of neighbor is ordered to the love of God as to an end, whence it is written (1 Tim. i. 5), The end of the commandment is charity, because the love of God is the goal in observing the precepts. In the relationship of efficient cause, however, inasmuch as charity is a habit tending toward loving, being related to the act of loving as heat is to heating. In the reationship of formal cause, however, inasmuch as the act receives its species from the habit, as heating does from heat. Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod ratio proximi salvatur et in eo qui dat beneficia, et in eo qui recipit, non tamen quod quicumque dat beneficia, sit proximus; sed requiritur quod inter proximos sint communicantia in aliquo ordine; unde Deus licet det beneficia, non tamen potest dici nobis proximus; sed Christus, in quantum est homo, dicitur nobis proximus, prout nobis dat beneficia. To the eighteenth, it must be said that the notion of being a neighbor is preserved both in him who gives favors and in him who receives, but not that whoever gives favors is a neighbor since it is required among neighbors that there be a sharing in some order. Therefore God, although He gives favors, cannot be said to be our neighbor; but Christ, inasmuch as He is man, is called our neighbor according as He gives favors to us. Unde patet responsio ad ultimum. From this the answer to the last objection is clear.
Octavo quaeritur utrum diligere inimicos sit de perfectione consilii
Whether Loving One's Enemies Arises From the Perfection of a Counsel?
Et videtur quod non. It seems that loving one's enemies is not from the perfection of a counsel. Quod enim cadit sub praecepto, non est de perfectione consilii. Sed diligere inimicum cadit sub praecepto illo, videlicet: diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum: nam nomine proximi intelligitur omnis homo, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de doctrina Christiana. Ergo diligere inimicum non est de perfectione consilii. 1. That which comes under a precept is not from the perfection of a counsel. But to love one's enemies comes under this precept, viz., Love your neighbor as yourself, for by the word neighbor is understood all men, as Augustine says in the De Doctrina Christiana. Therefore to love one's enemies is not from the perfection of a counsel. Sed dicendum, quod est de perfectione consilii dilectio inimicorum quantum ad exhibitionem familiaritatis, et aliorum effectuum caritatis.- Sed contra, omnem proximum tenemur ex caritate diligere. Sed dilectio caritatis non est tantum in corde, sed etiam in opere: dicitur enim I Ioan. III, 18: non diligamus verbo, neque lingua, sed opere et veritate. Ergo etiam quantum ad effectus caritatis dilectio inimicorum cadit sub praecepto. 2. But it should be objected that the love of enemies is from the perfection of a counsel, at least to the extent of displaying acquaintance and the other effects of charity. On the contrary, we are bound to love all men in charity. But the love of charity is not only in the heart but also in works, for it is said (1 John iii. 18), Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed, and in truth. Therefore, considered as the effect of charity, love of enemy comes under a precept. Praeterea, Matth. V, 44, similiter dicitur: diligite inimicos vestros, et benefacite his qui oderunt vos. Si igitur diligere inimicos cadit sub praecepto, et benefacere eis cadit sub praecepto; quod pertinet ad effectus caritatis. 3. Moreover, it is also written (Matt. v. 44), Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you. If, therefore, to love your enemy is from a precept, then to do good to him, which pertains to the effect of charity, is also from a precept. Praeterea, ea quae pertinent ad perfectionem consiliorum, non fuerunt in veteri lege tradita: quia, ut dicitur Hebr. VII, 19, nihil perfectum adduxit lex. Sed in veteri lege fuit traditum quod ad inimicos non solum affectus dilectionis haberetur, sed etiam effectus dilectionis eis impenderetur; dicitur enim Exod. XXIII, 4: si occurreris bovi inimici tui aut asino erranti, reduc ad eum;- Levit. XIX, 17: ne oderis fratrem tuum in corde tuo; sed publice argue eum, ne habeas super illo peccatum;- et Iob XXXI, vv. 29-30: si gavisus sum ad ruinam eius qui me oderat, et exultavi, quod invenisset eum malum: non enim dedi ad peccandum guttur meum;- et Prov. XXV, 21: si esurierit inimicus tuus, ciba illum; si sitiverit, da ei aquam bibere. Ergo diligere inimicum etiam quantum ad exibitionem effectuum caritatis, non est de perfectione consilii. 4. Moreover, those things which pertain to the perfection of the counsels were not written in the Old Law, as is said (Hebr. vii. 19), The law brought nothing to perfection. But in the Old Law, it was taught that not only the affection of love be had for enemies, but also that the effect of love be imparted to them. For, it is written (Exod., xxiii. 4), If thou meet thy enemy's ox or ass going astray, bring it back to him; (Levit. xix. 17), Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart, but reprove him openly, lest thou incur sin through him; (Job xxxi. 29, 30), If I have been glad at the downfall of him that hated me, and have re/oiced that evil had found him. For I have not given my mouth to sin; (Prov. xxv. 21), If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he thirst give him water to drink. Therefore the love of enemies, insofar as it shows the effects of charity, is not from the perfection of a counsel. Praeterea, consilium non contrariatur legis praecepto; unde dominus, perfectionem novae legis traditurus, praemisit Matth. V, v. 17: non veni solvere legem, sed adimplere. Diligere autem inimicos videtur contrariari praecepto legis: quia dicitur Matth. cap. V, 43: diliges amicum tuum, et odio habebis inimicum tuum. Ergo dilectio inimicorum non cadit sub perfectione consilii. 5. Moreover, a counsel is not contrary to a precept of the law. For the Lord, when He was about to teach the perfection of the New Law, first said (Malt. v. 17), I am not come to destroy the law but to fulfill it. But to love enemies seems to be contrary to the precept of the law, for it is said (Matt. v. 43), Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thy enemy. Therefore the love of enemies does not come under the perfection of a counsel. Praeterea, dilectio habet proprium obiectum in quod inclinat, quia, sicut dicit Augustinus, pondus meum est amor meus. Sed proprium obiectum dilectionis non videtur esse inimicus, sed magis dilectioni repugnans. Ergo non est de perfectione caritatis quod aliquis diligat inimicum. 6. Moreover, love has its proper object toward which it inclines, as Augustine says, My weight is my love. An enemy does not seem to be the proper object of love, but rather he seems to be one resisting love. Therefore it is not of the perfection of charity that an enemy should be loved. Praeterea, perfectio virtutis non contrariatur inclinationi naturae; sed magis per virtutem inclinatio naturae perficitur. Natura autem movet ad hoc quod inimicus odio habeatur: quaelibet enim res naturalis repudiat suum contrarium. Ergo non est de perfectione caritatis quod inimicus diligatur. 7. Moreover, the perfection of a virtue is not contrary to the inclination of nature; rather, through virtue the inclination of nature is perfected. But it is nature that moves us to hate our enemies, for every natural being rejects its own contrary. Therefore it is not of the perfection of charity that an enemy should be loved. Praeterea, perfectio caritatis et cuiuslibet virtutis consistit in assimilatione ad Deum. Sed Deus amicos diligit, et inimicos odit, secundum illud Malach. I, 2: Iacob dilexi, Esau odio habui. Ergo non est de perfectione caritatis quod aliquis diligat inimicos, sed magis quod eos odio habeat. 8. Moreover, the perfection of charity, and of any virtue, consists in our becoming like to God. But God loves His friends and hates His enemies, according to the text (Malac. i. 2), I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau. Therefore it is not of the perfection of charity that someone should love his enemies, but rather he should hate them. Praeterea, dilectio caritatis directe respicit bonum vitae aeternae. Sed aliquibus inimicis nostris non debemus velle bonum vitae aeternae; quia vel sunt damnati in Inferno, vel adhuc viventes sunt reprobati a Deo. Ergo diligere inimicos non pertinet ad perfectionem caritatis. 9. Moreover, the love of charity looks directly to the good of eternal life. But we ought not to wish the good of eternal life for some of our enemies; for, either they have been condemned to hell, or if they are still living, they have been rejected by God. Therefore to love enemies does not pertain to the perfection of charity. Praeterea, eum quem tenemur ex caritate diligere, non possumus licite occidere, nec velle eius mortem, aut quodcumque malum: quia de ratione amicitiae est quod amicos velimus esse et vivere. Sed nos licite possumus aliquos occidere; quia, secundum apostolum, Rom. XIII, 4: potestas saecularis Dei minister est, vindex in iram ei qui male agit. Non ergo tenemur inimicos diligere. 10. Moreover, we cannot lawfully kill one whom we are bound to love in charity, nor can we wish his death or any other evil for him, because the meaning of friendship is that we wish to be friends and to live. But it is lawful for us to kill some, for, according to the Apostle (Rom. xiii. 4), For he is God's minister: an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. Therefore we are not bound to love our enemies. Praeterea, philosophus in Lib. topicorum docet sic argumentari in contrariis. Si diligere amicos est bonum et eis benefacere; diligere inimicos et eis benefacere malum est. Sed nullum malum perfectionem habet caritatis, nec cadit sub consilio. Ergo diligere inimicum non pertinet ad perfectionem consilii. 11. Moreover, the Philosopher in the Topics, teaches that in the case of contraries the argument runs as follows. If to love your friends and to do good for them is a good thing, then to love your enemies and to do good for them is an evil thing. But no evil attains to the perfection of charity, nor is it included under a counsel. Therefore to love your enemies does not pertain to the perfection of a counsel. Praeterea, amicus et inimicus sunt contraria. Ergo et diligere amicum et diligere inimicum sunt contraria. Contraria autem non possunt esse simul. Cum igitur teneamur ex caritate diligere amicos, non potest cadere sub consilio quod inimicos diligamus. 12. Moreover, friend and enemy are contraries. Therefore both to love a friend and to hate an enemy are contraries. But contraries cannot exist together. Therefore, since we are bound to love our friends in charity, it cannot be a counsel that we love our enemies. Praeterea, consilium non potest esse sub impossibili. Sed diligere inimicum videtur impossibile, cum sit contra inclinationem naturae. Ergo diligere inimicum non cadit sub consilio. 13. Moreover, a counsel cannot be concerned with the impossible. But to love an enemy seems to be impossible, since it is contrary to the inclination of nature. Therefore to love our enemies is not a counsel. Praeterea, implere consilia perfectorum est. Perfecti autem maxime fuerunt apostoli, qui tamen non dilexerunt inimicos quantum ad affectum et effectum: legitur enim de beato Thoma apostolo, quod imprecatus fuit illi qui manu alapam ei dederat, ut manus eius in convivio a canibus deportaretur. Ergo diligere inimicos quantum ad affectum et effectum non cadit sub perfectione consilii. 14. Moreover, to obey the counsels is for the perfect. The Apostles were perfect to a high degree, but they did not love their enemies both with regard to affection and deed. For it was written of St. Thomas the Apostle that he called down upon the one who struck him with an open hand, a curse such that his hand was snatched off by hungry dogs. Therefore to love enemies both as regards affection and deed does not come under the perfection of a counsel. Praeterea, imprecari mala, praecipue damnationis aeternae opponitur dilectioni et quantum ad affectum, et quantum ad effectum. Sed prophetae imprecati sunt mala suis adversariis: dicitur enim in Psalm. LXVIII, 29: deleantur de libro vitae, cum iustis non scribantur; et iterum Psalm. LIV, 16: veniat mors super illos, et descendant in Infernum viventes. Ergo diligere inimicos non est de perfectione caritatis. 15. Moreover, to call down evils on anyone, especially the evil of eternal damnation, is opposed to love both as regards affection and deed. But the Prophets called down evils for their adversaries, for it is said (Psalms lxviii. 29), Let them be blotted out of the book of the living; and with the just let them not be written. And again, (Psalms liv. 16), Let death come upon them, and let them go down alive into hell. Therefore to love enemies does not come under the perfection of charity. Praeterea, de ratione amicitiae verae est ut aliquis propter seipsum diligatur: caritas autem includit amicitiam sicut perfectum minus perfectum. Diligere autem inimicum propter seipsum, contrariatur caritati; quia solus Deus propter seipsum diligitur. Non ergo cadit sub consilii perfectione ut inimicus diligatur. 16. Moreover, it is of the very nature of true friendship that someone be loved for his own sake; but charity includes friendship, as the perfect includes the less perfect. But to love one's enemy for his own sake is contrary to charity, for only God is loved for His own sake. Therefore it is not from the perfection of a counsel that our enemy is loved. Praeterea, id quod cadit sub perfectione consilii, melius est et magis meritorium quam id quod sub necessitate praecepti. Sed diligere inimicum non est melius neque melioris meriti quam diligere amicum, quod manifeste cadit sub necessitate praecepti: quia si bonum est diligere aliquod bonum, melius est et magis meritorium diligere quod melius est. Melior autem est amicus inimico. Non ergo diligere inimicum est de perfectione consilii. 17. Moreover, that which is from the perfection of a counsel is better and more meritorious than that which is from the necessity of a precept. But to love an enemy is neither better nor more meritorious than to love a friend, which clearly is from the necessity of a precept; for, if it is good to love something good, it is better and more meritorious to love what is better. But a friend is better than an enemy. Therefore to love an enemy is not from the perfection of a counsel. Sed dicebatur, quod diligere inimicum maioris meriti est, quia est difficilius.- Sed contra, diligere inimicum est difficilius quam diligere Deum. Ergo eadem ratione, maioris meriti esset diligere inimicum quam Deum. 18. But it was stated that to love an enemy is more meritorious because it is more difficult. On the contrary, to love an enemy is more difficult than to love God. Therefore, by the same reasoning, it should be more meritorious to love an enemy than to love God. Praeterea, signum generati habitus est delectatio operis, ut dicit philosophum in II Ethic. Sed diligere amicum est delectabilius quam diligere inimicum. Ergo etiam magis virtuosum, et, per consequens, magis meritorium; et sic diligere inimicum non cadit sub perfectione consilii. 19. Moreover, a sign that a habit has been formed is pleasure in the work, as the Philosopher writes in Book II of the Ethic." But to love a friend is more pleasing than to love an enemy. Therefore it is also more virtuous, and consequently more meritorious. Thus to love an enemy does not come from the perfection of a counsel. Sed contra, est quod Augustinus dicit in Enchir.: perfectorum filiorum Dei est diligere inimicos: in quo quidem se quilibet debet fidelem ostendere. On the contrary, Augustine writes in the Enchiridion, 2 that it is for the perfect sons of God to love their enemies; indeed each one ought to show himself faithful in this love. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod diligere inimicos aliquo modo cadit sub necessitate praecepti, et aliquo modo sub consilii perfectione. I answer. It must be said that to love one's enemies comes under the necessity of a precept in one way; yet in another way it comes under the perfection of a counsel. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod sicut supra, art. 4 huius quaest., dictum est, proprium et per se obiectum caritatis est Deus; et quidquid ex caritate diligitur, ea ratione diligitur qua ad Deum pertinet, sicut si diligimus aliquem hominem, diligimus per consequens omnes ei attinentes, etiam si sint nobis inimici. Constat autem quod omnes homines ad Deum pertinent, in quantum sunt ab ipso creati, et capaces beatitudinis, quae in fruitione ipsius consistit. Manifestum est ergo, quod ista ratio dilectionis quam respicit caritas, in omnibus hominibus invenitur. To prove this, it must be known that, as has been said above in Article IV of this Question, the proper and essential object of charity is God; and whatever is loved in charity is loved in terms of that very relationship by which it is related to God. For example, just as if we love some man, we consequently love everything with whom he is concerned, even if they are our own enemies. But it is agreed that all men are related to God as created by Him and as capable of a happiness which consists in the enjoyment of Him. It is clear, therefore, that this meaningful basis of the love that charity involves is found in all men. Sic ergo, in eo qui contra nos inimicitiam exercet, est duo invenire: unum quod est ratio dilectionis, scilicet quod ad Deum pertinet; et aliud quod est ratio odii, scilicet quod nobis adversatur. In quocumque autem invenitur ratio dilectionis et ratio odii si praetermissa dilectione in odium convertamur, manifestum est quod id quod est ratio odii praeponderat in corde nostro ei quod est ratio dilectionis. Sic ergo, si aliquis inimicum suum odio habeat, inimicitia illius praeponderat in corde suo amori divino. Magis ergo odit amicitiam illius quam diligat Deum. Tantum autem odimus aliquid, quantum diligimus bonum quod nobis per inimicum subtrahitur. Relinquitur ergo quod quicumque inimicum odit, aliquod bonum creatum diligit plus quam Deum; quod est contra praeceptum caritatis. Habere igitur odio inimicum est contrarium caritati; unde necesse est quod si ex praecepto caritatis tenemur quod dilectio Dei praeponderet in nobis dilectioni cuiuslibet alterius rei, et per consequens odio contrarii. Sequitur ergo quod ex necessitate praecepti teneamur diligere inimicos. Therefore, in one who acts unfriendly toward us, two things are to be considered: one which is the basis of love, viz., in that he is related to God; and another which is the basis of hate, viz., in that he is our adversary. However, if in anyone is tound both the basis of love and of hate, and if love is neglected and we turn in the direction of hate, it is clear that the basis of hate predominates in our heart over the basis of love. Thus, therefore, if one regards his enemy with hatred, his enmity toward him predominates in his heart over divine love. Therefore he hates the friendship with such a one more than he loves God. But we hate something to the degree that we love the good of which we are deprived by the enemy. Therefore it remains that whoever hates his enemy loves some created good more than he loves God; and this is against the precept of charity. But to regard your enemy with hatred is against charity, for it is necessary, if we are bound by the precept of charity, that the love of God predominate in us over the love of any other thing and, as a consequence, also over the hatred of the contrary of that thing. Therefore it follows that we are bound to love our enemies out of the necessity of a precept. Sed tunc considerandum, quod cum ex praecepto caritatis teneamur proximos diligere, non se extendit ad hoc praeceptum quod quemlibet proximum actu diligamus in speciali, aut unicuique specialiter bene faciamus: quia nullus sufficeret ad cogitandum de omnibus hominibus, ut specialiter unumquemque actu diligeret; nec etiam aliquis sufficeret ad benefaciendum vel serviendum singulariter unicuique. At this point, however, although we are bound by the precept of charity to love our neighbor, the precept does not extend to this that we should actually love each and every neighbor in particular or do well by each one in a particular way, because no man is capable of having all men in mind in such a way that he would actually love each one in a particular way, nor is there any one capable of doing good or helping each and every one in a particular way. Tenemur tamen etiam in speciali aliquos diligere, et eis prodesse, qui nobis aliqua alia amicitiae ratione coniuncti sunt: nam omnes aliae licitae dilectiones sub caritate comprehenduntur, ut supra dictum est; unde dicit Augustinus: cum omnibus prodesse non possis; his potissimum consulendum est, qui pro locorum et temporum vel quarumlibet rerum opportunitatibus constrictius tibi quasi quadam sorte iunguntur; pro sorte enim habendum est prout quisque tibi temporaliter colligatius adhaeret, ex quo eligis potius illi dandum esse. But we are bound to love some in a special way and to act for the welfare of those who are joined to us because of some other bond of friendship, for all other lawful loves are included under charity, as was said above. Whence Augustine says, You cannot do good to all men, you are to pay special regard to those who, by the accidents of time, or place, or circumstance, are brought into closer connection with you... You must take the matter as decided for you by a sort of lot, according as each man happens for the time being to be more closely connected with you. Ex quo patet quod non tenemur ex caritatis praecepto ut dilectionis affectu vel operis effectu moveamur in speciali ad eum qui nulla alia constrictione nobis coniungitur, nisi forte pro loco et tempore; utpote si videremus eum in aliqua necessitate per quam sine nobis ei succurri non posset. Tenemur tamen affectu et effectu caritatis, quo omnes proximos diligimus, et pro omnibus oramus, non excludere etiam illos qui nulla nobis speciali constrictione coniunguntur, ut puta illos qui sunt in India vel in Aethiopia. From this it is clear that we are not bound by the precept of charity to be moved by the affection of love or by the carrying out of the works of charity in a special way towards him who is not united to us by any other bond, except to him united to us by the chance bond of location or of time, and especially if we would see him in some necessity through which he would not be able to be helped except by us. We are bound, however, by the affection and the carrying out of the works of charity, by which we love all our neighbors and pray for them, not to exclude even those who are not joined to us by any special bond, as for instance those who live in India or Ethiopia. Cum etiam ad inimicum nulla alia unio nobis remaneat nisi sola unio caritatis; ex necessitate praecepti teneremur diligere eos in communi, et affectu et effectu, et in speciali, quando necessitatis articulus immineret; sed quod homo specialem affectum et effectum dilectionis, quem ad alios sibi coniunctos impendit, inimicis exhibeat propter Deum, hoc perfectae caritatis est, et sub consilio cadit. Ex perfectione enim caritatis procedit quod sola caritas sic moveat ad inimicum, sicut ad amicum movet et caritas et specialis dilectio. Manifestum est autem quod ex perfectione activae virtutis procedit quod actio agentis ad remota procedat. Perfectior enim est ignis virtus per quam non solum propinqua sed remota calefiunt. Ita et perfectior est caritas, per quam non solum ad propinquos, sed etiam ad extraneos, et ulterius ad inimicos, non solum generaliter, sed etiam specialiter, et diligendo et benefaciendo movetur. When no other bond remains to join us to our enemies except the bond of charity, we are bound by the obligation of precept to love them in common, both with affection and deed, and individually when the moment of need threatens. But when man for the sake of God shows toward his enemies that special affection and deeds of love which he devotes to those who are joined to him, this is perfect charity and follows from a counsel. For, it arises from the perfection of charity that charity alone should so move one toward an enemy in the manner that both charity and particular iove move one toward a friend. It is evident, however, that the fact that the action of an agent attains to that which is distant is due to the perfection of its active power. For the power of fire is more perfect when not only things nearby but also those distant are heated. So also that charity is more perfect through which one is moved, both in loving and in doing good, toward not only neighbors but also foreigners, and beyond this even to enemies, not only in general but in particular. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod dilectio inimicorum sub praecepto continetur, sicut dictum est. To the first, it must be said that the love of enemies is contained in a precept, as has been said. Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut per affectum, ita et per effectum inimicos diligere debemus, ut dictum est. To the second, it must be said that we ought to love our enemies, just as much in deed as in affection, as has been said. Unde etiam patet responsio ad tertium. The answer to the third objection can be seen from the above. Ad quartum dicendum, quod illae auctoritates veteris testamenti loquuntur in casu necessitatis, quando ex praecepto tenemur benefacere inimicis, ut dictum est in corp. art. To the fourth, it must be said that those authorities of the Old Testament speak of the case of necessity when we are bound by a precept to do good to our enemies, as has been said in the body of the Article. Ad quintum dicendum, quod hoc quod dicitur, odio habebis inimicum tuum, in toto veteri testamento non invenitur; sed hoc erat ex traditione Scribarum quibus visum fuit hoc esse addendum, quia dominus praecepit filiis Israel persequi inimicos suos. Vel dicendum est, quod haec vox, odio habebis inimicum tuum, non est accipienda ut iubentis iusto, sed ut permittentis infirmo, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de sermone domini in monte. Vel, sicut etiam Augustinus dicit contra Faustum, non debent homines inimicos odire, sed vitium. To the fifth, it must be said that what is written, Hate your enemy, is not found in the entire Old Testament, but this is from the tradition of the Scribes to whom it seemed that it should be added because the Lord commanded the sons of Israel to persecute their enemies. It should also be said that this saying, Hate your enemy, should not be interpreted as an order to the just but as a permission to the weak, as Augustine says in the De Sermone Domini in Monte. Or, as Augustine also writes in the Contra Faustum, men ought not to hate their enemy but only vice. Ad sextum dicendum, quod inimicus, ut inimicus, non est obiectum dilectionis, sed in quantum pertinet ad Deum; unde hoc debemus in inimico odire quod ipse nos odit, et desiderare quod nos diligat. To the sixth, it must be said that one's enemy, considered as enemy, is not the object of love but is so only insofar as he pertains to God. Therefore we ought to hate in our enemy the fact that he hates us, and to desire that he would love us. Ad septimum dicendum, quod, ex natura, homo omnem hominem diligit, ut etiam philosophus dicit in VIII Ethic. Sed quod aliquis sit inimicus, est ex aliquo quod naturae superadditur, ex quo non debet tolli naturae inclinatio. Caritas ergo, dum ad dilectionem inimicorum movet, perficit naturalem inclinationem; secus autem est de illis quae habent contrarietatem ex sua natura, sicut ignis et aqua, lupus et ovis. To the seventh, it must be said that man, by nature, loves all men, as the Philosopher says in Book VIII of the Ethic. But that one becomes an enemy is from something that is superadded to nature, and, accordingly, the inclination of nature ought not to be taken away. Therefore charity, when it moves to the love of enemies, perfects the natural inclination; the case is otherwise in things which are natural contraries, such as fire and water, or wolf and lamb. Ad octavum dicendum, quod Deus non odit in aliquo quod suum est, scilicet bonum naturale vel quodcumque aliud, sed solum illud quod suum non est, scilicet peccatum; et sic etiam nos in hominibus debemus diligere quod Dei est, et odire quod est alienum a Deo; et secundum hoc dicitur in Psalm. CXXXVIII, 22: perfecto odio oderam illos. To the eighth, it must be said that God does not hate anything that is His own, such as the natural good or any other thing; but He only hates what is not His, viz., sin. And so also we ought to love in men that which is of God, and to hate what is foreign to God, according as it is said (Psalms cxxxviii. 22), I have hated them with a perfect hatred. Ad nonum dicendum, quod praescitos et damnatos non debemus diligere ad habendum vitam aeternam, quia iam sunt totaliter per divinam sententiam ab ea exclusi; possumus tamen eos diligere ut opera Dei, in quibus divina iustitia manifestatur; sic enim eos Deus diligit. Praescitos autem nondum damnatos debemus diligere ad vitam aeternam habendam; quia hoc nobis non constat, et praescientia divina ab eis non excludit possibilitatem perveniendi ad vitam aeternam. To the ninth, it must be said that we ought not to wish those who are known to be damned to have eternal life, because they are already wholly excluded from this by the divine decree; but we can love them as works of God in which the divine justice is manifested. In this manner does God love them. But we ought to wish those who are not yet known to be damned to have life eternal. This foreknowledge is not given to us, and the foreknowledge of God does not exclude the possibility of their attaining eternal life. Ad decimum dicendum, quod licite potest ille ad quem ex officio pertinet, malefactores punire, vel etiam occidere, eos ex caritate diligendo. Dicit enim Gregorius in quadam homilia, quod iusti persecutionem commovent, sed amantes: quia si foris increpationes per disciplinam exaggerant, intus tamen dulcedinem per caritatem servant. Possumus enim illis quod ex caritate diligimus, velle aut inferre aliquod malum temporale, propter tria. Primo quidem, propter eorum correctionem. Secundo, in quantum aliquorum temporalis prosperitas est in detrimentum alicuius multitudinis, vel etiam totius Ecclesiae; unde dicit Gregorius, XXII Moral.: evenire plerumque solet, ut, non amissa caritate, inimici nos ruina laetificet; et rursus eius gloria, sine invidiae culpa, contristet; dum, corruente eo, quosdam bene erigi credimus; et, proficiente illo, plerosque iniuste opprimi formidamus.- Tertio, ad servandum ordinem divinae iustitiae, secundum illud Ps. LVII, 11: laetabitur iustus, cum viderit vindictam. To the tenth, it must be said that he whose office prescribes it, may lawfully punish evil-doers or even kill them while loving them out of charity. For, Gregory says in one of his Homilies that the just, while still loving, may cause a persecution; for if outwardly they create unrest by disciplining, inwardly, however, they may preserve their serenity by charity. Now we can desire or cause some temporal evil for those whom we love in charity for three reasons: first, we can do it in order to correct them; secondly, it may be because the temporal prosperity of some is detrimental to the good of some multitude or even the whole Church, whence Gregory writes in XXII Moral. It often happens that the ruin of our enemy can make us happy without our losing charity, and again, his glory can sadden us without incurring the fault of envy. This happens when, by his downfall, we believe that some are profited more, or when, by his advantage, we fear that many will be unjustly oppressed. Thirdly, our motive may be in order to preserve the order of divine justice, according as it is written (Psalms lvii. 11), The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod huiusmodi propositiones, ex quibus argumentatur philosophus, sunt accipiendae per se. Sicut enim diligere amicum, in quantum amicus est, bonum est; ita malum est diligere inimicum, quia inimicus est; sed bonum est diligere inimicum, in quantum ad Deum pertinet. To the eleventh, it must be said that propositions of this kind, by which the Philosopher argues,3 are to be taken as evident in themselves. For, just as it is good to love a friend insofar as he is a friend, so it is evil to love an enemy because he is an enemy. But it is good to love an enemy insofar as he pertains to God. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod diligere amicum, in quantum amicus, et inimicum, in quantum inimicus, esset contrarium; sed diligere amicum et inimicum, in quantum uterque est Dei, non est contrarium, sicut nec videre album et videre nigrum, in quantum est coloratum. To the twelfth, it must be answered that to love a friend as friend and an enemy as enemy are contraries. But to love a friend and an enemy insofar as they both belong to God is not contrary; just as it is not contrary to see white and to see black when both are considered as colored. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod diligere inimicum, in quantum inimicus est, est difficile, vel etiam impossibile; sed diligere inimicum propter aliquid magis amatum, est facile; et sic id quod in se videtur impossibile, caritas Dei facit facile. To the thirteenth, it must be said that to love an enemy as enemy is difficult, even impossible. But to love an enemy because of some greater love is easy. That is why the love of God makes easy that which seems to be impossible in itself. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod beatus Thomas non expetiit poenam sui percussoris zelo vindictae, sed propter manifestationem divinae iustitiae et virtutis. To the fourteenth, it must be said that St. Thomas did not ask for the punishment of his assailant because of a desire for revenge, but as a manifestation of the divine justice and power. Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod imprecationes quae inveniuntur in prophetis, sunt intelligendae per praenuntiationes, ut exponatur deleantur, id est delebuntur. Utuntur autem tali modo loquendi, quia conformant voluntatem suam divinae iustitiae eis revelatae. To the fifteenth, it must be said that these pleas which are found in the Prophets should be understood as predictions, so that let them be blotted out (deleantur) means they will be blotted out (delebuntur). For, they used such a manner of speaking because they were conforming their own wills to the divine justice revealed to them. Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod diligere aliquem propter se potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ita quod aliquid diligatur sicut ultimus finis; et sic solus Deus est propter se diligendus. Alio modo, ut diligamus ipsum cui volumus bonum, ut contingit in amicitia honesta; non autem sicut bonum quod volumus nobis, ut contingit in amicitia delectabili vel utili, in qua amicum diligimus ut bonum nostrum: non quia utilitatem vel delectationem appetamus amico, sed quia ex amico appetimus utilitatem et delectationem nobis; sicut et diligimus alia delectabilia nobis et utilia, ut cibum aut vestimentum. Sed cum diligimus aliquem propter virtutem, volumus ei bonum, non ipsum nobis; et hoc maxime contingit in amicitia caritatis. To the sixteenth, it must be said that to love one for his own sake can be understood in two ways. First, in such a way that one is loved as a final end; and thus only God should be loved for His own sake. Secondly, that we love him for whom we wish some good, as is proper to a friendship for a noble person; but not as the good which we wish for ourselves, as is proper to a friendship for a pleasant or useful person, in which we love a friend as our own good. For, it is not that we seek pleasure or utility for a friend, but that we seek pleasure or utility for ourselves from a friend; just as we also love things pleasing and useful for ourselves, such as food or clothing. But when we love one out of virtue, we wish good for him, and we do not wish him for ourselves; this is especially proper to the friendship of charity. Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod diligere inimicum melius est quam diligere amicum tantum, quia perfectiorem caritatem demonstrat, ut supra, in corp. art., dictum est. Sed si consideremus istos duos absolute, melius est diligere amicum quam inimicum; et melius diligere Deum quam amicum. Non enim difficultas quae est in dilectione inimici, facit ad rationem meriti, nisi in quantum per hoc demonstratur perfectio caritatis, quae hanc difficultatem vincit; unde si esset tam perfecta caritas quae totam difficultatem tolleret, adhuc esset magis meritorium. Loquimur autem in eo qui diligit amicum ex tam perfecta caritate, quae etiam se extendat ad dilectionem inimici, sed intensius operatur in dilectione amici; nisi forte per accidens, in quantum contra repugnans aliquid cum maiori conatu operatur; sicut et in rebus naturalibus aqua calefacta intensius congelatur. To the seventeenth, it must be said that it is better to love an enemy than to love only a friend, because this shows more perfect charity, as was said above in the body of the Article. But if we consider these two absolutely, it is better to love a friend than an enemy; it is also better to love God than a friend. For, the difficulty which is found in loving an enemy does not constitute the reason for meriting, except insofar as perfect charity is demonstrated by it, which overcomes the difficulty. Thus, if there would be such a perfect charity as to take away all difficulty, to this extent it would be more meritorious. But we speak of one who loves a friend with such perfect charity that it even extends to the love of enemies; but this love operates with more ardor toward the friend, unless by chance it is considered accidentally insofar as it operates against something repugnant with a greater effort. For example, in natural things, water that is warm is with greater effort brought to the freezing point. Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo sequentia. The answer to the eighteenth and nineteenth objections is clear from what was just stated.
Nono quaeritur utrum ordo aliquis sit in caritate
Whether there is an order in charity?
Et videtur quod non. It seems not. Quia sicut fides se habet ad credita, ita caritas ad diligenda. Sed fides aequaliter credit omnia credenda. Ergo caritas aequaliter diligit omnia diligenda. 1. Because as faith is related to objects of belief, so is charity to objects of love. But faith equally believes all that must be believed. Therefore charity equally loves all that must be loved. Praeterea, ordo ad rationem pertinet. Caritas autem non est in ratione, sed in voluntate. Ergo ordo non pertinet ad caritatem. 2. Moreover, order belongs to reason. But charity is not in the reason, but in the will. Therefore order does not belong to charity. Praeterea, ubicumque est ordo, ibi est aliquis gradus. Sed secundum Bernardum, caritas gradum nescit, dignitatem non considerat. Ergo ordo non est in caritate. 3. Moreover, whereverthere is order, there is gradation. But according to Bernard, charity knows nothing of gradation, and does not consider dignity. Therefore there is no order in charity. Praeterea, obiectum caritatis est Deus, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de Doctr. Christ.: in proximo enim nihil diligit caritas nisi Deum. Deus autem non est maior in seipso quam in proximo, nec maior in uno proximo quam in alio. Ergo caritas non magis diligit Deum quam proximum, vel unum proximum quam alium. 4. Moreover, the object of charity is God, as Augustine says ind De Doctrina Christiana: In one's neighbor, charity loves nothing but God. But God is not greater in himself than in our neighbor, nor greater in one neighbor than another. Therefore charity doess not love God more than neighbor, or one neighbor more than another. Praeterea, similitudo est ratio dilectionis, secundum illud Eccl. XIII, 19: omne animal diligit simile sibi. Sed maior est similitudo hominis ad proximum suum quam ad Deum. Ergo non est iste ordo in caritate, ut primo diligatur Deus, sicut Ambrosius dicit. 5. Moreover, likeness is the reason for love, according to Eccl. 13:19: "Every animal loves its like." But man resembles his neighbor more than he resembles God. Therefore there charity does not have the order that Ambrose says, that God should be loved first and then one's neighbor. Praeterea, I Ioan. IV, 20, dicitur: qui non diligit fratrem suum, quem videt; Deum, quem non videt, quomodo potest diligere? Arguit autem a dilectione proximi ad dilectionem Dei negando. Argumentum autem negativum non sumitur a minori, sed a maiori. Ergo magis diligendus est proximus quam Deus. 6. Moreover, 1 John 4:20 says: "How can he who does not love his brother whom he sees love God whom he does not see?" But he is arguing from the love of neighbor to the love of God by way of negation. But a negative argument is does not lean on the minor but on the major. Therefore one's neighbor must be loved more than God. Praeterea, amor est vis unitiva, ut Dionysius dicit. Sed nihil est magis unum alicui quam ipsemet. Ergo homo ex caritate non debet magis diligere Deum quam seipsum. 7. Moreover, love is a unitive power, as Dionysius says. But nothing is more one than oneself. Therefore from charity man must not love God more than himself. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in I de doctrina Christ., quod omnes homines aeque diligendi sunt. Ergo unus proximus non debet magis diligi quam alius. 8. Moreover, Augustine says in I De Doctrina Christiana that all mean should be loved equally. Therefore one neighbor must not be loved more than another. Praeterea, proximum praecipitur alicui diligere sicut seipsum. Ergo omnes proximi sunt aequaliter diligendi. 9. Moreover, it is commanded to love one's neighbor as oneself. Therefor all neighbors should be love equally. Praeterea, illum magis diligimus cui maius bonum volumus. Sed omnibus proximis volumus ex caritate unum bonum, quod est vita aeterna. Ergo unum proximum non debemus plus diligere quam alium. 10. Moreover, the one we love most is the one for whom we wish a greater good. But from charity we wish a single good for all our neighbors, and that is eternal life. Thererfore we must not love one neighbor more than another. Praeterea, si ordo est conditio caritatis, oportet quod cadat sub praecepto. Sed non videtur sub praecepto cadere; quia dummodo aliquem diligamus quem debemus, non videmur peccare, si alium quemcumque diligamus plus. Ergo ordo non est conditio caritatis. 11. Moreover, if order is a condition of charity, it should fall under a precept. But it doess not seem to fall under any precept, because as long as we love anyone we are supposed to love we do not seem to be sinning if we love someone else more. Therefore order is not a condition of charity. Praeterea, caritas viae imitatur caritatem patriae. Sed in patria magis amantur meliores, non autem propinquiores. Ergo videtur, si est aliquis ordo caritatis, quod etiam in via magis amandi sint meliores, et non propinquiores; quod est contra Ambrosium, qui dicit, quod primo diligendus est Deus, secundo parentes, deinde filii, post domestici. 12. Moreover, charity in this live imitates the charity of the next life. But in the next life the best, and not the closest, will be loved more. Therefore, if there is any order in charity, it seems that in this life we should love the best more than those who are closest to us. This is contrary to Ambrose, who says that God should be loved first, then our parents, then our children, then our servants.Praeterea, ratio diligendi aliquem ex caritate, est Deus. Sed aliquando extranei magis sunt coniuncti Deo quam propinqui, vel etiam parentes. Ergo sunt magis ex caritate diligendi. Praeterea, ratio diligendi aliquem ex caritate, est Deus. Sed aliquando extranei magis sunt coniuncti Deo quam propinqui, vel etiam parentes. Ergo sunt magis ex caritate diligendi. 13. Moreover, the reason for loving anyone from charity is God. But sometimes outsiders are more closely united to God than our neighbors or even oour parents. Therefore, in charity they should be loved more. Praeterea, sicut dicit Gregorius in quadam homilia, probatio dilectionis est exhibitio operis. Sed aliquando effectus dilectionis, qui est beneficentia, magis exhibetur extraneo, quam proximo, ut patet in collatione ecclesiasticorum beneficiorum. Ergo non videtur quod propinqui sint magis diligendi ex caritate. 14. Moreover, ass Gregory says in a Homily, the test of love is action. But sometimes the effect of love, which is beneficence is better shown to an outsider than to a neighbor, as is clear in the awarding of ecclesiastical benefices. Therefore it does not seem that one's neighbors should in charity be loved more. Praeterea, I Ioan., III, 18, dicitur: non diligamus ore neque lingua, sed opere et veritate. Sed aliquando plus de opere dilectionis exhibemus aliis quam parentibus; puta, miles plus obedit duci exercitus quam patri; et plus debet reddere benefactori quam patri, si in aequali necessitate existat. Ergo non sunt parentes plus diligendi. 15. Moreover, 1 John 3:18 says: "Let us not love by mouth or tongue, but by deed and trut." But sometimes we show more love to a stranger than to parents, as when a soldier shows more obedience to an army commander than to his father. And he must must be more generous to a benefactor than to his father if he is in some need. Therefore parents are not to be more loved. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, quod illi quos ex sacro fonte suscepimus, magis sunt a nobis diligendi quam illi quos ex carne nostra genuimus. Ergo extranei magis sunt diligendi quam propinqui. 16. Moreover, Gregory says that those whom we receive from the sacred font of baptism should be more loved by us than those who are born from our flesh. Therefore those who are not members of one's family are to be loved more than those who are close to us. Praeterea, ille est magis diligendus, cuius amicitia vituperabilius rescinditur. Sed vituperabilius videtur rescindi amicitia aliorum amicorum quos sponte eligimus, quam propinquorum, qui nobis non ex nostra electione, sed sorte naturae provenerunt. Ergo magis sunt diligendi alii amici quam propinqui. 17. Moreover, he ought to be loved more whose friendship is broken off with more blame. But it seems that the friendship of those friends whom we freely choose is more culpably broken off than that of our relatives who are given to us, not of our own choice, but by a chance of nature. Therefore other friends ought to be loved more than our own relatives. Praeterea, si ratione propinquitatis maioris est aliquis magis diligendus; cum uxor sit magis propinqua, quae est unum corpus, et filii, qui sunt aliquid generantis, sint magis propinqui quam parentes, videtur quod sint magis diligendi filii et uxor quam parentes. Non ergo parentes sunt maxime diligendi. Sic igitur non videtur esse ordo in caritate qui a sanctis assignatur. 18. Moreover, if by reason of a closer proximity one should be loved more, then since a wife who is one in flesh is closer, or children who are a part of the parent are closer than the parents are, it seems that children or a wife ought to be loved more than parents." Therefore parents should not be loved most. Thus there does not seem to be that order in charity which is designated by the saints. Sed contra, est quod dicitur Cantic. II, v. 4: introduxit me rex in cellam vinariam, ordinavit in me caritatem. On the contrary, it is said (Cant. ii. 4), The king brought me into the cellar of wine, he set in order charity in me. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod secundum omnem sententiam et auctoritatem Scripturae, indubitanter iste ordo in caritate significandus est, ut Deus affectu et effectu super omnia diligatur. I answer. It must be said that, according to every opinion or authority on Scripture, such order must, without doubt, be designated to charity so that God is loved above all things, both in regard to affection and to the effect of love. Sed quantum ad dilectionem proximorum, fuit quorumdam opinio, ut ordo caritatis attendatur secundum effectum, et non secundum affectum; et fuerunt moti ex dicto Augustini, qui dicit, quod omnes homines aeque diligendi sunt; sed cum omnibus prodesse non possis, his potissime consulendum est qui pro locorum et temporum vel quarumlibet rerum opportunitatibus constrictius tibi quasi quadam sorte coniunguntur. However, concerning the love for fellow-men, it was the opinion of some that the order of charity had to do with the effects of love, and not with the loving itself; and they were influenced by the words of Augustine, who writes that all men ought to be loved equally, but since you cannot do good to all, you are to pay special regard to those who, by the accidents of time, or place, or circumstance, are brought into closer connection with you. Sed ista positio irrationabilis videtur. Sic enim Deus providet unicuique secundum quod conditio eius requirit; unde tendentibus in finem naturae imprimitur a Deo amor et appetitus finis, secundum quod exigit sua conditio ut tendat in finem; unde quorum est vehementior motus secundum naturam in aliquem finem, eorum etiam est maior inclinatio in illum, quae est appetitus naturalis, ut patet in gravibus et levibus. Sicut autem appetitus vel amor naturalis est inclinatio quaedam, indita rebus naturalibus ad fines connaturales, ita dilectio caritatis est inclinatio quaedam infusa rationali naturae ad tendendum in Deum. Secundum igitur quod necesse est alicui tendere in Deum, secundum hoc ex caritate inclinatur. But this seems to be an unreasonable position, for God so provides for each man according as his state in life requires. Thus love and a desire for the end are implanted by God in those things which tend toward the end of their nature, according as each one's individual state demands that it tend toward its end. Therefore in these things there is a stronger movement according to nature toward a certain end, and there is also in them a greater inclination, which is the natural appetite; as can be seen in heavy and light objects. But, just as the appetite or natural love is a certain inclination implanted in natural things to ends which are connatural to them, so the love of charity is a certain. inclination infused in rational nature for the purpose of tending toward God. Therefore, according as it is necessary for one to tend toward God, thus is he inclined out of charity. Tendituris autem in Deum sicut in finem, id quod maxime necessarium est, divinum auxilium est; secundo autem auxilium quod est a seipso; tertio autem cooperatio, quae est a proximo: et in hoc est gradus. Nam quidam cooperantur tantum in generali; alii vero, qui sunt magis coniuncti, in speciali; non enim omnes omnibus in specialibus cooperari possent. Coadiuvat nos etiam, instrumentaliter tantum, corpus nostrum, et etiam quae corpori necessaria sunt. However, for those who will tend toward God as to an end, what is especially needed is that there be divine help; secondly, that there be some self-help; and thirdly, that there be cooperation with fellow-men. And in this we see a gradation, for some cooperate only in a general way, while others who are more closely united cooperate in a special way. Not all are able to cooperate in a special way. Our body and those things which are necessary for the body also help us tend toward God, but only instrumentally. Unde sic inclinari oportet affectum hominis per caritatem, ut primo et principaliter aliquis diligat Deum; secundo autem seipsum; tertio proximum: et inter proximos, magis illos qui sunt magis coniuncti, et magis nati sunt coadiuvare. Thus it is necessary that the affection of man be so inclined through charity that, first and foremost, each one loves God; secondly, that he love himself; and thirdly, that he love his neighbor. And among the fellow-men, he ought to give mutual help to those who are more closely united to him or who are more closely related to him. Qui autem impediunt, in quantum huiusmodi, sunt odiendi, quicumque sunt; unde dominus dicit, Luc., XIV, 26: si quis venit ad me, et non odit patrem suum et matrem (...) non potest esse meus discipulus. Ultimo autem diligendum est corpus nostrum. Sic etiam secundum actum quem caritas elicit, attendendus est ordo secundum affectum in dilectione proximorum. But whoever there is that is a hindrance to this love, should be hated, for the Lord said (Luke xiv. 26), If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother,... he cannot be my disciple. Finally, we ought to love our body. Thus, regarding the act which charity evokes, an order ought to be established according to the affection in the love of fellow-men. Sed etiam considerandum est, quod sicut supra, art. 7 et 8, diximus, etiam aliae dilectiones licitae et honestae, quae sunt ex aliquibus aliis causis, ordinari possunt ad caritatem; et sic caritas illarum dilectionum actus imperare potest; et sic quod magis secundum aliquam illarum dilectionum diligitur, magis diligitur ex caritate imperante. Manifestum est autem quod secundum dilectionem naturalem propinqui plus diliguntur etiam secundum affectum, et secundum dilectionem socialem plus coniuncti, et sic de aliis dilectionibus. Unde manifestum fit, quod etiam secundum affectum unus proximorum magis est diligendus quam alius, et ex caritate imperante actus aliarum amicitiarum licitarum. However, it should also be considered that, as we said above in Article VII and VIII, other lawful and noble loves which arise from other causes are also able to be ordered to charity. Thus, the charity of these loves can command an act; and therefore that which is loved more according to some of these loves is loved more out of that charity which commands the act. It is also clear that, according to natural love, our relatives are more loved in affection; according to a social love, those who are closely united to us are loved more; and so for all the other kinds of love. Therefore it is also evident that in affection, one neighbor ought to be loved more than another; and he is loved out of a charity which commands the act of the other lawful friendships. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod obiectum fidei est verum; unde secundum quod contingit esse aliquid magis verum, sic etiam contingit aliquid magis credere. Cum autem veritas constet in adaequatione intellectus et rei, si consideretur veritas secundum rationem aequalitatis, quae non recipit magis et minus, sic non contingit esse aliquid magis et minus verum; sed si consideretur ipsum esse rei, quod est ratio veritatis, sicut dicitur in II Metaphys., eadem est dispositio rerum in esse et veritate: unde quae sunt magis entia, sunt magis vera; et propter hoc etiam in scientiis demonstrativis magis creduntur principia quam conclusiones. Et sic etiam contingit in his quae sunt fidei. Unde apostolus, I ad Corinth., XV, probat resurrectionem mortuorum futuram per resurrectionem Christi. To the first, it must be said that the object of faith is the true, whence according as something happens to be more true, so is it more believed. But since truth consists in the conformity of intellect and thing, and if truth is considered according to the characteristic of equality which does not allow a greater or less degree, it does not then happen that a thing is more or less true. But if the being itself of the thing is considered, which is the basis of truth, as is said in II Metaphys., then the disposition of things in being and in truth is the same. Thus, those things which are more in being are more true, and because of this, principles in scientific demonstrations are believed more than conclusions. And thus it happens also in regard to those things which concern faith. In this way the Apostle (1 Cor. xv) proves the future resurrection of the dead through the resurrection of Christ. Ad secundum dicendum, quod ordo rationis est ut ordinantis; sed voluntatis ut ordinatae; et sic convenit ordo caritati. To the second, it must be said that the order of reason is as that which orders, but the order of the will is as that which is ordered. Therefore order is proper to charity. Ad tertium dicendum, quod caritas gradum nescit amantis ad amatum, quia unit utrumque; sed duorum diligibilium, non ignorat. To the third, it must be said that charity does not recognize a hierarchy of the lover to the loved because it unites the two. It does, however, recognize the hierarchy of two objects to be loved. Ad quartum dicendum, quod licet Deus non sit maior in uno quam in alio, tamen magis et perfectius est in seipso quam in creatura; et in una creatura quam in alia. To the fourth, it must be said that although God is not greater in one than in another, however He is more perfectly in Himself than in creatures, and in one creature than in another. Ad quintum dicendum, quod in dilectione, cuius principale obiectum est ipse diligens, necesse est quod magis diligatur id quod est diligenti similius, sicut accidit in dilectione naturali. Sed in dilectione caritatis principale obiectum est ipse Deus; unde magis diligendum est ex caritate quod magis est unum cum Deo, ceteris paribus. To the fifth, it must be said that in the love whose principal object is the one loving, it is necessary that what is more similar to the one loving be loved more, as in a natural love. But in the love of charity, the principal object is God Himself. Thus other things being equal, that which is more one with God ought to be loved more out of charity. Ad sextum dicendum, quod apostolus argumentatur secundum eos qui visibilibus praecipue inhaerent, a quibus visibilia invisibilibus magis diliguntur. To the sixth, it must be said that the Apostle (1 John iv. 20) was arguing according to those who are attached in a great degree to what is visible, and by these men, what can be seen is loved more than what cannot be seen. Ad septimum dicendum, quod unitate naturae nihil est magis unum quam nos; sed unitate affectus, cuius obiectum est bonum, summe bonum debet esse magis unum quam nos. To the seventh, it must be said that by a unity of nature nothing is more one than we ourselves. But by a unity of affection, whose object is the good, the highest good ought to be more one than we are. Ad octavum dicendum, quod omnes homines sunt aeque diligendi, in quantum omnibus aequale bonum velle debemus, scilicet vitam aeternam. To the eighth, it must be said that all men ought to be loved equally insofar as we ought to wish for all of them the same good, viz., eternal life. Ad nonum dicendum, quod proximum tenetur aliquis diligere sicut seipsum, non tamen quantum seipsum; propter quod non sequitur quod omnes proximi sint aequaliter diligendi. To the ninth, it must be said that one is bound to love his neighbor as himself, but not however as much as himself. Because of this, it does not follow that all fellow-men ought to be loved equally. Ad decimum dicendum, quod aliquem dicimus magis diligere, non solum quia maius bonum ei volumus, sed etiam quia intensiori affectu idem bonum ei optamus; et sic, licet omnibus optemus unum bonum, quod est vita aeterna, non tamen omnes aequaliter diligimus. To the tenth, it must be said that we speak of loving someone more not only because we wish a greater good for him, but also because we wish the same good for him with more intense affection. Thus, although we wish the one good, which is eternal life, for all; we do not, however, love all equally. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod non potest esse quod alicui impendamus de dilectione quod debemus, si alium quem minus diligere debemus, amplius diligamus; potest enim contingere quod in necessitatis articulo amplius subveniatur alteri, in derogationem eius quem plus amare debemus. To the eleventh, it must be answered that we are not giving to a person that love which we ought to give if we love more one whom we ought to love less. For, it can happen that in the moment of necessity we give more to the latter, to the neglect of the former whom we ought to love more. Ad decimumsecundum dicendum, quod illi qui sunt in patria, sunt coniuncti ultimo fini: et ideo solum illorum dilectio regulatur ex ipso fine; unde ordo caritatis in eis non attenditur nisi secundum propinquitatem ad Deum: et propter hoc Deo propinquiores magis amantur. Sed in via nobis est necessarium tendere in finem; et ideo ordo dilectionis attenditur etiam secundum mensuram auxilii, quod ex aliis consequitur ad tendendum in finem; et sic non semper meliores magis amantur, sed attenditur etiam ratio propinquitatis, ut ex utroque coniunctim sumatur ratio maioris dilectionis. To the twelfth, it must be said that those who are in heaven are joined to their final end, and therefore their love is regulated solely by that end; thus there is no order of charity in them, except that which is concerned with their nearness to God. Because of this, those who are closer to God are loved more. But in this life, it is necessary for us to tend toward our end; and therefore the order of love is also established according to the measure of help in tending to that end which is obtained from others. And thus it is not always those who live better lives that are loved more, but there also arises a factor of propinquity, so that the reason for greater love is found jointly in each of these factors. Et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad decimumtertium. From this the answer to the thirteenth objection is also evident. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod praelatus aliquis non potest conferre beneficia in quantum est Petrus vel Martinus, sed in quantum est magister Ecclesiae; et ideo in collatione ecclesiasticorum beneficiorum non debet attendere propinquitatem ad se, sed propinquitatem ad Deum, et utilitatem Ecclesiae: sicut dispensator alicuius familiae attendere debet, in dispensando res domini sui, servitium quod exhibetur domino suo, et non servitium quod exhibetur sibi. In rebus autem propriis, sicut patrimonialibus bonis, vel quae ex industria suae personae acquirit ut propria, debet attendi in benefaciendo ordo propinquitatis ad ipsum beneficium. To the fourteenth, it must be said that any prelate of the Church does not confer benefices insofar as he is Peter or Martin, but only insofar as he is a master of the Church. Therefore, in the collection for ecclesiastical benefices he ought not to regard any closeness to himself but rather the closeness to God and the usefulness to the Church; just as the overseer of any household in attending to the affairs of his master ought to consider the service as being rendered to his master and not to himself. But in one's own private affairs, such as the goods of patrimony, or those things which are acquired by one's own personal effort as an individual, in these goods one ought to observe an order of closeness in doing good. Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod secundum ea quae pertinent proprie ad propriam personam alicuius, plus debet exhibere dilectionis effectum parentibus quam extraneis; nisi forte in quantum in bono alicuius extranei penderet bonum commune, quod etiam sibi ipsi imponere quisque debet: ut cum aliquis seipsum periculo mortis exponit, ad salvandum in bello ducem exercitus, vel in civitate principem civitatis, in quantum ex eis dependet salus totius communitatis. Sed secundum ea quae pertinent ad aliquid ratione alicuius adiuncti, utpote in quantum est civis vel miles, plus debet obedire rectori civitatis, vel duci, quam patri. To the fifteenth, it must be said that concerning those things which properly pertain to the individual person of anyone, he ought to show more of the effects of love towards his parents than toward someone who is not a member of his family; except if by chance, when the common good which each one ought also to desire for himself would depend on the good of someone who is not a member of one's family, as when one would expose himself to the danger of death in order to save the general of the army in war time, or to save the leader of a state insofar as the welfare of the entire community depends on these men. But considering those things which pertain to some other thing by reason of a certain bond, such as the fact that one is a citizen or a soldier, he ought to obey the ruler of the state or his general more than his parents. Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod auctoritas Gregorii est intelligenda quantum ad illa qua ad regenerationem spiritualem pertinent, in quibus tenemur his quos ex sacro fonte suscepimus. To the sixteenth, it must be said that when we refer to those whom we receive from the sacred fountain, the text of Gregory ought to be understood as meaning that which pertains to a spiritual regeneration. Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit quantum ad illa quae pertinent ad socialem vitam, in qua fundatur amicitia extraneorum. To the seventeenth, it must be said that this argument applies only to those things which pertain to our social life, in which is founded friendship for someone who is not a member of one's family. Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod secundum illam dilectionem qua aliquis diligit seipsum, plus diligit uxorem et filios, quam parentes, quia uxor est aliquid viri, et filius patris; unde dilectio quae habetur ad uxorem et filium magis includitur in dilectione qua aliquis diligit seipsum, quam dilectio quae habetur ad patrem. Sed hoc non est diligere filium ratione eius, sed ratione sui ipsius. Sed secundum modum dilectionis qua diligimus aliquem ratione eius, plus diligendus est pater quam filius, in quantum ex patre maius beneficium suscepimus, et in quantum honor filii magis dependet ex honore patris quam e converso; et ideo in exhibitione reverentiae, et in obediendo, et in satisfaciendo voluntati eius, et in similibus, tenetur homo magis patri quam filio; sed in subventione necessariorum plus tenetur homo filio quam parenti, quia parentes debent thesaurizare filiis, et non e converso, ut dicitur I Corinth., IV. To the eighteenth, it must be said that according to that love by which one loves himself, he loves his wife and children more than his parents because a wife is some part of the husband, and the son of the father. Therefore the love which one has for his wife and son is more included in the love by which a person loves himself than is the love which he has for his parents. But this is not to love the son for the son's sake, but rather for one's own sake. But according to the mode of love by which we love another for the other's sake, a father ought to be loved more than a son insofar as we receive greater benefit from the father, and also insofar as the honor of the son depends more on the honor of the father than vice versa. Therefore in a display of reverence, in obedience, in doing the will of another, and in other similar things, man is bound more to his father than to his son. But in providing the necessities, he is bound more to the child than to the parent, because parents ought to lay away treasures for their children and not vice versa, as is said in 1 Corinth., iv.
Decimo quaeritur utrum possibile sit caritatem esse perfectam in hac vita
Whether Charity Can Be Perfect In This Life?
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that charity can be perfect in this life. Quia Deus nihil impossibile homini praecipit, ut Hieronymus dicit. Sed perfectio caritatis ponitur in praecepto, ut patet Deuter., VI, 5: diliges dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo; totum enim et perfectum idem sunt. Ergo possibile est caritatem esse perfectam in hac vita. 1. God commands nothing impossible for man, as Jerome says.2 But perfect charity is placed in a precept, as is shown (Deut. vi. 5), Love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart; for whole and perfect mean the same thing. Therefore it is possible for charity to be perfect in this life. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod perfecta caritas est ut meliora magis diligantur. Sed hoc est possibile in hac vita. Ergo caritas potest esse in hac vita perfecta. 2. Moreover, Augustine says that this is perfect charity, that better things be loved more. But this is possible in this life. Therefore charity can be perfect in this life. Praeterea, ratio amoris in quadam unione consistit. Sed caritas in hac vita maxime potest esse unum; quia qui adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus est, ut dicitur I Corinth., VI, 17. Ergo caritas in hac vita potest esse perfecta. 3. Moreover, the essence of love implies a certain union. But charity is especially able to be one in this life, for it is said (1 Cor. vi. 17), He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit. Therefore charity can be perfect in this life. Praeterea, perfectum est aliquid quod maxime recedit a contrario. Sed caritas in hac vita potest resistere omni peccato et tentationi. Ergo caritas in hac vita potest esse perfecta. 4. Moreover, something is perfect which is farthest removed from its' contrary. But charity in this life is able to resist every sin and temptation. Therefore charity is able to be perfect in this life. Praeterea, affectus noster in hac vita immediate fertur in Deum per dilectionem. Sed quando intellectus immediate ferretur in Deum, perfecte et totaliter ipsum cognosceremus. Ergo nunc perfecte et totaliter Deum diligimus: est ergo in hac vita caritas perfecta. 5. Moreover, our affective power in this life is directed to God immediately through love. But when the intellect is directed immediately to God, we will know Him perfectly and completely. Therefore we love God perfectly and completely now, and so charity is perfect in this life. Praeterea, voluntas est domina sui actus. Sed diligere Deum, est actus voluntatis. Ergo voluntas humana potest totaliter et perfecte ferri in Deum. 6. Moreover, the will is the mistress of its acts. But to love God is an act of the will. Therefore the human will can be completely and perfectly directed to God. Praeterea, obiectum caritatis est divina bonitas, quae est delectabilissima. Sed in eo quod est delectabile, non est difficile continue perseverare, et sine intermissione. Ergo videtur quod in hac vita de facili possit perfectio caritatis haberi. 7. Moreover, the object of charity is the divine goodness which is most lovable. But it is not difficult to adhere closely and without ceasing to that which is lovable. Therefore it seems that the perfection of charity can easily be had in this life. Praeterea, quod simplex est et indivisibile, si aliquo modo habetur, totum habetur. Sed amor caritatis est simplex et indivisibilis, et ex parte animae diligentis, et ex parte obiecti diligibilis, quod est Deus. Ergo, si quis habet in hac vita caritatem, totaliter et perfecte habet. 8. Moreover, that which is simple and indivisible, if it is possessed in any manner at all, is possessed completely. But the love of charity is simple and indivisible, both on the part of the soul loving and on the part of the object to be loved, which is God. Therefore, if one has charity in this life, he has it completely and perfectly. Praeterea, caritas est nobilissima virtutum, secundum illud I Cor., XII, 31: adhuc excellentiorem viam vobis demonstro, scilicet caritatis. Sed aliae virtutes possunt esse perfectae in hac vita. Ergo et caritas. 9. Moreover, charity is the most noble of the virtues, according to what is written (1 Cor. xii. 31), I shew unto you yet a more excellent way, i.e., the way of charity. But the other virtues can be perfect in this life. Therefore so also can charity. Sed contra. On the contrary, Cum caritati repugnet omne peccatum, ut dictum est, perfectio caritatis requirit quod homo sit omnino absque peccato. Sed hoc non potest esse in hac vita, secundum illud I Ioan., I, 8: si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus. Ergo perfecta caritas in hac vita haberi non potest. (1) since every sin is repugnant to charity, as has been said,8 the perfection of charity requires 'that a man be entirely free from sin. But this is not possible in this life, according as it is written (1 John i. 8), If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. Therefore perfect charity cannot be had in this life. Praeterea, nihil diligitur nisi cognitum, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de Trinit. Sed in hac vita Deus perfecte non potest cognosci, secundum illud I Cor., XIII, 9: nunc ex parte cognoscimus. Ergo nec etiam potest perfecte diligi. (2) Moreover, nothing is loved unless it is known, as Augustine says in the De Trinitate 9 But in this life God cannot be known perfectly, as is said (1 Cor. xiii. 9), For we know in part. Therefore neither can He be loved perfectly. Praeterea, illud quod semper potest proficere, non est perfectum. Sed caritas in hac vita semper potest proficere, ut dicitur in sermone. Ergo caritas in hac vita semper perfecta esse non potest. (3) Moreover, that which is always able to grow is not perfect. But charity can always grow in this life, as is taught.b0 Therefore charity is not always able to be perfect in this life. Praeterea, perfecta caritas foras mittit timorem, ut dicitur I Ioan., IV, 18. Sed in hac vita non potest homo esse sine timore. Ergo non potest aliquis habere caritatem perfectam. (4) Moreover, perfect charity casteth out fear, as is said (1 John iv. 18). But in this life man cannot be without fear." Therefore no one is able to have perfect charity. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod perfectum tripliciter dicitur. Uno modo perfectum simpliciter: alio modo perfectum secundum naturam; tertio modo secundum tempus. Perfectum quidem dicitur simpliciter quod omnibus modis perfectum est, et cui nulla perfectio deest. Perfectum autem secundum naturam dicitur, cui non deest aliquid eorum quae nata sunt haberi a natura illa: sicut intellectum hominis dicimus perfectum, non quod nihil ei intelligibilium desit, sed quia nihil ei deest eorum per quae homo natus est intelligere. Perfectum secundum tempus dicimus quando nihil deest alicui eorum quae natum est habere secundum tempus illud: sicut dicimus puerum perfectum, quia habet ea quae requiruntur ad hominem secundum aetatem illam. Sic igitur dicendum, quod caritas perfecta simpliciter a solo Deo habetur. Caritas autem perfecta secundum naturam haberi quidem potest ab homine, sed non in hac vita. Caritas autem perfecta secundum tempus, etiam in hac vita haberi potest. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod cum actus et habitus speciem habeant ex obiecto, oportet quod ex eodem ratio perfectionis ipsius sumatur. Obiectum autem caritatis est summum bonum. Caritas ergo est perfecta simpliciter quae in summum bonum fertur in tantum quantum diligibile est. Summum autem bonum diligibile est in infinitum, cum sit bonum infinitum. Unde nulla caritas creaturae, cum sit finita, potest esse simpliciter perfecta, sed sic perfecta dici potest sola caritas Dei, qua diligit seipsum. I answer. It must be said that the perfect is spoken of in three ways: first, the perfect in itself; secondly, the perfect according to nature; and thirdly, the perfect according to time. A thing is called perfect in itself when it is perfect in every respect and when no perfection is lacking. Something is called perfect according to nature when it lacks none of the things which it should possess by its very nature. For example, we say that the intellect of man is perfect, not because it lacks none of the intelligibles, but rather because it lacks none of those things through which man naturally knows. We say a thing is perfect according to time when nothing is lacking to it of those things which it is born to have according to a particular time, as we call a boy perfect because he possesses everything that is required for a human being of that age. So it must be said that charity which is perfect without any qualification is possessed by God alone. But charity which is perfect according to nature can be had by man, but not in this life. Charity which is perfect according to time can be had even in this life. To understand this clearly, it should be known that since act and habit are specified by their object, it is necessary that any reason of their perfection arise from this same object. But the object of charity is the highest good. Therefore charity is perfect without qualffication not only when it is directed to the highest good, but in the same degree as that good is good. Therefore since the highest good is infinite, it is to be loved infinitely. Whence no created charity, since it is finite, can be perfect without qualification, but only the love of God by which He loves Himself can be called perfect in this way. Sed tunc secundum naturam rationalis creaturae, caritas dicitur esse perfecta, quando rationalis creatura secundum suum posse ad Deum diligendum convertitur. Impeditur autem homo in hac vita, ne totaliter mens eius in Deum feratur, ex tribus. Primo quidem ex contraria inclinatione mentis; quando scilicet mens per peccatum conversa ad commutabile bonum sicut ad finem, avertitur ab incommutabili bono. Secundo per occupationem saecularium rerum; quia, ut dicit apostolus, I ad Cor., VII, 33: qui cum uxore est, sollicitus est quae sunt mundi quomodo placeat uxori, et divisus est; id est, cor eius non movetur tantum in Deum. Tertio vero ex infirmitate praesentis vitae, cuius necessitatibus oportet aliquatenus hominem occupari, et retrahi, ne actualiter mens feratur in Deum; dormiendo, comedendo, et alia huiusmodi faciendo, sine quibus praesens vita duci non potest: et ulterius ex ipsa corporis gravitate anima deprimitur, ne divinam lucem in sui essentia videre possit, ut ex tali visione caritas perficiatur; secundum illud apostoli, II ad Cor., V, 6: quamdiu sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a domino; per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem. However, according to the nature of a rational creature, charity is said to be perfect when the rational creature is turned to loving God as much as he is able to love Him. But man is impeded in this life, so that his mind is not directed completely to God, for three reasons. The first reason is the contrary inclination of the soul, for when the soul is turned by sin toward a changeable good as toward an end, it is directed away from the immutable good. Secondly, man does not completely love God because of his occupation with the affairs of the world; for, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. vii. 33), He that is with a wife, is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife; and he is divided; i.e., his heart is not directed only to God. The third reason is from the infirmity of this present life, with the necessities with which man must be occupied to a certain extent, and his soul must be diverted from being directed to God perfectly, e.g., sleeping, eating, and doing other things of this kind without which the present life could not be lived. Further, the soul is weighted down by the burden of the body so that it cannot see the divine light in its essence.14 By such a vision, charity would be per fected, according as the Apostle says (1I Cor. v. 6-7), While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord. (For we walk by faith, and not by sight.) Homo autem in hac vita potest esse sine peccato mortali avertente ipsum a Deo; et iterum potest esse sine occupatione temporalium rerum, sicut apostolus dicit, I ad Cor., c. VII, 33: qui sine uxore est, sollicitus est de his quae sunt domini, quomodo placeat Deo. Sed ab onere corruptibilis carnis in hac vita liber esse non potest. Unde quantum ad remotionem primorum duorum impedimentorum, caritas potest esse perfecta in hac vita; non autem quantum ad remotionem tertii impedimenti; et ideo illam perfectionem caritatis quae erit post hanc vitam, nullus in hac vita habere potest, nisi sit viator et comprehensor simul; quod est proprium Christi. However, man can live in this life without turning himself away from God by mortal sin. Again, he is able to live without the occupation of temporal affairs, as is said (1 Cor. vii. 32), He that is without a wife, is solicitous for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God. However, man cannot be free from the burden of his corruptible body in this life. Thus, according as the first two impediments are removed, charity can be perfect in this life; but not as regards the third. Therefore no one can possess in this life the perfect charity he will have in the next life, unless he be at one and the same time a traveler here below and a beholder of God, and this is proper only to Christ. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc quod dicitur, diliges dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo, intelligitur esse praeceptum, secundum quod totalitas excludit omne illud quod impedit perfectam Dei inhaesionem; et hoc non est praeceptum, sed finis praecepti: indicatur enim nobis per hoc non quid faciendum sit, sed potius quo tendendum sit, ut dicit Augustinus. To the first, it must be said that when it is written, Love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, this is understood to be a precept according to which the totality excludes everything that prevents a perfect adherence to God; and this is not a precept but the end of a precept. For us this does not mean that we should do it, but rather that we should tend toward it, as Augustine says. Ad secundum dicendum, quod diligere meliora tanto plus quanto eorum bonitas exigit, sic non potest homo, sicut non potest perfectam caritatem habere, ut dictum est. To the second, it must be said that man is not able to love better things more than their goodness demands; just as he is not able to have perfect charity, as has been said. Ad tertium dicendum, quod in hoc ipso quod est facere unum amantem cum amato, multiplex gradus inveniri potest. Tunc vero perfecte mens nostra erit unum cum Deo, quando semper actualiter feretur in ipsum; quod non est possibile in hac vita. To the third, it must be said that in the union which makes the lover one with the loved, there are various grades found. Our soul will then be one with God perfectly when it is always actually directed toward Him, which is not possible in this life. Ad quartum dicendum, quod perfectio quae convenit alicui rei secundum suam speciem, secundum quodcumque tempus ei convenit; sicut homo quolibet tempore et qualibet aetate est perfectus anima rationali. Unde perfectio caritatis quae est secundum quodcumque tempus, est perfectio quae competit caritati secundum eius speciem. Est autem de ratione caritatis ut Deus super omnia diligatur, et ut nullum creatum ei praeferatur in amore. Unde, cum omnis tentatio ex amore alicuius boni creati proveniat, vel ex timore mali contrarii, quod etiam ex amore derivatur; ex sua specie hoc habet caritas in quolibet statu, quod cuilibet tentationi resistere possit, ita etiam, scilicet, quod in peccatum mortale per eam homo non inducatur, non autem quod nullo modo tentatione afficiatur: hoc enim pertinet ad perfectionem patriae. To the fourth, it must be answered that the perfection which is found in a thing according to its species is found in it always; just as man, because of his rational soul, is perfect at any time or at any age. Whence, the perfection of charity which is according to all time is the perfection which is found in charity according to its species. But it is of the very essence of charity that God be loved above all things and that no creature be preferred to Him in love. Whence, since every temptation occurs from the love of some created good, or from the fear of a contrary evil which is derived from love, charity, in whatever degree, has from its species that it is able to resist any temptation in such way that man is not led into mortal sin through it, not however that man is affected in no way by temptation; for this pertains to the perfection of heaven. Ad quintum dicendum, quod eodem modo Deus in patria et totaliter videbitur et totaliter diligetur; secundum, scilicet, quod ly totaliter se tenet ex parte diligentis et videntis; quia, scilicet, totum posse creaturae applicabitur ad videndum et diligendum Deum. Similiter etiam potest intelligi, quod Deus totaliter videbitur et diligetur, quia non est aliqua pars eius quae non videatur et diligatur, cum ipse non sit compositus, sed simplex. Sed tamen secundum alium intellectum non totaliter diligetur, nec totaliter videbitur; quia, scilicet, non tantum videbitur, nec tantum ab aliqua creatura diligetur, sicut visibilis est et diligibilis. Sed in vita ista nec etiam secundum primum aut secundum modum Deus totaliter videri aut diligi potest: quia nec ipse per essentiam suam videtur, nec est possibile homini, in hac vita viventi, ut absque intermissione eius affectus actualiter feratur in Deum. Sed tamen quodammodo totaliter diligitur Deus ab homine in hac vita, in quantum nihil est in affectu eius contrarium dilectioni divinae. To the fifth, it must be said that in heaven God will be both wholly seen and wholly loved in the same way, viz., insofar as wholly is regarded on the part of the one who loves and the one who sees, for the entire power of the creature will be applied to seeing and loving God. Likewise, it can also be understood that God will be wholly seen and loved because there is no part of Him which is not seen and loved, since He is not composite but simple. But according to another way of understanding this, He is not wholly loved or seen, because He will not be seen or loved by any creature to the degree that He can be seen or is lovable. In this life, however, God cannot even be wholly seen or loved according to the first or second way, for He is not seen through His essence, nor is it possible for man living in this life that his affective power be perfectly directed toward God without any interruption. Nevertheless, God is wholly loved in some way by man in this life according as there is nothing in his affective power contrary to the divine love. Ad sextum dicendum, quod voluntas est domina sui actus quantum ad hoc quod agat, non quantum ad hoc quod continue in uno actu perseveret; cum conditio huius vitae requirat ut actus et voluntas ferantur ad multa. Vel potest dici, quod voluntas est domina sui actus in his quae sunt homini connaturalia; sed perfectio caritatis, maxime quae erit in patria, est super hominem, et praecipue si consideretur homo secundum statum praesentis vitae. To the sixth, it must be said that the will is the mistress of its own act in regard to that which it does, but not in regard to the fact that it perseveres continually in one act, since a condition of this life requires that acts and the will be directed toward many things. Or, it can be said that the will is the mistress of its acts in those things which are connatural to man, but the perfection of charity which will be greatest in heaven is above man, especially if man is considered according to his state in the present life. Ad septimum dicendum, quod aliqua actio desinit esse delectabilis non solum ex parte obiecti, sed etiam ex parte agentis quod deficit in virtute agendi. Sic igitur dicendum est, quod actualiter semper ferri in Deum, delectabile est ex parte obiecti; sed ex parte in hac vita constituti non potest esse talis delectatio continua, quia contemplatio mentis humanae non est sine actione virtutis imaginativae, et aliarum virium corporalium, quas necesse est laxari diuturnitate actionis, propter corporis infirmitatem, unde impeditur delectatio; et propter hoc dicitur Eccle., XII, 12: frequentis meditatio, carnis est afflictio. To the seventh, it must be said that an action can cease to be lovable not only on the part of the object, but also on the part of the agent because he is deficient in the power of acting. Thus it must be said that what is always actually directed toward God is lovable on the part of the object. However, such a love, on the part of one living in this life, cannot be continual, because the contemplation of the human mind is not without the action of the imaginative power and of the other corporeal powers, which must be released from continuous action because of the weakness of the body; and for this reason delight is impeded. Thus it is written (Eccle. xii. 1), Much study is an affliction of the flesh. Ad octavum dicendum, quod perfectio caritatis non attenditur secundum augmentum quantitatis, sed secundum intensionem qualitatis; quae quidem intensio simplicitati caritatis non repugnat. To the eighth, it must be said that the perfection of charity is not according to a quantitative increase, but according to a qualitative intensity. This intensity is not opposed to the simplicity of charity. Ad nonum dicendum, quod aliarum virtutum moralium obiecta sunt bona humana, quae non excedunt vires hominis; et ideo ad omnimodam earum perfectionem potest homo in hac vita pervenire. Sed obiectum caritatis est bonum increatum quod vires hominis excedit; et ideo non est ratio similis. To the ninth, it must be said that the objects of the other moral virtues are human goods which do not exceed the powers of man. Therefore man can arrive at the complete perfection of these in this life. But the object of charity is the uncreated good which does exceed the powers of man. Therefore the argument does not apply. Ad primum vero eorum quae in contrarium obiiciuntur, dicendum est, quod sine peccato mortali aliquis esse potest in hac vita, non autem sine peccato veniali: quod quidem non repugnat perfectioni viae, sed perfectioni patriae, quae est ut semper actu feratur in Deum; peccatum autem veniale non tollit habitum caritatis, sed impedit actum eius. To the first objection given in the On the contrary, it must be said that a man can live in this life without mortal sin, but not without venial sin; this is not contrary to the perfection of this life but to the perfection of the life in heaven which consists in being always actually directed toward God. Venial sin does not take away the habit of charity, but it impedes its act. Ad secundum dicendum, quod Deum in hac vita non possumus perfecte cognoscere, ut sciamus de eo quid sit; possumus tamen cognoscere de eo quid non sit, ut Augustinus dicit; et in hoc consistit perfectio cognitionis viae. Et similiter in hac vita non possumus perfecte diligere Deum, ut semper actu in ipsum feramur; sed ita quod nunquam in contrarium eius feratur mens. To the second, it must be said that we are not able to know God perfectly in this life so that we know what He is. However, we can know what He is not, as Augustine says, and in this consists the perfection of the knowledge of this life. Likewise, we are not able to love God perfectly in this life so that we are always actually directed toward Him, but the mind is never directed to what is contrary to God. Ad tertium dicendum, quod in hac vita non est caritas perfecta nec simpliciter, nec secundum humanam naturam: sed solum secundum tempus. Ea vero quae sic perfecta sunt, habent quo crescant, ut de pueris patet; et ideo caritas in hac vita semper habet quo crescat. To the third, it must be said that in this life charity is neither perfect without qualffication nor according to human nature, but only according to time. But those things which are perfect in this way possess that by which they grow, as is clear in the example given of boys. Therefore charity in this life always has that by which it increases itself. Ad quartum dicendum, quod perfecta caritas foras mittit timorem servilem et initialem; non tamen timorem castum vel filialem, nec etiam timorem naturalem. To the fourth, it must be said that perfect charity drives out servile and initial fear, but not a chaste or filial fear, or even a natural fear.
Undecimo quaeritur utrum omnes teneantur ad perfectam caritatem habendam
Whether All Are Bound to Perfect Charity?
Et videtur quod sic. It seems that all are bound to perfect charity. Ad id enim quod est in praecepto, omnes tenentur. Sed perfectio caritatis est in praecepto; dicitur enim Deuter., VI, 5: diliges dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde. Ergo omnes tenentur ad perfectionem caritatis. 1. All are bound to that which is commanded by a precept. But the perfection of charity is in a precept, for it is said (Deut. vi. 5), Love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart. Therefore all are bound to the perfection of charity. Praeterea, hoc videtur esse de perfectione caritatis, quod homo omnes actus suos referat in Deum. Sed ad hoc omnes homines tenentur; dicitur enim I ad Cor., X, 31: sive manducatis, sive bibitis, vel aliud quid facitis; omnia in gloriam Dei facite. Ergo omnes tenentur ad perfectionem caritatis. 2. Moreover, it seems to be from the perfection of charity that man orders all of his acts to God. But all men are bound to do this, for it is written (1 Cor. x. 31), Whether you eat or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all to the glory of God. Therefore all are bound to the perfection of charity. Sed dicendum, quod praeceptum illud apostoli ad hoc se extendit ut omnia habitu referantur in Deum, sed non actu. —Sed contra, praecepta legis sunt de actibus virtutum; habitus autem non cadit sub praecepto. Non ergo praeceptum apostoli intelligitur de habituali resolutione nostrorum actuum in Deo, sed de actuali. 3. But it must be objected that this precept of the Apostle means that everything should be ordered to God in habit, but not in act. On the contrary, the precepts of the law concern the acts of the virtues; but a habit does not come under a precept. Thus, this precept of the Apostle does not concern the habitual, but the actual resolution of our acts to God. Praeterea, dominus, Matth., V, 17, praecepta veteris legis adimplevit, secundum illud: non veni solvere (legem), sed adimplere. Haec autem adimpletio est de necessitate salutis, ut patet per illud quod subditur Matth., cap. V 20: nisi abundaverit iustitia vestra plusquam Scribarum et Pharisaeorum, non intrabitis in regnum caelorum. Ad ea autem quae sunt de necessitate salutis, omnes tenentur. Ergo et ad praedictam adimpletionem servandam. Sed praedicta adimpletio ad perfectionem pertinet; unde dominus in fine concludit Matth., V, 48: estote perfecti, sicut pater vester caelestis perfectus est. Ergo ad perfectionem caritatis omnes tenentur. 4. Moreover, the Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law (Matt. v. 17), I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill. But this fulfillment is from the necessity of salvation, as is clear from what follows in this text (Matt. v. 20), Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. But everyone is bound to do those things which concern the necessity of salvation, and they are therefore bound to accomplish this fulfillment. But this aforesaid fulfillment pertains to perfection, for the Lord concluded (Matt. v. 48), Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect. Therefore all are bound to the perfection of charity. Praeterea, ad consilia solum non omnes tenentur. Perfectio autem vitae aeternae, aut caritatis, non attenditur secundum consilia: datur enim consilium de paupertate, nec tamen sequitur quod qui magis est pauper, sit perfectior; datur etiam consilium de virginitate, et tamen multi virgines sunt aliis imperfectiores in caritate; et sic videtur quod perfectio caritatis non consistat in consiliis. Nullus ergo excusatur a perfectione caritatis. 5. Moreover, it is only the counsels that not all are bound to obey. But the perfection of eternal life or of charity is not referred to the counsels. For, a counsel of poverty is given, and it does not therefore follow that he who is poorer is more perfect; so, too, a counsel of virginity is given, and yet many virgins are less perfect in charity than others. Thus it seems that the perfection of charity is not referred to the counsels. Therefore no one is excused from the perfection of charity. Praeterea, status episcoporum est perfectior quam status religiosorum; alioquin non posset aliquis licite de statu religionis ad statum praelationis se transferre: unde et Dionysius dicit in Eccles. hierarchia, quod episcopi sunt perfectiores; monachi autem sunt perfectius eorum virtutibus traditi, et quod debent se sursum agere ad perfectiones quas in episcopis vident. Nec tamen episcopi tenentur ad observandum huiusmodi consilium paupertatis, et alia huiusmodi. Ergo in his non consistit perfectio caritatis. 6. Moreover, the status of bishops is more perfect than the status of religious. Otherwise, one would not be able lawfully to transfer from the state of a religious to that of a prelate. Thus, Dionysius says in the Eccles. Hierarchia, that bishops are more perfect, but monks are more perfectly resigned in their virtues; and they ought to elevate themselves to that perfection which they observe in bishops. However, bishops are not bound to observe the counsel of poverty or other counsels of this kind. Therefore the perfection of charity does not consist in these. Praeterea, dominus apostolis multa imposuit quae sunt de perfectione vitae: ut quod non portarent duas tunicas, neque calceamenta, neque virgam, neque aliquod huiusmodi. Sed quod iniunxit apostolis, omnibus iniunxit, secundum illud Marc., XIII, 37: quod vobis dico, omnibus dico. Ergo omnes tenentur ad perfectionem vitae. 7. Moreover, the Lord commanded many things to the Apostles which concern the perfection of this life, e.g., that they should not carry two coats or a pair of sandals or a staff or similar possessions. But what he enjoined on the Apostles, He enjoined on all, according to this (Mark xiii. 37), What I say unto you, I say to all: watch. Therefore all are bound to the perfection of life. Praeterea, quicumque habet caritatem, plus amat vitam aeternam quam vitam temporalem. Sed quilibet homo tenetur ad actum caritatis. Ergo quilibet homo tenetur ad hoc quod vitam aeternam praeeligat vitae corporali. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit, caritas cum ad perfectionem venerit, dicit: cupio dissolvi, et esse cum Christo. Ergo quilibet tenetur habere perfectam caritatem. 8. Moreover, whoever has charity loves eternal life more than temporal life. But each man is bound to the act of charity. Therefore each man is bound to choose eternal life over the life of the body. But, as Augustine says, charity cries out when it has become perfect: I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ. Therefore every one is bound to have perfect charity. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod perfecta caritas est ut quis paratus sit pro fratribus etiam mori. Sed ad hoc omnes tenentur, dicitur enim I Ioan., III, 16: in hoc cognoscimus caritatem Dei, quoniam ille pro nobis animam suam posuit; et nos debemus pro fratribus animas ponere. Ergo quilibet tenetur ad perfectionem caritatis. 9. Moreover, Augustine says that perfect charity is such that one is even prepared to die for his brethren.6 But all are bound to this, for it is written (1 John iii. 16), In this we have known the charity of God, because he hath laid down his life for us: and we ought to kiy down our lives for the brethren. Therefore every one is bound to the perfection of charity. Praeterea, quilibet tenetur vitare peccatum. Sed qui est sine peccato, habet fiduciam in die iudicii: quia in hoc perfecta est caritas Dei nobiscum, ut fiduciam habeamus in die iudicii, ut dicitur I Ioan., IV, 17. Ergo omnes tenentur ad perfectionem caritatis. 10. Moreover, every one is bound to avoid sin. But he who is without sin has some confidence on the day of judgment, for it is said (1 John iv. 17), In this is the charity of God perfected with us, that we may have confidence in the day of judgment. Therefore all are bound to the perfection of charity. Praeterea, philosophus dicit in VIII Ethic.: Deo et parentibus non possumus reddere aequivalens; sed sufficit ut quilibet eis reddat quod potest. Sed perfectio caritatis in hoc consistit ut aliquis faciat pro Deo quod potest, quia nullus facit ultra posse. Ergo quilibet tenetur habere perfectam caritatem. 11. Moreover, the Philosopher says in Book VIII of the Ethics, we cannot give back equity to 'God and to parents; but it is sufficient that each one return to them what he is able. But the perfection of charity consists in each one doing for God what he can, since no one can do more than that. Therefore each one is bound to have perfect charity. Praeterea, religiosi profitentur perfectionem vitae. Ergo ipsi videntur teneri ad habendam perfectionem caritatis, et ad omnia quae ad perfectionem vitae pertinent. 12. Moreover, people in religion promise perfection of life. Therefore they seem to be bound to possess the perfection of charity and to have all those things which pertain to the perfection of life. Sed contra, est quod nullus tenetur ad id quod non est in ipso. Sed habere perfectam caritatem non est a nobis, sed a Deo. Non ergo potest esse in praecepto. On the contrary, no one is bound to that which is not in him. But to have perfect charity is not from within us, but from God. Therefore to possess perfect charity cannot be a precept. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod huius quaestionis solutio ex praemissis accipi potest. Ostensum est enim supra, quod aliqua perfectio est quae ipsam speciem caritatis consequitur, utpote quae consistit in remotione cuiuslibet inclinationis in contrarium caritatis. Quaedam autem perfectio est, sine qua caritas esse potest, quae pertinet ad bene esse caritatis; quae scilicet consistit in remotione occupationum saecularium, quibus affectus humanus retardatur ne libere progrediatur in Deum. Est autem et quaedam alia perfectio caritatis, quae non est possibilis homini in hac vita, et quaedam ad quam nulla natura creata pertingere potest; ut ex supradictis apparet. I answer. It must be said that the answer to this problem can be seen from what has already been written. For, it was shown above, that a certain kind of perfection is that which follows from the very species of charity, viz., that which consists in removing any inclination toward the contrary of charity. But another perfection, without which charity can exist, is that which pertains to the well-being of charity, viz., that which consists in the taking away of the occupations of the world by which human affection is hindered from freely advancing to God. But there is another kind of perfection of charity which is not possible for man in this life; and another which no created nature can attain. This is clear from what is written above. Manifestum est autem, quod ad illud omnes teneri dicuntur, sine quo salutem consequi non possunt. Sine caritate autem nullus potest salutem aeternam consequi, et ea habita ad salutem aeternam pervenitur. Unde ad primam perfectionem caritatis omnes tenentur sicut ad ipsam caritatem. It is evident that all are said to be bound to that without which they cannot attain salvation. But without charity no one can attain eternal salvation, and when charity is possessed, eternal salvation is attained. Thus all are bound to the first perfection of charity as to charity itself. Ad secundam vero perfectionem, sine qua caritas esse potest, homines non tenentur, cum quaelibet caritas sufficiat ad salutem. Multo etiam minus tenentur ad tertiam vel quartam perfectionem, cum nullus ad impossibile teneatur. To the second kind of perfection, without which charity can exist, men are not bound, since any sort of charity is sufficient for salvation. And even less are they bound to the third or fourth perfections, since no one is bound to the impossible. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod totalitas illa, secundum quod cadit sub praecepto caritatis, pertinet ad perfectionem sine qua caritas esse non potest. To the first, it must be said that the wholeness of heart, considered as coming under the precept of charity, pertains to that perfection without which charity cannot exist. Ad secundum dicendum, quod omnia actu referre in Deum, non est possibile in hac vita, sicut non est possibile quod semper de Deo cogitetur; hoc enim pertinet ad perfectionem patriae. Sed quod omnia virtute referantur in Deum, hoc pertinet ad perfectionem caritatis ad quam omnes tenentur. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est, quod, sicut in causis efficientibus virtus primae causae manet in omnibus causis sequentibus, ita etiam intentio principalis finis virtute manet in omnibus finibus secundariis; unde quicumque actu intendit aliquem finem secundarium, virtute intendit finem principalem; sicut medicus, dum colligit herbas actu, intendit conficere potionem, nihil fortassis de sanitate cogitans, virtualiter tamen intendit sanitatem, propter quam potionem dat. Sic igitur, aliquis seipsum ordinat in Deum, sicut in finem, in omnibus quae propter seipsum facit manet virtute intentio ultimi finis, qui Deus est: unde in omnibus mereri potest, si caritatem habeat. Hoc igitur modo apostolus praecipit quod omnia in Dei gloriam referantur. To the second, it must be said that to order all things actually to God is not possible in this life; just as it is not possible to be always thinking of God, for this pertains to the perfection of heaven. But that all things be ordered to God by virtue does pertain to the perfection of charity, to which all are bound. To prove this, it must be understood that just as in efficient causes the power of the primary cause remains in all the subsequent causes, so also does the intention of the principal end virtually remain in all the secondary ends. Thus, whoever actually intends some secondary end, virtually intends the primary end. For example, a physician, while actually gathering herbs, intends the end of preparing a prescription, while perhaps not thinking about health; yirtually, however, he intends health as the end for which he administers the prescription. In the same way, he who orders himself to God as to an end, in all things which he does for his own sake, the intention of the final end which is God remains virtually. Thus he is able to gain merit in all things if he has charity. It is in this manner, therefore, that the Apostle wrote that everything should be ordered to the glory of God. Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliud est habitualiter referre in Deum, et aliud virtualiter. Habitualiter enim refert in Deum et qui nihil agit, nec aliquid actualiter intendit, ut dormiens; sed virtualiter aliquid referre in Deum, est agentis propter finem ordinantis in Deum. Unde habitualiter referre in Deum, non cadit sub praecepto; sed virtualiter referre omnia in Deum, cadit sub praecepto caritatis: cum hoc nihil aliud sit quam habere Deum ultimum finem. To the third, it must be said that it is one thing to order things to God habitually and another thing to do so virtually. For, habitually one orders to God who does nothing, nor does he actually intend anything, as sleeping. But to order something to God virtually is the act of an agent ordering to God because of the end. Therefore to order to God habitually does not come under a precept, but to do so virtually does come from a precept since this is nothing other than to have God as the ultimate end. Ad quartum dicendum, quod illud quod dicitur, estote perfecti etc., videtur esse referendum ad dilectionem inimicorum, quae quodammodo est de perfectione consilii, et quodammodo est de necessitate praecepti, ut supra, art. 8, expositum est. To the fourth, it must be said that the saying, Be ye perfect, etc., seems to have reference to the love of enemies which in one way is from the perfection of a counsel; in another way from the necessity of a precept, as has been shown above. Ad quintum dicendum, quod perfectio vitae aeternae in quibusdam quidem consistit principaliter et per se; in quibusdam autem secundario, et quasi per accidens. Principaliter quidem et per se consistit perfectio in his quae pertinent ad interiorem mentis dispositionem, et praecipue in actu caritatis, quae est radix omnium virtutum; secundario vero et per accidens consistit etiam in quibusdam exterioribus, ut puta in virginitate, paupertate, et huiusmodi. Haec enim ad perfectionem pertinere dicuntur tripliciter. Primo quidem, in quantum per ea subtrahuntur homini impedimenta occupationum, quibus remotis mens liberius fertur in Deum; unde et dominus cum dixisset, Matth. XIX, 21: si vis perfectus esse, vade, et vende omnia quae habes, et da pauperibus, consequenter adiecit: et veni, et sequere me; ut ostenderet, quod paupertas ad perfectionem non pertineret, nisi in quantum disponit ad sequendum Christum. Quem quidem sequimur non passibus corporis, sed affectibus mentis. Similiter apostolus, I ad Cor., VII, 34, consilium dat de non nubendo; quia quae virgo est, cogitat quae Dei sunt, quomodo placeat Deo; et eadem ratio est de aliis similibus. To the fifth, it must be said that the perfection of eternal life consists principally and essentially in certain things, but secondarily and accidentally it consists in others. Principally and essentially, this perfection consists in those things which pertain to an interior disposition of the mind, and especially in the act of charity which is the root of all the virtues. But secondarily and accidentally, this perfection also consists in certain external things, such as virginity, poverty, and other such things. These things are said to pertain to perfection in a threefold manner. They pertain to perfection, first, insofar as through them the hindrances of the manifold activities of ordinary life are taken away from man, and when they are removed, the mind is more freely directed to God. Thus the Lord, when He said (Matt. xix. 21), If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give it to the poor, He then added, and come follow me. He did this to show that poverty does not pertain to perfection unless it dispose one to follow Christ. For, we follow Him not with the movements of our body, but with the affections of the soul. In this way, the Apostle gave counsel about not marrying (1 Cor. vii. 34), for she who is a virgin thinkest on the things of the Lord, how to please Him. And this same reasoning concerns similar cases. Secundo pertinent ad perfectionem, in quantum sunt quidam perfectae caritatis effectus qui enim perfecte diligit Deum, ab his se retrahit quae eum retrahere possunt ne Deo vacet. Secondly, they pertain to perfection insofar as they are the effects of perfect charity; for he who loves God perfectly removes himself from those things which can prevent him from devoting himself to God. Tertio pertinent ad perfectionem poenitentiae; quia nulla satisfactio pro peccatis adaequari potest votis religionis, quibus homo se Deo consecrat, et animam per votum obedientiae, et corpus per votum continentiae, et res omnes per votum paupertatis. Sic igitur in his quae principaliter et per se ad perfectionem pertinent, sequitur quod sit maior perfectio ubi haec inveniuntur magis, sicut quod perfectior est qui maioris est caritatis. In his autem quae ex consequenti et quasi per accidens, ad perfectionem pertinent, non sequitur magis simpliciter ubi magis inveniuntur. Unde non sequitur quod magis pauper sit magis perfectus; sed mensuranda est in talibus perfectio per comparationem ad illa in quibus consistit perfectio simpliciter; ut scilicet ille dicatur perfectior, cuius paupertas magis sequestrat hominem a terrenis occupationibus, et facit liberius Deo vacare. Thirdly, they pertain to the perfection of penance, for no satisfaction for sin can be equal to religious vows by which man consecrates himself to God; his soul through the vow of obedience, his body through the vow of chastity, and all other things through the vow of poverty. Therefore, in regard to those things which primarily and essentially pertain to perfection, it follows that there will be a greater perfection where those things are found in more abundance; just as he who has more charity is more perfect. But with regard to those things which pertain to perfection as a consequent or accidentally, it does not follow that perfection in itself is greater where they are found in greater abundance. Therefore it does not follow that he who is poorer is more perfect. However, perfection in such matters ought to be measured by a comparison to those things in which perfection essentially consists. For example, he is said to be more perfect whose poverty separates him the more from earthly occupations and makes him freer in devoting himself to God. Ad sextum dicendum, quod haec est differentia inter amicitiam honesti et delectabilis: quia in amicitia delectabilis, amicus diligitur propter delectationem; in amicitia autem honesti amicus diligitur propter seipsum, sed delectatio provenit ex consequenti. Ad perfectionem igitur amicitiae honesti pertinet ut aliquis propter amicum interdum abstineat etiam a delectatione quam in eius praesentia habet, in eius servitiis occupatus. Secundum igitur hanc amicitiam plus amat aliquem qui ab eo se absentat propter amicum, quam qui a praesentia amici discedere non vult etiam propter amicum. Sed si quis libenter vel faciliter a praesentia amici divellitur et in aliis magis delectatur, vel nihil vel parum comprobatur amicum diligere. Hos igitur tres gradus considerare possumus in caritate. Deus autem maxime propter seipsum est diligendus. Sunt enim quidam qui libenter, vel sine magna molestia, separantur a vacatione divinae contemplationis, ut terrenis negotiis implicentur, et in his vel nihil vel modicum caritatis apparet. Quidam verum in tantum delectantur in vacatione divinae contemplationis, quod eam deserere nolunt, etiam ut divinis obsequiis mancipentur ad salutem proximorum. Quidam vero ad tantum culmen caritatis ascendunt, quod etiam divinam contemplationem, licet in ea maxime delectentur, praetermittunt, ut Deo serviant in salutem proximorum; et haec perfectio in Paulo apparet, qui dicebat Rom., IX, 3: optabam ego ipse anathema, id est separatus, esse a Christo pro fratribus meis;- et ad Philipp., I, 23-24: desiderium habens dissolvi, et esse cum Christo; permanere autem in carne necessarium propter vos. Et haec perfectio est proprie praelatorum, et praedicatorum, et quorumcumque aliorum, qui procurandae saluti aliorum insistunt; unde significantur per Angelos in scala Iacob ascendentes quidem per contemplationem, descendentes vero per sollicitudinem quam de salute proximorum gerunt. Nec derogare potest perfectioni status praelatorum, quod aliqui statu praelatorum abutuntur quaerentes praelationem propter temporalia bona, quasi dulcedine contemplationis non allecti; sicut nec incredulitas multorum, fidem Dei evacuat, ut dicitur Rom., III. To the sixth, it must be said that there is a difference between a friendship for a noble person and a friendship for a pleasant person, because in a friendship for a pleasant person, the friend is loved for the sake of pleasure; but in a friendship for a noble person, the friend is loved for his own sake, although pleasure is a result of this. Therefore it is proper to the perfection of a friendship for a noble person that one who is occupied in serving a friend should sometimes even abstain from a pleasure which he experiences in the friend's presence for the sake of that friend. So, according to this friendship, he who would absent himself from a friend for the friend's sake would love him more than he who would not wish to depart from the presence of that friend even for that friend's sake. But if anyone be willingly and easily deprived of the friend's presence and be more pleased with other things, this proves that he loves the friend either not at all, or only a little. We can, therefore, consider these three grades in charity, but God ought to be most especially loved for His own sake. For, there are some who freely, or without great vexation, are separated from the leisure of divine contemplation so that they are concerned with earthly affairs, and in these there is apparent either no charity, or very little. Some, however, so delight in the leisure of divine contemplation that they do not want to turn away from it even to apply their service to God to the salvation of their fellowmen. The highest degree, the third, are those who rise to the heights of charity so that even as they advance in divine contemplation, although they are very much delighted in it, serve God in order to save their fellowmen. This is the perfection meant by St. Paul (Rom. ix. 3), For I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ, i.e., separated from Him, for my brethren; and (Philip. i. 23-24), I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ,... But to abide still in the flesh, is needful for you. This is the perfection proper to prelates, preachers, and all the other religious whose life is dedicated to looking after the salvation of others. This is what is meant by the angels on the ladder, in Jacob's dream, ascending through contemplation, but descending through the responsibility which they bear over the salvation of their neighbor (Gen. xxviii. 11-12). The status of church dignitaries, however, cannot become less perfect because of some who misuse this state and seek that position for the sake of temporal goods, as if not attracted to the delightfulness of contemplation; just as the disbelief of many does not destroy faith in God, as is said (Rom. iii. 27). Ad septimum dicendum, quod in doctrina evangelica quaedam dicta sunt apostolis in persona omnium fidelium, ea scilicet quae pertinent ad necessitatem salutis; unde et Marc., XIII, 37, dicit: quod vobis dico, omnibus dico: vigilate; nam in vigilantia ibi intelligitur sollicitudo quam homo debet habere, ne imparatus inveniatur a Christo. Quaedam vero dicuntur apostolis quae pertinent ad perfectionem vitae, et ad praelati officium; et ad hoc extendi non potest, quod vobis dico, omnibus dico. Sciendum tamen, quod illa quae dixit dominus discipulis Luc., IX, 3: nihil in via tuleritis etc., secundum quod Augustinus exponit in Lib. de Consen. Evangelist., non pertinent ad perfectionem vitae, sed ad potestatem dignitatis apostolicae, per quam poterant, nihil secum ferentes, vivere de his quae ministrabantur ab his quibus Evangelium praedicabant: unde ibidem dicitur, quod dignus est operarius mercede sua, vel cibo suo, unde nec praeceptum fuit, nec consilium, sed concessio. Et propter hoc Paulus, qui secum necessaria deferebat, non utens hac concessione, supererogabat, quasi propriis stipendiis militans, ut patet I ad Cor., IX 7. To the seventh, it must be said that in the teaching of the Gospels, certain things are said to the Apostles in the person of all the faithful, viz., those things which pertain to the necessity of salvation. Thus, it is written (Mark xiii. 37), What I say to you, I say to all: watch. By watch is meant that solicitude which man ought to have so that he will not be found unprepared by Christ. But other things are said to the Apostles which concern the perfection of this life and the duties of prelates, and these cannot be included in, What I say to you, I say to all. However, it should be understood that what the Lord said to His disciples (Luke ix. 3), Take nothing for your journey, etc., as Augustine has explained in the De Consen. Evangelist., does not pertain to the perfection of life but to the power of apostolic dignity, through which the Apostles, while carrying nothing with them, were able to live on that which was provided for them by those to whom they preached the Gospel. Thus it was written in the same place (Luke x. 7), The labourer is worthy of his hire, i.e., of his food; but this was neither a precept nor a counsel, but a concession. Because of this, St. Paul who carried his necessities about with him, not using this concession, paid over and above, as if striving against his own wages. This is clear from 1 Cor. ix. 7. Ad octavum dicendum, quod in homine sunt duo affectus; unus caritatis, quo anima desiderat esse cum Christo; alius autem naturalis, quo anima refugit separationem a corpore, qui adeo est homini naturalis, quod nec etiam Petro senectus abstulit, ut Augustinus dicit super Ioan. Ex coniunctione ergo horum duorum affectuum vellet anima sic coniungi Deo, quod non separaretur a corpore; secundum illud apostoli, II ad Corinth., V, 4: nolumus expoliari, sed supervestiri; ut absorbeatur quod mortale est a vita. Sed quia hoc est impossibile (quamdiu enim sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a domino); insurgit quaedam contrarietas inter praedictos affectus, et quanto caritas est perfectior, tanto sensibilius affectus caritatis vincit affectum naturae; et hoc ad perfectionem caritatis pertinet. Unde et apostolus ibidem subdit: audemus autem, et bonam voluntatem habemus, magis peregrinari a corpore; et praesentes esse ad dominum. Sed in his in quibus est caritas imperfecta, si tantum affectus caritatis vincat, ex repugnantia tamen naturalis affectus redditur insensibilis victoria caritatis. Quod ergo aperte et indubitanter, sive audacter, apostolus dicit: cupio dissolvi, et esse cum Christo, hoc perfectae caritatis est; sed quod qualitercumque, licet insensibiliter, praeferat anima fruitionem Dei unioni corporis, est de necessitate caritatis. To the eighth, it must be said that there are two affections in man; the one of charity by which the soul desires to be with Christ; the other, however, a natural affection by which the soul resists the separation from the body—which is natural to man; for not even was the old man taken away from Peter, as Augustine says in Super Joan. 2. Thus, by uniting these two affections, the soul wishes to be united in such a way to God so that it would not be separated from the body. For this reason, the Apostle wrote (1I Cor. v. 4), We would not be unclothed, but clothed upon, that that which is mortal may be swallowed up by life. But since this is impossible, While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord (2 Cor. v. 6), opposition arises among these mentioned affections, and the more perfect charity is, the more does the affection of charity sensibly overcome the affection of nature. This pertains to the perfection of charity. Whence the Apostle adds (1I Cor. v. 8), But we are confident, and have a good will to be absent rather from the body, and to be present with the Lord. But in those in whom charity is imperfect, if only the affection of charity conquers, then from the repugnance of the natural affection, the victory of charity is rendered imperceptible. Therefore the Apostle clearly, unhesitatingly, and even boldly said, I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ (Philip. i. 23); this is perfect charity. It is from the necessity of charity that the soul prefers in any way, even imperceptibly, the enjoyment of God to the union with the body. Ad nonum dicendum, quod ponere animam, id est, vitam praesentem, pro fratribus quodammodo est de necessitate caritatis, et quodammodo est de perfectione ipsius. Plus enim homo debet diligere proximum quam corpus proprium; unde in eo casu quo aliquis tenetur procurare proximi salutem, tenetur etiam pro ipsius salute periculis corporalem vitam exponere. Sed hoc perfectae caritatis est ut etiam pro his in quibus proximo non tenetur, pro eo corporalem suam vitam periculis quis exponat. To the ninth, it must be said that to give up your life, i.e., this present life for your brother is, in one way, from the necessity of charity, and in another way from the perfection of it. For, man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body. Therefore, in the case where one is bound to look after the salvation of his neighbor, he is also bound to expose his bodily life to dangers for the sake of that salvation. But this is perfect charity, that he also expose his bodily life to dangers for those to whom he is not bound as to a neighbor. Ad decimum dicendum, quod licet quilibet teneatur esse sine peccato mortali, non tamen omnium est huiusmodi rei securitatem habere; sed perfectorum, qui peccata totaliter subiugaverunt. To the tenth, it must be said that, although every one is bound to live without mortal sin, it is not for every one to have complete assurance in this matter; but only for the perfect who have completely overcome sin. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod et parentibus, et multo magis Deo, tenetur homo rependere totum quod potest; tamen secundum communem modum humanae vitae, supra quem potest aliquis aliquid erogare, ad quod tamen ex necessitate praecepti non tenetur. To the eleventh, it must be said that man is bound to return to parents, and even more to God, all that he can. But according to the common mode of human life, no one is bound from the necessity of a precept to give more than he is able. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod perfectionem caritatis nullus profitetur; sed profitentur aliqui statum perfectionis, qui consistit in his quae organice ordinantur ad perfectionem caritatis, ut paupertas et ieiunia; qui tamen nec ad omnia huiusmodi tenentur, sed ad illa solum quae profitentur. Unde perfectio caritatis non cadit eis sub voto, sed est eis ut finis, ad quem pervenire conantur per ea quae vovent. To the twelfth, it must be said that no one promises perfect charity, but some promise a state of perfection which consists in those things which are ordered as means to the perfection of charity, such as poverty or fastings. They are not bound to all things of this kind, but only to those which they promise. Thus, the perfection of charity does not accrue to them by their vows, but it is as an end to which they attempt to arrive by means of what they vow.
Duodecimo quaeritur utrum caritas semel habita possit amitti
Whether Charity, Once Possessed, Can Be Lost?
Et videtur quod non. It seems that charity, once possessed, cannot be lost. Dicitur enim I Ioan., III, 9: omnis qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit, quoniam semen ipsius in eo manet; et non potest peccare, quoniam ex Deo natus est. Sed caritatem non habent nisi filii Dei; ipsa enim est quae distinguit inter filios regni et filios perditionis, ut Augustinus dicit in XV de Trinit. Ergo ille qui habet caritatem, non potest eam amittere peccando. 1. It is said (1 John iii. 9), Whosoever is born of God, committeth not sin: for his seed abideth in him, and he can not sin, because he is born of God. But only the sons of God have charity, for this distinguishes the children of God's kingdom from the children of perdition, as Augustine says in Book XV of the De Trinit. Therefore he who has charity cannot lose it by sinning. Praeterea, omnis virtus quae peccando amittitur, per peccatum arescit, ut Augustinus dicit: unctio invisibilis caritas est, quae in quocumque fuerit, radix illi erit, quae arescere non potest, et nutritur calore solis, ut non arescat. Ergo caritas per peccatum amitti non potest. 2. Moreover, every virtue that is lost by sinning withers away through sin, as Augustine says, Charity is an invisible unction which will be the foundation wherever it is and which cannot wither away; it is nourished by the heat of the sun so that it does not dry up.3 Therefore charity cannot be lost through sin. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in VIII de Trin., quod dilectio si non est vera, dilectio dicenda non est. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit in epistola ad Iulianum comitem, caritas quae deleri potest, nunquam vera fuit. Ergo neque caritas fuit. Qui igitur habet caritatem, non potest eam peccando deserere. 3. Moreover, Augustine says in Book VIII of the De Trin. that if love is not true it ought not to be called love. But, as he also says in Ad Julianum Comitem, charity which is able to be lost was never true. Thus it was not charity. Therefore he who has charity cannot lose it by sinning. Praeterea, prosper dicit in Lib. de contemplatione: caritas est recta voluntas Deo inseparabiliter iuncta, inquinationis extranea, corruptionis nescia, nulli vitio mutabilitatis obnoxia; cum qua nec potuit aliquis peccare, nec poterit. Ergo caritas semel habita, per peccatum amitti non potest. 4. Morever, Prosper says in the De Contemplatione: Charity is a right will inseparably united to God, free from any defilement, not knowing corruption, not liable to the fault of change; for when it is possessed, one neither was able, nor will he be able to sin. Therefore charity, once possessed, cannot be lost through sin. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit in quadam Hom., quod amor Dei magna operatur, si est. Sed nullus magna operando amittit caritatem. Ergo si caritas inest, amitti non potest. 5. Moreover, Gregory says in one of his Homilies, that the love of God does great works, if it is present. But no one loses charity by doing great works. Therefore if charity is in us, it cannot be lost. Praeterea, plus homo per caritatem amat Deum quam per naturalem amorem amet seipsum. Sed amor sui ipsius nunquam amittitur per peccatum. Ergo nec etiam caritas. 6. Moreover, man loves God more by charity than he loves himself by a natural love. But the love of self is never lost through sin; therefore neither is charity. Praeterea, liberum arbitrium non inclinatur in peccatum nisi per aliquod motivum ad peccandum. Motivum autem ad omnia peccata est amor sui, qui, ut Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civit. Dei, facit civitatem Babylonis. Sed hunc caritas excludit; quia, sicut Dionysius dicit: est extasim faciens divinus amor, non sinens sui ipsorum amantes esse. Similiter etiam radix omnium malorum ponitur cupiditas, ut apostolus dicit I ad Timoth., cap. VI. Sed hunc etiam caritas excludit, ut Augustinus dicit in l. LXXXIII quaestionum. Ergo ille qui habet caritatem, non potest peccando eam amittere. 7. Moreover, free will does not incline toward sin unless it be through something that moves to sinning. But that which moves to every sin is self-love, which, as Augustine says in Book XIV of the De Civit. Dei, caused the city of Babylon. But charity does not allow this, as Dionysius says, Divine love causes rapture, not allowing men to be' lovers of self. Likewise, the desire of money is the root of all evils, as St. Paul says (1 Tim. vi. 10). But neither does charity allow this, as Augustine says in the LXXXIII Quaestionum. Therefore he who has charity cannot lose it by sinning. Praeterea, quicumque habet caritatem, spiritu Dei ducitur, secundum illud Galat. V, v. 18: si spiritu ducimini, non estis sub lege. Sed spiritus sanctus, cum sit infinitae virtutis, non potest in sua actione deficere. Ergo videtur quod homo habens caritatem peccare non possit. 8. Moreover, whoever has charity is directed by the spirit of God, according to this, If you are led by the spirit, you are not under the law (Galat. v. 18). But the Holy Spirit, since He is of infinite power, cannot fail in His action. Therefore it seems that one having charity cannot sin. Praeterea, contra nullum habitum cuius esse est in operari, contingit peccare; dicit enim philosophus in VII Ethic., quod non peccatur contra scientiam in actu, sed contra scientiam in habitu. Sed caritas semper consistit in operari: dicit enim Gregorius in quadam Homil., quod amor Dei nunquam est otiosus. Ergo contra caritatem aliquis peccare non potest, ut sic per peccatum possit amitti. 9. Moreover, no one sins against a habit that is in operation, for the Philosopher says in Book VII of the Ethics, one does not sin against science in its actual state, but only against science in its habitual state. But charity is always in operation, for Gregory says in one of his Homilies, the love of God is never idle. Therefore one cannot sin against charity so that it can in this way be lost by sin. Praeterea, si aliquis caritatem amittit, aut amittit eam dum habet, aut dum non habet. Sed dum habet, non amittit eam per peccatum, quia simul esset peccatum cum caritate. Neque etiam amittit eam cum non habet, quia quod non habet, amitti non potest. Ergo caritas nullo modo potest amitti. 10. Moreover, if anyone loses charity, he loses it either while he is possessing it or while he is not possessing it. But while he has it, he does not lose it through sin, because sin would then exist along with charity. Nor does he lose it when he does not have it, because he cannot lose what he does not have. Therefore in no way can charity be lost. Praeterea, caritas accidens est quoddam in anima. Accidens autem quatuor modis potest deficere. Uno quidem modo per corruptionem subiecti; sed per hunc modum caritas deficere non potest; cum anima humana, quae est subiectum eius, sit incorruptibilis. Secundo deficit aliquod accidens per defectum causae, sicut lumen deficit ab aere per absentiam solis; sed hoc modo caritas deficere non potest, quia causa eius est indeficiens, scilicet Deus. Tertio modo deficit accidens aliquod deficiente obiecto; sicut paternitas deficit per mortem filii: sed nec hoc modo deficit caritas, quia eius obiectum est bonum aeternum, quod est Deus. Quarto modo deficit aliquod accidens per actionem contrarii agentis, sicut frigiditas aquae deficit per actionem caloris: sed nec hoc modo caritas deficere potest, cum sit fortior peccato, quod videtur in contrarium agere: secundum illud Cantic., VIII, 6: fortis est ut mors dilectio; et iterum: aquae multae non possunt extinguere caritatem. Ergo caritas nullo modo potest deficere in habente eam. 11. Moreover, charity is a sort of accident in the soul. But accidents can fail in four ways. The first way is through the corruption of the subject. But charity is not deficient in this way because the human soul, which is its subject, is incorruptible. An accident fails in the second way through a defect of cause, as light fails in the air through an absence of the sun. But charity cannot fail in this way because its cause, which is God, is unfailing. An accident fails in a third way by a deficiency of its object, as paternity ceases through the death of a child. But neither is charity deficient in this way, because its object is the eternal good, which is God. In the fourth way, an accident fails through the action of its contrary agent, as the cold quality of water fails through the action of heat. But charity does not fail in this way because it is stronger than sin which is the agent acting against it, according to this (Cantic. viii. 6), Love is strong as death; and (Cant. viii. 7), Many waters cannot quench charity. Therefore charity can in no way fail in one who possesses it. Praeterea, peccatum est malum quoddam rationalis naturae. Sed malum non agit nisi virtute boni, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Divin. Nomin.- Bonum autem non contrariatur bono, ut dicitur in praedicamentis; et ita non potest ipsum corrumpere, cum unumquodque corrumpatur a suo contrario. Caritas ergo per peccatum non potest corrumpi. 12. Moreover, for rational nature, sin is in the class of evil. But evil does not act except in virtue of the good, as Dionysius says in chap. IV of the De Divinis Nominibus: But one good is not contrary to another, as is said in the Praedicamentis; and thus one good cannot destroy another, because each thing is destroyed by its contrary. Therefore charity cannot be destroyed by sin. Praeterea, si caritas a peccato corrumpitur; aut a peccato existente, aut a non existente. Sed non a peccato existente; quia sic peccatum mortale simul esset cum caritate. Neque iterum a peccato non existente; quia non ens agere non potest. Ergo caritas nullo modo potest amitti per peccatum. 13. Moreover, if charity is destroyed by sin, it is destroyed either by existing sin or by non-existing sin. But it cannot be destroyed by existing sin, for then mortal sin would be existing along with charity. Again, it cannot be destroyed by non-existing sin, because non-being cannot act. Therefore charity cannot be lost by sin in any way. Praeterea, si caritas per peccatum amittitur; aut caritas et peccatum sunt in eodem instanti in anima, aut in alio. Sed non in eodem, quia tunc simul essent: neque iterum in alio et alio, quia oporteret quod esset tempus medium in quo homo neque peccatum neque caritatem haberet, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo potest caritas per peccatum amitti. 14. Moreover, if charity is lost by sin, charity and sin exist in the soul either at the same moment or at different moments. They cannot exist at the same moment, because then they would exist together. Nor can charity exist at one instant, and sin at another; because it would then be necessary that there be a medium time during which man has neither charity nor sin, which cannot happen. Therefore charity cannot be lost through sin. Praeterea, Magister dicit, 31 dist. III Lib. Sentent., quod perfecta caritas per peccatum amitti non potest. 15. Moreover, the Master says in Book III of the Sententences, d. 31, perfect charity cannot be lost through sin. Praeterea, sicut se habet intellectus ad cognitionem veri, ita et voluntas ad amorem boni. Sed intellectus cognoscendo quodcumque verum, cognoscit primam veritatem. Ergo amando quodcumque bonum, amat summam bonitatem. Sed nunquam peccat qui amat, nisi convertendo se per amorem ad bonum commutabile. Ergo in omni peccato homo amat summam bonitatem, cuius amor est caritas. Numquam igitur caritas per peccatum amitti potest. 16. Moreover, just as the intellect is related to the knowledge of the truth, so is the will related to the love of the good. But the intellect, by knowing anything whatever, knows the first truth. Therefore by loving anything good, the will loves the greatest good. But he who loves never sins unless he turn himself by his love to a mutable good. Therefore in every sin man loves the highest good, the love of which is charity. Therefore charity can never be lost by sin. Praeterea, sicut in genere causae efficientis est agens universale et proprium, ita et in genere causae finalis. Sed agens proprium semper agit in virtute universalis agentis. Ergo finis proprius semper movet voluntatem in virtute finis ultimi. Sed finis ultimus est Deus; et sic idem quod prius. 17. Moreover, just as there is a universal and a proper agent in the genus of efficient cause, so also is there in the genus of final cause. But the proper agent always acts in virtue of the universal agent. Therefore the proper end always moves the will in virtue of the final end. But the final end is God. Thus the same argument as above follows. Praeterea, caritas est signum quod aliquis sit verus Christi discipulus, secundum illud Ioan., XIII, 35: in hoc cognoscent omnes quia mei estis discipuli, si dilectionem habueritis ad invicem. Sed non est Christi verus discipulus qui non semper est eius discipulus unde Augustinus exponens illud Ioan., VI: multi ex discipulis eius abierunt retrorsum, dicit, quod illi non fuerunt Christi veri discipuli; et dominus dicit, Ioan. VIII, 31: si manseritis in sermone meo, veri discipuli mei eritis. Ergo ille qui non permanet in caritate nunquam habuit caritatem. 18. Moreover, charity is a sign that someone is a true disciple of Christ, according to this (John xiii. 35), By this shall all men know that you are my disciples, if you have love one for another. But he is not a true disciple of Christ who is not always His disciple, as Augustine says. In explaining this text (John vi. 67), After this many of His disciples turned back, Augustine says that they were not true disciples of Christ; and the Lord said (John viii. 31), If you abide in my word, you shall be my disciples indeed. Therefore he who does not remain in charity never had charity. Praeterea, omnis motus est secundum exigentiam praedominantis. Sed caritas praedominatur in corde caritatem habentis, quia totum cor sibi occupat, secundum illud quod mandatur Deuter. VI, 5: diliges dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo. Ergo motus omnis habentis caritatem est secundum caritatem; non ergo per peccatum amitti potest. 19. Moreover, every motion follows the direction of that which rules it. But charity is the ruler of the heart of the one who has charity, for it seizes the entire heart for itself, as is commanded (Deut. vi. 5), Love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart. Therefore the movement of the one who has charity follows according to charity; thus charity cannot be lost through sin. Praeterea, differentiae diversificantes genus vel speciem non possunt convenire eidem secundum numerum. Sed corruptibile et incorruptibile diversificant genus, ut dicitur in X Metaph. Cum igitur caritas viae et patriae sit eadem numero, videtur quod sicut caritas patriae corrumpi non potest, ita nec caritas viae. 20. Moreover, differences diversifying genus and species cannot exist together as the same in number. But corruptible and incorruptible are of different genera, as is said in Book X of the Metaphysics. Therefore, since the charity of this life and the charity of heaven are the same in number, it seems that just as the charity of heaven cannot be destroyed, neither can the charity of this life. Praeterea, si caritas corrumpitur: aut corrumpitur in aliquid, aut in nihil. Sed non in aliquid; quia hoc est solum formarum quae educuntur de potentia materiae. In nihil autem corrumpi non potest: quia Deus nunquam caritatem corrumpit, qui solus potest ex aliquo facere nihil, sicut ipse solus potest facere ex nihilo aliquid: aequalis enim est utraque distantia. Ergo videtur quod caritas corrumpi non possit. 21. Moreover, if charity is destroyed, it is destroyed either in something or in nothing. But it is not destroyed in something, because this concerns only form which is educed from the potency of matter. It cannot be destroyed in nothing, because God Who alone is able to make nothing out of something, just as He alone is able to make something out of nothing, never destroys charity. Both are equally far apart. Therefore it seems that charity cannot be lost. Praeterea, illud per quod peccatum tollitur, a peccato corrumpi non potest. Sed peccatum tollitur per caritatem, secundum illud I Pet., IV, 8: caritas operit multitudinem peccatorum. Ergo caritas per peccatum amitti non potest. 22. Moreover, that by which sin is taken away cannot be destroyed by sin. But sin is taken away by charity, according to this (1 Peter iv. 8), Charity covereth a multitude of sins. Therefore charity cannot be lost through sin. Praeterea, super illud Ps. XXVI, 2: Deum appropiant super me nocentes, ut edant carnes meas dicit Glossa Augustini: si aufertur donum, dator vincitur. Sed Deus, qui est dator caritatis, vinci non potest. Ergo caritas non potest auferri per peccatum. 23. Moreover, commenting on this text (Psalms xxvi. 2), While the wicked draw near against me to eat my flesh, Augustine says in a marginal gloss, If a gift be taken away, the giver is restrained. But God Who is the giver of charity cannot be restrained. Therefore charity cannot be taken away by sin. Praeterea, per caritatem anima unitur Deo ut sponsa, secundum quoddam spirituale matrimonium. Sed matrimonium carnale non potest separari per dissensum supervenientem matrimonio. Ergo caritas non potest tolli per peccatum quo mens dissentit ab iis quae sunt Dei. 24. Moreover, the soul, through charity, is united to God; just as a spouse, according to a kind of spiritual marriage. But a bodily marriage cannot be dissolved by any disagreement that overshadows the marriage. Therefore charity cannot be taken away by sin, in which the soul disagrees with those things which pertain to God. Sed contra. On the contrary, Est quod dicitur Apoc. II, v. 4: habeo adversus te pauca, quod caritatem tuam primam reliquisti. (1) it is said (Apoc. ii. 4), But I have somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first charity. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit in homilia: in quorumdam corda venit Deus, et mansionem non facit; quia per compunctionem respectum Dei percipiunt, sed tentationis tempore sic ad perpetranda peccata redeunt, ac si haec minime planxissent. Sed Deus non venit in corda fidelium nisi per caritatem. Ergo aliquis post habitam caritatem potest eam amittere per sequens peccatum. (2) Moreover, Gregory says in a Homily, God comes into the hearts of some, but he does not dwell there; for they regard God out of remorse, but in time of temptation they return to committing sins, as if they lamented these sins very little. But God does not come into the hearts of the faithful except through charity. Therefore one is able to lose charity after it is possessed by pursuing sin. Praeterea, I Reg., XVI, dicitur de David, quod dominus erat cum eo. Sed postmodum peccavit, faciendo adulterium et homicidium. Deus autem est in homine per caritatem. Ergo post habitam caritatem aliquis potest eam amittere peccando mortaliter. (3) Moreover, it is said of David that the Lord was with him (1 Kings xvi. 13). But shortly after, he sinned by committing adultery and murder. However, God is in man through charity. Therefore after charity is once possessed, one can lose it by sinning mortally. Praeterea, caritas est vita animae, secundum illud I Ioan. III, 14: nos scimus quoniam translati sumus de morte ad vitam, quoniam diligimus fratres. Sed vita naturalis potest amitti per mortem naturalem. Ergo et vita caritatis per mortem peccati mortalis. (4) Moreover, charity is the life of the soul, according to this (1 John iii. 14), We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. But natural life can be lost through natural death. Therefore the life of charity can also be lost through the death of mortal sin. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod Magister in 17 dist., I Lib., posuit, quod caritas in nobis sit spiritus sanctus. Non autem fuit sua intentio dicere, quod ipse actus dilectionis nostrae sit spiritus sanctus; sed quod spiritus sanctus movet animam nostram ad diligendum Deum et proximum, sicut etiam ad actus aliarum virtutum: sed ad actus aliarum virtutum movet animam per quosdam habitus virtutum infusarum; ad actum autem dilectionis Dei et proximi movet absque alio habitu mediante. Unde eius opinio vera fuit quidem quantum ad hoc quod posuit animam moveri a spiritu sancto ad diligendum Deum et proximum; sed imperfecta fuit quantum ad hoc, quia non posuit in nobis habitum, quid creatum, quo perficeretur voluntas humana ad huiusmodi dilectionis actum. Oportet enim huiusmodi habitum in anima poni, ut supra, art. 1 huius quaest., habitum est. I answer. It must be said that the Master wrote in Book I, dist. 17,24 that the charity in us is the Holy Spirit. But his intention was not to say that the very act of our love is the Holy Spirit, but rather that the Holy Spirit moves our soul to love God and neighbor; just as He moves our soul to the acts of the other virtues. But to the act of the other virtues, He moves the soul through certain habits of infused virtues, whereas to the act of love for God and neighbor He moves the soul without any habitual medium. Therefore, Peter's opinion was indeed true insofar as he maintained that the soul is moved by the Holy Spirit to love God and neighbor. However, it was imperfect in this respect that he did not posit in us a certain created habit by which the human will is perfected to the act of this kind of love. For, it is necessary that a habit of this kind be found in the soul, as was said above in Article I of this Question. Potest igitur quadruplex consideratio de caritate haberi. Prima quidem ex parte spiritus sancti moventis animam ad dilectionem Dei et proximi; et quantum ad hoc, necesse est dicere, quod motio spiritus sancti semper est efficax secundum suam intentionem. Operatur enim in anima spiritus sanctus dividens singulis prout vult, ut dicitur I Cor., XII; et ideo quibus spiritus sanctus pro suo arbitrio vult dare perseverantem divinae dilectionis motum, in his peccatum caritatem excludens esse non potest. Dico non posse ex parte virtutis motivae, quamvis possit ex parte vertibilitatis liberi arbitrii. Ista enim sunt beneficia Dei, quibus certissime liberantur, quicumque liberantur, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de Praedest. Sanctor. Quibusdam autem spiritus sanctus, pro suo arbitrio, dat quidem ut ad tempus moveantur motu dilectionis in Deum, non autem dat eis ut in hoc perseverent usque in finem, ut patet per Augustinum in Lib. de Corrept. et gratia. There is, therefore, a four-fold consideration of charity that can be made. First, charity is considered on the part of the Holy Spirit moving the soul to the love of God and neighbor. In this regard, it is necessary to say that the movement of the Holy Spirit is always efficacious according to its own intention. For, the Holy Spirit operates in the soul, dividing to everyone according as he will, as is written (1 Cor. xii. 11). Therefore those to whom the Holy Spirit freely wishes to give a persevering movement of divine love, in them sin cannot drive out charity. This cannot be, I say, on the part of the moving power, although it is possible on the part of the indetermination of free choice. For, these are the gifts of God by which those who are liberated are most certainly liberated, as Augustine says in De Praedestinatione Sanctorum. For though the Holy Spirit freely gives to some that at times they might be moved to love God, He does not give in such manner that they might persevere to the end in that love, as is clear from St. Augustine in De Correctione et Gratia. Secunda consideratio est de caritate secundum potestatem ipsius caritatis; et quantum ad hoc, nullus habens caritatem potest peccare, quantum est ex vi ipsius caritatis, sicut neque aliquis habens aliquam formam, ex vi illius formae potest operari contra formam illam; sicut calidum ex vi calidi non potest infrigidare, vel frigidum esse; potest tamen amittere calorem et infrigidari. Et secundum hoc loquitur Augustinus in Lib. de sermone domini in monte, exponens illud quod habetur Matth., VII, 18: non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere. Dicit enim, quod sicut potest fieri ut quod fuit nix, non sit, non autem ut nix sit calida; sic potest fieri ut qui malus fuit non sit malus, non tamen fieri potest ut malus bene faciat: et eadem ratio est de bono secundum quamcumque virtutem, quia nulla virtute aliquis male utitur. Secondly, charity is considered according to the power of that charity. In this respect, no one who possesses charity can sin, in the sense of committing a sin by virtue of that charity; just as no one possessing any form can act contrary to that form by virtue of the form. For example, that which is warm, although it can lose heat and become cold, cannot become cold or be cold by virtue of its warmth. It was in this way that Augustine spoke in De Sermone Domini in Monte, explaining this text (Matt. vii. 18), A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit. For, he said that it can happen that what was snow is not now snow, but it does not happen that snow is warm. Thus, he who was evil is not now evil, but it cannot be that an evil man acts rightly. And concerning the good, this same reasoning applies to all the virtues, for no one uses virtue for evil. Tertia consideratio est de caritate ex parte voluntatis, in quantum ei subiicitur ut materia formae. Ubi attendendum est, quod quando forma implet totam potentialitatem materiae, non potest remanere in materia potentia ad aliam formam; unde illam formam inamissibiliter habet, sicut patet de materia caelesti. Quaedam vero forma est quae non replet totam potentialitatem materiae, sed remanet potentia ad aliam formam; et tunc illa forma amissibiliter habetur ex parte materiae vel subiecti, sicut patet in formis elementarium corporum. Caritas autem implet potentialitatem sui subiecti, secundum quod suum subiectum reducit in actum dilectionis: et ideo in patria, ubi actu creatura rationalis diligit Deum ex toto corde suo, et nihil aliud diligit nisi actualiter referendo in Deum, caritas inamissibiliter habetur; in statu autem viae caritas non implet totam potentialitatem animae, quae non semper actualiter movetur in Deum, omnia in ipsum actuali intentione referens; et ideo caritas viae amissibiliter habetur, quantum est ex parte subiecti. Thirdly, there is a consideration of charity from the side of the will insofar as the will is subjected to charity, as matter is to form. It must be noted that when form completes the entire potentiality of matter, the potency cannot remain in matter as potency to another form. Whence, it possesses that form in a manner such that it cannot be lost, as is evident with celestial matter. But there is a certain form which does not complete the entire potentiality of matter, but it remains in potency to another form. Then that form is possessed in such a manner that it can be lost on the part of matter, Le., on the subject; as is evident with the forms of the bodily elements. But charity completes the potentiality of its subject according as it reduces its subject to the act of love. Therefore in heaven, where the rational creature loves God in act with his whole heart, and loves nothing else except by referring it perfectly to God, charity is possessed in such a way that it is not lost. But in this present state of life, charity does not perfect all of the potentialities of the soul, and is not always perfectly directed to God because it must refer everything to Him by an actual intention. Therefore the charity of this life can be lost, considered on the part of the subject. Quarta consideratio est de caritate ex parte subiecti, prout comparatur specialiter ad ipsam caritatem sicut potentia ad habitum. Ubi considerandum est, quod habitus virtutis inclinat hominem ad recte agendum, secundum quod per ipsam homo habet rectam aestimationem de fine; quia, ut dicitur in III Ethic., qualis unusquisque est, talis et finis videtur ei. Sicut enim gustus iudicat de sapore, secundum quod est affectus aliqua bona vel mala dispositione, ita id quod est conveniens homini secundum habitualem dispositionem sibi inhaerentem, bonam vel malam, aestimatur ab eo ut bonum; quod autem ab hoc discordat, aestimatur ut malum et repugnans; unde et apostolus dicit, I ad Cor., cap. II, 14, quod animalis homo non percipit ea quae sunt spiritus Dei. Contingit tamen quandoque, quod id quod videtur alicui secundum inclinationem habitus, non videatur ei secundum aliquid aliud; sicut luxurioso secundum inclinationem proprii habitus videtur bonum delectatio carnis, sed secundum rationis deliberationem, vel auctoritatem Scripturae, videtur ei contrarium; et ideo habens habitum luxuriae, ex hac aestimatione contra habitum quandoque agit, et similiter habens habitum virtutis quandoque agit contra inclinationem proprii habitus; quia aliquid ei aliter videtur secundum aliquem alium modum, puta per passionem, vel aliquam seductionem. Tunc ergo contra habitum caritatis nullus agere poterit, quia nullus potest habere aliam aestimationem de fine et obiecto caritatis quam secundum inclinationem caritatis; hoc autem erit in patria, ubi ipsa Dei essentia videbitur, quae est ipsa essentia bonitatis. Unde sicut nunc nullus potest aliquid velle nisi sub communi ratione boni, nec bonum sub ratione boni potest non amari, ita et tunc hoc bonum, quod est Deus, nullus poterit non amare. Et propter hoc, nullus videns Deum per essentiam, potest contra caritatem agere. Et inde est quod caritas patriae est inamissibilis. The fourth consideration of charity is on the part of the subject according as it is compared in a special way to charity itself, as potency is compared to habit. It must be considered that the habit of virtue indines man to act rightly according as through it man has the right estimation of the end. For, as is said in Book III of the Ethics, according as a man is, such does the end seem to him. For example, just as taste judges flavor insofar as it is the affection for some good or bad disposition, so also that which is suitable to man according to a habitual disposition, inhering in him either as good or evil, is judged by him as a good; and what is not in accord with this is considered as evil and repugnant. Whence the Apostle says (1 Cor. ii. 14), The sensual man perceiveth not these things that are of the spirit of God. But it sometimes happens that that which seems to one to be according to the inclination of habit does not seem to him to be according to something else. For example, to one who has carnal delight, the delight of the flesh seems to be a good according to the inclination of his proper habit; but it seems to be contrary to the good according to the deliberation of reason or the text of Scripture. And because of this estimation, one who has the habit of carnal delight sometimes acts contrary to that habit. Likewise, one who has the habit of virtue sometimes acts contrary to the inclination of his proper habit; for a thing seems to him to be otherwise, according to some other mode, such as through passion or anything that entices him from the correct estimation. Therefore, no one will be able to act contrary to the habit of charity, because no one is able to have any judgment about the end and the object of charity other than that which he has according to the inclination of charity. This, however, will be in heaven where the very essence of God, which is the essence of goodness, will be seen. Thus, just as now no one can wish anything unless it be under the aspect of good, nor is any one able not to love the good as good; so also in the next life, no one will be able not to love this good, which is God. Because of this, no one who sees God in His essence can act against charity; and that is why the charity of heaven cannot be lost. Sed nunc mens nostra non videt ipsam essentiam bonitatis divinae, sed aliquem effectum eius, qui potest videri bonus et non bonus, secundum diversas considerationes; sicut bonum spirituale aliquibus videtur non bonum, in quantum contrariatur delectationi carnali, in cuius concupiscentia sunt. Ideo caritas viae potest amitti per peccatum mortale. However, now our mind does not see that essence of divine goodness; it sees some of its effects which can seem either good or not-good, according to different considerations. For, the spiritual good appears as not-good to some insofar as it is contrary to their carnal delight, which concupiscence desires. Therefore the charity of this life can be lost through mortal sin. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum illum Ioannis est intelligendum secundum potestatem spiritus sancti moventis animam, qui indeficienter operatur quod vult. To the first, it must be said that what St. John wrote (1 John iii. 9), should be understood according to the power of the Holy Spirit moving the soul, Who unfailingly operates as He wishes. Ad secundum dicendum, quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de caritate secundum potestatem ipsius caritatis: de se enim habet sufficienter unde nunquam arescat; sed quod amittatur, est propter vertibilitatem subiecti, ut dictum est. To the second, it must be said that Augustine speaks of charity as the power of charity itself; for charity is sufficient that it will never wither away. But that it is lost, is due to the indetermination of the subject, as has been said. Ad tertium dicendum, quod vera dilectio de sua ratione habet quod nunquam amittatur; qui enim vere diligit hominem, hoc in animo suo proponit, ut nunquam dilectionem dimittat. Sed quandoque illud propositum mutatur, et sic dilectio quae vera fuit, amittitur. Si autem hoc aliquis habuisset in proposito, ut a diligendo quandoque desisteret, vera dilectio non fuisset. Unde patet, quod caritas inamissibilis est secundum potestatem propriam; amitti tamen potest secundum potestatem subiecti vertibilis. To the third, it must be said that true love has an essential note that is never lost; for he who truly loves man has foremost in his soul that he will never diminish that love. But when this commitment in the soul is changed, that which was true love is lost. Further, if anyone would have this commitment that he would sometimes cease loving, his love would not be true. Whence it is clear that charity, considered according to its own power cannot be lost; but it can be lost because of the indeterminate power of the subject. Ad quartum dicendum, quod illa etiam auctoritas prosperi loquitur de caritate secundum potestatem ipsius, et non secundum potestatem subiecti. To the fourth, it must be said that Prosper also speaks of charity according to the power of charity itself, and not according to the power of the subject. Ad quintum dicendum, quod caritas, dum est, habet inclinationem ad magna operandum; et hoc vult et proponit, secundum rationem suae virtutis; sed quandoque ab hoc deficit propter vertibilitatem subiecti. To the fifth, it must be said that charity, if it is present, has an inclination to do great works, and Gregory wished to speak in this manner according to the quality of his own virtue. But sometimes one can fail from this because of the indetermination of the subject. Ad sextum dicendum, quod cum in homine sit duplex natura, scilicet intellectiva, quae principalior est, et sensitiva, quae minor est, ille vere seipsum diligit qui se amat ad bonum rationis: qui autem se amat ad bonum sensualitatis contra bonum rationis, magis se odit quam amat, proprie loquendo, secundum illud Psalm. X, 5: qui diligit iniquitatem, odit animam suam; et hoc etiam philosophus dicit in IX Ethic. Et secundum hoc amor verus sui ipsius amittitur per peccatum contrarium, sicut et amor Dei. To the sixth, it must be said that since there is in man a twofold nature, viz., the intellectual which is primary, and the sensitive which is lesser; he truly loves himself who loves himself for the good of reason. But when a man loves himself and wants sensual goods for himself which are contrary to the good of reason, he hates himself more than he loves himself, because it is written (Psalms x. 6), He that loveth iniquity hateth his own soul. And this the Philosopher also said in Book IX of the Ethics. According to this, true love of self is lost through the contrary sin; just as the love of God is also lost. Ad septimum dicendum, quod caritas excludit omne motivum peccati secundum suum propositum: pertinet enim hoc ad rationem caritatis, ut velit non concupiscere, nec inordinate se amare. Sed quandoque accidit contrarium, propter vertibilitatem et corruptionem naturae; secundum illud apostoli ad Roman. cap. VII, 19: non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago; sed quod odi malum, id facio. To the seventh, it must be said that charity excludes every movement of sin according to its own determination. For, it pertains to the essence of charity that it wishes not to desire concupiscibly, nor to love self inordinately. But sometimes the contrary happens because of the indetermination of free choice and the corruption of nature; thus the Apostle said (Rom. vii. 19), For the good which I will, I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do. Ad octavum dicendum, quod quamdiu aliquis sequitur motionem spiritus sancti, non peccat; sed quando resistit, tunc peccat. To the eighth, it must be said that whenever one follows the movement of the Holy Spirit, he does not sin; but when he resists it, then he sins. Ad nonum dicendum, quod esse caritatis non semper est in operari; alioquin dormientes non haberent caritatem. Dicitur autem quod amor Dei nunquam est otiosus secundum caritatis propositum, quod ad hoc est ut totum se homo det Deo. To the ninth, it must be said that the being (esse) of charity is not always to be in operation, otherwise when one sleeps, he would not have charity. But it is said that the love of God is never idle according to the determination of charity, whose whole purpose is that a man give himself completely to God. Ad decimum dicendum, quod amissio ita se habet ad rem habitam sicut corruptio ad rem existentem. Unde sicut corruptio incipit a re existente, et terminatur in eius non esse, quia eius mutatio est de esse in non esse; ita etiam amissio, cum sit etiam mutatio de habere in non habere, incipit in habere, et terminatur in non habere, et ideo principium amissionis caritatis est quando caritas habetur; finis autem quando non habetur. To the tenth, it must be said that a loss is related to the thing had, as corruption is related to the thing existing. Therefore, as corruption begins in an existing thing and terminates in its non-being (non-esse), because the change is from being (esse) to non-being (non-esse); so does a loss, since it is a change from having to non-having, begin in having and terminate in non-having. Therefore the beginning of the loss of charity is when charity is had; its end, however, is when charity is not had. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod caritas aliquo modo desinit esse in anima secundum illa quatuor. Subiectum enim caritatis quamvis sit incorruptibile secundum substantiam, fit tamen indispositum ad hanc formam per contrariam dispositionem peccati. Similiter, quamvis causa caritatis sit incorruptibilis, tamen influxio huiusmodi causae impeditur per peccatum, quod dividit inter nos et Deum. Et ex hac etiam ratione ex parte obiecti deficit caritas, in quantum voluntas se avertit a bono incommutabili. Desinit etiam per contrarium motivum ad peccandum: quod licet, simpliciter loquendo, sit debilius quam caritas, tamen in casu potest esse fortius; quando scilicet caritas in actu non operatur, et motivum peccati movet in aliquo particulari opere, sicut etiam philosophus ostendit in VII Ethic., quod a passione potest vinci scientia, quamvis sit fortissima; in quantum non est in actu agens, sed in habitu ligato per passionem: et sicut scientia est fortissima in universali, passio autem in particulari operabili, ita caritas est fortissima circa finem ultimum; et motivum peccati habet fortitudinem in aliquo particulari opere. To the eleventh, it must be said that charity ceases to exist in the soul in some way according to these four modes. For, the subject of charity, although it is incorruptible according to its substance, becomes indisposed to this form through the contrary disposition of sin. Likewise, although the cause of charity is incorruptible, the influence of this cause is impeded by sin which separates us from God. Also, charity fails on the part of its object insofar as the will diverts itself from the unchangeable good. Charity even fails through the contrary movement to sinning; for, essentially speaking, although sin is weaker than charity, in some instances sin can be stronger, viz., when charity is not operating in act and the movement of sin directs toward some other particular operation. The Philosopher also showed in Book VII of the Ethics, that science, although it is stronger, can be overcome by passion; this is considered insofar as the agent is not in act but is bound up in habit because of passion. For, just as science is strongest in the universal, passion however operates in the particular; so also charity is strongest when acting toward the final end, but it allows the movement of sin which has strength in some particular act. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod philosophus dicit, quod bonum unius virtutis non contrariatur bono alterius virtutis; et hoc intendit philosophus dicere in praedicamentis, et in II Ethic. Sed in naturis bonum contrariatur bono; utrumque enim contrariorum est quoddam bonum naturae. Bonum ergo quod movet appetitum ad peccandum, contrariatur bono divino quod est obiectum caritatis, in quantum in eo constituitur finis. Sic enim non est possibile esse nisi unum finem ultimum: sicut et in regno, in quo non potest esse nisi unus rex, contrariatur regi qui se regem facit secundum illud Ioan., XIX, 12: omnis qui se regem facit, contradicit Caesari. To the twelfth, it must be said that the Philosopher did write that the good of one virtue is not contrary to the good of another, and this is what he intended to say in the Praedicamentis and in Book II of the Ethics. But in nature, one good is contrary to another, for each of the contraries is a certain good of nature. Therefore, the good which moves the appetite to sin is contrary to the divine good which is the object of charity, insofar as the end is found in the divine good. For there can be only one final end; just as in a kingdom, where there can be only one king, he who makes himself to be a king is contrary to the actual king, according to what is written (John xix. 12), Whosoever maketh himself a king, speaketh against Caesar. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod caritas non expellitur a peccato sicut ab agente, sed sicut a contrario; unde ipsa superventio peccati est expulsio caritatis, sicut adventio lucis expulsio est tenebrarum: lux enim expellit tenebras in ipso suo fieri; sed motivum ad peccatum expellit secundum quod praeexistit in apprehensione animae. To the thirteenth, it must be said that charity is not driven out by sin as by an agent, but as by its contrary. Thus, that intervening of sin is the expulsion of charity; just as the coming of light is the expulsion of darkness. For, the light drives out darkness by its own becoming; but a movement to sin drives out charity according as it pre-exists in the understanding of the soul. Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod quando homo in peccato mortali consistit, hoc quadam deliberatione rationis agitur, quia sine deliberato consensu non est peccatum mortale. Deliberatio autem quidam motus est tempore mensuratus, in cuius temporis ultimo instanti inest peccatum animae; sed ante illud ultimum instans, non est dare proximum in quo caritas insit; quia instantia non se habent consequenter, sed tempus est continuum; et ideo in toto tempore praecedenti quod terminatur ad ultimum instans, caritas inest animae, in cuius ultimo instanti post inest peccatum. Non ergo est dare ultimum instans in quo caritas insit, sed ultimum temporis, ut per philosophum patet in VIII Physic. To the fourteenth, it must be said that when man stands in mortal sin, this is done by a certain deliberation of reason; for without a deliberating consent, there can be no mortal sin. But this deliberation is a measured movement of time in the last moment of which sin exists in the soul. But before that final instant, the nearest instant in which charity exists cannot be designated; because these moments are not regarded as moments following one another, for time is a continuum. Therefore in the entire time which precedes the moment that terminates in the final instant, charity exists in the soul; after the last instant of this time, sin exists. Thus it is not possible to designate the final instant in which charity exists, but the final time, as is shown by the Philosopher in Book VIII of the Physics. Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod si Magister intelligat de perfecta caritate, quae est caritas patriae, verum est quod inamissibilis est, rationibus supradictis. Si vero intelligatur de caritate viae quantumcumque perfecta, non est verum quod sit inamissibilis ex modo inhaerentiae ipsius ad subiectum, sed ex sola virtute motionis spiritus sancti; et sic dicuntur confirmati quicumque fuerunt confirmati in statu viae. To the fifteenth, it must be said that if the Master understood of charity that it is the charity of heaven, it is true that it is not lost, according to the proofs given above. But if he meant the charity of this life insofar as it is perfect, it is not true that it cannot be lost because of the mode of inhering in its subject, but only by virtue of the movement of the Holy Spirit; and thus it is said that those who were strengthened, were strengthened in this life. Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod sicut in cognitione cuiuslibet veri cognoscitur prima veritas, sicut primum exemplar in imagine, vel vestigio; ita etiam in amore cuiuslibet boni amatur summa bonitas. Sed talis amor summae bonitatis non sufficit ad rationem caritatis, sed oportet quod diligatur summum bonum prout est beatitudinis obiectum. To the sixteenth, it must be said that just as the first truth is understood in the knowledge of anything that is true, as the first exemplar is understood in an image or vestige, so is the highest good loved in the love of anything that is good. But such a love of the highest good is not sufficient for the definition of charity; it is necessary that the highest good be loved as the object of beatitude. Et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad decimumseptimum. The answer to the seventeenth objection is evident from this. Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod sicut Augustinus dicit exponens illud Ioan., X, 27: oves meae vocem meam audiunt, et vocem alienorum non audiunt, est quaedam vox Christi quam nullus audit nisi sit ovis eius per praedestinationem; haec scilicet vox: qui perseveraverit usque in finem, hic salvus erit. Et per hunc modum intelligit, quod qui non permanet in sermone Christi, non est vere discipulus, quia perseverare ab eo efficaciter non didicit; potest tamen esse discipulus ad tempus quantum ad temporalem dilectionem Dei et proximi. To the eighteenth, it must be said that, as Augustine says explaining this text (John x. 27), My sheep hear my voice and do not hear the voice of others, there is a certain voice of Christ which no one hears unless he be His sheep through a predetermination. This voice says, He who perseveres to the end will be saved. And in this way he understands that he who does not remain faithful to the words of Christ is not a true disciple, because he has not learned from Him to persevere effectively. However, he can be a temporary disciple when he loves God for a time and his neighbor. Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod quamdiu caritas actu dominatur in homine, non movetur motu contrario, sed sequitur homo motum caritatis; et ideo summum remedium contra peccatum est ut homo redeat ad cor suum, convertens illud in Dei dilectionem. Sed quando actu homo secundum caritatem non movetur, ingeritur quandoque motus contrarius peccati. To the nineteenth, it must be said that as long as charity is actually dominant in man, man is not moved by a contrary motion, but he follows the movement of charity. Therefore the greatest remedy against sin is for man to return into his heart, converting it to the love of God. But when man is not moved in act according to charity, he is under pressure from the contrary movement of sin. Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod corrumpi et generari vel fieri est proprium eius quod habet esse: et hoc est solum res subsistens in suo esse. Accidentia autem et formae non subsistentes, non dicuntur entia quia ipsae habeant esse, sed quia eis aliquid est. Et ideo fieri et corrumpi non proprie est accidentium et formarum, sed subiectorum; puta, cum corpus aliquod fit album hoc est albedinem fieri, sicut aliquod corpus esse album, hoc est albedinem esse. Et eadem ratio est de corruptione; et ideo corruptibile et incorruptibile non attribuuntur per se accidenti, sed substantiae. Unde nihil prohibet caritatem viae et patriae esse eamdem numero, quamvis caritas viae sit amissibilis, caritas autem patriae sit inamissibilis. To the twentieth, it must be said that to be corrupted and to be generated or to become, is proper to that which has being (esse); i.e., only a thing subsisting in its being (esse). But accidents and forms that are not subsisting are not called being because they have existence, but rather because by them something exists. Therefore, to become and to be corrupted are not proper to accidents and to forms, but to subjects. For example, when any thing becomes white, this is whiteness in becoming; just as for any thing to be white, is this existing whiteness. And the same reasoning holds for corruption. Therefore corruptible and incorruptible are not attributed directly to accidents, but only to substance. Whence, there is nothing that prevents the charity of this life and of heaven from being the same in number; although the charity here can be lost while the charity of heaven cannot be lost. Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum, quod sicut iam dictum est, caritas, proprie loquendo, non corrumpitur, sed subiectum desinit participare caritatem; unde non proprie dicitur quod caritas corrumpatur, vel in aliquid, vel in nihil. To the twenty-first, it must be said that, as has already been said, charity, properly speaking, is not corrupted; but the subject ceases to participate in charity. Whence it is not proper to say that charity is corrupted either in something or in nothing. Ad vicesimumsecundum dicendum, quod propter vertibilitatem subiecti, sicut caritas superveniens peccato destruit ipsum, ita peccatum superveniens caritati expellit ipsam; contraria enim mutuo se expellunt. To the twenty-second, it must be said that because of the indetermination of the subject, just as charity that overshadows sin destroys it, so also does sin overshadowing charity, drives it out; for contraries are mutually exclusive. Ad vicesimumtertium dicendum, quod si donum posset per violentiam auferri, videretur vinci donator, ad quem pertinet conservare donum ei cui dedit; sed si ille cui dedit, voluntarie abiiciat, non propter hoc videtur donator vinci, ad quem non pertinet cogere hominem ad virtutem. To the twenty-third, it must be said that if a gift can be taken away by violence, then it seems that the giver who must preserve the gift for the one to whom he has bestowed it, is defeated. But if he to whom the gift is given voluntarily rejects it, it does not seem that this causes the donor, who ought not to force men to virtue, to be defeated. Ad vicesimumquartum dicendum, quod mulier per matrimonium amittit potestatem sui corporis; sed anima per caritatem non amittit potestatem liberi arbitrii; unde ratio non sequitur. To the twenty-fourth, it must be said that a wife in marriage loses the power over her own body. But the soul, through charity, does not lose the power of free choice. Whence the argument does not follow.
Decimotertio quaeritur utrum per unum actum peccati mortalis caritas amittatur
Whether Charity Can Be Lost Through One Act of Mortal Sin?
Et videtur quod non. It seems that charity cannot be lost through one act of mortal sin. Dicit enim Origenes I Periarch.: si aliquando satietas cepit aliquem ex his qui in summo perfectoque gradu perstiterunt; non arbitror quod ad subitum quis evacuetur ac decidat; sed paulatim ac per partes eum decidere, necesse est; ita ut fieri possit interdum, ut, si brevis aliquis lapsus acciderit, et cito resipiscat, non penitus ruere videatur. Sed ille qui caritatem amittit, penitus ruit, secundum illud apostoli, I Cor., XIII, 2: si caritatem non habeam, nihil sum. Ergo caritas non amittitur per unum peccatum mortale, quod quandoque subito fit. 1. For, Origen writes in I Periarch.,2 If a disgust for spiritual things ever takes one who has continually stayed in the highesrt and perfect state, I do not think that he is taken away or falls away suddenly; but he must fall away little by little and gradually. Thus, as it can sometimes happen, if one undergoes a slight fall and quickly recovers, it does not seem that he rushes to his complete downfall. But he who hast lost charity falls completely, according to this (1 Cor. xiii. 2), If I have not charity, I am nothing. Therefore charity is not lost through one mortal sin which sometimes happens suddenly. Praeterea, Bernardus dicit in Lib. de diligendo Deo, quod in Petro, qui negavit Christum, non fuit caritas extincta, sed sopita, et tamen, quando Christum negavit, peccavit mortaliter. Ergo caritas non amittitur per unum actum peccati mortalis. 2. Moreover, Bernard says in the De Diligendo Deo, charity was not extinct in Peter who denied Christ, but it was only rendered inactive. But when he denied Christ, he sinned mortally. Therefore charity is not lost through one act of mortal sin. Praeterea, Leo Papa dicit in sermone IX de passione, alloquens Petrum: vidit in te dominus non fidem victam, non dilectionem aversam, sed constantiam fuisse turbatam: abundavit fletus, ubi non defecit affectus, et fons caritatis lavit verba formidinis. Ergo dilectio caritatis non desiit in Petro propter actum peccati mortalis. 3. Moreover, Pope Leo the Great says in Sermon IX De Passione, when speaking of Peter, Our Lord saw in you not a conquered faith, not a reverted love, but a constancy shaken. Tears flowed in abundance where affection never failed, and the fount of charity washed away the words of dread. Therefore the love of charity was not lacking in Peter on account of that act of mortal sin. Praeterea, caritas est fortior quam virtus acquisita. Sed virtus acquisita, non corrumpitur per unum actum peccati, sicut nec generatur; dicit enim philosophus, II Ethic., quod ex eisdem generatur virtus et corrumpitur. Ergo multo minus caritas amittitur per actum unius peccati mortalis. 4. Moreover, charity is stronger than acquired virtue. But acquired virtue is not corrupted by one act of sin; just as it is not generated by one act, for the Philosopher says in Book II of the Ethics, virtue is generated and corrupted from the same thing. Therefore much less is charity lost through the act of one mortal sin. Praeterea, contrarium non expellitur nisi per suum contrarium. Habitus autem caritatis non opponitur actui peccati. Sed habitus non generatur per unum actum. Ergo caritas non amittitur per unum actum peccati. 5. Moreover, a thing is not driven out except by its contrary. But the habit of charity is not opposed to the act of sin. Now habit is not generated by one act. Therefore charity is not lost by one act of sin. Praeterea, sicut fides se habet ad multa credenda, ita caritas ad multa diligenda ex caritate. Sed qui credit contra unum articulum non propter hoc amittit fidem de aliis articulis. Ergo qui peccat contra unum diligibile ex caritate, non propter hoc amittit caritatem circa alia diligibilia; et sic caritas non amittitur per unum peccatum mortale. 6. Moreover, just as faith is concerned with believing many things, so is charity concerned with loving many things out of charity. But he who does not believe in one article of faith does not on that account lose faith in the other articles.~ Therefore he who sins against one object that should be loved out of charity does not on this account lose charity toward the other objects of love. Thus charity is not lost by one mortal sin. Sed contra, est quod dicitur I Ioan. III, v. 17: qui habuerit substantiam huius mundi, et viderit fratrem suum necessitatem habentem, et clauserit viscera sua ab eo: quomodo caritas Dei manet in eo? Et sic videtur quod per peccatum omissionis aliquis caritatem amittat. Sed peccatum transgressionis non est minus quam peccatum omissionis. Ergo per quodcumque peccatum caritas tollitur. On the contrary, it is written (1 John iii. 17), He that hath the substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up his bowels from him: how doth the charity of God abide in him? Thus it seems that through a sin of omission one can lose charity. But a sin of transgression is no less than a sin of omission. Therefore charity is taken away by any sin. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod absque omni dubio per quemlibet actum peccati mortalis habitus caritatis subtrahitur; non enim dicitur peccatum mortale, nisi quia per ipsum homo spiritualiter moritur, quod esse non potest praesente caritate, quae est animae vita. Similiter etiam per peccatum mortale fit homo dignus morte aeterna, secundum illud Rom. cap. VI, 23: stipendia peccati mors. Quicumque autem habet caritatem, habet meritum vitae aeternae: dominus enim dilectori suo promittit manifestationem sui ipsius, in quo vita aeterna consistit. Unde necesse est dicere, quod per quemlibet actum peccati mortalis homo caritatem amittit. Manifestum est enim quod in quolibet actu peccati mortalis fit aversio ab incommutabili bono, cui caritas unit; cui actus peccati mortalis opponitur. I answer. It must be said that, without doubt, the habit of charity is taken away by one act of mortal sin, for a sin is not called mortal unless men die spiritually by it; which cannot happen with charity which is the life of the soul. Likewise, man also becomes worthy of eternal death through mortal sin, according to this (Rom. vi. 23), The wages of sin is death. But whoever has charity is worthy of eternal life, for the Lord promised to those who love Him a manifestation of His own self in which vision eternal life consists. Whence it must be said that man loses charity through any act of mortal sin. For, it is clear that in each act of mortal sin there is a turning away from the immutable good to which charity unites us. The act of mortal sin is opposed to this charity. Sed quia actus non directe contrariatur habitui, sed actui, posset alicui videri quod per actum peccati mortalis impediretur quidam oppositus caritatis actus, ita tamen quod non tolleretur habitus, sicut contingit in habitibus acquisitis; non enim aliquis amittit habitum virtutis gratuitae, si contra virtutem gratuitam agat. Now, because act is not directly contrary to habit but to act, one could see that through the act of mortal sin the opposite act of charity would be hindered; however, not so that the habit would be taken away, as it happens in acquired habits. For, no one loses the virtue of generosity if he acts contrary to that virtue. Sed de habitibus caritatis est aliter. Habitus enim caritatis non habet causam in subiecto, sed totaliter dependet a causa extrinseca: caritas enim infunditur in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis, ut dicitur ad Rom. V, 5. Non autem sic Deus causat caritatem in anima, ut sit causa eius solum quantum ad fieri, et non quantum ad conservationem ipsius, sicut aedificator est causa domus solum quantum ad fieri, unde eo subtracto adhuc remanet domus; sed Deus est causa caritatis et gratiae in anima, et quantum ad fieri, et quantum ad conservationem, sicut sol est causa luminis in aere. Et ideo, sicut statim cessaret lumen in aere, si interponeretur aliquod obstaculum; ita statim cessat habitus caritatis in anima, quando anima se avertit a Deo per peccatum. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad litteram: non ita Deus operatur hominem iustum, id est iustificando eum, ut si abscesserit, maneat in absente quod fecit; sed potius, sicut aer praesente lumine non factus est lucidus, sed fit; sic homo Deo sibi praesente illuminatur, absente autem continuo obtenebratur. This is not the case concerning the habit of charity. For, the habit of charity does not have a cause in the subject, but entirely depends on an extrinsic cause; for the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Spirit, Who is given to us, as is written (Rom. v. 5). However, God does not cause charity in our soul so that He is the cause only of its becoming and not of its preservation; as the builder is the cause of a house only in its becoming, and when he is taken away, the house still remains. God, however, is the cause of charity and of grace in the soul both as regards their becoming and their preservation; just as the sun is the cause of light in the air. Therefore, just as light in the air immediately ceases if some obstacle is placed in the way, so does the habit of charity immediately cease in the soul when the soul turns itself away from God through sin. This is what Augustine says in Book VIII of Super Gen. ad Litteram, God does not operate in a lust man thus (that is, by justifying him), so that if He would depart, that which He effected would remain in His absence. Rather, lust as the air has not made itself lucid but becomes so in the presence of light, so man is illuminated when God is present to him; but he continues in darkness when God is absent. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum illud Origenis sic posset intelligi, quod homo qui est in statu perfecto, non subito procedit in actum peccati mortalis, sed per aliquam negligentiam praecedentem. Sed quia ipse subdit: si aliquis brevis lapsus acciderit etc., videtur melius dicendum, quod ipse intelligit, eum penitus evacuare et decidere, qui sic decidit, ut ex malitia peccet, quod non statim a principio contingit; quia etiam, ut philosophus dicit in I Ethic., non est facile iusto ut opus iniustum operetur statim, sicut iniustus facit, scilicet ex electione. Amittit ergo caritatem per unum actum peccati mortalis, sed adhuc aliquae reliquiae de praecedenti perfectione remanent, dum non habet ex malitia quod caritatem amittat. To the first, it must be said that this saying of Origen can be understood in this way, that a man who is in a perfect state does not suddenly fall into the act of mortal sin, but does so through some previous negligence. But because he adds, If one undergoes a slight fall, etc., it seems better to say that he understood one who completely falls away falls so that he sins by malice, which fall does not come about suddenly. For, as the Philosopher says in Book I of the Ethics, it is not easy for a just man to perform unjust works suddenly as an unjust man does them, viz., by choice. Therefore one loses charity through one act of mortal sin, but some of the previous perfection remains if he has not lost charity out of malice. Ad secundum dicendum, quod caritas amittitur dupliciter; uno modo directe, alio modo indirecte. Directe quidem per actualem Dei contemptum, sicut accidit in illis qui dicunt Deo, Iob XXI, 14: recede a nobis; scientiam viarum tuarum nolumus sicut dicitur Iob XII, 14. Alio modo indirecte; sicut non cogitans de Deo, propter aliquam passionem timoris vel concupiscentiae consentit in aliquid quod est contra Dei praeceptum, et sic per consequens caritatem amittit. Intendit ergo Bernardus dicere, quod caritas non fuit extincta in Petro per modum primum, sed amisit eam per modum secundum, et hoc nominat soporem. Et similiter sunt intelligenda verba Leonis Papae: quod patet ex hoc quod subiungit: non tardatum est remedium ablutionis, ubi non fuit iudicium voluntatis; magis enim negatio Petri fuit extorta ex terrore, quam ipse negaverit ex iudicio deliberatae voluntatis. To the second, it must be said that charity is lost in two ways; directly and indirectly. It is lost directly through an actual contempt for God, as happens with those who say to God (Job xxi. 14), Depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of thy ways. In another way, it is lost indirectly; just as one who is not thinking of God, consents to something that is against the law of God on account of some passion of fear or of concupiscence, and as a consequence loses charity. Therefore Bernard intended to say that charity was not extinct in Peter according to the first manner; but Peter lost it according to the second manner, and therefore Bernard calls it inactive. In the same way, the words of Leo should be understood, and this is clear from what he further adds, The cleansing remedy will not be far away where there was no judgment of the will; for the denial of Peter was driven by fear more than by a deliberate judgment of the will. Unde patet solutio ad tertium. From this the answer to the third objection is clear. Ad quartum dicendum, quod virtus acquisita habet causam in subiecto, et non totaliter ab extrinseco, sicut caritas; et ideo non est similis ratio. To the fourth, it must be said that an acquired virtue has its cause in the subject and is not entirely extrinsic, as is true of charity. Therefore the comparison between acquired virtue and charity cannot be made. Ad quintum dicendum, quod in contrariis potest expelli unum contrarium, sine hoc quod alterum adveniat. Habitus autem virtutis et vitii sunt contraria mediata; unde philosophus dicit in praedicamentis, quod inter bonum et malum est medium; unde non oportet quod solum tunc amittat homo habitum unius virtutis, quando generatur in eo habitus contrarii vitii. To the fifth, it must be said that in contraries, one contrary can be driven out without the other contrary coming in. But the habits of virtue and vice are mediated contraries; whence the Philosopher says in the Praedicamentis, there is a medium between good and evil. Whence it is not necessary to say that a man loses the habit of one virtue only when the habit of the contrary vice is generated in him. Ad sextum dicendum, quod habitus respicit, per se, formalem rationem obiecti magis quam ipsum obiectum materialiter; et ideo, si formalis ratio obiecti tollatur, species habitus non manet. Formalis autem ratio obiecti in fide est veritas prima, per doctrinam Ecclesiae manifestata, sicut formalis ratio scientiae est medium demonstrationis: et ideo, sicut aliquis memorialiter tenens conclusiones geometricas, non habet geometriae scientiam, si non propter media geometriae eis assentiatur, sed habebit conclusiones illas tamquam opinatas: ita, qui tenet ea quae sunt fidei, et non assentit eis propter auctoritatem Catholicae doctrinae, non habet habitum fidei. Qui autem propter doctrinam Catholicam alicui assentit, omnibus assentit quae doctrina Catholica habet: alioquin magis credit sibi quam Ecclesiae doctrinae. Ex quo patet, quod qui deficit in uno articulo pertinaciter, non habet fidem de aliis articulis: illam dico fidem quae est habitus infusus; sed oportet quod teneat ea quae sunt fidei, quasi opinata. To the sixth, it must be said that a habit, of itself, regards the formal notion of its object more than the material notion of the object; therefore if the formal notion (ratio) of the object is taken away, the species of habit does not remain. However, the formal notion in the object of faith is the first truth manifested through the teaching of the Church; just as the formal notion of science is the medium of demonstration. Therefore, just as one who remembers the conclusions of geometry does not have the science of geometry if he does not assent to these conclusions because of the reasons of geometry, but he holds these conclusions only as opinion; so also one who holds those things which are of faith but does not assent to them because of the authority of Catholic teaching, does not have the habit of faith. For, he who asserts to anything because of Catholic teaching assents to all those things which that teaching contains. Otherwise, he would believe himself more than the teaching of the Church. From this it is clear that he who obstinately denies one article of faith does not have faith in the other articles—that faith, I say, which is an infused habit, for he holds the conclusions of faith as opinion.