Disputed Question on the Cardinal Virtues

translated by Ralph McInerny
in Disputed Questions on Virtue,
St. Augustine’s Press, South Bend, Indiana, 1999

modified and html-edited by Joseph Kenny, O.P.

CONTENTS

  1. Et primo enim quaeritur, utrum prudentia, iustitia, fortitudo et temperantia sint virtutes cardinales.
  2. Secundo utrum virtutes sint connexae, ut qui habet unam habeat omnes.
  3. Tertio utrum omnes virtutes in homine sint aequales.
  4. Quarto utrum virtutes cardinales maneant in patria.
  1. Are prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance cardinal virtues?
  2. Whether the virtues are connected such that he who has one has all
  3. Whether all virtues in a man are equal
  4. Whether all the cardinal virtues remain in heaven
Articulus 1
Et primo quaeritur utrum istae sint quatuor virtutes cardinales, scilicet iustitia, prudentia, fortitudo et temperantia

Article 1
Are prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance cardinal virtues?

Et videtur quod non. And it seems that they are not.
Ea enim quae non distinguuntur ad invicem, non debent ad invicem connumerari; quia distinctio est causa numeri, ut dicit Damascenus. Sed praedictae virtutes non distinguuntur ad invicem; dicit enim Gregorius in XXII Moral.: prudentia vera non est, quae iusta et temperans et fortis non est; nec perfecta temperantia, quae fortis, iusta et prudens non est; neque fortitudo integra, quae prudens, temperans et iusta non est; nec vera iustitia, quae prudens, fortis et temperans non est. Ergo non debent dici hae quatuor virtutes cardinales. 1. Things which are not distinct ought not to be numbered separately, since distinction is the cause of number, as Damascene says. But the virtues mentioned are not distinguished from one another, for Gregory says in the Morals on Job 22: Unless prudence is just and temperate and brave, it is not true prudence, nor is there perfect temperance which is not brave, just, and prudent, nor complete fortitude which is not prudent, temperate, and just, nor true justice which is not prudent, brave, and temperate. Therefore, these should not be called the four cardinal virtues.
Praeterea, virtutes videntur dici cardinales, ex eo quod sunt aliis principaliores; unde quas quidam cardinales, aliquando principales vocant, ut patet per Gregorium, XXII Moralium. Sed cum finis principalior sit his quae sunt ad finem; principaliores esse videntur virtutes theologicae, quae habent ultimum finem pro obiecto, quam praedictae virtutes, quae sunt circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Ergo non debent dici praedictae quatuor virtutes cardinales. 2. Moreover, virtues seem to be called cardinal because they are principles of other virtues; hence, what some call cardinal, others call principal, as is clear in Gregory Morals on Job 22. But since the end is principal with respect to what is for the sake of the end, the theological virtues which have the ultimate end as their object would seem to have a better claim to be called principal than the virtues mentioned which bear on that which is for the sake of the end. Therefore, the virtues mentioned ought not be called the four cardinal virtues.
Praeterea, ea quae sunt diversorum generum, non debent poni in una coordinatione. Sed prudentia est in genere virtutum intellectualium, ut patet in VI Ethic.: aliae vero tres sunt virtutes morales. Ergo inconvenienter ponuntur praedictae quatuor virtutes cardinales. 3. Moreover, things which belong to different genera ought not be placed in the same ordering. But prudence is in the genus of intellectual virtues, as is clear in Ethics 6 and the other three are moral virtues. Therefore, they are unfittingly called the four cardinal virtues.
Praeterea, inter intellectuales virtutes sapientia est principalior quam prudentia, ut philosophus probat in VI Ethic.; quia sapientia est de divinis, prudentia autem est de humanis. Si igitur debuit aliqua virtus intellectualis poni inter virtutes cardinales, potius debuit poni sapientia quasi principalior. 4. Moreover, among the intellectual virtues wisdom is more principal than prudence, as the Philosopher proves in Ethics 6, because wisdom is concerned with divine things and prudence with human. Therefore, if any intellectual virtue is to be listed among the cardinal virtues, it should be the more principal one, that is, wisdom.
Praeterea, ad virtutes cardinales aliae debent reduci. Sed philosophus in II Ethic. condividit quasdam alias virtutes fortitudini et temperantiae; scilicet liberalitatem et magnanimitatem et huiusmodi, quae sic non reducuntur. Non ergo praedictae virtutes sunt cardinales. 5. Moreover, other virtues ought to be reduced to the cardinal virtues. But the Philosopher in Ethics 2 opposes certain other virtues to fortitude and temperance, namely liberality and magnanimity and the like, which thus are not reduced to them. Therefore, the aforementioned are not cardinal virtues.
Praeterea, illud quod non est virtus, non debet poni inter virtutes cardinales. Sed temperantia non videtur esse virtus. Non enim habetur aliis virtutibus habitis; ut patet in Paulo, qui habebat omnes alias virtutes, et tamen temperantiam non habebat: inerat enim adhuc in membris eius concupiscentia, secundum illud Rom., VII, 23: video aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae. Temperatus autem differt in hoc a continente, quod temperatus non habet concupiscentias pravas; continens autem habet, sed non sequitur eas; ut patet per philosophum in VII Ethic. Ergo inconvenienter enumerantur praedictae quatuor cardinales virtutes. 6. Moreover, what is not a virtue should not be put among the cardinal virtues. But temperance does not seem to be a virtue, for it is not had when other virtues are had, as is clear in Paul who had all the other virtues yet did not have temperance, for concupiscence remained in his members according to Romans 7:23: “I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind.” The temperate man differs from the continent in this, that the temperate man does not have depraved desires, but the continent does, though he does not follow them, as is clear from the Philosopher in Ethics 6. Therefore, the foregoing are improperly enumerated as four cardinal virtues.
Praeterea, sicut per virtutem homo ordinatur ad seipsum, ita et ad proximum. Sed duae virtutes ponuntur, quibus homo ordinatur ad seipsum; scilicet fortitudo et temperantia. Ergo etiam duae virtutes debent poni quibus aliquis ordinatur ad proximum; et non solum iustitia. 7. Moreover, just as a man is well-ordered in himself by virtue, so too is he well-ordered to his neighbor. But by two of these virtues a man is ordered to himself, namely, fortitude and temperance. Therefore, there should be two virtues by which he is ordered to his neighbor, and not only justice.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in Lib. de moribus Eccles., quod virtus est ordo amoris. Sed amor gratiae comprehenditur sub duobus praeceptis; scilicet dilectionis Dei et proximi. Ergo non debent esse nisi duae virtutes cardinales. 8. Moreover, Augustine says in On the morals of the church that virtue is the order of love. But the love of grace is contained in two precepts, namely, love of God and love of neighbor. Therefore, there should be only two cardinal virtues.
Praeterea, diversitas materiae quae est secundum extensionem, facit solum diversitatem secundum numerum; diversitas autem materiae quae est secundum diversas acceptiones formae, facit differentiam secundum genus: propter quod corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt genere, ut dicitur X Metaph. Sed praedictae virtutes differunt secundum diversitatem materiae habentis rationem diversam recipiendi formam. Nam modus rationis circa materiam temperantiae ponitur secundum refrenationem passionum; circa materiam autem fortitudinis secundum quemdam conatum ad id a quo passio retrahit. Ergo praedictae virtutes differunt genere; non ergo debent coniungi in una ordinatione virtutum cardinalium. 9. Moreover, the diversity of matter due to extension causes only numerical diversity. But the diversity of matter which is due to the reception of different forms causes a generic difference, on account of which the corruptible and incorruptible differ in genus, as is said in Metaphysics 10. But the virtues mentioned differ insofar as matter has a different way of receiving form. For the mode of reason in the case of the matter of temperance is to refrain the passions, but in the matter of fortitude to struggle toward that from which reason pulls away. Therefore, the virtues mentioned differ in genus and ought away. not to be conjoined in one order of cardinal virtues.
Praeterea, ratio virtutis moralis sumitur secundum quod attingit rationem, ut patet per philosophum in II Ethicor., qui definit virtutem per hoc, quod est secundum rationem rectam. Sed ratio recta est regula regulata a prima regula quae est Deus; a qua etiam virtutem regulandi habet. Ergo virtutes morales praecipue habent rationem virtutis ex eo quod attingunt primam regulam, scilicet Deum. Sed virtutes theologicae, quae sunt circa Deum, non dicuntur cardinales. Ergo neque virtutes morales debent dici cardinales. 10. Moreover, the definition of virtue is based on the fact that it has to do with reason, as is clear from the Philosopher in Ethics 2, who defines virtue as being in accord with right reason. But right reason is a measured measure that is measured by the first measure, God, from whom reason has the power of regulating. Therefore, moral virtues have the note of virtue chiefly insofar as they attain the first measure, God, but the theological virtues, which are concerned with God, are not called cardinal. Therefore, moral virtues ought not be called cardinal.
Praeterea, principalis pars animae est ratio. Sed temperantia et fortitudo non sunt in ratione, sed sunt irrationabilium partium, ut philosophus dicit in III Ethic. Ergo non debent poni virtutes cardinales. 11. Moreover, reason is the chief part of the soul, but temperance and fortitude are not in reason but in the irrational part, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 3. Therefore, they ought not be put among the cardinal virtues.
Praeterea, laudabilius est dare de suo quam reddere vel non auferre alienum. Sed primum pertinet ad liberalitatem, secundum ad iustitiam. Ergo liberalitas magis debet poni virtus cardinalis quam iustitia. 12. Moreover, it is more laudable to use one’s own property than to give or take away another’s. But the first pertains to liberality and the second to justice. Therefore, liberality rather than justice ought rather to be called a cardinal virtue.
Praeterea, illud maxime videtur esse virtus cardinalis quod est firmamentum aliorum. Sed huiusmodi est humilitas; dicit enim Gregorius, quod qui ceteras virtutes sine humilitate congregat, quasi pulveres in ventum portat. Ergo humilitas debuit poni inter virtutes cardinales. 13. Moreover, that which is the basis of others ought especially to be called a cardinal virtue. But humility is that, for Gregory says that he who has the other virtues without humility carries them as ashes in the wind. Therefore, humility ought to be numbered among the cardinal virtues.
Praeterea, virtus est perfectio quaedam, ut patet per philosophum in VI Phys. Sed, sicut dicitur Iac., I, 4, patientia perfectum opus habet. Ergo patientia tamquam perfectio, poni debuit inter virtutes cardinales. 14. Virtue is a kind of perfection, as is clear from the Philosopher in Physics 6. But, as is said in James 1:4, patience has a perfect work. Therefore, as perfection patience ought to be numbered among the cardinal virtues.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., quod magnanimitas operatur magnum in virtutibus, et est velut ornamentum aliis virtutibus. Sed hoc maxime videtur pertinere ad principalitatem virtutis. Ergo magnanimitas videtur esse virtus cardinalis. Inconvenienter igitur annumerantur praedictae quatuor virtutes cardinales. 15. Moreover, the Philosopher says in Ethics 6 that magnanimity does the most among the virtues and is as an ornament to the other virtues. But this especially seems to count toward a virtue’s being principal. Therefore, magnanimity seems to be a cardinal virtue and the foregoing are improperly accounted the four cardinal virtues.
Sed contra, est quod Ambrosius dicit super illud Lucae, cap. VI: beati pauperes spiritu: scimus virtutes esse quatuor cardinales: temperantiam, iustitiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem. ON THE CONTRARY. Ambrose says in commenting on Luke 6, “Blessed are the poor in spirit,” that we know there are four cardinal virtues: temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod cardinalis a cardine dicitur, in quo ostium vertitur, secundum illud Proverb., XXVI, 14: sicut ostium vertitur in cardine suo, ita piger in lectulo suo. Unde virtutes cardinales dicuntur in quibus fundatur vita humana, per quam in ostium introitur; vita autem humana est quae est homini proportionata. RESPONSE. It should be said that ‘cardinal’ comes from the hinge on which a door swings, according to Proverb 26:14: “As a door turns on its hinges, so does the slothful on his bed.” Hence, cardinal virtues are those on which human life is founded, by which the gate may be entered; but human life is what is proportioned to man.
In hoc homine autem invenitur primo quidem natura sensitiva, in qua convenit cum brutis; ratio practica, quae est homini propria secundum suum gradum; et intellectus speculativus, qui non perfecte in homine invenitur sicut invenitur in Angelis, sed secundum quamdam participationem animae. Ideo vita contemplativa non est proprie humana, sed superhumana; vita autem voluptuosa, quae inhaeret sensibilibus bonis, non est humana, sed bestialis. In man, however, there is found first a sensitive nature, in which he is like the brutes; then practical reason, which is proper to man according to his level; and speculative intellect, which is not found in man as perfectly as it is in the angels, but as a kind of participation on the part of the soul. Therefore, the contemplative life is not properly human but superhuman; the life of pleasure, however, by which one adheres to sensible goods, is not human but bestial.
Vita ergo proprie humana est vita activa, quae consistit in exercitio virtutum moralium: et ideo proprie virtutes cardinales dicuntur in quibus quodammodo vertitur et fundatur vita moralis, sicut in quibusdam principiis talis vitae; propter quod et huiusmodi virtutes principales dicuntur. The properly human life is the active which consists in the exercise of the moral virtues; therefore, those virtues are properly called cardinal on which the moral life somehow turns and is based, as the principles of such a life, which is why these virtues are also called principal.
Considerandum est autem, quod de ratione actus virtuosi quatuor existunt. Quorum unum est, ut substantia ipsius actus sit in se modificata; et ex hoc actus dicitur bonus, quasi circa debitam materiam existens, vel debitis circumstantiis vestitus. Secundum autem est, ut actus sit debito modo se habens ad subiectum, ex quo firmiter subiecto inhaereat. Tertium autem est, ut actus sit debito modo proportionatus ad aliquid extrinsecum sicut ad finem. Et haec quidem tria sunt ex parte eius quod per rationem dirigitur. Quartum autem ex parte ipsius rationis dirigentis, scilicet cognitio. Et haec quatuor philosophus tangit in II Ethic., ubi dicit, quod non sufficit ad virtutem quod aliqua sint iuste vel temperate comparata, quod pertinet ad modificationem actus. There are four things involved in the virtuous act. First, that the substance of this act is modified in itself. This is why the act is called good, as bearing on fitting matter or clothed with fitting circumstances. Second, the act must relate fittingly to the subject, that is, be firmly rooted. Third, the act must be fittingly proportioned to something extrinsic to it as an end. These three all follow from the fact that the virtuous act is directed by reason, but a fourth is taken from directing reason, namely, deliberation. The Philosopher touches on these four in Ethics 2 when he says that it does not suffice for virtue that things are justly or temperately done, which pertains to the modification of the act.
Sed alia tria requiruntur ex parte operantis. Primum quidem, ut sit sciens; quod pertinet ad cognitionem dirigentem. Deinde, quod sit eligens et reeligens propter hoc, id est propter debitum finem; quod pertinet ad rectitudinem actus in ordine ad aliquid extrinsecum. Tertium est, si firme et immobiliter adhaereat et operetur. Haec igitur quatuor scilicet cognitio dirigens, rectitudo, firmitas et moderatio, etsi in omnibus virtuosis actibus requirantur; singula tamen horum principalitatem quamdam habent in specialibus quibusdam materiis et actibus. Three other things are required from the side of the agent. First, that he be knowing, which refers to the directing knowledge; then, that he should will and choose for the sake of this: This refers to the rightness of the act as ordered to something extrinsic. Third, that it be stable, such that it firmly and changelessly characterizes the agent and his act. Now these four, namely, directive knowledge, rightness, stability, and moderation, although they are required of every virtuous act, each has a kind of special importance in certain matters and acts.
Ex parte cognitionis practicae tria requiruntur. Quorum primum est consilium: secundum est iudicium de consiliatis; sicut etiam in ratione speculativa invenitur inventio vel inquisitio, et iudicium. Sed quia intellectus practicus praecipit fugere vel prosequi, quod non facit speculativus intellectus, ut dicitur in III de anima; ideo tertio ad rationem practicam pertinet praemeditari de agendis; et hoc est praecipuum ad quod alia duo ordinantur. Circa primum autem perficitur homo per virtutem eubuliae, quae est bene consiliativa. Circa secundum autem perficitur homo per synesim et gnomen, quibus homo fit bene iudicativus, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed per prudentiam fit ratio bene praeceptiva, ut ibidem dicitur. Unde manifestum est quod ad prudentiam pertinet id quod est praecipuum in cognitione dirigente; et ideo ex hac parte ponitur prudentia virtus cardinalis. Three things are required of practical knowledge. The first of which is deliberation, the second is judgment of what has been deliberated; of course, discovery, inquiry and judgment are also found in speculative reason. But because practical reason commands flight or pursuit, something speculative intellect does not do, a point made in On the Soul 3, a third note characterizes practical reason, namely, to ponder things which must be done. The other two are ordered to this as to what is principal in practical reason. What Aristotle calls eubulia – deliberating well – perfects a man in the first respect, and synesis and gnome enable a man to judge well, as is said in Ethics 6. But it is through prudence that reason is able to command well, as is said in that same place; so it is clear that what is most important in directive knowledge pertains to prudence, and this is why prudence is numbered among the cardinal virtues.
Similiter rectitudo actus per comparationem ad aliquid extrinsecum, habet quidem rationem boni et laudabilis etiam in his quae pertinent ad unum secundum seipsum, sed maxime laudatur in his quae sunt ad alterum; quando scilicet homo actum suum rectificat non solum in his quae ad ipsum pertinent, sed etiam in his in quibus cum aliis communicat. Dicit enim philosophus in V Ethic., quod multi in propriis quidem virtute uti possunt, in his autem quae sunt ad alterum, non possunt. Et ideo iustitia ex hac parte ponitur virtus principalis, per quam homo debito modo coaptatur et adaequatur aliis, cum quibus communicare habet; unde et vulgariter dicuntur iusta illa quae sunt debito modo coaptata. Similarly, the rectitude of the act in comparison to something extrinsic has the note of the good and laudable even in things which pertain to oneself, but is especially praised in the things that pertain to others: that is, when a man makes his act right not only with respect to himself but also with respect to what he has in common with others. For the Philosopher says in Ethics 5 that many can use virtue in what concerns themselves but cannot in what concerns others; justice is the principal virtue in this regard, since by it a man is adapted and made equal in a fitting way to those with whom he lives. Hence, those things are commonly called just which are adapted in certain way.
Moderatio autem, sive refrenatio, ibi praecipue laudem habet et rationem boni, ubi praecipue passio impellit, quam ratio refrenare debet, ut ad medium virtutis perveniatur. Impellit autem passio maxima ad prosequendas delectationes maximas, quae sunt delectationes tactus; et ideo ex hac parte ponitur cardinalis virtus temperantia, quae reprimit concupiscentias delectabilium secundum tactum. Moderation, or restraining, commands praise and has the note of the good chiefly when passion is intense and the restraint of reason is needed if the mean of virtue is to be achieved. Passions are most intense with respect to the greatest pleasures, that is, the pleasures of touch. Temperance is called a cardinal virtue because it restrains the desire for tactile pleasures.
Firmitas autem praecipue laudem habet et rationem boni in illis in quibus passio maxime movet ad fugam: et hoc praecipue est in maximis periculis, quae sunt pericula mortis; et ideo ex hac parte fortitudo ponitur virtus cardinalis, per quam homo circa mortis pericula intrepide se habet. Firmness deserves praise and has the note of the good chiefly when passions induce us to flee, especially in the greatest perils which involve mortal danger. Fortitude is called a cardinal virtue because by it one is intrepid in the face of mortal danger.
Harum autem quatuor virtutum prudentia quidem est in ratione, iustitia autem est in voluntate, fortitudo autem in irascibili, temperantia autem in concupiscibili; quae solae potentiae possunt esse principia actus humani, id est voluntarii. Of these four virtues, prudence is in reason, justice in will, fortitude in the irascible, and temperance in the concupiscible, which are the only powers that can be the principles of a human or a voluntary act.
Unde patet ratio virtutum cardinalium, tum ex parte modorum virtutis, quae sunt quasi rationes formales, tum etiam ex parte materiae, tum etiam ex parte subiecti. Thus, the meaning of cardinal virtue is clear, both on the side of the modes of virtue, which are its formal notes, and on the side of matter, and on the side of the subject.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod de praedictis quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus aliqui dupliciter loquuntur. Quidam enim utuntur praedictis quatuor nominibus ad significandum generales modos virtutum: puta omnem cognitionem dirigentem vocantes prudentiam; omnem rectitudinem adaequantem actus humanos vocantes iustitiam; omnem moderationem refrenantem appetitum hominis a temporalibus bonis vocantes temperantiam; omnem firmitatem animi stabilientem hominem in bono contra insultum quorumcumque malorum, fortitudinem appellantes. Et ita videtur uti his nominibus Augustinus in Lib. de moribus Eccles.; et secundum hoc potest intelligi praedictum verbum Gregorii: quia una harum conditionum ad veram virtutis rationem non sufficit nisi omnes praedictae conditiones concurrant. Secundum hoc ergo praedicta quatuor dicuntur quatuor virtutes non propter diversas species habituum quae attenduntur secundum diversa obiecta, sed secundum diversas rationes formales. Ad 1. It should be said that people speak in two ways of the four cardinal virtues mentioned, for some use these four names to signify general modes of the virtues, for example, calling any directive knowledge prudence, any rectitude that equalizes human acts justice, any moderation that restrains man’s appetite for temporal goods temperance, and all firmness of soul stabilizing man in the good against the assault of whatever evils, fortitude. It is in this way that Augustine seems to use these words in On the morals of the church, and in this way too that the remark of Gregory can be understood, because only one of the conditions of the true virtue does not suffice: All the conditions must be satisfied. On this basis the four are called virtues not because of different species of habits drawn from diverse objects, but according to different formal notions.
Alii vero, sicut Aristoteles in Lib. Ethic., loquuntur de praedictis quatuor virtutibus secundum quod sunt speciales virtutes determinatae ad proprias materias; et secundum hoc etiam potest verificari dictum Gregorii: per modum enim cuiusdam redundantiae, praedictae virtutes sunt circa illas materias in quibus potissime commendantur praedictae generales quatuor virtutis conditiones. Unde secundum hoc fortitudo temperans est, et temperantia fortis, quia qui potest refrenare appetitum suum ne consequatur concupiscentias delectationum, quod pertinet ad temperantiam, multo magis poterit refrenare motum audaciae in periculis; et similiter qui potest stare firmus contra pericula mortis, multo magis potest stare firmus contra illecebras voluptatum. Et secundum hoc, id quod est principaliter temperantiae, transit ad fortitudinem, et e converso; et eadem ratio est in aliis. Others however, like Aristotle in the Ethics, speak of the four virtues mentioned as special virtues determined to proper matters, and Gregory’s remark is true in this sense as well, for by a certain redundancy, these virtues bear on matters in which the four cardinal virtues are most powerfully needed. In this way, fortitude is temperate and temperance brave since one who can restrain his appetite for pleasure, the task of temperance, will more easily restrain the impulse to recklessness before mortal danger; and similarly he who can stand firm against the dangers of death, can all the more easily stand firm against the allurements of desire. On this basis, what belongs principally to temperance passes on to fortitude and vice versa. And the same can be said of the others.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod in fine appetitus hominis quiescit; et ideo virtutum theologicarum, quae sunt circa finem ultimum, principalitas non comparatur cardini, qui movetur, sed magis fundamento et radici, quae sunt stantia et quiescentia, secundum illud ad Ephes., III, 17: in caritate radicati et fundati. Ad 2. It should be said that man’s appetite rests in the end, and, therefore, the principality of the theological virtues, which bear on the ultimate end, is not compared to a hinge, which moves, but rather to a foundation or root, which is standing and at rest, according to Ephesians 3, 17: “rooted and grounded in love.”
Ad tertium dicendum, quod secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., prudentia est recta ratio agibilium. Agibilia autem dicuntur moralia opera, ut ex his quae ibi dicuntur, apparet. Et ideo prudentia convenit cum moralibus virtutibus quantum ad sui materiam; et propter hoc connumeratur eis, licet quantum ad suam essentiam vel subiectum sit intellectualis. Ad 3. It should be said that, according to the Philosopher in Ethics 6, prudence is right reason with respect to things to be done. But things to be done are called moral works, as is clear from what is said there. Therefore, prudence agrees with the moral virtues because of its matter, and on account of this is numbered among them, although with respect to its essence or subject it is an intellectual virtue.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod sapientia, ex hoc ipso quod non est circa humana, sed circa divina, non communicat cum virtutibus moralibus in materia: unde non connumeratur virtutibus moralibus, ut simul cum eis dicatur cardinalis virtus, quia ipsa ratio cardinis repugnat contemplationi, quia non est sicut ostium, quo intratur ad aliquid aliud; sed magis actio moralis est ostium, per quod ad contemplationem sapientiae intratur. Ad 4. It should be said that wisdom, because it is concerned with the divine and not the human, does not have its matter in common with the moral virtues, and hence is not numbered among them as if together with them it might be called a cardinal virtue. The notion of hinge is repugnant to contemplation, which is not like a door, whereby one enters into something else, but moral action is the door through which entry is made to the contemplation of wisdom.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod si praedictae quatuor virtutes accipiantur secundum quod significant generales conditiones virtutum, secundum hoc omnes virtutes speciales, de quibus philosophus tractat in Lib. Ethic., reducuntur ad has quatuor virtutes sicut species ad genus. Si vero accipiantur secundum quod sunt speciales virtutes circa quasdam materias principales, sic aliae reducuntur ad eas sicut secundarium ad principale ut eutrapelia quae moderatur delectationem ludi, potest reduci ad temperantiam, quae moderatur delectationes tactus; unde et Tullius in II rhetoricae, ponit alias virtutes esse partes harum quatuor. Quod potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo quod sint partes subiectivae secundum primum modum sumendi has virtutes; alio modo quod sint partes potentiales, si sumantur secundo modo virtutes praedictae; sic sensus est pars potentialis, quia non nominat totam virtutem animae, sed aliquid eius. Ad 5. It should be said that if the foregoing four virtues are taken to signify the general conditions of virtue, then all the special virtues of which the Philosopher treats in the Ethics are reduced to these four as species to genera. But if they be taken as special virtues dealing with the most basic matters, the others are reduced to them as the secondary to the principal; for example, eutrapelia, which moderates the pleasure of play, can be reduced to temperance which moderates the pleasures of touch. Hence, Cicero in Rhetoric 2 says that the other virtues are parts of these four. That can be understood in two ways: They are subjective parts if these virtues are taken in the first way, whereas they are potential parts if they are taken in the second way. Thus, sense is a potential part of the soul because it does not name the whole power of the soul, but something of it.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod non est de ratione temperantiae quod omnes pravas concupiscentias excludat, sed quod temperatus non patiatur aliquas tales concupiscentias vehementes et fortes, sicut patiuntur illi qui non studuerunt concupiscentias refrenare. Paulus igitur patiebatur concupiscentias inordinatas propter fomitis corruptionem: non tamen fortes neque vehementes, quia studebat eas reprimere castigando corpus suum, et in servitutem redigendo; unde vere temperatus erat. Ad 6. It should be said that it is not of the meaning of temperance that it excludes all depraved desires, but that the temperate person does not experience as vehement and strong desires as those who do not try to restrain them. Therefore, Paul suffered inordinate desires because of the corruption of lust, but not strongly or vehemently, because he sought to repress them by castigating his own body and bring it into subjection. Hence, he was truly temperate.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod iustitia, per quam ordinamur ad alterum, non est circa passiones proprias, sed circa operationes quibus communicamus cum aliis, sicut sunt emptio et venditio, et alia huiusmodi: temperantia autem et fortitudo sunt circa proprias passiones. Et ideo, sicut in homine est una vis appetitiva sine passione id est voluntas, duae autem cum passione, id est concupiscibilis et irascibilis: ita est una virtus cardinalis ordinans ad proximum, duae autem ordinantes hominem ad seipsum. Ad 7. It should be said that justice, by which we are related to the other, does not deal with one’s own passions but with the activities by which we communicate with others, such as buying and selling and the like: But temperance and fortitude are concerned with one’s own passions and therefore, Just as there is one appetitive power without passion, namely, will, and two with passion, namely, the concupiscible and irascible, so there is one cardinal virtue ordered to the neighbor, and two ordering a man to himself.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod caritas dicitur esse omnis virtus non essentialiter, sed causaliter, quia scilicet caritas est mater omnium virtutum. Semper autem effectus magis multiplicatur quam causa; et ideo oportet aliarum virtutum esse maiorem multiplicitatem quam caritatis. Ad 8. It should be said that charity is called the whole of virtue not essentially but causally, because charity is the mother of all the virtues. But the effect is always more multiplied than the cause, and therefore the other virtues must be greater in number than charity.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod diversa ratio receptionis potest esse vel ex parte materiae, quae receptiva est formae; et talis diversitas facit diversitatem generis; vel ex parte formae, quae diversimode receptibilis est in materia: et talis diversitas facit diversitatem speciei. Et ita est in proposito. Ad 9. It should be said that the different senses of reception can be taken either from the side of the matter which is receptive of form, and such diversity causes diversity of genus, or from the side of the form which is diversely receivable in matter, and such diversity causes diversity of species. And so it is in the objection.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod virtutes morales attingunt rationem sicut regulam proximam, Deum autem sicut regulam primam. Res autem specificantur secundum propria et proxima principia, non secundum principia prima. Ad 10. It should be said that the moral virtues involve reason as their proximate measure, but God as their first measure. Things are specified according to proper and proximate principles, not according to first principles.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod principalis pars hominis est pars rationalis. Sed rationale est duplex: scilicet per essentiam et per participationem; et sicut ipsa ratio est principalior quam vires participantes ratione, ita etiam prudentia est principalior quam aliae virtutes. Ad 11. It should be said that the rational is the principal part of man, but something is rational in two ways, essentially or by way of participation and, just as reason itself is more principal that the powers participating in reason, so prudence is more principal than the other virtues.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod virtutes cardinales dicuntur principaliores omnibus aliis, non quia sunt omnibus aliis perfectiores, sed quia in eis principalius versatur humana vita, et super eas aliae virtutes fundantur. Manifestum est autem quod humana vita magis versatur circa iustitiam, quam circa liberalitatem: utimur enim iustitia ad omnes, liberalitate autem ad paucos. Ipsa autem liberalitas supra iustitiam fundatur: non enim esset liberalis donatio, nisi aliquis daret de suo; per iustitiam autem distinguuntur propria ab alienis. Ad 12. It should be said that the cardinal virtues are called more principal, not because they are more perfect than all the other virtues, but because human life more principally turns on them and the other virtues are based on them. But it is manifest that human life turns more on justice than on liberality, for we use justice in regard to all, but liberality in regard to a few. And liberality itself is founded on justice, for there would not be a liberal gift if one did not give of his own, but one’s own is distinguished from that of others through justice.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod humilitas firmat omnes virtutes indirecte, removendo quae bonis virtutum operibus insidiantur, ut pereant; sed in virtutibus cardinalibus firmantur aliae virtutes directe. Ad 13. It should be said that humility strengthens all virtues indirectly by removing what can undermine the good works of the virtues and cause them to perish; but the other virtues are directly strengthened by the cardinal virtues.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod patientia includitur in fortitudine: nam fortis habet id quod est patientis, ut scilicet non conturbetur ex imminentibus malis; et etiam addit amplius, ut scilicet in mala imminentia exiliat secundum quod oportet. Ad 14. It should be said that patience is included in fortitude, for the brave person has what the patient person has, but adds even more, namely, that he drives off imminent evils in the way that he should.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso quod magnanimitas est ornatus aliarum virtutum, manifestatur quod alias virtutes praesupponit, in quibus fundatur; et ex hoc apparet quod aliae sunt magis principales quam ipsa. Ad 15. It should be said that, from the fact that magnanimity adorns the other virtues, it is clear that it presupposes the other virtues in which it is grounded, and from this it is also clear that the others are more principal than it.
Articulus 2
Secundo quaeritur utrum virtutes sint connexae; ut qui habet unam, habeat omnes

Article 2
Whether the virtues are connected such that he who has one has all

Et videtur quod non. And it seems not.
Dicit enim Beda super Lucam, quod sancti magis humiliantur de virtutibus quas non habent, quam extollantur de virtutibus quas habent. Ergo quasdam habent, et quasdam non habent; non ergo virtutes sunt connexae. 1. In commenting on Luke, Bede says that the saints are more humbled by the virtues they do not have than extolled for those they have. Therefore, they have some and lack others, and the virtues are not connected.
Praeterea, homo post poenitentiam est in statu caritatis: de his autem patitur difficultatem operandi propter consuetudinem praecedentem, ut dicit Augustinus contra Iulianum; et sic huiusmodi difficultas videtur provenire ex habitu contrario virtuti, per malam consuetudinem acquisitam, cum quo non potest simul esse virtus ei contraria. Ergo aliquis potest habere unam virtutem, scilicet caritatem, et carebit aliis. 2. Moreover, a man is in the state of charity after penance, and yet he experiences difficulty in certain matters because of his earlier practice, as Augustine says against Julian. But a difficulty of this kind seems to arise from a habit contrary to virtue, due to an acquired bad inclination incompatible with the contrary virtue. Therefore, someone can have one virtue, namely, charity, and lack others.
Praeterea in omnibus baptizatis caritas invenitur. Sed quidam baptizati non habent prudentiam, ut patet maxime in morionibus et phreneticis, qui non possunt esse prudentes, secundum philosophum; et etiam in quibusdam adultis simplicibus, qui non bene videntur esse prudentes, cum non sint bene consiliativi, quod est opus prudentiae. Non ergo qui habet unam virtutem, scilicet caritatem habet omnes alias. 3. Moreover, charity is found in all those who have been baptized, but some of the baptized do not have prudence, as is particularly evident in the retarded and insane, who cannot be prudent, according to the Philosopher, and even in some simple adults who do not seem to be prudent, since they do not deliberate well, which is a work of prudence. Therefore, he who has one virtue, namely charity, does not have all the others.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, sicut ars est recta ratio factibilium. Sed homo potest habere rectam rationem circa unum genus factibilium puta circa fabrilia, et non habebit rectam rationem circa alia artificialia. Ergo etiam potest habere prudentiam circa unum genus agibilium, puta circa iusta, et non habebit circa aliud genus, puta circa fortia; et ita poterit habere unam virtutem absque alia. 4. Moreover, according to the Philosopher in Ethics 6, prudence is right reason concerning things to be done, as art is right reason regarding things to be made. But a man can have right reason with regard to one sort of makeable things, for example, tools, and not with respect to other artificial things. Therefore, he can also have prudence concerning one sort of act, for example, just acts, and not have it concerning another, for example, brave acts. Thus, he will have one virtue without the others.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., quod non omnis liberalis est magnificus, et tamen utrumque est virtus, scilicet liberalitas et magnificentia; et similiter dicit, quod aliqui sunt moderati, non tamen magnanimi. Non ergo quicumque habet unam virtutem, habet omnes. 5. Moreover, the Philosopher says in Ethics 6 that not every liberal person is magnificent, yet both liberality and magnificence are virtues; similarly he says that some are moderate and not magnanimous. Therefore, it is not the case that whoever has one virtue has them all.
Praeterea, apostolus dicit I ad Corinth., cap. XII, 4: divisiones gratiarum sunt; et postea subdit: alii datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae, quae sunt intellectuales virtutes, alii fides, quae est virtus theologica. Ergo aliquis habet unam virtutem, et non habet aliam. 6. Moreover, the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 12:4: “There are varieties of gifts;” and afterwards (8:9) adds: “To one through the Spirit is given the utterance of wisdom; and to another the utterance of knowledge” (which are intellectual virtues), “to another faith” (which is a theological virtue). Therefore, one can have one virtue and not another.
Praeterea, virginitas est quaedam virtus, ut Cyprianus dicit. Sed multi habent alias virtutes qui non habent virginitatem. Ergo non quicumque habet unam virtutem, habet omnes. 7. Moreover, virginity is a virtue, as Cyprian says. But many have other virtues and do not have virginity. Therefore, not everyone who has one virtue has them all.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., quod Anaxagoram et Thaletem sapientes quidem dicimus, non autem prudentes. Sed sapientia et prudentia sunt quaedam virtutes intellectuales. Ergo aliquis potest habere unam virtutem sine aliis. 8. Moreover, the Philosopher says in Ethics 6 that although we call Anaxagoras and Thales wise we do not call them prudent. But wisdom and prudence are intellectual virtues. Therefore, a person can have one virtue without the others.
Praeterea, philosophus in eodem Lib. dicit, quod quidam habent inclinationem ad unam virtutem, et non ad aliam. Potest ergo contingere quod aliquis exercitetur in actibus unius virtutis, et non in actibus alterius. Sed ex exercitio actuum acquiruntur quaedam virtutes, ut patet per philosophum in II Ethic. Ergo, saltem, virtutes acquisitae non sunt connexae. 9. Moreover, in the same book the Philosopher says that some have an inclination to one virtue but not to another. It can happen, therefore, at someone practices the acts of one virtue an not those of another. But from the performance of acts virtues are acquired, as is clear from the Philosopher in Ethics 2. Therefore, the acquired virtues at least are not connected.
Praeterea, virtus etsi secundum aptitudinem sit a natura, tamen secundum esse perfectum non est a natura, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Manifestum est etiam quod non est a fortuna, quia quae sunt a fortuna, sunt praeter electionem. Relinquitur ergo quod virtus acquiratur in nobis vel a proposito vel a Deo. Sed a proposito (ut videtur) potest acquiri una virtus sine alia: quia unus potest habere intentionem ad acquirendum unam virtutem, et non aliam. Similiter etiam et a Deo: quia aliquis potest petere a Deo unam virtutem, et non aliam. Ergo omnibus modis una virtus potest esse sine alia. 10. Moreover, although the aptitude for virtue comes from nature it cannot be perfected by nature, as is said in Ethics 2. It is manifest as well that it is not from fortune, because the goods of fortune are outside the realm of choice. It follows, therefore, that we acquire virtue either by putting our minds to it or from God. But it seems that one virtue can be acquired intentionally without another since one can have the intention of acquiring one virtue but not another. Similarly, someone can ask God for one virtue and not another. Therefore, in whatever way it be considered, one virtue can be without others.
Praeterea, finis in moralibus comparatur ad actus virtutum in moralibus, sicut in demonstrativis principia ad conclusiones. Sed homo potest habere unam conclusionem sine alia. Ergo potest habere unam virtutem sine alia. 11. Moreover, in moral matters, the end is related to the acts of the virtues, as principles are to conclusions in demonstrative matters. But a man can have one conclusion without others. Therefore, he can have one virtue without others.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in quadam Epist. de sententia Iacobi, quod non est divina sententia, qua dicitur: qui habet unam virtutem, habet omnes; et quod homo potest habere unam virtutem sine alia, puta misericordiam, et non continentiam; sicut et in membris corporis unum potest esse illuminatum, sive decorum aut sanum, sine alio. Ergo virtutes non sunt connexae. 12. Moreover, Augustine says in a letter about the judgment of Jacob that it is not a divine judgment that he who has one virtue has them all, and that a man can have one virtue without the others, for example, mercy and not continence, much as in the body one member can be well, handsome, or healthy, and another not. Therefore, the virtues are not connected.
Praeterea, ea quae sunt connexa, aut hoc est ratione principii, aut ratione subiecti, aut ratione obiecti. Sed non ratione principii, quod est Deus, quia, secundum hoc, omnia bona quae sunt a Deo, essent connexa; nec etiam ratione subiecti, quod est anima, quia secundum hoc omnes non essent connexae; nec iterum ratione obiecti, quia per obiecta distinguuntur: non est autem idem principium distinctionis et connexionis. Ergo et cetera. 13. Moreover, things are connected either by reason or principle or subject or object. But the virtues cannot be connected by reason of their principle, God, because then it would follow that all the goods that are from God are connected. Nor by reason of their subject, the soul, because not all are connected on that basis. And not by reason of object, because they are distinguished from one another by their objects and the principle of distinction and connection cannot be the same. Therefore...
Praeterea, intellectuales virtutes non habent connexionem cum moralibus; sicut patet maxime de intellectu principiorum, qui potest haberi sine moralibus virtutibus. Sed prudentia est virtus intellectualis, quae ponitur una cardinalium. Ergo non habet connexionem cum aliis cardinalibus, quae sunt virtutes morales. 14. Moreover, the intellectual virtues are not connected with the moral virtues, as is most evident in the understanding of principles, which can be had without the moral virtues. But prudence is an intellectual virtue, which is numbered among the cardinal virtues. Therefore, it does not have a connection with the other cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues.
Praeterea, in patria non erit fides et spes, sed tantum erit ibi caritas. Ergo etiam in statu perfectissimo virtutes non erunt connexae. 15. Moreover, in heaven there will be neither faith nor hope, but only charity. Therefore, even in the most perfect state the virtues are not connected.
Praeterea, Angeli, in quibus non sunt virtutes sensitivae, et similiter animae separatae, habent caritatem et iustitiam, quae est perpetua et immortalis; non autem habent temperantiam et fortitudinem, quia hae virtutes sunt irrationabilium partium, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo virtutes non sunt connexae. 16. Moreover, angels and separated souls, which are perpetual and immortal, do not have sense powers, and they have charity and justice but not temperance and fortitude because these are virtues of the irrational parts, as is said in Ethics 3. Therefore, the virtues are not connected.
Praeterea, sicut sunt virtutes quaedam animae, sunt etiam quaedam virtutes corporales. Sed in virtutibus corporalibus non est connexio, quia aliquis habet visum qui non habet auditum. Ergo neque etiam in virtutibus animae. 17. Moreover, some virtues are of the soul, but there are also virtues of body. But there is no connection among the bodily powers, since one can have sight and not hearing. Therefore, neither is there a connection among the virtues of the soul.
Praeterea, dicit Gregorius super Ezechielem, quod nemo repente fit summus; et in Psalm. LXXXIII, 8, dicitur, quod ibunt de virtute in virtutem. Non ergo simul acquirit homo virtutes, sed successive; et ita virtutes non sunt connexae. 18. Moreover, Gregory says on Ezechiel that no one suddenly becomes the best, and in Psalm 83, 8, it is said: “They shall go from strength to strength.” Therefore, a man does not acquire the virtues simultaneously, but successively, and thus the virtues are not connected.
Sed contra. Est quod Ambrosius dicit super Luc.: connexae sunt et concatenatae: ut qui unam habuerit, omnes habere videatur. ON THE CONTRARY. 1. Ambrose says in commenting on Luke that they are connected and interlocked such that he who has one is seen to have them all.
Praeterea, Gregorius dicit XXII Moral., quod si una virtus sine alia habeatur, aut virtus non est, aut perfecta non est. Sed perfectio est de ratione virtutis: virtus enim est perfectio quaedam, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Ergo virtutes sunt connexae. 2. Moreover, Gregory says in morals on Job 23 that if one virtue could be had without the others, either it is not a virtue or it is not perfect. But perfection is of the very notion of virtue. “For virtue is a certain perfection,” as is said in Physics 7. Therefore, the virtues are connected.
Praeterea, super illud Ezech., I, 11: duae pennae singulorum iungebantur, Glossa dicit, quod virtutes sunt coniunctae; ut qui una caruerit, alia careat. 3. Moreover, with respect to Ezekiel 1:11: “Two wings of every one were joined,” the Gloss says the virtues are conjoined such that he who lacks one, lacks the others.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod de virtutibus dupliciter possumus loqui: uno modo de virtutibus perfectis; alio modo de virtutibus imperfectis. Perfectae quidem virtutes connexae sibi sunt; imperfectae autem virtutes non sunt ex necessitate connexae. RESPONSE. It should be said that we can speak of virtues in two ways, as perfect and as imperfect. Perfect virtues are connected to one another, but imperfect virtues are not necessarily connected.
Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod cum virtus sit quae hominem bonum facit, et opus eius bonum reddit, illa est virtus perfecta quae perfecte opus hominis bonum reddit, et ipsum bonum facit; illa autem est imperfecta, quae hominem et opus eius reddit bonum non simpliciter, sed quantum ad aliquid. In evidence of which it should be noted that since virtue is that which makes a man and his work good, the virtue that makes a man’s work and himself good is perfect virtue, whereas the imperfect does not make a man and his work good simply speaking, but only in a certain respect.
Bonum autem simpliciter in actibus humanis invenitur per hoc quod pertingitur ad regulam humanorum actuum; quae quidem est una quasi homogenea et propria homini, scilicet ratio recta, alia autem est sicut prima mensura transcendens, quod est Deus. Ad rationem autem rectam attingit homo per prudentiam, quae est recta ratio agibilium, ut philosophus dicit in VI Ethic. Ad Deum autem attingit homo per caritatem, secundum illud I Ioan., IV, 16: qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. Human acts are good simply speaking when they attain to the rule of human acts, one of which is, as it were, homogeneous and proper to man, namely, right reason, and the other a first transcendent measure, which is God. A man attains right reason through prudence, which is right reason concerning what is to be done, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 6. A man attains to God through charity, according to John 4, 16: “God is love, and he who abides in love abides in God, and God in him.”
Sic igitur est triplex gradus virtutum. Sunt enim quaedam virtutes omnino imperfectae, quae sine prudentia existunt, non attingentes rationem rectam, sicut sunt inclinationes quas aliqui habent ad aliqua virtutum opera etiam ab ipsa nativitate, secundum illud Iob, XXXI, 18: ab infantia crevit mecum miseratio, et de utero egressa est mecum. Huiusmodi autem inclinationes non simul insunt omnibus, sed quidam habent inclinationem ad unum, quidam ad aliud. Hae autem inclinationes non habent rationem virtutis, quia virtute nullus male utitur, secundum Augustinum; huiusmodi autem inclinationibus potest aliquis male uti et nocive, si sine discretione utatur; sicut equus, si visu careret, tanto fortius impingeret, quanto fortius curreret. Unde Gregorius dicit in XXII Moral., quod ceterae virtutes, nisi ea quae appetunt, prudenter agant, virtutes esse nequaquam possunt; unde ibi inclinationes quae sunt sine prudentia, non habent perfecte rationem virtutis. There is then a threefold grade of virtue. For there are some wholly imperfect virtues which exist without prudence, not attaining right reason, such as the inclinations which some have to certain works of virtue even from their birth, according to Job 31:18: “For from my infancy mercy grew up with me: and it came out with me from my mother’s womb.” Such inclinations are not all at once in everybody, but some have an inclination to one and others to another. Such inclinations do not have the mark of virtue, however, because no one uses a virtue badly, according to Augustine, but a person can use such inclinations badly and harmfully if he acts without discretion, much as a horse if it lacks vision will run faster the harder it is beaten. Hence, Gregory in Morals on Job 22 says that other virtues, unless those who desire act prudently, cannot be called virtues at all. Hence, these inclinations without prudence do not fulfill the definition of virtue.
Secundus autem gradus virtutum est illarum quae attingunt rationem rectam, non tamen attingunt ad ipsum Deum per caritatem. Hae quidem aliqualiter sunt perfectae per comparationem ad bonum humanum, non tamen sunt simpliciter perfectae, quia non attingunt ad primam regulam, quae est ultimus finis, ut Augustinus dicit contra Iulianum. Unde et deficiunt a vera ratione virtutis; sicut et morales inclinationes absque prudentia deficiunt a vera ratione virtutis. The second grade of virtues are those that attain right reason but do not attain God through charity. These are in a sense perfect with respect to the human good, but not simply speaking perfect, because they do not attain the first rule, which is the ultimate end, as Augustine says against Julianus. Hence, they fall short of the true definition of virtue much as moral inclinations without prudence fall short of the true definition of virtue.
Tertius gradus est virtutum simpliciter perfectarum, quae sunt simul cum caritate; hae enim virtutes faciunt actum hominis simpliciter bonum, quasi attingentem usque ad ultimum finem. Est autem considerandum ulterius, quod, sicut virtutes morales esse non possunt absque prudentia, ratione iam dicta, ita nec prudentia potest esse sine virtutibus moralibus; est enim prudentia recta ratio agibilium. Ad ipsam autem rectam rationem in quolibet genere requiritur quod aliquis habeat aestimationem et iudicium de principiis, ex quibus ratio illa procedit; sicut in geometricalibus non potest aliquis habere aestimationem rectam, nisi habeat rectam rationem circa principia geometricalia. Principia autem agibilium sunt fines; ex his enim sumitur ratio agendorum. De fine autem habet aliquis rectam existimationem per habitum virtutis moralis; quia, ut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., qualis unusquisque est, talis et finis videtur ei; sicut virtuoso videtur appetibile, ut finis, bonum quod est secundum virtutem; et vitioso illud quod pertinet ad illud vitium; et est simile de gustu infecto et sano. Unde necesse est quod quicumque habet prudentiam, habeat etiam virtutes morales. The third grade is of virtues that are perfect simply speaking, because they are with charity. These virtues make a man’s act simply good, as attaining the ultimate end. It should be considered further that just as moral virtues cannot exist without prudence, for the reason already given, so prudence cannot exist without the moral virtues, for prudence is right reason about things to be done. For right reason in any genus one must have estimation and judgment of principles, from which reason proceeds, as in geometry one cannot have a correct estimate unless his reason is right concerning geometrical principles. But ends are the principles in things to be done and from them is drawn the reason for acting. But a person has a right estimate of the end thanks to the habit of moral virtue because, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 3, as a person is, so does the end appear to him. For to the virtuous that which is the good according to virtue seems desirable as an end, but to the vicious the desirable is that which pertains to his vice. And it is the same with healthy and unhealthy taste. Hence it is necessary that whoever has prudence also has moral virtues.
Similiter etiam quicumque habet caritatem, oportet quod habeat omnes alias virtutes. Caritas enim est in homine ex infusione divina, secundum illud Rom. V, 5: caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis. Deus autem ad quaecumque dat inclinationem, dat etiam formas aliquas, quae sunt principia operationum et motuum, ad quos res inclinatur a Deo; sicut igni dat levitatem, per quam prompte et faciliter sursum tendit; unde, ut dicitur Sap. VIII, 1, disponit omnia suaviter. Similarly, whoever has charity, must have all the other virtues. But charity is in man by a divine infusion, according to Romans 5:5: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.” But to whomever God gives an inclination he also gives certain forms which are the principles of action and motion to the things God inclines him to, just as he gives lightness to fire so that it can quickly and easily leap upward. Hence, it is said in Wisdom 8:1: “and orders all things sweetly.”
Oportet igitur quod similiter cum caritate infundantur habituales formae expedite producentes actus ad quos caritas inclinat. Inclinat autem caritas ad omnes actus virtutum, quia cum sit circa finem ultimum, importat omnes actus virtutum. Quaelibet enim ars vel virtus ad quam pertinet finis, imperat his quae sunt circa finem, sicut militaris equestri, et equestris frenorum factrici, ut dicitur in I Ethicor. Unde secundum decentiam divinae sapientiae et bonitatis, ad caritatem simul habitus omnium virtutum infunduntur; et ideo dicitur I ad Corinth. XII, v. 4: caritas patiens est, benigna est, et cetera. So it is necessary that, along with charity, there should be infused habitual forms for expeditiously producing the acts to which charity inclines. But charity inclines to the acts of all the virtues: Since it is concerned with the ultimate end, it implies the acts of all virtues. But any art or virtue which pertains to the end commands those which are for the sake of the end, as the general commands the cavalryman and the cavalryman the maker of harness, as is said in Ethics 1. Hence, according to the fittingness of divine wisdom and goodness, along with charity, the habits of all virtues are infused along with charity, and therefore it is said in 1 Corinthians 13, 5: “Charity is patient, is kind,” etc.
Sic ergo, si accipiamus virtutes simpliciter perfectas, connectuntur propter caritatem; quia nulla virtus talis sine caritate haberi potest, et caritate habita omnes habentur. Si autem accipiamus virtutes perfectas in secundo gradu, respectu boni humani, sic connectuntur per prudentiam; quia sine prudentia nulla virtus moralis esse potest, nec prudentia haberi potest, si cui deficiat moralis virtus. Si tamen accipiamus quatuor cardinales virtutes, secundum quod important quasdam generales conditiones virtutum, secundum hoc habent connexionem, ex hoc quod non sufficit ad aliquem actum virtutis quod adsit una harum conditionum, nisi omnes adsint; et secundum hoc videtur assignare causas connexionis Gregorius, in Lib. XXI Moralium. Therefore, if we mean simply perfect virtues, they are connected because of charity, because no such virtue can be had without charity and, if charity is had, all of them are had. If we understand virtues perfect in the second grade, with respect to the human good, they are connected through prudence, because no moral virtue can be had without prudence nor can prudence be had if one is lacking moral virtue. But if we understand the four cardinal virtues insofar as they imply the general conditions of virtue, in this way they are connected in the sense that it does not suffice to the act of virtue that one of these conditions be present if all are not, and this is the reason Gregory gave for their connection in Morals on Job 21.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod propter inclinationem quae est ex natura, vel ex aliquo dono gratiae, quam habet aliquis magis ad opus unius virtutis quam alterius contingit quod aliquis promptior est ad actum unius virtutis quam alterius; et secundum hoc dicuntur sancti aliquas virtutes habere, ad quarum actus magis sunt prompti, et aliquas non habere, ad quas sunt minus prompti. Ad 1. It should be said that because of an inclination one has to the work of one virtue rather than another, which is either natural or a gift of grace, it happens that one more promptly performs the act of one virtue than another; and in this way the saints are said to have some virtues on which they are prompt to act and not to have others on which they are less prompt to act.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum habitus secundum se facit prompte et delectabiliter operari, potest tamen hoc impediri per aliquid superveniens; sicut habens habitum scientiae interdum impeditur ad eius usum per somnolentiam vel ebrietatem, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Sic ergo iste qui poenitet, consequitur cum gratia gratum faciente, caritatem, et omnes alios habitus virtutum, sed propter dispositiones ex actibus priorum peccatorum relictas patitur difficultatem in executione virtutum quas habitualiter recipit; quod quidem non contingit in virtutibus acquisitis per exercitium actuum, per quos simul et contrariae dispositiones tolluntur, et habitus virtutum generantur. Ad 2. It should be said that although habits as such make someone act promptly and with pleasure, this can be impeded by something supervening, as one having the habit of science is sometimes impeded from using it by sleepiness or drunkenness or something of the like. Therefore, one who repents receives by grace charity and all the other virtues but because of the lingering dispositions from his prior sins he experiences difficulty in the performance of virtues which he has received habitually. This does not happen with virtues acquired through the practice of acts, which at the same time remove contrary dispositions and generate the habits of the virtues.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod ille qui baptizatur, simul cum caritate recipit et prudentiam, et omnes alias virtutes; sed de necessitate prudentiae non est ut homo sit bene consiliativus in omnibus, puta in mercationibus et rebus bellicis et huiusmodi, sed in his quae sunt necessaria ad salutem: quod non deest omnibus in gratia existentibus, quantumcumque sint simplices, secundum illud I Ioan. II, 27: unctio docebit vos de omnibus; nisi forte in aliquibus baptizatis impediatur actus prudentiae propter corporalem defectum aetatis, sicut in pueris, vel pravae dispositionis, sicut in morionibus et phreneticis. Ad 3. It should be said that those who are baptized receive prudence along with charity and all the other virtues too, but it is not of the necessity of prudence that a man deliberate well in everything, for example, in trade and military matters and the like, but only in the things necessary for salvation, which are not lacking to those in grace, however simple they be, according to 1 John 2:27: “But his anointing teaches you concerning all things”; unless perhaps in some of the baptized the act of prudence be impeded on account of the bodily defect of age, as in children or those of deformed dispositions, such as the retarded and mad.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod artificialia diversorum generum habent principia omnino disparata: et ideo nihil prohibet habere artem circa unum genus eorum, et non circa aliud. Sed principia moralium sunt ordinata ad invicem, ita quod per defectum unius sequeretur etiam defectus in aliis; puta, si quis deficeret ab hoc principio quod est concupiscentias non esse sequendas, quod pertinet ad concupiscentiam, sequeretur interdum quod sequendo concupiscentiam faceret iniuriam, et sic violaretur iustitia; sicut etiam in una et eadem arte vel scientia, puta in geometria, error unius principii inducit errorem in totam scientiam. Et inde est quod non potest esse aliquis sufficienter prudens circa materiam unius virtutis, nisi sit prudens circa omnes. Ad 4. It should be said that artifacts of different types have wholly different principles, so nothing prevents someone having one kind of art and not another. But the principles of morals are so interrelated to one another that the failure of one would entail the failure in others. For example, if one were weak on the principle that concupiscence is not to be followed, which pertains to desire, then sometimes in pursuing concupiscence, he would do injury and thus violate justice. So too in one and the same art or science, for example, geometry, an error about one principle leads to error in the whole science. Thence it is that one cannot be sufficiently prudent with regard to the matter of one virtue unless he is prudent with regard to them all.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod potest dici quod contingit esse aliquem liberalem, sed non magnificum quantum ad actus: quia aliquis parum habens, potest in usu eius quod habet, exercere actum liberalitatis, non autem magnificentiae; quamvis aliquis habeat habitum, per quem etiam magnificentiae actum exerceret, si materia adesset. Et similiter dicendum est de moderantia et magnanimitate. Ista responsio tenenda est omnino in virtutibus infusis. In virtutibus etiam acquisitis per actum, potest dici, quod ille qui acquisivit habitum liberalitatis in usu parvae substantiae, nondum acquisito habitu magnificentiae, sed habito liberalitatis actu, est in proxima dispositione ut acquirat habitum magnificentiae per modicum actum. Quia igitur in propinquo est ut habeatur, idem videtur ac si haberetur, quia quod parum deest, quasi nihil deesse videtur, ut dicitur in II Physic. Ad 5. It should be said that it happens that someone can be called liberal but not high-minded with respect to an act, because someone having little can use what he has to perform an act of liberality but not of magnificence, although he might have the virtue by which he could also perform the act of magnificence if he had the wherewithal. Similarly, it must be said of moderation and magnanimity. This solution is to be held without reservation in the case of infused virtues, but in virtues acquired through acts it can be said that he who acquired the habit of liberality in the use of little, not yet having acquired the habit of magnificence but actually having the habit of liberality, is in proximate potency to acquiring the habit of magnificence with but slight effort. Therefore, because what is close to being had seems the same as being had, what is lacking only a little seems not to be lacking at all, as is said Physics 2.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod sapientia et scientia non accipiuntur in illis verbis apostoli neque secundum quod sunt virtutes intellectuales, quae tamen connexionem non habent, ut infra dicetur, neque secundum quod sunt dona spiritus sancti, quae connexionem habent secundum caritatem; sed secundum quod sunt gratiae gratis datae: prout scilicet aliquis abundat scientia et sapientia, ut possit aedificare alios ad finem et Dei cognitionem, et contradicentes arguere; unde et apostolus non dicit: alii datur sapientia, alii scientia; sed: alii datur sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae. Unde Augustinus dicit in XIV de Trinitate, quod huiusmodi scientia, non pollent fideles plurimi, quamvis ipsa fide polleant. Fides etiam non accipitur ibi pro fide informi, ut quidam dicunt, quia donum fidei commune est omnibus; sed accipitur pro quadam fidei constantia, seu certitudine, quae interdum abundat etiam in peccatoribus. Ad 6. It should be said that in those words of the Apostle wisdom and knowledge are understood neither as intellectual virtues, which, however, have no connection, as will be said below, nor as gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are connected through charity, but insofar as they are of grace freely given: namely, insofar as someone abounds in knowledge and wisdom so that he can spur others to the end and to the knowledge of God, convincing those who object. Hence, the Apostle does not say that to one is given wisdom and to another knowledge, but to one is given the utterance of wisdom, to other the utterance of knowledge. Hence, Augustine, in On the Trinity 14, says that many believers are not strong in such knowledge although they might be strong in faith itself. Faith does not mean here unformed faith, as some say, because the gift of faith is common to all, but means the constancy of faith or its certitude, which sometimes abounds even in sinners.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod virginitas secundum quosdam non nominat virtutem, sed quemdam perfectiorem statum virtutis. Non autem oportet quod quicumque habet virtutem, habeat eam secundum gradum perfectum. Et ideo sine virginitate, castitas et aliae virtutes haberi possunt. Vel, si detur quod virginitas sit virtus, hoc erit secundum quod importat habitum mentis, ex quo aliquis eligit virginitatem conservare propter Christum. Et hic quidem habitus esse potest etiam in his qui carnis integritate carent; sicut et habitus magnificentiae potest esse sine magnitudine divitiarum. Ad 7. It should be said that some hold that virginity is not the name of a virtue so much as of a more perfect state of virtue. But it is not necessary that anyone who has a virtue have it in its perfect grade. Therefore, chastity and the other virtues can be had without virginity. Or, if virginity is taken to be a virtue, this will be insofar as it implies a habit of mind by which one chooses to preserve virginity for the sake of Christ. And this habit can exist even in those who are not intact in the flesh, just as the habit of magnificence can be without a lot of wealth.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod virtutes intellectuales non sunt connexae ad invicem; et hoc propter tria. Primo quidem, quia quae sunt circa rerum diversa genera, non sunt coordinata ad invicem, sicut et de artibus dictum est. Secundo, quia in scientiis non convertibiliter se habent principia et conclusiones; ita scilicet quod quicumque habet principia, habeat conclusiones, sicut in moralibus dictum est. Tertio, quia virtus intellectualis non habet respectum ad caritatem, per quam ordinatur homo ad ultimum finem. Et ideo huiusmodi virtutes ordinantur ad aliqua particularia bona: puta geometria ad dimetiendum circa abstracta quaedam, physica circa mobilia, et sic de aliis. Unde eadem ratione non sunt connexae qua nec virtutes imperfectae, ut supra, in corp. art., dictum est. Ad 8. It should be said that the intellectual virtues are not interconnected and this for three reasons. First, because virtues concerned with different kinds of things are not related to one another, as has been said of the arts. Second, because in the sciences principles and conclusions are not convertible, such that whoever has the principles has the conclusions, as has been said about moral matters. Third, because intellectual virtue is not related to charity by which man is ordered to his ultimate end. Therefore, such virtues are concerned with particular goods, for example, geometry with measuring abstract entities, Physics with mobile things, and so on with the others. Hence, they are not connected for the same reason that imperfect virtues are not, as was said about in the body of the article.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod quaedam virtutes sunt quae ordinant hominem in his quae occurrunt in vita humana: sicut temperantia, iustitia, mansuetudo et huiusmodi; et in talibus necesse est quod homo, dum exercitatur in actu huius virtutis, vel simul etiam exerceatur in actibus aliarum virtutum, et tunc acquiret omnes habitus, virtutum simul; vel oportet quod bene se habeat in uno et male in aliis, et tunc acquiret habitum contrarium alteri virtuti, et per consequens corruptionem prudentiae, sine qua nec dispositio, quam acquisivit per actus alicuius virtutis, habet proprie rationem virtutis, ut supra, in corp. art., dictum est. Huiusmodi autem habitibus acquisitis circa ea quae communiter in vita occurrunt, virtualiter iam habentur quasi in propinqua dispositione si qui alii habitus virtutum sunt, quorum actus occurrant frequenter in conversatione humana; sicut de magnificentia et magnanimitate dictum est, in solutione ad 5 argumentum. Ad 9. It should be said that there are some virtues which order man with respect to the things that occur in human fife, such as temperance, justice, patience, and the like, and with them a man Must either, while actually performing the act of a virtue, simultaneously perform the acts of the other virtues and thus acquires all habits of the virtues together, or he must be good in the one and bad in the others. But in the latter case, he acquires a habit contrary to a virtue and consequently the corruption of prudence without which, as has been said above in the body of the article, the disposition acquired through the act of any virtue cannot properly be called a virtue. Such acquired habits bearing on things that commonly occur in fife are already virtually had as it were in proximate disposition if one has other virtues whose acts frequently occur in human intercourse, as was said of magnificence and magnanimity in the solution of argument 5.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod virtutes acquisitae causantur a proposito; et necesse est quod simul causentur in homine qui sibi proponit acquirere unam virtutem; et non acquiret, nisi simul acquirat prudentiam, cum qua omnes habentur, ut dictum est in corp. art. Virtutes autem infusae causantur immediate a Deo, quae etiam causantur ex caritate, sicut ex communi radice, ut dictum est in corp. art. Ad 10. It should be said that acquired virtues are caused purposely, and must be all caused together in a man who proposes to himself to acquire one of them, nor are they acquired unless at the same time one acquires prudence with which all are had, as was said in the body of the article. But infused virtues are caused immediately by God, and they are also caused by charity as by their common root, as was said in the body of the article.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod in scientiis speculativis non se habent principia convertibiliter ad conclusiones, sicut accidit in moralibus, ut dictum est in corp. art., et ideo qui habet unam conclusionem, non necesse est quod habeat aliam. Esset autem necesse, si oporteret, quod quicumque habet principia, haberet conclusiones, sicut est in proposito. Ad 11. It should be said that in speculative sciences principles and conclusions are not convertible as they are in morals, as was said in the body of the article. Therefore, he who has one conclusion does not necessarily have another. If this were the case, it would be necessary that whoever has the principles has the conclusions, as the objection assumes.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de virtutibus imperfectis, quae sunt dispositiones quaedam ad actus virtutum; unde et ipsemet probat in VI de Trinitate, connexionem. Ad 12. It should be said that Augustine is speaking there of imperfect virtues which are dispositions to the acts of virtues; hence, he himself proves their connection in On the Trinity 6.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod virtutes habent connexionem ratione principii proximi, id est sui generis, quod est prudentia vel caritas; non autem ratione principii remoti et communis, quod est Deus. Ad 13. It should be said that virtues are connected by reason of the proximate principle of their genus, which is either prudence or charity, not by reason of the remote and common, which is God.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod prudentia specialiter inter virtutes intellectuales habet connexionem cum virtutibus ratione materiae circa quam est; est enim circa mobilia. Ad 14. It should be said that among the intellectual virtues prudence has a special connection with the [moral] virtues by reason of its matter, for it is concerned with changeable things.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod in patria, deficiente spe et fide, succedent quaedam perfectiora, scilicet visio et comprehensio, quae connectentur caritati. Ad 15. It should be said that in heaven where hope and faith disappear certain more perfect things succeed them, namely, vision and comprehension, which are conncctcd with charity.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod in Angelis et animabus separatis non est temperantia et fortitudo ad hos actus ad quos sunt in hac vita, scilicet ad moderandum passiones sensibilis partis; sed ad quosdam alios actus, ut patet per Augustinum in XIV de Trinitate. Ad 16. It should be said that In the angels and separated souls there is not temperance or fortitude with respect to such acts as are performed in this life, namely, moderating the passions of the sensible part, but to other acts, as is evident in Augustine On the Trinity 14.
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod potentiae animae non se habent convertibiliter cum essentia; quamvis enim nulla potentia animae possit esse sine essentia, tamen essentia animae potest esse sine quibusdam potentiis; puta sine visu et auditu, propter corruptionem organorum quorum huiusmodi potentiae proprie sunt actus. Ad 17. It should be said that the powers of the soul are not convertible with its essence, for although no power of the soul can exist apart from essence, yet the essence of the soul can exist without some powers, for example, without sight and hearing because of the corruption of the organs of which such powers are properly the acts.
Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod non propter hoc homo est summus, quod habet omnes virtutes, sed propter hoc quod habet eas in summo. Ad 18. It should be said that a man is not the best because he has all the virtues but because he has them to the greatest degree.
Articulus 3
Tertio quaeritur utrum omnes virtutes in homine sint aequales

Article 3
Whether all virtues in a man are equal

Et videtur quod non. And it seems that they are not.
Dicitur enim I ad Cor. XIII, 13: nunc autem manent fides, spes et caritas, tria haec; maior autem horum est caritas. Sed maioritas excludit aequalitatem. Ergo virtutes in uno homine non sunt aequales. 1. For it is said in 1 Corinthians 13:13: “So there abide faith, hope and charity, these three, but the greatest of these is charity.” But greatest excludes equality. Therefore, the virtues in a man are not equal.
Sed dicendum, quod caritas est maior secundum actum, sed non secundum habitum. Sed contra, Augustinus dicit in Lib. de Trinit., quod in his quae non mole magna sunt, idem est esse maius quod melius. Sed habitus caritatis est melior quam habitus aliarum virtutum, quia magis attingit ad Deum, secundum illud I Ioan., IV, 16: qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet. Ergo caritas secundum habitum, maior est quam aliae virtutes. 2. But it will be said that charity is greatest in its act but not as a habit. On the contrary, Augustine says in On the trinio that in things that are not quantitatively large, to be greater is the same as to be better. But the habit of charity is better than the habits of the other virtues, because it attains God more, according to 1 John 4:16, “God abides in him, and he in God.” Therefore, charity as a habit is greater than the other virtues.
Praeterea, perfectio praecedit suum perfectibile. Sed caritas est perfectio aliarum virtutum, secundum illud Coloss. III, 14: super omnia autem haec caritatem habete, quod est vinculum perfectionis; et I ad Tim. I, 5, dicitur: finis autem praecepti caritas. Ergo est maior aliis virtutibus. 3. Moreover, perfection precedes the perfectible, but charity is the perfection of the other virtues, according to Colossians 3:14: “But above all these things have charity, which is the bond of perfection,” and in 1 Timothy 1:5, we read that “the purpose of this charge is charity.” Therefore, it is greater than the other virtues.
Praeterea, illud quod nihil imperfectionis habet annexum, est perfectius et maius; quia albius est quod est nigro impermixtius. Sed habitus caritatis nihil habet imperfectionis admixtum; quia fides est de non apparentibus, et spes de non habitis. Ergo caritas, etiam secundum habitum, est perfectior et maior quam fides et spes. 4. Moreover, that which has nothing of imperfection connected with it is more perfect or greater, because the whiter is that which has no black in it. But the habit of charity has no imperfection mixed with it, because faith is of things unseen and hope of what is not had. Therefore, charity, even as a habit, is more perfect and greater than faith and hope.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in XIX de civitate Dei: virtutes nisi ad Deum referantur, vitia sunt. Ex quo potest accipi, quod ratio virtutis perficitur ex ordine ad Deum. Sed caritas propinquius ordinat hominem ad Deum quam aliae virtutes; quia unit hominem Deo, secundum illud I ad Cor. cap. VI, 17: qui adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus est. Ergo caritas est maior virtus quam aliae. 5. Moreover, Augustine, in The City of God 19 says that, unless virtues are referred to God, they are vices. From which can be gathered that the notion of virtue is perfected by an ordering to God. But charity more proximately orders man to God than the other virtues, because it unites man to God, according to 1 Corinthians 6:17: “But he who cleaves to the Lord is one spirit with him.” Therefore, charity is a greater virtue than the others.
Praeterea, virtutes infusae originem habent ex gratia, quae est earum perfectio. Sed caritas perfectius participat gratiam quam aliae virtutes: gratia enim et caritas inseparabiliter se concomitantur; fides autem et spes possunt esse sine gratia. Ergo caritas est maior aliis virtutibus; non ergo omnes virtutes sunt aequales. 6. Moreover, the infused virtues have their origin in grace which is their perfection. But charity participates in grace more perfectly than the other virtues do, because charity and grace inseparably accompany one another, but faith and hope can be without grace. Therefore, since charity is greater than the other virtues, not all virtues are equal.
Praeterea, Bernardus dicit in I de consideratione, quod prudentia est materia fortitudinis, quia sine prudentia fortitudo praecipitat. Sed id quod est principium et causa alicuius, est maius et potius eo. Ergo prudentia est maior fortitudine; non ergo omnes virtutes sunt aequales. 7. Moreover, Bernard says in On consideration 1 that prudence is the matter of fortitude, because without prudence fortitude is precipitous. But that which is the principle and cause of something is greater and more powerful than it. Therefore prudence is greater than fortitude. Therefore, not all virtues are equal.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit in V Ethic., quod iustitia est tota virtus; aliae autem virtutes sunt secundum partem. Sed totum est maius parte. Ergo iustitia est maior aliis virtutibus; non ergo omnes virtutes sunt aequales. 8. Moreover, the Philosopher in Ethics 5 says that justice is the whole of virtue, and the other virtues are by way of being parts. But the whole is greater than its part. Therefore, justice is greater than the other virtues, so not all virtues are equal.
Praeterea, Augustinus probat in XI super Genes. ad Litt. quod si omnia in universo essent aequalia, non essent omnia. Sed virtutes omnes habentur simul, quia sunt connexae, ut supra, art. praec., ostensum est. Non ergo omnes virtutes sunt aequales. 9. Moreover, Augustine, in his Literal commentary on Genesis 6, says that if everything in the universe were equal, not all of them would exist. But the virtues are all had at once because they are connected, as the preceding article showed. Therefore, not all virtues are equal.
Praeterea, virtutibus opponuntur vitia. Sed non omnia vitia sunt aequalia. Ergo neque omnes virtutes sunt aequales. 10: Moreover, the vices are opposed to the virtues, but not all vices are equal. Therefore, neither are the virtues equal.
Praeterea, laus debetur actibus virtutum. Sed quidam magis laudantur de una virtute quam de alia; unde Cassianus dicit in V de institutione Coenob.: alius scientiae floribus exornatur; alius discretionis ratione robustius communitur; alter patientiae gravitate fundatur; alius humilitatis, alius continentiae virtute praefertur. Non ergo omnes virtutes in uno homine sunt aequales. 11. Moreover, the acts of virtue ought to be praised, but some people are more praised for one virtue than for another. Hence, Cassian says in On the Cenobitic constitution 5: One is adorned with the flowers of knowledge; another by reason of an uncommonly robust discretion; another is founded on the gravity of patience; another of humility; another is preferred for the virtue of continence. Therefore, not all the virtues in a man are equal.
Sed dicendum, quod ista inaequalitas est secundum actus, non secundum habitus. Sed contra, secundum philosophum in I Poster., ea quae ad aliquid sunt, simul intenduntur. Sed habitus secundum propriam rationem dicitur ad actum. Est enim habitus quo quis agit cum tempus fuerit, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de bono coniugali. Si ergo actus unius virtutis in aliquo homine est maior quam actus alterius, sequitur quod etiam habitus sint inaequales. 12. But it will be said that this is an inequality on the side of acts, not of habits. On the contrary, according to the Philosopher in Posterior Analytics 1, things which are for the sake of something are intended at the same time as the end. But habit by definition is related to act. For habit is that by which one acts when the time is ripe, as Augustine says in On the conjugal good. Therefore, if the act of one virtue in a man is greater than the act of another, it follows that the habits too are unequal.
Praeterea, Hugo de s. Victore dicit, quod actus augent habitus. Si ergo actus virtutum sunt inaequales; et habitus virtutum inaequales erunt. 13. Moreover, Hugh of St. Victor says that acts augment habits. Therefore, if the acts of virtues are unequal, their habits too will be unequal.
Praeterea, ita se habet in moralibus habitus virtutis ad actum proprium, sicut in naturalibus forma ad proprium motum vel actionem. Sed in naturalibus, quanto aliquis magis habet de forma, tanto magis habet de operatione vel motu, quia quod est gravius, velocius tendit deorsum, et quod est calidius, magis calefacit. Ergo etiam in moralibus actus virtutum inaequales esse non possunt, nisi habitus virtutum fuerint inaequales. 14. Moreover, in morals the habit of virtue relates to its proper act just as in natural things form relates to its proper motion or action. But the more of form a natural thing has, the more it has of activity or motion; for example what is heavier falls more swiftly, and what is warmer heats better. Therefore, in morals too the acts of virtues can only be unequal if the habits of the virtues are unequal.
Praeterea, perfectiones sunt proportionabiles perfectibilibus. Virtutes autem sunt perfectiones potentiarum animae, quae sunt inaequales, quia ratio excedit inferiores vires, quibus imperat. Ergo etiam virtutes sunt inaequales. 15. Moreover, perfections are proportionate to the things perfected. But virtues are perfections of powers of the soul which are unequal, since reason excels the lower powers which it commands. Therefore, the virtues are unequal.
Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, XXII Moral. et Homil. XV in Ezech., beatus Iob incrementa virtutum, quia distincte hominibus superno munere tribui conspexit, gradus vocavit; quoniam per ipsos ascenditur, et ad caelestia obtinenda venitur. Sed ubi est incrementum et gradus, non est aequalitas. Ergo virtutes non sunt aequales. 16. Moreover, Gregory in Morals on Job 22 and in his fifteenth homily on Ezekiel says that blessed Job, because he saw how differently the highest gift was distributed among men, called the increments of virtues steps, since by them they rise and come to attain celestial things. But where there is increment and grades there is no equality. Therefore, the virtues are not equal.
Praeterea, quaecumque ita se habent quod uno crescente aliud decrescit, oportet quod sint inaequalia. Sed videtur quod caritate crescente aliud decrescat: quia status patriae, in quo perficietur caritas, opponitur statui viae, in quo habet locum fides; uno autem oppositorum crescente, alterum decrescit. Ergo caritas et fides non possunt esse aequales; non ergo omnes virtutes sunt aequales. 17. Moreover, things so related that the increase of one causes the decrease of another must be unequal. But when charity increases something else seems to decrease, because the condition of heaven, where charity is perfected, is opposed to the condition of the wayfarer where faith plays a role. When one of opposites increases the other decreases. Therefore charity and faith cannot be equal, so not all virtues are equal.
Sed contra. ON THE CONTRARY
Apocal. XXI, 16 dicitur: quod latera civitatis sunt aequalia; per quae latera signantur virtutes, secundum Glossam. Ergo virtutes sunt aequales. 1. Apocalypse 21:16, says: “And the city stands foursquare, and its length is as great as its breadth.” The virtues are meant by the walls of the city, according to the gloss. Therefore the virtues are equal.
Praeterea, dicit Augustinus in VI de Trinit.: quicumque sunt aequales in fortitudine, aequales sunt in prudentia et temperantia. Si enim dixeris aequales esse istos fortitudine, sed illum praestare prudentia; sequitur quod huius fortitudo minus prudens sit. Ac per hoc nec fortitudine aequales erunt; quando est illius fortitudo prudentior. Atque ita de ceteris virtutibus invenies, si omnes eadem consideratione percurras. Non autem oporteret eos qui sunt aequales in una virtute, esse aequales in aliis, nisi omnes virtutes in uno homine sint aequales. 2. Moreover, as Augustine says in On the Trinity 6, 4: “Those who are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance. For if you should say that some are equal in fortitude but prudence is greater than fortitude, it follows that the fortitude of one is less prudent. And then they will not be equal in fortitude since this one’s fortitude is more prudent. And you will find the same in the other virtues, if you apply the same consideration to all.” Thus, those who are equal in one virtue need not be equal in others, unless all virtues in the same man are equal.
Praeterea, Gregorius dicit super Ezech. quod fides, spes, caritas et operatio sunt aequales. Ergo pari ratione omnes aliae virtutes sunt aequales. 3. Moreover, Gregory says in commenting on Ezekiel that faith, hope, and action are equal. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, the other virtues are equal.
Praeterea, Ezech. XLVI, 22, dicitur: mensurae unius quatuor erant; Glossa: quibus proficimus ad virtutem. Sed quae unius mensurae, sunt aequalia. Ergo omnes sunt aequales. 4. Moreover, Ezekiel 46:22, says that there are four measures of one thing, that is, of the way we advance to virtue, according to the gloss. But things that have the same measure are equal. Therefore, all are equal.
Praeterea, Damascenus dicit: naturales sunt virtutes, et aequaliter insunt omnibus secundum esse accidentis. Ergo virtutes secundum suum esse accidentis sunt aequales. 5. Moreover, Damascene says that virtues are natural, and are equally in everyone in the mode of being of accident. Therefore, virtues insofar as they are accidents are equal.
Praeterea, maioris virtutis actui debetur maius praemium. Si ergo in homine esset una virtus maior quam alia, sequeretur quod eidem homini deberetur maius et minus praemium; quod est inconveniens. 6. Moreover, the greater the virtue, the greater the reward. Therefore, if in man there were one virtue greater than another, it would follow that the same man is owed greater and lesser praise, which is absurd.
Praeterea, si simpliciter sequitur ad simpliciter, et magis sequitur ad magis. Sed ad hoc quod una virtus habeatur, sequitur quod omnes habeantur, quia virtutes sunt connexae, ut supra, art. praeced., dictum est. Ergo ad hoc quod una magis habeatur, sequitur quod omnes magis habeantur; oportet ergo omnes virtutes esse aequales. 7. Moreover, if simply follows on simply, then more follows on more. But when one virtue is had, all are had, because the virtues are connected, as was said above in the preceding article. Therefore, if one virtue were had more, it would follow that all were had more. Therefore, it is necessary that all virtues are equal.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod aequale et inaequale dicuntur secundum quantitatem; unum enim in quantitate aequale dicitur, sicut in qualitate simile, et in substantia idem, ut patet in V Metaph. Quantitas autem importat rationem mensurae, quae primo quidem invenitur in numeris; secundario autem in magnitudinibus; et quodam alio modo in omnibus aliis generibus, ut patet in IX Metaph. RESPONSE. It should be said that things are called equal or unequal with reference to quantity. For things one in quantity are called equal, things one in quality, similar, and things one in substance, the same, as is clear from Metaphysics 5. But quantity implies the note of measure, which is found first in numbers, secondarily in magnitudes, and in a different manner in the other genera, as is clear from Metaphysics 9.
In quolibet enim genere id quod est simplicissimum et perfectissimum, est mensura omnium aliorum, ut in coloribus albedo, et in motibus motus diurnus; eo quod unaquaeque res tanto perfectior est, quanto magis accedit ad primum sui generis principium. Ex quo patet quod perfectio uniuscuiusque rei secundum quam attenditur mensuratio eius, est a primo principio; similiter quantitas eius; et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit in VIII de Trinit., quod in his quae non mole magna sunt, idem est melius quod maius. Cum autem cuiuslibet formae non subsistentis esse consistat in eo quod subiecto vel materiae inest, dupliciter potest eius quantitas seu perfectio considerari: uno modo, secundum rationem propriae speciei; alio modo, secundum esse quod habet in materia seu subiecto. For in every genus that which is most simple and perfect is the measure of all else, as whiteness in colors and diurnal motion in movements, because a thing is more perfect to the degree that it approaches the first principle of its genus. From this it is evident that insofar as a thing’s perfection pertains to its measurement it is from the first principle; and so too its quantity; and this is what Augustine says in On the Trinity 8 that in things which are not great in quantity, the better and the greater are the same. But since the existence of any non-subsistent form consists in its being in a subject or matter, the perfection of its quantity is of two kinds: one, according to the proper notion of the species; another, according to the existence it has in the matter or subject.
Secundum quidem rationem propriae speciei, formae diversarum specierum sunt inaequales; sed formae unius speciei quaedam quidem possunt esse aequales, quaedam autem non. Oportet enim principium specificum accipi in aliquo indivisibili. Differentia enim huiusmodi principii speciem variat, et ideo, si hoc principio esset additio vel subtractio, ex necessitate species variaretur. Unde et philosophus dicit in VIII Metaph., quod species rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus unitas addita vel subtracta variat speciem. With respect to the proper notion of species, the forms of different species are unequal, but in the same species some forms can indeed be equals and some not. The specific principle must be taken from something indivisible. For the difference in such a principle causes the species to vary and therefore by the addition or subtraction of this principle the species necessarily vary. Hence, the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 8 that the species of things are like numbers, in which a unit added or taken away changes the species.
Quaedam vero formae sunt quae sortiuntur speciem per aliquid suae essentiae, sicut omnes formae absolutae, sive sint substantiales sive accidentales; et in talibus impossibile est quod in eadem specie secundum hunc modum una forma maior alia inveniatur, non enim est una albedo secundum se considerata, magis albedo quam alia. Quaedam vero formae sunt quae sortiuntur speciem ex aliquo extrinseco ad quod ordinantur, sicut motus sortitur speciem ex termino. Unde unus motus est maior alio, secundum propinquitatem vel distantiam a termino. Et similiter inveniuntur quaedam qualitates quae sunt dispositiones in ordine ad aliquid; sicut sanitas est quaedam commensuratio humorum in ordine ad naturam animalis, quod dicitur sanum: et ideo aliquis gradus commensurationis humorum in leone est sanitas, qui in homine esset infirmitas. There are some forms that are specified by something of their essence, such as all absolute forms, whether substantial or accidental, and in such it is impossible that in this mode one form be greater than another of the same species, for there is not one whiteness which, considered in itself, could be greater than another. But other forms are specified by something extrinsic to which they are ordered, as motion is specified by its term. Hence, one motion is greater than another as it is closer to or more distant from the term. Similarly, there are some qualities which are dispositions related to something, as health is a certain commensuration of humors ordered to the nature of the animal. Therefore, what is called healthy in a lion would be illness in a man.
Quia ergo secundum gradum commensurationis sanitas non recipit speciem, sed secundum naturam animalis ad quam ordinatur, contingit etiam quod in eodem animali una sanitas est maior quam alia, ut dicitur X Ethicorum: in quantum, scilicet, diversi gradus commensurationis humorum possunt esse, in quibus salvatur convenientia humanae naturae. Et eodem modo se habet in scientia, quae recipit unitatem ex unitate subiecti; unde in uno potest esse geometria maior quam in alio, in quantum novit plures conclusiones ordinatas ad cognitionem subiecti geometriae, quod est magnitudo. Health is not specified by the degree of commensuration but by the nature of the animal to which it is ordered, and it also happens that the same animal is at some times healthier than at others, as is said in Etbi. cs 10, insofar, that is, as there can be different degrees of commensuration of humors which realize what is fitting to human nature. And the same is true of science which derives its unity from the unity of the subject, so that geometry can be greater in one person than another insofar as the former knows more conclusions conveying knowledge of the subject of geometry, which is extension.
Similiter etiam secundum quantitatem perfectionis quam habent huiusmodi formae secundum quod insunt materiae vel subiecto, quaedam formae unius speciei inaequales esse possunt, in quantum insunt secundum magis et minus; quaedam vero magis et minus inesse non possunt. Non enim quaecumque forma dat speciem subiecto cui inest, potest inesse magis et minus: quia, sicut dictum est, principium specificum oportet in indivisibili consistere; quod inde est, quia nulla forma substantialis recipit magis et minus. Similarly too according to the quantity of perfection such forms have insofar as they are in a matter or subject, forms of the same species can be unequal insofar as they inhere more or less, because, as has been said, the specific principle should consist in something indivisible. That is why substantial form is more or less.
Similiter etiam si qua forma speciem sortiatur secundum aliquid quod secundum suam rationem est indivisibile, non dicitur secundum magis et minus. Et inde est quod binarius, et quaelibet alia species numeri quae specificatur secundum unitatem additam, non recipit magis et minus; et eadem ratio est in figuris quae secundum numerum specificantur, ut triangulus et quadratum; et in quantitatibus determinatis, ut bicubitum et tricubitum; et in relationibus numeralibus, sicut duplum et triplum. Similarly, if a form is specified by something indivisible in its notion, it will not admit of more or less. No more does two or any other species of number specified by the addition of a unit admit of more and less; nor do figures which are specified by number, like triangle and quadrilateral; nor determined quantities like the cube and pyramid; nor finally numerical relations, such as double and triple.
Formae vero quae neque dant speciem subiecto, neque sortiuntur speciem ex aliquo quod secundum rationem suam sit indivisibile, possunt inesse secundum magis et minus, ut albedo et nigredo, et alia huiusmodi. But forms which neither give species to their subject nor take their species from something indivisible in its notion, can inhere more or less; e.g., whiteness and blackness and the like.
Ex his igitur patet, quod dupliciter potest aliquid se ad diversas formas habere circa aequalitatem et inaequalitatem. From all this it is evident that there are two ways in which equality and inequality pertain to forms.
Quaedam enim formae sunt quae in eadem specie inaequalitatem non recipiunt neque secundum se, ut una earum sit maior quam alia eiusdem speciei, neque secundum esse, ut scilicet magis insit subiecto; et huiusmodi sunt omnes formae substantiales. Quaedam vero inaequalitatem non recipiunt secundum se, sed solum secundum quod insunt subiecto, sicut albedo et nigredo. Forms specifically the same are unequal neither in themselves, as if one form could be greater than another of the same species, nor according to existence, such that it inheres more in the subject. This is the case with all substantial forms. Other forms do not admit inequality as such but only insofar as they are in a subject, like whiteness and blackness.
Quaedam vero inaequalitatem recipiunt secundum se, non tamen secundum quod insunt subiecto, sicut triangulus dicitur maior triangulo, eo quod lineae unius trianguli sunt maiores quam alterius, quamvis ordinentur ad aliquid unum specificans; non tamen una superficies est magis triangula quam alia. Some forms admit inequality in themselves but not as they exist in a subject; for example, one triangle is greater than another, because the base of one is larger than that the other, although they are specified in the same way so the one surface is not more of a triangle than another.
Quaedam vero sunt quae recipiunt inaequalitatem et secundum se, et secundum quod insunt subiecto; sicut sanitas, et scientia, et motus. Est enim motus inaequalis, vel quia maius spatium pertransit, vel quia mobile velocius movetur. Similiter etiam scientia est maior unius quam alterius, vel quia conclusiones plures novit, vel quia easdem res melius scit. Similiter potest esse sanitas inaequaliter, vel quia gradus commensurationis in uno est propinquior debitae et perfectae aequalitati quam in alio, vel quia circa eumdem gradum commensurationis unus firmius se habet quam alius, et melius. There are some forms that admit inequality both in themselves and insofar as they exist in a subject, for example, health, knowledge, motion. Motions are unequal either because they cover more or less space, or because the moved moves more swiftly. Similarly too one person’s knowledge is greater than another’s either because he knows more conclusions or because he knows the same things better. So too health can be unequal either because the level of commensuration in one is closer to fitting and perfect equality than in another, and better.
His igitur visis, circa aequalitatem et inaequalitatem virtutum dicendum est, quod si loquamur de inaequalitate virtutum quae attenditur secundum seipsas, sic virtutes diversarum specierum possunt esse inaequales. Cum enim virtus sit dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in VII Ethic., illa virtus perfectior et maior est quae ad maius bonum ordinatur. Et secundum hoc virtutes theologicae, quarum obiectum est Deus, sunt aliis potiores; inter quas tamen caritas est maior, quia propinquius Deo coniungit; et spes maior quam fides, quia scilicet spes aliqualiter movet affectum in Deum, fides autem facit Deum in homine esse per modum cognitionis. Speaking of the equality and inequality of virtues against this background, we can say that, considered in themselves, specifically different virtues can be unequal. For since virtue is a disposition of the perfect to the best, as is said in Ethics 7, that virtue is more perfect and greater which is ordered to the greater good. Given this, the theological virtues, whose object is God, are stronger than the others, and among them charity is the greatest because it unites us more closely to God, and hope is greater than faith, because hope moves the will to God, whereas by faith God is in a man by way of knowledge.
Inter alias autem virtutes prudentia est maxima, quia est moderatrix aliarum; et post hanc iustitia, per quam homo bene se habet non solum in seipso, sed ad alium; et post hanc fortitudo, per quam homo propter bonum contemnit pericula mortis; et post hanc temperantia, per quam homo propter bonum contemnit maximas delectationes corporalium. Among all the other virtues prudence is the greatest because it governs the others, and after it comes justice by which a man is well ordered not only in himself but also with respect to others. After this comes fortitude by which a man disregards the perils of death for the sake of the good. Then comes temperance which disregards the greatest of bodily pleasures.
Sed in eadem specie virtutis non potest huiusmodi inaequalitas inveniri sicut invenitur in eadem specie scientiae, quia non est de ratione scientiae, quod habens aliquam scientiam sciat omnes conclusiones illius scientiae; est autem de ratione virtutis, ut habens aliquam, bene se habeat in omnibus quae ad virtutem illam pertinent. But the kind of inequality found in science cannot be found within a species of virtue. Although it is not of the definition of science that anyone having the science should know all its conclusions, it is of the definition of virtue that one having it is well ordered with respect to everything pertaining to that virtue.
Secundum vero perfectionem vel quantitatem virtutis ex parte illa qua inest subiecto, potest esse inaequalitas etiam in eadem specie virtutis: in quantum unus habentium virtutem melius se habet ad ea quae sunt illius virtutis quam alius; vel propter meliorem dispositionem naturalem, vel propter maius exercitium, vel propter melius iudicium rationis, vel propter gratiae donum; quia virtus neque dat speciem subiecto, neque habet aliquid indivisibile in sui ratione, nisi secundum Stoicos, qui dicebant nullum habere virtutem nisi eam haberet in summo; et secundum hoc omnes sunt habentes eamdem virtutem aequaliter. As to the perfection or quantity of virtue insofar as it exists in a subject, there can be inequality even in the same species of virtue when one of those having the virtue is better related than others to the things pertaining to that virtue; and this because of a better natural disposition, or greater exercise, or a better judgment of reason, or a gift of grace. Virtue does not give species to its subject, nor does it have anything indivisible in its notion,pace the Stoics who taught that no one has a virtue unless he has it to the maximum, so everyone would have the same virtue equally.
Sed hoc non videtur esse de ratione alicuius virtutis, quia talis diversitas in modo participandi virtutem attenditur secundum praedicta, quae non pertinent ad rationem alicuius particularis virtutis, puta castitatis, vel similium. But this does not seem to be the meaning of any virtue, because diversity in the manner of participating in the virtue is gauged by the factors just mentioned, which do not enter into the definition of any particular virtue, for example, chastity and the like.
Sic igitur in diversis, virtutes inaequales esse possunt, et quantum ad diversas species virtutum, et etiam secundum quod insunt subiecto, quantum etiam ad unam speciem virtutis. Therefore, virtues can be unequal in different people, not only with respect to specifically different virtues but also to virtues specifically the same according as they exist in the subject.
Sed in uno et in eodem homine sunt quidem virtutes inaequales secundum quantitatem vel perfectionem, quam virtus secundum se habet; secundum vero illam quantitatem et perfectionem quam habet virtus secundum quod inest subiecto, simpliciter quidem oportet omnes virtutes esse aequales, eadem ratione qua et sunt connexae, quia aequalitas est quaedam connexio in quantitate. Unde et aequalitatis rationem aliqui assignant secundum quod per quatuor virtutes cardinales intelliguntur quidam generales modi virtutum; et huiusmodi est ratio Augustini in VI de Trinit. Aliter vero assignari potest secundum dependentiam virtutum moralium a prudentia, et omnium virtutum a caritate; unde ubi est aequaliter caritas, oportet omnes virtutes esse aequales secundum formalem perfectionem virtutis; et eadem ratione de prudentia per comparationem ad virtutes morales. But in one and the same man virtues are unequal according to the quantity or perfection a virtue has of itself; but according to the virtue’s quantity and perfection as existing in a subject, all virtues must, simply speaking, be equal for the same reason that they are connected, since equality is a kind of connection in quantity. Hence, some give as the reason for equality that the four cardinal virtues are understood as general modes of virtue, and this is the reason of Augustine in On the Trinity 6. It can be otherwise assigned according to the dependence of moral virtues on prudence and of all virtues on charity. Hence, where charity is equal, all virtues must be equal according to the formal perfection of virtue, and for the same reason prudence with respect to the moral virtues.
Secundum quid vero possunt virtutes esse inaequales in uno et eodem, sicut et non connexae, secundum inclinationem potentiae ad actum, quae est ex natura, vel ex quacumque alia causa. Et propter hoc quidam dicunt, quod sunt inaequales secundum actum; sed hoc non est intelligendum nisi secundum inaequalitatem inclinationis ad actum. In a certain respect, however, virtues in one and the same person can be called unequal and not connected because of the power’s inclination to act, which is from nature or some other cause. Because of this some call them unequal in act, but this must be understood only as an inequality of inclination to act.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de inaequalitate quae est et attenditur secundum ipsas virtutes, non de inaequalitate quae est secundum inesse ipsarum, de qua nunc loquimur. Caritas enim, ut dictum est, secundum se est maior omnibus aliis virtutibus; sed tamen, ea crescente, etiam proportionaliter crescunt omnes aliae virtutes in uno et eodem homine, sicut digiti manus secundum se sunt inaequales, tamen proportionaliter crescunt. Ad 1. This argument, it should be said, is based on the inequality of the virtues themselves, not of the inequality in the way they inhere, of which we are now speaking. For charity, as has been said, taken as such, is greater than all other virtues, and yet, as it grows in a person, all the other virtues grow proportionately, as the fingers of the hand are unequal to one another, yet grow proportionately.
Et similiter dicendum est ad secundum, tertium, quartum, quintum et sextum; et etiam ad septimum, quod secundum eumdem modum probabat, aliis virtutibus esse fortitudinem maiorem. Ad 2-7. Similarly, it should be replied to the second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth, and the seventh too, which in the same fashion argued that fortitude was greater than the other virtues.
Similiter etiam ad octavum, quod eodem modo procedit de iustitia, licet iustitia, quae est tota virtus, non sit illa iustitia quae ponitur virtus cardinalis. Ad 8. Similarly to the eighth, which proceeds in the same way concerning justice; although justice is the whole of virtue, it is not justice in that sense that is called a cardinal virtue.
Et similiter etiam dicendum ad nonum; quia in hoc omnes virtutes homini insunt, quod distinguuntur secundum maiorem et minorem perfectionem speciei. Ad 9. And we should answer the ninth objection in the same way, because it is insofar as the virtues are in man that greater or less perfection of a species of virtue is distinguished.
Et similiter etiam dicendum ad decimum, quia etiam hoc modo vitia sunt inaequalia. Ad 10. Similarly it should be replied to the tenth, because in this way the vices too are unequal.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod unus magis laudatur de una virtute quam de alia propter maiorem promptitudinem ad actum. Ad 11. It should be said that a person is more praised for one virtue than for another because of a greater promptitude to act.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod ubi est maior habitus, oportet quod sit maior actus secundum inclinationem habitus. Potest tamen esse in homine aliquid vel impediens vel disponens ad actum, quod per accidens se habet ad habitum; sicut habitus scientiae impeditur ne ad actum prodeat, propter ebrietatem. Et ideo secundum huiusmodi impedimenta vel auxilia ad agendum, potest quandoque esse augmentum in actu, non existente augmento circa habitum. Ad 12. It should be said that where there is a greater habit there should be a greater act according to the inclination of the habit. But there can be something in a man that either impedes action or disposes to it yet is incidentally related to the habit, as one might be impeded from exercising the habit of science because of drunkenness. Therefore, with respect to such impediments or aids to action there can sometimes be an increase in the act without an increase in the habit.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod in habitibus acquisitis maius exercitium causat maiorem habitum; tamen per accidens potest impediri habitus iam ex pluribus actibus acquisitus, ut non magis possit in actum procedere; sicut dictum est in corp. art. Ad 13. It should be said that in acquired habits greater exercise causes a greater habit; however, a habit acquired through many acts can still be incidentally impeded and not produce its act, as was said in the body of the article.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod in rebus naturalibus, ubi est aequalis forma, potest esse inaequalitas actus propter aliquod impedimentum accidentale. Ad 14. It should be said that in natural things where there is equal form there can be inequality of act due to some incidental impediment.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod potentiae sunt inaequales secundum seipsas: in quantum, scilicet, una potentia secundum propriam rationem est perfectior alia. Et hoc etiam modo dictum est, quod virtutes sint inaequales. Ad 15. It should be said that powers are unequal in themselves, insofar as one power is more perfect than another according to its proper definition. And it has been said that virtues are unequal in this way too.
Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod virtutes insunt proportionaliter, ut dictum est; unde ex hoc non sequitur quod inaequaliter habeantur. [Ad 16. It should be said that powers are in a subject proportionally, as has been said. So it does not follow that they are had unequally.]
Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod status patriae opponitur fidei, ratione apertae visionis, quam non consequitur aliquis per augmentum caritatis; unde non oportet quod crescente caritate fides minuatur. Ad 17. It should be said that virtues inhere proportionately, as has been said; hence, the condition of heaven is opposed to faith by reason of open vision which one does not attain through an increase of charity; so it does not follow that faith decreases as charity increases.
Responses to arguments advanced On the Contrary:
Ad primum vero eorum quae in contrarium obiecta sunt et secundum, tertium et quartum patet responsio ex his quae dicta sunt. Ad 1-4. The answers are evident from what has been said.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod Damascenus intelligit virtutes aequaliter in omnibus esse. Ad 5. It should be said that Damascene understands the virtues to be equally in all.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod praemium essentiale respondet radici caritatis; et ideo, si etiam detur quod virtutes non sint aequales, tamen idem praemium debebitur uni homini propter identitatem caritatis. Ad 6. It should be said that the essential reward responds to the root of charity; therefore, even if it be granted that the virtues are not equal, still the same reward is owed to a given man because of the identity of charity.
Septimum concedimus. Ad 7. We concede this point.
Articulus 4
Quarto quaeritur utrum virtutes cardinales maneant in patria

Article 4
Whether all the cardinal virtues remain in heaven

Et videtur quod non. And it seems that they do not.
Dicit enim Gregorius, XVI Moral., quod accidentia vitae comparata cum corpore transeunt. Non ergo manent in patria. 1. For Gregory says in Morals on Job 16 that the accidents disposed for life pass away with the body. Therefore, they do not remain in heaven.
Praeterea, habito fine non sunt necessaria ea quae sunt ad finem; sicut postquam pervenitur ad portum, non necessaria est navis. Sed virtutes cardinales in hoc distinguuntur a theologicis, quod theologicae habent ultimum finem pro obiecto, cardinales autem sunt circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Ergo quando perventum fuerit ad ultimum finem in patria, non erit necessaria virtus cardinalis. 2. Moreover, once the end is attained, that which was for the sake of the end is no longer necessary: When one has come to port the ship is no longer necessary. But the cardinal virtues are distinct from the theological virtues in this, that the theological virtues have the ultimate end for their object whereas the cardinal virtues are concerned with what is for the sake of the end. Therefore, when the ultimate end has been attained in heaven, the cardinal virtues will no longer be necessary.
Praeterea, sublato fine cessat id quod est ad finem. Sed virtutes cardinales ordinantur ad bonum civile, quod non erit in patria. Ergo neque virtutes cardinales erunt in patria. 3. Moreover, take away the end and that which is for the sake of the end ceases. But the cardinal virtues are ordered to the civil good, which is not in heaven. Therefore, the cardinal virtues will not remain in heaven.
Praeterea, id non dicitur manere in patria, sed magis evacuari, quod non manet secundum propriam speciem, sed solum secundum communem generis rationem; sicut fides dicitur evacuari, quamvis maneat cognitio, quae est genus eius. Sed virtutes cardinales non remanent in patria secundum proprias species, secundum quas distinguuntur: dicit enim Augustinus, XII super Genes. ad Litt., quod una ibi et tota virtus est amare quod videris. Ergo virtutes cardinales non manent in patria, sed evacuantur. 4. Moreover, that which does not remain according to its proper species but only according to some common notion of the genus is said not to remain in heaven, as faith is said to disappear although knowledge, which is its genus, remains. But cardinal virtues do not remain in heaven according to their distinct proper species, for Augustine says in the Literal commentary on Genesis 12 that the one and complete virtue there is to love what you see. Therefore, the cardinal virtues do not remain in heaven, but pass away.
Praeterea, virtutes habent speciem ex obiectis. Sed obiecta virtutum cardinalium non manent in patria: nam prudentia est circa dubia, de quibus est consilium; iustitia autem est circa contractus et iudicia; fortitudo autem est circa pericula mortis; temperantia autem circa concupiscentias ciborum et venereorum, quae omnia non erunt in patria. 5. Moreover, virtues are specified by their objects. But the objects of the cardinal virtues do not remain in heaven, for prudence is concerned with the doubtful matters on which counsel is taken, justice with contracts and judgments, fortitude with deadly perils, and temperance with desires for food and sex, none of which obtain in heaven.
Sed dicendum, quod in patria habebunt alios actus.- Sed contra, diversitas eius quod cadit in definitione alicuius rei, diversificat speciem eius. Sed actus cadit in definitione habitus: dicit enim Augustinus in libro de bono Coniug., quod habitus est quo quis agit cum tempus affuerit. Ergo si sunt diversi actus, erunt et habitus specie differentes. 6. It might be said that in heaven they will have other acts. On the contrary, the difference of a thing, which enters into its definition, specifies it, but act enters into the definition of habit, for Augustine says, in On the conjugal good, that a habit is that thanks to which one acts when the time is propitious. Therefore, if their acts are different, the habits will be specifically different.
Praeterea, secundum Plotinum, ut Macrobius refert, aliae sunt virtutes purgati animi, et aliae virtutes politicae. Sed virtutes purgati animi maxime videntur esse virtutes quae sunt in patria; virtutes autem quae sunt hic, sunt virtutes politicae. Ergo virtutes quae sunt hic, non manent, sed evacuantur. 7. Moreover, according to Plotinus, as reported by Macrobius, the virtues of the purged soul differ from political virtues. But the virtues of the purged soul would seem especially to be found in heaven, while the virtues of here below are the political virtues. Therefore virtues of this life win not remain but disappear.
Praeterea, plus distant status beatorum et viatorum, quam status domini et servi, aut viri et mulieris in vita praesenti. Sed secundum philosophum in I Politic., alia est virtus domini et alia est virtus servi, et similiter alia viri et alia mulieris. Ergo multo magis aliae sunt virtutes viatorum et beatorum. 8. Moreover, the condition of the blessed differs from that of wayfarers more than do those of master and slave or of husband and wife in the present life. But, according to the Philosopher in Politics 1, the virtues of the master differ from the virtues of the servant, and similarly the husband’s from the wife’s. Therefore, the virtues of wayfarers and of those in heaven must differ even more.
Praeterea, habitus virtutum sunt necessarii ad habilitandum possibilitatem ad actum. Sed huiusmodi habilitatio sufficienter fiet ibi per gloriam. Non ergo erunt necessarii habitus virtutum. 9. Moreover, virtuous habits are needed to facilitate the possibility of acting. But this comes about sufficiently through glory. Therefore, virtuous habits are not necessary.
Praeterea, apostolus probat, I ad Corinth. XIII, 8, quod caritas est excellentior aliis, quia non evacuatur. Sed fides et spes, quae evacuantur, sunt nobiliores virtutibus cardinalibus, quia habent nobilius obiectum, scilicet Deum. Ergo virtutes cardinales evacuantur. 10. Moreover, in 1 Corinthians 13:8, the Apostle proves that charity is more excellent than the others because it does not pass away. But faith and hope, which pass away, are more noble than the cardinal virtues because they have a more noble object, namely, God. Therefore, the cardinal virtues pass away.
Praeterea, virtutes intellectuales sunt nobiliores moralibus, ut patet in VI Ethic. Sed virtutes intellectuales non manent, quia scientia destruetur, ut dicitur I ad Corinth. cap. XIII, 8. Ergo nec virtutes cardinales manebunt in patria. 11. Moreover, the intellectual virtues are more noble than the moral, as is evident in Ethics 6. But the intellectual virtues do not remain, because science is destroyed, as is said in 1 Corinthians 13:8. Therefore, the cardinal virtues will not remain in heaven.
Praeterea, sicut Iac. I, 4, dicitur, patientia opus perfectum habet. Sed patientia non manet in patria nisi secundum praemium, ut dicit Augustinus XIV de Civit. Dei. Ergo multo minus aliae virtutes morales. 12. Moreover, as is said in James 1:4, “And let patience have its perfect work.” But patience remains in heaven only as a reward, as Augustine says in On the city of God 14. Much less then will the cardinal virtues remain.
Praeterea, quaedam virtutes cardinales, scilicet temperantia et fortitudo, sunt in potentiis animae sensitivis: sunt enim irrationabilium partium animae, ut patet per philosophum in III Ethic. Sed partes animae sensitivae neque sunt in Angelis, neque possunt esse in anima separata. Ergo huiusmodi virtutes non sunt in patria neque in Angelis, neque in animabus separatis. 13. Moreover, some cardinal virtues, namely temperance and fortitude, are in the sense powers of the soul, for, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 3, they are of the irrational parts of the soul, as is evident from what the Philosopher says in Ethics 3. But the sense parts of soul are neither in angels nor in the separated soul. Therefore, such virtues are not in heaven, neither in the angels nor in the separated souls.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XIII de Civit. Dei, quod in patria vacabimus, videbimus, amabimus, laudabimus. Sed vacare est actus sapientiae: videre actus intellectus: amare actus caritatis: laudare actus latriae. Ergo ista sola erunt in patria, non autem virtutes cardinales. 14. Moreover, Augustine says in On the city of God 13 that in heaven we will have leisure, will see, will love and praise. But to have leisure is an act of wisdom, seeing of intellect, loving of charity, praising of worship. Therefore, only these remain in heaven and not the cardinal virtues.
Praeterea, in patria erunt homines similes Angelis, ut dicitur Matth. XXII, 30. Sed secundum sobrietatem homines non assimilantur Angelis, ad quos non pertinet cibis et potibus uti. Ergo sobrietas non erit in patria, et pari ratione nec aliae huiusmodi virtutes. 15. Moreover, in heaven men win be like angels, as is said in Matthew 22:30, but men do not become like angels by sobriety, since they do not use food and drink. Therefore, sobriety will not be in heaven, and by parity of reasoning no other such virtues.
Sed contra. ON THE CONTRARY
Est quod dicitur Sap. I, v. 15: iustitia perpetua est et immortalis. 1. There is what is said in Wisdom 1:15: “For justice is perpetual and immortal.”
Praeterea, Sap. VIII, 7, dicitur de divina sapientia quod sobrietatem et prudentiam docet, iustitiam et virtutem, quibus in vita nihil utilius est hominibus. Sed in patria erit plenissima participatio sapientiae. Ergo huiusmodi virtutes plenius erunt in patria. 2. Moreover, Wisdom 7:7, says, “Wherefore I wished, and understanding was given me: and 1 called upon God, and the spirit of wisdom came upon me.” But nothing is more useful for men in this life and in heaven there will be the fullest participation in wisdom. Therefore, such virtues will be more fully had in heaven.
Praeterea, virtutes sunt divitiae spirituales. Sed spiritualium divitiarum maior copia est in patria quam in via. Ergo huiusmodi virtutes plenius in patria abundabunt. 3. Moreover, virtues are spiritual riches. But there is a greater treasury of spiritual riches in heaven than in this fife. Therefore, such virtues abound in heaven.
Respondeo. Dicendum, quod in patria manent virtutes cardinales, et habebunt ibi alios actus quam hic, ut Augustinus dicit, XIII de Trinit.: quod nunc agit iustitia in subveniendo miseris, quod prudentia in praecavendis insidiis, quod fortitudo in perferendis molestiis, quod temperantia in coercendis delectationibus pravis, non ibi erit, ubi nihil omnino mali erit; sed iustitiae erit regenti Deo subditum esse; prudentiae, nullum bonum Deum praeponere vel aequare; fortitudinis, ei firmissime cohaerere; temperantiae, nullo affectu noxio delectari. RESPONSE. it should he said that the cardinal virtues remain in heaven and will there have other acts than here, as Augustine says in On the Trinity 13, 8 & 9: “What justice now does in succoring the miserable, what prudence does in forestalling harm, what fortitude in resisting evils, what temperance in restraining depraved pleasures, win not be there where there is no evil at all, but by justice one will be subject to the ruling God, by prudence one will neither prefer nor equate any other good to God, by fortitude adhere to him most firmly, by temperance taking delight in no harmful desire.”
Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod sicut philosophus dicit in I de caelo, virtus importat ultimum potentiae. Manifestum est autem, quod in diversis naturis diversum est potentiae ultimum, quia altioris naturae est maior potentia, ad plura et maiora se extendens. Et ideo illud quod est virtus uni, non est virtus alteri; puta, hominis virtus determinatur ad ea quae sunt praecipua in humana vita; sicut temperantia humana est, quod a ratione homo non discedat propter maximas delectationes, sed eas magis secundum rationem moderetur; fortitudo autem humana est, ut propter bonum rationis firmiter stet contra maxima pericula, quae sunt pericula mortis. In evidence of which it should be known that, as the Philosopher says in On the heavens 1, virtue implies the ultimate of a power. Obviously there is a different ultimate in power in different natures, since higher natures have higher powers extending to more and greater things. Therefore, what is a virtue in one is not a virtue in another. For example, virtue in man bears on the most important things in human life; human temperance lies in not departing from reason because of great pleasures, but rather moderating them according to reason; human fortitude consists of standing firm against the greatest perils, deadly perils, for the sake of the good of reason.
Sed quia divinae potentiae ultimum non attenditur secundum ista, sed secundum aliquid altius pertinens ad infinitatem potentiae eius; ideo fortitudo divina est eius immobilitas; temperantia erit conversio mentis divinae ad seipsam; prudentia autem est ipsa mens divina; iustitia autem Dei ipsa lex eius perennis. But the ultimate of divine power is not in terms of these but of something higher pertaining to the infinity of his power. Therefore, divine fortitude is his changelessness; temperance, the turning of the divine mind on itself; prudence is the divine mind itself; and the justice of God is his perennial law.
Est autem considerandum, quod diversa ultima dupliciter accipi possunt: uno modo secundum quod accipiuntur in eadem serie motus; alio modo secundum quod accipiuntur ut omnino disparata, et ad invicem non ordinata. Si igitur accipiantur diversa ultima quae sub una serie motus ordinantur, esse diversa ultima, faciunt diversas species motus; non autem diversificant speciem principii motivi, eo quod idem est principium motus quod movet a principio usque ad finem. Et huius exemplum accipere possumus in aedificatione, in qua ultimus terminus est forma domus completa; possunt tamen alia ultima accipi secundum complexionem singularum partium domus; unde, ut philosophus dicit in X Ethic., alius specie motus est fundatio domus, quae terminatur ad fundamentum, et alia columnarum erectio, et alia completa aedificatio; sed tamen ars aedificatoria est una et eadem, quae est horum trium motuum principium; et idem est in aliis motibus. It must be noticed that the difference in ultimates can be understood in two ways. First, when they are in the same series of motion; second, when they are wholly disparate, and not ordered to one another. If different ultimates are understood in the first sense, they will cause different species of motion, but they will not diversify the species of the first motor because the same principle of motion moves from beginning to end. Take the example from building where the ultimate term is the completed form of the house; but other ultimates occur as different parts of the house are completed. Hence, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 10, one kind of movement terminates in the foundation of the house, another in the superstructure, and another in the complete edifice, yet the building art is one and the same and is the principle of these three changes. And it is the same with other movements.
Si vero accipiantur diversa ultima disparata, quae non sunt in una serie motus, sed sunt omnino disparata: tunc et motus specie differunt, et principia motiva; sicut alia ars est quae est principium aedificationis, et constructionis navis. But if we understand different ultimates, not in a continuous change, but wholly disparate, then both the changes and the moving principles are specifically different. For example, the art of building a house is different from the art of building a ship.
Sic ergo ubi est idem ultimum specie, est et eadem virtus secundum speciem, idem actus, sive motus virtutis; sicut patet quod idem ultimum specie est quod attingit temperantia in me et in te, scilicet moderantia circa delectationes tactus; unde nec temperantia nec actus eius specie differt in me et in te. Ubi vero ultimum quod attingit virtus, nec est in eadem specie, nec sub eadem serie motus continetur, oportet quod sit differentia secundum speciem non solum in actu virtutis, sed etiam in ipsa virtute; sicut patet de istis virtutibus secundum quod dicuntur de Deo et de homine. Ubi vero ultimum virtutis differt specie (si tamen sub eadem serie motus continetur, ut scilicet ab uno perveniatur in aliud), est quidem actus differens specie, sed virtus est eadem; sicut fortitudinis actus ad aliud ultimum derivatur ante praelium, et ad aliud in ipso praelio, et ad aliud in triumpho: unde alius specie actus est accedere ad bellum, et alius in praelio fortiter stare, et alius iterum de adepta victoria gaudere; et eadem fortitudo est; sicut etiam eiusdem potentiae actus est amare, desiderare et gaudere. Therefore, where the ultimate is specifically the same, there is the same species of virtue, and the same act or movement of the virtue. Clearly, the ultimate that temperance achieves in me and in you is specifically the same, namely, the moderating of the pleasures of touch. Hence, neither temperance nor its act is specifically different in me and in you. But where the ultimate that a virtue attains is neither specifically the same nor in the same series of movement, there must be a specific difference not only in the act of the virtue but also in the virtue itself. This is clear insofar as these virtues are said to be from God and from man. But where the ultimate of a virtue is specifically different (yet it s contained in the same series of movements, so that by the one another is achieved), the acts are specifically different but the virtue is the same. For example, the act of fortitude aims at one ultimate before the battle and another during battle and at yet another in victory: It is one kind of act to go to war, another to stand bravely in battle, and yet another to rejoice in the victory achieved. But it is the same fortitude, just as to love, desire, and rejoice are acts of the same power.
Manifestum est igitur ex praedictis, in istomet artic., quod cum status patriae sit altior quam status viae, pertingat ad perfectius ultimum. Si igitur ultimum illud ad quod pertingit virtus viae, ordinetur ad ultimum illud ad quod pertingit virtus patriae, necesse est quod sit eadem virtus secundum speciem; sed actus erunt differentes. Si autem non accipiatur unum in ordine ad aliud, tunc non erunt eaedem virtutes nec secundum actum nec secundum habitum. It is clear from what has been said in this article that, since our state in heaven is higher than our state in this life, the former attains something that is more perfectly the utmost. If then the utmost attained by virtues in this fife is ordered to the utmost attained by the virtues in heaven, they must be specifically the same virtues, although their acts will be different. If they are not taken as ordered one to the other, then they will not be the same virtues nor the same act nor the same habit.
Manifestum est autem quod virtutes acquisitae, de quibus locuti sunt philosophi, ordinantur tantum ad perficiendum homines in vita civili, non secundum quod ordinantur ad caelestem gloriam consequendam. Et ideo posuerunt, quod huiusmodi virtutes non manent post hanc vitam, sicut de Tullio Augustinus narrat. But it is obvious that the acquired virtues, of which the philosophers spoke, are ordered only to perfecting men in civil fife, not as they are ordered to achieving celestial glory. Therefore, they taught that such virtues do not remain after this life, as Augustine reports of Cicero.
Sed virtutes cardinales, secundum quod sunt gratuitae et infusae, prout de eis nunc loquimur, perficiunt hominem in vita praesenti in ordine ad caelestem gloriam. Et ideo necesse est dicere, quod sit idem habitus harum virtutum hic et ibi; sed quod actus sunt differentes: nam hic habent actus qui competunt tendentibus in finem ultimum; illic autem habent actus qui competunt iam in fine ultimo quiescentibus. But the cardinal virtues, insofar as they are gratuitous and infused, as we speak of them now, perfect man in the present fife as ordered to celestial glory. Therefore, we must say that the habit of these virtues is the same here and there, but that the acts differ, for here they have acts appropriate to those striving for the ultimate end, but there they have acts which are appropriate to those who are already at rest in the ultimate end.
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod huiusmodi virtutes perficiunt hominem in vita activa, sicut in quadam via qua pervenitur ad terminum contemplationis patriae; et ideo in patria manent secundum actus consummatos in fine. Ad 1. It should be said that such virtues perfect man in the active life, as on a kind of path leading to the term of contemplation in heaven; and they remain in heaven in the acts consummated by the end.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod virtutes cardinales sunt circa ea quae sunt ad finem, non quasi in his sit ultimus eorum terminus, sicut ultimus terminus navis est navigatio; sed in quantum, per ea quae sunt ad finem, habent ordinem ad finem ultimum; sicut temperantia gratuita non habet pro finali ultimo moderari concupiscentias tactus, sed hoc facit propter similitudinem caelestem. Ad 2. It should be said that the cardinal virtues deal with what is for the sake of the end, notas if these might be their ultimate term, as the ultimate term of the ship is navigation, but insofar as they are ordered to the ultimate end by way of the things that are for the sake of the end. The temperance infused by grace does not have for its ultimate end the moderation of the pleasures of touch, but does this for the sake of celestial similitude.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod bonum civile non est finis ultimus virtutum cardinalium infusarum, de quibus loquimur, sed virtutum acquisitarum de quibus philosophi sunt locuti, sicut dictum est in corp. art. Ad 3. It should be said that the civil good is not the ultimate end of the infused cardinal virtues, of which we speak, but of the acquired virtues of which philosophers spoke, as was said in the body of the article.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod nihil prohibet unam et eamdem rem esse finem diversarum virtutum vel artium; sicut conservatio boni civilis est finis et terminus militaris et legis positivae: unde utraque ars vel virtus habet actum suum circa hoc sicut circa finale bonum; sed militaris, in quantum providet de conservatione boni civilis, secundum quod per fortia certamina ad hoc pervenitur; sed lex positiva gaudet de eodem, secundum quod per ordinationem legum bonum civile conservatur. Sic igitur fruitio Dei in patria est finis omnium cardinalium virtutum; et unaquaeque gaudet ibi de ea, secundum quod est finis suorum actuum. Et ideo dicitur quod in patria erit una virtus, in quantum erit in subiecto, de qua omnes virtutes gaudebunt; tamen erunt differentes actus et differentes virtutes secundum diversam rationem gaudendi. Ad 4. It should be said that nothing prevents one and the same thing from being the end of different virtues or arts. The preservation of the civil good is the end and term of both the army and of positive law; hence both arts and virtues have acts concerned with it as a final good, but the military provides for the preservation of the civil good insofar as brave battles bring it about, whereas positive law rejoices in the same end insofar as the civil good is preserved by the ordinances of law. Therefore, the enjoyment of God in heaven is the end of all the cardinal virtues, and there each rejoices in it, insofar as it is the end of his acts. That is why it is said that in heaven there win be one virtue, inasmuch as one subject will have that in which all the virtues rejoice; however, there will be different acts and different virtues according to the different reasons for rejoicing.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur esse obiectum virtutum dupliciter. Uno modo sicut illud ad quod virtus ordinatur sicut ad finem; sicut summum bonum est obiectum caritatis, et beatitudo aeterna obiectum spei. Alio modo sicut materia circa quam operatur, ut ab ea in aliud tendens; et hoc modo delectationes coitus sunt obiectum temperantiae, non enim temperantia intendit huiusmodi delectationibus inhaerere, sed istas delectationes compescendo, tendere in bonum rationis. Similiter fortitudo non intendit inhaerere periculis superando pericula, sed consequi bonum rationis; et idem est de prudentia respectu dubitationum, et de iustitia respectu necessitatum huius vitae. Et ideo quanto longius ab his fuerit recessum, secundum profectum spiritualis vitae, tanto erunt perfectiores actus harum virtutum, quia praedicta verba magis se habent ad has virtutes per modum termini a quo quam per modum termini ad quem, qui dat speciem. Ad 5. It should be said that something is called the object of a virtue in two ways. In one way, as that to which the virtue is ordered as to its end, as the highest good is the object of charity and eternal happiness the object of hope. In another way, as the matter on which it acts, as tending from it to another, and in this way the pleasures of coition are the object of temperance, for temperance does not intend attachment to such pleasures but intends the good of reason by constraining them. Similarly, fortitude does not intend to dwell on perils but by overcoming them to attain the good of reason, and the same is the case with reason with respect to doubts, and of justice in respect to the necessities of this fife. Therefore, the greater the distance from these as the spiritual fife develops, the more perfect the acts of these virtues, because the foregoing words refer to these virtues by way of a term from which rather than of a term toward which, which specifies the act.
Ad sextum dicendum, quod non omnis differentia actuum demonstrat diversitatem habituum, sicut iam dictum est in corp. art. Ad 6. It should be said that not every difference in acts points to a diversity of habits, as has already been said in the body of the article.
Ad septimum dicendum, quod virtutes purgati animi, quas Plotinus definiebat, possunt convenire beatis: nam prudentiae ibi est sola divina intueri; temperantiae, cupiditates oblivisci; fortitudinis, passiones ignorare; iustitiae, perpetuum foedus cum Deo habere. Sed virtutes politicae de quibus ipse loquitur, ordinantur tantum ad bonum civile praesentis vitae ut dictum est in corp. art. Ad 7. It should be said that the virtues of the purged soul that Plotinus defined can belong to the blessed, for there prudence only intuits the divine, temperance forgets desire, fortitude ignores the passions, and justice consists in a perpetual covenant with God. But the political virtues of which he speaks are ordered only to the civil good of the present life, as was said in the body of the article.
Ad octavum dicendum, quod ultima virtutum servi et domini, mulieris et viri non ordinantur in invicem, ut sic ex uno transeatur in aliud; et ideo non est similis ratio. Ad 8. It should be said that the ultimate of the virtues of master and servant and of husband and wife are ordered to one another, such that from one there can be a transition to the other, so the case is not similar.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod ipsa habilitatio gloriae ad opera virtutum, quae fiet vel perficietur per gloriam, pertinet ad ipsos habitus virtutum. Ad 9. It should be said that facilitation of the works of the virtues, that comes about or is perfected by glory, pertains to these habits of virtue.
Ad decimum dicendum, quod fides ordinatur ad veritatem non apparentem, et spes ad arduum non habitum sicut a quo speciem habent. Et ideo, quamvis excellentiores sint virtutibus cardinalibus propter altius obiectum, tamen evacuantur, propter hoc quod habent speciem ab eo quod non manet. Ad 10. It should be said that faith is ordered to a truth that is not seen and hope to something arduous not yet had, and these specify them. Therefore, although they are more excellent than the cardinal virtues with respect to their higher object, nonetheless they pass away because they are specified by what does not remain.
Ad undecimum dicendum, quod etiam scientia non destruetur secundum habitum, sed habebit alium actum. Ad 11. It should be said that knowledge is not destroyed as a habit but it has another act.
Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod patientia non manebit in patria secundum actum quem habet in via, tolerando scilicet tribulationes; manebit tamen secundum actum convenientem fini, sicut et de aliis virtutibus dictum est in corp. art. Ad 12. It should be said that patience does not remain in heaven according to the act that it has in this life, namely, tolerating tribulations, but remains according to an act appropriate to the end, as was said of the other virtues in the body of the article.
Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod quidam dicunt quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis, in quibus sunt temperantia et fortitudo, sunt in parte superiori, non autem in parte sensitiva. Sed hoc est contra philosophum in III Ethic., ubi dicit, quod virtutes sunt irrationabilium partium. Ad 13. It should be said that some teach that the irascible and concupiscible, the subjects of temperance and fortitude, are in the higher part, not in the sensitive part of the soul. But this conflicts with what the Philosopher says in Ethics 3, namely, that virtues are in the irrational parts.
Quidam autem dicunt, quod vires sensitivae partis manent in anima separata vel secundum potentiam tantum, vel secundum actum. Sed hoc non potest esse, quia actus potentiae sensitivae non est sine corpore; alioquin anima sensitiva brutorum esset etiam incorruptibilis, quod est erroneum. Others say that the powers of the sensitive part remain in the separated soul either according to potency alone or according to act. But this cannot be because the acts of the sensitive power cannot exist without the body; otherwise the sensitive soul of the brutes would be incorruptible, which is erroneous.
Cuius autem est actio, eius est etiam potentia; unde oportet quod potentiae huiusmodi sint coniunctae; et ita post mortem non remanent in anima separata actu, sed virtute, sicut in radice in quantum scilicet potentiae animae fluunt ab essentia eius. Virtutes autem istae sunt quidem in irascibili quantum ad eorum derivationem; sed secundum originem et inchoationem sunt in ratione et in voluntate, quia principalis actus virtutis moralis est electio, quae est actus appetitus rationalis. Sed ista electio per quamdam applicationem terminatur ad passiones irascibilis et concupiscibilis secundum temperantiam et fortitudinem. The object of the act is the object of the power; hence, such powers are connected; and thus after death they do not remain in the actually separated soul, save virtually, as in a root because the powers of the soul flow from its essence. But these virtues are in the irascible so far as their derivation goes, but according to origin and beginning they are in reason and will, because choice is the principle act of moral virtue and it is an act of rational appetite. But by a kind of application this choice terminates in the passions of the irascible and concupiscible because of temperance and fortitude.
Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod omnia illa quatuor pertinent ad unumquemque actum virtutum cardinalium per modum finis, in quantum in eis consistit beatitudo caelestis. Ad 14. It should be said that all four of these pertain to each act of the cardinal virtues in the manner of end, insofar as celestial happiness consists of them.
Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod sobrietas non assimilat nos Angelis secundum actum viae quem habet circa materiam ciborum et potuum; sed secundum actum patriae, quem habet circa ultimum finem, sicut et aliae virtutes. Ad 15. It should be said that sobriety does not make us like the angels according to the act of this life which bears on the matter of food and drink, but according to the act of heaven where it bears on the ultimate end, like the other virtues.