METAPHYSICS
BOOK IVTHE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS, DEMONSTRATIVELY
CONTENTS
LESSON 1
The Proper Subject Matter of This Science: Being as Being, and Substance and Accidents
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294. There is a certain science which studies being as being and the attributes which necessarily belong to being.
295. This science is not the same as any of the so-called particular sciences; for none of the other sciences attempt to study being as being in general, but cutting off some part of it they study the accidents of this part. This, for example, is what the mathematical sciences do.
296. Now since we are seeking the principles and ultimate causes of things, it is evident that these must be of themselves the causes of some nature. Hence, if those who sought the elements of beings sought these principles, they must be the elements of beings not in any accidental way but inasmuch as they are beings. Therefore the first causes of being as being must also be understood by us.
Chapter 2
297. The term being is used in many senses, but with reference to one thing and to some one nature and not equivocally. Thus everything healthy is related to health, one thing because it preserves health, another because it causes it, another because it is a sign of it (as urine) and still another because it is receptive of it. The term medical is related in a similar way to the art of medicine; for one thing is called medical because it possesses the art of medicine, another because it is receptive of it, and still another because it is the act of those who have the art of medicine. We can take other words which are used in a way similar to these. And similarly there are many senses in which the term being is used, but each is referred to a first principle. For some things are called beings because they are substances; others because they are affections of substances; others because they are a process toward substance, or corruptions or privations or qualities of substance, or because they are productive or generative principles of substance, or of things which are related to substance, or the negation of some of these or of substance. For this reason too we say that non-being is non-being.
298. Therefore, just as there is one science of all healthy things, so too the same thing is true in other cases. For it is the office of one and the same science to study not only those things which are referred to one thing but also those which are referred to one nature. For those too in a sense are referred to one thing.
299. It is evident, then, that it is the function of one science to study beings as beings.
299a. But in every respect a science is concerned with what is primary, and that on which other things depend, and form which they derive their name. Hence, if this is substance, it must be of substances that the philosopher possesses the principles and causes.
300. Now of every single class of things there is one sense and one science; for example, grammar, which is one science, studies all words. And for this reason too it belongs to a general science to study all species of being as being and the species of these species.
COMMENTARY
It is being and its properties
529. In the preceding book the Philosopher proceeded to treat dialectically the things which ought to be considered in this science. Here he begins to proceed demonstratively by establishing the true answer to those questions which have been raised and argued dialectically.
In the preceding book he treated dialectically both the things which pertain to the method of this science, namely, those to which the consideration of this science extends, as well as those which fall under the consideration of this science. And because it is first necessary to know the method of a science before proceeding to consider the things with which it deals, as was explained in Book II (335), this. part is therefore divided into two members. First, he speaks of the things which this science considers; and second (749), of those which fall under its consideration. He does this in Book V (“In one sense the term principle”).
The first part is divided into two members. First, he establishes what the subject matter of this science is. Second (534), he proceeds to answer the questions raised in the preceding book about the things which this science considers (“The term being”).
In regard to the first he does three things. First, he submits that there is a science whose subject is being. Second (532), he shows that it is not one of the particular sciences (“But this science”); and third (533), he shows that it is the science with which we are now dealing (“Now since”).
Now because a science should investigate not only its subject but also the proper accidents of its subject, he therefore says, first, that there is a science which studies being as being, as its subject, and studies also “the attributes which necessarily belong to being,” i.e., its proper accidents.
530. He says “as being” because the other sciences, which deal with particular beings, do indeed consider being (for all the subjects of the sciences are beings), yet they do not consider being as being, but as some particular kind of being, for example, number or line or fire or the like.
531. He also says “and the attributes which necessarily belong to being,” and not just those which belong to being, in order to show that it is not the business of this science to consider those attributes which belong accidentally to its subject, but only those which belong necessarily to it. For geometry does not consider whether a triangle is of bronze or of wood, but only considers it in an absolute sense according as it has three angles equal to two right angles. Hence a science of this kind, whose subject is being, must not consider all the attributes which belong accidentally to being, because then it would consider the accidents investigated by all sciences; for all accidents belong to some being, but not inasmuch as it is being. For those accidents which are the proper accidents of an inferior thing are related in an accidental way to a superior thing; for example, the proper accidents of man are not the proper accidents of animal.
Now the necessity of this science, which considers being and its proper accidents, is evident from this, that such things should not remain unknown since the knowledge of other things depends on them, just as the knowledge of proper objects depends on that of common objects.
532. This science (295).
Then he shows that this science is not one of the particular sciences, and he uses the following argument. No particular science considers universal being as such, but only some part of it separated. from the others; and about this part it studies the proper accidents. For example, the mathematical sciences study one kind of being, quantitative being. But the common science considers universal being as being, and therefore it is not the same as any of the particular sciences.
533. Now since (296).
Here he shows that the science with which we are dealing has being as its subject, and he uses the following argument. Every principle is of itself the principle and cause of some nature. But we are seeking the first principles and ultimate causes of things, as was explained in Book I (57), and therefore these are of themselves the causes of some nature. But this nature can only be the nature of being. This is clear from the fact that all philosophers, in seeking the elements of things inasmuch as they are beings, sought principles of this kind, namely, the first and ultimate ones. Therefore in this science we are seeking the principles of being as being. Hence being is the subject of this science, for any science seeks the proper causes of its subject.
It applies analogically to the different categories.
534. The term “being” (297).
Then he proceeds to answer the questions raised in the preceding book about the things which this science considers, and this is divided into three parts. First, he answers the question whether this science considers substances and accidents together, and whether it considers all substances. Second (548), he answers the question whether it belongs to this science to consider all of the following: one and many, same and different, opposites, contraries, and so forth (“Now although”). Third (588), he answers the question whether it belongs to this science to consider the principles of demonstration (“Moreover, it is necessary”).In regard to the first he does three things. First, he shows that it is the office of this science to consider both substances and accidents. Second (546), he shows that this science is chiefly concerned with substances (“But in every respect”). Third (547), he shows that it pertains to this science to consider all substances (“Now of every”).
In regard to the first part he uses this kind of argument: those things which have one term predicated of them in common, not univocally but analogously, belong to the consideration of one science. But the term being is thus predicated of all beings. Therefore all beings, i.e., both substances and accidents, belong to the consideration of one science which considers being as being.
535. Now in this argument he gives, first (535), the minor premise; second (544), the major premise (“Therefore, just as”); and third (545), the conclusion (“It is evident, then”).
He accordingly says, first, that the term being, or what is, has several meanings. But it must be noted that a term is predicated of different things in various senses. Sometimes it is predicated of them according to a meaning which is entirely the same, and then it is said to be predicated of them univocally, as animal is predicated of a horse and of an ox. Sometimes it is predicated of them according to meanings which are entirely different, and then it is said to be predicated of them equivocally, as dog is predicated of a star and of an animal. And sometimes it is predicated of them according to meanings which are partly different and partly not (different inasmuch as they imply different relationships, and the same inasmuch as these different relationships are referred to one and the same thing), and then it is said “to be predicated analogously,” i.e., proportionally, according as each one by its own relationship is referred to that one same thing.
536. It must also be noted that the one thing to which the different relationships are referred in the case of analogical things is numerically one and not just one in meaning, which is the kind of oneness designated by a univocal term. Hence he says that, although the term being has several senses, still it is not predicated equivocally but in reference to one thing; not to one thing which is one merely in meaning, but to one which is one as a single definite nature. This is evident in the examples given in the text.
537. First, he gives the example of many things being related to one thing as an end. This is clear in the case of the term healthy or healthful. For the term healthy is not predicated univocally of food, medicine, urine and an animal; because the concept healthy as applied to food means something that preserves health; and as applied to medicine it means something that causes health; and as applied to urine it means something that is a sign of health; and as applied to an animal it means something that is the recipient or subject of health. Hence every use of the term healthy refers to one and the same health; for it is the same health which the animal receives, which urine is a sign of, which medicine causes, and which food preserves.
538. Second, he gives the example of many things being related to one thing as an efficient principle. For one thing is called medical because it possesses the art of medicine, as the skilled physician. Another is called medical because it is naturally disposed to have the art of medicine, as men who are so disposed that they may acquire the art of medicine easily (and according to this some men can engage in medical activities as a result of a peculiar natural constitution). And another is called medical or medicinal because it is necessary for healing, as the instruments which physicians use can be called medical. The same thing is also true of the things called medicines, which physicians use in restoring health. Other terms which resemble these in having many senses can be taken in a similar way.
539. And just as the above-mentioned terms have many senses, so also does the term being. Yet every being is called such in relation to one first thing, and this first thing is not an end or an efficient cause, as is the case in the foregoing examples, but a subject.
For some things are called beings, or are said to be, because they have being of themselves, as substances, which are called beings in the primary and proper sense. Others are called beings because they are affections or properties of substances, as the proper accidents of any substance. Others are called beings because they are processes toward substance, as generation and motion. And others are called beings because they are corruptions of substances; for corruption is the process toward non-being just as generation is the process toward substance. And since corruption terminates in privation just as generation terminates in form, the very privations of substantial forms are fittingly called beings. Again, certain qualities or certain accidents are called beings because they are productive or generative principles of substances or of those things which are related to substance according to one of the foregoing relationships or any other relationship.
And similarly the negations of those things which are related to substances, or even substance itself, are also called beings. Hence we say that non-being is non-being. But this would not be possible unless a negation possessed being in some way.
540. But it must be noted that the above-mentioned modes of being can be reduced to four.
(1) For one of them, which is the most imperfect, i.e., negation and privation, exists only in the mind. We say that these exist in the mind because the mind busies itself with them as kinds of being while it affirms or denies something about them. In what respect negation and privation differ will be treated below (564).
541. (2) There is another mode of being inasmuch as generation and corruption are called beings, and this mode by reason of its imperfection comes close to the one given above. For generation and corruption have some admixture of privation and negation, because motion is an imperfect kind of actuality, as is stated in the Physics, Book III.
542. (3) The third mode of being admits of no admixture of non-being, yet it is still an imperfect kind of being, because it does not exist of itself but in something else, for example, qualities and quantities and the properties of substances.
543. (4) The fourth mode of being is the one which is most perfect, namely, what has being in reality without any admixture of privation, and has firm and solid being inasmuch as it exists of itself. This is the mode of being which substances have. Now all the others are reduced to this as the primary and principal mode of being; for qualities and quantities are said to be inasmuch as they exist in substances; and motions and generations are said to be inasmuch as they are processes tending toward substance or toward some of the foregoing; and negations and privations are said to be inasmuch as they remove some part of the preceding three.
544. Therefore, just as (298).
Here he gives the major premise of the first argument. He says that it is the office of one science to study not only those things which are referred “to one thing,” i.e., to one common notion, but also those which are referred to one nature according to different relationships. And the reason for this is that the thing to which they are referred is one; just as it is clear that one science, medicine, considers all health-giving things. The same thing holds true of other things which are spoken of in the same way.
545. It is evident (299).
Then he draws his intended conclusion. This is evident of itself.
546. But in every (299a).
Then he shows that this science, even though it considers all beings, is chiefly concerned with substances. He uses the following argument. Every science which deals with many things that are referred to one primary thing is properly and principally concerned with that primary thing on which other things depend for their being and from which they derive their name; and this is true in every case. But substance is the primary kind of being. Hence the philosopher who considers all beings ought to consider primarily and chiefly the principles and causes of substances. Therefore his consideration extends primarily and chiefly to substances.
547. Now of every (300).
Then he shows by the following argument that it is the business of the first philosopher to consider all substances. There is one sense and one science of all things belonging to one class; for example, sight is concerned with all colors, and grammar with all words. Therefore, if all beings somehow belong to one class, all species of being must belong to the consideration of one science which is a general science, and different species of being must belong to the different species of that science. He says this because it is not necessary for one science to consider all the species of one genus according to the special notes of every single species, but only inasmuch as they agree generically. But according to their specific notes the different species of one genus belong to the special sciences, as happens in the present case. For inasmuch as all substances are beings or substances, they belong to the consideration of this science; but inasmuch as they are a particular kind of substance, as a lion or an ox, they belong to the special sciences.
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Metaphysics also treats of “being-one”.
554. Further, the substance (303).
Yet whatever parts are first must be continuous with the others, because all parts have unity and being as their genus. Hence all parts of this science are united in the study of being and unity, although they are about different parts of substance. Thus it is one science inasmuch as the foregoing parts are things which correspond to “these,”i.e., to unity and being, as common attributes of substance. In this respect the philosopher resembles the mathematician; for mathematical science has different parts, one of which is primary, as arithmetic, another secondary, as geometry, and others following these in order, as optics, astronomy and music.
The Same Science Considers Unity and Plurality and All Opposites. The Method of Treating These
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It also considers “one-many”, “negation-privation” etc.
569. Hence it is evident (309).
He draws his conclusion from what has been said, namely, that it belongs to this science to reason about those common predicates and about substance; and this was one of the problems investigated in the questions treated dialectically in Book III (393).
First Philosophy Considers All Contraries. Its Distinction from Logic
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General reasons for that (difference between metaphysics and dialectics or sophistry).
578. Further, one corresponding (313).
586. And for this reason (317)
He now summarizes the points established above. He says that obviously the consideration of being as being and the attributes which belong to it of itself pertain to one science. Thus it is clear that that science considers not only substances but also accidents since being is predicated of both. And it considers the things which have been discussed, namely, sameness and otherness, likeness and unlikeness, equality and inequality, privation and negation, and contraries-which we said above are the proper accidents of being. And it considers not only those things which fall under the consideration of this science, about which demonstration was made individually by means of arguments based on proper principles, but it in like manner also considers prior and subsequent, genus and species, whole and part, and other things of this kind, because these too are accidents of being as being.
Answers to Questions Raised in Book III about Principles of Demonstration
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This science considers the first principles of demonstration.
590. For these principles (321).
He draws the conclusion primarily intended, namely, that it will be the function of the philosopher to consider every substance as such and also the first syllogistic principles. In order to make this clear it must be noted that self-evident propositions are those which are known as soon as their terms are known, as is stated in Book I of the Posterior Analytics. This occurs in the case of those propositions in which the predicate is given in the definition of the subject, or is the same as the subject. But it happens that one kind of proposition, even though it is self-evident in itself, is still not self-evident to all, i.e., to those who are ignorant of the definition of both the subject and the predicate. Hence Boethius says in De Hebdomadibus that there are some propositions which are self-evident to the learned but not to all. Now those are self-evident to all whose terms are comprehended by all. And common principles are of this kind, because our knowledge proceeds from common principles to proper ones, as is said in Book I of the Physics. Hence those propositions which are composed of such common terms as whole and part (for example, every whole is greater than one of its parts) and of such terms as equal and unequal (for example, things equal to one and the same thing are equal to each other), constitute the first principles of demonstration. And the same is true of similar terms. Now since common terms of this kind belong to the consideration of the philosopher, then it follows that these principles also fall within his scope. But the philosopher does not establish the truth of these principles (~) by way of demonstration, but (+) by considering the meaning of their terms. For example, he considers what a whole is and what a part is; and the same applies to the rest. And when the meaning of these terms becomes known, it follows that the truth of the above-mentioned principles becomes evident.
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This science considers particularly the very first principle, that of contradiction.
606. Now as we have said (329).
608. But even in this case (331).
610. Another text states this better by saying, “But when one argues for the sake of convincing another, there will then be refutation but not demonstration”; i.e., when a process of this kind from a less well known to a better known principle is employed for the sake of convincing another man who denies this, there will then be disproof or refutation but not demonstration; i.e., it will be possible to have a syllogism which contradicts his view, since what is less known absolutely is admitted by the opponent, and thus it will be possible to proceed to demonstrate the above-mentioned principle so far as the man is concerned but not in the strict sense.
Contradictories Cannot Be True at the Same Time
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334. Again, if the term man signifies one thing, let this be a twofooted animal.
612. First of all, then (333).
620. Therefore, if it is true (338).
635. Now with regard to the argument given it must be noted that, even though one accident is not the subject of another, and thus one accident is not related to the other as its subject, still one is related to the other as cause and thing caused. For one accident is the cause of another. Heat and moistness, for example, are the cause of sweetness, and surface is the cause of color. For by reason of the fact that a subject is receptive of one accident it is receptive of another.
Other Arguments Against the Foregoing Position
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639. But the affirmation (345).
640. And it also follows (346).
642. Again, either this (347).
651. A fourth impossible conclusion will follow because of the definition of the true and the false. For truth exists when one says that what is, is, or that what is not, is not. But falsity exists when one says that what is, is not, or that what is not, is. Hence from the definition of the true and the false it is clear that, when an affirmation is true, its negation is false; for one then says that what is, is not. And when a negation is true, its affirmation is false; for what is not is then said to be. Therefore it is impossible both to affirm and to deny the same thing truly. But perhaps an opponent could say that this last argument is begging the questiofi; for he who claims that contradictories are true at the same time does not accept this definition of the false: the false is to say that what is not, is, or that what is, is not.
Three Further Arguments Against Those Who Deny the First Principle
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654. It is most evident (349).
659. Further, even if all (351).
661. The doctrine of Protagoras (352).
662. Similarly, if it is true that both parts of a contradiction are true at the same time, the opinion of Protagoras must be true, namely, that all things which seem true to anybody are true. For it is clear that people have different opinions, and some of these are false and others are true because they have opinions which are opposed to each other. If, then, all opposites are true at the same time (and this follows if contradictories are true at the same time), the result must be that all are right, and that what seems so to anyone is true. Thus it is clear that each position contains the same opinion, theory, or way of thinking, because one necessarily follows from the other.
The Procedure Against Those Who Say that Contradictories Are True at the Same Time
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Then he gives the second solution. He says that we deem it fitting that they should accept or think that there is some kind of substance to which neither motion nor generation nor corruption belongs, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics. Now one could not conclude to the existence of this kind of substance by reason of what has been said above, namely, that contraries belong to it, because nothing is generated from them. This solution seems to be like the one reached by the Platonists, who, because of the changeable character of sensible things, were compelled to posit unchangeable separate Forms (i.e., those of which definitions are given, and demonstrations made, and certain knowledge is had) on the grounds that there could be no certain knowledge of sensible things because of their changeableness and the mixture of contrariety which they contain. But the first solution is a better one.
The Reason Why Some Considered Appearances to Be True
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671. But someone could say, in opposing this position, that some rule can be adopted whereby a person can discern among contrary opinions the one that is true. That is, we might say that the judgment which healthy people make about sensible things is right, and the one which sick people make is not; and that the judgment which wise and intelligent people make in matters of truth is right, and the one which foolish or ignorant people make is not. He rejects this reply at the very start on the grounds that no certain judgment about the truth of any theory can be fittingly based on the number, large or small, of persons who hold it, according to which that would be said to be true which seems so to many, and that to be false which seems so to a few; for sometimes what many believe is not simply true. Now health and sickness or wisdom and foolishness do not seem to diff er only by reason of the greater or smaller number of people involved. For if all or most persons were like those who are now thought to be ignorant or foolish, they would be considered wise, and those who are now thought to be wise would be considered foolish. The same applies in the case of health and sickness. Hence the judgment regarding truth and falsity of one who is healthy and wise is no more credible than the judgment of one who is ill and foolish.
Two Reasons Why Some Identify Truth with Appearances
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680. Hence, their conclusion (360).
684. That such was their argument becomes clear as follows. For from this assumption or opinion there sprouted “the most serious or extreme” opinion of the philosophers of whom we have spoken, i.e., the opinion which is found to be the most serious or extreme in this class. And this is the one which he called “Heraclitizing,” i.e., following the opinion of Heraclitus, or the opinion of those who were disciples of Heraclitus, according to another text, or of those who professed to follow the opinion of Heraclitus, who claimed that all things are in motion and consequently that nothing is definitely true. This opinion also was maintained by Cratylus, who finally arrived at such a pitch of madness that he thought that he should not express anything in words, but in order to express what he wanted he would only move his finger. He did this because he believed that the truth of the thing which he wanted to express would pass away before he had finished speaking. But he could move his finger in a shorter space of time. This same Cratylus also reprimanded or rebuked Heraclitus. For Heraclitus said that a man cannot step into the same river twice, because before he steps in a second time the water of the river already has flowed by. But Cratylus thought that a man cannot step into the same river even once, because even before he steps in once the water then in the river flows by and other water replaces it. Thus a man is incapable not only of speaking twice about anything before his disposition is changed but even of speaking once.
Change in Sensible Things Not Opposed to Their Truth
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690. Further, it is evident (367).
He gives the sixth argument. He says that their position that all things are being moved is opposed to their first position, that contradictories are true of the same subject at the same time, because if something is and is not at the same time, it follows that all things are at rest rather than in motion. For nothing is being changed in terms of any attribute which already belongs to it; for example, what is already white is not being changed as regards whiteness. But if it is possible for the same thing both to be and not be at the same time, all attributes will be present in all things, as has been proved above (345:C 639), because all will be one. Hence there will not be anything to which a thing can be changed.
Seven Arguments against the View that Truth Consists in Appearances
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694. Second, that it is (370).
700. Again, concerning future (371).
701. Again, in the case (372).
707. And even if someone were to raise the objection that a sensible object and a sense are correlative and thus naturally simultaneous, so that when one is destroyed the other is destroyed, Aristotle’s thesis is still true; for what is potentially sensible is not said to be relative to a sense because it is referred to a sense, but because the sense is referred to it, as is stated in Book V of this work (496:C 1027)- It is dearly impossible, then, to say that some things are true because they appear to the senses; yet this is what those men maintain who claim that all appearances are true, as is evident from the foregoing statements.
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716. And, as has been said (379).
717. Further, if a thing (380).
719. But since it is impossible (382).
He draws the corollary. He says that, since it is impossible, from what has been said, for two contradictories to be true of the same subject at the same time, it is also evident that contraries cannot belong to the same subject; for the privative character of one of two contraries is no less evident in the case of contraries than it is in the case of other opposites, although each of two contraries is a positive reality; for it does not consist in affirmation and negation or in privation and possession. For one of them is imperfect when compared with the other, as black when compared with white, and bitter with sweet; and thus it has a kind of privation added to it. But privation is negation of substance, i.e., in some determinate subject. And it is also the deprivation of some determinate genus; for it is a negation within a genus. For not everything which does not see is said to be blind, but only that which is found in the genus of seeing things. It is clear, then, that a contrary includes privation, and that privation is a kind of negation. Hence, if it is impossible both to affirm and to deny something at the same time, it is also impossible for contraries to belong absolutely to the same subject at the same time; but either “both belong to it,” i.e., relatively, as when both are present potentially or partially, or one is present in a certain respect and the other absolutely; or one is present in many and the more important parts, and the other only in some part; for example, an Ethiopian is black absolutely and white as regards his teeth.
No Intermediate between Contradictories. How Heraclitus and Anaxagoras Influenced This Position
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722. Further, an intermediate (384).
729. Further, there will (388).
733. The starting point (391).
735. And from the position of Anaxagoras it follows that there is an intermediate between contradictories; for he held that everything is mixed with everything, because everything comes from everything. But neither of the extremes can be predicated of the mixture; for example, intermediate colors are neither whiteness or blackness. Hence the mixture is neither good nor not-good, neither white nor not-white; and thus there is an intermediate between contradictories. It follows, then, that everything is false; for according to the common opinion we posit nothing but affirmation and negation. Hence, if both an affirmation and its negation are false, it follows that everything is false.
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401. Further, it must be some being which is changed; for change is from something to something.
739. Further, it is evident (394).
741. Again, if everything (396).