METAPHYSICS
BOOK IIIMETAPHYSICAL PROBLEMS
CONTENTS
LESSON I
The Need of Questioning Everything in the 8earch for Universal Truth
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176. With a view to the science under investigation we must attack first those subjects which must first be investigated. These are all the subjects about which some men have entertained different opinions, and any other besides these which has been omitted.
177. Now for those who wish to investigate the truth it is worth the while to ponder these difficulties well. For the subsequent study of truth is nothing else than the solution of earlier problems. For it is impossible to untie a knot without knowing it. But a perplexity on the part of the mind makes this evident in regard to the matter at hand; for insofar as the mind is perplexed, to that extent it experiences something similar to men who are bound; for in both cases it is impossible to move forward. For this reason, then, it is first necessary to consider all the difficulties and the reasons for them.
178. [This is also necessary] for another reason, namely, that those who make investigations without first recognizing the problem are like those who do not know where they ought to go.
179. Again, one would not even know when he finds the thing which he is seeking [and when not]; for the goal is not evident to such a man, but it is evident to one who previously discussed the difficulties.
180. Furthermore, one who has heard all the arguments of the litigants, as it were, and of those who argue the question, is necessarily in a better position to pass judgment.
COMMENTARY
338. Having indicated in Book II (331) the method of considering the truth, the Philosopher now proceeds with his study of the truth. First he proceeds disputatively, indicating those points which are open to question so far as the truth of things is concerned. Second (529), he begins to establish what is true, and he does this in Book IV, which begins: “There is a certain science.”
The first part is divided into two sections. In the first, he states what he intends to do. In the second (346), he proceeds to do it (“The first problem”).
In regard to the first he does two things. First, he states what he intends to do. Second (339), he gives the reasons for this (“Now for those”).
He says first, then, that with a view to this science which we are seeking about first principles and what is universally true of things, we must attack, first of all, those subjects about which it is necessary to raise questions before the truth is established. Now there are disputed points of this kind for two reasons, either because the ancient philosophers entertained a different opinion about these things than is really true, or because they completely neglected to consider them.
339. Now for those (177).
Here he gives four arguments in support of this thesis:
First, he says that for those who wish to investigate the truth it is “worth the while,” i.e., worth the effort, “to ponder these difficulties well,” i.e., to examine carefully those matters which are open to question. This is necessary because the subsequent study of truth is nothing else than the solution of earlier difficulties. Now in loosening a physical knot it is evident that one who is unacquainted with this knot cannot loosen it. But a difficulty about some subject is related to the mind as a physical knot is to the body, and manifests the same effect. For insofar as the mind is puzzled about some subject, it experiences something similar to those who are tightly bound. For just as one whose feet are tied cannot move forward on an earthly road, in a similar way one who is puzzled, and whose mind is bound, as it were, cannot move forward on the road of speculative knowledge. Therefore, just as one who wishes to loosen a physical knot must first of all inspect the knot and the way in which it is tied, in a similar way one who wants to solve a problem must first survey all the difficulties and the reasons for them.
340. [This is also necessary] (178).
Here he gives the second argument. He says that those who wish to investigate the truth without first considering the problem are like those who do not know where they are going. This is true for this reason, that, just as the terminus of a journey is the goal intended by one who travels on foot, in a similar way the solution of a problem is the goal intended by one who is seeking the truth. But it is evident that one who does not know where he is going cannot go there directly, except perhaps by chance. Therefore, neither can one seek the truth directly unless he first sees the problem.
341. Again, one would (179).
Here he gives the third argument. He says that, just as one who is ignorant of where he is going does not know whether he should stop or go further when he reaches his appointed goal, in a similar way one who does not know beforehand the problem whose solution marks the terminus of his search cannot know when he finds the truth which he is seeking and when not. For he does not know what the goal of his investigations is, but this is evident to one who knew the problem beforehand.
342. Furthermore (180).
He gives the fourth argument, which is taken from the viewpoint of a judge. For a judge must pass judgment on the things which he hears. But just as one can pass judgment in a lawsuit only if he hears the arguments on both sides, in a similar way one who has to pass judgment on a philosophy is necessarily in a better position to do so if he will hear all the arguments, as it were, of the disputants.
343. Now it must be noted that it was for these reasons that Aristotle was accustomed, in nearly all his works, to set forth the problems which emerge before investigating and establishing what is true. But while in other works Aristotle sets down the problems one at a time in order to establish the truth about each one, in this work he sets forth all the problems at once, and afterwards in the proper order establishes the things that are true. The reason for this is that other sciences consider the truth in a particular way, and therefore it belongs to them to raise problems of a particular kind about individual truths. But just as it belongs to this science to make a universal study of truth, so also does it belong to it to discuss all the problems which pertain to the truth. Therefore it does not discuss its problems one at a time but all at once.
344. There can also be another reason [why Aristotle proceeds in this way], namely, that those problems on which he touches are chiefly those about which the philosophers have held different opinions. However, he does not proceed to investigate the truth in the same order as the other philosophers did. For he begins with things which are sensible and evident and proceeds to those which are separate from matter, as is evident below in Book VII (1566), whereas the other philosophers wanted to apply intelligible and abstract principles to sensible things. Hence, because he did not intend to establish the truth in the same order as that followed by the other philosophers, and from whose views these problems arise, he therefore decided to give first all the problems in a separate section, and afterwards to solve these problems in their proper order.
345. Averroes gives another reason [for Aristotle’s procedure]. He says that Aristotle proceeds in this way because of the relationship of this science to logic, which will be touched on below in Book IV (588); and therefore he made dialectical discussion a principal part of this science.
Questions Concerning the Method of This Science
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Q. 1: Does this science make use of all four causes?
Q. 2: Does it consider both principles of substance and principles of knowledge?
347. And there is also the problem (182).
Q. 3: Is its subject all substances, or do different sciences consider different substances?
Q. 4: Is it distinct from other sciences?
Q. 5. Are there immaterial substances, and of what kind?
350. It is also necessary (183).
Q. 6: Does this science consider accidents or properties of substance?
352. There is also the problem (184).
Q. 7: How does it differ from logic in considering these things?
Q. 8: Does it consider how these accidents are inter-related?
354. And since certain proper attributes naturally flow from these common accidents of being, the third question is whether it is the function of the philosopher to consider in regard to the common accidents only their quiddity or also their properties; for example, whether there is one opposite for each one.
Questions Concerning the Things with Which This Science Deals
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Q. 9: How are substances to be analysed, into elements or into genera?
Q. 10: Is there an immaterial principle? Is it one or many?
Q. 11: Is individuality distinct from the specific form?
361. Further, we must inquire (187).
Q. 13: Are the principles of corruptible and incorruptible things the same or different?
Q. 14: Are “one” and “being” the same as or distinct from specific natures?
365. Again, we must inquire (188).
366. And in addition to these (189).
368. Now these questions are raised as problems which must be debated and settled below, because in these matters it is not only difficult to discover the truth, but it is not even easy to debate the matter adequately by finding probable arguments for either side of the question.
Are All the Classes of Causes Studied by One Science or by Many?
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191. For how will it be the office of one science to come to principles since they are not contrary?
Q 1: Can one science consider many causes?
370. For how will it be (191).
372. Furthermore, in the case of (192).
376. But on the other hand (193).
377. For it is possible (194).
378. Therefore from the things (195)
379. But insofar as wisdom (196).
382. But with regard to processes (197)
386. The reply to the second question is already clear; for a study of the three causes, about which he argued dialectically, belongs to this science.
Are the Principles of Demonstration and Substance Considered by One Science or by Many?
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Q. 2: Is the science of substance also that of first principles?
389. But at the same time (200).
391. But on the other hand (201).
But the second argument is solved thus: the [first] philosopher does not consider principles of this kind in such a way as to make them known by defining them or by demonstrating them in an absolute sense, but by refutation, i.e., by arguing disputatively against those who deny them, as is stated in Book IV (608).
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203. If there is not one science, then with what substances must this science deal?
Qq. 3 & 6: Does the science of substance consider all substances as well as accidents?
395. but it is unreasonable (204).
399. Further, there is the problem (205).
400. For if it is the concern (206).
401. But if it is the concern (207).
402. The Philosopher answers this question in Book IV (570) of this work, saying that it is also the office of that science which is concerned with the study of substance and being to consider the proper accidents of substance and being. Yet it does not follow that it would consider each in the same way, i.e., by demonstrating substance as it demonstrates accidents, but by defining substance and by demonstrating that accidents either belong to or do not belong to it, as is explained more fully at the end of Book IX (1895) of this work.
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217. Furthermore, it would be necessary for two solids to occupy the same place.
In these matters, then, it is difficult to see how it is possible to have any positive truth.
Q. 5: Are there substances besides sensible ones?
406. Now the way in which (209).
407. But while they involve (210).
410. Furthermore, if anyone (211).
414. Similarly, neither (213).
418. It is unreasonable (216).
419. Furthermore, it would be (217)
420. Furthermore, if anyone (211).
422. Now the Philosopher treats these questions below in Books XII, XIII and XIV of this work, where he shows that there are neither separate mathematical substances nor Forms. The reasoning which moved those who posited the objects of mathematics and the Forms, which are derived from an abstraction of the intellect, is given at the beginning of Book XIII. For nothing prevents a thing which has some particular attribute from being considered by the intellect without its being viewed under this aspect and yet be considered truly, just as a white man can be considered without white being considered. Thus the intellect can consider sensible things not inasmuch as they are mobile and material but inasmuch as they are substances or continuous quantities; and this is to abstract the thing known from matter and motion. However, so far as the thing known is concerned, the intellect does not abstract in such a way that it understands continuous quantities and forms to exist without matter and motion. For then it would follow either that the intellect of the one abstracting is false, or that the things which the intellect abstracts are separate in reality.
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Q. 9: What is the difference between genera and elements?
424. Just as the elements (221).
425. Furthermore, those who (222).
426. And again if anyone (223).
429. Moreover, some of those (226).
430. But it is not possible (227)
434. Further, those things (230)
436. But on the other hand (231).
437. Further, in the case of (232).
439. Further, where one thing (233)
441. But again it is not (234).
442. Now the solution to these questions is implied in this last argument. For according to this argument genera or species are held to be universal principles inasmuch as they are held to be separate. But the fact that they are not separate and self-subsistent is shown in Book VII (1592) of this work. Hence the Commentator also shows, in Book VIII, that the principles of things are matter and form, to which genus and species bear some likeness. For a genus is derived from matter and difference from form, as will be shown in the same book (720). Hence, since form is more of a principle than matter, species will consequently be principles more than genera. But the objection which is raised against this, on the grounds that genera are the principles of knowing a species and its definitions, is answered in the same way the objection raised about their separateness. For, since a genus is understood separately by the mind without understanding its species, it is a principle of knowing. And in the same way it would be a principle of being, supposing that it had a separate being.
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Q. 10: Is there anything separate from sensible things, which is their principle?
444. For if there is nothing (236).
447. Further, if there is something (238).
449. Further, neither will anything (240).
451. Further, since generation (242).
453. Further, if matter exists (143).
454. But again if anyone (244).
455. Now Aristotle solves this problem partly in Book XII (2488) of this work, where he shows that there are certain substances separate from sensible things and intelligible in themselves; and partly in Book VII (1503), where he shows that the forms or specifying principles of sensible things are not separate from matter. However, it does not follow that no science of sensible things can be had or that science is sensory perception. For it is not necessary that things have in themselves the same mode of being which they have in the intellect of one who knows them. For those things which are material in themselves are known in an immaterial way by the intellect, as has also been stated above (446). And even though a form is not separate from matter, it is not therefore necessary that it should be generated; for it is not forms that are generated but composites, as will be shown in Book VII (1417) of this work. It is clear, then, in what cases it is necessary to posit separate forms and in what not. For the forms of all things which are sensible by nature are not separate from matter, whereas the forms of things which are intelligible by nature are separate from matter. For the separate substances do not have the nature of sensible things, but are of a higher nature and belong to another order of existing things.
Do All Things Have a Single Substance? Do All Things Have the Same or Different Principles?
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245. Again, there is the problem whether all things, for example, all men, have a single substance.
Q. 11: Are there one or many forms and principles of things?
457. But this is absurd (246).
458. And at the same time (247)
460. And again one might (248).
464. But, on the other hand (249).
465. Now this question will be solved in Book XII (2464); for it will be shown there that the principles which things have, namely, matter and form or privation, are not numerically the same for all things but analogically or proportionally the same. But those principles which are separate, i.e., the intellectual substances, of which the highest is God, are each numerically one in themselves. Now that which is one in itself and being is God; and from Him is derived the numerical unity found in all things. And there is science of these, not because they are numerically one in all, but because in our conception there is a one in many. Moreover, the argument which is proposed in support of the opposite side of the question is true in the case of essential principles but not in that of separate ones, which is the class to which the agent and final cause belong. For many things can be produced by one agent or efficient cause, and can be directed to one end.
Do Corruptible and Incorruptible Things Have the Same or Different Principles?
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467. For, if they are the same (251).
468. The followers of Hesiod (252)
471. But with regard to those (254).
472. However, from those who make assertions (255).
473. For the explanation (256).
477. Nor, similarly, is love (260).
483. But if the principles (264)
Q. 13: Are the principles of corruptible and incorruptible things the same?
487. Now the solution to this problem is given in Book XII (2553), where the Philosopher shows that the first active or motive principles of all things are the same but in a certain sequence. For the first principles of things are unqualifiedly incorruptible and immobile, whereas the second are incorruptible and mobile, i.e., the celestial bodies, which cause generation and corruption in the world as a result of their motion. Now the intrinsic principles of corruptible and of incorruptible things are the same, not numerically but analogically. Still the intrinsic principles of corruptible things, which are matter and form, are not corruptible in themselves but only in reference to something else. For it is in this way that the matter and form of corruptible things are corrupted, as is stated in Book I of the Physics.
Are Unity and Being the Substance and Principle of All Things?
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Q. 14a: Are “one” and “being” substances or principles of things?
493. But, on the other hand (269).
494. But there is a difficulty (270).
500. But even if someone (274)
501. The solution of this problem is treated by Aristotle in the following books. For the fact that there is something separate, which is itself one and being, he will prove below in Book XII (2553), when he establishes the oneness of the first principle which is separate in an absolute sense, although it is not the substance of all things which are one, as the Platonists thought, but is the cause and principle of the unity of all things. And insofar as unity is predicated of other things it is used in two ways. In one way it is interchangeable with being, and in this way each thing is one by its very essence, as is proved below in Book IV (548); and unity in this sense adds nothing to being except merely the notion of undividedness. Unity is used in another way insofar as it has the character of a first measure, either in an absolute sense or with respect to some genus. And this unity if it is both a minimum in the absolute sense and indivisible, is the one which is the principle and measure of number. But if it is not both a minimum in an absolute sense and indivisible, it will not be a unit and measure in an absolute sense, as a pound in the case of weights and a half-tone in the case of melodies, and a foot in the case of lengths. And nothing prevents continuous quantities from being composed of this kind of unity. He will establish this in Book X (1940) of this work. But because the Platonists thought that the one which is the principle of number and the one which is interchangeable with being are the same, they therefore held that the one which is the principle of number is the substance of each thing, and consequently that number, inasmuch as it is composed of many substantial principles, makes up or comprises the substance of composite things. But he will treat this question at greater length in Books XIII and XIV of this work.
Are Numbers and Continuous Quantities the Substances and Principles of Sensible Things?
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Q 14b: Are numbers and continuous quantities the substances or principles of sensible things?
503. For if they are not (276).
508. Further, all of these (280).
514. But the Philosopher will treat this question in Books XIII and XIV. And the truth of the matter is that mathematical entities of this kind are not the substances of things, but are accidents which accrue to substances. But this mistake about continuous quantities is due to the fact that no distinction is made between the sort of body which/belongs to the genus of substance and the sort which belongs to the genus of quantity. For body belongs to the genus of substance according as it is composed of matter and form; and dimensions are a natural consequence of these in corporeal matter. But dimensions themselves belong to the genus of quantity, and are not substances but accidents whose subject is a body composed of matter and form. The same thing too was said above (500) about those who held that numbers are the substances of things; for their mistake came from not distinguishing between the one which is the principle of number and that which is interchangeable with being.
Are There Separate Forms in Addition to the Objects of Mathematics and Sensible Things?
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Q14c: Are forms substances or principles of things?
516. For if it is because (285)
518. But if wehold that (286).
But the Philosopher will deal with this problem in Book XII (2450) and Book XIV of this work. And the truth of the matter is that, just as the objects of mathematics do not exist apart from sensible things, neither do Forms exist apart from the objects of mathematics and from sensible substances. And while the efficient and moving principles of things are limited in number, the formal principles of things, of which there are many individuals in one species, are not limited in number but only in species.
Do First Principles Exist Actually or Potentially, and Are They Universal or Singular?
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Q 14d: Are principles of substances actual or potential?
521. But if the elements (289).
Q 14e: Are principles of substances universal or singular?
523. And here is also the problem (290).