METAPHYSICS
BOOK XIRECAPITULATION ON THE NATURE AND SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS. MOTION
CONTENTS
LESSON 1: Metaphysics Is the Science of Principles LESSON 2 Are There Non-Sensible Substances and Principles? LESSON 3 All Beings Reduced to Being and Unity LESSON 4 This Science Considers the Principles of Demonstration LESSON 5 The Principle of Non-Contradiction LESSON 6 Contradictories Cannot Be True at the Same Time LESSON 7 Metaphysics Differs from All the Other Sciences LESSON 8 No Science of Accidental Being LESSON 9 The Definition of Motion LESSON 10 The Infinite LESSON 11 Motion and Change LESSON 12 Motion Pertains to Quantity, Quality and Place LESSON 13 Concepts Related to Motion
LESSON 1
Metaphysics Is the Science of Principles
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 1: 1059a 18-1060a 2
899. That wisdom is a science of principles, then, is evident from the first chapters (45-143) of this work, in which problems were raised concerning the statements of other philosophers about the principles of things.
900. But one might raise the question whether wisdom must be understood to be one science or many (181, 190). For if it is one, then the objection might be raised that one science always deals with contraries; but principles are not contraries. And if it is not one but many, what kind of sciences must they be assumed to be (190-197)?
901. Further, one might raise the question whether it is the office of one science or of many to study the principles of demonstration? For if it is the office of one science, why should it be the office of this science rather than of another? And if it is the office of many, what kind of sciences must these be admitted to be (198-201)?
902. Further, there is the question whether it is the office of wisdom to deal with all substances or not (182)? And if not with all, it is difficult to say with what kind it does deal. But if there is one science of all substances, the problem arises how one science can deal with many subjects (202-204).
903. Again, there is the question whether this science is a demonstration of substances alone, or also of accidents (184, 205-207); for if it is a demonstration of accidents, it is not a demonstration of substances. But if there is a different science of accidents, what is the character of each, and which of the two is wisdom? For a demonstrative science of accidents is wisdom; but that which deals with primary things is the science of substances.
904. But the science which we are seeking must not be assumed to be the one which deals with the causes mentioned in the Physics. For it does not deal with the final cause, because such is the good, and this is found in the sphere of practical affairs and in things which are in motion. And it is the first thing which causes motion (for the end is such a nature); but there is no first mover in the realm of immobile things (192).
905. And in general there is the question whether the science which is now being sought is concerned with sensible substances, or whether it is not concerned with these but with certain others (183). For, if it deals with other substances, it must be concerned with either the separate Forms or with the objects of mathematics. Now it is evident that separate Forms do not exist.
906. But nevertheless even if one were to assume that these separate Forms exist, the problem would arise why the same thing should not be true of the other things of which there are Forms as is true of the objects of mathematics. I mean that they place the objects of mathematics between the Forms and sensible things as a kind of third class of entities besides the Forms and the things which exist here. But there is no third man or horse over and above man-in-himself and horse-in-itself and singular men and horses.
907. If, however, the situation is not as they say, with what kind of things must the mathematician be assumed to deal? For he is not concerned with the things which exist here, because none of these are the kind of things which the mathematical sciences study. Nor is the science which we are now seeking concerned with the objects of mathematics; for no one of these is capable of existing separately. Nor does it deal with sensible substances, for these are corruptible (208-219).
908. And in general one might raise the question to what science it belongs to consider the problem about the matter of the mathematical sciences (627). It is not the office of the philosophy of nature, for this science is wholly concerned with things which have in themselves a principle of rest and of motion. Nor is it the office of the science which investigates demonstration and scientific knowledge, for it is about this class of things that it makes its investigations. It follows, then, that it pertains to the philosophy which we have proposed to investigate these things.
909. And one might raise the question whether the science which is now being sought must deal with the principles which are called elements by some thinkers (184). But all men suppose these to be present in composite things. And it would seem rather that the science which is now being sought ought to deal with universals, for every intelligible nature and every science is of universals and not of extremes (228), so that in this way they would deal with the primary genera.
910. And these would become being and unity; for these most of all might be thought to contain all existing things and to be principles in the highest degree, because they are first by nature; for when they have been destroyed, everything else is destroyed, since everything is a being and one. But if one supposes them to be genera, then inasmuch as it is necessary for differences to participate in them, and no difference participates in a genus, it would seem that they must not be regarded either as genera or as principles.
911. Further, if what is more simple is more of a principle than what is less simple, and the ultimate members resulting from the subdivision of different genera are more simple than the genera themselves (for these members are indivisible, whereas genera are divided into many different species), it would seem that species are principles to a greater degree than genera. But since species are involved in the destruction of their genera, genera are like principles to a greater degree; for whatever involves something else in its destruction is a principle of that thing (229-234). These and other such points, then, are the ones which cause difficulties.
COMMENTARY
2146. Because the particular sciences disregard certain things which should be investigated, there must be a universal science which examines these things. Now such things seem to be the common attributes which naturally belong to being in general (none of which are treated by the particular sciences since they do not pertain to one science rather than to another but to all in general) and to the separate substances, which lie outside the scope of every particular science. Therefore, in introducing us to such knowledge, Aristotle, after he has investigated these attributes, begins to deal particularly with the separate substances, the knowledge of which constitutes the goal to which the things studied both in this science and in the other sciences are ultimately directed.
Now in order that a clearer understanding of the separate substances may be had, Aristotle first (899:C 2146) makes a summary of the points discussed both in this work and in the Physics’ which are useful for knowing the separate substances. Second (1055:C 2488), he investigates the separate substances in themselves (in the middle of the following book: “Since there are”).
The first part is divided into two. In the first he summarizes the points which act as a preface to the study of substances. In the second (1023:C 2416) he restates the things that pertain to the study of substances (at the beginning of the following book: “The study here”).
He prefaced his study of substances by doing three things. First, he raised the questions given in Book 111, which he now restates under the first point of discussion. Second (924:C 2194), he expressed his views about the things that pertain to the study of this science. These are given in Book IV and are restated here under the second point of discussion (“Since the science”). Third (963:C 2268), he drew his conclusions about imperfect being, i.e., accidental being, motion, and the infinite, about which he had partly established the truth in Books II (152:C 299) and VI (543-59:C 1171-1244) of this work, and partly in Book III of the Physics; and he gives a summary restatement of these under the third point of discussion (“Since the term being”).
The first part is divided into two. First, he raises a question about the study of this science; and second (912:C 2173), about the things established in this science (“Further, there is”).
In regard to the first he does two things. First, he asks in what way the study of this science is concerned with principles and substances. Second (904: C 2156), he asks with what principles and what substances it deals (“But the science”).
In regard to the first he does two things. First, he raises questions about the study of the principles of this science; and second (902:C 2152), about this science’s study of substances (“Further, there is the question”).
In treating the first point (899) he does three things. First, he assumes that the inveselgations of this science are concerned with principles. He says that it is evident from Book I (45-143:C 93-272), in which he argued against the statements that other philosophers have made about the first principles of things, that wisdom is a science of principles. For it was shown in the Prologue to this work that wisdom considers the highest and most universal causes, and that it is the noblest of the sciences.
2147. But one might (900).
Second, he raises a question about the study of the principles by this science which is called wisdom. He says that one can ask whether wisdom, which considers principles, must be one science or many.
2148. However, if we say that it is one, this seems to be inconsistent, because many of the things studied in one science are contraries, since one contrary is the basis for knowing the other, and thus both contraries seem to fall under one art. But since the principles of things are many, they are not contraries, otherwise they could not be combined in one subject. Hence, wisdom, which is concerned with principles, does not seem to be one science. And if it is not one science but many, it is impossible to state what these sciences are.
2149. Now the truth of the matter is that, while wisdom is one science, it considers many principles inasmuch as they are reduced to one genus, because contraries fall under one science since they belong to one genus.
2150. Further, one might (901).
Third, he raises a question about the study which this science makes of the principles of demonstration. He says that it is still a problem whether the study of the principles of demonstration (for example, every whole is greater than one of its parts, and the like) belongs to the study of one science or many. If one claims that such a study belongs to one science, it seems difficult to explain why it belongs to this science rather than to another, since all sciences make common use of these principles. But if one claims that it belongs to many sciences, it seems difficult to give many sitch sciences.
2151. Now the truth of the matter is that there is one science which is chiefly concerned with these principles, and this is the one which investigates the common terms involved in these principles, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and the like; and the other sciences receive such principles from this science.
2152. Further, there is (902).
Then he raises questions about this science's study of substances; and there are two of these. First, he asks whether or not this science considers all substances. If one claims that it does not, it is difficult to indicate what substances it does consider and what not. And if one claims that it considers all substances, the question remains how one and the same science can deal with many substances, since each science treats of one thing.
2153. The truth is that, although this science deals especially with the separate substances, it does treat all substances inasmuch as all belong to one common class of essential being.
2154. Again, there is (903).
Second, he asks whether there is demonstration only with regard to substances or also with regard to accidents; for, if demonstration, properly speaking, were concerned with accidents, there would be no demonstration with regard to substances, since it is the function of demonstration to infer the essential accidents of substances. But if one claims that there is one demon. strative science of substances and an. other of essential accidents, the question remains as to which science each of these is, and whether each is worthy of the name of wisdom. For, on the one hand, it does seem that the science which deals with accidents is wisdom, because demonstration is properly concerned with accidents, and demonstrative science is the most certain. Thus it seems that wisdom, which is a demonstrative science, deals with accidents But, on the other hand, it seems to deal with substances; for since substances are the primary kind of being, it seems that the science which treats of them is the primary science.
2155. Now the truth is that wisdom considers both substances and accidents inasmuch as they have being in common, which constitutes the subject of wisdom; but its demonstrations are concerned chiefly with substances, which are the primary kind of essential beings, and of these it demonstrates the accidents.
2156. But the science (904).
Then he raises more specific questions about the study of this science. First (904:C 2156), he asks about the substances which this science considers; and second (909:C 2166), about the principles which it considers (“And one might”).
In treating the first point he raises four questions. The first (904) has to do with the causes of sensible substances. He says that it does not seem that we should hold that the science which we are seeking is concerned with the four classes of causes discussed in the Physics, because it seems to deal especially with the final cause, which is the most important of all. But this science does not seem to deal with “the final cause,” or goal, because an end or goal has the nature of the good. Now the good relates to operations and to things which are in motion. Hence in the case of immovable things, such as the objects of mathematics, nothing is demonstrated by way of the final cause. It is also evident that the end is what first moves a thing, for it moves the efficient cause. But there does not seem to be a first cause of motion in the case of immovable things.
2157. Now the truth of the matter is that this science considers the classes of causes mentioned, especially the formal and final cause. And furthermore, the end, which is the first cause of motion, is altogether immovable, as will be shown below (1069:C 2526).
2158. And in general (905).
Second, he raises a question about the study of sensible substances. He asks whether this science is concerned with sensible substances or not. For if it is concerned with them, it does not seem to differ from the philosophy of nature. But if it is concerned with other substances, it is difficult to state what these substances are. For it must deal with either “the separate Forms,” i.e., the Ideas, which the Platonists posited, or with the objects of mathematics, which some supposed to exist as an intermediate class of things between the Ideas and sensible substances, for example, surfaces, lines, figures and the like. But it is evident from the previous books that “separate Forms do not exist,” i.e., separate Ideas; and so he immediately raises the question about the objects of mathematics.
2159. Now the true answer to this question is that this science deals with sensible substances inasmuch as they are substances, but not inasmuch as they are sensible and movable; for this latter belongs properly to the philosophy of nature. But the proper study of this science has to do with substances which are neither Ideas nor separate mathematical entities but primary movers, as will be seen below (1055:C 2488).
2160. But nevertheless (906).
Third, he raises a third difficulty as a secondary issue. For, since he had said that there are evidently no separate Forms, he poses the question whether the objects of mathematics are separate. First, he shows that they are not. For if one claims that there are separate Forms and separate mathematical entities over and above sensible substances, why is not the same thing true of all things which have Forms as is true of the objects of mathematics? So that just as the objects of mathematics are assumed “ to be intermediate between the separate Forms and sensible substances as a third class of things over and above the separate Forms and the singular things which exist here (for example, a mathematical line over and above the Form of a line and the perceptible line), in a similar fashion there should be a third man and a third “horse over and above man-in-himself and horse-in-itself” (i.e., the ideal man and the ideal horse, which the Platonists called Ideas) and individual men and horses. But the Platonists did not posit intermediates in such cases as these but only in that of the objects of mathematics.
2161. If, however (907).
Then he argues on the other side of the question; for, if the objects of mathematics are not separate, it is difficult to indicate the things with which the mathematical sciences deal. For they do not seem to deal with sensible things as such, because no lines and circles such as the mathematical sciences investigate are found in sensible things. It seems necessary to hold, then, that there are certain separate lines and circles.
2162. Now the truth of the matter is that the objects of mathematics are not separate from sensible things in being but only in their intelligible structure, as has been shown above in Book VI (537:C 1162) and will be considered below (919:C 2185).
2163. And since he had interjected as a secondary issue this difficulty about the separateness of the objects of mathematics because he had said that forms evidently are not separate, therefore when he says, “Nor is the science which we are now seeking concerned with the objects of mathematics,” he returns to the main question that was raised, namely, with what kind of substances this science deals. And since he had shown that it does not deal with separate Forms (for there are no separate Forms), he now shows by the same reasoning that it does not deal with the objects of mathematics; for neither are they separate in being. And it does not seem to deal with sensible substances, because these are destructible and in motion.
2164. The true answer to this question is the one given above.
2165. And in general one might (908).
Then he gives a fourth difficulty by asking to what science it belongs “to consider the problems about the matter of the mathematical sciences,” i.e., to investigate the things with which the mathematical sciences are concerned. This does not pertain to the philosophy of nature, because it is wholly concerned with those things which have in themselves a principle of rest and of motion and are called natural beings. Therefore he does not examine this problem. Similarly, the investigation of this problem does not seem to belong to that science which is called mathematical, which has as its aim the demonstration and knowledge of mathematical entities; for this kind of science presupposes matter of this sort or a subject of this sort, and some science does investigate this subject. It follows, then, that it is the business of this philosophical science to consider the things of which the mathematical sciences treat.
2166. And one might (909).
Then he asks what kind of principles this science investigates. In regard to this he raises three questions. First, he asks whether this science studies the principles which are called elements by some thinkers. This question seems to refer to the common supposition that principles of this kind are present in, i.e., intrinsic to, the composite, so that in order to know composite things these principles must be known. But from another point of view it seems that this science is concerned with more universal things, because every intelligible nature and every science seems to be “of universals and not of extremes,” i.e., not about the particular things in which the division of common genera terminates. Thus it seems that this science has to do especially with the first genera.
2167. But the truth is that this science deals chiefly with common attributes, yet without making the common factors principles in a Platonic sense. However, it does consider the intrinsic principles of things—matter and form.
2168. And these would (910).
Second, he raises the second problem. For, on the one hand, it seems that unity and being are principles and genera, because these most of all seem to contain all things within their general ambit. And they seem to be principles because they are first by nature; for when they are destroyed, other things are too; for everything is a being and one. Hence, if being and unity are destroyed, everything else is destroyed, but not the other way around.
2169. But, on the other hand, it seems that unity and being are not genera, and therefore they are not principles if genera are principles. For no difference participates actually in a genus, because difference is derived from form and genus from matter; for example, rational is taken from intellective nature, and animal from sensory nature. Now form is not included actually in the essence of matter, but matter is in potentiality to form. And similarly difference does not belong to the nature of a genus, but a genus contains differences potentially. And for this reason a difference does not participate in a genus, because, when I say “rational,” I signify something having reason. Nor does it belong to the intelligibility of rational that it should be animal. Now that is participated in which is included in the intelligibility of the thing which participates; and for this reason it is said that a difference does not participate in a genus. But there cannot be any difference whose intelligibility does not contain unity and being. Hence unity and being cannot have any differences. Thus, they cannot be genera, since every genus has differences.
2170. Now the truth of the matter is that unity and being are not genera but are common to all things analogically.
2171. Further, if what (911).
Then he raises the third question. The problem now is whether genera are principles to a greater degree than species. First, he shows that species are principles to a greater degree than genera; for what is more simple is a principle to a greater degree. But species seem to be more simple, for they are the indivisible things in which the formal division of a genus terminates. But genera are divided into many different species, and therefore species seem to be principles to a greater degree than genera. But in view of the fact that genera constitute species, and not vice versa, genera seem to be principles to a greater degree; for the intelligible structure of a principle is such that, when it is destroyed, other things are destroyed.
2172. Now the truth is that universals are principles, namely, of knowing; and thus genera are principles to a greater degree because they are simpler. The reason why they are divided into more members than species are is that they contain more members potentially. But species contain many members actually. Hence they are divisible to a greater degree by the method of dissolving a composite into its simple constituents.
LESSON 2
Are There Non-Sensible Substances and Principles?
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2: 1060a 3-1060b 3
912. Further, there is the question whether or not we must posit the existence of something besides singular things; and if not, then the science which we are now seeking must deal with these things. But they are infinite in number. And what exists apart from singular things are genera and species; but the science which we are now seeking deals with neither of these. The reason why this is impossible has already been stated (909-911).
913. And in general the problem is whether one must suppose that there is some substance which is separable from sensible substances (i.e., the things which exist here and now), or that the latter are beings and the things with which wisdom deals. For we seem to be looking for another kind of substance, and this constitutes the object of our study: I mean, to know whether there is something which is separable in itself and belongs to no sensible thing.
914. Further, if there is another kind of substance apart from sensible substances, from what kind of sensible substances must it be assumed to be separate? For why should we suppose that it exists apart from men and from horses rather than from other animals or non-living things generally? Yet to devise various eternal substances equal in number to sensible and corruptible ones would seem to be unreasonable.
915. But if the principle we are now seeking is not separable from bodies, what could be more of a principle of things than matter? Yet matter does not exist actually but only potentially; and thus it would seem rather that the specifying principle or form is a more important principle than matter. But the form is corruptible [according to some]; and so in general there is no eternal substance which is separate and exists of itself. But this is absurd; for such a principle and substance seems to exist and is sought by almost all accomplished thinkers as something that exists. For how will there be order in the world if there is not a principle which is eternal, separable and permanent (235-246)?
916. Again, if there is some substance and principle of such a nature as that now being sought, and this one principle belongs to everything and is one and the same for both corruptible and eternal things, the question arises why it is, if this principle is the same for all, that some of the things which come under it should be eternal and some not; for this is absurd. But if all corruptible things have one principle, and eternal things another, we shall face the same problem if the principle of corruptible things is eternal; for if it is eternal, why are not the things which fall under this principle also eternal? But if it is corruptible, it in turn must have some other principle, and this again must have another, and so on to infinity (250-265).
917. But on the other hand, if one were to posit those principles which are thought to be the most unchangeable, namely, being and unity, then, first, if each of these does not signify a particular thing or a substance, how will they be separable and exist of themselves? Yet the eternal and primary principles for which we are looking must be such. But if each of these does signify a particular thing or a substance, all beings will be substances; for being is predicated of all things, and unity is predicated of some. But it is false that all beings are substances.
918. Again, how can the statement of those be true who say that unity is the first principle and a substance, and who generate number as the first thing produced from the unit and matter and say that it is substance? For how are we to understand that the number two and each of the other numbers composed of units is one? For they say nothing about this, nor is it easy to do so.
919. But if someone maintains that lines and what is derived from these (I mean surfaces) are the first principles of things, these are not separable substances but sections and divisions; the former of surfaces, and the latter of bodies (and points are the sections and divisions of lines); and further they are the limits of these same things. And all of these exist in other things, and none are separable.
920. Again, how are we to understand that the unit and the point have substance. For every substance is generated but not the point; for the point amounts to a division (266-283).
921. There is also the problem that, while every science must be about universals and about such and such a universal, a substance is not a universal but is rather a particular and separable thing. Hence, if there is a science of principles, how are we to understand substance to be a principle (288-293) ?
922. Again, the question arises whether or not there is any principle apart from the concrete whole? And by this I mean the matter and what is joined to it. For if not, then everything that is in matter is corruptible. But if there is some principle, it must be the specifying principle or form. Therefore it is difficult to determine in what cases this exists apart and in what not; for in some cases it is evident that the form is not separable, for example, in that of a house (235-247).
923. Again, there is the question whether principles are the same specifically or numerically? For if they are the same numerically, all things will be the same (248-249).
COMMENTARY
2173. Having raised a question about the study of this science, Aristotle now raises a question about the things which are considered in this science. He does this, first (912:C 2173), with regard to substances; and second (916:C 2180), with regard to principles (“Again, if”).
In treating the first issue he raises two questions. First, he asks whether or not it is necessary to posit the existence of something else in reality over and above singular things. Now if one claims that it is not, then it seems to follow that the science which we are now investigating must be concerned with singular things. But this seems to be impossible, because singular things are infinite in number, and the infinite is unknowable. And if one claims that it is necessary to posit the existence of something apart from singular things, they must be genera or species; and then this science would deal with genera and species. First, he explains why this is impossible; for it seems that neither genera nor species are principles, yet this science deals with principles.
2174. The truth of the matter is that in reality there are only singular things, and that anything else exists only in the consideration of the intellect, which abstracts common attributes from particular ones.
2175. And in general (913).
Then he states the second question: whether there is some substance which exists apart from sensible substances existing here and now. This question must be raised here because, if there is nothing apart from sensible substances, only sensible substances are beings. And since wisdom is the science of beings, wisdom must be concerned only with sensible substances, even though we seem in this science to be looking for some other separate reality. It belongs to this science, then, to investigate whether or not there is something apart from sensible substances. And whichever alternative is taken, another question arises.
2176. Further, if there (914).
He therefore poses the question which seems to arise if one claims that there is something separate from sensible substances. The question is whether this separate thing exists apart from all sensible substances or only apart from some. And if only apart from some, it is hard to explain why we should posit a separate substance apart from some sensible substances and not from others. For there does not seem to be any reason why there should be a separate man and a separate horse apart from the men and horses we perceive by the senses, and why this should not be true also of other animals and other non-living things. But if there is some separate substance apart from all sensible substances, it follows that we must posit the existence of certain separate substances which are eternal and equal in number to sensible and corruptible substances. Thus, just as there is a corruptible man, in a similar way there would be an incorruptible man, and the same with horse and ox, and also with other natural bodies. This seems to be absurd.
2177. But if the principle (915).
Then he raises another question which seems to follow if there is no substance separate from sensible substances. This question asks what the first principle is, whether matter or form; for sensible substances are composed of these two principles. For at first glance it seems that nothing can be more of a principle of things than matter, which is the first subject and always continues to exist, as the first philosophers of nature claimed. Yet it would seem that matter cannot be a principle, because it is not an actuality but a potentiality. Hence, since actuality is naturally prior to potentiality, as has been pointed out in Book IX (785:C 1856), the specifying principle or form, which is an actuality, seems to be this principle.
2178. But it seems that form cannot be a principle because a sensible form appears to be corruptible. If a sensible form were the first principle, then, it would seem to follow that there would be no eternal substance, separable and existing of itself. But this is clearly absurd because some such principle, eternal and separate, and some such substance, is sought by [almost all] the famous philosophers. This is reasonable, for there would not be a perpetual order of things in the world if there were no separate and eternal principle which causes things to be perpetual.
2179. The true answer to this question is that there are certain substances which are separate from sensible substances; and these are not the Forms of sensible things, as the Platonists claimed, but the primary movers, as will be shown below (1056:C 2492).
2180. Again, if there (916).
Then he raises the question about principles. First, he asks what kinds of principles there are; second (917:C 2182), what they are (“But on the other hand”); and third (918:C:2184), how they are related to one another (“Again, how can”).
He accordingly asks (916) whether or not, if there is some separate substance and principle such as we are now seeking, it is the principle of all things, corruptible and incorruptible. Now if there is such a principle of all things, the question arises why some of the things which come from the same principle are eternal and some ire not. But if there is one principle for corruptible things and another for incorruptible ones, there remains the question why, if the principle is eternal the things coming from it are not themselves eternal. But if the principle of things is corruptible, and every corruptible thing is capable of being generated, and everything capable of being generated has a principle, it follows that the corruptible principle will have a principle, and that this will have another, and so on to infinity, as has been made clear above in Book II (153:C 301).
2181. The truth of the matter is that the first principle of all things is incorruptible, and that some things are corruptible because of their great distance from that principle. These are the things in which generation and corruption are caused by an intermediate cause which is incorruptible as regards its substance but changeable as regards place.
2182. But on the other hand (917).
Then he asks what the principles of things are. First, he examines the opinions of those men who claimed that the principles are unity and being because these are the most unchangeable. For no matter how a thing varies, it always remains one.
2183. But the opinion of these men gives rise to two questions. The first is whether unity and being signify a particular thing, i.e., a substance; for, if they do not, they cannot be separable and exist of themselves. But we are looking for such principles which are eternal and exist separately. Yet if they do signify a particular thing or substance, it follows that all things are substances, and that nothing is an accident; for being is predicated of any existing thing at all, and unity is predicated of some. Now there are some things which involve multiplicity in their being, and the different ways in which unity is predicated truly of these is clear enough. But it is false that all things are substances; and therefore it seems that unity and being do not signify substance.
2184. Again, how can (918).
The second question or problem which he raises runs as follows: those who maintain that unity, or the unit, is the principle and substance of things say that number is generated as a first product from the unit and matter. And this, i.e., number, they call substance. But evidently this is not true, because, if a number is composed of the unit and matter, it must be something one, just as what is composed of a living principle and matter must be something living. But in what way is the number two or any other number, which is composed of units, one, as the Platonists claimed? This is not easy to explain, inasmuch as it can be said that they neglected to account for this as though it were easy to understand.
2185. But if someone (919).
Second, he examines another opinion about the principles of things. For sonic claimed that “lines and what is derived from them,” namely, surfaces, are principles, because they held that bodies are composed of surfaces, and surfaces of lines. But it is clear that such things are not separate substances which exist of themselves; for such things are sections and divisions: lines being sections and divisions of surfaces, surfaces of bodies, and points of lines. They are also the limits of these things, i.e., points are the limits of lines, and so forth; for a point, which is at the extremity of a line, is the limit of a line. Now what is signified as actually within a line is a section of the line. The same thing is true of, a line in relation to a surface, and of a surface in relation to a body; for it is evident that limits and sections are entities which exist in other things as their subjects. Hence they cannot exist apart. Lines and surfaces, then, are not principles of things.
2186. Again, how are we (920).
Then he introduces another argument. He says that it cannot be understood that the unit and the point have a substance, because substance begins to exist only by way of generation. But when a line is actually divided, the division itself is a point.
2187. The correct answer to these questions is that neither units nor lines nor surfaces are principles.
2188. There is also the problem (921).
After the question about unity and being and dimensions he now raises the question about substances. First, he asks whether substances are principles. The answer seems to be that they are not; for every science is concerned with universals and with “such and such a universal,” i.e., some definite universal subject. Now a substance is not included among universals, but is rather a particular thing which exists of itself. Hence it seems that there is no science of substances. But a science is concerned with principles. Therefore substances are not principles.
2189. The truth is that, although universals do not exist of themselves, it is still necessary to consider universally the natures of things which subsist of themselves. Accordingly, genera and species, which are called second substances, are put in the category of substance; and of these there is scientific knowledge. And certain things which exist of themselves are principles; and these, because they are immaterial, pertain to intelligible knowledge, even though they surpass the comprehension of our intellect.
2190. Again, the question (922).
Second, he asks whether or not there is any “principle apart from the concrete whole,” i.e., the natural whole or composite. He explains that by concrete whole he means matter, or the thing composed of matter. For if there is no principle apart from the composite of matter and form, and those principles which are said to be in matter are corruptible, it follows that nothing is eternal. And if there is some principle apart from the composite, it must be the specifying principle or form. Then the question arises in which cases the form is separate and in which it is not. For it is obvious that in some cases the form is not separate; the form of a house, for example, is not separate from matter. It was for this reason that the Platonists did not posit Ideas or Forms of artificial things, because the forms of such things are actualities which cannot exist of themselves.
2191. The correct answer to this question is that there is some principle apart from matter, and this is not the form of sensible things.
2192. Again, there is (923).
He now asks how the principles of all things are related to one another: whether they are the same numerically or only specifically. For, if they are the same numerically, it follows that all things -are the same numerically. But if they are not the same numerically, this difference will have to be accounted for.
2193. The truth is that, if one is speaking of the extrinsic principles of things, they are the same numerically, since the first principle of all things is an agent and final cause. But the intrinsic principles of things-matter and form-are not the same numerically but only analogically, as will be shown below (1049-54:C 2474-87).
LESSON 3
All Beings Reduced to Being and Unity
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 3: 1060b 31-1061b 17
924. Since the science of the philosopher treats of being as being in general and not of some part of it, and the term being is used in many senses and not merely in one, it follows that, if being is used equivocally and not with a common meaning, being does not fall under one science (for such terms do not have a common class). But if the term is used according to one common meaning, being will fall under one science.
925. Therefore the term seems to be used in the way mentioned, like the terms medical and healthy; for each of these is used in many senses. Now the term is used in each of these ways because of some kind of reference. Thus the former is used in reference to the science of medicine; the latter, to health; and still another, to something else; yet in each case the term is referred to the same thing. For both a discussion and a knife are called medical: the one because it comes from the science of medicine, and the other because it is useful to it. The same is true of the term healthy; for one thing is called healthy because it is a sign of health, and another because it produces it. The same is true of other terms. Hence the same thing is true of every instance of being; for each thing is called a being because it is either a modification or a state or a disposition or a motion or something else of this kind which belongs to being as being.
926. And since every being is referred to something one and common, each of the contrarieties may also be referred to the primary differences and contrarieties of being,.whether the primary differences are plurality and unity, likeness and unlikeness, or any others; for these have been considered (304).
927. And it makes no difference whether an existing thing is referred to being or to unity. For even if they are not the same but different, they are nevertheless interchangeable; for what is one is somehow a being, and what is a being is somehow one.
928. Now since it is the office of one and the same science to study all contraries, and one of each pair involves privation (though one might be puzzled how some contraries are predicated privatively, i.e., those which have an intermediate, as just and unjust), in all such cases it is necessary to hold that the privation of the one is not the privation of the whole notion of the other, but only of the last species. For example, if a man is just because of some habitual tendency to obey the laws, the unjust man will not always be deprived of the perfection completely but will fail to obey the laws in some respect; and in this respect privation will belong to him. The same holds true in other cases.
929. Now the mathematician in a sense studies things which are gotten by taking something away; for he speculates by removing from things all sensible qualities, such as heaviness and lightness, hardness and its contrary, and also heat and cold and other sensible contrarieties, and leaves only the quantified and the continuous (some things being such in one, some in two, and some in three dimensions). And he studies the properties of the quantified and the continuous as such and not in any other respect. And of some he considers the relative positions and attributes, and of others the commensurability and incommensurability, and of others the ratios; yet we claim that there is only one science of all these things, namely, geometry. The same holds true of being.
930. For an investigation of the attributes of being as being, and of the contrarieties of being as being, belong to no other science than [first] philosophy; for one would not assign to the philosophy of nature the study of things insofar as they are beings but rather insofar as they participate in motion. For dialectics and sophistry are concerned with the accidents of existing things, but not as beings, nor do they deal with being as being. It follows, then, that it is the philosopher who speculates about the things which we have mentioned, insofar as they are beings.
931. And since every being is referred to some one common meaning, which is used in many senses, and the same applies to contraries (for they are referred to the primary differences and contrarieties of being), and such things can fall under one science, the difficulty which was stated at the beginning of this work (900-904) is solved in this way. I mean the question how there can be one science of things which are many and different in genus.
COMMENTARY
2194. Having raised the foregoing questions, Aristotle now begins to assemble the things that belong to the consideration of this science. This is divided into two parts. In the first (924:C 2194) he indicates the things which this science considers. In the second (956:C 2247) he compares this science with the others (“Every science”).
The first part is divided into two members. First, he shows that it is the office of this science to consider all beings; and second (932:C 2206), that it has to consider the principles of demonstration (“And since the mathematician”).
In considering the first part he does two things. First, he shows that all things are somehow reduced to one. Second (929:C 2202), he shows that the study of this science extends to all things insofar as they are somehow reduced to some one thing (“Now the mathematician”).
In treating the first part he does two things. First, he shows that in view of the goal of our present study it is necessary to ask whether all things are somehow reduced to one. He says that, since the science of philosophy treats being as being in such a way as to consider being in terms of its universal character and not merely in terms of the intelligible character of any particular being, and since the term being is used in many senses and not just in one, if the many senses of being were purely equivocal without any common meaning, not all beings would fall under one science, because they would not in any way be reduced to one common class. And one science must deal with one class of things. But if the many senses of being have one common meaning, all beings can then fall under one science. Hence, in order to answer the question that was raised as to whether this science is one even though it treats many different things, we must consider whether or not all beings are reduced to some one thing.
2195. Therefore the term (925).
Here he shows that all things are reduced to some one thing. In treating this he does two things. First (925:C 2195), he explains his thesis. Second (928:C 2200), he clears up a point that might present a difficulty (“Now since”).
The first is divided into two parts. In the first he shows that all things are reduced to one. In the second (92-7:C 219q), he explains what this one thing is to which all things are reduced (“And it makes no difference”) -
In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he shows that all beings are reduced to one common being; and second (926:C 2198), that all contrarieties are reduced to one contrariety (“And since every”).
He accordingly says, first (925), that the term being is used in the way mentioned above; i.e., it is used of many things according to some common meaning. He makes this clear by means of two examples: the terms medical and healthy.
2196. For both of these terms are used variously, yet in such a way that they are reduced or referred to some one thing. The term medical is used in many ways inasmuch as it is referred in one sense to a medicine and in another to something else. And similarly the term healthy is used in many ways inasmuch as it is referred in one sense to health and in another to something else. Yet in both cases the various senses have reference to the same thing, though in different ways. For example, a discussion is called medical because it comes from the
science of medicine, and a knife is called medical because it is an instrument that is used by the same science. Similarly one thing is called healthy because it is a sign of health, as urine, and another because it causes health, as a medication. The same applies to other terms which are used in a similar way.
2197. It is evident that terms which are used in this way are midway between univocal and equivocal terms. In the case of univocity one term is predicated of different things with absolutely one and the same meaning; for example, the term animal, which is predicated of a horse and of an ox, signifies a living, sensory substance. In the case of equivocity the same term is predicated of various things with an entirely different meaning. This is clear in the case of the term dog, inasmuch as it is predicated both of a constellation and of a certain species of animal. But in the case of those things which are spoken of in the way mentioned previously, the same term is predicated of various things with a meaning that is partly the same and partly different—different regarding the different modes of relation, and the same regarding that to which it is related; for to be a sign of something and to be a cause of something are different, but health is one. Terms of this kind, then, are predicated analogously, because they have a proportion to one thing. The same holds true also of the many ways in which the term being is used; for being in an unqualified sense means what exists of itself, namely, substance; but other things are called beings because they belong to what exists of itself, namely, modifications or states or anything else of this kind. For a quality is called a being, not because it has an act of existence, but because a substance is said to be disposed by it. It is the same with other accidents. This is why he says that they belong to a being (or are of a being). It is evident, then, that the many senses of the term being have a common meaning to which they are reduced.
2198. And since (926).
Next he shows that all contrarieties are reduced to one first contrariety. Since all beings are reduced to one common meaning, and the contrarieties of beings, which are opposite differences, are in themselves a natural consequence of beings, it follows that contrarieties must be reduced to some primary contrariety, whatever it may be, whether it is plurality and unity, likeness and unlikeness, or whatever else are primary differences of beings. And contrarieties of this kind have to be considered in the science which establishes what is true about beings.
2199. And it makes (927).
Then he indicates what this common thing is to which all things are reduced. He says that it makes no difference whether things are reduced to being or to unity; for if it is said that being and unity are not the same conceptually but differ inasmuch as unity adds the note of indivisibility to being, none the less it is evident that they are interchangeable; for everything that is one is somehow a being, and everything that is a being is somehow one; because, just as a substance is a being properly and of itself, so too it is one properly and of itself. The way in which unity is related to being has been explained above in Book IV (301-04:C 548-60) and in Book X (832:C 1974).
2200. Now since (928).
Then he removes a difficulty. He says that, since all contraries are investigated by one science (and the most cogent reason seems to be that in each pair of contraries one contrary is used privatively, and this is known from its opposite term), the difficulty arises how contraries which have an intermediate can be predicated as privations, since in the case of opposites which are privatively opposed there is no intermediate.
2201. The answer to this must be that in the case of such contraries one opposite is not posited as a privation removing all the intelligible notes of the other but as the privation of the last species inasmuch as it detracts from the complete intelligible constitution of the whole species. For instance, if someone is said to be just because he habitually obeys the laws, he will not always be said to be unjust, as if he were deprived of the entire notion of justice, which would be the case if he obeyed the laws in no way—but rather because he fails to obey them in some respects. Hence the privation of justice will be found in him to the extent that he falls short of the perfection of justice. It is for this reason that he can be in an intermediate state, because not everyone who lacks justice is completely deprived of it but only of some part of it. And this intermediate state is one that differs in degree. The same holds true of other contraries. The privation of sight, however, is said to consist in the total lack of sight, and therefore there is no intermediate state between blindness and sight.
2202. Now the mathematician (929).
Here he shows that the investigations of this science extend to all beings insofar as they are reduced to one thing. In treating this he makes a tripartite division. First, he shows by an example from geometry that it is the office of one science to consider all things which are reduced to being. He says that the science of mathematics studies “those things which are gotten by taking something away,” i.e., abstract things. It makes this abstraction, not because it supposes that the things which it considers are separate in reality from sensible things, but because it considers them without considering sensible qualities. For the science of mathematics carries on its investigations by removing from the scope of its study all sensible qualities, such as lightness, heaviness, hardness, softness, heat and cold, and all other sensible qualities, and retains as its object of study only the quantified and the continuous, whether it is continuous in one dimension, as a line, or in two, as a surface, or in three, as a body. And it is primarily interested in the properties of these inasmuch as they are continuous and not in any other respect; for it does not consider the properties of surface inasmuch as it is the surface of wood or of stone. Similarly it considers the relationships between its objects. And in considering figures it also studies their accidents, and how quantities are commensurable or incommensurable, as is clear in Book X of Euclid, “and their ratios,” or proportions, as is clear in Book V of the same work. Yet there is one science of all these things, and this is geometry.
2203. Now what was true for the mathematician is also true for the philosopher who studies being. He passes over a study of all particular beings and considers them only inasmuch as they pertain to being in general. And though these are many, there is nevertheless a single science of all of them inasmuch as all are reduced to one thing, as has been pointed out.
2204. For an investigation (930).
Second, he indicates what science it is that considers the above-mentioned things. He says that the study of the attributes of being as being does not belong to any other science but only to this branch of philosophy. If it did belong to another science, it would mostly seem to belong to the philosophy of nature or to dialectics, which seemingly are the most common of the sciences. Now according to the opinion of the ancient philosophers who did not posit any substances other than sensible ones, it would seem to be the philosophy of nature that is the common science. In this way it would follow that it is the function of the philosophy of nature to consider all substances, and consequently all beings, which are reduced to substance.-But dialectics would seem to be the common science, and also sophistry, because these consider certain accidents of beings, namely, intentions and the notions of genus and species and the like. It follows, then, that it is the philosopher who has to consider the above-mentioned things, inasmuch as they are accidents of being.
2205. And since every (931).
Third, from what has been said, he draws his thesis as his chief conclusion. He says that, since being is used in many senses in reference to some one thing, and since all contrarieties are referred to the first contrariety of being, such things organized in this way can fall under one science, as has been pointed out. Thus he solves the question previously raised: whether there is one science of things which are many and generically different.
LESSON 4
This Science Considers the Principles of Demonstration
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 4: 1061b 17-1061b 33
932. And since the mathematician uses the common axioms in a particular way, it must be the office of first philosophy to study principles of this kind. For the axiom or principle that “when equals are subtracted from equals the remainders are equal” is common to all quantities. But mathematics, assuming [principles of this kind], makes a study of some part of the quantified as its proper subject matter, for example, lines or angles or number or some of the other kinds of quantity. Yet it does not consider them inasmuch as they are beings but inasmuch as each is continuous in one, two or three dimensions. Philosophy, however, does not investigate those things which are in some part of matter insofar as each has some attribute, but it considers each of these particular things from the standpoint of being insofar as it is being.
933. Now what applies in the case of the science of mathematics is also true of the philosophy of nature; for the philosophy of nature studies the attributes and principles of beings inasmuch as they are moved, not inasmuch as they are beings. But, as we have said, the primary science considers these attributes and principles insofar as their subjects are beings, and not in any other respect. For this reason it is necessary to hold that this science and the science of mathematics are parts of wisdom (319-23; 900-01).
COMMENTARY
2206. Having shown how the investigations of this science are concerned with beings and with the attributes which belong to being as being, the Philosopher now shows how the investigations of this science are concerned with the first principles of demonstration.
This is divided into two parts. In the first (932:C 2206) he shows that it is the office of this science to consider these first principles of demonstration. In the second (934:C 2211) he draws his conclusions about one principle of demonstration which is prior to the others (“There is a principle”).
In regard to the first he does two things. First (932:C 22o6), he clarifies his thesis by considering the science of mathematics; and second (933:C 2209), by considering the philosophy of nature (“Now what applies”).
In the first part he uses the following argument: all the common axioms which are used by the particular sciences in a way peculiar to themselves and not in their common aspect belong to the consideration of this science. But the first principles of demonstration are used by the science of mathematics and by other particular sciences in a way peculiar to themselves. Therefore an investigation of these principles insofar as they are common belongs to the science which considers being as being.
2207. He accordingly says that, since the mathematician uses “the common axioms in a particular way,” i.e., insofar as they are adapted to his subject matter, it must be the function of first philosophy to consider such principles in their common aspect. For these principles are taken as principles of the sciences insofar as they are adapted to some particular subject matter. He clarifies his statement by an example.
2208. The principle that “when equals are subtracted from equals the remainders are equal” is common to all instances of quantity which admit of equality and inequality. But the science of mathematics presupposes principles of this kind in order to make a special study of that part of quantity which constitutes its proper subject matter; for there is no mathematical science which considers the attributes common to quantity as quantity, because this is the work of first philosophy. The mathematical sciences rather consider those attributes which belong to this or to that quantity; for example, arithmetic considers the attributes that belong to number, and geometry considers those that belong to continuous quantity. Thus the arithmetician uses the above-mentioned principle only inasmuch as it has to do with numbers, and the geometer uses it inasmuch as it has to do with lines and with angles. The geometer, however, does not consider this principle inasmuch as it relates to beings as beings but inasmuch as it relates to being as continuous, whether it is continuous in one dimension, as a line; or in two, as a surface; or in three, as a body. But first philosophy does not study the parts of being inasmuch as each has certain accidents; but when it studies each of these common attributes, it studies being as being.
2209. Now what applies (933).
Then he makes the same thing clear by considering the philosophy of nature. He says that what applies in the case of the science of mathematics is also true of the philosophy of nature; for while the philosophy of nature studies the attributes and principles of beings, it does not consider beings as beings but as mobile. The first science, on the other hand, deals with these inasmuch as they are being, and not in any other respect. Hence, the philosophy of nature and the science of mathematics must be parts of first philosophy, just as any particular science is said to be a part of a universal science.
2210. The reason why common principles of this kind belong to the consideration of first philosophy is this: since all first self-evident propositions are those of which the predicate is included in the definition of the subject, then in order that propositions may be self-evident to all, it is necessary that their subjects and predicates should be known to all. Common notions of this type are those which are conceived by all men, as being and non-being, whole and part, equal and unequal, same and different, and so on. But these belong to the consideration of first philosophy; and therefore common propositions composed of such terms must belong chiefly to the consideration of first philosophy.
LESSON 5
The Principle of Non-Contradiction
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 5 & 6: 1061b 34-1062b 19
934. There is a principle in existing things about which it is impossible to make a mistake, but of which one must always do the contrary, I mean acknowledge it as true, namely, that the same thing cannot both be and not be at one and the same time; and the same is also true of other things which are opposed in this way (326-328).
935. And while there is no demonstration in the strict sense of such principles, one may employ an argument ad hominem; for it is impossible to construct a syllogism from a more certain principle than this one. But this would be necessary if there were demonstration of it in the strict sense (329-330).
936. Now anyone who wants to prove to an opponent making statements opposite to one’s own that he is wrong must take some such principle which is the same as this one—that the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time—but apparently is not the same. For this will be the only method of demonstration that can be used against one who says that opposite statements can be truly made about the same subject.
937. Accordingly, those who are to join in some discussion must understand each other to some extent. And if this does not happen, how will they join in a common discussion? Therefore each of the terms used must be understood and must signify something, and not many things but only one. But if a term does signify many things, it must be made clear to which of these it refers. Hence, one who says that this is and is not, totally denies what he affirms, and thus denies that the term signifies what it signifies. But this is impossible. Hence, if to be this has some meaning, the contradictory cannot be said to be true of the same subject (332-340).
938. Again, if a term signifies something and this is affirmed truly, it must necessarily be so; and what is necessarily so cannot not be. Hence opposite affirmations and negations cannot be true of the same subject (337-338).
939. Again, if the affirmation is in no way truer than the negation, it will not be truer to say that something is a man than to say that it is not a man. And it would also seem that it is either more or not less true to say that a man is not a horse than to say that he is not a man. Hence one will also be right in
saying that the same thing is a horse; for it was assumed that opposite statements are equally true. Therefore it follows that the same thing is a man and a horse, or any other animal (343-345). Hence, while there is no demonstration in the strict sense of these principles, there is still a demonstration ad hominem against one who makes these assumptions.
940. And perhaps if one had questioned Heraclitus himself in this way, he would quickly have forced him to admit that opposite statements can never be true of the same subjects. But he adopted this view without understanding his own statement (328). And in general if what he said is true, not even this statement will be true—I mean that the same thing can both be and not be at one and the same time. For just as when they are separated the affirmation will not be truer than the negation (346), in a similar way when both are combined and taken together as though they were one affirmation, the negation will not be truer than the whole statement regarded as an affirmation.
941. Again, if it is possible to affirm nothing truly, even this statement-that no affirmation is true-will be false (396-397). But if there is a true affirmation, this will refute what is said by those who raise such objections and completely destroy discussion.
Chapter 6
942. The statement made by Protagoras is similar to those mentioned; for he said that man is the measure of all things, meaning simply that whatever appears so to anyone is just as it appears to him. But if this is true, it follows that the same thing is and is not, and is good and evil, and that other statements involving opposites are true; because often a particular thing appears to be good to some and just the opposite to others, and that which appears to each man is the measure.
COMMENTARY
2211. Having shown that a study of the common principles of demonstration belongs chiefly to the consideration of this philosophical science, the Philosopher now deals with the first of these principles (934:C 2212). For just as all beings must be referred to one first being, in a similar fashion all principles of demonstration must be referred to some principle which pertains in a more basic way to the consideration of this philosophical science. This principle is that the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time. It is the first principle because its terms, being and non-being, are the first to be apprehended by the intellect.
2212. This part is divided into two members. In the first (934:C 2211) he establishes the truth of this principle. In the second (936:C 22T4) he rejects an error (“Now anyone who”).
In reference to the first part he does two things regarding this principle. First, he says that in regard to beings there is a principle of demonstration “about which it is impossible to make a mistake” (i.e., so far as its meaning is concerned), but of which we “must always do the contrary,” namely, acknowledge it as true. This principle is that the same thing cannot both be and not be at one and the same time, granted of course that the other conditions which it is customary to give in the case of a contradiction are fulfilled, namely, in the same respect, in an unqualified sense, and the like. For no one can think that this principle is false, because, if someone were to think that contradictories may be true at the same time, he would then have contrary opinions at the same time; for opinions about contradictories are contrary. For example, the opinion that “Socrates is sitting” is contrary to the opinion that “Socrates is not sitting.”
2213. And while (935).
Second, he says that, while there cannot be demonstration in the strict sense of the above-mentioned principle and other similar ones, one may offer an argument ad hominem in support of it. That it cannot be demonstrated in the strict sense he proves thus: no one can prove this principle by constructing a syllogism from some principle which is better known. But such would be necessary if that principle were to be demonstrated in the strict sense. However, this principle can be demonstrated by using an argument ad hominem against one who admits some other statement, though less known, and denies this one.
2214. Now anyone who (936).
Then he rejects the opinion of those who deny this principle; and this is divided into two parts. First (936:C 2214), he argues against those who deny this principle. Second (943:C 2225), he shows how one can meet this opinion (“Now this difficulty”).
In regard to the first he does two things. First (936:C 2214), he argues against those who unqualifiedly deny this principle. Second (940:C 2221), he turns his attention to certain particular opinions (“And perhaps”).
In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the method of arguing against this error. He says that in arguing against an opponent who claims that contradictory propositions may be true, anyone who wants to show that this opinion is false ought to take some such principle which is the same as this one—that the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time—but apparently is not the same. For, if it were evidently the same, it would not be admitted by an opponent. Yet if it were not the same, he could not prove his thesis, because a principle of this kind cannot be demonstrated from some principle which is better known. Hence, it is only in this way that a demonstration can be made against those who say that contradictories may be true of the same subject, namely, by assuming as a premise what is in fact the same as the conclusion but apparently is not.
2215. Accordingly (937).
Second, he begins to argue dialectically against the above-mentioned error; and in regard to this he gives three arguments, First, he argues as follows: if two men are to join in a discussion in such a way that one may communicate his view to the other in a dispute, each must understand something that the other is saying. For if this were not the case, no statement would be understood by both of them; and thus an argument with an opponent would be pointless.
2216. However, if one of them is to understand what the other is saying, each of the terms used must be understood according to its proper meaning and must therefore signify some one thing and not many things. And if it should signify many, it will be necessary to make clear which of the many things it signifies; otherwise one would not know what the other person means.
2217. Now granted that a term signifies one thing, it is evident that one who says both that this is and that this is not, for example, that Socrates is a man and that he is not a man, denies the one thing which he attributed to Socrates, namely, that he is a man, when he adds that he is not a man; and thus he denies what he first signified. Hence it follows that a word does not signify what it signifies. But this is impossible. Consequently, if a term signifies some definite thing, the contradictory cannot be truly affirmed of the same subject.
2218. Again, if a term (938).
Then he gives the second argument, which runs as follows: if a term signifies some attribute, and the attribute signified by the term is truly affirmed of the same subject of which the term is first predicated, this attribute must belong to the subject of which the term is predicated so long as the proposition is true. For this conditional proposition, “If Socrates is a man, Socrates is a man,” is clearly true. Now every true conditional proposition is a necessary one. Hence, if the consequent is true, the antecedent must be true. But what is, cannot sometimes not be, because to be necessary and to be incapable of not being are equivalent. Therefore so long as the proposition “Socrates is a man” is true, the proposition “Socrates is not a man” cannot be true. Thus it is evident that opposite affirmations and negations cannot be true of the same subject at the same time.
2219. Again, if the affirmation (939).
Then he gives the third argument, which is as follows: if an affirmation is not truer than the negation opposed to it, one who says that Socrates is a man does not speak with greater truth than one who says that Socrates is not a man. But it is evident that one who says that a man is not a horse speaks either with greater or with no less truth than one who says that a man is not a man. Hence, according to this argument, he who says that a man is not a horse will speak with equal or no less truth. But if contradictory opposites are true at the same time, for example, if the proposition “Man is not a horse” is true, and the proposition “Man is a horse” is also true, then it follows that a man is a horse and also any other animal.
2220. But because someone could criticize the foregoing arguments on the grounds that the things assumed in them are less known than the intended conclusion, he therefore answers this by saying that no one of the foregoing arguments is demonstrative in the strict sense, although there can be an argument ad hominem against an opponent who gives this argument, because the things assumed must be admitted to be true even though they are less known, absolutely than what he denies.
2221. And perhaps (940).
Then he rejects the above error by considering certain particular thinkers. He does this, first (940:C 2221), with regard to Heraclitus; and second (942:C 2224), with regard to Protagoras (“The statement”).
Now Heraclitus posited two things: first, that an affirmation and a negation may be true at the same time (and from this it would follow that every proposition, affirmative as well as negative, is true); and second, that there may be an intermediate between affirmation and negation (and from this it would follow that neither an affirmation nor a negation can be true). Consequently every proposition is false.
2222. First (940:C 2222), he raises an argument against Heraclitus’ first position; and second (941:C 2223), against his second position (“Again, if it is possible”).
He accordingly says, first (940), that by giving an argument ad hominem in this way one may easily bring even Heraclitus, who was the author of this statement, to admit that opposite propositions may not be true of the same subject. For he seems to have accepted the opinion that they may be true of the same subject because he did not understand his own statement. And he would be forced to deny his statement in the following way: if what he said is true, namely, that one and the same thing can both be and not be at one and the same time, it follows that this very statement will not be true; for if an affirmation and a negation are taken separately, an affirmation is not truer than a negation; and if an affirmation and a negation are taken together in such a way that one affirmation results from them, the negation will not be less true of the whole statement made up of the affirmation and the negation than of the opposite affirmation. For it is clearly possible for some copulative proposition to be true, just as for some simple proposition; and it is possible to take its negation. And whether the copulative proposition be composed of two affirmative propositions, as when we say “Socrates is sitting and arguing,” or of two negative propositions, as when we say “It is true that Socrates is not a stone or an ass,” or of an affirmative proposition and a negative proposition, as when we say “It is true that Socrates is sitting and not arguing,” nevertheless a copulative proposition is always taken to be true because one affirmative proposition is true. And he who says that it is false takes the negation as applying to the whole copulative proposition. Hence he who says that it is true that man is and is not at the same time, takes this as a kind of affirmation; and that this is not true is the negation of this. Hence, if an affirmation and a negation are true at the same time, it follows that the negation which states that this is not true, i.e., that an affirmation and a negation are true at the same time, is equally true. For if any negation is true at the same time as the affirmation opposed to it, every negation must be true at the same time as the affirmation opposed to it; for the reasoning is the same in all cases.
2223. Again, if it is possible (941).
Then he introduces an argument against the second position of Heraclitus: that no affirmation is true. For if it is possible to affirm that nothing is true, and if one who says that no affirmation is true does affirm something, namely, that it is true that no affirmation is true, then this statement will be false. And if some affirmative statement is true, the opinion of people such as those who oppose all statements will be rejected. And those who adopt this position destroy the whole debate, because if nothing is true, nothing can be conceded on which an argument may be based. And if an affirmation and a negation are true at the same time, it will be impossible to signify anything by a word, as was said above (937:C 2215), and then the argument will cease.
2224. The statement (942).
Here he considers the opinion of Protagoras. He says that the statement made by Protagoras is similar to the one made by Heraclitus and by others who claim that an affirmation and a negation are true at the same time. For Protagoras says that man is the measure of all things, i.e., according to the intellect and the senses, as has been explained in Book IX (753:C 1800), as if the being of a thing depended upon intellectual and sensory apprehension. And one who says that man is the measure of all things merely says that whatever appears so to anyone is true. But if this is maintained, it follows that the same thing both is and is not and is both good and evil at the same time. The same thing is also true of other opposites, because often something seems to be good to some and just the opposite to others, and the way in which things seem or appear is the measure of all things according to the opinion of Protagoras; so that, inasmuch as a thing appears, to that extent it is true.
LESSON 6
Contradictories Cannot Be True at the Same Time
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6: 1062b 20-1063b 35
943. Now this difficulty may be solved by considering the origin of this view.
944. For it seems to have arisen in some cases from the opinion of the philosophers of nature, and in others from the fact that not all men apprehend the same thing in the same way, but something appears pleasant to some and the opposite to others (352).
945. For the view that nothing comes from non-being but everything from being is a doctrine common to nearly all those who have dealt with nature. Thus, since the not-white comes from what is actually white, and not from the not-white, should the not-white have come to be, what becomes not-white will have come to be from what is not not-white. Hence whiteness must come from non being according to them, unless the white and the not-white are the same. But it is not hard to solve this difficulty; for we have stated in our physical treatises in what sense things which come to be come from non-being, and in what sense they come from being (355-356).
946. But it is also foolish to occupy oneself equally with both opinions and with the fanciful statements of those who argue against themselves, because i is evident that one or the other of them must be wrong. This is clear from the facts of sensory perception; for the same thing never appears sweet to some and the opposite to others unless in some the organ of the sense which distinguish the above-mentioned savors has been impaired or injured. And such being the case, some must be taken as the measure and the others not. And I say that th same thing applies in the case of good and evil, of beautiful and ugly, and o other attributes of this kind. For to maintain this view is not different from maintaining that what appears to those who push their finger under their eye an make one object appear to be two must therefore be two because it appears to be so many, and yet that it must be one because to those who do not move their eye the one object appears to be one (369-375).
947. And in general seeing that things here are subject to change and never remain the same, it would be unfitting to base our judgment of the truth on this. For in pursuing the truth one must start with those things which are always the same and never undergo a single change. Such things are those which contain the world; for they do not appear at one time to be such and at another different but they are always the same and admit of no change (365).
948. Further, if there is motion, there is also something that is moved; and everything is moved from something and to something. Therefore that which is moved must be in that from which it is moved, and yet not be in it; and it must be moved to this and come to be in it; but contradictories cannot be true at the same time, as they claim.
949. And if things here are in a state of continuous change and motion as regards quantity, and one were to suppose this even though it is not true, why should they not be permanent as regards quality? For the view that contradictories may be predicated of the same subject seems to be based largely on the assumption that the quantity of bodies does not remain constant; and for this reason they say that the same thing is and is not four cubits long. But a thing’s substance involves quality, and this is of a determinate nature, whereas quantity is of an indeterminate nature (365).
950. Further, when a physician orders them to take some particular food, why do they take it? For why is this particular food bread rather than not bread? Hence it would make no difference whether they ate it or not. But they take the food prescribed as though they know the truth about it and that it is the food prescribed. Yet they should not do this if there is no nature which remains fixed in the sensible world, but everything is always in a state of motion and flux (349).
951. Again, if we are always undergoing change and never remain the same, what wonder is it if to us, as to those who are ill, things never appear the same? For to them also, since they are not in the same condition as when they were well, sensible qualities do not appear to be the same; yet sensible things themselves need not for this reason undergo any change, but they cause different, and not the same, impressions in those who are ill. And perhaps the same thing must happen to those who are well if the above-mentioned change takes place (950). However, if we do not change but always remain the same, there will be something permanent (357-359).
952. Hence, in the case of those who raise the foregoing difficulties as a result of reasoning, it is not easy to meet their arguments unless they assume something and do not demand a reason for it; for every argument and demonstration comes about in this way. For those who admit nothing destroy discussion and reasoning in general, and thus there is no reasoning with such men. But in the case of those who are puzzled by the usual problems, it is easy to meet them and to reject the arguments which cause their difficulty. This becomes clear from what has been said above (943-951).
953. It is evident from these considerations, then, that opposite statements cannot be verified of the same subject at one time (353; 376-377), nor can contrary ones, because every contrariety involves privation. This becomes clear if we reduce the definitions of all contraries to their principle (382). Similarly no intermediate can be predicated of one and the same subject. For if the subject is white, those who say that it is neither white nor black are wrong, for it then follows that it is white and is not white; for the second of the two terms which we have combined is true of it, and this is the contradictory of white (383-391).
954. One cannot be right, then, in holding the views either of Heraclitus (940) or of Anaxagoras; and if this were not so it would follow that contraries would be predicated of the same subject. For when Anaxagoras says that there is a part of everything in everything else, he says that nothing is sweet any more than it is bitter, and so on with any of the other pairs of contraries, since everything is present in everything else, not potentially, but actually and separately.
955. And similarly all statements cannot be true or all false, both because of many other difficulties which might be brought forward on the basis of this position, and because, if all statements are false, anyone who says this will not speak the truth; and if all are true, it will not be false to say that all are false (392).
COMMENTARY
2225. Having argued against those who claim that contradictories may be verified of the same subject at the same time, the Philosopher now shows how these men can be persuaded to abandon this theory. His discussion is divided into two parts. In the first (943:C 2225) he explains his thesis. In the second (953:C 2243) he draws a corollary from what has been said (“It is evident”).
The first part is divided into two members. In the first he explains how it is possible in some cases to deal with the above-mentioned theory. In the second (952:C 2241) he indicates in what cases it can be refuted and in what not (“Hence, in the case”).
In treating the first (943) he does three things. First, he describes the way in which the foregoing theory can be disqualified in some cases. He says that the above-mentioned difficulty which led some people to adopt the position that contradictories may be verified of the same subject at the same time can. be dispelled if one considers its source.
2226. For it seems (944).
Second, he gives two sources of this position. He says that this position seems to have arisen in some cases from the opinion of the philosophers of nature, who claimed that nothing comes to be from non-being, and in others from the fact that not all men make the same judgments about the same things, but something appears pleasant to some and just the opposite to others. For if one were to believe that whatever appears is true, it would follow from this that opposites are true at the same time.
2227. For the view (945).
Third, he shows how the abovementioned position might follow from the two sources just given; and he points out how it may be dealt with. First, he shows how it might follow from the opinion of the philosophers of nature; and second (946:C 2227), from the belief that every appearance is true (“But it is also foolish”).
He accordingly says, first (945), that the doctrine common to nearly all of the thinkers who have dealt with nature is that nothing comes to be from non-being, but everything from being. It is clear that something becomes not-white from what is actually white; but what is not-white does not come from what is not-white. Further, it is also evident that what is not-white comes from what is not not-white. Consequently, it is evident that what is not not-white becomes not-white, just as what is not-black becomes black. It is clear, then, that that from which the not-white comes to be is the white, and it is not not-white. This cannot be understood in the sense that the not-white is entirely non-being, because it would then seem to follow that something comes to be from non-being absolutely. For example, if we were to say that fire comes from what is not-fire, there would be the question how they think that that from which fire comes to be is entirely not-fire. For it would then seem to follow, according to them, that something comes to be from non-being. Hence they claimed that fire lay hidden in that from which fire comes to be, as is evident from the opinion of Anaxagoras, which is given in Book I of the Physics. Similarly, they believed that, if something comes to be not-white from what is not not-white, the not-white must have preexisted in that from which it comes to be, as has been explained. Thus it would follow, according to them, that that from which the not-white comes to be is both white and not-white at the same time, unless it is assumed that something comes to be from non-being.
2228. But this difficulty is not hard to solve, as the Philosopher points out; for it has been explained in Book I of the Physics how a thing comes to be from being and how from nonbeing; for it has been stated that something comes to be from what is a nonbeing in act, though it is incidentally a being in act. But it comes to be properly from matter, which is in potency; for it is accidental to the process of making that the matter from which a thing comes to be should be the subject of form and of privation. Thus it is not necessary that that from which a thing comes to be should be at the same time both a being and a nonbeing in act, but that it should be of itself in potency both to being and to non-being, i.e., both to form and to privation.
2229. But it is also foolish (946).
Then he rejects the foregoing opinion inasmuch as it might be derived from the other source, i.e., from the view that every appearance is judged to be true. First, he rejects this source; and second (947:C 2232), its cause (“And in general”).
He accordingly says, first (946), that, just as it is foolish to think that contradictories may be verified of the same subject at the same time, so too “it is also foolish to occupy oneself with,” i.e., to accept, both of the foregoing opinions of the philosophers who argue against themselves; for it is obvious that one or the other of them must be in error.
2230. This is evident from the facts of sensory perception; for the same thing never appears sweet to some and bitter to others, unless in some the sense organ and the power which discriminates between savors, has been impaired or injured. But since this does happen in some cases, “some must be taken as the measure,” i.e., the judgment of those whose senses are not impaired in this way must be taken as the rule and measure of truth. But this should not be understood to apply to those whose senses are impaired.
2231. And what is evident in the case of sensory perception must also be said to apply in the case of good and evil, of beautiful and ugly, and of all attributes of this kind which are apprehended by the intellect. For if some conceive a thing to be good and others evil, the judgment of those whose intellect has not been impaired by some bad habit or by some bad influence or by some other cause of this kind must be the norm. For if someone were to hold that it is not less fitting to believe the one group rather than the other, this would not differ in any way from saying that things are as they appear “to those who push their finger under their eye,” i.e., who move their eye with their finger, and thereby make one thing appear as two, and say that it must be two because it appears to be so many, and again that it must be one because it appears to be one to those who do not move their eye with their finger. For it is obvious that we must base our judgment about the oneness of things on the judgment which the eye makes when it does not receive some strange impression, and not on the judgment which it makes when it receives such an impression. Now a man judges one visible object to be two because the form of the visible object is made to appear as two to the organ of vision when it is moved; and this double impression reaches the organ of the common sense as though there were two visible objects.
2232. And in general (947).
Then he rejects the basis of the position that every appearance is true. For some held this because they thought that all things are in a state of continuous flux, and that there is nothing fixed and determinate in reality; and thus it would follow that a thing is such only when it is seen.
2233. He therefore presents five arguments against this position. He says, first, that it is altogether unfitting to base our judgment about the whole truth on the fact that these sensible things which are near or close to us are undergoing change and are never permanent. But the truth must be based rather on those things which are always the same and never undergo any change as regards their substance, though they do appear to be subject to local motion. For such things are those “which contain the world,” i.e., the celestial bodies, to which these corruptible bodies are compared as things that have no quantity, as the mathematicians prove. Now the celestial bodies are always the same and do not at one time appear to be such and at another different, for they admit of no change which affects their substance.
2234. Further, if there (948).
Then he gives the second argument against this position. The argument runs thus: if there is motion in these lower bodies, there must be something that is moved, and it must also be moved from something and to something. Hence that which is moved must already be in that from which it is moved and yet not be in it, and this must be moved to something else and be continuously coming to be in it. Thus some definite affirmation, as well as some negation, must be true. And it will not be necessary that a contradiction be true of the same subject, b6cause according to this nothing would be moved. For if the same thing might be at the extreme to which it is moved and not be at it, there would be no reason why a thing which has not yet reached an extreme should be moved thereto, because it would already be there.
2235. And if things (949).
He gives the third argument; and with a view to making this clear it should be borne in mind that, when Heraclitus saw that a thing increased in size according to some definite and very small quantity over a long period of time (for example, a year), he thought that some addition would be made in any part of that time, and that it would be imperceptible because of the very small quantity involved. And because of this he was led to believe that all things, even those which seem to be static, are also being moved continuously by an imperceptible motion, and that after a long time their motion would become apparent to the senses. But his opinion about increase is false; for increase does not take place continuously in such a way that something grows in any part of time, but a body is disposed to increase during some time and then grows, as Aristotle makes quite clear in Book VIII of the Physics.
2236. Hence he says that, if the bodies around us here are in a continuous state of flux and motion as regards quantity, and one wishes to admit this even though it is not true, there is no reason why a thing cannot be unchanging as to its quality. For the opinion that contradictories are true of the same subject at the same time seems to be based largely on the assumption that the quantitative aspect of bodies does not remain constant; and thus some thought that the same thing is and is not four cubits long. But a thing’s substance is defined in terms of some quality, i.e., some form; and quality is of a determinate nature in things, although quantity is of an indeterminate nature because of change, as has been pointed out.
2237. Further, when a physician (950).
Then he gives the fourth argument, which runs thus: if there is nothing fixed in the world as regards being or non-being, why do they take this kind of bread which the physician prescribes and not that? For according to the position given above, why is this bread rather than not-bread? He implies that the answer cannot be in the affirmative any more than in the negative. And thus it would make no difference whether one ate the bread or did not. But we see that they take the bread which the physician prescribes, implying that they form a true judgment about bread itself, and that this kind of bread is really the one which the physician prescribes. Yet this would not be the case if no nature remained fixed in the sensible world but all things are always in a state of motion and flux.
2238. Again, if we (951).
Then he presents the fifth argument: since the above-mentioned position assumes that there is no fixed truth in things because of the continuous change which they undergo, if the truth is identical with appearance it is necessary to say that we men, who make judgments about other things, are either in motion or are not.
2239. For if we are always undergoing change and never remain the same, it is not surprising that things never appear the same to us; and this is the case with those who are ill. For since they have been changed and are not in the same state as when they were well, the sensible qualities which they perceive by way of the senses will not seem the same to them as they did before they became ill. For to those whose sense of taste has been impaired sweet things seem bitter or tasteless; and the same is true of other sensible qualities. Yet sensible qualities themselves are not changed for this reason, but they cause different impressions in those who are ill because their senses are differently disposed. Therefore, if we men, who are continuously undergoing change, make different judgments about other things, this should not be attributed to things but to us.
2240. However, if we are not changing but always remain the same, there will therefore be something permanent in the world and consequently some fixed truth about which we can make positive judgments. For we make judgments not only about other things but also about human nature.
2241. Hence, in the case (952).
Then he indicates who can be disabused of the above opinion and who can not. He says that, if those who adopt the foregoing opinions do so not because of any reasoning, in the sense that they do not assume anything because they are obstinate, and do not inquire into the reasons for the things that they say but stubbornly adhere to the opinions which they hold, it is not easy for them to give up an opinion of this kind. For every argument and every demonstration comes about in this way, namely, by admitting the truth of some statement and investigating the reason for it. But those who admit nothing destroy discussion and every rational argument; and thus no appeal of reason can be addressed to them whereby they can be dislodged from their error.
2242. But if there are any who are perplexed because of certain deficiencies (for example, because they do not understand some things well), it is easy to dispel such an error by removing the difficulties which puzzle them. This is evident from the previous discussion in which he deals with the difficulties that could lead to the above-mentioned opinion.
2243. It is evident (953).
Then he draws three corollaries from what has been said. First, it is evident from the foregoing discussion that opposite statements cannot be verified of the same subject at one and the same time. Consequently it is clear from this that contraries cannot be verified of the same subject at the same time. And this is true because every contrariety involves privation; for one of two contraries is always a priv4on. This becomes evident if one wishes to reduce the definitions of contraries to their first principle; for contained in the notion of black is the privation of white. Since a privation, then, is a kind of negation having a determinate subject, it is evident that, if contraries were true of the same subject, both an affirmation and a negation would have to be true of the same subject at the same time.
2244. Now, it is not only impossible for two contraries to be true of the same subject at the same time, but it is also impossible for an intermediate to be predicated of one and the same subject of which one of two extremes is predicated; for from what has been said in Book X (880-86-.C 2101-10 it is evident that an intermediate between contraries involves the privation of both extremes, whether it is designated by one word or by many or is nameless. Hence an intermediate between white and black, such as red or yellow, contains in its definition the fact that it is neither white nor black. Therefore, if one says that some subject is red when it is really white, he is saying at the same time that it is neither white nor black. Hence he is in error; for it would follow that that subject is both white and not white at the same time; because if it is true that that subject is neither white nor black, the other part of the copulative proposition may be verified of the same subject, and this is the contradictory of being white. Thus it follows that, if an intermediate and an extreme are true of the same subject, contradictories must be true of the same subject.
2245. One cannot (954).
He gives the second corollary. He concludes that, if an affirmation and a negation are not true at the same time, neither the opinion of Heraclitus nor that of Anaxagoras is true. That this is so regarding the opinion of Heraclitus is evident from what has been said. Hence he shows that the same thing applies with respect to the opinion of Anaxagoras. He says that, if Anaxagoras’ opinion is not false, it follows that contraries may be predicated of the same subject, and therefore that contradictories may also be predicated of the same subject. This is shown as follows. Anaxagoras claimed that anything at all comes to be from anything at all, and everything which comes to be comes from something. Hence he was not compelled to maintain that something comes to be from nothing, and thus he claimed that everything is present in everything else. Therefore, since he posited that there is a part of everything in everything else (for example, a part of flesh in bone, and a part of whiteness in blackness, and vice versa), it follows that the whole is no more sweet than bitter. The same holds true of other contrarieties. And this is so if a part of anything is present in any whole not only potentially but actually and separately. And he added this because whatever comes to be from something else must pre-exist in it potentially and not actually. Hence contraries must preexist in the same subject potentially and not actually. This does not mean that contraries exist separately in something, because the potency for contraries is the same. But Anaxagoras did not know how to distinguish between potency and actuality.
2246. And similarly (955).
He gives the third corollary. He concludes from what has been said that both opinions are false, i.e., the opinion of those who said that all statements are true, and the opinion of those who said that all are false. This is evident because of the many difficult and serious conclusions which result from these opinions which have been brought together here and above in Book IV (332402:C 611-748); and especially “because if all statements are false,” he who says that every statement is false makes a statement and thus does not speak the truth. And similarly if all statements are true, he who says that all are false will not say what is false but will speak the truth. And for this reason the position of one who claims that all statements are true is destroyed.
LESSON 7
Metaphysics Differs from All the Other Sciences
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 7: 1063b 36-1064b 14
956. Every science seeks certain principles and causes of each of the knowable objects which comes within its scope; for example, medicine and gymnastics do this, and so does each of the other sciences, productive as well as doctrinal. For each of these marks off for itself some class of things and occupies itself with this as with something that is real and a being, though not as being; but there is a certain other science distinct from these which does this.
957. And each of the sciences mentioned somehow assumes the quiddity in some class of things and tries to prove the rest, with greater or lesser certainty. Some derive the quiddity from sensory perception, and some by assuming it from some other science. Hence from such a process of induction it becomes evident that there is no demonstration of the substance and of its quiddity.
958. Now since there is a science of nature, it is evident that it must differ from both the practical and the productive sciences. For in the case of a productive science the source of motion is in the maker and not in the thing made, and it is either the art or some kind of potency. And similarly in the case of a practical science the motion is not in the thing done but rather in the agents. But the science of the philosopher of nature is concerned with things which have a source of motion in themselves. It is evident from these considerations, then, that the philosophy of nature must be neither practical nor productive but speculative; for it must fall in one of these classes.
959. And since it is necessary that each one of the sciences have some knowledge of the quiddity and must use it as a starting point, we must not fail to consider how the philosophy of nature should define things, and how it should consider the intelligible structure of the substance: whether in the same way as the term snub or rather as the term concave. For of these the notion of snub includes the matter of the object, but that of concave is expressed without matter. For snubness comes into being in a nose, and for this reason its intelligible structure includes matter; for snub is a concave nose. It is evident, then, that the intelligible structure of flesh and of eye and of the other parts of the body must always be given along with matter.
960. And since there is a science of being as being and as separable, one must consider whether this science should be held to be the same as the philosophy of nature or rather a science distinct from it. The philosophy of nature deals with things which have a principle of motion in themselves, and mathematics is speculative and is concerned with things which are permanent but are not separable. Therefore there is a science distinct from both of these, which treats of what is separable and immovable; that is to say, if there is some such substance, and I mean one which is separable and immovable, as we shall attempt to prove (1055-76). And if there is some such nature among existing things, this will exist somewhere and will be divine, and it will be the primary and highest principle. It is evident, then, that there are three classes of speculative science: the philosophy of nature, mathematics and theology.
961. The class of speculative sciences, then, is the highest, and of these the last mentioned is highest of all. For it is concerned with the noblest of beings, and each science is said to be higher or lower by reason of its proper object.
962. However, one might raise the question whether the science of being as being is universal or not. For each of the mathematical sciences deals with some one determinate class of things, but a universal science is common to all. If, then, natural substances are the primary beings, the philosophy of nature must be the primary science. But if there is another nature and substance which is separable and immovable, the science which treats of this must be different from and prior to the philosophy of nature, and must be universal because it is prior (902).
COMMENTARY
2247. Having shown with what things this science is concerned, here the Philosopher compares this science with the others. In regard to this he does three things. First (956:C 2247), he indicates what is proper to the particular sciences. Second (958:C 2252), he shows how the particular sciences differ from one another (“Now since”). Third (960:C 2259), he compares this science with the others (“And since there is”).
In treating the first member of this division he does two things, insofar as there are two characteristics which he says pertain to the particular sciences. He accordingly says, first (956), that every particular science seeks certain principles and causes of the proper object of knowledge which comes within its scope. He says certain principles and causes because not every science considers every class of cause.
2248. He gives as an example the science of medicine, whose object is health, and the art of gymnastics, whose object is physical exercise directed to the well-being of the body. The same thing holds true of any of the other sciences, whether they are “productive,” i.e., practical, or “doctrinal,” i.e., theoretical; because each of these particular sciences marks off and takes as its own some determinate class of being inasmuch as it confines itself to that class and deals with it alone. For it is concerned with that class of being as a certain kind of being, though not as being. But to consider this, namely, being as being, belongs to a science which differs from all of the particular sciences.
2249. And each (957).
Second, he gives another characteristic of the particular sciences. He says that each of the above-mentioned particular sciences somehow assumes the quiddity in whatever class of things is considered. Hence it has been stated at the beginning of the Posterior Analytics that it is necessary to assume both the existence and quiddity of the subject. And having assumed this, i.e., the quiddity, which every science uses as a middle term to demonstrate certain things, such as properties and the like, it tries to demonstrate these with greater or lesser certainty; because some sciences have a more certain method of demonstrating, as the mathematical sciences, and others a less certain one, as the natural sciences.
2250. And since he had said that other sciences somehow assume the quiddity, he therefore adds that some sciences derive the quiddity from sensory perception inasmuch as they acquire a knowledge of a thing’s essence from sensible accidents, and that others derive the quiddity by assuming it from other sciences, as particular sciences from universal ones.
2251. Thus it is evident that in the particular sciences there is no demonstration of the substance or the quiddity of a thing. Hence both of the things with which the particular sciences do not concern themselves, i.e., a consideration of the substance or being and its quiddity, pertain to a universal science.
2252. Now since (958).
Then he shows how the particular sciences differ from one another. First (958:C 2252), he shows how the philosophy of nature differs from the productive sciences; and second (959:C 2256), how the mathematical sciences differ from the philosophy of nature (“And since it is necessary”).
He accordingly says, first (958), that, since there is a particular science of nature, it must be different “from the practical,” i.e., from the sciences which govern activity and from those which govern production; for every practical science is either a science of action or a science of production.
2253. In order to understand this difference we must consider a distinction which was made above in Book IX (790:C 1864), namely, that to act and to make differ; for to act is said properly of an operation which remains in the agent and does not pass over into some external matter, for instance, to understand and to perceive and so on. But to make or produce is said of an operation which passes over into some external matter which is changed, for example, to heat and to cut and the like. Hence there is a science of activity by which we are instructed how to perform correctly those operations which are called actions; and moral science is such. But that science by which we make something correctly is a productive science. The art of carpentry and the like belong to this class.
2254. Now the philosophy of nature differs from each of these sciences which govern operations; for the productive sciences do not have a principle of motion in the thing made but in the maker, and this principle is either the art, which is a directive principle, or some potency which is the principle executing the work. Similarly “the practical sciences,” i.e., those governing activity, do not have a principle of motion in that upon which the activity is exercised but rather in the agents.
2255. But those things which belong to the consideration of the philosophy of nature have their principles of motion in themselves, since nature is a principle of motion in the thing in which it exists. It is evident, then, that the philosophy of nature is a science neither of action nor of production but is speculative. For the philosophy of nature must fall into one of these classes, i.e., active, productive or speculative science. Hence, if it is a science neither of action nor of production, it follows that it must be speculative.
2256. And since (959).
Then he shows how the mathematical sciences differ from the philosophy of nature. He says that, since each of the sciences must somehow come to know the quiddity and must use this as a starting point with a view to demonstrating, the sciences must be distinguished on the basis of a different method of defining. Hence in order to understand how the philosophy of nature differs from the other sciences we must not neglect to consider the method which the philosophy of nature uses in defining things, and how the definition should be considered in the philosophy of nature; that is, whether a thing should be defined in the way that snub is or in the way that concave is.
2257. Now the definition of snub includes sensible matter, but that of concave does not; for since snubness is found only in a definite sensible matter, because it is found only in a nose, the intelligible structure of snub must therefore include sensible matter; for snub is defined thus: snub is a concave nose. Sensible matter, however, is not included in the definition of concave or curved. Hence, just as sensible matter is included in the definition of snub, so too it must be included in the definition of flesh and of eye and of the other parts of the body. The same holds true of other natural beings.
2258. The difference between the philosophy of nature and mathematics is taken from this, because the philosophy of nature deals with those things whose definitions include sensible matter, whereas mathematics deals with those things whose definitions do not include sensible matter, although they have being in sensible matter.
2259. And since there is (960).
Then he compares this science with the other particular sciences; and in regard to this he does three things. First (960:C 2259), he compares this science with the different particular sciences in reference to the way in which their objects are separate from matter. Second (961:C 2265), he compares them from the viewpoint of nobility (“The class of speculative sciences”). Third (962:C 2265), he compares them from the viewpoint of universality (“However, one”).
He accordingly says, first (960), that there is a science of being insofar as it is separable; for it is the office of this science not only to establish the truth about being in common (and this is to establish the truth about being as being) but also to establish the truth about things which are separate from matter in being. Hence it is necessary to consider whether this science whose function is to consider these two things is the same as the philosophy of nature or differs from it.
2260. That it differs from the philosophy of nature he makes clear as follows: the philosophy of nature is concerned with things which have a principle of motion in themselves; therefore natural things must have a definite matter, because only that which has matter is moved. But mathematics studies immovable things; for those things whose intelligible structure does not include sensible matter must likewise not have motion in their intelligible structure, since motion is found only in sensible things.
2261. But those things which mathematics considers are not separable from matter and motion in being but only in their intelligible structure. Hence the science which treats that kind of being which is separable from matter and from motion and is immovable in every respect must be one which differs both from mathematics and from the philosophy of nature.
2262. He says here, “if there is some such substance” apart from sensible substances which is immovable in every respect. He says this because the existence of some such substance has not yet been proved, although he intends to prove this.
2263. And if there is some such nature among existing things, i.e., one which is separable and immovable, it is necessary that “such a nature exist somewhere,” i.e., that it be attributed to some substance. And whatever has this nature must be something that is divine and the highest of all; because the simpler and more actual a being is, the nobler it is and the more it is prior and a cause of other things. Thus it is evident that the science which considers separate beings of this kind should be called the divine science and the science of first principles.
2264. From this he again concludes that there are three classes of speculative science: the philosophy of nature, which considers things that are movable and have sensible matter in their definition; mathematics, which considers immovable things that do not have sensible matter in their definition yet exist in sensible matter; and theology, which considers beings that are entirely separate from matter.
2265. The class (961).
Next he compares this science with the others from the viewpoint of nobility. He says that the speculative sciences are the noblest, because of all the sciences the speculative seek knowledge for its own sake, whereas the practical seek knowledge for the sake of some work. And among the speculative sciences there is one that, is highest, namely, theology, since a science which deals with more noble beings is itself more noble; for a science is more noble in proportion to the greater nobility of its object.
2266. However, one might (962).
Then he compares this science with the others from the viewpoint of universality. He says that one might raise the question whether or not the science which deals with separate beings must be held to be a universal science of being as being; and that it must be such he shows by a process of elimination.
2267. For it is evident that the foregoing sciences which deal with operations are not universal sciences, and he therefore omits them. In the case of the speculative sciences it is evident that every mathematical science is concerned with some one determinate class of things. But a universal science deals with all things in common. No mathematical science, then, can be the one which treats all beings in common. Regarding the philosophy of nature it is evident that, if natural substances, which are perceptible and movable, are the primary beings, the philosophy of nature must be the primary science; because the order of the sciences corresponds with that of their subjects, as has been stated already (961:C 2265). But if there is a different nature and substance over and above natural substances, which is separable and immovable, there must be a science which differs from the philosophy of nature and is prior to it. And because it is first, it must be universal; for it is the same science which treats of primary beings and of what is universal, since the primary beings are the principles of the others.
LESSON 8
No Science of Accidental Being
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 8: 1064b 15-1065b 4
963. Since the term being in its unqualified sense has many meanings, and one of these is the accidental, it is first necessary to consider this sense of being.
964. Now it is evident that none of the traditional sciences are concerned with the accidental. The science of building does not consider what will happen to the occupants of a house, for example, whether they will dwell there unhappily or in the opposite way; nor is the art of weaving or of shoemaking or of cooking concerned with it. But each of these sciences considers only what is proper to itself, and this is its particular end.
965. Further, no science considers a man insofar as he is a musician or also a grammarian; nor does any science consider the quibble that “when one who is a musician has become a grammarian he will be both at the same time, although he was not so before; but that which is and has not always been, must have come to be; and therefore he must have at the same time become both a musician and a grammarian.” None of the known sciences are concerned with this except sophistry, and thus Plato was not wrong in saying that sophistry is concerned with non-being.
966. That it is impossible to have a science of the accidental will be evident to those who are trying to learn what the accidental is. Accordingly, we say of all things that some are always and of necessity (not necessity in the sense of what is done by force but with the meaning used in matters of demonstration); others are for the most part; and others are neither for the most part nor always and of necessity, but are such as occur by chance. For example, there might be cold weather during the dog days, but this occurs neither always and of necessity nor for the most part, though it might happen sometimes. Hence the accidental is what occurs, but neither always and of necessity nor for the most part. What the accidental is, then, has been stated; and it is evident that there is no science of it. For every science deals with what is always or for the most part, but the accidental belongs to neither of these.
967. It is also evident that there are no causes and principles of accidental being such as there are of essential being; for if there were, everything would be of necessity. For if one thing exists when another does, and this again when something else does, and if this last thing is not a matter of chance but exists of necessity, then that of which it was the cause will also exist of necessity, and so on right down to the last thing said to be caused. But this was assumed to be accidental. Hence everything will be of necessity, and the possibility of anything happening by chance or being contingent and of coming to be or not coming to be will be entirely removed from the sphere of things which are generated. And if the cause is assumed not to exist but to be something which is coming to be, the same results will follow; for everything will come to be of necessity. For tomorrow’s eclipse will occur if something else does, and this again if some other thing occurs, and the latter if still another thing occurs. And if time is subtracted in this way from the limited time between the present and tomorrow, we shall at some point reach something which exists now. Therefore, since this exists, everything which comes after it will occur of necessity, so that everything will occur of necessity.
968. Regarding being in the sense of what is true and accidental being, the former depends upon the combination which the mind makes and is a modification of it. It is for this reason that it is not the principles of this kind of being that are sought but of that which exists outside the mind and is separable; and the latter kind of being is not necessary but indeterminate (and by this I mean the accidental); and the causes. of this kind of being are indeterminate and unordered (543-59).
969. And that for the sake of which something exists is found both in things which come to be by nature and in those which are a result of mind. It is luck when one of these comes about accidentally; for just as a being is either essential or accidental, so also is a cause. And luck is an accidental cause of those things which come to be for some end as a result of choice.
970. And for this reason both luck and mind are concerned with the same thing; for there is no choice without mind.
971. However, the causes from which some lucky result comes to be are indeterminate; and for this reason luck is uncertain for human knowledge and is an accidental cause, although in an absolute sense it is a cause of nothing.
972. There is good or bad luck when the result is good or bad, and prosperity or misfortune when this occurs on a large scale.
973. And since nothing accidental is prior to things which are essential, neither are accidental causes prior. Therefore, if luck or chance is the cause of the heavens, mind and nature are prior causes.
COMMENTARY
2268. After having restated in a summary way the points that were discussed before with regard to this science’s field of study, here the Philosopher begins to summarize the things that were said about imperfect being both in Book VI (543-559:C 1171-1244) of this work and in the Physics. He does this, first (963:C 2268), with regard to accidental being; and second (974:C 2289), with regard to motion (“One thing”).
In treating the first member of this division he does two things. First, he states the things that have been said about accidental being. Second (969:C 2284), he states those that pertain to an accidental cause (“And that for the sake”).
In regard to the first he does two things. First (963), he points out what he intends to do. He says that, since, “being in its unqualified sense,” i.e., taken in general, has many meanings, of which one is the accidental (as when we say, for example, that the musician is white), and these have been explained above in Book V (435-39:C 885-97), we ought to consider accidental being before we deal with essential being, so that when this kind of being has been disposed of we may speak in a more positive way of essential being.
2269. Now it is evident (964).
Second, he proceeds to carry out his plan; and in regard to this he does two things. First (964:C 2269), he shows that the consideration of accidental being belongs to no science. Second (968:C 2283), he excludes both this kind of being and the being which signifies the truth of a proposition from this science’s field of study (“Regarding being”).
In treating the first he does two things. First, he shows that no science considers accidental being; and second (966:C 2276), that none can do so (“That it is impossible”).
In regard to the first he does two things. First (964), he shows by a process of elimination that no science considers accidental being. He says that no one of the sciences treated by us is concerned with the accidental.
2270. Now accidental here does not mean something in one of the categories of accidents, in the sense that whiteness is an accident; for there are many sciences which deal with accidents of this kind, because such accidents have a certain species of themselves and certain determinate causes in their subject. And they are called accidents because they do not have being of themselves but exist in something else.—But here accidental means what happens accidentally; for example, it is accidental that a musician is white. For accidents of this kind do not have any species or any determinate cause. And no science is concerned with this kind of being. He proves this by induction.
2271. For the art of building does not consider what happens accidentally to the occupants of the house which it builds, whether they happen to experience some unhappiness there or live there “in the opposite way,” i.e., happily; for this is accidental to a house. Similarly, the art of weaving does not consider what happens to those who use the cloth which has been woven; nor does the art of shoemaking consider what happens to those who use shoes; nor does the art of cooking consider what happens to the food, for example, whether someone uses too much of it or just what is necessary. But each of these sciences considers only what is proper to itself, i.e., its subject and the properties of its subject. This is the goal of any science.
2272. Further, no science (965).
Second, he gives the reason why no science considers things which are accidental. It is because the accidental is not a being in the proper sense but is rather a non-being inasmuch as it is not essentially and properly one; for one and being are convertible. Now every science deals with being, and therefore it follows that no science is concerned with the accidental.
2273. Hence he says that a musician is also a grammarian, but not inasmuch as he is a musician. And if it happens that one who is a musician becomes a grammarian, he has become both at the same time, i.e., both a grammarian and a musician, although he was not so before. But if some being exists now and was not always a being, it must have come to be. Therefore, if “a musician grammarian” is a kind of being, since it did not always exist it must have become both at the same time, i.e., both a musician and a grammarian, because any being admits of some generation. Hence, since these have not come to be at the same time, it is evident that this whole—a musician-grammarian—is not one being.
2274. Nor should it be urged that matter, which is ungenerated, has existence prior to the generation of substances; for it is not the form that properly comes to be but the composite, as has been proved in Book VII (611:C 1423). Now matter does not have prior existence as an actual being but only as a potential one. But here the musician has actual prior existence. Therefore, since he who was a musician has become a grammarian, only a grammarian has come to be, and not the whole-a grammarian musician. Hence this whole is not one being.
2275. For this reason no science that is truly a science and attains certainty is concerned with accidental being. Only sophistry deals with it; and it uses the accidental as though it were something of itself in order to deceive. From this there arises the fallacy of accident, which is most effective in deceiving even those who are wise, as is stated in Book I of the Sophistical Refutations. Hence Plato was not wrong in saying that sophistry is concerned with non-being, because it deals with the accidental.
2276. That it is impossible (966).
He shows that it is impossible for any science to consider accidental being, and he does this in two ways. First, he proceeds from the definition of accidental being. He says that, if we consider what accidental being is, it will be evident that there can be no science of it. With a view to proving his point he makes a tripartite division. He says that of things which are said to be there are some which are always and of necessity (not necessity in the sense of force, but in the sense used in demonstrations, as when we say that a triangle necessarily has three angles equal to two right angles; for we use the term necessary in this way to mean what cannot be otherwise). There are others which are for the most part; for example, a man is born with five fingers on each hand. This does not happen always, since it does happen that some are born with six fingers, but it does happen for the most part. And there are others which are neither always and of necessity nor for the most part but are such as occur by chance; for example, “there might be cold weather during the dog days,” i.e., during the days of the dog-star. This occurs neither always and of necessity nor for the most part, though even this kind of being sometimes occurs. But since it happens rarely, and not always and of necessity or for the most part, it is called accidental being.
2277. For things which occur either always or for the most part are such that one is the cause of the other or both are referred to one cause which is the proper cause of each. And they occur in both ways. If a cause produces its effect without fail, the effect will be one that is said to be of necessity. But if a cause can fail because of some obstacle, the effect will be one that occurs for the most part.
2278. But if it so happens in the case of two things that one is not the cause of the other and there is no single common proper cause which links them together, they will seldom be combined. Such is the case, for example, when we say “the musician builds”; for the cause of building is not the art of music but that of building, which differs completely from the art of music. The same thing is true of the previous example; for excessive heat during the dog days is a result of the sun moving closer to the earth; but that there should be cold weather at this time is a result of some other cause, such as Saturn’s being somehow connected with the sun. Hence, if there is cold weather during the dog days, which are caused by the sun, this is accidental.
2279. It is evident, then, that the accidental is what occurs neither always nor for the most part. But every science is concerned with what occurs either always or for the most part, as has been proved in Book I of the Posterior Analytics. Thus it is clear that there can be no science of the accidental.
2280. It is also evident (967).
Second, with a view to making the same point he says that accidental being has no causes and principles such as essential being has; and thus there can be no science of it, since every science is concerned with principles and causes.’He proves this as follows: if accidental being should have proper causes, everything would happen of necessity; for essential beings have a cause such that when it is placed the effect necessarily follows. And if there were some cause from which an effect did not follow of necessity but only for the most part, this would be a result of some obstacle, which can be accidental. If, then, accidental being had a necessary proper cause, so that when this cause is placed its effect necessarily follows (although perhaps it is not necessary to place it), the result would be that everything happens of necessity. He proves this as follows.
2281. Let us suppose that something past or present is the cause of a future effect, and that this cause has already been placed. But when the cause has been placed, as you say, the effect necessarily follows. Therefore, if this past or present thing which has already been placed is the cause of this future effect, and this in turn is the cause of another, the effect will follow not in just any way at all but necessarily. For once the cause has been placed, that whose cause has been placed will necessarily follow, and so on right down to the last thing caused. But this was assumed to be accidental. Therefore that which was assumed to be accidental will happen of necessity. Consequently, everything will happen of necessity; and “the possibility of anything happening by chance,” i.e., any fortuitous event, “or being contingent,” i.e., being accidental, and “of coming to be or not coming to be,” i.e., the possibility of anything being or not being, or being generated or not being generated, will be completely removed from the world.
2282. But because one can meet this argument by saying that the cause of future contingent events has not yet been placed as either present or past but is still contingent and future, and that for this reason its effects are still contingent, he therefore throws out this objection (“And if the cause”). He points out that the same unreasonable conclusion follows if it is held that the cause of future contingent events is not something that already exists in the present or in the past but is something that is coming to be and is future, because it will follow that everything happens of necessity, as has been stated before. For if that cause is future, it must be going to be at some definite time, tomorrow say, and must be quite distinct from the present. Therefore, if an eclipse, which is the proper cause of certain future events, will occur tomorrow, and everything that occurs is a result of some cause, tomorrow’s eclipse must occur “if something else does,” i.e., because of something that existed before, and this in turn because of something else. Thus by always anticipating or subtracting causes some part of the time between the present moment and the future eclipse will be removed. And since that time is limited, and every limited thing is used up when some part of it is removed, we shall therefore reach at some point some cause which exists now. Hence, if that cause is already posited, all future effects will follow of necessity; and thus everything will occur of necessity. But since this is impossible, it is therefore evident that things which are accidental have no determinate cause from which they necessarily follow once it has been placed. Everything that can be said about this has been given in Book VI (543-552:C 1171-90).
2283. Regarding being (968).
Then he shows that accidental being and the being which signifies the truth of a proposition must be omitted from this science. He says that there is one kind of being, “being in the sense of what is true,” or being as signifying the truth of a proposition, and it consists in combination; and there is accidental being.’ The first consists in the combination which the intellect makes and is a modification in the operation of the intellect. Hence the principles of this kind of being are not investigated in the science which considers the kind of being that exists outside of the mind and is separable, as has been stated. The second, i.e., accidental being, is not necessary but indeterminate. Hence it does not have a related cause but an infinite number of causes that are not related to one another. Therefore this science does not consider such being.
2284. And that for the sake (969).
Here he summarizes the things that have been said about an accidental cause, or luck, in Book II of the Physics. There are four points. First, he states what it is; and with a view to investigating this he prefaces his remarks with the statement, “And that for the sake of which,” i.e., what exists for the sake of some end, is found both in those things which exist by nature and in those which are a result of mind. This is evident in Book II of the Physics. He adds that luck is found in those things which occur for the sake of some end, but that it is accidental. For just as we find both essential being and accidental being, so too we find essential causes and accidental causes. Luck, then, is an accidental cause “of those things which come to be for the sake of some end,” i.e., some goal, not by nature but by choice. For example, when someone chooses to dig in a field in order to plant a tree and thereupon discovers a treasure, we say that this is accidental because it is unintended. And this happens by luck.
2285. And for this reason (970).
Second, he shows in what instances luck exists. He says that, since there is choice only where there is mind or thought, luck and thought must be concerned with the same thing. Hence luck is not found in those things which lack reason, such as plants, stones and brute animals, or in children who lack the use of reason.
2286. However, the causes (971).
Third, he shows that luck is uncertain. He says that there are an infinite number of causes by which something can happen by luck, as is evident in the examples given; for one can find a treasure by digging in the earth either to plant something or to make a grave or for an infinite number of other reasons. And since everything infinite is unknown, luck is therefore uncertain for human knowledge. And it is called an accidental cause, although absolutely and of itself it is the cause of nothing.
2287. There is good (972).
Fourth, he explains why luck is said to be good or bad. He points out that luck is said to be good or bad because the accidental result is good or bad. And if the accidental result is a great good, it is then called prosperity; and if a great evil, it is then called misfortune.
2288. And since nothing (973).
Fifth, he shows that luck is not the primary cause of things; for nothing that is accidental is prior to things that are essential. Hence an accidental cause is not prior to a proper cause. Thus, if luck and chance, which are accidental causes, are the causes of the heavens, mind and nature, which are proper causes, must be prior causes.
LESSON 9
The Definition of Motion
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 9: 1065b 5-1066a 34 1
974. One thing is actual only, another potential, and others both actual and potential; and of these one is a being, another a quantity, and another one of the other categories. Motion is not something apart from things themselves; for a thing is always changed according to the categories of being, and there is nothing that is common to these and in no one category. And each belongs to all its members in a twofold way, for example, this particular thing; for sometimes this is the form of a thing and sometimes its privation. And with regard to quality, one thing is white and another black; and with regard to quantity, one is perfect and another imperfect; and with regard to motion in space, one thing tends upwards and another downwards, or one is light and another heavy. Hence there are as many kinds of motion and change as there are of being.
975. Now since each class of things is divided by potentiality and actuality, I call motion the actualization of what is potential as such.
976. That our account is true becomes evident as follows: when the buildable in the sense in which we call it such actually exists, it is being built; and this is the process of building. The same is true of learning, walking, healing, dancing and bereaving. And motion occurs when something is in this very act, and neither before nor after. Motion, then, belongs to what is potential when it is actual and is engaged in activity, not inasmuch as it is itself, but inasmuch as it is movable.
977. And by the phrase inasmuch as I mean this: bronze is potentially a statue, but the actuality of bronze inasmuch as it is bronze is not motion; for to be bronze and to be some potentiality are not the same. If they were absolutely the same in meaning, the actuality of bronze would be a kind of motion; but they are not the same. This is evident in the case of contraries; for the potentiality of being healed and that of being ill are not the same, because being). healed would then be the same as being ill. But it is the subject which is both healed and ill, whether it be moisture or blood, that is one and the same. And since they are not the same, just as color and the visible object are not the same, it is the actualization of what is potential insofar as it is potential that is motion.
978. That motion is this, and that a thing is being moved when it is actual in this way, and neither before nor after, is evident. For each thing is capable of being at one time actual and at another not, for example, the buildable as buildable; and the actualization of the buildable as buildable is the process of building. For the actuality is either the process of building or this particular house. But when the house exists, it will no longer be buildable; but what is being built is what is buildable. Therefore the process of building must be its actualization; and the process of building is a kind of motion. The same reasoning also applies to other motions.
979. That this account is true is evident from what others say about motion, and because it is not easy to define it otherwise. For one cannot place it in another class.
980. This is evident from what some say; for they call it otherness and inequality and non-being.
981. However, no one of these is necessarily moved, and change is not to these or from these anymore than to or from their opposites.
982. The reason for putting motion in this class is that it seems to be something indefinite; and the principles in one of the columns of opposites (60) are indefinite because they are privative, for no one of them is either a this or such or any of the other categories.
983. The reason why motion seems to be indefinite is that it cannot be identified either with the potentiality or with the actuality of existing things; for neither what is capable of having a certain quantity nor what actually has it is necessarily being moved. And motion seems to be an actuality, but an incomplete one; and the reason for this is that the potentiality of which it is the actuality is incomplete. Hence it is difficult to grasp what motion is; for it must be put under privation or under potentiality or under simple actuality; but none of these appear to be possible. It remains, then, that it must be as we have said, i.e., both an actuality and a non-actuality as explained, which is difficult to see but capable of existing.’
984. That motion belongs to the thing moved is evident; for it is the actualization of the thing moved by what is capable of causing motion.
985. And the actuality of what is capable of causing motion is no other than this; for it must be the actuality of both.
986. And a thing is capable of causing motion because of its power, but it is a mover because of its activity.
987. But it is on the thing moved that it is capable of acting. Thus the actuality of both alike is one.
988. And it is one just as the distance from one to two and that from two to one are the same, and just as what goes up and what comes down are the same, although their being is not one. The same applies in the case of the mover and the thing moved.
COMMENTARY
2289. Having settled the issue about accidental being, the Philosopher now states his views about motion; and this is divided into three parts. First (974:C 2289), he deals with motion in itself; second (989:C 2314), with infinity, which is a property of motion and of other continuous things (“The infinite”); and third (1005:C 2355), with the division of motion into its species (“Everything which is changed”).
The first is divided into two parts. First, he explains what motion is; and second (984:C 2308), he points out what the subject of motion is (“That motion”).
In regard to the first he does three things. First, he prefaces his discussion with some points which are necessary for defining motion. Second (975:C 2294), he defines’ motion (“Now since each”). Third (979:C 2299), he proves that the definition of motion is a good one (“That this account”).
In treating the first member of this division he gives four points from which he infers a fifth. The first is that being is divided by actuality and by potentiality. He says that one kind of being is actual only, such as the prime mover, which is God; another is potential only, such as prime matter; and others are both potential and actual, as all intermediate things. Or by the phrase actual only he means what already has a form completely, as what is now completely white; and by potential only, what does not have a form, as what is not white in any way; and by potential and actual, what does not yet have a form completely but is being moved to a form.
2290. The second point is that being is divided by the ten categories, as is implied when he says that there is one kind of being which exists of itself, i.e., substance, and another is quantity, and another is quality, and so on for the other categories.
2291. The third point is that motion does not have a distinct nature separate from other things; but every form insofar as it is in a state of becoming is an imperfect actuality which is called motion. For to be moved to whiteness is the same as for whiteness to begin to become actual in a subject; but it need not be in complete actuality. This is his meaning in saying that motion is not something apart from things themselves; for everything which is being changed is being changed according to the categories of being. And just as the ten categories have nothing in common as their genus, in a similar way there is no genus common to all the kinds of motion. Hence motion is not a category distinct from the others but is a natural concomitant of the other categories.
2292. The fourth point is that a thing is found in any genus in two ways, namely, perfectly and imperfectly; for example, in the genus of substance one thing has the character of a form, and another the character of a privation; and in the genus of quality there is one thing which is perfect, as a white thing, which has a perfect color, and another which is imperfect, as a black thing, which is imperfect in the genus of color. And in the genus of quantity one thing is perfect, and this is called “great,” and another is imperfect, and this is called “small”; and in the genus of place, in which “motion in space” is found, i.e., local motion, one thing tends upwards and another downwards, or one is light and another heavy inasmuch as that is called light which actually rises upwards, and that heavy which actually sinks downwards; and one of these has the character of something perfect and the other the character of something imperfect. The reason is that all the categories are divided by contrary differences; and one contrary always has the character of something perfect, and the other the character of something imperfect.
2293. From these four points he infers a fifth, namely, that there are as many kinds of motion and change as there are of being. He does not say this because there is motion in every genus of being, but because, just as being is divided by actuality and potentiality and by substance and accident and the like, and in terms of perfect and imperfect, so also is motion. This follows from his assertion that motion is not something apart from things. The way in which change and motion differ will be explained below.
2294. Now since each (975).
Next, he defines motion. First, he gives its definition, saying that, since in each genus of being, being is divided by potentiality and actuality, motion is said to be the actualization of what is potential insofar as it is such.
2295. That our account (976).
Second, he explains the definition which has been given; and in regard to this he does two things. First (976:C 2295), he explains what was given in the definition with regard to the subject of motion; and second (978:C 2297), what was given as the genus of motion (“That motion is this”).
In regard to the first member of this division he does two things. First, he explains the part of the definition, what is potential; and second (977:C 2296), the part, insofar as it is such (“And by the phrase”).
He accordingly says, first (976), that it is evidently true from this that motion is as we have described it to be. For it is clear that the term buildable signifies something in potentiality, and that the potentiality in question is presented as being brought to actuality by what is designated as being built; and this actuality is called the process of building. The same thing is also true of other motions, such as walking, altering, and the like. And a thing is said to be being moved when it is coming to be such and such actually and has been such and such potentially, and neither before nor after. If this is so, then, it follows that motion belongs to a thing in potentiality when it is being brought to actuality; and by this I mean that it is being brought to actuality insofar as it is movable; for a thing is said to be movable because it is in potentiality to motion. Hence a potentiality of this kind is being brought to actuality when it is actually being moved; but what is potential “inasmuch as it is itself,” i.e., in reference to what it actually is and in itself, does not have to be brought to actuality by motion. For it actually is this before it begins to be moved. And neither is it being brought to actuality by motion insofar as it is in potentiality to the terminus of motion, because so long as it is being moved it still remains in potentiality to the terminus of motion. But a thing is being brought from potentiality to actuality by motion only in the case of that potentiality which is signified when a thing is said to be movable, i.e., capable of being moved.
2296. And by the phrase (977).
Then he explains a phrase which was given in the definition of motion, namely, insofar as it is such, or inasmuch as it i’s of this kind. With a view to making this clear he says that bronze is in potentiality to being a statue, and thus the subject bronze and bronze in potentiality to being a statue are the same, although they are not the same in their meaning; for the concept of bronze as bronze and that of bronze insofar as it has some potentiality are different; and this is what he means when he says that to be bronze and to be some potentiality are not the same. For if they were the same in their meaning, then just as motion is an actuality of bronze insofar as it is bronze in potentiality, in a similar way motion would be the actuality of bronze insofar as it is bronze. But bronze and the potentiality of bronze do not have the same meaning. This is evident in the case of the potentiality for contraries, because the potentiality “of being healed and that of being ill” do not have the same meaning; for the concept of a potentiality is derived from that of the actuality. Hence, if the potentiality of being healed and that of being ill were the same in meaning, it would follow that being healed and being ill are the same. But this is impossible. Therefore the potentiality for each of two contraries is not the same in meaning, although it is the same in subject. For it is the same subject which can be healed or be ill; and whether that subject is any one at all of the humors in the animal’s body, or the blood, which is more natural and proper to the life and nourishment of the animal, it can be a cause of its being healed or being ill. Since, then, the potentiality of being healed and that of being ill are not the same in meaning, it is evident that neither of these is the same as its subject in meaning, because any two things which are essentially the same as some third thing are themselves essentially the same. Hence, since bronze and bronze in potentiality to being a statue are not the same in meaning, just as color and the visible object are not the same, the phrase insofar as it is such must be added to the statement that motion is the actualization of what is potential.
2297. That motion is this (978).
Then he explains the term which was given as the genus in the definition of motion. That motion is this is evident, he says, because the said motion then exists “when it” (the actuality of what is potential) “is actual in this way,” and neither before nor after. For obviously every movable thing can be at one time in a state of actualization and at another not; for the buildable as buildable at one time is in a state of potentiality and at another time is in a state of actualization. He says “the buildable as buildable” because the matter of a house is in potentiality to two things, namely, to the form of a house, and to the process of being built. And it is possible for it at one time to be in a state of potentiality to both and at another to be in a state of actuality. But the potentiality which the matter of a house has for being built is signified by the term buildable. Therefore the buildable as buildable becomes actual when it is being built; and thus the process of building is the actuality of the buildable as buildable.
2298. He proves this as follows: the matter of a house is in potentiality to only two actualities, namely, the act of building the house and the form of the house. But the term buildable signifies a potentiality belonging to the matter of the house. Therefore, since there is some actuality corresponding to every potentiality, the potentiality signified by the term buildable must correspond to one of these two actualities, namely, either to the form of the house or to the act of building. But the form of the house is not the actuality of the buildable as buildable, because when the form of the house develops, the house is no longer buildable but is already built. But the buildable is in a state of actuality when the house is actually being built. Therefore the act of building must be the actuality of the buildable. Now the act of building is a kind of motion; and thus motion is the actuality of the buildable. The same explanation holds for all other motions. It is evident, then, that motion is the actuality of what is potential.
2299. That this account (979).
Then he proves that the definition given is a good one. First, he gives a general proof. He says that it is evident that this definition of motion is a good one if we consider what others have said about motion when they defined it; and also because it cannot easily be defined in a different way. For it cannot be put in any other class than in that of actuality.
2300. This is evident (980).
Second, he states what others have said about motion. He says that some have said that motion is otherness, others inequality, and others non-being. And perhaps they spoke of it thus because the thing being moved gradually loses its initial state, and so long as it is being moved it is always in different states and comes closer to its goal.
2301. However, no one (981).
Third, he shows that the definitions given above are not suitable ones; for they do not fit motion so far as its subject is concerned, i.e., the thing moved. For if motion were non-being or inequality or otherness, it would follow that every non-being or whatever is other or unequal is moved, but it is not necessary that any of these should be moved. Hence motion is not as they have described it to be. The same thing is also apparent with regard to the termini of motion, which are the limits from which and to which there is motion. For motion is not to non-being or inequality or otherness rather than to their opposites, nor is motion from these rather than from their opposites. For there can be motion from nonbeing to being and vice versa, and from otherness to likeness, and from inequality to equality and vice versa.
2302. The reason (982).
Fourth, he shows why some defined motion in the foregoing way. He says that the reason why they put motion in the above-mentioned class is that motion seems to be something indefinite, and things which are privative are indefinite. Hence they assumed that motion is a kind of privation.
2303. It should also be noted, as has been pointed out in Book I (60:C 127) of this work, that the Pythagoreans posited two orders of things, and in one of these, which they called the order of good things, they placed things which seem to be perfect, for example, light, right, male, rest, and the like; and in the other order, which they listed under evil, they placed darkness, left, female, motion and the like. And they said that all such things are indefinite and privative because no one of them seems to signify “either a this,” i.e., substance, “or such,” i.e., quality, or any of the other categories.
2304. The reason why (983).
Fifth, he points out why motion is placed in the class of the indefinite. The reason for this, he says, is that motion can be placed neither in the class of the potential nor in that of the actual; for if it were placed in the class of the potential, it would follow that whatever is in potentiality to something, for example, to have some quantity, would be moved to that quantity. But this is not necessary, because, before a thing begins to be moved to some quantity, it is in potentiality to that quantity. Moreover, it is not being moved when it already actually has that quantity to which it was in potentiality, but the motion has then already been terminated.
2305. But motion must be a kind of actuality, as has been proved above (975:C 2294), although it is an imperfect one. The reason for this is that the thing of which it is the actuality is imperfect, and this is a possible or potential being; for if it were a perfect actuality, the whole potentiality for some definite actuality which is in the matter would be eliminated. Hence perfect actualities are not actualities of something in potentiality but of something in actuality. But motion belongs to something that is in potentiality, because it does not eliminate the potentiality of that thing. For so long as there is motion, the potentiality for that to which it tends by its motion remains in the thing moved. But only the previous potentiality for being moved is eliminated, though not completely; for what is being moved is still in potentiality to motion, because everything which is being moved will be moved, because of the division of continuous motion, as is proved in Book VI of the Physics. It follows, then, that motion is the actuality of what is potential; and thus it is an imperfect actuality and the actuality of something imperfect.
2306. It is because of this that it is difficult to grasp what motion is; for it seems necessary to place motion either in the class of privation, as is evident from the definitions given above, or in the class of potentiality, or in that of simple and complete actuality—none of which may be moved. It follows, then, that motion is as we have described it to be, namely, an actuality, and that it is not called a perfect actuality. This is difficult to grasp, although it can nevertheless be true, because when this is admitted nothing untenable follows.
2307. Some have defined motion by saying that it is the gradual passage from potentiality to actuality. But they erred, because motion must be given in the definition of a passage, since it is a kind of motion. Similarly, time is placed in the definition of the gradual, and motion in the definition of time.
2308. That motion belongs (984).
Then he explains what the subject of motion is. First, he shows that it is the thing moved; because every actuality is found in the thing whose actuality it is. But motion is the actuality of the movable by what is capable of causing motion. Hence it follows that motion is found in the movable or thing moved; and that it is the actualization of this is clear from the above discussion.
2309. And the actuality (985).
Second, he shows how motion is related to a mover; and he gives two points, namely, that motion is the actuality of what is capable of causing motion, and that the actuality of the thing capable of causing motion and that of the thing moved do not differ; for motion must be the actuality of both.
2310. And a thing is capable (986).
Third, he proves the first of these two points, namely, that motion is the actuality of what is capable of causing motion. For the actuality of a thing is that by which it becomes actual. But a thing is said to be capable of causing motion because of its power of moving, and it is said to be a mover because of its activity, i.e., because it is actual. Hence, since a thing is said to be a mover because of motion, motion will be the actuality of what is capable of causing motion.
2311. But it is (987).
Fourth, he proves the second of these points, namely, that the actuality of what is capable of causing motion and the actuality of what is capable of being moved are one and the same motion. He does this as follows: it has been stated that motion is the actuality of what is capable of causing motion inasmuch as it causes motion; and a thing is said to be movable inasmuch as motion is caused in it; but the thing capable of causing motion causes that motion which is found in the thing moved and not a different one. This is what he means when he says that it is on what is movable that the mover is capable of acting. It follows, then, that the actuality of the mover and that of the thing moved are one and the same motion.
2312. And it is one (988).
Fifth, he clarifies this by an example. He says that the distance from one to two and from two to one are the same, although they differ conceptually; and for this reason the distance is signified differently, namely, by the terms double and half. Similarly, the path of an ascent and that of a descent are one, but they differ conceptually; and for this reason some are called ascenders and others descenders. The same applies to a mover and to the thing moved; for the actuality of both is essentially one motion, although they differ conceptually. For the actuality of a mover functions as that from which motion comes, whereas the actuality of the thing moved functions as that in which motion occurs. And the actuality of the thing moved is not that from which motion comes, nor is the actuality of the mover that in which motion occurs. Hence the actuality of the thing causing motion is called action, and that of the thing moved is called undergoing or suffering.
2313. But if action and undergoing are essentially the same thing, it seems that they should not be different categories. However, it should be borne in mind that the categories are distinguished on the basis of a different way of predicating; and thus inasmuch as the same term is differently predicated of different things, it belongs to different categories; for inasmuch as place is predicated of a thing that locates, it belongs to the genus of quantity, but inasmuch as it is predicated denominatively of the located thing it constitutes the category where. Similarly, inasmuch as motion is predicated of the subject in which it is found, it constitutes the category of undergoing; but inasmuch as it is predicated of that from which it comes, it constitutes the category of action.
LESSON 10
The Infinite
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 10: 1066a 35-1067a 371
989. The infinite is either what cannot be spanned because it is not naturally fitted to be spanned (just as the spoken word is invisible); or what is imperfectly spanned; or what is spanned with difficulty; or what is not actually spanned, although it admits of being spanned or of having a terminus.
990. Further, a thing may be infinite either by addition or by subtraction or by both.
991. That the infinite should be a separate entity and be perceptible is impossible. For if it is neither a continuous quantity nor a plurality, and is a substance and not an accident, it will be indivisible; for what is divisible is either a continuous quantity or a plurality. But if it is indivisible, it is not infinite, except in the sense in which the spoken word is invisible. But people do not use the term in this sense, nor is this the sense of the infinite which we are investigating, but the infinite in the sense of what cannot be spanned.
992. Further, how can the infinite exist of itself if number and continuous quantity, of which the infinite is an attribute, do not exist of themselves?
993. Again, if the infinite is an accident, it cannot, inasmuch as it is infinite, be an element of existing things, just as the invisible is not an element of speech although the spoken word is invisible.’ It is also evident that the infinite cannot be actual; for any part of it which might be taken would be infinite, since infinity and the infinite are the same if the infinite is a substance and is not predicated of a subject. Hence it is either indivisible, or if it is divisible, the parts into which it is divided are infinite in number. But it is impossible that the same thing should be many infinites; for, just as a part of air is air, so too a part of the infinite must be infinite if the infinite is a substance and principle. Therefore it cannot be divided into parts, and so is indivisible. But this cannot apply to the actually infinite, for it must be a quantity. Hence it is an accidental attribute. But if this is so, then, as we have said, it cannot be it that is a principle, but that of which it is an accident, for example, air or the even This investigation, then, is universal.
994. That the infinite does not exist in sensible things is made clear as follows: if it is the nature of a body to be bounded by surfaces, then no body, whether it is perceptible or intelligible, can be infinite.
995. Nor can there be any separate and infinite number; for a number or that which has a number is numerable.
996. This is evident from the following argument drawn from nature: the infinite can be neither composite nor simple. It cannot be a composite body if the elements are limited in number; for the contraries must be equal, and no one of them must be infinite; for if the active power of one of two elemental bodies is inferior to that of the other, the finite body will be destroyed by the infinite body. And that each should be infinite is impossible, because a body is what is extended in all directions, and the infinite is what is extended without limit; so if the infinite is a body, it must be infinite in all directions.
997. Nor can the infinite be a single simple body: neither, as some say, something apart from the elements, from which they generate these (for there is no such body apart from the elements, because everything can be dissolved into that of which it is composed; but there does not appear to be anything apart from the simple bodies), nor fire, nor any of the other elements. For unless some of them are infinite, the whole, even though it is finite, could not be or become any one of them, as Heraclitus says that all things at one time become fire. The same reasoning also applies to “the one,” which the philosophers of nature posited as an entity over and above the elements (997). For everything is changed from a contrary, for example, from hot to cold.
998. Again, a sensible body is somewhere, and the place of the whole and that of a part (of the earth, for example) is the same.
999. Hence, if the infinite is composed of like parts, it will be immovable or will always be undergoing motion. But this is impossible. For why should it be moved upwards rather than downwards or in some other direction? For example, if it were a clod of earth, where would it move to or where remain at rest? For the place of the body naturally fitted to this will be infinite. Will it then occupy the whole place? And how will it do this? And what then will be its place of rest and of motion? For if it rests everywhere, it will not be in motion. And if it is moved everywhere, it will not be at rest.
1000. And if the whole is composed throughout of unlike parts, their places will also be unlike. And, first, the body of the whole will be one only by contact; and, second, the parts will be either finite or infinite in species. But they cannot be finite, for some would then be infinite and some not (if the whole is infinite), for example, fire or water. But such an infinite element would necessitate the destruction of contrary elements (996). But if the parts are infinite and simple, their places will be infinite, and the elements will be infinite in number. And since this is impossible, their places will be finite and the whole finite.
1001. And in general there cannot be an infinite body and a place for bodies if every sensible body has either heaviness or lightness; for it will tend either to the center or upwards. But the infinite-either the whole or a half of it-is incapable of any of these motions. For how can you divide it? Or how can one part tend upwards and another downwards, or one part tend to the extreme and another to the center?
1002. Further, every sensible body is in a place, and there are six kinds of place, but these cannot pertain to an infinite body.
1003. And in general if a place cannot be infinite, neither can a body be infinite; for to be in a place is to be somewhere, and this means to be either down or up or in some one of the other places, and each of these is a limit.
1004. And the infinite is not the same in the case of continuous quantity, of motion, and of time, as though it were a single reality; but the secondary member is said to be infinite inasmuch as the primary one is; for example, motion is said to be infinite in reference to the continuous quantity in which it is moved or altered or increased, and time is said to be such in reference to motion.
COMMENTARY
2314. Having given his views about motion, here the Philosopher deals with the infinite, which is an attribute of motion and of any quantity in general. In regard to this he does three things. First (989:C 2314), he distinguishes the various senses in which the term infinite is used. Second (991:C 2322), he shows that the actually infinite does not exist (“That the infinite”). Third (1004:C 2354), he explains how the infinite is found in different things (“And the infinite”).
In regard to the first he does two things. First, he explains the different senses in which the term infinite is used; and second (990:C 2319), the various senses in which things are said to be potentially infinite (“Further, a thing”).
In regard to the first (989) part it should be borne in mind that every finite thing may be spanned by division. Hence the infinite, properly speaking, is what cannot be spanned by measurement; and therefore the term infinite is used in the same number of senses as the term untraversable.
2315. Now each of these is used in four ways. First, the infinite or untraversable means what cannot be spanned by measurement because it does not belong to the class of things which are naturally fitted to be spanned; for example, we say that the point or the unit or something which is not a quantity and is not measurable is infinite or untraversable; and in this sense the spoken word is said to be invisible because it does not belong to the class of things which are visible.
2316. Second, the infinite or untraversable means what has not yet been spanned although it has begun to be spanned. This is his meaning in saying “what is imperfectly spanned.”
2317. Third, the infinite or untraversable means what is spanned with difficulty. Thus we may say that the depth of the sea or the height of the sky is infinite, or that any long distance is immeasurable or untraversable or infinite, because it surpasses our powers of measurement although in itself it is capable of being spanned.
2318. Fourth, the infinite or untraversable means what belongs to the class of things which are naturally fitted to be spanned, or to have some limit set to them, but are not actually spanned; for example, if a line is limitless. This sense of the infinite is the true and proper one.
2319. Further, a thing (990).
Second, he explains the various senses in which things are said to be potentially infinite. He says that in one sense a thing is said to be infinite by addition, as a number; for it is always possible to add a unit to any number, and in this respect number is capable of infinite increase.
2320. In another sense a thing is said to be infinite by subtraction or division inasmuch as a continuous quantity is said to be infinitely divisible.
2321. In a third sense it is possible for a thing to be infinite from both points of view; for example, time is said to be infinite both as regards division, because it is continuous, and as regards addition, because it is a number. It is in a similar way that the infinite is found in motion.
2322. That the infinite (991).
Then he shows that the actually infinite does not exist; and in regard to this it should be noted that the Platonists held that the infinite is separate from sensible things and is a principle of them, whereas the philosophers of nature held that the infinite exists in sensible things, not in the sense that it is a substance, but rather in the sense that it is an accident of some sensible body. He therefore shows, first (991:C 2322), that the infinite is not a separate entity; and second (994:C 2327), that the actually infinite does not exist in sensible things (“That the infinite does not”).
In treating the first member of this division he gives three arguments. The first is as follows: if the infinite is a substance which exists of itself and is not an accident of some subject, the infinite must lack continuous quantity and plurality, because continuous quantity and number constitute the subject of the infinite. But if it lacks continuous quantity and plurality, it must be indivisible, because everything divisible is either a continuous quantity or a plurality. But if it is indivisible, it is infinite only in the first sense of the term, as a spoken word is said to be invisible. However, we are not investigating this sense of the term here, nor did they use the term in this sense; but we are considering the fourth sense, i.e., what is untraversable. Therefore, all things considered, if the infinite were an independently existing substance, it would not be truly infinite. This position destroys itself in this way.
2323. Further, how can (992).
Then he gives the second argument, which runs thus: infinity is an attribute of number and of continuous quantity. But number and continuous quantity are not things which have separate existence, as has been shown in Book I (122:C 239) and will be shown below (993:C 2324). Therefore much less is the infinite a separate substance.
2324. Again, if the infinite (993).
Here he gives the third argument, which runs as follows. Let us suppose that the infinite is either a substance which is separate from sensible things or an accident belonging to some separate subject, for example, to continuous quantity or to number-which are separate according to the Platonists. Now if the infinite is assumed to be an accident, it cannot be the infinite as infinite that is a principle of existing things, but rather the subject of the infinite; just as what is invisible is not said to be a principle of speech, but the spoken word, although the spoken word is invisible in this sense.
2325. And if the infinite is assumed to be a substance and is not predicated of a subject, it is also evident that it cannot be actually infinite; for it is either divisible or indivisible. But if the infinite itself as infinite is a substance and is divisible, any part of it which might be taken would necessarily be infinite; because infinity and the infinite are the same “if the infinite is a substance,” i.e., if infinity expresses the proper intelligible structure of the infinite. Hence, just as a part of water is water and a part of air is air, so too any part of the infinite is infinite if the infinite is a divisible substance. We must say, then, that the infinite is either indivisible or divisible into many infinites. But many infinite things cannot possibly constitute one finite thing; for the infinite is not greater than the infinite, but every whole is greater than any of its parts.
2326. It follows, then, that the infinite is indivisible. But that any indivisible thing should be actually infinite is impossible, because the infinite must be a quantity. Therefore it remains that it is not a substance but an accident. But if the infinite is an accident, it is not the infinite that is a principle, but the subject of which it is an accident (as was said above), whether it be air, as some of the natural philosophers claimed, or the even, as the Pythagoreans claimed. Thus it follows that the infinite cannot be both a substance and a principle of beings at the same time. Last, he concludes that this investigation is a general one which goes beyond the study of natural things.
2327. That the infinite does not exist (994).
Then he proves that the actually infinite does not exist in sensible things. First (994:C 2327), he proves this by probable arguments; and second (996:C 2330), by arguments drawn from nature (“This is evident”).
He accordingly says, first (994), that it is obvious that the actually infinite is not found in sensible things; and he proves two points. First, he says that there is no infinite body in the sensible world, for it is the nature of a body to be bounded by surfaces. But no body with a definite surface is infinite. Therefore no body is infinite, “whether it be perceptible,” i.e., a natural body, “or intelligible,” i.e., a mathematical one.
2328. Nor can there be (995).
Second, he shows in the following way that there is no infinite number in sensible things. Every number and everything which has a number is numerable. But nothing numerable is infinite, because what is numerable can be spanned by numeration. Therefore no number is infinite.
2329. Now these arguments do not pertain to natural philosophy, because they are not based on the principles of a natural body but on certain principles which are common and probable and not necessary. For anyone who would claim that a body is infinite would not maintain that its surface has limits, for this characteristic belongs to the nature of a finite body. And anyone who would claim that there is an infinite multitude would not hold that it is a number, because number is multitude measured by one, as has been explained in Book X (875-C 2090). But nothing measured is infinite.
2330. This is evident (996).
Next, he proves that the actually infinite does not exist within sensible things, by using arguments drawn from nature. He does this, first (996:C 2330), with reference to the active and passive powers of bodies; and second (998:C 2339), with reference to place and the thing in place (“Again, a sensible body”).
Now active and passive powers, Place and thing in place are proper to natural bodies as such; and therefore he says that these arguments are drawn from nature. He accordingly says, first (996), that, if a body is perceptible and infinite, it wilt be either a simple body or a composite body or compound.
2331. First, he shows that a composite body cannot be infinite, if we assume that simple bodies, which are the elements of composite bodies, are finite in number. He proves this as follows: either all the elements must be infinite in quantity, or one must be infinite and the others finite, otherwise an infinite body could not be composed of elements which are finite in number.
2332. But that one of the elements should be infinite and the rest finite is impossible; because in the case of a compound contraries must somehow be equalized in order that the compound may be preserved in being, for otherwise that contrary which exceeds the others will destroy them. But if one contrary is infinite and the rest finite, no equality will be established, since there is no proportion between the infinite and the finite. A compound, then, could not exist, for the infinite element would destroy the others.
2333. And since someone might say that a body which is finite in quantity has greater power, and that equality is achieved in this way (for example, if someone were to say that in a cornpound air is infinite and fire finite), he therefore adds that, even if we suppose that the active power of one body which is assumed to be infinite falls short of the active power of any one of the others, because these are assumed to be finite, the finite element will be destroyed by the infinite one; for a finite body must have a finite power, and then finite fire will have a finite power. Hence, if from infinite air a portion of air equal to the fire is taken out, its power will be less than that of the whole infinite air, but proportioned to the power of fire. Let us suppose, then, that the power of fire is a hundred times greater than that of air. Hence, if we take away a hundredfold of air from infinite air it will be equal to fire in power; and thus the whole infinite air will have a greater infinite power than fire and will destroy it. It is impossible, then, that one element of a compound should be infinite and the rest finite.
2334. Similarly, it is impossible that all should be infinite, because a body is what is extended in every dimension. But the infinite is what is infinite in dimension. Hence an infinite body must have an infinite dimension in every direction. But two bodies cannot be in the same place. Therefore two infinite bodies cannot be combined into one.
2335. Nor can the infinite (997).
Second, he proves that the infinite cannot be a simple body. There cannot be a simple body apart from the elements, from which all of them are generated, as some claimed air to be, because each thing is dissolved into the elements of which it is composed. But we see that compounds are dissolved only into the four elements; and therefore there cannot be a simple body apart from the four elements.
2336. Nor can fire or any of the other elements be infinite, because no element could possibly exist except the one which is infinite, since it would fill every place. Again, if there were some finite element it would have to be changed into that infinite element because of the very great power of the latter; just as Heraclitus claimed that at some time all things must be changed into the element fire because of its very great power.
2337. And the same argument therefore applies to the one simple body which the natural philosophers posited as an entity over and above the elements themselves; for it would have to be opposed to the other elements as a kind of contrary, since according to them there is change from that one body alone into the others. But every change in things is from one contrary to another. Therefore, since one of two contraries destroys the other, it follows that, if that body which is supposed to exist apart from the elements is infinite, it will destroy the others.
2338. The philosopher omits the celestial body here, because, while it is something apart from the four elements, it is not contrary or repugnant to them in any way, nor are these bodies naturally derived from it. For the philosophers of nature who posited an actually infinite body did not attain any knowledge of this fifth essence or nature. Yet in The Heavens Aristotle proves that even a celestial body, which moves circularly, is not actually infinite.
2339. Again, a sensible body (998).
Then he proves that a sensible body is not infinite; and he does this by means of arguments based upon place and a thing in place. He gives three arguments. As a sort of preamble to the first he considers two points necessary for its development. The first is that every sensible body is in a place. He emphasizes sensible in order to distinguish this kind of body from a mathematical one, to which place and contact are attributed only figuratively.
2340. The second point is that the natural place of a whole and that of a part are the same, i.e., the place in which it naturally rests and to which it is naturally moved. This is clear, for instance, in the case of earth and of any part of it, for the natural place of each is down.
2341. Hence, if the infinite (999).
After giving these two points he states his argument, which runs as follows. If a sensible body is assumed to be infinite, either its parts will all be specifically the same, as is the case with bodies having like parts, such as air, earth, blood, and so on, or they will be specifically different.
2342. But if all of its parts are specifically the same, it will follow that the whole will always be at rest or always in motion. Each one of these is impossible and incompatible with the facts of sensory perception.
2343. For why should it (ibid.).
Then he shows that the other alternative has to be accepted; for it has already been assumed that the natural place of a whole and that of a part are the same. And it is evident that every body is at rest when it is in its natural place, and that it naturally moves to its natural place when it is outside of it. If, then, the whole place occupied by a body having an infinite number of like parts is natural to it, this place must be natural to each part, and thus the whole and each of its parts will be at rest. But if it is not natural to it, the whole and each of its parts will then be outside their proper place; and thus the whole and any part of it will always be in motion.
2344. For it cannot be said that some part of a place is natural to the whole and to its parts, and that some part of a place is not; because, if a body were infinite and every body were in a place, its place would also have to be infinite. But in infinite place there is no dividedness by reason of which one part of it is the natural place of the body and another is not, because there must be some fixed proportion and distance between a place which is natural and one which is not, and this cannot apply to an infinite place. This is what he means when he says that an infinite body or one of its parts will not be moved downwards rather than upwards or in some other direction, because in an infinite place it is impossible to find any fixed proportion between these parts.
2345. He gives an example of this. If we assume that the earth is infinite, it will be impossible to give any reason why it should be in motion or at rest in one place rather than in another, because the whole infinite place will be equally fitted by nature to the infinite body which occupies this place. Hence, if some part of a place is naturally fitted to a clod of earth, the same will apply to another part; and if one part is not naturally fitted to a Place, neither will another be. If, then, an infinite body is in a place, it will fill the whole of that infinite place. Yet how can it be at rest and in motion at the same time? For if it rests everywhere, it will not be in motion; or if it is in motion everywhere, it follows that no part of it will be at rest.
2346. And if the whole (1000).
Then the Philosopher examines the other alternative, namely, the supposition that the whole is not composed of like parts. He says that it follows, first, that, if “the body of the whole,” i.e., of the universe, is composed of specifically unlike parts, it will be one only by contact, as a pile of stones is one. But things specifically different, such as fire, air and water, cannot be continuous; and this is not to be one in an absolute sense.
2347. Again, if this whole is composed of parts which are specifically unlike, they will be either infinite in species, i.e., so that the different parts of the whole are infinite in species; or they will be finite in species, i.e., so that the diversity of species found among the parts amount to some fixed number.
2348. But that the elements cannot be finite in species is clear from what was proposed in the preceding argument; for it would be impossible for an infinite whole to be composed of parts which are finite in number, unless either all parts were infinite in quantity, which is impossible, since an infinite body must be infinite in any of its parts, or at least unless some part or parts were infinite. Therefore, if a whole were infinite and its parts were different species infinite in number, it would follow that some of them would be infinite and some finite in quantity—for example, if one were to assume that water is infinite and fire finite. But this position introduces corruption among contraries, because an infinite contrary would destroy other contraries, as has been shown above (996:C 2332). Therefore they cannot be finite in number.
2349. But if the parts of the universe were infinite in species, and these must be assumed to be simple, it would follow that places would be infinite and that the elements would be infinite. But both of these are impossible; for since each simple body has a place naturally fitted to it which is specifically different from the place of another body, if there were an infinite number of simple bodies which are different in species, it would also follow that there are an infinite number of places which are different in species. This is obviously false; for the species of places are limited in number, and these are up and down, and so on. It is also impossible that the elements should be infinite in number, because it would then follow that they would remain unknown; and if they were unknown, all things would be unknown. Therefore, if the elements cannot be infinite, places must be finite, and consequently the whole must be finite.
2350. And in general (1001).
Here he gives the second argument. He says that, since every sensible body has a place, it is impossible for any sensible body to be infinite, granted the assumption that every sensible body has heaviness and lightness-which would be true according to the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers, who claimed that bodies are actually infinite. Aristotle, however, is of the opinion that there is a sensible body which does not have heaviness or lightness, namely, a celestial body, as he proved in The Heavens. He introduces this circumstantially, as admitted by his opponents, but not in the sense that it is unqualifiedly true. If every sensible body, then, is either heavy or light and some sensible body is infinite, it must be heavy or light; and therefore it must be moved upwards or towards the center; for a light thing is defined as one that rises upwards, and a heavy thing as one that tends towards the center. But this cannot apply to the infinite, either to the whole of it or to a part; for the center of a body is found only when a proportion is established between the boundaries by dividing the whole. But the infinite cannot be divided according to any proportion; and therefore neither up and down nor boundary and center can be found there.
2351. This argument must be understood to apply even if one assumes that there is a third kind of body which is neither heavy nor light; for such a body is naturally moved around the center, and this could not be the case with an infinite body.
2352. Further, every sensible body (1002).
The Philosopher now gives the third argument, which runs thus: every sensible body is in a place. But there are six kinds of place: up and down, right and left, before and behind; and it is impossible to attribute these to an infinite body, since they are the limits of distances. Thus it. is impossible that a place should be attributed to an infinite body; and therefore no sensible body is infinite. However, in saying that there are six kinds of place he does not mean that these places are distinguished because of the elements (for their motions are distinguished merely in terms of up and down) but only because, just as up and down are out of the question so far as an infinite body is concerned, so are all the other differences of place.
2353. And in general if (1003).
He gives the fourth argument, which is as follows. Every sensible body is in a place; but it is impossible for a place to be infinite; and therefore it is impossible for a body to be infinite. The way in which it is impossible for a place to be infinite he proves thus: whatever has a common term predicated of it must also have predicated of it any of the things which fall under that common term; for example, whatever is an animal must belong to some particular species of animal, and whatever is man must be some particular man. Similarly, whatever occupies an infinite place must be “somewhere,” i.e., it must occupy some place. But to occupy some place is to be up or down or to be in some one of the other kinds of place. However, none of these can be infinite because each is the limit of some distance. It is impossible, then, that a place should be infinite, and the same applies to a body.
2354. And the infinite (1004).
Then he shows how the potentially infinite is found in different things. He says that it is found in continuous quantity, in motion, and in time, and it is not predicated of them univocally but in a primary and a secondary way. And the secondary member among them is always said to be infinite inasmuch as the primary member is; for example, motion is said to be infinite in reference to the continuous quantity in which something is moved locally or increased or altered; and time is said to be infinite in reference to motion. This must be understood as follows: infinite divisibility is attributed to what is continuous, and this is done first with reference to continuous quantity, from which motion derives its continuity. This is evident in the case of local motion because the parts of local motion are considered in relation to the parts of continuous quantity. The same thing is evident in the case of the motion of increase, because increase is noted in terms of the addition of continuous quantity. However, this is not as evident in the case of alteration, although in a sense it also applies there; because quality, which is the realm of alteration, is divided accidentally upon the division of continuous quantity. Again, the intensification and abatement of a quality is also noted inasmuch as its subject, which has continuous quantity, participates in some quality to a greater or lesser degree.
And motion is referred to continuity, and so is a continuous time; for since time in itself is a number, it is continuous only in a subject, just as ten measures of cloth are continuous because the cloth is continuous. The term infinite, then, must be used of these three things in the same order of priority as the term continuous is.
LESSON 11
Motion and Change
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter it: 1067b 1-1068a 7
1005. Everything which is changed is changed either accidentally, as when we say that a musician walks; or it is changed without qualification because something belonging to it is changed, as what is changed in some of its parts; for example, the body is said to be healed because the eye is. And there is some primary thing which is moved of itself, and this is what is essentially movable.
1006. The same division applies to a mover, for it causes motion either accidentally or in some part of itself or essentially.
1007. And there is a primary mover and something which is moved. And there is also a time in which it is moved, and something from which it is moved, and something to which it is moved. But the forms and modifications and place to which things in motion are moved are immovable, as science and heat. Heat is not motion, but heating is.
1008. Now change which is not accidental is not found in all things, but between contraries and between their intermediates and between contradictories. We may be convinced of this by induction. Whatever is changed is changed either from a subject to a subject, or from a non-subject to a non-subject, or from a subject to a non-subject, or from a non-subject to a subject. And by subject I mean what is expressed by an affirmative term. Hence there must be three changes; for to go from a non-subject to a non-subject is not change, because, since the limits are neither contraries nor contradictories, there is no opposition (1008).
1009. The change from a non-subject to a subject which is its contradictory is generation; and if it is unqualified, it is generation in an unqualified sense, and if in a part, partial generation; and the change from a subject to a non-subject is destruction.
1010. If non-being has several different meanings, then neither that which involves a combination or separation of terms, nor that which refers to potentiality and is opposed to being in an unqualified sense, is capable of being moved (for what is not-white or not-good can be moved only accidentally, since what is not-white may be a man). But non-being in an unqualified sense cannot be moved in any way, because it is impossible for non-being to be moved. And if this is so, generation cannot be motion, because non-being is generated. For even if it is most certainly generated accidentally, it will still be true to say that what is generated in an unqualified sense is non-being. The same argument applies to rest. These are the difficulties, then, which result from this view. And if everything moved is in a place, though non-being is not in a place, it would have to be somewhere. Nor is destruction motion; for the contrary of motion is motion or rest, but the contrary of destruction is generation.
1011. And since every motion is a kind of change, and the three changes are those described (1008), and of these those which refer to generation and destruction are not motions, and these are changes between contradictories, only change from a subject to a subject must be motion. And the subjects are either contraries or their intermediates—for privation is given as a contrary—and they are expressed by an affirmative term, for example, naked or toothless or black.
COMMENTARY
2355. Having explained what motion is, and having dealt with the infinite, which is a certain attribute of motion, here the Philosopher establishes the truth about the parts of motion. This is divided into two parts. In the first (1005:C 2355) he distinguishes the parts of motion; and in the second (1021:C:2404) he explains the connection between motion and its parts (“Things which are”).
The first is divided into three members, corresponding to the three divisions which he makes in motion, although one of these is included under the other as a subdivision of the preceding division.
In regard to the first he does two things. First, he divides motion with regard to the thing moved; and second (ioo6:C 2358), with regard to a mover (“The same division”).
He accordingly says, first (1005), that a thing may be changed in three ways. In one way a thing may be changed only accidentally, as when something is said to be changed because the thing to which it belongs is changed, whether it belongs to it as an accident to a subject, as when we say that a musician walks, or as a substantial form to matter, as the soul belongs to the body which is moved; or as a part is said to be moved when the whole is moved, or also as something contained is moved when its container is moved, as a sailor is said to be in motion when his ship is in motion.
2356. In a second way a thing is said to be changed without qualification because some part of it is changed, as those things which are moved in some part; for example, the body of a man is said to be healed because the eye is; and this is to be moved essentially but not in the first instance.
2357. In a third way a thing is said to be moved primarily and of itself; as when some whole is moved in its totality, for example, when a stone is moved downwards.
2358. The same division (1006).
He then gives the same division with regard to a mover; for a thing is said to be a mover in three ways. First, a thing is said to cause motion accidentally; as when a musician builds.
2359. Second, a thing is said to be a mover in regard to some one of its parts; as when a man strikes and injures someone with his hand.
2360. Third, a thing is said to be a mover essentially; as when fire heats and a physician heals.
2361. And there is (1007).
Then he gives a second division of motion or change, and in regard to this he does three things. First (1007:C 2361), he prefaces his discussion with certain points which are necessary for an understanding of the division of motion. Second (1008:C 2363), he divides motion (“Now change”). Third (1009:C 2366), he explains the division of change (“The change”).
He says, first, that there are five things found in every change. First, there is a primary mover; second, something which is moved; third, a time during which the motion takes place, because every motion occurs in time; fourth, a starting point from which motion begins; and fifth, a terminus to which the motion proceeds. However, motion or change is not divided into species either on the basis of the mover or of the thing moved or of time, because these are common to every change; but it is divided on the basis of the starting point from which it begins and the terminus to which it proceeds.
2362. He therefore explains the last two, saying that “the forms,” i.e., specifying principles, “modifications,” i.e., qualities, and “place,” are limits of motion, because those things which are movable are moved with respect to these. He uses the term forms, because of generation; modifications, because of alterations; and place, because of local motion. He gives examples of modifications by using science and heat. And because it might seem to some that heat is the sam6 as alteration, and then it would follow that heat is motion and not a limit or terminus of motion, he therefore says that heat is not motion but heating is.
2363. Now change (1008).
Then, passing over two parts of the first division, he takes the third, namely, change which is neither accidental nor in a part, and subdivides it according to its limits. He says that change which is not accidental is not found between just any limits whatever; but its limits must either be contraries, as change from white to black, or intermediates, as change from black to red and from red to gray; or there is change between contradictories, as from white to not-white, and vice versa. He says nothing of privative opposites because they are found between contradictories and contraries and are understood to come under these.
2364. He shows by induction that change takes place only between the above-mentioned limits; for the limits of change admit of four possible combinations: first, when both limits are affirmative or positive terms, as when something is said to be changed from white to black, and this change he describes as one from subject to subject; second, when both limits are negative terms, as when something is said to be changed from not-white to not-black, or in his words, from non-subject to non-subject; third, when the starting point from which change begins is a positive term and the terminus to which it proceeds is a negative one, as when a thing is said to be changed from white to not-white, or as he says, from subject to non-subject; fourth, when the starting point of change is a negative term and the terminus to which it proceeds is a positive one, as when a thing is said to be changed from not-white to white, or as he says, from a non-subject to a subject. He explains the meaning of the term subject which he had used, as what is signified by an affirmative or positive term.
2365. Now one of these four combinations is useless; for there is no change from a non-subject to a non-subject, because two negative terms, such as not-white and not-black, are neither contraries nor contradictories since they are not opposites; for they can be affirmed truly of the same subject because there are many things which are neither white nor black. Hence, since change is between opposites, as is proved in Book I of the Physics, it follows that there is no change from a non-subject to a non-subject. Therefore there must be three kinds of change, two of which relate to contradiction and the other to contrariety.
2366. The change (1009).
Then he shows what these three changes are; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he shows that generation and destruction are two of these. Second (1010:C 2368), he shows that neither of these is motion (“If non-being”). Third (1011:C 2375), he draws his conclusion as to which change is called motion (“And since every”).
He accordingly says, first (1009), that of the three changes mentioned above, that which is from a non-subject to a subject, or between contradictory terms, is called generation. And this is twofold; for there is change either from non-being in an unqualified sense to being in an unqualified sense (generation in an unqualified sense), and this occurs when a movable subject is changed substantially; or there is change from non-being to being, not in an unqualified sense but in a qualified one, for example, change from not-white to white (generation in a qualified sense).
2367. But that change which proceeds from a subject to a non-subject is called destruction; and in this change we also distinguish between destruction in an unqualified sense and in a qualified one, just as we did in the case of generation.
2368. If non-being (1010).
Then the Philosopher shows that neither of these changes is motion. First (1010:C 2368), he shows that this is true of generation; and second (ibid.), that it is true of destruction (“Nor is destruction”).
He accordingly says, first (1010), that the term non-bring is used in the same number of senses as being is. One meaning is the combination and separation found in a proposition; and since this does not exist in reality but only in the mind, it cannot be moved.
2369. Being and non-being are used in another sense with reference to actuality and potentiality. That which is actual is a being in an unqualified sense, but that which is potential only is a non-being. He therefore says that even that sort of non-being which is a being potentially but not actually cannot be moved.
2370. He explains why he had said that actual non-being is opposed to being in an unqualified sense, when he adds “for what is not-white.” For potential being, which is opposed to actual being and is not being in an unqualified sense, can be moved, because what is not not-white actually or not-good actually can be moved, but only accidentally. For what is moved is not the not-white itself, but the subject in which this privation is found, and this is an actual being. For that which is not white may be a man, but that which is an actual non-being in an unqualified sense, i.e., in substance, cannot be moved at all. Now if all of these statements are true, I say, it is impossible for non-being to be moved. And if this is the case, generation cannot be motion, because non-being is generated. For generation, as has been pointed out (1009:C 2366), proceeds from non-being to being. Hence, if generation in an unqualified sense were motion, it would follow that non-being in an unqualified sense would be moved.
2371. But one can raise an objection to this process of reasoning by saying that non-being is generated only accidentally; for “the subject of generation,” i.e., a being in potentiality, is generated essentially. But non-being signifies privation in a matter. Hence it is generated only accidentally.
2372. For even if (ibid.).
Then he refutes this objection. He says that, even if a being is generated only accidentally, nevertheless it is true to say that what is generated in an unqualified sense is non-being. And of each of these it is true to say that it cannot be moved. Similarly it cannot be at rest, because non-being in an unqualified sense is neither in motion nor at rest. These are the untenable results if one maintains that generation is motion.
2373. In order to show that nonbeing is not moved, he adds that everything which is moved is in a place because local motion is the first of all motions, whereas non-being in an unqualified sense is not in a place; for [were it moved] it would then be somewhere. Hence it cannot be moved; and therefore generation is not motion.
2374. Nor is destruction (ibid.).
From these considerations he further shows that destruction is not motion; for the only thing that is opposed to motion is motion or rest. But destruction is opposed to generation. Therefore, if destruction were motion, generation would have to be either motion or rest. But this cannot be true, as has been shown.
2375. And since every motion (1011).
Next he shows which change is said to be motion. He says that every motion is a kind of change. But there are only three changes, and two of these, which involve contradictories, i.e., generation and destruction, are not motion. It follows, then, that only change from a subject to a subject is motion. And since the subjects between which motion takes place must be opposed to each other, they must be contraries or intermediates; for even though a privation is expressed by an affirmative term, such as naked, toothless, and black, it is regarded as a contrary, because privation is the primary contrariety, as has been pointed out in Book X (852:C 2049). And he says that black is a privation not in an unqualified sense but inasmuch as it participates deficiently in the nature of its genus.
LESSON 12
Motion Pertains to Quantity, Quality and Place
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 12: 1068a 8-1068b 25
1012. If the categories are divided into substance, quality, place, action, passion, relation and quantity, there must be three kinds of motion, namely, of quality, of quantity and of place.
1013. There is no motion of substance, because substance has no contrary.
1014. Nor is there motion of relation; for it is possible that, when one of two relative things has undergone a change, the other may be truly referred to under a new term even though it has not been changed in any way. Hence the motion of these relative things will be accidental.
1015. Nor is there motion of agent or of patient as of mover and thing moved, because there is no motion of motion or generation of generation. There are two ways in which there might be motion of motion. First, motion might be of the subject moved, as a man is moved because he is changed from white to black. Thus motion might be heated or cooled or might change its place or might increase. But this is impossible, for change is not a subject. Or, second, some other subject might be changed from change to some other form of being, as a man might be changed from sickness to health. But this is possible only accidentally; for every motion is a change from one thing to something else. The same applies to generation and destruction; although the opposites involved in these changes are different from those of motion. Therefore a man changes at the same time from health to sickness, and from this change itself to another. And it is evident that, if a man has become ill, he will be changed into something else whatever it may be (for he can come to rest); and further this will always be to some opposite which is not contingent; and that change will be from something to something else. Hence, its opposite will be becoming healthy; but this will happen accidentally; for example, there is a change from recollection to forgetting, because the subject to which forgetting belongs is changed, sometimes to a state of knowledge and sometimes to one of ignorance.
1016. Further, the process will go on to infinity if there is change of change and generation of generation. Therefore, if the latter comes to be, the former must also; for example, if generation in an unqualified sense at one time was coming to be, that which is coming to be something was also coming to be. Hence that which was coming to be in an unqualified sense did not yet exist, but there was something which was coming to be, or which has already come to be. Therefore, if this also at one time was coming to be, then at that time it was not coming to be something. However, since there is no first term in infinite things, neither will there be a subsequent one. Hence it is impossible for anything to come to be or be moved or be changed in any way.
1017. Further, of the same thing of which there is contrary motion and rest there is also generation and destruction. Hence when that which is coming to be becomes that which is coming to be, it is then being destroyed; for it is not destroyed as soon as it is generated or afterwards; for that which is being destroyed must be.
1018. Further, there must be some matter underlying the thing which is coming to be or being changed. What then will it be that becomes motion or generation in the same way that a body or a soul or something else of this kind is alterable? Further, what is the thing to which motion proceeds; for motion must be of this particular thing from this to that, and yet the latter should not be a motion at all. In what way then is this to take place? For there can be no learning of learning, and therefore no generation of generation (1008-9).
1019. And since there is no motion of substance or of relation or of action or of passion, it follows that there is motion of quality, of quantity and of location; for each of these admits of contrariety. By quality I mean, not that which comes under the category of substance (for even difference is quality), but the passive power in virtue of which a thing is said to be acted upon or to be incapable of being acted upon.
1020. The immovable is what is totally incapable of being moved, or what is moved with difficulty over a long period of time or begins to be moved slowly, or what is naturally fit to be moved but is not capable of being moved when it is so fit, and where, and in the way in which it would naturally be moved. And this is the only kind of immobility which I call rest; for rest is contrary to motion. Hence it will be the privation of what is receptive of motion.
COMMENTARY
2376. Having divided change into generation, destruction and motion, here he subdivides the other member of this division, Le, motion, on the basis of the categories in which it takes place. In regard to this he does two things. First (1012:C 2376), he indicates the categories in which motion can be found. Second (1020:C 2401), he explains the different senses in which the term immovable is used (“The immovable”).
In regard to the first he does three things. First, he sets forth his thesis. Second (1013:C 2378), he proves this (“There is no motion”). Third (1019:C 2399), he draws his main conclusion (“And since”).
He accordingly says, first (1012), that, since the categories are divided into substance, quality and so on, and since there cannot be motion in the other categories, there are therefore three categories of being in which motion can be found; that is, quality, quantity and location, for which he substitutes the term place, because location merely signifies being in a place; and to be moved with respect to place is merely to be moved with respect to one’s location. For motion with respect to place is not attributed to a subject in which place inheres but to the thing in place.
2377. Now it should be noted that he seems to omit three categories, namely, temporal situation (quando), posture and accoutrement; for since temporal situation signifies being in time, and time is the measure of motion, the reason why there is no motion in the category of temporal situation or in that of action and of passion, which signify motion itself under special aspects, is the same. And posture adds nothing to location except a definite arrangement of parts, which is nothing else than a definite relationship of parts to each other. And accoutrement implies the relation of one clothed to his clothing. Hence the reason why there does not seem to be motion with respect to posture and to accoutrement and to relation seems to be the same.
2378. There is no motion (1013).
Next, he proves his thesis; and in regard to this he does three things. First (1013:C 2378) he shows that there is no motion with respect to substance; second 0014:C 2385), that there is no motion with respect to relation (“Nor is there motion”); and third (1015:C 2386), that there is no motion with respect to action and passion (“Nor is there motion of agent”).
He accordingly proves, first (1013), that there cannot be motion with respect to substance because motion is a change from subject to subject. Therefore the two subjects between which there is motion are either contraries or intermediates. Hence, since nothing is contrary to substance, it follows that there cannot be motion with respect to substance, but only generation and destruction, whose limits are opposed to each other as contradictories and not as contraries, as has been stated above (1009:C 2366).
2379. Now it seems that his statement that “substance has no contrary” is false, because fire clearly appears to be contrary to water, and because Aristotle had proved in Book I of The Heavens that the heavens are not destructible since they do not have a contrary, whereas other bodies, which are corruptible, have a contrary.
2380. Hence some said that there is nothing contrary to the whole composite substance because the subject of contraries must be one; but nothing prevents a substantial form from having a contrary. For they said that heat is the substantial form of fire. But this cannot be true, because substantial forms are not perceptible of themselves. And again it is evident that in other bodies heat and cold are accidents. But what belongs to the category of substance cannot be an accident in anything.
2381. Others have said that heat and cold are not the substantial forms of fire and water, but that their substantial forms are contraries differing in degree, and are, so to speak, intermediate between substance and accidents. But this is wholly unreasonable; for, since form is the principle of a species, if the forms of fire and of water are not truly substantial, neither are fire and water true species in the category of substance. It is impossible, then, that there should be an intermediate between substance and accidents, because they belong to different categories, and between such things an intermediate does not fall, as has been shown above in Book X (881:C 2102); and also because the definitions of substance and accident have no intermediate. For a substance is a being of itself, whereas an accident is not a being of itself but has being in something else.
2382. It is necessary then to say that substantial forms cannot be contraries, because contraries are extremes of a certain definite distance, and in a sense they are continuous, since motion is i one contrary to another. In those categories, then, in which no such continuous and definite distance is found, it is impossible to find a contrary, as is clear in the case of numbers. For the distance between one number and another does not mean continuity but the addition of units. Hence number is not contrary to number, nor similarly is figure contrary to figure.
2383. The same thing applies to substances because the intelligible structure of each species consists in a definite unity. But since form is the basis of difference, if substantial forms are not contrary to each other, it follows that contrariety cannot be found between differences.
2384. It is necessary to say, then, that a substantial form, considered in itself, constitutes a species in the category of substance; but according as one form implies the privation of another, different forms are the principles of contrary differences. For in one respect a privation is a contrary, and living and non-living, rational and irrational, and the like are opposed in this way.
2385. Nor is there motion of relation (1014).
Next, he shows that there is no motion in the proper sense in the category of relation except accidentally. For just as a thing is moved accidentally when motion takes place in it only as a result of something else being moved, in a similar way motion is said to be accidental to a thing when it takes place in it only because something else is moved. Now we find this in the category of relation; for unless something else is changed, it is not true to say that change occurs in relation; for example, the unequal comes from the equal only when there has been change in quantity. Similarly the like comes from the unlike only when there has been a change in quality. Thus we see that one of two relative things is said to be changed when change affects the other one of them; for example, a thing which is unmoved of itself changes from left to right when some other thing changes its place. Hence it follows that there is motion in the category of relation only accidentally.
2386. Nor is there motion of agent (1015).
Here he shows that motion does not occur with respect to either action or passion. He proves this by four arguments, of which the first is as follows: action and passion constitute motion and designate it. If, then, motion were to occur in action and in passion, it would follow that there would be motion of motion and generation of generation and change of change. But this is impossible. Therefore it is also impossible that there should be motion in action and in passion. That it is impossible for motion to be moved he proves thus: there are two ways in which there might be motion of motion: first, there might be motion of motion as of a subject which is moved, or, second, as of the limit of motion. And motion might be the subject of motion, as we say that there is motion of a man because a man is moved since he is changed from white to black. In a similar way motion would be moved, and would either be heated or cooled, or changed with respect to place, or increase. But this is impossible; because motion cannot be the subject of heat or of cold or of similar attributes. It follows, then, that there cannot be motion of motion if motion is regarded as a subject.
2387. But neither can there be motion of motion as of a limit, some other subject being changed from one species of change to another, as a man might be changed from sickness to health; for this is possible only accidentally.
2388. Hence he shows next that it is impossible for motion to be moved essentially because every motion is a change from one thing to something else. Similarly generation and destruction are a change from one thing to something else, even though in their case the limits of change are not opposed to each other as they are in that of motion, as has been said above (1008:C 2363). If, then, there is change from one change to another, as from becoming sick to some other process of change, it will follow that, while a thing is being changed from health to sickness, it is being changed at the same time from that change to another; because, while one of the limits of a change is arising, a change from one limit to another occurs. Thus if two processes of change are the limits of one change, it follows that while the original change is occurring, a change into another takes place. And so at the same time that a thing is being moved from health to sickness it will be being changed from becoming healthy to some other change.
2389. But this seems to be true only inasmuch as one change succeeds another. And it is possible that any other change may succeed this one by which something is being moved from health to sickness, for example, becoming white or becoming black or change of place or any other change. Hence it is evident that, if someone is becoming ill because he is being moved from health to sickness, he can be changed from this change to any other. Nor is this surprising, because he can even be changed from this change to a state of repose; for it is possible that someone might come to rest after this change.
2390. But since every change is “always to an opposite which is not contingent,” i.e., an opposite which cannot be true at the same time as the opposed term, it follows that, if there is a change from change to change, it will always be to an opposite change, which he calls not contingent. And that change in which the transition takes place will have to be from one thing to something else. Hence the transition from a change of becoming ill will only be to the opposite change, which is called becoming healthy.
2391. And so two contrary positions seem to follow, namely, that an opposite change passes from one change to any other, and only to its opposite. And from this it further follows that, at the same time that something is being changed to one of its opposites, it is also being changed to a change as if it were another opposite. This seems to be impossible, for it would follow that nature inclines to opposite effects at the same time. Hence it cannot be that anything is changed essentially from one change to another.
2392. But this can happen accidentally; for example, a person may change from recollection to forgetfulness because the subject is changed, sometimes in relation to one extreme and sometimes to the other-not that it may be the mover’s intention that at the same time that he is being changed to one extreme he is at the same time intending to move to the other.
2393. Further, the process (1016).
Then he gives the second argument, which runs thus: if there is change of change, as limit of limit, or generation of generation, one change must be reached only by another change, as one quality is reached only by a preceding alteration; and thus it will be possible to reach that preceding change only by a prior change, and so on to infinity.
2394. But this cannot be the case, because, if it is assumed that there are an infinite number of changes related in such a way that one leads to the other, the preceding must exist if the following does. Let us suppose that there is a particular instance of the generation of a generation in an unqualified sense, which is the generation of substance. Then, if the generation in an unqualified sense sometimes comes to be, and again if the coming to be of generation in an unqualified sense itself at one time came to be, it will follow that that which is coming to be in an unqualified sense did not yet exist, but there was generation in one respect, namely, the very generation of the process of generation. And if this generation also came to be at some time, since it is not possible to have either an infinite regress or any first term among infinite things, it is impossible ever to come to any first process of generation. But if the preceding member in a series does not exist, there will be no succeeding member, as has been pointed out above, and the consequence will be that “there will not be a subsequent one,” i.e., one which follows it. It follows, then, that nothing can come to be or be moved or be changed. But this is impossible. Hence change of change is impossible.
2395. Further, of the same thing (1017)
Then he gives the third argument, which is as follows. Contrary motions, and rest and motion, and generation and destruction, belong to the same subject, because opposites are suited by nature to come to be in the same subject. Therefore, if some subject is being changed from generation to destruction, at the same time that it is being generated it will be undergoing change leading to destruction, which is to be changed into non-being; for the terminus of destruction is non-being, Now what is being changed into non-being is being destroyed. Hence it follows that a thing is being destroyed at the same time that it is being generated.
2396. But this cannot be true; for while a thing is coming to be it is not being destroyed, nor is it corrupted immediately afterwards. For since destruction is a process from being to nonbeing, that which is being destroyed must be. And thus there will have to be an intermediate state of rest between generation, which is a change to being, and destruction, which is a change to non-being. Hence there is no change from generation to destruction.
2397. Further, there must be (1018).
Then he gives the fourth argument, which runs as follows. In everything that is being generated two things must be present: first, the matter of the thing which is generated, and, second, that in which the generation is terminated. If, then, there is generation of generation, both generation and motion will have to have some matter, such as an alterable body or a soul or something of this kind. But it is impossible to assign matter of this kind to generation and to motion.
2398. Similarly, there must also be something in which the process of change is terminated, because some part, namely, the matter of the thing generated, must be moved from one attribute to another, and that in which motion is terminated cannot be motion but is the terminus of motion. For of the kind of change which we call learning there is not some other learning which is terminated in it, which is a learning of learning. Hence there is nothing to conclude but that there is no generation of generation.
2399. And since (1019).
Here he draws as his conclusion his main thesis. He says that, since there cannot be motion either in the category of substance or in that of relation or in that of action and passion, it follows that motion belongs to quality, quantity and location; for in these categories there can be contrariety, which stands between the termini of motion, as has been pointed out.
2400. But since quality is sometimes used to mean substantial form, he adds that, when there is said to be motion in quality, it is not understood to signify substance, in view of the fact that substantial difference is predicated as something qualitative; but it refers to the kind of quality by which something is said to be acted upon or to be incapable of this. For there is alteration, properly speaking, only in terms of susceptible qualities, as is proved in Book VII of the Physics.
2401. The immovable (1020).
Then he explains the different senses in which the term immovable is used; and he gives three of these. First, the immovable means what is completely incapable of being moved; for example, God is immovable.
2402. Second, it means what can be moved with difficulty, as a huge boulder.
2403. Third, it means what is naturally fit to be moved but cannot be moved when it is fit, and where, and in the way in which it is fit to be moved. And only this kind of immobility is properly called rest, because rest is contrary to motion. Hence rest must be the privation of motion in what is susceptible of motion.
LESSON 13
Concepts Related to Motion
ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 12: 1068b 26-1069a 14
1021. Things which are in one primary place are together in place, and those which are in different places are separate, and those whose extremities are together are in contact. And an intermediate is that at which something continuously changing according to its nature naturally arrives before it reaches the limit to which it is changing. That is contrary in place which is most distant in a straight line. That is subsequent which comes after a starting point (the order being determined by position or form or in some other way) and has nothing in the same genus between itself and that which it follows; for example, lines in the case of a line, and units in the case of a unit, or a house in the case of a house. But there is nothing to prevent something else from coming between. For that which follows something is subsequent and comes after something else; for one does not follow two, nor does [the first day of] the new moon follow the second. Again, what is subsequent and in contact is contiguous. And since every change is between opposites, and these are contraries and contradictories, and since there is no intermediate between contradictories, it is evident that an intermediate is between contraries. The continuous has something of the nature of the contiguous; and I call two things continuous when both have the same extremity in which they are in contact and are uninterrupted.
1022. It is evident, then, that the continuous belongs to those things from which one thing results in virtue 6f their contact. And it is evident that the subsequent is the first of these; for things which are subsequent are not necessarily in contact, but what is in contact is subsequent. But if it is in contact it is not necessarily continuous. And in things in which there is no contact there is no natural coherence. The point, then, is not the same as the unit; for contact belongs to the former but not to the latter, but only successiveness, and there is an intermediate between the former but not between the latter.
COMMENTARY
2404. He explains the terms which apply to motion, especially local motion. First (T021:C 2404), he explains them. Second (1022:C 2413), he draws a corollary from his remarks (“It is evident”).
He accordingly says, first (1021), that things which are “in one primary place,” i e., a proper place, are said to be together in place; for if some things are in one common place, they are not for this reason said to be together, for then all things which are contained in the circumference of the heavens would be said to be together.
2405. Things which are in different places are said to be separate.
2406. And those whose extremities are said to touch one another are said to be in contact; for example, two bodies whose surfaces are joined.
2407. And an intermediate between two things is that at which it is natural for something that continuously changes to arrive before it reaches its limit; for example, if there is continuous motion from a to c, the thing being changed first arrives at b before it reaches c.
2408. Again, that which is most distant in a straight line is contrary in place; for that which is most distant cannot be measured by a curved line, because an infinite number of unlike sections of circles can be drawn between two points, but there can be only one straight line between two points. Now a measure must be definite and fixed. And that which is most distant as to place admits of being above and below, which are the extremity and the center of the universe.
2409. That is said to be subsequent which comes after some starting point, whether the order is determined by position or by form or in some other way; for example, two comes after one. And there must also be nothing of the same genus between that which is subsequent and that which it follows, as lines are subsequent to a line and units to a unit and a house to a house. But nothing prevents something of another genus from being an intermediate between two things one of which follows the other; for example, there may be one intermediate horse between two houses. In order to make the above distinction clear he adds that what is said to follow something must be subsequent and come after something. For one does not come after two, since it is first; nor does the first day of the new moon follow the second, but the other way around.
2410. Then he says that the contiguous means what is subsequent and in contact with something else-for example, if two bodies are so related that one touches the other.
2411. Then he says that, since every change is between opposites, and the opposites between which there is change are either contraries or contradictories, as has been shown (1008:C 2363), and since there is no intermediate between contradictories, it is evident that there is an intermediate only between contraries; for that which is intermediate is between the limits of a motion, as is clear from the definition given above. His introduction of this is timely; for since he said that those things are subsequent between which there is no intermediate, it was fitting that he should indicate between what things it is possible to have an intermediate.
2412. Then he shows what the continuous is. He says that the continuous adds something to the contiguous; for there is continuity when both of those things which are in contact and together have one and the same extremity, as the parts of a line are continuous in relation to a point.
2413. It is evident (1022).
Then he draws three corollaries from what has been said. The first is that continuity belongs to those things from which one thing naturally results in virtue of their contact; and this is because the continuous requires identical extremities.
2414. The second corollary is that, of these three things—the subsequent, the contiguous and the continuous—the first and most common is the subsequent; for not everything that is subsequent is in contact, but everything which is in contact is subsequent or consecutive. For things which are in contact are arranged according to their position, and no one of them is an intermediate. Similarly, the contiguous is prior to and more common than the continuous, because, if a thing is continuous, there must be contact. For what is one must be together, unless perhaps plurality is understood in the phrase being together. For in that case the continuous would not involve being in contact. But the continuous must involve contact in the way in which something one is together. Yet if there is contact it does not follow that there is continuity; for example, if certain things are together it does not follow that they are one. But in things in which there is no contact “there is no natural coherence,” i.e., natural union, which is a property of the continuous.
2415. The third corollary is that the point and the unit are not the same, as the Platonists claimed when they said that the point is the unit having position. That they are not the same is evident for two reasons: first, because there is contact between points but not between units, which only follow each other; second, because there is always some intermediate between two points, as is proved in Book V of the Physics. But it is not necessary that there should be an intermediate between two units.