BOOK X
PLEASURE, HAPPINESS
LECTURE 1
Pleasure
Chapter 1
I. HE SHOWS THAT WE MUST CONSIDER PLEASURE.
A. He proposes his intention. — 1953-1954
After these matters we ought perhaps next to discuss pleasure.
B. Three reasons why we must treat pleasure.
1. FIRST. — 1955
For it seems to be adapted especially to humankind. This is why masters of households teach children by means of pleasure and pain.
2. SECOND. — 1956-1957
Likewise, it seems that a man’s rejoicing in the things he ought and hating the things he ought has great importance for moral virtue; they extend throughout the whole of life, having influence and power for virtue and a happy life, since men choose pleasure and shun pain—motives that should not, it seems, determine our choice.
3. THIRD.
a. He enumerates the diffcrent opinions. — 1958-1959
Moreover, they (pleasure and pain) particularly admit of much uncertainty. Some people say that pleasure is a good, while others, on the contrary, maintain it is something very evil—some of them because they are convinced, and others because they think it better for human living to declare pleasure an evil, though it is not—for most men are disposed to it and are in fact slaves of pleasure. Therefore they are to be induced to the opposite, since in this way they will attain the mean.
b. He rejects a statement contained in the opinions. — 1960-1963
But perhaps this is not a wise attitude, for in questions concerning the passions and actions, arguments are less convincing than facts. Therefore, when arguments are at variance with facts they are spurned and their truth destroyed. If a man who censures b pleasure is seen in his own way to desire it, his inclination to it seems to indicate that all pleasure is desirable. For the majority of people do not draw nice distinctions. Consequently, true arguments are most useful not only for science but also for living, for when they are in accord with the facts they are accepted, and so move those who understand their truth to live by them.
These matters have been discussed sufficiently. Let us pass on to the treatment of pleasure.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
1953.After the Philosopher has finished the consideration of the moral and intellectual virtues-and of continence and friendship which have a relation to virtue-in the tenth book he intends to consider the end of virtue. First, concerning the end of virtue that perfects man in himself; then [Lect. 14], at “Have we sufficiently etc.” (B. 1179 a 33), concerning the end of virtue in relation to the common good, the good of the whole state. He discusses the first point from two aspects. First he defines pleasure which is designated by some as the end of virtue. Next [Lect. 9], at “After the discussion etc.” (B. 1176 a 30), he defines happiness, which in the opinion of everyone is the end of virtue. He treats the first point in a twofold manner. First [I] by way of introduction he shows we must consider pleasure. Second [Lect. 2; II], after the introduction, at “Eudoxus thought etc.” (B. 1172 b 9), he pursues his proposition. He considers the first point under two headings. First [I, A] he proposes his intention.
1954. He remarks that after the previous treatise (245-1952), it is logical for pleasure to be treated in passing, i.e., briefly. To be sure he had already treated pleasure in the seventh book (1354-1367), inasmuch as it is the object of continence. Hence there his study dwelt chiefly on sensible and bodily pleasures. But here he intends to consider pleasure as an adjunct to happiness. Therefore, he gives special attention to intellectual and spiritual pleasure.
1955. Then [II, B], at “For it seems,” he proves by three reasons why we must treat pleasure. The first [B, 1] is taken from the relation of pleasure to us. For pleasure seems in a marked degree to be naturally adapted to humankind. For this reason orakizontes, i.e., rulers of households, teach children especially by means of pleasure and pain. People who wish to induce children to good or restrain them from evil try to please the well-behaved, e.g., with small presents, and to punish those who misbehave, e.g., by whipping. Since moral philosophy considers human affairs, it is the business of moral science to treat pleasure.
1956. At “Likewise, it seeme’ he presents the second reason [B, 2], which istaken from a comparison with virtue. He says that it seems to be a particular concern of moral virtue that a mat enjoy the things he ought and hate the things he ought and grieve over them. For moral virtue consists principally in the regulation of the appetite; and this is judged by the regulation of pleasure and pain which all the movements of the appetitive part follow, as has been pointed out in the second book (296). And he adds: they, viz., pleasure and pain extend to all phases of human life, exerting great influence on man to be virtuous and live happily. This cannot happen unless his pleasures and pain are properly ordered.
1957. Men frequently choose even harmful pleasures and avoid even salutary afflictions. But it seems that the man who wishes to be virtuous and happy ought not to choose pleasure and reject pain as such, that is, commit evil deeds or omit virtuous actions on this account. And, conversely, it can be said that he must not choose to do evil or avoid good for the sake of these, i.e., to obtain pleasure and shun pain. Obviously then it is the function of moral philosophy to treat pleasure, just as it treats moral virtue and happiness.
1958. He offers a third reason [B, 3] at “Moreover, they.” It is taken from the uncertainty prevalent concerning pleasure. He discusses this point from two aspects. First [3, a] he enumerates the different opinions about pleasure, from which the uncertainty arises. Then [3, b], at “But perhaps this etc.,” he rejects a statement contained in the opinions. He says first that we must treat pleasure and pain for another reason: because they admit of much uncertainty. This is obvious from the different views of thinkers who discuss these subjects.
1959. Some say pleasure is a kind of good. Others, on the contrary, maintain that it is something very badand this in different ways. For some hold the opinion because they are convinced that it is so and believe they are speaking the truth. But others, though they may not believe that pleasure is an evil, nevertheless judge it better for human living to declare that pleasure is an evil-although it is not-to withdraw men from pleasure to which the majority are inclined (for people are in fact slaves to pleasure). For this reason men must be induced to the opposite, i.e., to have an aversion to pleasures by declaring them evil. In this way we attain the mean, that is, men use pleasures with moderation.
1960. Then [3, b], at “But perhaps this,” he rejects the last statement. It hardly seems correct for people to say what they do not believe—that pleasures are evil just to withdraw us from them, because in questions of human actions and passions we give less credence to words than to actions. For if a man does what he says is evil, he incites by his example more than he restrains by his word.
1961. The reason for this is that everyone seems to choose what appears to him good in a particular case, the object of human actions and passions. When, therefore, a man’s arguments are at variance with his clearly manifest actions, such arguments are spurned; and consequently the truth enunciated by them is destroyed. Thus it will happen in our proposition.
1962. If someone censuring all pleasure is seen to give way to a pleasure lie might give the impression that all pleasure ought to be chosen. The common people cannot determine by distinguishing this as good and that as evil, but without discrimination they accept as good what appears good in one instance. In this way, then, sound arguments seem to be useful not only for science but also for good living, for they are convincing to the extent they are in accord with actions. For this reason such arguments move those who understand their truth to live by them.
1963. Finally, he concludes in an epilogue that these matters have been discussed sufficiently. Now we must pass on to the observations made by others about pleasure.
Opinions on Pleasure as a Good
II. HE CONTINUES WITH THE OPINIONS OF OTHERS.
A. The opinion of those who set pleasure in the category of good.
1. THE ARGUMENTS EUDOXUS USED TO PROVE THAT PLEASURE IS IN THE CATEGORY OF GOOD.
a. On the part of pleasure itself.
i. The opinion and argument of Eudoxus. — 1964-1965
ii. Why the opinion and argument were accepted. — 1966
b. On the part of the contrary. — 1967
2. THE ARGUMENTS EUDOXUS USED TO PROVE THAT (PLEASURE) IS THE GREATEST GOOD.
ii. The flaw in this argument. — 1970
1. HOW THEY MEET THE PRECEDING ARGUMENTS.
a. How they used in the opposite way the argument... advanced.
i. How Plato used this argument. — 1971-1972
ii. He rejects Plato’s process of reasoning. — 1973
b. How they met the other arguments.
i. On the part of pleasure itself. — 1974-1977
ii. On the part of the contrary. — 1978-1979
Pleasure Is Not a Good According to Plato
(B)2. HE PRESENTS (PLATONISTS’) ARGUMENTS AGAINST EUDOXUS’ POSITION.
x. THE REASON OF THE PLATONISTS. — 1982
y. HE REJECTS SUCH AN ARGUMENT. — 1983-1988
x. HE PROPOSES THE ARGUMENT. — 1989
aa. First... that pleasure is a motion. — 1990-1992
bb. Next... that pleasure is a process of generation.
b’. The origin of this opinion. — 1995-1996
A Fourth Argument that Pleasure Is Not a Good
(a) iv. He refutes a fourth (argument).
x. FIRST (REPUTATION) — 1997-1998
b. Pleasure is not a good in itself for three reasons.
Pleasure Is Neither a Motion Nor a Process of Change
I. HE SHOWS THAT PLEASURE DOES NOT COME UNDER THE CATEGORY OF MOTION.
A. He proposes his intention. — 2005
B. He carries out his proposition.
1. A PRINCIPLE NECESSARY FOR AN EXPLANATION. — 2006-2007
2. HE PROVES THE PROPOSITION (BY TWO ARGUMENTS).
i. He... states a conclusion. — 2008-2009
Therefore, pleasure is not a form of motion.
ii. The major of the previous argument.
x. CONCERNING THE PROCESS OF GENERATION. — 2010-2012
y. CONCERNING LOCOMOTION. — 2013-2017
b. Second (argument). — 2018-2019
3. HE CONCLUDES WHAT HE PRINCIPALLY INTENDED. — 2020-2021
The Nature and Properties of Pleasure
II. HE NOW EXPLAINS THE NATURE AND PROPERTIES OF PLEASURE.
1. PLEASURE IS A PERFECTION OF ACTIVITY.
a. What is the perfect activity.
i. He explains his proposition. — 2022-2023
ii. He mentions a doubt. — 2024
b. Pleasure is the perfection of activity. — 2025-2026
c. How pleasure can perfect activity. — 2027
2. HE CLARIFIES WHAT HE HAS SAID.
B. The properties of pleasure.
a. How long pleasure should last. — 2032
b. Why pleasure cannot be continuous. — 2033
c. Why new things are more pleasing. — 2034-2035
2. DESIRABILITY (OF PLEASURE).
a. He explains his proposition. — 2036
b. He raises a doubt. — 2037-2038
I. HE EXPLAINS THE DIFFERENCE OF PLEASURES TAKEN ON THE PART OF THE ACTIVITIES.
A. How pleasures may differ in kind according to... activities.
2. HE MANIFESTS THE SAME PROPOSITION BY INDICATIONS.
i. He shows the difference among pleasures (from the hindrance of other activities). — 2044-2047
ii. He compares alien pleasures with pains belonging to the activities. — 2048-2049
B. Pleasures differ in goodness and evil according to the difference of activities.
a. He states his proposition. — 2050
b. He proves his proposition. — 2051-2055
2. IN PHYSICAL GOODNESS. — 2056
II. HE SHOWS WHAT THE DIFFERENCE OF PLEASURE IS RELATIVE TO THE SUBJECT.
A. In regard to animals. — 2057-2058
1. MEN HAVE DIFFERENT PLEASURES. — 2059-2061
2. THE PRINCIPAL PLEASURE IS FOUND IN THE VIRTUOUS MAN. — 2062-2063
3. WHICH IS THE PRINCIPAL PLEASURE. — 2064
I. HE CONNECTS THIS WITH HIS EARLIER TREATMENT. — 2065
II. HE CARRIES OUT HIS PROPOSAL.
A. He explains the genus of happiness. — 2066-2067
B. He shows the nature of virtuous activity.
1. HAPPINESS IS CONTAIN UNDER THE ACTIVITIES DESIRABLE IN THEMSELVES.
a. A division of activities. — 2068
b. Happiness falls under... activities... desirable in themselves. — 2069
2. HE DIVIDES THESE ACTIONS INTO VIRTUOUS AND AGREEABLE. — 2070
3. HE SHOWS UNDER WHICH CLASSIFICATION HAPPINESS FALLS.
a. Why some may think that happiness consists in amusement. — 2071-2072
b. He rejects the reason offered for this. — 2073-2075
c. He resolves the truth (by two arguments).
ii. Second argument. — 2078-2079
Happiness, an Activity According to the Highest Virtue
I. (HE SHOWS THIS) IN GENERAL. — 2080-2085
II. (HE SHOWS THIS) IN PARTICULAR.
A. Perfect happiness consists in... contemplative virtue.
1. PERFECT HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN THE ACTIVITY OF CONTEMPLATION.
a. Happiness consists in contemplative activity.
i. He states his intention. — 2086
ii. He proves his statement by six arguments.
(II) Z. SIXTH (REASON). — 2098-2104
b. He shows how this contemplative life is associated with man.
i. He explains his proposition. — 2105-2106
ii. He rejects an error. — 2107-2110
Happiness and the Moral Virtues
(A)2. The Philosopher... introduces a kind of a secondary happiness.
a. He proposes his intention. — 2111
But life in accordance with the other kind of virtue is happy only in a secondary degree.
b. He proves his proposition by four reasons.
I. HE EXPLAINS HOW THE HAPPY MAN IS DISPOSED TOWARDS INFERIOR CREATURES.
A. To what extent the happy man needs external... goods.
1. (HE) NEEDS EXTERNAL GOODS. — 2126-2127
2. HE DOES NOT NEED MANY AND GREAT POSSESSIONS. — 2128-2129
B. He confirms this by the authority of the philosophers.
a. The opinion of Solon. — 2130 —
b. The opinion of Anaxagoras. — 2131
II. (HE EXPLAINS HOW THE HAPPY MAN IS DISPOSED) TOWARD GOD. — 2133-2136
I. THE NECESSITY OF LEGISLATION.
1. HE SHOWS IT IS NECESSARY THAT A MAN BECOME GOOD. — 2138
2. HE SHOWS THAT HABITUATION TO VIRTUOUS LIVING IS REQUIRED.
a. Persuasive words alone are not enough. — 2139-2142
b. Habituation is needed. — 2143-2147
3. HE SHOWS... LEGISLATION IS REQUIRED.
a. All men become virtuous by means of law.
i. He discloses his proposition.
x. ABOUT THE YOUNG. — 2148-2149
ii. He presents evidence for (his proposition). — 2151-2152
b. (Men cannot be made virtuous) without law (for two reasons).
Man Must Be Capable of Legislating
II. A MAN SHOULD BE A MAKER OF LAWS.
A. (Aristotle) indicates his intention. — 2155-2156
B. He proves his proposal (by two arguments).
How to Learn the Science of Lawmaking
III. HE NOW ASKS HOW ONE BECOMES A LAWMAKER. A. He states his intention.
B. He carries (it) out. — 2164
a. The way someone should learn lawmaking. — 2165
b. That this does not follow in practice.
i. He proposes their diversity (among those who busy themselves about legislation). — 2166-2167
ii. He shows the deficiencies:
aa. He states... the deficiency. — 2168
bb. He verifies his statement. — 2169-2170
cc. He refutes an error. — 2171
y. (THE DEFICIENCY) OF THE SOPHISTS.
aa. He states his proposition. — 2172
bb. He verifies his proposition. — 2173-2177
cc. We must reject (an) error. — 2178
2. HE CONCLUDES THAT... (TEACHING THE SCIENCE OF LAWMAKING) HAS TO BE DISCUSSED BY ITSELF.
a. This is incumbent upon him. — 2179