CONTENTS
Article 1: Whether this union was brought about in the person or in the nature?
Article 2: Whether there is only one hypostasis or suppositum in Christ or two?
Article 3: Whether Christ is one or two in the neuter?
Article 4: Whether there is only one being in Christ?
Article 5: Whether in Christ there is only one operation?
translated by Jason L.A. West, faculty.niagara.edu/loughlin/Translation.html
| Quaeritur utrum haec unio facta sit in persona, vel in natura. Videtur autem quod in natura. | Article 1: Whether this union was brought about in the person or in the nature? It seems that it was in the nature. |
| Dicit enim Athanasius quod sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo; ita Deus et homo unus est Christus. Sed anima rationalis et caro uniuntur in unam naturam humanam. ergo Deus et homo uniuntur in unam naturam Christi. | Objection 1: For Athanasius says (On the Creed) that "just as the rational soul and the body are one man, so God and man are one Christ". But the rational soul and the body are united into one human nature. Therefore, God and man are united into the one nature of Christ. |
| Praeterea, Damascenus dicit in iii libro: hoc facit haereticis errorem, quia dicunt idem naturam et hypostasim. Sed hoc non videtur falsum esse: quia in quolibet simplici, et praecipue in Deo, idem est suppositum et natura. Ergo non est falsum quod haeretici dicunt, quod si unio facta sit in persona, sit facta in natura. | Objection 2: Besides, Damascene says in the third book of Concerning the Orthodox Faith, "This produces the error of the heretics, because they say the nature and the hypostasis are the same". But this does not seem to be false, because in anything simple, and especially in God, suppositum and nature are the same. Therefore what the heretics say, that if the union was brought about in the person, it was brought about in the nature, is not false. |
| Praeterea, Damascenus dicit in iii libro, quod inconvertibiliter et inalterabiliter unitae sunt ad invicem duae naturae. Sed unio naturarum videtur importare unionem naturalem. Ergo unio facta est in natura. | Objection 3: Besides, Damascene says in the third book that "the two natures were mutually united unchangeably and inalterably. But the union of natures seems to imply a natural union. Therefore, the union was brought about in the nature. |
| Praeterea, in omnibus illis in quibus suppositum aliquid habet praeter naturam speciei, vel accidens vel naturam individualem necesse est quod differat suppositum a natura, ut patet per Philosophum in vii Metaph. Sed si unio humanae naturae ad verbum non est facta in natura humana, non pertinebit ad naturam speciei ipsius verbi. Ergo sequetur quod oppositum verbi sit aliud a natura divina; quod est impossibile. videtur ergo quod unio facta sit in natura. | Objection 4: Besides, in all those things in which the suppositum possesses something beyond the nature of the species, either an accident or an individual nature, it is necessary that the suppositum differ from the nature, as is clear from the Philosopher in book 7 of the Metaphysics (com. n. 20-21). But if the union of human nature to the Word did not occur in the human nature it will not belong to the nature of the species of the Word itself. Therefore, it would follow that the suppositum of the Word would be different from the divine nature, which is impossible. Therefore, it seems that the union was brought about in the nature. |
| Praeterea, omnis unio terminatur ad aliquod unum, quod est posterius ipsa unione. Sed unitas personae verbi, cum sit aeterna, non est posterior unione quae facta est in plenitudine temporis. Ergo unio non est facta in persona. | Objection 5: Besides, every union is terminated in something one, which is posterior to the union itself. But the unity of the person of the Word, since it is eternal, is not posterior to the union which was brought about in the fullness of time. Therefore the union was not brought about in the person. |
| Praeterea, unio importat additamentum quoddam. Unde non potest fieri unio in aliquo quod est summae simplicitatis. Sed persona verbi, cum sit vere deus, est summae simplicitatis. Ergo in persona verbi non potest fieri unio. | Objection 6: Besides, a union entails a certain addition. Hence, a union cannot be brought about in something which is of highest simplicity. But, the person of the Word, since he is true God, is of the highest simplicity. Therefore, a union cannot be brought about in the person of the Word. |
| Praeterea, duo quae non sunt unius generis, non possunt in aliquo uniri: ex linea enim et albedine non fit unum. Sed humana natura multo plus differt a divina quam ea quae differunt genere. Ergo non potest simul humanae et divinae naturae unio fieri in persona una. | Objection 7: Besides, two things which are not of one genus cannot be united in something: for one thing does not arise from a line and whiteness. But human nature differs much more from the divine nature than those things which differ in a genus. Therefore, the union of human and divine natures cannot be brought about in one person at the same time. |
| Praeterea, persona et natura verbi differunt solum secundum modum intelligendi, in quantum in persona verbi importatur relatio originis, non autem in natura. Sed per relationem originis verbum non refertur ad humanam naturam, sed ad patrem. Ergo eodem modo se habent ad naturam assumptam persona verbi, et natura eius. Si ergo est facta unio in persona, erit facta unio in natura. | Objection 8: Besides, the person and the nature of the Word differ only according to the mode of understanding, in so far as a relation of origin is entailed in the person of the Word, but not in the nature. But, the Word is not related to human nature through the relation of origin, but to the Father. Therefore the Word and the Word's nature are related to the assumed nature in the same way. If, therefore, the union was brought about in the person, it would have been brought about in the nature. |
| Praeterea, incarnatio excitat nos ad Deum incarnatum diligendum. Sed non debemus plus diligere unam personam divinam quam aliam; quia quorum est eadem bonitas, debet esse eadem dilectio. Ergo unio incarnationis facta est in natura communi tribus personis. | Objection 9: Besides, the incarnation stimulates us to love God Incarnate. But we should not love one divine person more than another; since their goodness is the same, the love ought to be the same. Therefore, the union of the incarnation occurred in the nature common to the three persons. |
| Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in ii De Anima, vivere viventibus est esse. Sed in Christo est duplex vita, scilicet humana et divina. Ergo est illi duplex esse, et per consequens duplex persona: esse enim est suppositi vel personae. Non ergo facta est unio in persona. | Objection 10: Besides, according to the Philosopher, in book II On the Soul (com. 37), in living things living is being. But in Christ life is two-fold, namely human and divine. Therefore being is two-fold for him and, consequently, there is a two-fold person: for being is of the suppositum or the person. Therefore the union was not brought about in the person. |
| Praeterea, sicut forma partis comparatur ad materiam, ita forma totius ad suppositum. Sed forma partis non potest esse nisi in materia propria. ergo forma totius, quae est natura, non potest esse nisi in proprio supposito, quod est persona humana. et eadem ratione natura divina est etiam in persona divina. Ergo, si sint ibi duae naturae, oportet quod sint ibi duae personae. | Objection 11: Besides, just as the form of a part is compared to matter, so the form of a whole is compared to a suppositum. But the form of a part cannot exist except in its own matter. Therefore, the form of the whole, which is the nature, cannot exist except in its own suppositum, which is a human person. And by the same reason the divine nature also exists in the divine person. Therefore, if there were two natures there, it would be necessary that there be two persons there. |
| Praeterea, omne quod vere praedicatur de aliquo, potest supponere pro ipso. Sed natura divina vere praedicatur de persona verbi. Ergo potest supponere pro ipsa. Si ergo facta est unio in persona, vere potest dici quod facta sit unio in natura. | Objection 12: Besides, everything which is truly predicated of something, is able to supposit for it. But the divine nature is truly predicated of the person of the Word. Therefore, it is able to supposit for the person of the Word. If, therefore, the union was brought about in the person, it can be truly said that it was brought about in the nature. |
| Praeterea, omne quod unitur alicui, aut unitur ei essentialiter aut accidentaliter. Sed humana natura non unitur verbo accidentaliter, quia sic retineret suam personalitatem, et essent duae personae. Omnis enim substantia alteri adveniens retinet suam singularitatem; sicut vestis induta, et equus equitantis. Ergo advenit ei essentialiter quasi pertinens ad essentiam vel naturam verbi. Est ergo unio facta in natura. | Objection 13: Besides, everything that is united to something, is united either accidentally or essentially. But human nature is not united to the Word accidentally, because it would thus retain its own personality and there would be two persons. For every substance added to another retains its own singularity, as the garment which has been put on or the horse which is being ridden. Therefore, human nature comes to the Word essentially as though pertaining to the essence or nature of the Word. Therefore the union occurred in the nature. |
| Praeterea, nihil quod comprehenditur sub alio, extendit se ad aliquid extrinsecum; sicut quod comprehenditur loco non est in exteriori loco. Sed suppositum cuiuslibet naturae comprehenditur sub natura illa, unde et dicitur res naturae. Sic enim comprehenditur individuum sub specie, sicut species sub genere. Cum ergo verbum sit suppositum divinae naturae, non potest se extendere ad aliam naturam ut sit eius suppositum, nisi efficiatur natura una. | Objection 14: Besides, nothing that is included in another stretches out to something outside, just as what is found in a place is not also outside the place. But the suppositum of any nature is found in that nature, hence it is called a thing of nature. In this way, the individual is included under a species, just as the species is included under a genus. So since the Word is the suppositum of the divine nature, it is not able to stretch out to another nature so as to be its suppositum, unless one nature is brought about. |
| Praeterea, natura se habet ad suppositum per modum formalioris, et simplicioris et constituentis. Hoc autem modo non potest se habere natura humana ad personam verbi. Ergo persona verbi non potest esse persona humanae naturae. | Objection 15: Besides, nature is related to suppositum through a more formal and more simple mode, and the nature constitutes it. But, human nature cannot be related to the person of the Word in this way. Therefore the person of the Word cannot be a person of human nature. |
| Praeterea, actio attribuitur supposito vel personae: quia actiones singularium sunt, secundum Philosophum. Sed in Christo sunt duae actiones, ut Damascenus probat in libro iii. Ergo sunt ibi duae personae. Non ergo facta est unio in persona. | Objection 16: Besides, action is attributed to the suppositum or person, since actions belong to particular things, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. Ch. 1,). But, there are two actions in Christ as Damascene proves in book three (De Fide Orth. Ch. xv). Therefore, there are two persons there. Therefore, the union is not brought about in the person. |
| Praeterea, persona definitur esse natura proprietate distincta. Si ergo facta est unio in persona, sequitur quod facta sit unio in natura. | Objection 17: Besides, person is properly defined as a nature made distinct as a property. If therefore the union occurred in the person, it follows that it occurred in the nature. |
| Sed contra. Est quod Augustinus dicit in libro De Fide ad Petrum: duarum naturarum veritas manet in Christo secundum unam personam. Praeterea, ad Orosium dicit: duas naturas cognoscimus in una persona filii. | But on the contrary is 1) what Augustine says in the book Concerning the faith to Peter [spurious]: "The truth of the two natures remain in Christ according to one person. 2) In "To Orosius" [spurious] he also says "we know two natures in the one person of the Son." |
| Respondeo. Dicendum quod ad evidentiam huius quaestionis, primo, oportet considerare quid est natura, secundo, quid est persona; tertio, quomodo unio verbi incarnati facta est in persona, non in natura. | I answer that for a clear understanding of this question, first it is necessary to consider what a nature is, second what a person is, and third how the union of the Word incarnate occurred in the person, not in the nature. |
| Sciendum est ergo, quod nomen naturae a nascendo sumitur. Unde primo est dicta natura, quasi nascitura, ipsa nativitas viventium, scilicet animalium et plantarum. Deinde tractum est nomen naturae ad principium praedictae nativitatis. Et quia huiusmodi nativitatis principium intrinsecum est, ulterius derivatum est nomen naturae ad significandum interius principium motus, secundum quod dicitur in ii Physic., quia natura est principium motus in quo est, per se, non secundum accidens. Et quia motus naturalis praecipue in generatione terminatur ad essentiam speciei, ulterius essentia speciei, quam significat definitio, natura vocatur. Unde et Boetius dicit in libro De Duabus Naturis, quod natura est unumquodque informans specifica differentia. Et hoc modo hic natura accipitur. | Therefore, it should be known that the name "nature" is taken from being born (nascendo). Hence, nature, or "about to be born", was first said of the actual birth of living things, namely of plants and animals. Next the name nature was transferred to the principle of the aforementioned nativity. And since the principle of this kind of nativity is interior, the name nature was further extended to signifying a more interior principle of motion, according to what is said in II Physics (com. 1), that nature is a principle of motion in which [motion] is per se, not accidental. Since natural motion especially in generation is terminated at the essence of a species, we may say further, the essence of a species, which a definition signifies, is called a nature. Hence Boethius also says in " Concerning the Two Natures " that nature is the specific difference informing each and every thing. And it is in this way that nature is taken here. |
| Ad intelligendum autem quid sit persona, considerandum est quod si aliqua res est in qua non sit aliud quam essentia speciei, ipsa essentia speciei erit per se individualiter subsistens. Et sic in huiusmodi re idem esset realiter suppositum et natura, sola ratione differens; in quantum scilicet natura dicitur prout est essentia speciei, suppositum vero in quantum per se subsistit. Si vero aliqua res sit intra quam praeter essentiam speciei, quam significat definitio, sit aliquid aliud, vel accidens vel materia individualis; tunc suppositum non erit omnino idem quod natura, sed habebit se per additionem ad naturam. Sicut apparet praecipue in his quae sunt ex materia et forma composita. Et quod dictum est de supposito, intelligendum est de persona in rationali natura: cum persona nihil aliud sit quam suppositum rationalis naturae, secundum quod Boetius dicit in libro De Duabus Naturis, quod persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia. | However, in order to understand what a person is, it must be considered that if there is some thing in which there is nothing other than the essence of the species, the essence of the species itself will be subsisting individually through itself. Thus, in a thing of this kind nature and suppositum would be really the same, differing only by reason; that is, the thing is called a nature insofar as it is the essence of the species, but it is called a suppositum insofar as it subsists through itself. But, if there were anything within a thing beyond the essence of the species, which the definition signifies, it would be something other, either an accident or the matter of an individual. Then the suppositum will not be entirely the same as that nature, but it will be constituted by an addition to the nature, as is most evident in those things which are composed of matter and form. And what was said concerning the suppositum must be understood concerning the person in a rational nature, since a person is nothing other than a suppositum of a rational nature according to what Boethius says in the book Concerning the Two Natures, that person is an individual substance of a rational nature. |
| Sic ergo patet quod nihil prohibet aliqua uniri in persona quae non sunt unita in natura; potest enim individua substantia rationalis naturae habere aliquid quod non pertinet ad naturam speciei, et hoc unitur ei personaliter, non naturaliter. Hoc igitur modo accipiendum est quod natura humana unita est verbo Dei in persona, non in natura: quia si non pertinet ad naturam divinam, pertinet autem ad personam ipsius, in quantum persona verbi assumendo, adiunxit sibi humanam naturam. Sed de modo huiusmodi coniunctionis dubitatio et discordia accidit. Videmus enim in creaturis quod dupliciter aliquid alicui advenit; scilicet accidentaliter, et essentialiter. | Hence, it is obvious that nothing prevents some things being united in a person which are not united in the nature. For an individual substance of a rational nature can have something which does not pertain to the nature of a species and this is united to it personally, not naturally. Therefore, in this manner it must be taken that the human nature was united to the Word of God in the person, not in the nature: since if it does not pertain to the divine nature, nevertheless it pertains to his person, insofar as the person of the Word joined human nature to himself by assuming it. But concerning the manner of this kind of conjunction doubt and discord occurs. For we see in creatures that something comes to another in two ways; namely accidentally and essentially. |
| Nestorius igitur, et ante ipsum Theodorus Mopsuestenus, posuerunt naturam humanam coniunctam esse verbo accidentaliter; scilicet secundum gratiae inhabitationem: ponentes quod verbum Dei unitum erat homini Christo sicut habitans in ipso ut in templo suo. Videmus autem quod omnis substantia coniuncta alteri accidentaliter, retinet seorsum suam propriam singularitatem, sicut vestis adveniens homini aut domus continens habitatorem: unde sequitur quod homo ille habuerit propriam singularitatem quae est personalitas eius. Sequebatur ergo secundum Nestorium, quod in Christo persona hominis esset distincta persona a persona verbi; et quod esset alius filius hominis, et alius Filius Dei. Unde Beatam Virginem non confitebatur matrem Dei, sed matrem hominis.- Sed hoc est omnino absurdum. primo quidem, quia Sacra Scriptura aliter loquitur de hominibus in quibus verbum dei habitavit per gratiam, et aliter de Christo. Nam de aliis dicit quod factum est verbum Domini ad talem prophetam, sed de Christo dicit: verbum caro factum est, id est homo; quasi ipsum verbum personaliter sit homo. Secundo, quia apostolus ad Philipp. hanc unionem exinanitionem Filii Dei vocat. Manifestum est autem quod inhabitatio gratiae non sufficit ad rationem exinanitionis. Alioquin exinanitio competeret non solum Filio, sed etiam Patri et Spiritui Sancto, de quo Dominus dicit Ioan. xiv: apud vos manebit, et in vobis erit; et de se et Patre: ad eum veniemus, et apud eum mansionem faciemus. Propter hoc igitur et multa alia, praedictus error damnatus est in Concilio Ephesino. | Therefore, Nestorius, and Theodorus Mopsuestenus before him, posited that the human nature was conjoined to the Word accidentally; namely according to the indwelling of grace: positing that the Word of God had been united to the man Christ as if by dwelling in him as in his temple. But we see that every substance accidentally conjoined to another retains its own proper singularity separately, as when clothes are put on by man or a house contains an inhabitant. Hence it follows that man will have a proper singularity which is his personality. Therefore, according to Nestorius it followed that the person of man in Christ was a distinct person from the person of the Word, and that one was the son of man and the other the Son of God. Hence the Blessed Virgin was not acknowledged as the mother of God, but the mother of a man. -- But this is entirely absurd. First, indeed, because Sacred Scripture speaks in one way concerning men in whom the Word of God dwelled through grace, and in another way concerning Christ. For concerning other men it says that the Word of the Lord was brought to a given prophet, but concerning Christ it says "The Word was made flesh", that is a man; as if the Word itself were personally a man. Second, since the Apostle in the letter to the Philippians calls this union an emptying of the Son of God. But it is clear that the indwelling of grace is not adequate to the notion of emptying. Otherwise emptying would belong not only the Son, but also to the Father and the Holy Spirit, concerning which the Lord says "He will remain with you, and he will be in you" and concerning himself and the Father: "We will come to him and make a home with him". Therefore, on account of this and many other things, the aforesaid error was condemned in the Council of Ephesus. |
| Quidam vero cum Nestorio sustinentes humanam naturam accidentaliter verbo advenisse, voluerunt evitare dualitatem personarum quam ponebat Nestorius, ponentes quod verbum assumpsit animam et corpus sibi invicem non unita; ut sic non constitueretur persona humana ex anima et corpore. Sed ex hoc sequitur maius inconveniens, quod Christus non vere fuerit homo; cum ratio hominis consistat in unione animae et corporis. Et ideo etiam hic error damnatus est sub Alexandro iii in Concilio Turonensi. | Certain men, holding with Nestorius that human nature had come to the Word accidentally, wanted to avoid the duality of persons which Nestorius posited, positing that the Word assumed a soul and a body to itself not united to each other; so that a human person would not produced from a soul and a body. But from this a greater absurdity follows, i.e. that Christ was not truly a man; since the notion of a man consists in the union of a soul and a body. And thus this error was also condemned under Alexander III in the Council of Tours. |
| Alii vero acceperunt aliam partem, ponentes naturam humanam verbo essentialiter advenire; ut quasi conflaretur una natura, sive essentia, ex natura divina et natura humana. Et ad hoc quidem Apollinaris Laodicensis tria dogmata posuit, ut Leo Papa dicit in epistola quadam ad Constantinopolitanos, quorum primum fuit quod posuit animam non esse unitam in Christo, sed verbum carni loco animae advenisse. Ut sic ex verbo et carne fieret una natura, sicut in nobis ex anima et corpore. In quo quidem dogmate Apollinaris secutus est Arium. Sed quia evangelica Scriptura expresse de anima Christi loquitur, secundum illud Ioan. x: potestatem habeo ponendi animam meam, incidit in secundum dogma, ut poneret quidem animam sensitivam esse in Christo, non autem rationalem; sed verbum fuisse homini Christo loco intellectus. sed hoc est inconveniens; quia secundum hoc, verbum non assumpsisset humanam, sed bestialem naturam, ut Augustinus contra eum arguit in libro LXXXIII Quaestionum. Tertium dogma eius fuit, quod caro Christi non est de femina sumpta sed facta de verbo in carnem mutato atque converso. Hoc autem est maxime impossibile: quia verbum Dei, cum sit vere Deus, est immutabile omnino. Unde propter haec dogmata damnatus est Apollinaris in Concilio Constantinopolitano; et Eutyches, qui eius tertium dogma secutus est, in Concilio Chalcedonensi. | But others took the other side, positing that human nature was joined to the Word essentially; so that it is as if one nature or essence was produced out of the divine and human nature. And on this point indeed Apollinaris made three claims, as Pope Leo says in a certain letter to the Constantinopolians. First, he posited that a soul was not united to Christ, but that the Word had come to the flesh in place of the soul. As a result, one nature was produced from the Word and the flesh, just as in us one nature is produced from the soul and the body. In which doctrine Apollinaris also followed Arius. But since the evangelical Scriptures explicitly speak about the soul of Christ, according to that passage of John: (10:18) "I have power of laying down my soul," he fell into the second opinion, so that he even posited that there was a sensitive soul in Christ, but not a rational soul; rather he posited that the Word took the place of the intellect in the man Christ. But this is unfitting because according to this the Word did not assume a human, but a bestial nature, as Augustine argued against him in the book Eighty-Three Questions. His third teaching was that the flesh of Christ was not taken from a woman but made from the Word changed into flesh and even conversely. But this is most impossible, because the Word of God, since he is truly God, is completely immutable. For these doctrines of Apollinaris were condemned in the Council of Constantinople, as was that of Eutyches, who followed his third teaching, in the Council of Chalcedeon. |
| Sic igitur, si non est facta unio in persona sed solum secundum habitationem, secundum Nestorium, nihil novum in Christi incarnatione accidit. Quod vero facta sit unio in natura, secundum Apollinarem et Eutychen, est omnino impossibile. Cum enim species rerum sint sicut numeri, in quibus addita vel subtracta unitate variant speciem, ut dicitur in viii Metaph., quaecumque natura est in se perfecta, impossibile est quod recipiat alterius naturae additionem. Vel, si reciperet, non esset eadem natura, sed alia. Divina autem natura est perfectissima. Similiter etiam humana natura habet perfectionem suae speciei. Unde impossibile est quod una alteri adveniat unione naturali. Et si esset possibile, iam id quod ex utroque constitueretur neque esset natura divina neque humana: et sic Christus esset neque homo neque Deus, quod est inconveniens. Relinquitur ergo quod humana natura non est unita verbo neque accidentaliter neque essentialiter, sed substantialiter, secundum quod substantia significat hypostasim, et hypostatice vel personaliter. | So, therefore, if the union was not made in the person, but only according to inhabiting, as Nestorius claimed, nothing new happened in the incarnation of Christ. But, that the union occurred in the nature, as Apollinaris and Eutyches claimed, is completely impossible. For since the species of things are like numbers in which added and subtracted units vary the species, as is said in book 8 of the Metaphysics, it is impossible that whatever nature is complete in itself should receive the addition of another nature. (cf. William of Auxerre) Or if it did receive, it would not be the same nature, but another one. But the Divine nature is most complete. Similarly, even the human nature has the completion of its own species. Hence it is impossible that one [nature] should be joined to another in a natural union. Even if it were possible, then surely that which was produced from both would be neither a human nature nor a divine nature; and thus Christ would be neither man nor God, which is unfitting. Therefore, it remains that the human nature was united to the Word neither accidentally, nor essentially, but substantially; insofar as substance signifies a hypostasis, and hypostatically or even personally. |
| Huius autem unionis exemplum in rebus creatis nullum est propinquius quam unio animae rationalis ad corpus, quod ponit Athanasius. Non quidem secundum quod anima est forma corporis, quia verbum non potest esse forma in materia; sed secundum quod corpus est animae instrumentum, non quidem extrinsecum et adventitium, sed proprium et coniunctum. Unde Damascenus dicit humanam naturam esse organum verbi. Esset autem adhuc similius, sicut Augustinus dicit Contra Felicianum, si fingamus, sicut plerique volunt, esse in mundo animam generalem, quae passibilem materiam ad diversas formas, unam faceret secum esse personam. | But there is no example of this union in created things nearer than the example Athanasius posits, of the union of the rational soul to the body. Not indeed in the way that the soul is the form of the body, because the Word cannot be a form in matter; but in the way that the body is the instrument of the soul, not indeed an extrinsic and foreign instrument, but its own and a conjoined one. Hence Damascene said that the human nature is the implement of the Word. However, we would find a closer example Augustine says in Contra Felicianus, if we suppose, as very many want, that there is a generic soul in the world, which as matter received of diverse forms, would make one person with itself. |
| Sed tamen omnia huiusmodi exempla sunt deficientia: quia unio instrumenti est accidentalis; sed haec est quaedam unio singularis supra omnes modos unionis nobis notos. Sicut enim Deus est ipsa bonitas et suum esse, ita etiam est ipsa unitas per essentiam. Et ideo, sicut virtus eius non est limitata ad istos modos bonitatis et esse qui sunt in creaturis, sed potest facere novos modos bonitatis et esse nobis incognitos; ita etiam per infinitatem suae virtutis potuit facere novum modum unionis, ut humana natura uniretur verbo personaliter, non tamen accidentaliter. Quamvis ad hoc in creaturis nullum sufficiens exemplum inveniatur. Unde Augustinus dicit in epistola Ad Volusianum, de hoc mysterio loquens: si ratio quaeritur, non est admirabile: si exemplum poscitur, non est singulare. Demus Deo aliquid posse, quod fateamur nos investigare non posse; in talibus enim tota ratio facti est potentia facientis. Et Dionysius dicit in cap. ii De Divin. Nom.: Iesus secundum nos divina compositio, id est unio, et ineffabilis est verbo omni, et ignota menti; tamen et ipsi primo dignissimorum angelorum. | Nevertheless, all examples of this kind are deficient: because the union of an instrument is accidental; but, this is a certain singular union above every mode of union known to us. For just as God is goodness itself and his own being, so also he is unity itself through [his] essence. And thus, as his power is not limited to these modes of goodness and being which are in creatures, but is able to make new kinds of goodness and being unknown to us; so also he was able to make a new kind of union through the infinity of his own power, in order for human nature to be united to the Word personally, but not accidentally, although no adequate example for this can be found in creatures. Hence Augustine speaking of this mystery in the epistle to Volusianus (3) "If a reason is sought, it is not wonderful; if an example is demanded, it is not unique. We must grant that something is possible for God, which we confess that we cannot investigate; for in such things the entire reason for the thing made is the power of maker." And Dionysius says in cap. 2 of the Divine Names: "According to us Jesus is a divine composition, that is a union, and he is ineffable by any word and unknown to the mind, and also to the first of the most worthy angels himself. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod similitudo non attenditur quantum ad hoc quod ex anima et carne sit una hominis natura; sed quantum ad hoc quod utrobique constituitur una persona. | 1: A similarity is not observed according to this, that from a soul and a body there is one nature of man, but according to this, that one person is constituted from both. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod quamvis in divinis natura et suppositum, sive persona, non differant realiter, differunt tamen ratione ut dictum est. Et quia idem est subsistens in natura humana et divina, non autem eadem essentia ex utroque componitur, inde est quod unio facta est in persona, ad cuius rationem pertinet subsistere; non autem ad naturam, quae importat essentiam rei. | 2: Although nature and suppositum, or person, do not differ really in divine things, nevertheless, they differ by reason, as was said. And because the same thing is subsisting in human nature and in the divine, but the essence composed from both is not the same, hence it is that the union was made in the person, to whose character it pertains to subsist; but [subsisting does] not [pertain] to the nature which implies the essence of the thing. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod naturae quidem unitae sunt in Christo; non tamen in natura, sed in persona. Quod apparet ex hoc ipso quod dicuntur inconvertibiliter et inalterabiliter naturae esse unitae. | 3: The natures were indeed united in Christ; yet not in the nature, but in the person. This is evidence for the fact that the natures are said to be unchangeably and unalterably united. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod haeretici, dicentes quod non est facta unio in persona, sed quod sit facta in natura, non reputabant aliud esse personam et aliud naturam nec re nec ratione; et ideo decipiebantur. | 4: Heretics, saying that the union did not occur in the person, but in the nature, did not think that the person and the nature differ - neither in reality, nor in reason; and thus they were deceived. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod proprie secundum unionem dicitur aliquid unitum, sicut secundum unitatem dicitur aliquid unum. Et ideo unio non intelligitur terminari ad personam divinam secundum quod est una in se ab aeterno, sed secundum quod est unita humanae naturae in tempore. Et ita unio secundum modum intelligendi praecedit personam, non prout est una, sed prout est unita. | 5: Something is properly called "united" according to a union, just as something is called "one" according to a unity. And thus, a union is not understood to be terminated in the divine person insofar as it is one in itself from eternity, but insofar as it is united to the human nature in time. And thus according to the mode of understanding the union precedes the person, not as it is one, but as it is united. |
| Ad sextum dicendum quod unio non dicitur fieri in persona divina, quasi ipsa persona divina constituatur ex duobus sibi invicem unitis. Hoc enim eius summae simplicitati repugnaret. Sed dicitur unio esse facta in persona, in quantum divina persona simplex subsistit in duabus naturis, scilicet divina et humana. | 6: A union is not said to have occurred in the divine person, as if the divine person itself were constituted out of two things united to each other. For this would be contrary to its highest simplicity. But a union is said to have occurred in the person, insofar as the simple divine person subsists in two natures, namely the human and the divine. |
| Ad septimum dicendum quod duo quae sunt diversa secundum genus, non uniuntur in una essentia vel natura; nihil tamen prohibet quin uniantur in uno supposito. Sicut ex linea et albedine non fit aliqua essentia; inveniuntur tamen in uno supposito. | 7: Two things which are diverse according to genus may not be united in one essence or nature; yet nothing prevents that they should be united in one suppositum. In the same way, some essence does not come out of whiteness and line, yet they are found in one suppositum. |
| Ad octavum dicendum quod persona Filii Dei dupliciter potest considerari. uno modo secundum communem rationem personae, prout significat quoddam subsistens; et secundum hoc unio facta est in persona secundum rationem personae, sicut supra dictum est. Alio modo potest in persona Filii considerari id quod est proprium personae Filii, scilicet relatio qua refertur ad Patrem. Et secundum huius relationis rationem non consideratur unio duarum naturarum. | 8: The person of the Son of God can be considered in two ways. In one way according to the common character of a person, as it signifies something subsisting; and according to this, the union occurred in the person according to the character of a person, as was said above. In another way, that which is proper to the person of the Son can be considered in the person of the Son, namely, the relation by which he is referred to the Father. And the union of the two natures is not considered according to the character of this relation. |
| Ad nonum dicendum quod sicut incarnatio nihil bonitatis adiicit ad personam divinam, ita etiam nihil adiicit ei diligibilitatis. Unde persona verbi incarnati non est plus diligenda quam persona verbi simpliciter, licet sit secundum aliam rationem diligenda; quae tamen ratio sub universali bonitate verbi comprehenditur. Et propter hoc etiam non sequitur, si incarnationis unio facta est in una persona et non in alia, quod propter hoc una persona sit magis diligenda quam alia. | 9: As the incarnation adds nothing of goodness to the divine person, so also it adds nothing of lovability to Him. Hence the person of the Word incarnate should not be more loved than the person of the Word simply, although it must be loved according to another aspect, which aspect, nevertheless, is understood as falling under the universal goodness of the Word. On account of this also it does not follow, if the union of the incarnation occurred in one person and not in another that on account of this one person must be loved more than another. |
| Ad decimum dicendum quod esse est et personae subsistentis, et naturae in qua persona subsistit; quasi secundum illam naturam esse habens. Esse igitur personae verbi incarnati est unum ex parte personae subsistentis, non autem ex parte naturae. | 10: Being (esse) belongs both to the subsisting person and to the nature in which the person subsists; in the sense that the person has being according to that nature. Therefore, the being of the person of the incarnate Word is one on the part of the subsisting person, but not on the part of the nature. |
| Ad undecimum dicendum quod non eodem modo se habet natura ad suppositum, sicut se habet forma ad materiam. materia enim non constituitur in esse nisi per formam; et ideo forma requirit determinatam materiam, quam faciat esse in actu. Sed suppositum non solum constituitur per naturam speciei, sed etiam alia quaedam potest habere. Et ideo nihil prohibet naturam aliquam attribui supposito alterius naturae. | 11: Nature is not related to suppositum in the same way as form is related to matter. For matter is not constituted in being except through a form; and thus form requires determinate matter which it [i.e. the form] may make to exist actually. But a suppositum is constituted not only through the nature of a species, but it can also have certain other things. Thus, nothing prevents some nature being attributed to a suppositum of another nature. |
| Ad duodecimum dicendum quod natura divina praedicatur de persona divina propter identitatem rei, non autem secundum proprietatem modi significandi. Et ideo non oportet quod supposito uno supponatur alterum; quia etiam in divinis haec est vera: persona generat; non tamen haec est vera: essentia generat. | 12: The divine nature is predicated of the divine person according to the identity of the thing, but not according to the suitability of the mode of signifying. Thus it is not necessary for one suppositum to take the place of the other; since this is also true in divine things: "the person begets"; yet, this is not true, "The essence begets". |
| Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod humana natura unita est verbo, non quidem accidentaliter, neque etiam essentialiter, quasi pertinens ad divinam naturam verbi; sed substantialiter, id est hypostatice, quasi pertinens ad verbi hypostasim vel personam. | 13: Human nature was united to the Word certainly not accidentally, nor also essentially, as if pertaining to the divine nature of the Word; but substantially, that is hypostatically, as if pertaining to the hypostasis or person of the Word. |
| Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod persona verbi comprehenditur sub natura verbi, nec potest se ad aliquid ultra extendere. Sed natura verbi, ratione suae infinitatis, comprehendit omnem naturam finitam. Et ideo, cum persona verbi assumit naturam humanam, non se extendit ultra naturam divinam, sed magis accipit quod est infra. Unde dicitur Ad Philipp. ii, quod cum in forma Dei esset Dei Filius, semetipsum exinanivit; non quidem deponens magnitudinem formae dei, sed assumens parvitatem humanae naturae. | 14: The person of the Word is included under the nature of the Word, nor can it extend itself to something beyond. But the nature of the Word, by reason of its own infinity, includes every finite nature. Thus, when the person of the Word assumes human nature, it does not extend itself beyond the divine nature, but the greater receives what is beneath it. Hence, it is said in Philippians (2:6-7) that "while" the Son of God "was in the form of God, he emptied his very self." Not only laying aside the greatness of the form of God, but also assuming the smallness of human nature. |
| Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod sicut natura verbi est infinita, ita et persona verbi infinita est. Et ideo natura divina verbi correspondet ex aequo ipsi personae verbi secundum se. Natura autem humana correspondet verbo secundum quod factum est homo. Unde non oportet quod natura sit simplicior et formalior illo homine qui est verbum caro factum, et constituens ipsum in quantum est homo. | 15: Just as the nature of the Word is infinite, so too the person of the Word is infinite. Thus, the divine nature of the Word corresponds equally to the person of the Word in itself from an equality. But, human nature corresponds to the Word inasmuch as it was made man. Hence, it is not necessary that the nature is simpler and more formal than that man who is the Word made flesh and constituting himself inasmuch as he is a man. |
| Ad decimumsextum dicendum quod actio est suppositi secundum aliquam naturam vel formam; et ideo non solum diversificantur actiones secundum diversitatem suppositorum, sed etiam secundum diversitatem naturae vel formae. Sicut etiam in uno et eodem homine alia actio est videre, et alia audire, propter diversas potentias. Unde in Christo propter duas naturas sunt duae actiones, licet sit una persona vel hypostasis. | 16: Action is of a suppositum according to some nature or form; and thus actions are not only diversified according to the diversity of supposits, but also according the diversity of nature or form. Just as also one action is seeing and another is hearing in one and the same man on account of diverse powers. Hence, there are two actions in Christ on account of the two natures, although there is one person or hypostasis. |
| Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod persona est quidem substantia distincta proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente, non autem secundum quod substantia significat essentiam vel naturam, sed secundum quod significat hypostasim. | 17: A person is indeed a substance distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity, but not insofar as substance signifies an essence or nature, but inasmuch as it signifies a hypostasis. |