Question Twenty-Two: The Tendency to Good and the Will
ARTICLE I
The question is about the tendency to good and the will,
and in the first article we ask:
Do all things tend to good?
[Parallel readings: De ver., 21, 2; C.G., III, 16; S.T., I, 5, 1; 80, 1.]
Difficulties
It seems that they do not, for
1. Being is related to the true and to good in the same way since it is interchanged with either one. Furthermore, tendency is related to good as cognition is to the true. But not every being knows the true. Neither, then, does every being tend to good.
2.When the prior is removed the posterior also is removed. But in an animal cognition precedes appetitive tendency. Cognition, however, in no sense extends to inanimate things so that we could say that they know naturally. Neither, then, does appetitive tendency extend to them so that we could say that they naturally tend to good.
3. According to Boethius’ a thing is said to tend to something else inasmuch as it is like it. If, then, something tends to good, it must be like good. But since things are alike which have the same quality or form, the form of good must be in whatever tends to good. Now it cannot be there according to the thing’s real existence, because it would then no longer tend; for what someone has he does not seek. The form of good must therefore pre-exist intentionally in the being which tends to good. But anything which has something else in it in this manner is cognitive. Only in cognitive beings, therefore, can there be a tendency to good; and so the conclusion is the same as before.
4. If all things tend to good, this must be understood of a good which all can have, because nothing tends either naturally or rationally to what is impossible for it to have. But the only good extending to all beings is existence. It is therefore the same to say that all things tend to good as that they tend to existence. Now not all things tend to existence; in fact it seems that none do, because all have existence and nothing tends except to what it does not have, as is made clear by Augustine and the Philosopher. Not all things, therefore, tend to good.
5. The one, the true, and the good are all equally interchanged with being. But not all beings tend to the one and the true. Neither, then, do they tend to the good.
6. Some people who know the right thing to do act contrary to this knowledge, according to the Philosopher.Now they would not this knowledge, according so act if they did not desire or will to do so. But what is against reason is evil. Some people therefore tend to evil, and so not all tend to good.
7. The good which all things are said to tend to, as the Commentator says, is to be. But some people do not seek to be but rather not to be—the damned in hell, for instance, who desire even the death of the soul —so that they should not exist at all. Not everything, therefore, seeks good.
8. The appetitive powers stand to their objects in just the same relation as the apprehensive to theirs. But an apprehensive power has to be devoid of the species of its object in order to be able to know, as the pupil of the eye must be without color. Hence whatever tends to good must also be devoid of the species of good. But everything has the species of good. Therefore nothing tends to good.
9. To work for an end belongs to the Creator, to nature, and to an agent who acts with a purpose. But the Creator and a created agent with a purpose, such as man, in working for an end and desiring and loving good, have knowledge of the end or good. Then since nature is in a sense intermediate between the two, presupposing the work of creation and being presupposed in the work of art, if it takes pleasure in seeking the end for which it works, it too must know that end. But it does not have knowledge. Then the things of nature also do not tend to good.
10. Whatever is tended to is sought. But according to Plato, nothing of which knowledge is not had can be sought. Thus if anyone were to seek a runaway slave without having any knowledge of his appearance, upon finding him he would not know that he had done so. Hence things which do not have knowledge of good do not tend to it.
11. To strive for an end belongs to what is directed to an end. But the last end, God, is not directed to an end. He does not, then, strive for an end or good; and so not everything tends to good.
12. A nature is determined to one thing. Then if things naturally tend to good, they should not naturally tend to anything else. But all things seek peace, as Augustine and Dionysius explain, and also the beautiful, as Dionysius also says. Consequently not all things naturally tend to good.
13. Just as a person strives for an end when he does not have it, he also takes pleasure in it when he has it. But we do not say that inanimate things take pleasure in good. Neither, then, should we say that they tend to good.
To the Contrary
1. Dionysius says: “Existents desire the beautiful and the good; and whatever they do, they do because it seems good. The intention of all existents has as its principle and term the good.”
2. The Philosopher says” that some have defined good well by saying that it is “what all things tend to.”
3. Whatever acts, acts for an end, as is made clear by the Philosopher. But whatever acts for something tends to it. Therefore everything tends to an end and to good, which has the character of an end. Everything seeks its own perfection. But by the fact that a thing is perfect it is good. Everything therefore seeks good.
REPLY
All things, not only those which have knowledge but also those which are without it, tend to good. To understand this it will help to bear in mind that some of the ancient philosophers taught that wellsuited effects in nature come about from the necessity of their prior causes, though the natural causes themselves have not been disposed in that particular way with a view to the suitability of the effects.
With this opinion the Philosopher finds fault ‘14 because according to it, unless such suitabilities and aptnesses were in some sense intended, they would come about by chance and so would not happen most of the time but only rarely, like other things which we say happen by chance. Hence we must say that all natural things are ordained and disposed to their well-adapted effects.
There are two ways in which a thing may be ordained or directed to something else as its end: (1) by itself, as a man directs himself to the place where he is going; and (2) by something else, as an arrow is aimed at a definite spot by the archer. Nothing can direct itself to an end unless it knows the end, for the one directing must have knowledge of that to which he directs. But even things which do not know the end can be directed to a definite end, as is evident from the arrow.
This can come about in two ways. (1) Sometimes what is directed to an end is merely driven or moved by the one directing it without acquiring from the director any form by which such a direction or inclination belongs to it. Such an inclination, like that by which the arrow is aimed by the archer at a definite target, is violent. (2) Sometimes what is directed or inclined to an end acquires from the director or mover some form by which such an inclination belongs to it. In that case the inclination will be natural, having a natural principle. Thus He who gave heaviness to the stone inclined it to be borne downward naturally. In this way the one who begets them is the mover in regard to heavy and light things, according to the Philosopher.
It is after this fashion that all natural things are inclined to what is suitable for them, having Within themselves some principle of their inclination in virtue of which that inclination is natural, so that in a way they Igo themselves and are not merely led to their due ends. Things moved by violence are only led, because they contribute nothing to the mover. But natural things go to their ends inasmuch as they cooperate with the one inclining and directing them through a principle implanted in them.
What is directed or inclined to something by another is inclined to that which is intended by the one inclining or directing it. The arrow, for example, is directed to the same target at which the archer aims. Consequently, since all natural things have been inclined by a certain natural inclination toward their ends by the prime mover, God, that to which everything is naturally inclined must be what is willed or intended by God. But since God can have no end for His will other than Himself and He is the very essence of goodness, all other things must be naturally inclined to good. To desire or have appetency (appetere) is nothing else but to strive for something (ad aliquid petere), stretching, as it were, toward something which is destined for oneself.
Accordingly, since all things are destined and directed by God to good, and this is done in such a way that in each one is a principle by which it tends of itself to good as if seeking good itself, it is necessary to say that all things naturally tend to good. If all things were inclined to good without having within themselves any principle of inclination, they could be said to be led to good, but not to be tending toward it. But in virtue of an innate principle all things are said to tend to good as if reaching for it of their own accord. For this reason it is said in Wisdom (8: 1) that divine wisdom “ordereth all things sweetly” because each one by its own motion tends to that for which it has been divinely destined.
Answers to Difficulties
1. The true and good are somewhat similarly related to being, and also somewhat dissimilarly. From the viewpoint of predicative interchangeability they are similarly related, for every being is good just as it is true. But as perfecting causes they are dissimilarly related; for the true, unlike good, does not stand as a perfecting cause to all beings, because the perfection of the true is considered from the point of view of the specific character only. Only immaterial beings, then, can be perfected by the true, because only they can receive the specific character without its material act of existing. But good, being perfective both in regard to the specific character and in regard to the act of existing, can perfect material beings as well as immaterial. All things can accordingly tend to good, but not all can know the true.
2. Some say that there is natural cognition in all things just as there is a natural appetitive tendency. But this cannot be true because, in view of the fact that cognition is by assimilation, likeness in real existence does not bring about cognition but rather hinders it. It is for this reason that the sense organs must be devoid of sensible species in order to be able to receive them by way of the spiritual existence which causes knowledge. Hence those things which in no way receive anything except according to material existence can in no way know. Yet they can tend inasmuch as they are directed to something having real existence. Appetitive tendency does not necessarily look to a spiritual existence as does cognition. Hence there can be a natural appetite but not a natural cognition. This still does not prevent appetite from following cognition in animals, because even in the things of nature it follows apprehension or cognition—not that of the things which have the appetite but that of Him who directs them to their end.
3. Whatever tends to anything tends to it in so far as that thing has some likeness to itself. And a likeness in spiritual existence does not suffice; otherwise an animal would have to tend to whatever it knows. The likeness must be one in real existence. Now this likeness may be taken in two ways: (1) in so far as the form of one thing is in another with perfect actuality; and in this case there does not follow from likeness to the end a tendency to the end, but repose in it; and (2) in so far as the form of one is in another incompletely, i.e., potentially; and so, by reason of the potential possession of the form of the end and of good, the thing tends to good or its end and desires it. It is in this sense, as having form within it potentially, that matter is said to desire form. The more, then, that potentiality is achieved and brought closer to actuality, the more vigorous is the inclination which it causes. This is why any natural motion is intensified near the end when the thing tending to the end is more like that end.
4. When we say that all things tend to good, good is not to be restricted to this or that but to be taken in its generality, because each being naturally tends to a good suitable to itself. If, notwithstanding, the term good is limited to some single good, that will be the act of being. Nor is this prevented by the fact that all things have the act of being, because whatever has being desires its continuance and what actually has being in one way has it only potentially in another. Thus air is actually air and potentially fire. And so what actually has being desires to be actually.
5. The one and the true do not have the character of an end as does good; and so they do not have the character of the appetible either. Even those who act contrary to reason are seeking good directly.
6. A man who fornicates, for instance, is interested in something good and pleasurable to sense. That the act is bad from the viewpoint of reason is beyond his intention. Good is accordingly desired directly; evil, indirectly.
7. A thing is appetible in the same way as it is good. It was said above that in its substantial act of being a thing is not called good simply and absolutely unless other due perfections are added. The substantial act of being is accordingly not appetible in an absolute sense if its due perfections are not joined to it. Hence the Philosopher says: “To be is delightful to all things.” But we are not to understand an evil and corrupt life or a sorrowful one, for this is evil simply and is simply to be shunned, though it is appetible in a certain respect. In the matter of seeking and shunning, it is all of a piece for a thing to be good and to be destructive of evil, or again to be evil and to be destructive of good. Hence we call the very lack of evil a good, as the Philosopher points out. Non-existence therefore assumes the aspect of a good inasmuch as it takes away being in a state of sorrow or wickedness, which is simply evil, although it is good in some respect. In this sense non-existence can be desired under the aspect of good.
8. Concerning apprehensive powers it is not always true that the power is altogether devoid of the species of its object. It is false in regard to those powers which have a universal object, as in the case of the intellect, whose object is the what although it has whatness itself. Yet it must be devoid of the forms which it receives. It is false also in regard to touch, because, although it has special objects, they nevertheless necessarily belong to an animal. Thus its organ cannot be wholly without warmth and cold; and yet it is somehow independent of heat and cold, being of an intermediate make-up. But what is intermediate is neither of the extremes. Now appetitive tendency has a common object, good. Hence it is not altogether devoid of good, but just of that good to which it tends. It nevertheless has that good potentially and in this respect is like it, just as an apprehensive power is in potency to the species of its object.
9. As is clear from what has been said, knowledge of the end is required in everyone directing anything to an end. Nature, however, does not direct to an end but is directed. But God and also any purposeful agent direct to an end, and so they must have knowledge of the end, but not a thing of nature.
10. That argument is correct in regard to a being that tends to an end by directing itself towards it, because it has to know when it has reached the end. But there is no such necessity in a thing which is merely being directed to its end.
11. By the same nature by which a thing tends to an end which it does not yet have, it delights in an end which it already has. Thus by the same nature the element earth moves downward and rests there. Now it is not consonant with the last end to tend to an end, but it is consonant with it to take pleasure in itself as an end. Though this cannot properly be called an appetite, still it is something belonging to the genus of appetite, and from it all appetite is derived. For from the fact that God takes pleasure in Himself, He directs other things to Himself.
12. If appetite terminates in good and peace and the beautiful, this does not mean that it terminates in different goals. By the very fact of tending to good a thing at the same time tends to the beautiful and to peace. It tends to the beautiful inasmuch as it is proportioned and specified in itself. These notes are included in the essential character of good, but good adds a relationsf~p of what is perfective in regard to other things. Whoever tends to good, then, by that very fact tends to the beautiful. Peace, moreover, implies the removal of disturbances or obstacles to the obtaining of good. By the very fact that something is desired, the removal of obstacles to it is also desired. Consequently, at the same time and by the same appetitive tendency good, the beautiful, and peace are sought.
13. Pleasure includes in its notion knowledge of the good which gives pleasure. For this reason only things which know the end can take pleasure in an end. But appetitive tendency does not entail knowledge in the being which tends, as is evident from what has been said. Nevertheless, using pleasure broadly and improperly, Dionysius says that what is beautiful and good is found by all to be pleasurable and lovable.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
ARTICLE II
In the second article we ask:
Do all things tend to God himself?
[Parallel readings: II Sent., 1, 2, 1; C.G.., III, 17 & 18; S.T., I, 6, 1 c & ad 2; 44, 4; Comp. theol., I, 100 & 101.]
Difficulties
It seems that they do not, for
1. Things are oriented to God as knowable and appetible. But not all things oriented to God as knowable know Him, for not all cognitive beings know God. Therefore, neither do all things oriented to Him as appetible tend to Him.
2. The good which is desired by all things is, in the opinion of the Philosopher, existence, as the Commentator maintains. But God is not the existence of all. Then God is not the good which is desired by all.
3. No one seeks what he flees from. But some people flee from God, as is had in the Psalms (73:23): “The pride of them that hate thee ascendeth continually.” And Job (21:14) says: “[They] have said to God: Depart from us.” Hence not all things seek God.
4. No one seeks what he has. But some, the blessed who enjoy the possession of Him, have God. Then not all things seek Him.
5. There is a natural appetite only for what can be had. But only a rational creature can have God, since it alone is made to the image of God and “is the image of God by the very fact of having a capacity for Him,” as Augustine says. Not all things, then, naturally seek God.
To the Contrary
1. There is the statement of Augustine: “Whatever can love loves God.” But all things can love because all seek good. Then all seek God.
2. Everything naturally tends to the end for which it exists. But all things are ordained to God as their end; for as is written in Proverbs (16:4): “The Lord hath made all things for himself.” All things, therefore, naturally tend to God.
REPLY
All things naturally tend to God implicitly, but not explicitly. That this may appear clearly it should be observed that a secondary cause can influence its effect only in so far as it receives the power of the first cause. The influence of an efficient cause is to act; that of a final cause is to be sought or desired. A secondary agent acts only by the efficacy of the first agent existing in it; similarly a secondary end is sought only by reason of the worth of the principal end existing in it inasmuch as it is subordinated to the principal end or has its likeness.
Accordingly, because God is the last end, He is sought in every end, just as, because He is the first efficient cause, He acts in every agent. But this is what tending to God implicitly, means. For the efficacy of the first cause is in the second as the principles of reasoning are in the conclusions. But to reduce conclusions to their principles or secondary causes to their first causes belongs only to the power of reasoning. Hence only a rational nature can trace secondary ends back to God by a sort of analytic procedure so as to seek God Himself explicitly. In demonstrative sciences a conclusion is correctly drawn only by a reduction to first principles. In the same way the appetite of a rational creature is correctly directed only by an explicit appetitive tendency to God, either actual or habitual.
Answers to Difficulties
1. All cognitive beings also know God implicitly in any object of knowledge. Just as nothing has the note of appetibility except by a likeness to the first goodness, so nothing is knowable except by a likeness to the first truth.
2. Created existence is itself a likeness to the divine goodness. So in desiring to be, things implicitly desire a likeness to God and God Himself.
3. God can be viewed in two ways, in Himself and in His effects. Viewed in Himself He cannot but be loved since He is the very essence of goodness. Hence He is loved in His essence by all who see Him; and to the extent that each one knows Him each loves Him. But viewed in some of His effects, e.g., punishment or commands that seem onerous, seeing that they are contrary to our will, God is shunned and, in a sense, hated. And yet those who hate Him in some of His eff ects necessarily love Him in others. Thus even the devils, as Dionysius teaches, naturally desire to be and to live, and in this respect seek and love God Himself.
4. The blessed who already enjoy the possession of God desire the continuance of their enjoyment. Furthermore, the enjoyment itself is a sort of appetite perfected by its object, although the name appetite implies imperfection.
5. Only a rational creature has the capacity for God because only it can know and love Him explicitly. But other creatures too participate in a likeness to God and so tend to Him.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
ARTICLE III
In the third article we ask:
Is appetite a special power of the soul?
[Parallel readings: III Sent., 27, 1, 2; S.T., I, 80, 1.]
Difficulties
It seems that it is not, for
1. The powers of the soul are ordained only to vital operations. Now those operations are called vital by which animate things are distinguished from inanimate. But it is not as regards tending that animate things are distinguished from inanimate, because even the inanimate tend to good. Appetite is therefore not a special power of the soul.
2. Appetite is nothing, it seems, but a sort of direction to an end. But natural appetite suffices for a thing to be directed to an end. So there is no necessity of adding an animal appetite which would be a special power of the soul.
3. Operations and powers are differentiated as to their terms. But there is the same term, good, for both natural and animal appetite. It is therefore the same power or operation. But natural appetite is not a power of the soul. Then neither is animal appetite.
4. Appetite is for what is not had, according to Augustine. But in the case of animals the good is already had by knowledge. Therefore there does not follow upon knowledge among animals any appetite which would call for a special power.
5. A special power is destined for a special act, not for an act corn mon to all the powers of the soul. But to tend to good is common to all the powers of the soul. This is apparent from the fact that every power tends to its object and takes pleasure in it. Therefore appetite is not a special power of the soul.
6. If the appetitive power tends to good, it tends either to good in general or to what is good for itself. Now if it should tend to good in general, since every other power tends to some particular good, the appetitive power will not be a special power but a universal one. But if it tends to what is good for itself, since every other power also tends to what is good for itself, every other power can for the same reason be called an appetite. There will therefore not be any power of the soul which can be called appetite in a special way.
To the Contrary
The Philosopher posits the appetitive part as a special power of the soul.
REPLY
Appetite is a special power of the soul. In this regard it should be noted that, since the powers of the soul are destined for operations proper to animate beings, an operation has a special power of the soul appointed for it for the reason that it is an operation proper to an animate being. There is found, indeed, a certain operation which from one point of view is common to both animate and inanimate beings but from another is proper to animate beings; for instance, to be moved or generated.
Spiritual things considered in themselves have such a nature as to move but not to be moved. Bodies, however, are moved; and though one can move another, still no one of them can move itself. For things which move themselves are divided into two parts, one of which is the mover, the other, moved, as is shown in the Physics.
But this cannot be realized in purelycorporeal beings, because their forms cannot be movers, though they can be the principle of motion in the sense of that by which something is moved. In the movement of the element earth, for instance, heaviness is the principle by which it is moved but yet is not the mover. This is so both because of the simplicity of inanimate bodies, which do not have enough diversity in their parts for one to originate motion and another to be moved, and also because of the baseness and materiality of their forms, which, being far removed from the separated forms to which it belongs to move, do not retain the ability to move but only the function of being principles of motion.
Animate things, however, are composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature. There can accordingly be in them a moving part and another moved—both locally and in other ways. And so, inasmuch as to be moved is made an action proper to animate beings in the sense that they move themselves to definite species of movement, there is found in animals a hierarchy of special powers. Thus for locomotion in animals there is a motive power; and in plants and animals alike, a power of growth for the movement of growing, a nutritive power for the movement of alteration, and a generative power for the movement of generation. To tend, which is in a way common to all things, likewise becomes in a way special for animate beings, or rather animals, inasmuch as there are found in them appetite and what moves the appetite. This latter, according to the Philosopher, is the apprehended good itself. Hence, just as animals more than other things are moved of themselves, so too they tend of themselves. For this reason the appetitive power is a special faculty in the soul in the same way as the motive power.
Answers to Difficulties
1. The solution is clear from what has already been said.
2. It is prccisely because animals are capable of participating in divine goodness a more eminent way than other, inferior things, that they have need of many operations and helps to their perfection. A man who can gain perfect health by much exercise is nearer to health than one who can attain only a little health and needs for this only a little exercise—to use the example given by the Philosopher. Now a natural appetite is determined to a single object and cannot be so diversely oriented that it extends to as many different things as animals have need of. For this reason it was necessary for animals to be supplied in addition with an animal appetite consequent upon apprehension so that among many objects of apprehension the animal would be attracted to different ones.
3. Although good is sought by both natural and animal appetite, nevertheless by its natural appetite a thing does not of itself seek good as it does by its animal appetite. Consequently for the seeking of good by animal appetite there is required a power which is not required for the exercise of natural appetite. Furthermore the good to which a natural appetite tends is definite and always the same; but this is not true of the good sought by an animal appetite. And the same can be applied to the motive power.
4. The being which desires a good does not seek to have the good according to its intentional existence, as it is had by one who knows it, but according to its essential or real existence. Consequently the fact that an animal possesses the good by knowing it does not keep it from being able to desire it.
5. Every power tends to its object by a natural appetite. But animal appetite belongs to a special power. And because natural appetite is determined to a single object whereas animal appetite follows apprehension, individual powers tend to a determined good but the appetitive faculty tends to any good apprehended. Yet it does not follow that it is a universal power, since it tends to good in a special way.
6. The solution to this difficulty is evident from what has just been said.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
ARTICLE IV
In the fourth article we ask:
In rational beings is will a power distinct from sense appetite?
[Parallel readings: De ver., 25, 1; III Sent., 26,1, 2 sol. & ad 2; C.G., II, 47; In III de an., 14, nn. 802-06; 15, n. 831; S.T., I, 80, 2.]
Difficulties
it seems that it is not, for
1. An accidental difference in objects does not distinguish powers. But the objects of the, will and of the sense appetite are differentiated only by accidental differences in good, which is essentially the object of appetite. They do not, indeed, seem to differ except inasmuch as the will has as its object the good apprehended by the intellect, and sense appetite, that apprehended by sense. But these differences are accidental to good as such. Therefore the will is not a power distinct from sense appetite.
2. Sensitive and intellectual apprehensive powers differ as particular and universal, for sense apprehends particulars and intellect universals. But the appetite of the sensitive and intellective parts cannot be distinguished in this way, because any appetite is for the good as it exists in reality. This, however, is not universal but singular. The rational appetite—the will—must therefore not be said to be a power other than sense appetite as intellect is other than sense.
3. The motive power follows the appetitive just as the appetitive follows apprehension. But the motive power is not one thing in rational beings and another in irrational. Then neither is the appetitive. And so the conclusion is the same as before.
4. The Philosopher distinguishes five kinds of powers and operations of the soul. One includes generation, nutrition, and growth; the second is sense; the third, appetite; the fourth, locomotion; and the fifth, intellect. Intellect is here distinguished from sense, but not intellective appetite from sense appetite. It therefore seems that a higher appetitive power is not distinguished from a lower as a higher apprehensive power is distinguished from a lower.
To the Contrary
1. The Philosopher distinguishes the will from sense appetite.
2. All things that stand in a series must be distinct. But intellective appetite is higher than that of sense according to the Philosopher, and even moves it “as sphere moves sphere,” as he says in the same place. The will is therefore a power other than sense appetite.
REPLY
The will is a power distinct from sense appetite. It should be noted in this connection that rational appetite is distinguished from that of sense in just the same way as sensitive appetite is distinguished from that of nature—because of a more perfect way of tending. The closer a nature is to God, the more pronounced is the likeness of the divine excellence which is found in it. Now it belongs to the divine excellence to move and incline and direct all things while not being moved, inclined, or directed by any other. Hence the nearer a nature is to God, the less it is inclined by another and the more it is capable of inclining itself.
An insensible nature, therefore, being by reason of its materiality the farthest removed from God, is inclined to an end, to be sure, but has within it nothing which inclines, but only a principle of inclination, as was explained above.
A sensitive nature, however, being closer to God, has within itself something which inclines, 1.e., the apprehended object of appetite. Yet this inclination is not within the control of the animal which is inclined but is determined by something else. An animal is not able at the sight of something attractive not to crave it, because animals do not themselves have the mastery over their own inclination. Hence “they do not act but are rather acted upon,” as Damascene says. This is because the sensuous appetitive power has a bodily organ and so is nearly in the condition of matter and of corporeal things so as rather to be moved than to move.
But a rational nature, being closest to God, not merely, like inanimate things, has an inclination to something, and, like a sentient nature, a mover of this inclination determined as it were extrinsically, but further so has its inclination within its own power that it does not necessarily incline to anything appetible which is apprehended, but can incline or not incline. And so its inclination is not determined for it by anything else but by itself. This belongs to it inasmuch as it does not use abodily organ; and so, getting farther away from the nature of what is moved, it approaches that of what moves and acts. It can come about that something determines for itself its inclination to an end only if it knows the end and the bearing of the end upon the means to it. But this belongs to reason alone. Thus such an appetite, which is not determined of necessity by something else, follows the apprehension of reason. Hence, rational appetite, called will, is a power distinct from sense appetite.
Answers to Difficulties
1. The will is not distinguished from sense appetite directly on the basis of the apprehension which it follows but on that of determining one’s inclination for oneself or having it determined by another. These two sorts of inclination require different kinds of powers. And such a diversity further demands a difference in the apprehensions, as appears from what has been said. Hence the distinction of the appedtive powers is more or less resultantly based upon the distinction of the apprehensive, not principally.
2. Although appetite always looks to something existing in reality as a particular and not as a universal, nevertheless it is sometimes moved to tend by the apprehension of some universal condition. We tend to this particular good, for instance, from the consideration of the fact that we look upon good as simply to be sought. At other times we tend as a result of the apprehension of a particular thing in its particularity. Thus appetite is distinguished into universal and particular in a secondary sense, Just as it is distinguished in a secondary sense according to the difference in the apprehension which it follows.
3. Motion and operations are found in singulars. But there can be a descent from a universal proposition to a particular conclusion only through the mediation of a particular assumption. Now in matters of operating the choice of a deed is a sort of conclusion, as is said in the Ethics. A universal conception of the intellect, accordingly, can be applied to the choice of a deed only by means of a particular apprehension. Consequently the motion which follows upon a universal apprehension of the intellect by means of a particular sense apprehension does not require one motive power corresponding to intellect and another corresponding to sense, as is true of the appetite which follows apprehension immediately. Moreover, the motive power in question in the difficulty, that which is commanded, is a power attached to the muscles and nerves. Hence it cannot pertain to the intellective part, which uses no organ.
4. Because sense and the intellect diff er according to the formal aspects of the apprehensible in so far as it is apprehensible, they therefore belong to different genera of powers. Sense is concerned with apprehending the particular; the intellect, with apprehending the universal. But higher and lower appetite are not differentiated by differences in the appetible as such, since either appetite sometimes tends to the same good. They differ rather in their different ways of tending, as is evident from what has been said. Hence they are indeed distinct powers but not distinct kinds of powers.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
ARTICLE V
In the fifth article we ask:
Does the will will anything necessarily?
[Parallel readings: II Sent., 25, a. 2; S.T., I, 82, 1; I-II, 10, 1; De malo, 6.]
Difficulties
It seems that it does, for
1. According to Augustine’ all seek happiness “with a single will.” But what is sought by all in common is sought of necessity; for if it were not of necessity, it might chance not to be sought by someone. The will therefore wills something necessarily.
2. Every cause of motion having perfect efficacy moves its object of necessity. But according to the Philosopher good as apprehended is the cause of the motion of the will. Therefore, since something is a perfect good, viz., God and beatitude, as is said in the Ethics, there will be something which will move the will with necessity. And so something is desired by the will necessarily.
3. Immateriality is the reason why a given power cannot be forced; for powers connected with organs are forced, as appears especially in regard to the motive power. But the intellect is a more immaterial power than the will. This is clear from the fact that it has a more immaterial object, the universal, whereas the object of the will is the good existing in particular things. Since, then, the intellect is forced to hold something of necessity, as is said in the Metaphysics, it seems that the will also tends to something of necessity.
4. Necessity is removed from the will only by reason of freedom, to which necessity seems to be opposed. But not every sort of necessity prevents freedom. Hence Augustine says: “If necessity is defined to be that according to which we say: ‘It is necessary for something to be or to become thus and so, I do not know why we should fear that it will take away the freedom of the will.” The will therefore of necessity wills something.
5. Necessary means unable not to be. But God is unable not to will good just as He is unable not to be good. He therefore necessarily wills good; and so some will wills something necessarily.
6. According to Gregory “a sin which is not wiped out by repentance, by its own weight soon draws a person to another.” But a sin is not committed unless it is done voluntarily, as Augustine teaches..Since drawing is a violent motion, as is made clear in the Physics, one can accordingly be violently forced to will something of necessity.
7. Following Augustine, the Master says: “In the second state (the state of guilt) man cannot avoid sinning even mortally before reparation and at least venially after reparation.” But both mortal and venial sin are voluntary. There is therefore a state of man in which he is unable not to will something which constitutes a sin. And so the will of necessity wills something.
8. The more a thing is disposed by nature to cause motion, the more it is disposed to impose necessity. But good can cause motion more than what is true, since good is in things but what is true is only in thought, as is said in the Metaphysics. Therefore, since what is true forces the intellect, with all the more reason does good force the will.
9. Good makes a stronger impression than truth. This is evident from the fact that love, which is the imprint left by the impact of good, is more conducive to unity than knowledge, which is the imprint left by the impact of truth. For according to Augustine, love is a sort of life uniting the lover to the beloved. Good can therefore impose necessity upon the will more than truth can upon the intellect. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.
10. The more power a faculty has over its objects, the less it can be forced by them. But reason has more power over its objects than will; for according to Augustine, reason forms within itself the species of things, and the will does not, but is moved by appetible things. The will can therefore be forced by its objects more than reason can by its own. And so the same conclusion is reached as before.
11. What is in something essentially is in it of necessity. But to will something is in the will essentially. Therefore the will wills something of necessity. Proof of the minor: The highest good is willed essentially. Therefore whenever the will is directed to it, it wills essentially. But then it is always directed to it because it is so naturally. Therefore the will always essentially wills the highest good.
12. In scientific knowledge necessity is found. Now just as all men naturally want to know, as the Philosopher says, so too do they naturally will good. In willing good necessity is therefore found.
13. The Gloss says that the will “naturally wills good.”But things which are in something by nature are necessary. Therefore the will necessarily wills good.
14 Whatever is increased or diminished canalso be taken away entireily. But the freedom of the will is increased or diminished, for before the fall man had freer choice than after the fall, according to Augustine.” The freedom of the will can therefore be taken away entirely. And so the will can be forced with necessity.
To the Contrary
1. According to Augustine, if anything is voluntary, it is not necessary. But whatever we will is voluntary. The will therefore does not will anything necessarily.
2. Bernard says that free choice is the most powerful thing under God. But such a thing cannot be forced by anyone. The will therefore cannot be forced to will something of necessity.
3. Freedom is opposed to necessity. But the will is free. Therefore it does not will anything of necessity.
4. Bernard says that our choice, which is free because of our innate will, is moved by no necessity. But the dignity of the will cannot be taken away. The will therefore cannot will anything of necessity.
5. Rational faculties are open to opposites according to the Philosopher. But the will is a rational faculty, for it is in reason, as is said in The Soul. It is therefore open to opposites, and so it is not determined to anything necessarily.
6. Whatever is determined to something of necessity is naturally determined to it. But the will is distinguished from natural appetite. It therefore does not will anything of necessity.
7. From the fact that something is voluntary it is said to be in us in such a way that we are masters of it. But we can will or not will anything within us of which we are masters. Therefore, whatever the will wills it can will or not will. Thus it does not will anything necessarily.
REPLY
As can be gathered from the words of Augustine,2 necessity is of two kinds: (1) the necessity of force; and this can by no means apply to the will; and (2) the necessity of natural inclination, as we say that (sod necessarily lives; and with such necessity the will necessarily wills something.
For an understanding of this it should be noted that among things arranged in an order the first must be included in the second, and in the second must be found not only what belongs to it by its own nature but also what belongs to it according to the nature of the first. Thus it is the lot of man not only to make use of reason, as belongs to him in accordance with his specific difference, rational; but also to make use of senses and food, as belongs to him in accordance with his genus, animal or living being. In like manner we see among the senses that the sense of touch is a sort of foundation for the other senses and that in the organ of each sense there is found not only the distinctive characteristic of the sense whose proper organ it is, but also the characteristics of touch. Thus the eye not only senses white and black as the organ of sight, but also as the organ of touch senses heat and cold and is destroyed by an excess in them.
Now nature and the will stand in such an order that the will itself is a nature, because whatever is found in reality is called a nature. There must accordingly be found in the will not only what is proper to the will but also what is proper to nature. It belongs to any created nature, however, to be ordained by God for good, naturally tending to it. Hence even in the will there is a certain natural appetite for the good corresponding to it. And it has, moreover, the tendency to something according to its own determination and not from necessity. This belongs to it inasmuch as it is the will.
Just as there is an ordination of nature to the will, there is, moreover, a parallel ordination of the things which the will naturally wills to those in regard to which it is determined of itself and not by nature. Thus, just as nature is the foundation of will, similarly the object of natural appetite is the principle and foundation of the other objects of appetite. Now among the objects of appetite the end is the foundation and principle of the means to the end, because the latter, being for the sake of the end, are not desired except: by reason of the end. Accordingly what the will necessarily wills, determined to it by a natural inclination, is the last end, happiness, and whatever is included in it: to be, knowledge of truth, and the like. But it is determined to other things, not by a natural inclination, but by so disposing itself without any necessity.
Although the will wills the last end by a certain necessary inclination, it is nevertheless in no way to be granted that it is forced to will it. For force is nothing else but the infliction of some violence. According to the Philosopher that is violent “whose principle is outside it with the being which suffers the violence contributing nothing.” The throwing of a stone upward would be an example, because the stone of itself is not at all inclined to that motion. But seeing that the will is an inclination by the fact of its being an appetite, it cannot happen that the will should will anything without having an inclination to it. Thus it is impossible for the will to will anything by force or violently even though it does will something by a natural inclination. It is therefore evident that the will does not will anything necessarily with the necessity of force, yet it does will something necessarily with the necessity of natural inclination.
Answers to Difficulties
1. That common appetite for happiness does not come from any forcing but from a natural inclination.
2. However effectively a good moves the will, it still cannot force it; because as soon as we posit that the will wills something, we posit that it has an inclination to it. But that is the contrary of force. It does happen, however, that because of the excellence of a good the will is determined to it by an inclination of natural necessity.
3. The intellect naturally understands something just as the will naturally wills. But force is not contrary to the intellect in its very notion as it is to the will. For although the intellect has an inclination to something, it nevertheless does not designate a man’s inclination itself, whereas the will does designate the very inclination of the man. Hence whatever happens according to the will happens according to the man’s inclination and so cannot be violent. But the operation of the intellect can be against a man’s inclination, his will. This occurs, for instance, when a certain opinion pleases him but because of the force of the arguments he is brought by his intellect to assent to the contrary.
4. Augustine is speaking of natural necessity, which we do not exclude from the will in regard to certain things. This necessity is also found in the divine will just as it is found in the divine existence; for God is necessary essentially, as is said in the Metaphysics.
5. From what has just been said the answer is clear.
6. A sin committed does not draw a man by forcing his will but by inclining it, inasmuch as it deprives the man of the grace by which he is strengthened against sin, and also inasmuch as there is left in the soul from the act of sinning a disposition or habit inclining it to subsequent sin.
7.On this point there are two opinions. Some say that however much a man may be in the state of mortal sin, he can avoid mortal sin by the freedom of his will. They explain the statement that man cannot avoid sinning to mean that he cannot avoid having sin, just as to see means to have sight as well as to make use of sight. But in their opinion he is able not to sin, meaning not to make use of sin. And it is accordingly evident that no necessity of consenting to sin is introduced into the will. Others say that, just as a man in the state of this present life cannot avoid venial sin, not in the sense that he is unable to avoid this or that particular venial sin, but in the sense that he cannot avoid all venial sins so as not to commit a single one, the same is also true of mortal sins in a man who does not have grace. And in accordance with this opinion it is clear that the will is not necessitated to will this or that mortal sin, although when without grace it is found to fall short of an unwavering inclination to good.
8. A form received into something does not move the recipient, but the very having of such a form means that it has, been moved. It is, however, inoved by an external agent. Thus a body which is heated by fire is not moved by the heat received but by the fire. So too the intellect is not moved by the species already received or by the true knowledge which is consequent upon the species, but by some external thing which influences the intellect—the agent intellect or a phantasm or something else of the sort. Moreover, just as truth is proportioned to the understanding, so too is good proportioned to the affection. Hence because truth is in our apprehension, it is not for that reason any less capable of moving our understanding than good our affection. And furthermore, the fact that the will is not forced by a good does not come from the insufficiency of the good for moving butfrom the very nature of willing, as is apparent from what has been said.
9. From the above answer the answer here too is evident.
10. A thing which is external to the soul does not imprint its species upon the possible intellect except through the operation of the agent intellect. On this account the soul is said to form within itself the forms of things. In like manner it is not without the operation of the will that the will tends to its object. The argument is accordingly not conclusive. And besides, the same answer can be given as was given to the two preceding difficulties.
11. The first good is essentially willed, and the will essentially and naturally wills it. Nevertheless it does not always actually will it, for is not necessary that the things which are naturally associated with the soul are always actually in the soul, just as principles which are naturally known are not always actually being considered.
12. The necessity by which we know something necessarily in scientific knowledge and that by which of necessity we desire knowledge do not belong to the same kind of necessity. The former can be the necessity of force, but the latter can be only a necessity of natural inclination. It is in this way that the will necessarily wills good inasmuch as it naturally wills it.
13. From the above answer this answer also is clear.
14. The freedom which is increased and diminished is freedom from sin and from misery, not freedom from force. Hence it does not follow that the will can be brought to such a pass that it is forced.
Answers to Difficulties to the Contrary
1. That authoritative statement is to be understood of the necessity of force, which is repugnant to the will, not of the necessity of natural inclination, which, according to Augustine, is not repugnant to the will.
2. It is not due to the weakness of the will if it is directed to something of necessity by a natural inclination but rather to its strength, just as a heavy body is the stronger, the greater the necessity with which it is borne downward. But it would be due to it eakness if it were forced by another.
3. Freedom is opposed to the necessity of force, according to Augustine, but not to the necessity of natural inclination.
4. Natural necessity is not repugnant to the dignity of the will, but only the necessity of force.
5. Inasmuch as the will is rational it is open to opposites. This is to consider it according to what is distinctive of it. But from the viewpoint of its being a nature nothing prevents it from being naturally determined to one object.
6. The will is distinguished from natural appetite in a precisive sense, 1.e., an appetite which is only natural, just as man is distinguished from what is only animal. It is not distinguished from natural appetite in an absolute sense, but includes it, just as man includes animal.
7. This argument also is based upon the will taken as will. For it is characteristic of the will as will to be master of its own acts.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
ARTICLE VI
In the sixth article we ask:
Does the will necessarily will whatever it wills?
[Parallel readings: II Sent., 25, a. 2; C.G., II, 47; S.T., I, 82, 2; I-II, 10, 2; De malo, 3, 3; 6; In Perih., 14, nn. 23-24.]
Difficulties
It seems that it does, for
1 The nobler a thing is, the more unchangeable it is. But to live is nobler than to be; to understand, nobler than to live; and to will, nobler than to understand. Therefore to will is more unchangeable than to be. But the being of a soul that wills is unchangeable because it is incorruptible. Therefore its willing is also unchangeable; and so whatever it wills, it wills unchangeably and necessarily.
2. The more conformed a thing is to God, the more unchangeable it is. But the soul is more conformed to God by secondary conformity, which is that of likeness, than by primary conformity, which is that of an image. But in its primary conformity the soul has unchangeableness because it cannot lose its image, according to the words of the Psalm (38:7): “Man passeth as an image.” Then according to secondary conformity, which is that of a likeness consisting in the due ordering of the will, it will also have unchangeableness so that the will will unchangeably will good and cannot will evil.
3. Potency stands to potential being as act to actualbeing. But God, being actually good, cannot actually do anything evil. Therefore His power, which is good, also cannot produce anything which is evil potentially; and thus the will, which the divine power has produced, cannot tend to evil.
4. According to the Philosopher’ in matters of operation and appetency ends are related to means just as in demonstrative sciences principles are to conclusions. But from principles that are naturally known necessity is imposed upon the intellect so that it knows conclusions necessarily. Then from the fact that the will necessarily wills the last end in the way already explained, it will of necessity will all other things which are directed to the ultimate end.
5. Whatever is naturally determined to something necessarily attains it unless something interferes. But the will “naturally wills good,” as is said in the Gloss. It therefore unchangeably wills good, since there is nothing to stop it, seeing that it is “the most powerful” thing under God, as Bernard teaches.
6. Evil is opposed to good as darkness to light. But sight, which is naturally determined to know light and what is lighted, sees them naturally so as to be unable to see what is dark. Then the will, whose object is the good, so unchangeably wills good that it can in no way will evil. And so the will has some necessity not only in regard to the last end but also in regard to other things.
To the Contrary
1. Augustine says: “It is by the will that one sins or lives correctly.”
2. According to Augustine “sin is voluntary to such an extent that if it is not voluntary it is not a sin.” If, then, sin is not at all from the will, there will not be any sin at all. But it is evident from experience that that is false.
REPLY
Something is said to be necessary from the fact that it is unchangeably determined to one thing. Since, therefore, the will stands undetermined in regard to many things, it is not under necessity in regard to everything but only in regard to those things to which it is determined by a natural inclination, as has been said . And because everything mobile is reduced to what is immobile as its principle, and everything undetermined, to what is determined, that to which the will is determined must be the principle of tending to the things to which it is not determined; and this is the last end, as has been said . Now there is found to be indetermination of the will in regard to three things: its object, its act, and its ordination to its end.
In regard to its object the will is undetermined as to the means to the end, not as to the last end itself, as has been said. This is so because there are many ways of reaching the last end, and for different people different ways prove suitable. The appetite of the will could not, then, be determined to the means to the end as is the appetite in natural things, which have definite and fixed ways of reaching a definite and fixed end. And so it is evident that natural things not only desire the end necessarily, but also desire the means in the same way, so diat there are among the means none to which natural things can cither tend or not. The will, however, necessarily desires the last end in such a way that it is unable not to desire it, but it does not necessarily desire any of the means. In their regard, then, it is within the Power of the will to desire this or that.
In the second place the will is undetermined in regard to its act, because even concerning a determined object it can perform its act or not perform it when it wishes. It can pass or not pass into the act of willing with regard to anything at all. This is not true of natural things, for something heavy always actually goes down unless something else prevents it. This is the case because inanimate things do not move themselves but are moved by other things. There is in them, then, no ability to be moved or not to be moved. But animate things are their own source of movement. Hence it is that the will can will or not.
A third indetermination of the will is found in regard to its ordination to its end inasmuch as the will can desire what is in truth directed to its appointed end or what is so only in appearance. This indetermination comes from two sources: from the indetermination in regard to its object in the case of the means, and again from the indetermination of our apprehension, which can be correct or not. From a given true principle a false conclusion does not follow unless it is because of some falsity in the reasoning through a false subsumption or the false relating of the principle to the conclusion. In the same way from a correct appetite for the last end the inordinate desire for something could not follow unless reason were to take as referable to the end something which is not so referable. Thus a person who naturally desires happiness with a correct appetite would never be led to desire fornication except in so far as he apprehends it as a good for man, seeing that it is something pleasurable, and as referable to happiness as a sort of copy of it. From this there follows the indetermination of the will by which it can desire good or evil.
Since the will is said to be free inasmuch as it is not necessitated, the freedom of the will can be viewed in three respects: (1) as regards its act, inasmuch as it can will or not will; (2) as regards its object, inasmuch as it can will this or that, even if one is the opposite of the other; and (3) as regards its ordination to the end, inasmuch as it can will good or evil.
In regard to the first of these three there is freedom in the will in any state of nature with reference to any object, for the act of any will is in its power as regards any object. The second of these is had with reference to some objects, the means and not the end itself. This too holds for any state of nature. The third is not with reference to all objects but only certain ones, the means to the end, and not with reference to any state of nature but only that in which nature can fail. Where there is no failure in apprehending and comparing, there can be no willing of evil even when there is question of means, as is clear among the blessed. For this reason it is said that to will evil is not freedom or any part of it, though it is a sign of freedom.
Answers to Difficulties
1. The act of being of the soul is not determined for it by itself but by another, but it does determine its own act of willing. Thus, although its being is unchangeable, still its willing is undetermined and so can be directed to different things. It is not true, however, that to understand or to will is nobler than to be if they are discriminated from being. Rather being is then nobler than they, according to Dionysius.
2. The conformity of an image is viewed from the standpoint of natural powers, which are determined for the thing by nature. And so that conformity always remains. But secondary conformity, that of likeness, is had by grace and the habits and acts of the virtues, to which the soul is directed by an act of the will which stands within its power. That conformity, then, does not always remain.
3. In God there is no passive or material potency to be distinguished from act, as is supposed in the objection; but there is active potency, which is the act itself, because a being is capable of acting inasmuch as it is in act. And yet the ability of the will to be directed to evil does not come from the fact of its being from God but from that of its being made out of nothing.
4. In demonstrative sciences conclusions are so related to principles that when the conclusion is removed the principle is removed. And so from this fixity of the conclusions with regard to the principles the intellect is forced by the principles themselves to assent to the conclusions. But the means do not have with regard to the end such a fixity that upon the removal of any one of them the end is removed, since it is possible to attain the last end in various ways either really or apparently. Consequently, from the necessity which is in the voluntary appetite in regard to the end, there is not imposed upon it any necessity in regard to the means.
5. The will naturally wills good but not this or that particular good. It is like sight, which naturally sees color but not this or that particular color. For this reason whatever the will wills it wills under the aspect of good; yet it does not always have to will this or that good.
6. Nothing is so evil that it cannot have some aspect of good; and it is by reason of that goodness that it can move the appetite.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
ARTICLE VII
In the seventh article we ask:
Does a person merit by willing what he wills necessarily?
[Parallel readings: S.T., III, 138; S.T., II-II, 88, 6; 189, 2.]
Difficulties
It seems that he does not, for
1. What anyone necessarily wills he wills naturally. But we do not merit by what is natural. Therefore we do not merit by such an act of the will.
2. Merit and demerit apply to the same thing. But according to Augustine’ no one gets any demerit in anything that he cannot avoid.
3. No one merits except by an act of virtue. But every act of virtue is from a choice, not from a natural inclination. Then no one merits in anything that he does from necessity.
To the Contrary
1. Every creature naturally and necessarily seeks God. But in loving God we merit. it is therefore possible to merit in what one necessarily does.
2. Happiness consists in eternal life. But saints merit by desiring eternal life. Therefore a person merits by willing what he wills necessarily.
REPLY
In willing what he naturally wills a person merits in a certain sense and in a certain sense does not. For the explanation of this it should be observed that there is a difference in the way in which providence is exercised in regard to man and in regard to the other animals both as to his body and as to his soul. For other animals are provided with special coverings for their bodies, such as a tough hide, feathers, and the like, and also special weapons, such as horns, claws, and so forth. This is because they have just a few ways of acting to which they can adapt definite instruments. But man is provided with those things in a general way inasmuch as there has been given to him by nature hands by which he is able to prepare for himself a variety of coverings and protections. This is because man’s reason is so manifold and extends to so many different things that definite tools sufficient for him could not be provided for him ahead of time.
The case is similar in regard to apprehension. Other animals have innate in them in the line of natural discretion certain specific conceptions necessary for them, as a sheep has a natural realization that a wolf is its enemy, and so on. But in place of these there are implanted in man certain naturally understood universal principles by means of which he can go on to [figure out] everything that is necessary for him.
In regard to their appetitive tendency also the same holds true. In other things there is implanted a natural appetite for something definite, as in a heavy body, to be down, and in every animal, whatever suits it according to its nature. But man has implanted in him an appetite for his last end in general so that he naturally desires to be complete in goodness. But in just what that completeness consists, whether in virtues or knowledge or pleasure or anything else of the sort, has not been determined for him by nature.
When, therefore, by his own reason with the help of divine grace he grasps as his happiness any particular good in which his happiness really does consist, then he merits, not because he desires happiness (which he naturally desires), but because he desires this particular good (which he does not naturally desire)—for example, the vision of God, in which his happiness does in truth consist. But if anyone were by erroneous reasoning to be brought to desire as his happiness some particular good—for example, bodily pleasures, in which his happiness does not in fact consist—he incurs demerit by so desiring. This is not because he desires happiness, but because he unwarrantedly desires as his happiness this particular thing in which his happiness is not found.
It is therefore clear that willing what anyone naturally wills is in itself neither meritorious nor blameworthy. But when it is specified to this or that, it can be either the one or the other. In this way the saints merit by desiring God and eternal life.
Answers to Difficulties
From what has just been said the answers are clear.
22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
ARTICLE VIII
In the eighth article we ask:
Can God force the will?
[Parallel readings: S.T., III, 88, 89, 91; S.T., I, 105, 4; 111, 2; I-II, 9, 6; De malo, 3,3; Comp. theol., 1, 129.]
Difficulties
It seems that He can, for
1.Whoever turns something whithersoever he wishes can force it. But, as is said in Proverbs (2 1:1), “The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord: whithersoever he will he shall turn it.” God can therefore force the will.
2. Quoting Augustine on Romans (1:24): “Wherefore, God gave them up to the desires of their heart...” the Gloss says. “It is evident that God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills to whatever He wishes, whether to good, according to His mercy, or to evil, according to their deserts.” God can accordingly force the will.
3. If a finite being acts finitely, an infinite being will act infinitely. But a finite creature attracts the will in a finite way, because, as Cicero says, the honorable is what attracts us by its own vigor and entices us by its own excellence. Therefore God, who has infinite efficacy in acting, can therefore force the will.
4. He is properly said to be forced to something who is unable not to do it whether he wants to or not. But the will is unable not to will what God by His will of good pleasure wants it to will; otherwise the will of God would be inefficacious in regard to our will. God can therefore force the will.
5. In any creature there is perfect obedience to the Creator. But the will is a creature. Hence there is in it a perfect obedience to the Creator. God can therefore force it to what He wills.
To the Contrary
1. To be free from force is natural to the will. But what is natural to anything cannot be removed from it. The will therefore cannot be forced by God.
2. God cannot make opposites to be true at the same time. But what is voluntary and what is violent are opposites, because the violent is a species of the involuntary, as is made clear in the Ethics. God therefore cannot make the will do anything by force; and so He cannot force the will.
REPLY
God can change the will with necessity but nevertheless cannot force it. For however much the will is moved toward something, it is not said to be forced to it. The reason for this is that to will something is to be inclined to it. But force or violence is contrary to the inclination of the thing forced. When God moves the will, then, He causes an inclination to succeed a previous inclination so that the first disappears and the second remains. Accordingly, that to which He induces the will is not contrary to an inclination still extant but merely to one that was previously there. This is not, then, violence or force.
The case is parallel to that of a stone, in which by reason of its heaviness there is an inclination downward. While this inclination remains, if the stone is thrown upward, violence is done it. But if God were to subtract from the stone the inclination of its heaviness and give it an inclination of lightness, then it would not be violent—for the stone to be borne upward. Thus a change of motion can be had without violence.
It is in this way that God’s changing of the will without forcing it is to be understood. God can change the will because He works within it just as He works in nature. Now, just as every natural action is from God, so too every action of the will, in so far as it is an action, not only is from the will as its immediate agent but also is from God as its first agent, who influences it more forcefully. Then, just as the will can change its act to something else, as is apparent from the explanation above, so too and much more can God.
God changes the will in two ways. (1) He does it merely by moving it. This occurs, for instance, when He moves the will to want something without introducing any form into the will. Thus He sometimes without the addition of any habit causes a man to want what he did not want before. (2) He does it by introducing some form into the will itself. By the very nature which God gave the will He inclines it to will something, as is clear from what has been said. Now in like fashion by something additional, such as grace or a virtue, the soul is inclined to will something to which it was not previously determined by a natural inclination.
This additional inclination is sometimes perfect, sometimes imperfect. When it is perfect it causes a necessary inclination to the thing to which it determines the will, in the same way as the will is inclined by nature necessarily to desire the end. This happens among the blessed, whom perfect charity sufficiently inclines to good not only as regards the last end but also as regards the means to this end. Sometimes, however, the additional form is not in all respects perfect, as among the wayfarers on earth. Then the will is indeed inclined by reason of the additional form, but not necessarily.
Answers to Difficulties
From what has just been said the answers are clear. For the first set of arguments go to prove that God can change the will; the second, that He cannot force it. Both of these are true, as is evident from the explanation above.
It should, however, be noted that, when it is said in the Gloss as cited that God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills to evil, this is not to be understood (as the Gloss itself says in the same place) as if God bestowed wickedness, but in the sense that, just as He confers grace by which men’s wills are inclined to good, He also withdraws it from some; and when it is thus withdrawn, their wills are bent to evil.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
ARTICLE IX
In the ninth article we ask:
Can any creature change the will or influence it?
[Parallel readings: II Sent., 8, a. 5; C.G., III, 88 & 92; S.T., I, 106, 2; I-II, 80, 1; De malo, 3, 3 & 4; In Joan., c. 13, lect. 1, §3 (P 10:526b-527a).]
Difficulties
It seems that it can, for
1. The will is a creature. But the will changes its own act as it wishes. It therefore seems that some creature can change the will and force it.
2. It is harder to change a whole thing than a part of it. But according to some philosophers’ the heavenly bodies change a whole crowd to will something. With all the more reason, then, does it seem that they can force the will of a single man.
3. Whoever is bound by something is forced by it. But according to the Philosopher incontinent people are bound by their passions. Passions therefore change and force the will of an incontinent person.
4. According to Augustine both among spirits and among bodies the higher move the lower with a certain natural order. But not only the intellect but also the will of the blessed angels is higher and more perfect than ours. Therefore, just as they can influence our intellect by theirs by enlightening it, according to the teaching of Dionysius, so also it seems that by their will they can influence our will by changing it in some way.
5. According to Dionysius, the higher angels enlighten, cleanse, and perfect the lower. But just as enlightenment applies to the intelIcct, so cleansing seems to apply to the affections. Angels can accordingly influence the will as they can the intellect.
6. A thing is naturally more disposed to be changed by a higher nature than by a lower. But just as sense appetite is inferior to our will, the will of angels is superior. Therefore, since sense appetite sometimes changes our will, with all the more reason will the angelic will be able to change ours.
7. In Luke (14:23) the master says to his servant, “Compel them to come in.” Now it is by their will that they enter that banquet hall. Our will can therefore be forced by an angel, the servant of God.
To the Contrary
1. Bernard says that free choice is the most powerful thing this side of God. But nothing is changed except by something stronger. Then nothing can change the will.
2. Merit and demerit are in some sense situated in the will. If, then, any creature could change the will, a person could be justified or even made a sinner by some creature. But that is false, because no one becomes a sinner except by himself; nor does anyone become just except by the operation of God and his own cooperation.
REPLY
The will can be understood to be changed by something in two ways. (1) This is referred to its object. In this sense the will is changed by the appetible thing. But nothing which changes the will in this way is in question here; for that was treated above,where it was shown that a certain good does move the will with necessity (in the way in which the object moves it), though the will is not forced. (2) The will can be taken to be moved by something in the manner of an efficient cause. In this sense we say that not only can no creature by acting upon the will force it (for even God could not do this), but also it cannot even act upon the will directly so as to change it with necessity or in any way to incline it (which God can do). But indirectly a creature can in some way incline the will though not change it with necessity. The reason for this is that, since the act of the will mediates as it were between the power and its object, a change in the act can be considered either from the point of view of the will or from that of the object.
From the point of view of the will only what works inside the will can change the act of the will. This is the will itself and that which is the cause of the being of the will, which according to the faith is God alone. Consequently only God can transfer the act of the will which He has made, from one thing to another as He wishes. But according to those who hold that the soul was created by intelligences (which is in fact contrary to the faith), the angel or intelligence itself has an effect intrinsic to the will, since it causes the act of being which is intrinsic to the will. Avicenna accordingly maintainsP that our wills are changed by the will of the heavenly souls just as our bodies are changed by the heavenly bodies. This is, however, thoroughly heretical.
But if the act of will is considered from the point of view of the object, the object of the will is found to be twofold. There is one to which the natural inclination of the will is determined with necessity. This object is implanted in the will and proposed to it by the Creator, who gave it its natural inclination to this. Consequently no one can change the will necessarily by means of such an object except God alone. But there is another object of the will capable of inclining the will inasmuch as there is in it some likeness or ordination with regard to the last end which is naturally desired. And yet the will is not changed necessarily by this object, as was said above, because there is not found in it alone an ordination to the naturally desired last end. Now by means of this object a creature can incline the will to some extent but not change it in a necessary way. This is the case when someone persuades another to do something by proposing to him its usefulness or nobility. It nonetheless remains within the power of the will to accept it or not, seeing that it is not determined to it by nature.
It is accordingly apparent that no creature can directly change the will as if by acting within the will itself; but by proposing something to the will extrinsically it can in some way induce it, though not change it necessarily.
Answers to Difficulties
1. The will can change itself in regard to certain things even directly, since it is master of its acts. And when we say that it cannot be changed directly by a creature, we mean by another creature. Still it cannot force itself, because to say that anything is forced by itself implies a contradiction, since that is violent in which the patient contributes nothing; but the one who exerts force does contribute something. And so the will cannot force itself, because in applying the force it would thus be contributing something inasmuch as it would force itself, and contributing nothing inasmuch as it would be forced. And this is impossible. It is in this way that the Philosopher proves that no one suffers anything unjust from himself, because anyone who suffers something unjust suffers against his will; but if he does something unjust, that is according to his will.
2. Heavenly bodies cannot with necessity change the will either of one man or of a crowd, but they can change their bodies. And by means of the body the will is in some way inclined, though not necessarily since it can resist. Choleric persons, for example, are inclined by their natural temperament to wrath; yet a choleric person can resist that inclination by his will. But only the wise resist bodily inclinations; and they are few in comparison with the foolish, because according to Ecclesiastes (1:15) “the number of fools is infinite.” Consequently it is said that heavenly bodies change a crowd inasmuch as the crowd follows bodily inclinations; but they do not change this or that individual who with prudence resists the inclination mentioned.
3. An incontinent person is not said to be bound by his passions as if the bodily passions forced or necessitated his will; otherwise an incontinent person should not be punished, because punishment is not deserved for what is involuntary. Now the incontinent man is not said to act involuntarily, according to the Philosopher, but he is said to be bound by his passions inasmuch as he voluntarily yields to their urge.
4. Angels influence the intellect by acting upon it interiorly but only from the viewpoint of the object, because they propose the intelligible object by which our intellect is actuated and won over to assent. But the object of the will proposed by an angel does not change the will of necessity, as has been said. Thus there is no parallel.
5. That cleansing which the angels undergo applies to the intellect, for it is a cleansing from ignorance, as Dionysius says. But even if it did apply to the affections, it would be used in the sense of persuading.
6. What is inferior to the will, as the body or sense appetite, does not change the will by acting upon it directly but only from the point of view of its object. For the object of the will is the apprehended good. But the good apprehended by universal reason moves the will only through the mediation of a particular apprehension, as is said in The Soul, since acts are performed in individual cases. Now by the passion of the sense appetite, the cause of which can sometimes be the bodily make-up or anything undergone by the body from the fact that sense appetite uses an organ, the particular apprehension itself is impeded and sometimes entirely inhibited so that what higher reason dictates in a universal way is not actually applied to this particular case. And so in its appetitive tendency the will is moved to that good which the particular apprehension reports to it, passing up the good which universal reason reports. In this way such passions incline the will; yet they do not change it with necessity, because it remains within the power of the will to restrain such passions so that the use of reason is not prevented, in accordance with the words of Genesis (4:7): “But the lust thereof shall be under thee,” namely, that of sin.
7. The compelling there mentioned is not that of force but that of efficacious persuasion either by harsh or by gentle means.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
ARTICLE X
In the tenth article we ask:
Are will and intellect the same power?
[Parallel readings: S.T., I, 80, 1; 82, 3.]
Difficulties
It seems that they are, for
1. Powers are distinguished on the basis of their objects. Now the object of the intellect is the true, that of the will, the good. Since the good and the true are identical as to their real subject and differ in formal character, it therefore seems that the intellect and the will are really identical and differ only in formal character.
2. According to the Philosopher, the will is in reason. It is therefore either the same as reason or a part of reason. But reason is the same power as the intellect. Then so is the will.
3. The faculties of the soul are commonly divided into the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible. But the will is distinguished from the irascible and the concupiscible. It is therefore contained within the rational.
4. Wherever there is found an object which is the same in reality and in formal character, there is a single power. But the object of the will and of the practical intellect is the same in reality and in formal character, for the object of both is the good. Therefore the practical intellect is not a power different from the will. But the speculative intellect is not a power different from the practical because, according to the Philosopher,by extension the speculative intellect becomes practical. Therefore the will and the intellect (taken simply) are a single power.
5. To know the difference of two things from one another it is necessary for the same person to know both of the things differentiated. Similarly it must be the same person who knows and wills. But for the knowing of the difference between any two things, as “between white and sweet,” it must be the same power which knows both. From this the Philosopher proves the existence of the central sense. By the same reasoning, then, it must be a single power which knows and wills; and so the intellect and the will are a single power, so it seems.
To the Contrary
1. The appetitive genus of powers of the soul is different from the intellective according to the Philosopher. But the will is listed under the appetitive. The will is therefore a power different from the intellect.
2. The intellect can be forced, according to the Philosopher. But the will cannot be forced, as has been said. The intellect and the will are therefore not one and the same power.
REPLY
The will and the intellect are distinct powers, even belonging to different genera of powers. That this may be clearly understood it should be noted that, since the distinction of powers is taken from the acts and objects, not just any difference at all among the objects reveals the distinctness of the powers but a difference in the objects precisely inasmuch as they are objects; and this will not be an accidental difference—I mean one which merely happens to be connected with the object taken specifically as object. It merely happens to the object of sense, for instance, inasmuch as it is sensible, to be animate or inanimate, though these differences are essential for the things which are sensed. It is accordingly not from these differences that the sense powers are diversified, but according as their objects are audible, visible, or tangible (for these are differences in the sensible inasmuch as it is sensible); that is to say, according to whether the objects are sensible through a medium or without a medium.
Now when essential differences of objects as objects are taken as dividing some specific object of the soul of themselves, by this fact powers are diversified but not genera of powers. Thus the sensible designates, not the object of the soul without qualification, but an object which of itself is divided by the aforesaid differences. Hence sight, hearing, and touch are distinct specific powers belonging to the same genus of powers of the soul, 1.e., to sense. But when the differences considered divide the object taken in general, then from such a difference distinct genera of powers become known.
Something is said to be an object of the soul according as it has some relation to the soul. Hence, where we find different aspects of relatedness to the soul, there we find an essential difference in the object of the soul, and this indicates a distinct genus of the soul’s powers. Now a thing is found to have a twofold relationship to the soul: one by which the thing itself is in the soul in the soul’s manner and not in its own, the other by which the soul is referred to the thing in its own existence. Thus something is an object of the soul in two ways. (1) It is so inasmuch as it is capable of being in the soul, not according to its own act of being, but according to the manner of the soul—spiritually. This is the essential constituent of the knowable. in so far as it is knowable. (2) Something is the object of the soul according as the soul is inclined and oriented to it after the manner of the thing itself as it is in itself. This is the essential constituent of the appetible in so far as it is appetible.
The cognitive and appetitive principles in the soul accordingly constitute distinct genera of powers. Hence, since the intellect is included in the cognitive, and the will in the appetitive, the will and the intellect must be powers that are distinct even generically.
Answers to Difficulties
1. The distinction of powers is not manifested by the objects taken according to their reality but according to their formal aspect, because the formal aspects of the objects specify the operations of the powers. And so where there is a different formal aspect of the object, there we find a different power, even though it is the same thing which has the two formal aspects, as is the case with good and the true. This is also verified in material things. Air is modified by fire inasmuch as fire is hot, in view of the fact that air is potentially hot. But inasmuch as fire is luminous, air is modified by it in view of the fact that air is transparent. Nor is it the same potency in air by which it is called transparent and by which it is called potentially hot, even though it is the same fire which acts upon both potencies.
2. A power can be considered in two ways: either in reference to the object or in reference to the essence of the soul in which it is rooted. If the will is considered in reference to its object, it then belongs to a different genus from intellect. In this way will is distinguished from reason and intellect, as has been said. But if the will is considered according to that in which it is rooted, then since the will, like the intellect, does not have a bodily organ, the will and the intellect are reduced to the same part of the soul. In this way the intellect or reason is sometimes taken as including both within it, and then the will is said to be in reason. On this basis the rational part, including both the intellect and the will, is distinguished from the irascible and the concupiscible.
3. From the above answer this also is clear.
4. The object of the practical intellect is not the good, but the true which is related to operation.
5. To will and to know are not acts of the same formal character, and so they cannot belong to the same power as can knowledge of what is sweet and what is white. Hence there is no parallel.
22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
ARTICLE XI
In the eleventh article we ask:
Is the will a higher power than the intellect, or is the opposite true?
[Parallel readings: II Sent., 25, a. 2 ad 4; III Sent., 27,1, 4; C.G., III, 26; S.T., I, 82,3; 4 ad 1; II-II, 23,6 ad 1; De carit., 3 ad 12 & 13.]
Difficulties
It seems that the intellect is the nobler and higher, for
1. The nobility of the soul consists in its being made to the image of God. But the soul is made to the image of God in virtue of reason or intelligence. Hence Augustine says: “Let us understand that man is made to the image of God in that particular in which he excels irrational animals; but that is reason, mind, or intelligence, or whatever it may more appropriately be called.” Therefore the most excellent power of the soul is the intellect.
2. The answer was given that the image is in the will as well as in the intellect, since according to Augustine, the image is seen in memory, intelligence, and will.—On the contrary, when the nobility of the soul is considered from the standpoint of the image, that in which the notion of image is most properly verified must be the most excellent part of the soul. Now even if the image is in both the will and the intellect, it is more properly in the intellect than in the will. Hence the Master of the Sentences says that the image is in the knowledge of truth and merely a likeness in the love of good. Therefore the intellect must still be nobler than the will.
3. Since we judge of the powers from their acts, that power must be the nobler whose act is the nobler. But to understand is nobler than to will. Therefore the intellect is nobler than the will. Proof of the minor: Since acts are specified by their terms, that act must be nobler whose term is nobler. But the act of the intellect involves a motion to the soul; that of the will, from the soul to things. Since the soul is nobler than external things, to understand is therefore nobler than to will.
4. Among all things arranged in an order the more distant anything is from the lowest member, the higher it is. But the lowest among the powers of the soul is sense, and the will stands closer to sense than does the intellect. For the will shares with the sense powers the condition of its object, because the will is concerned with particulars just as is sense. We wish for a particular health and not health as something universal. But the intellect is concerned with universals. The intellect is therefore a higher power than the will.
5. That which rules is nobler than the thing ruled. But the intellect rules the will. Therefore it is nobler than the will.
6. That from which something comes has authority over it and is greater than it if it is distinct in essence. But intelligence is from memory as the Son from the Father, and will is from memory and intelligence as the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. Intelligence therefore has authority in regard to the will and is greater and stronger than it.
7. The simpler and more immaterial an act is, the nobler it is. But the act of the intellect is simpler and more immaterial than that of the will, because the intellect abstracts from matter, but not the will. The act of the intellect is therefore nobler than that of the will.
8. The intellect bears to the soul the same relation as brightness to material things, and the will or affective power, that of warmth, as appears from the sayings of the saints. But brightness is nobler than warmth, since it is the quality of a nobler body. The intellect is therefore also nobler than the will.
9. According to the Philosopher, that which is proper to man as man is nobler than that which is shared by man and the other animals. But to understand is proper to man, whereas to will belongs to the other animals also. The Philosopher accordingly says, “Children and brutes share in what is voluntary.” The intellect is therefore nobler than the will.
10. The nearer a thing is to its end, the nobler it is, since the goodness of means is from the end. But the intellect seems to be nearer to the end than the will, for a man first attains the end by his intellect by knowing it before he does so by his will by desiring it. The intellect is therefore nobler than the will.
11. Gregory says, “The contemplative life is... of greater merit than the active.” But the contemplative life pertains to the intellect; the active, to the will. Then the intellect is also nobler than the will.
12. The Philosopher says that the intellect is the most excellent of the things which are in us. It is therefore nobler than the will.
To the Contrary
1. The habit of a more perfect power is more perfect. But the habit by which the will is perfected, charity, is nobler than faith and knowledge, by which the intellect is perfected, as is evident from what the Apostle says in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13: 2). The will is therefore nobler than the intellect.
2.What is free is nobler than what is not. But the intellect is not free since it can be forced, but the will is free since it cannot be forced. The will is therefore nobler than the intellect.
3. The order of the powers follows the order of their objects. But good, which is the object of the will, is nobler than the true, which is the object of the intellect. The will is therefore also nobler than the intellect.
4. According to Dionysius the more common any one of the divine participations is, the nobler it is. But the will is more common than the intellect, because some things participate in will which do not participate in intellect, as was said above. The will is therefore nobler than the intellect.
5. The nearer to God anything is, the nobler it is. But the will comes closer to God than the intellect, because, as Hugh of St. Victor says, love enters in where knowledge remains outside, for we love God more than we are able to know of Him. Therefore the will is nobler than the intellect.
REPLY
A thing can be said to be more eminent than another either simply or in a certain respect. For something to be shown to be simply better than another the comparison must be made on the basis of what is essential to them and not on that of accidentals. In the latter case one thing would be shown to stand out over another merely in a certain respect. Thus if a man were to be compared to a lion on the basis of essential differences, he would be found to be simply nobler inasmuch as the man is a rational animal, the lion irrational. But if a lion is compared to a man on the basis of physical strength, he surpasses the man. But this is to be nobler only in a certain respect. To see, then, which of these two powers, the will or the intellect, is better without qualification, we must consider the matter from their essential differences.
The perfection and dignity of the intellect consists in this, that the species of the thing which is understood is in the intellect itself, since in this way it actually understands, and from this its whole dignity is seen. The nobility of the will and of its act, however, consists in this, that the soul is directed to some noble thing in the very existence which that thing has in itself. Now it is more perfect, simply and absolutely speaking, to have within oneself the nobility of another thing than to be related to a noble thing outside oneself. Hence, if the will and the intellect are considered absolutely, and not with reference to this or that particular thing, they have this order, that the intellect is simply more excellent than the will.
But it may happen that to be related in some way to some noble thing is more excellent than to have its nobility within oneself. This is the case, for instance, when the nobility of that thing is possessed in a way much inferior to that in which the thing has it within itself. But if the nobility of one thing is in another just as nobly or more nobly than it is in the thing to which it belongs, then without doubt that which has the nobility of that thing within itself is nobler than that which is related in any way whatsoever to that noble thing. Now the intellect takes on the forms or things superior to the soul in a way inferior to that which they have in the things themselves; for the intellect receives things after its own fashion, as is said in The Causes. And for the same reason the forms of things inferior to the soul, such as corporeal things, are more noble in the soul than in the things themselves.
The intellect can accordingly be compared to the will in three ways: (1) Absolutely and in general, without any reference to this or that particular thing. In this way the intellect is more excellent than the will, just as it is more perfect to possess what there is of dignity in a thing than merely to be related to its nobility. (2) With regard to material and sensible things. In this way again the intellect is simply nobler than the will. For example, to know a stone intellectually is nobler than to will it, because the form of the stone is in the intellect, inasmuch as it is known by the intellect, in a nobler way than it is in itself as desired by the will. (3) With reference to divine things, which are superior to the soul. In this way to will is more excellent than to understand, as to will God or to love Him is more excellent than to know Him. This is because the divine goodness itself is more perfectly in God Himself as He is desired by the will than the participated goodness is in us as known by the intellect.
Answers to Difficulties
1. Augustine takes reason and intelligence for the whole intellective part, which includes both the apprehension of the intellect and the appetite of the will; and so the will is not excluded from the image.
2. The Master appropriates to reason the fact of being an image because it is prior; and to love, likeness, because with reference to God knowledge is completed by love, just as a picture is achieved and beautified by colors and similar means, by which it is made like the original.
3. That argument is based upon things surpassed in nobility by the soul. But by the same reasoning can be shown the pre-eminence of the will in reference to things nobler than the soul.
4. The will has its object in common with the senses only in so far as it is directed to sensible things, which are inferior to the soul. But in so far as it is directed to intelligible and divine things, it is more distant from the senses than is the intellect, since the intellect can grasp less of divine things than the affective power desires and loves. The intellect rules the will, not by inclining it to that to which it tends, but by showing it that to which it should tend. When, therefore, the intellect is less capable of exhibiting something noble than the inclination of the will is of being directed to it, the will surpasses the intellect.
6. The will does not proceed from intelligence directly but from the essence of the soul, intelligence being presupposed. From this, then, the order of dignity is not revealed, but only the order of origin, by which the intellect is naturally prior to the will.
7. The intellect abstracts from matter only when it knows sensible and material things; but when it knows things which are above it, it does not abstract; rather it receives things in a way that is less simple than the things are in themselves. Hence, the act of the will, which is directed to the things as they are in themselves, remains simpler and nobler.
8. Those expressions by which the intellect is compared to brightness and the will to warmth are metaphorical; and from such expressions no argument is to be drawn, as the Master says. Dionysius also says that symbolical theology is not argumentative.
9. Willing belongs to man alone as well as understanding, though tending appetitively belongs to other things besides man.
10. Although the soul is referred to God by the intellect before it is by the affections, nevertheless the affections attain Him more perfectly than does the intellect, as has been said.
11. The will is not excluded from contemplation. Gregory says that the contemplative life is to love God and one’s neighbor. Hence the pre-eminence of the contemplative life over the active is not prejudicial to the will.
12. The Philosopher is Speaking of the intellect according as it is taken for the whole intellective part, which includes the will also. Or it can be said that he is viewing the intellect and the other powers of the soul absolutely, not as referred to this or that particular object.
Answers to Contrary Difficulties
l. Charity is a habit perfecting the will with reference to God. In this reference the will is nobler than the intellect.
2. The freedom of the will does not show that it is nobler simply, but that it is nobler in moving, as will appear more clearly from what follows.
3. Since the true is a certain good (for it is the good of the intellect, as is made clear by the Philosopher), good should not be called nobler than the true, just as animal is not nobler than man, since man includes the nobility of animal and adds to it. We are now speaking of the true and the good in so far as they are the objects of the will and of the intellect.
4. Willing is not found more extensively than understanding although tending appetitively is. It should, however, be observed that in this argument the passage from Dionysius is not used in his meaning for two reasons. (1) Dionysius is speaking on the supposition that one is included in the notion of the other, as being in living and living in understanding. He accordingly says that one is simpler than the other. (2) Although a participation which is simpler is nobler, nevertheless, if it is taken together with the mode in which it is found. in things lacking additional perfections, it will be less noble. Thus if to be, which is nobler than to live, is taken together with the mode in which inanimate things are, that mode of being will be less noble than the being of living things, which is to live. It is accordingly not necessary that what is found more extensively should always be more noble; otherwise we should have to say that sense is nobler than intellect and the nutritive power nobler than the sensitive.
5. That argument is concerned with the will in reference to God. In this sense it is granted to be more noble.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
ARTICLE XII
In the twelfth article we ask:
Does the will move the intellect and the other powers of the soul?
[Parallel readings: S.T., III, 26; S.T., I, 82,4; I-II, 9, 1 & 3; De malo, 6.]
Difficulties
It seems that it does not, for
1. The mover is naturally prior to the thing moved. But the will is posterior to the intellect, for nothing is loved or desired unless it is known, according to Augustine. The will therefore does not move the intellect.
2. If the will moves the intellect to its act, then it follows that the intellect understands because the will wants it to understand. But the will does not want anything unless it is understood. The intellect therefore first understands its understanding before the will wills it. But before the intellect could understand this, the will would have to be held to will it, because the intellect is held to be moved by the will. We should then have to go on to infinity. But this is impossible. Therefore the will does not move the intellect.
3. Every passive power is moved by its object. But the will is a passive power, for appetite is a mover which is moved, as is said in The Soul. Hence it is moved by its object. But its object is the understood or apprehended good, as is said in the same book. Therefore the intellect or some other apprehensive power moves the will, and not the other way about.
4. One power is said to move another only because of the ability to command which it has over the other. But to command belongs to reason, as is said in the Ethics. It therefore belongs to reason to command the other powers and not to the will.
5. According to Augustine, the mover and agent is nobler than the thing moved or made. But the intellect is nobler than the will, at least in regard to sensible things, as has been explained. At least in regard to these, then, it is not moved by the will.
To the Contrary
l. Anselm says that the will moves all the other powers of the soul.
2. According to Augustine every motion proceeds from what is immovable. But among the powers of the soul the will is the only one which is immovable in the sense of not being able to be forced by anything. All the other powers of the soul are therefore moved by the will.
3. According to the Philosopher, every motion occurs for the sake of an end. But good and the end are the object of the will. The will, then, moves the other powers.
4. According to Augustine, among spirits love does the same thing as weight among bodies. But weight moves bodies. Then the love of the will moves the spiritual powers of the soul.
REPLY
In a way the intellect moves the will, and in a way the will moves the intellect and the other powers. For the clarification of this it should be noted that both an end and an efficient cause are said to move, but in different ways. Two things are to be taken into account in any action, the agent and the reason for acting. In heating, the agent is fire and the reason for acting is heat. Similarly in moving, the end is said to move as the reason for moving, but the efficient cause, as the one producing the movement, that is, the one which brings the subject of the motion from potency to act.
The reason for acting is the form of the agent by which it acts. It must accordingly be in the agent for it to act. It is not there, however, according to its perfect act of being; for when that is had the motion comes to rest. But it is in the agent by way of an intention, for the end is prior in intention but posterior in being. Thus the end preexists in the mover in a proper sense intellectually (for it belongs to intellect to receive something by way of an intention) and not according to its real existence. Hence the intellect moves the will in the way in which an end is said to move—by conceiving beforehand the reason for acting and proposing it to the will.
To move in the manner of an efficient cause, however, belongs to the will and not to the intellect; for the will is referred to things as they are in themselves, whereas the intellect is referred to them as existing spiritually in the soul. Now to act and to move pertain to things according totheir own act of being by which they subsist in themselves, not according as they exist in the soul in the manner of an intention. It is not heat in the soul which heats, but that which is in fire. Thus the will is referred to things as subject to motion, but not the intellect. Furthermore the act of the will is an inclination to something, but not that of the intellect. But an inclination is the disposition of something that moves other things as an efficient cause moves. It is accordingly evident that the will has the function of moving in the manner of an agent cause; not, however, the intellect.
The higher powers of the soul, because immaterial, are capable of reflecting upon themselves. Both the will and the intellect, therefore, reflect upon themselves, upon each other, upon the essence of the soul, and upon all its powers. The intellect understands itself and the will and the essence of the soul and all the soul’s powers. Similarly the will wills that it will, that the intellect understand, that the soul be, and so of the other powers. Now when one power is brought to bear upon another, it is referred to that other according to what is proper to itself. When the intellect understands that the will is willing, it receives within itself the intelligible character of willing. When the will is brought to bear upon the other powers of the soul, it is directed to them as things to which motion and operation belong, and it inclines each to its own operation. Thus the will moves in the manner of an efficient cause not only external things but also the very powers of the soul.
Answers to Difficulties
1. Since there is in reflection a certain similarity to circular motion, in which what is last is the same as what was originally the beginning, we must so express ourselves in regard to reflection that what was originally prior then becomes posterior. And so, although the intellect is prior to the will when taken absolutely, it nonetheless becomes posterior to the will by reflection. Thus the will can move the intellect.
2. There is no necessity of going on to infinity, for we stop at the natural appetite by which the intellect is inclined to its act.
3. The argument shows that the intellect moves in the manner of an end, for this is the bearing of the apprehended good upon the will.
4 Command belongs to both will and reason but in different respects. It belongs to the will in so far as a command implies an inclination; it belongs to reason in so far as this inclination is distributed and ordained to be carried out by this or that individual.
5. Any power surpasses another in what is proper to itself. Thus touch is referred to heat, which it senses in itself, in a more perfect way than sight, which sees it only by accident. Similarly the intellect is referred to truth more completely than the will; and conversely, the will is referred to the good in things more perfectly than the intellect. Hence, although the intellect is nobler than the will absolutely, at least in regard to some things, nevertheless under the aspect of moving, which belongs to the will by reason of the distinctive characteristic of its object, the will is found to be nobler.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
ARTICLE XIII
In the thirteenth article we ask:
Is intention an act of the will?
[Parallel readings: II Sent., 38, 1, 3; S.T., I-II, 12 , 1.]
Difficulties
It seems that it is not, for
1. In regard to the words of Luke (11: 34): “The light of thy body is thy eye,” the Gloss explains: “That is, ‘thy intention.” But the eye in the soul is reason or the intellect. Intention therefore pertains to reason or the intellect, not to the will.
2. The answer was given that it pertains to the will as subordinated to reason and in this respect is compared to an eye.—On the contrary, the act of a higher and prior power does not depend upon that of a posterior power. The will, however, is prior to the intellect in acting, because it moves the intellect; as has been said. Then the act of the will does not depend upon reason. If intention were an act of the will, it would therefore in no way pertain to reason.
3. The answer was given that the act of the will does depend upon reason in this respect, that knowledge of the thing willed is a prerequisite for willing; and so, although intention is an act of the will, it nevertheless does in some sense belong to reason.—On the contrary, there is no act of the will for which knowledge is not a prerequisite. Consequently, according to the proposed solution no act should be attributed to the will simply, not even willing and loving, but to will and reason together. This, however, is false. Then so is the preceding contention that intention is an act of the will.
4. The very name intention implies a relation to an end. But it belongs to reason to refer anything to an end. Intention therefore belongs to reason and not to will.
5. It was maintained in answer that there is in intention not only a relation to an end but also an act of the will which is referred to the end, and that both are meant by the name intention.—On the contrary, that act is made the substratum of the relation to an end as a material principle is made that of the formal. But a thing takes its name from its formal rather than its material principle. Intention accordingly takes its name rather from what belongs to reason than from what belongs to will, and so it should be held to be an act of reason rather than of will.
6. Reason directs the will just as the prime mover directs the whole of nature. But the intention in the things of nature is more properly attributed to the prime mover than to the things of nature themselves, since these are said to intend something only in so far as they are directed by the prime mover. Then among the powers of the soul too, intention should be attributed to reason rather than to the will.
7. Properly speaking there is an intention only in a knower. But the will is not a knower. Intention therefore does not belong to the will.
8. There cannot be a single act of things that are in no sense one. But the will and reason are in no sense one, since they even belong to different genera of powers of the soul: the will is in the appetitive genus and reason is in the intellective. Consequently reason and the will cannot have a single act; and so, if intention is in any sense an act of reason, it will not be an act of the will.
9. According to the Philosopher “willing has as its object only the end.” But in a single order there is only a single end. The will in its act, then, is referred to only one thing. But where there is only one thing, there is no order. Since intention implies order, it therefore seems that it in no sense belongs to the will.
10. Intention seems to be nothing but the direction of the will to the last end. But it belongs to reason to direct the will. Intention therefore belongs to reason.
11. In the perversity of sin error belongs to reason, contempt to the irascible power, and the inordinacy of will to the concupiscible. In the reformation of the soul, on the other hand, faith belongs to reason, hope to the irascible power, and charity to the concupiscible. But according to Augustine, it is faith which “directs the intention.” Intention therefore belongs to reason.
12. According to the Philosopher, the will is referred to both possibles and impossibles, but intention only to possibles. Intention does not, then, belong to the will.
13 What is not in the soul is not in the will. Now intention is not in the soul, because it is not a power (for then it would be natural, and there would be no merit in it), nor is it a habit (for then it would be in one asleep), nor is it a passion (for then it would pertain to the sensitive part, as is apparent from what the Philosopher says). Since there are in the soul only these three, as is said in the Ethics, intention is not in the will.
14. To order is the function of reason, since this belongs to the wise man, as is said in the Metaphysics. But intention is an ordination to an end. It therefore is the function of reason.
15. Intention is referred to what is distant from an end, since distance is implied in the [Latin] preposition in [here used as a prefix]. But reason is more distant from the end than is the will, because reason merely points out the end, whereas the will clings to the end as its proper object. Intending, then, belongs to reason rather than to the will.
16. Every act of the will belongs to it either absolutely, or by a reference to higher powers, or by a reference to lower powers. Now intending is not an act of the will absolutely, because in that case it would be the same as willing or loving. Nor is intending its act by a reference to a higher power, reason, for in that reference its act is to choose. Nor is it so by a reference to lower powers, since its act in that reference is to command. Intending is therefore in no wise an act of the will.
To the Contrary
1. Intention is referred only to the end. But the end and good are the object of the will. Intention therefore pertains to the will.
2. Intending is a sort of pursuing. But pursuit and flight pertain to the will, not to reason. To reason it belongs only to say that something should be pursued or fled. Intention accordingly belongs to the will.
3. All merit is situated in the will. But intention is meritorious, and chiefly on the basis of it merit and demerit are reckoned. Hence intention is a function of the will.
4. Ambrose says: “Affection gives the name to your work.” But an act is judged to be good or bad from the intention. The intention is therefore contained in affection, and so it seems to belong to the will and not to reason.
REPLY
Intention is an act of the will. This shows up very clearly from its object. A power and its act must agree in their object, since a power is referred to the object only through the act. Thus for the power of sight and for vision there must be the same object, color. Now since the object of the act of intention is the good which is an end, and this is also the object of the will, intention must be an act of the will. It is, however, an act of the will, not absolutely, but in subordination to reason.
That this may be seen clearly it should be noted that, whenever there are two agents standing in an order, the second agent can move or act in two ways: (1) according to what belongs to its own nature, and (2) according to what belongs to the nature of the higher agent. The influence of the higher agent remains in the lower, and for this reason the lower acts not only by its own action but also by the action of the higher. The sphere of the sun, for example, moves by its own motion, which is completed in the course of a year, and by the motion of the first mobile, which is the motion of one day. In like fashion water moves by its own motion, tending to the center, and it has a motion from the influence of the moon moving it, as is revealed in the tides. Compounds also have certain reactions proper to themselves which are based upon the natures of the four elements, such as to tend downward, to heat, and to cool; and they have other operations from the influence of the heavenly bodies, as a magnet attracts iron.
Though no action of the lower agent takes place unless that of the higher agent is presupposed, nevertheless the action which belongs to it in accordance with its own nature is attributed to it absolutely, as it is attributed to water to move downward; but that which belongs to it from the influence of the higher agent is not attributed to it absolutely but only with reference to something else. Thus the ebb and flow of the tides are said to be the proper motion of the sea, not in so far as it is water, but in so far as it is moved by the moon.
Now reason and the will are operative powers related to each other. Viewed absolutely, reason is prior, although by reflection the will is made prior and superior inasmuch as it moves reason.
The will can accordingly have two types of acts. (1) It has one which belongs to it according to its own nature inasmuch as it tends to its own object absolutely. This act is attributed to the will without qualification, e.g:, to will and to love, although even for this act the action of reason is presupposed. (2) It has another type of act which belongs to it inasmuch as the influence of reason is left in the will. Since the proper function of reason is to order and compare, whenever there appears in the act of the will any comparison or ordering, such an act does not belong to the will absolutely but in subordination to reason. It is in this way that intending is an act of the will, since to intend seems to be nothing but to tend from what one wills to something else as to an end. Thus intending differs from willing in this, that willing tends.to an end absolutely whereas intending expresses a reference to an end inasmuch as the end is that to which the means are referred. Since the will is moved to its object as proposed to it by reason, it is moved in various ways according as the object is variously proposed. When reason proposes something to it as a good absolutely, the will is moved to it absolutely. This is willing. When reason proposes something to it under the aspect of a good to which other things are referred as to an end, then the will tends to it with a certain order, which is found in the act of the will, not in accordance with its own nature, but in accordance with the demands of reason. In this way intending is an act of the will in subordination to reason.
Answers to Difficulties
1. Intention is likened to an eye as regards the characteristic of reason which is found in it.
2. Reason moves the will in a certain sense, and the will in a certain sense moves reason, as is evident from what has been said. Thus each one is higher than the other in a different respect, and to each can be attributed an act in subordination to the other.
3. Although any act of the will presupposes knowledge on the part of reason, nevertheless there does not always appear in the act of the will what is proper to reason, as is clear from what has been said. Hence the argument proves nothing.
4. An active relation to the end belongs to reason, for it is its function to refer or relate to an end. But a passive relation can belong to whatever is directed or referred to an end by reason, and so it can also belong to the will. It is in this sense that the relation to an end pertains to intention.
5. From what has just been said the answer is clear.
6. In the prime mover there is found not only knowledge but also will, and so intention can properly be attributed to it. But only knowledge belongs to reason. The case is accordingly not the same.
7.Intending also has to do with non-cognitive beings, since even the things of nature intend an end, even though intention supposes some knowledge. But if we speak of an intention of the soul, this has to do only with cognitive beings, as does willing. Yet it is not necessary that intending and willing be acts of the same power as knowing, but merely of the same supposite. Properly speaking, it is not a power which knows or intends, but the supposite through a power.
8. Reason and the will are one by order, just as the universe is said to be one. In this case nothing prevents a single act from belonging to both, to one immediately, to the other mediately.
9. Although the will is chiefly concerned with the end in view of the fact that the means are desired only for the sake of the end, nevertheless the will is also concerned with the means to the end. The statement of the Philosopher that “the will is concerned with the end; choice, with the means,”“ does not mean that the will is always directed to the end, but merely sometimes and chiefly. From the fact that choice is never directed to the end it is shown that choosing and willing are not the same thing.
10. Active direction to an end belongs to reason, but passive direction to an end can belong to will. In the latter way it belongs to intcntion.
11. Faith directs our intention as reason directs our will. Intention accordingly is a function of the will as faith is of reason.
12. The will is not always concerned with impossibles but merely sometimes. In conformity with the Philosopher’s meaning this suffices to show the difference between willing and choice, which is always concerned with possibles; that is, it shows that to choose is not altogether the same as to will. Similarly, neither is to intend altogether the same as to will. But this does not keep it from being an act of the will.
13. Intention is an act of the soul. But in that threefold division proposed by the Philosopher the actions of the soul are not included, because actions do not belong to the soul as being in the soul but rather as being from the soul.—Or it may be said that actions are included under habits as that which proceeds from a principle is contained within its principle.
14. To order is the function of reason, but to be ordered can be the function of the will. In this way intention implies ordering.
15. That argument would prove something if nothing else were required for intention besides mere distance. But along with distance there is required an inclination; and that inclination is in the province of the will, not of reason. Hence the conclusion does not follow.
16. Intention is an act of the will in subordination to reason as it directs to an end the means to it. Choice is an act of the will in subordination to reason as it compares among themselves the means to an end. On this account intention and choice also differ.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
ARTICLE XIV
In the fourteenth article we ask:
Does the will in the same motion will the end and intend the means?
[Parallel readings: II Sent., 38, 1, 4; S.T., I-II, 8, 3; 12, 4.]
Difficulties
It seems that it does not, for
1. It is impossible for the same act to be at the same time good and bad. But it sometimes happens that there is a bad act of will with a good intention, as when someone wishes to steal in order to give an alms. Intending and willing are therefore not the same act.
2. According to the Philosopher, a motion which terminates in the mean and one which terminates in the extreme are specifically different. But the means to an end and the end are related about as the mean and the extreme. The intention of the end and the willing of the means are therefore specifically different, and so they are not a single act.
3. According to the Philosopher,in practical matters ends are comparable to principles in demonstrative sciences. But the act of the speculative intellect by which it understands principles is not the same as that by which it sees conclusions. This is shown by the fact that they are elicited from different habits; for understanding is the habit of principles, and science, that of conclusions. Then in matters of operation it is not the same act of the will by which we intend the end and will the means.
4. Acts are distinguished by their objects. But the end and the means are distinct. The intention of the end and the willing of the means are therefore not the same act.
To the Contrary
1. There cannot be two acts of the same power at the same time. But while the will is willing the means, it is at the same time intending the end. The intention of the end and the willing of the means are therefore not distinct acts.
2. The end is the reason for the appetibility of the means just as light is the reason for the visibility of color. But in the same act sight sees color and light. In the same act, therefore, the will wills the means and intends the end.
REPLY
Concerning this question there are two opinions, as the Master of the Sentences says. Some have said that the willing of the means to an end and the intention of the end are distinct acts. Others, on the contrary, have said that they are one and the same act but that their distinction comes merely from the difference in things. Each of these opinions is in some respect true.
In clarification of this it should be noted that, since the unity of an act is to be judged from the unity of its object, if there are any two things which are one in any sense, an act which is directed to them under the aspect of their unity will be one. But an act which is directed to them under the aspect of their duality will be two different acts. Take for example the parts of a line, which are in some sense two and in some sense one—as they are united in the whole. If an act of vision is directed to the two parts of the line as two, that is, to each one under the aspect of what is proper to it, there will be two acts Of seeing, and the two parts will not be able to be seen at the same time. But if our vision is directed to the whole line embracing both parts, it will be a single act of seeing, and the whole line will be seen at once.
Now all things that are arranged in an order are, indeed, many in so far as they are things viewed in themselves, but they are one in regard to the order in which they are arranged. An act of the soul which is directed to them from the point of view of their order is accordingly one. But an act which is directed to them as considered in themselves is manifold. This distinction shows up in a viewing of the statue of Mercury. If one looks upon it as a thing in itself, one’s attention will in one act be directed to it, and in another to Mercury, whose image the statue is. But if one looks upon the statue as the image of Mercury, in the same act one’s attention will be directed to the statue and to Mercury.
Similarly when the motion of the will is directed to the end and to the means, if it is directed to them inasmuch as each is a certain thing existing by itself, there will be a distinct motion of the will for each. In this way the opinion which says that the intention of the end and the willing of the means are distinct acts is true. But if the will is directed to one as having an ordination to the other, there is a single act of the will in regard to both. In this way the other opinion’ which holds that the intention of the end and the willing of the means are one and the same act, is true.
Now if the essential character of intention is rightly examined, the latter opinion is found to be truer than the former. For the motion of the will toward an end taken absolutely is not called an intention, but it is called willing without further qualification. But an inclination of the will to an end as being that in which the means terminate is called an intention. A person who wants health is said simply to will it. He is said to intend it only when he wills something else on account of health. And so it must be granted that intention is not an act numerically distinct from willing.
Answers to Difficulties
1. A single act cannot be both good and bad; yet there can bbee aa good circumstance of a bad act. The act is vicious if a person eats more than he should, though he may eat when he should. Thus the act of will by which someone wishes to steal in order to give food to a poor man is an act simply evil, yet having a good circumstance; for the reason for which something is done is listed as one of the circumstances.
2. The Philosopher’s statement is to be understood as meaning: when the motion stops in the mean. When it passes through the mean to the term, then the motion is numerically one. And so when the will is moved to a means subordinated to the end, there is a single motion.
3 When the conclusion and the principle are considered each by itself, there are distinct considerations; but when the principle is considered in its relation to the conclusion, as happens in syllogizing, there is one and the same consideration of both.
4. The end and the means are one object in so far as one is considered in relation to the other.
Q. 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will
ARTICLE XV
In the fifteenth article we ask:
Is choice an act of the will?
[Parallel readings: II Sent., 24, 1, 2; S.T., I, 83,3; In III Eth., 6, nn. 452,456; 9, nn. 484,486; In VI Eth., 2, nn. 1129,1133-41; S.T., I-II, 13, 1.]
Difficulties
It seems that it is not, but rather of reason, for
1. Ignorance is not found in the will but in reason. But the perversity of a choice is a sort of ignorance. Hence also “every evil person is said to be ignorant” with the ignorance of choice, as is explained in the Ethics. Choice, then, pertains to reason.
2. Not only do inquiry and argumentation belong to reason but also conclusion. But a choice is, as it were, the conclusion of a deliberation, as is made clear in the Ethics. Since deliberation belongs to reason, choice will therefore also belong to reason.
3. According to the Philosopher3 the chief characteristic of moral virtue consists in choice. But, as he himself says, in the moral virtues the part of prudence is the most important factor, adding the last formal determinant to the essential nature of virtue. Choice therefore pertains to prudence. But prudence is in reason, and so choice also is.
4. Choice implies a certain discrimination. But to discriminate is a function of reason. Therefore to choose also is.
To the Contrary
1. To choose is, when two things are proposed, to want one in preference to the other, as Damascene explains.But to want is an act of the will, not of reason. Then so is to choose.
2. The Philosopher says that choice is the desire of what has been previously deliberated. But desire is a function of the will, not of reason. Then so is choice.
REPLY
Choice contains something of the will and something of reason. But the Philosopher seems to leave in doubt whether it is properly an act of the will or of reason, when he says that choice is an act either of the intellective appetite (that is, of appetite as subordinated to the intellect) or of the appetitive intellect (that is, of the intellect in subordination to appetite). The first, that it is an act of the will in subordination to reason, is the truer.
That it is directly an act of the will is clear from two considerations: (1) From the formality of its object. The proper object of choice is the means to an end, and this belongs to the formality of good, which is the object of the will. For both the end, such as the honorable or the pleasurable, and the means, namely, the useful, are called good. (2) From the formality of the act itself. Choice is the final acceptance of something to be carried out. This is not the business of reason but of will; for, however much reason puts one ahead of the other, there is not yet the acceptance of one in preference to the other as something to be done until the will inclines to the one rather than to the other. The will does not of necessity follow reason. Choice is nevertheless not an act of the will taken absolutely but in its relation to reason, because there appears in choice what is proper to reason: the comparing of one with the other or the putting of one before the other. This is, of course, found in the act of the will from the influence of reason: reason proposes something to the will, not as useful simply, but as the more useful to an end.
It is accordingly clear that the act of the will is to will, to choose, and to intend. It is to will in so far as reason proposes to the will something good absolutely, whether it is something to be chosen for itself, as an end, or because of something else, as a means. In either case we are said to will it. In so far as reason proposes to the will a good as the more useful to an end, the act is to choose. It is to intend in so far as reason proposes to the will a good as an end to be attained through a means.
Answers to Difficulties
1. Ignorance is attributed to choice on the basis of the part played in it by reason.
2. The conclusion of a practical inquiry is of two kinds. One is in reason, and this is decision, the judgment about what has been deliberated upon. The other is in the will, and this is choice. It is called a conclusion by a sort of simile, because in speculative matters the discourse finally comes to rest in the conclusion, and in matters of operation it comes to rest in the doing.
3. Choice is said to be the principal element in moral virtue both from the point of view of the role of reason in it, and from that of the role of the will. Both are necessary for the essential character of moral virtue. Choice is called the principal element with reference to external acts. It is accordingly not necessary that choice be entirely an act of prudence, but it shares in the characteristics of prudence as it does in those of reason.
4. Discrimination is found in choice in accordance with what belongs to reason, whose distinctive characteristic the will follows in choosing, as has been said.