Question Twenty-Six: The Passions of the Soul

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
How does the soul suffer when separated from the body?
How does the soul suffer while joined to the body?
Is passion only in the sense appetitive power?
On what grounds are the contrariety and diversity among the passions of the soul based?
Are hope, fear, joy, and sadness the four principal passions of the soul?
Do we merit by our passions?
Does a passion accompanying a meritorious act detract from its merit?
Were there any such passions in Christ?
Was the passion of pain in the soul of Christ as regards higher reason?
Did the pain of the passion which was in Christ's higher reason prevent the joy of fruition, and conversely?

ARTICLE I

The question is about the passions of the soul,

and in the first article we ask:

How does the soul suffer when separated from the body?

[Parallel readings: IV Sent., 44, 3, 3, sol. 3 (cf. a. 2, sol. 1-3; 47, 2, 1, sol. 2 & 3); S.T., IV, 95; Quodl. II, (7), 13; III, (10), 23; VIII, (8), 18; De spir. creat., I ad 20; S.T., I, 64, 4 ad 1; Q.D. de an., 6 ad 7; 2 1; Comp. theol., I, 180.]

Difficulties

It seems that it does not suffer from a corporeal fire, for

1. Augustine says: “An agent is superior to its corresponding patient.” But the soul is superior to any body whatsoever. Therefore the soul cannot suffer from corporeal fire.

2. It was said in answer that fire acts upon the soul as an instrument of divine vindictive justice.—On the contrary, an instrument accomplishes its instrumental action only by exercising its natural action, as the water of baptism sanctifies the soul by washing the body, and a saw makes a bench by cutting wood. But fire cannot have any natural action upon the soul. It therefore cannot act upon the soul as the instrument of divine justice.

3. The answer was given that the natural action of fire is to burn up, and so it naturally acts upon the soul in so far as the soul has a complement of combustibles.—On the contrary, the combustibles which are said to form the complement of the soul are sins, to which corporeal fire is not contrary. Since all natural action is by reason of contrariety, it therefore seems that the soul cannot suffer from corporeal fire as having a complement of combustibles.

4. Augustine says: “The things by which souls freed of their bodies are affected either for good or for ill are not corporeal but similar to corporeal things. Then the fire by which the separated soul is punished is not corporeal.

5. Damascene says: “The devil and his demons and his man, the Antichrist, and the wicked and sinners will be given over to eternal fire—not a material one such as is familiar to us but one such as God surely knows.” Now all corporeal fire is material. Then the fire from which the separated soul suffers is not corporeal.

6. The answer was offered that such a corporeal fire afflicts the soul inasmuch as it is seen by it, as Gregory says: “The soul suffers from fire by the very fact of seeing it”; and so what immediately afflicts the soul is not something corporeal but the apprehended likeness of something corporeal.—On the contrary, the thing seen, by being seen, is the perfection of the seer. Consequently by being seen it does not give pain to the one seeing but rather pleasure. If, then, something that is seen causes pain, this will be because it is harmful in some other way. But fire cannot afflict the soul by acting upon it in some other way, as has been proved. Then neither does the soul suffer from fire simply by seeing it.

7. Between an agent and its patient there is some proportion. But there is no proportion between an incorporeal and a corporeal being. The soul, therefore, being incorporeal, cannot suffer from corporeal fire.

8. If corporeal fire acts upon the soul in a way that is not natural, this action must be due to some superadded power. Now that power is either corporeal or spiritual. But it cannot be spiritual, because a corporeal being is not susceptible of a spiritual power. If, on the other hand, it is corporeal, fire will still not be able to act upon the soul by this power, since the soul is superior to every corporeal power. The soul therefore cannot suffer either naturally or supernaturally.

9. It was advanced in answer that by sin the soul is made less noble than a corporeal creature.—On the contrary, Augustine says that a living substance is nobler than any non-living substance. But a rational soul, even after sinning, still remains living by its natural life. It therefore does not become less noble than corporeal fire, which is a nonliving substance.

10. If corporeal fire afflicts the soul, it does so only inasmuch as it is apprehended or sensed as harmful. But a thing does harm to another by taking something away from it. Thus Augustine says that evil does harm because it takes good away. Now a corporeal fire cannot take anything away from the soul. Thus it cannot afflict it.

11. It was said that it takes away the glory of the vision of God.On the contrary, children who are damned for original sin alone are deprived of the vision of God. If, then, corporeal fire does not take away from the damned anything more, the pains of those who are being punished in hell for actual sins will be no greater than those of children who are being punished in limbo. But this is against Augustine’s doctrine.

12. Whatever acts upon another impresses upon it a likeness of the form through which the agent acts. But fire acts through heat. Now since the soul cannot be heated, it therefore seems that it cannot be acted upon by fire.

13. God is more ready to show mercy than to punish. But one who deliberately resists, especially an adult, is not helped through the instruments of divine mercy, the sacraments. Then through the instrument of divine justice, corporeal fire, the soul will not undergo punishment against its will. Obviously it does not undergo it voluntarily. Hence the soul is in no way punished through corporeal fire.

14. Whatever suffers anything from another being is in some way moved by it. But under no species of motion can the soul be moved by corporeal fire, as is clear by induction. Consequently the soul cannot suffer anything from corporeal fire.

15. Whatever is made to suffer by another has matter in common with it, as is seen from Boethius. But the soul does not have matter in common with corporeal fire. It therefore cannot suffer from corporeal fire.

To the Contrary

1. The rich man buried in hell as to his soul only, says: “I am tormented in this flame.” (Luke 16:24.)

2. Commenting on the words of Job (20:26): “A fire that is not kindled shall devour him,” Gregory says: “Though the fire of hell is corporeal and corporeally burns the reprobates cast into it, it is not kindled by any human effort or fed with wood; but once created, it continues inextinguishable without needing kindling or losing its heat.”

3. Cassiodorus says” that the soul separated from the body “hears and sees with its senses more keenly” than when it is in the body. But while it is in the body it suffers from something corporeal by sensing it. All the more then does it do so when it is separated from the body.

4. Like the soul, demons are incorporeal. But demons suffer from corporeal fire, as is clear from Matthew (25:41): “Depart from me, you cursed...” So too, then, does the separated soul.

5. For the soul to be justified is something greater than for it to be punished. But certain corporeal beings act upon the soul for its justification in so far as they are instruments of divine mercy, as is evident in the case of the sacraments of the Church. Some corporeal beings, then, can likewise act upon the soul for its punishment in so far as they are instruments of divine justice.

6. What is less noble can suffer from what is more noble. But corporeal fire is nobler than the soul of a damned person. Therefore the souls of the damned can suffer from corporeal fire.—Proof of the minor: Any being at all is nobler than non-being. But non-existence is nobler than the existence of the souls of the damned, as is clear from Matthew (26:24): “It were better for him, if that man had not been born.” Then any being at all, and therefore corporeal fire, is nobler than a damned soul.

REPLY

To clear up this issue and those of the following articles we must understand whit passion or suffering is in its proper sense. It must therefore be home in mind that the term passion is taken in two senses: one general and the other proper.

In its general sense passion is the reception of something in any way at all. This usage conforms to the root meaning of the word itself, for passion is derived from the Greek patin, meaning “to receive.”

In its proper sense passion is used of motion, since action and passion consist in motion, inasmuch as it is by way of motion that reception in a patient takes place. And because all motion is between contraries, that which the patient receives must be contrary to something given up by the patient. Now conformably with what is received the patient is made like the agent; and hence it is that by passion in the proper meaning of the term the agent is opposed to the patient as its contrary, and every passion removes something from the substance of the patient. Passion in this sense, however, is found only in the motion of alteration. For in local motion nothing is received in the mobile, but the mobile itself is received in a place. But in the motion of increase and decrease what is received or given up is not a form but something substantial, like nourishment, on whose addition or subtraction the greatness or smallness of quantity depends. In generation and corruption there is no motion or contrariety except by reason of a previous alteration. Consequently passion is properly found only in alteration, in which one contrary form is received and the other is driven out.

Because passion in its proper sense involves a certain loss, inasmuch as the patient is changed from its former quality to a contrary one, the term passion is broadened in usage, so that whatever is in anyway kept from what belongs to it is said to suffer (pati). Thus we should say that something heavy suffers when prevented from moving downward, or that a man suffers if prevented from doing his own will.

Taken in the first sense, then, passion is found in the soul and in every creature, because every creature has some potentiality in its composition, and by reason of this every subsistent creature is capable of receiving something. Taken in the second sense, however, passion is found only where there is motion and contrariety. Now motion is found only in bodies, and the contrariety of forms or qualities only in beings subject to generation and corruption. Hence only such beings can properly suffer in this sense. Consequently the soul, being incorporeal, cannot suffer in this sense; for even though it receives something, this does not happen by an exchange of contraries but simply by a communication from the agent, as air is lighted by the sun. But in the third sense, in which the term passion is taken figuratively, the soul can suffer in the sense that its operation can be hampered.

Some, aware that passion in a proper sense cannot be in the soul, have asserted that everything said in the Scriptures about the bodily pains of the damned is to be understood metaphorically. Thus by the bodily pains with which we are familiar there would be indicated the spiritual afflictions by which damned spirits are punished; just as on the other hand, by the bodily delights promised in Scripture we understand the spiritual delights of the blessed. Origen and Algazel seem to have been of this opinion. But because, believing in the resurrection, we believe that there will be suffering not only for spirits but also for bodies, and because bodies cannot be punished except by bodily suffering, and because the same suffering is due both to men after the resurrection and to spirits, as is clear from Matthew (25:41): “Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire it is therefore necessary to say, as Augustine proves, that even spirits are affected in some way by bodily pains. Nor is there a [Parallel between the glory of the blessed and the pains of the damned, because the blessed are raised up to a state that surpasses their nature and thus are given beatitude through the enjoyment of the divinity, whereas the damned are pushed down to a state that is below them and thus are punished even with bodily torments.

Others have accordingly said that the separated soul will be affected by certain pains, to be sure, which, though not bodily, are nevertheless like bodily pains, something like the pains with which people asleep are afflicted. Augustine seeMS18 to have thought this, and also Avicenna. But this also cannot be true. For such likenesses of bodies cannot be intellectual, because intellectual likenesses are universal and attention to them would not cause affliction of the soul but rather pleasure in the contemplation of truth. This expression must therefore be understood of imaginational likenesses, which can exist only in a bodily organ, as is proved by the philosophers. But there is no such organ, of course, in the separated soul and in the spirits of the demons.

Others accordingly say that the separated soul suffers from bodies themselves. How this can be is explained by some in one way and by others in another.

Some say that the separated soul uses its senses, and therefore, by sensing a corporeal fire, is punished by fire. This is what Gregory seems to, say when he says: “The soul suffers from fire by the very fact of seeing it.” But that does not seem to be true; first of all because the acts of the sensitive powers cannot be had except by means of bodily organs, for otherwise the sentient souls of the brutes would be incorruptible, as being capable of having their operations by themselves; and in the second place because, granted that the separated souls would sense, they could still not be afflicted by sensible things; for the sensible object is the perfection of the sentient being as such, just as the intelligible object is the perfection of the intelligent being.

It is therefore not as sensed or understood that something sensible or intelligible causes pain or sadness, but inasmuch as it is harmful or is so apprehended. Thus it is necessary to find a way in which fire can be harmful to the separated soul.

Nor can it be true, as Some say, that, although corporeal fire cannot be harmful to a spirit, yet it can be apprehended as harmful. This seems to agree with what Gregory says: “Because the soul sees itself being burned, it is burned.” For it is improbable that demons, who enjoy sharpness of perception, do not know their own nature and that of corporeal fire much better than we do, so that they could falsely believe it possible for a corporeal fire to harm them.

It must therefore be said that really, and not only apparently, souls are afflicted by corporeal fire. This is what Gregory says: “We can gather from the statements of the gospels that the soul suffers burning not only by seeing but also by experiencing it.”

To assign the way in which this happens some say that as the instrument of divine justice corporeal fire can act upon the soul, even though it cannot do so according to its own nature. For there are many things that are not sufficient of their own nature to accomplish something which they are nonetheless able to accomplish as the instruments of another agent. Thus the element fire is not sufficient for the generation of flesh except as the instrument of the nutritive power. But this solution does not seem to be adequate, for an instrument does not perform an action which surpasses its own nature except by exercising some action natural to it, as was said in the difficulties.

It is therefore necessary to find some other way in which the soul somehow suffers naturally from corporeal fire. This can be under stood as follows. An incorporeal substance may be united to a body in two ways: (1) as a form, inasmuch as it vivifies the body; and (2) as a mover is united to the thing moved or as a thing placed is united to its place, namely, by some operation or some relationship. But because there is one act of existing for the form and that of which it is the form, the union of a spiritual substance to a corporeal one after the manner of a form is a union in the act of existing. Now the existence of no being lies within its own power; and consequently it is not within the power of a spiritual substance to be united to a body or to be separated from it after the manner of a form, but this is accomplished either by a law of nature or by the divine power. But because the operation of a thing which operates voluntarily is within its own power, it is within the power of a spiritual nature, conformably to the order of nature, to be united to a body or to be separated from it after the manner of a mover or of a thing placed; but that a spiritual substance thus united to a body should be confined and hampered and, as it were, fettered by it, that is above nature. The corporeal fire in question, then, acting as the instrument of divine justice, accomplishes something above the power of nature, that is, to confine or fetter the soul; but the union itself in the manner mentioned is natural.

The soul accordingly suffers from corporeal fire in the third way proposed above, namely, in the sense in which we say that anything suffers which is obstructed in its proper activity or kept from something which belongs to it. Augustine affirms this sort of passion when he says: “Why should we not say that even incorporeal spirits can be afflicted by the punishment of corporeal fire in true though wonderful ways if the spirits of men, which are also unquestionably incorporeal, both could now be enclosed in bodily members and will in the future be able to be indissolubly bound by the chains of their own bodies? The incorporeal spirits of the demons... will therefore cling to corporeal fires to be tormented, not in such a way that the fires themselves to which they cling will be animated by union with them and become living beings.... but by clinging in marvelous and inexpressible ways they will receive pain from the fires yet not give life to them.”

Gregory also proposes this sort of passion, saying: “As long as Truth presents the rich sinner as damned in fire, what man of any wisdom will deny that the souls of the reprobate are held by fires?”

Answers to Difficulties

1. The agent does not have to be superior to the patient in every respect, but merely as agent. And so, inasmuch as fire acts upon the soul as the instrument of divine justice, it is superior to the soul, though not in every respect.

2. There is something natural in that passion and action, as has been said.

3. That difficulty is speaking about a passion as used in the second sense, which is had through the contrariety of forms; and this is impossible in the case at hand.

4. On this matter Augustine does not expressly decide anything in the place cited, but he is speaking there by way of inquiry as if proposing a difficulty. Hence he does not say absolutely that the things by which the separated souls are affected are not corporeal but similar to corporeal things, but he is speaking hypothetically: if the things were of this kind, they could still affect the souls with joy or sorrow. In the same way, when he says that the soul is not bome to corporeal places except in company with another body, he says this as part of a disjunction, adding: “or else not locally,” that is, by commensuration to a place.

5. In the pain of a separated soul there are two principles to be taken into account: the first afflicting principle, and the proximate one. The first afflicting principle is corporeal fire itself which confines the soul as explained above. But this would not arouse sadness in the soul unless it were apprehended by the soul. The proximate afflicting principle is therefore the confining fire as apprehended; and this fire is not material but spiritual. In this sense Damascene’s statement can be verified.—Or it can be said in answer that he says it is not material because it does not punish the soul by acting materially, as it punishes bodies.

6. That fire is apprehended as harmful inasmuch as it is confining and fettering. In this sense the sight of it can be the source of affliction.

7. There is no proportion of the spiritual to the corporeal if proportion is taken in its proper sense, according to a definite relationship of quantity to quantity, either of dimensive quantity to dimensive quantity or of virtual quantity to virtual quantity, as two bodies are proportioned to each other in dimension and power; for the power of a spiritual substance is not of the same genus as corporeal power. If, however, proportion is taken broadly as meaning any relationship, then there is some proportion of the spiritual to the corporeal through which the spiritual can naturally act upon the corporeal, though not conversely except by divine power.

8. An instrument performs its instrumental activity inasmuch as it is moved by the principal agent and through this motion shares in some way in the power of the principal agent, but not so that that power has its complete existence in the instrument, because motion is an incomplete act. The difficulty argues as if a complete power were required in the instrument for the performance of the instruniental action.

9. The soul, even when sinful, is simply nobler than any corporeal power as regards its nature; but as regards guilt it is made less noble than corporeal fire, not simply but inasmuch as it is the instrument of divine justice.

10. That fire harms the soul, not in such a way that it takes away from it some form inhering in it absolutely, but in so far as it prevents its free action, confining it, as has been said.

11. In children because of the lack of grace there is only the privat ion of the vision of God without anything contrary actively hampering them. But the damned in hell are not only deprived of the vision of God because of the lack of grace, but are also hampered as by something contrary because they are overwhelmed with bodily pains. The soul does not suffer from fire as if it were altered by it but in the manner explained above.

13. Voluntariness is essential to justice but not to punishment; rather it is contrary to it. Hence the instruments of divine mercy, which are intended to justify, do not act upon a soul which resists; but the instruments of divine justice for punishing do act upon a soul which resists.

14. That difficulty argues on the supposition of a passion properly so called, which consists in motion. But we are not speaking of that now.

15. To have a passion in the proper sense of the term a thing must have matter subject to contrariety, as has been said. And for two things to have a reciprocal passion, they must have a common matter. Yet a thing can suffer from another with which it does not have any matter in common, as an inferior body suffers from the sun. And a thing which does not have any matter at all can suffer in some way, as is evident from what was said above.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties

Because these in some way come to true conclusions, but not by a true process, they must be answered in order.

1. Augustine shows that that proof is invalid: “I should indeed say that spirits without any body are going to burn, just as that rich man was burning in hell when he said, ‘I am tormented in this flame,’ if I did not see that it would fittingly be answered that that flame was of the same kind as the eyes which he raised to see Lazarus, as the tongue upon which he craved a little water to be poured, as the finger of Lazarus by which he asked that it be done, while they were nevertheless souls without bodies. Thus that flame by which he was burning can be understood to have been incorporeal as well.” From this it is clear that that passage cited in authority is not effective as a proof of the point at issue unless something else is added to it.

2. The fire of hell burns incorporeal substances corporeally from the point of view of the agent, not from that of the patient. But the bodies of the damned it will burn corporeally from the latter point of view as well.

3. The statement of Cassiodorus does not seem to be true if he is speaking of the external senses. For it to be true it must be understood of internal spiritual senses.

4. An answer to that passage of the gospel could be that the fire is spiritual, except for the fact that the bodies of the damned could not be punished by it. That argument, then, does not sufficiently prove the point at issue.

5. The same is to be said of this difficulty, which argues from a parallel.

6. In so far as a damned soul is a real being it is better than nonbeing. But the words of our Lord that it would be better for it not to be, mean: in so far as it is subject to misery and guilt.

Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul

ARTICLE II

In the second article we ask:

How does the soul suffer while joined to the body?

[Parallel readings: III Sent., 15, 2, 1 sol. 2; S.T., I-II, 22, 1.]

Difficulties

It seems that it does not suffer indirectly, for

1. As is said in the work Spirit and Soul, because of the friendship of the body and soul, the soul while joined to the body cannot be free; and though the soul cannot be destroyed, it can nevertheless fear destruction. But to fear is a sort of suffering. Therefore the soul while joined to the body suffers in itself, because the inability to be destroyed belongs to it in itself.

2. Whatever gives perfection to another is superior to it. But the body gives perfection to the soul, for the soul is united to the body that it may be perfected there. The body is therefore superior to the soul; and so the soul can suffer directly from the body to which it is united.

3. The soul is moved in place indirectly because it is indirectly in the place in which the body is directly. But a form or quality which is in the body directly is not said to be in the soul indirectly. Now, since a passion or suffering is concerned with a form or quality, being of the type of motion which is alteration, it therefore seems that the soul in the body cannot suffer indirectly.

4. Being moved indirectly is distinguished from being moved in part, as is made clear in the Physics. But the soul is part of a composite which is moved directly, as appears from The Soul. The soul should therefore not be said to be moved indirectly, but as a part with reference to the movement of the whole.

5. The direct is prior to the indirect. But in the passions of the soul the role of the soul is prior to that of the body, because the body is transformed by the apprehension and appetency of the soul, as is evident in anger, fear, and so on. It should therefore not be said that by those passions the soul suffers indirectly and the body directly.

6. Whatever is formal in anything is more important than what is material in it. But in the passions of the soul the role of the soul is formal, and that of the body is material. The formal definition of anger is that it is the desire for revenge; its material definition, that it is the boiling of the blood around the heart. In such passions, then, the role of the soul is more important than that of the body. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.

7. Just as joy and sorrow and such passions of the soul do not belong to the soul without the body, neither does sensing. But the soul is not said to sense indirectly. Then neither should it be said to suffer indirectly.

To the Contrary

1. Taken strictly passion is a certain motion in the line of alteration, as has been said. But the soul is not altered except indirectly. Then neither does it suffer except indirectly.

2. The powers of the soul are not more perfect than the substance of the soul itself. But according to the Philosopher’ the powers do not grow old directly but only because of the failure of the body. Then neither does~the soul suffer directly but only indirectly.

3. Whatever is moved directly is divisible, as is proved in the Physics. But the soul is indivisible. It therefore is not moved directly, and so neither does it suffer directly.

REPLY

If passion is taken strictly, it is impossible for anything incorporeal to suffer (pati), as was shown above. Then in a passion properly so called it is the body that suff ers directly. Consequently, if such a passion belongs in any way to the soul, this is only inasmuch as it is united to the body, and therefore indirectly.

Now the soul is united to the body in two respects: (1) as a form, inasmuch as it gives existence to the body, vivifying it; (2) as a mover inasmuch as it exercises its operations through the body. And in both respects the soul suffers indirectly, but differently. For anything that is composed of matter and form suffers by reason of its matter just as it acts by reason of its form. Thus the passion begins with the matter and in a certain sense indirectly belongs to the form. But the passion of the patient is derived from the agent, because passion is the effect of action.

A passion of the body is therefore attributed to the soul indirectly in two ways: (1) In such a way that the passion begins with the body and ends in the soul inasmuch as it is united to the body as its form. This is a bodily passion. Thus, when the body is injured, the union of the body with the soul is weakened; and so the soul, which is united to the body in its act of existing, suffers indirectly. (2) In such a way that the passion begins with the soul inasmuch as it is the mover of the body, and ends in the body. This is called a psychical passion. An example is seen in anger and fear and the like; for passions of this kind are aroused by the apprehension and appetency of the soul, and a bodily transformation follows upon them, just as the transformation of a mobile being follows from the operation of the mover in any one of the ways in which the mobile being is disposed to obey the motion of the mover. Thus, when the body is transformed by an alteration, the soul itself also is said to suffer indirectly.

Answers to Difficulties

1. The soul does not fear destruction as if it would be destroyed in itself, but it fears the destruction of the composite through the separation of itself from the body. And even if it should fear its own destruction, this would be only in so far as there is some doubt whether upon the destruction of the body the soul is corrupted indirectly. Not even destruction, then, is compatible with the soul directly, and even the passion of fear is not attributable to it apart from its union with the body.

2. Even though the soul is perfected in the body, it is not perfected by the body, as Augustine proves.But either it is perfected by God or it perfects itself with the assistance of the body working at its command, just as the possible intellect is perfected by the power of the agent intellect with the help of phantasms which are made actually intelligible by this power.

3. Although a quality of the body by no means belongs to the soul, yet the act of being of the composite is common to soul and body, and likewise the operation. The passion of the body therefore overflows into the soul indirectly.

4. A passion happens to the composite of body and soul only by reason of the body. It therefore happens to the soul only indirectly. The argument proceeds, however, as if the passion belonged to the whole composite by reason of the whole and not by reason of one of the two parts.

5. Anger, and any passion of the soul for that matter, can be viewed in two ways: (1) According to the specific characteristic of anger. From this point of view it is primarily in the soul rather than in the body. (2) Inasmuch as it is a passion. From this point of view it is primarily in the body, for there it first gets the character of a passion. We accordingly do not say that the soul becomes angry indirectly, but that it suffers indirectly.

6. The answer to this difficulty is clear from what has just been said.

7. The soul is not said to sense indirectly any more than to rejoice, though it is said to suffer indirectly.

Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul

ARTICLE III

In the third article we ask:

Is passion only in the sense appetitive power?

[Parallel readings: III Sent., 15, 2, 1 sol. 2; IV Sent., 49, 3, 1 sol. 2 ad 1; In De div. nom., c. 2, lect. 4, n. 191; In II Eth., 5; S.T., I, 20, 1 ad 1 & 2; 81, 1; I-II, 22, 2 & 3.]

Difficulties

It seems not, for

1. Christ suffexed in His whole soul, as appears from the words of the Psalm (87:4): “For my soul is filled with evils,” which are referred to’ the sufferings of His passion in the explanation given in the Gloss) But totality as applied to the soul refers to powers. Consequently there can be passion in any power of the soul, and therefore not only in the sense appetitive power.

2. Every movement or operation which belongs to the soul in itself independently of the body is a function of the intellective, not the sensitive, part. But, as Augustine says, “the soul is not influenced by flesh alone to crave, fear, rejoice, or be distressed; but it can also be stirred up with these movements by itSelf.” Such passions are therefore not only in the sense appetitive part.

3. The will belongs to the intellective part, as is made clear in The Soul. But Augustine says: “There is will in all of these (that is, fear, joy, and the like). They are all, in fact, nothing but acts of the will. For what is craving and joy but the will in its acceptance of the things which we wish? And what is fear and sorrow but the will in its rejection of the things which we do not wish?” Passions of this kind are therefore also in the intellective part.

4. It is not the function of the same power to act and to be acted upon or suffer. But sense seems to be an active power; for the basilisk is said to kill by its gaze, and a menstruating woman ruins a mirror by looking into it, as is explained in the work Sleep and Wakefulness. Hence the passion of the soul is not to be placed in the sensitive part.

5. An active power is nobler than a passive one. But the vegetative powers are active, and the sensitive powers are nobler than they. Therefore the sensitive powers are also active. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.

6. The rational powers are capable of opposite determinations according to the Philosopher. But delight is opposed to sadness. Now, since delight is properly in the intellective part, as is made clear in the Ethics, it seems that sadness is also there. And so passions can be in the intellective part.

7. The answer was advanced that the Philosopher’s statement refers to opposite acts.—On the contrary, knowledge and ignorance, which are opposites, are in the intellective part of the soul, and yet they are not acts. The Philosopher’s statement therefore does not refer only to acts.

8. According to the Philosopher, the same thing by its absence and by its presence is the cause of contraries, as the pilot is the cause of both the saving and the sinking of the ship. But the intelligible object when present causes delight in the intellective part. When absent, therefore, it causes sadness in the same part. Thus the same is to be concluded as before.

9. Damascene says: “Pain is not a passion but the sensing of a passion.” It is therefore in the sensitive power and not in the appetitive; and, for the same reason, so are pleasure and the other things which are called passions of the soul.

10. According to Damascene and the Philosopher” a passion is that which is followed by joy and sadness. The passions of the soul therefore precede joy and sadness. But joy and sadness are in the appetitive part. Then the passions of the soul are in the part which precedes the appetitive. Since it is the apprehensive part which precedes the appetitive, they are therefore in the apprehensive part.

The body undergoes change in the operations of the sense apprehensive power just as it does in those of the sense appetitive power. Passions are therefore not only in the appetitive but also in the apprehensive.

12. A passion strictly so called is had through the loss of something and the reception of its contrary. But this happens in the intellective part; for guilt is lost and grace is received, and the habit of lust is lost and the habit of chastity is introduced. Passion is therefore properly in the higher part of the soul.

13. The movement of the sense appetitive power follows the apprehension of sense. But sometimes such passions of the soul are aroused in us by objects which cannot be apprehended by sense, such as shame for a disgraceful action or fear for the future. Such passions therefore cannot be in the sense appetitive part, and so we are left with the conclusion that they are in the rational appetitive part, the will.

14. Hope is listed among the passions of the soul. But hope is in the intellective part of the soul, because the holy fathers while in limbo had hope, and the movement of the sensitive part does not remain in the separated soul. Passions are therefore also in the intellective part.

15. The image [of the Trinity] is in the intellective part. But the soul suffers in the powers of the image, since the powers of the image which are now perfected by grace will be perfected by the glory of enjoyment in the state of glory. Consequently passions are not only in the sense appetitive part of the soul.

16. According to Damascene “passion is a movement from one thing to another.” Now the intellect moves from one thing to another by proceeding from principles to conclusions. Therefore passion is in the intellect. And so the same is to be concluded as before.

17. The Philosopher says that “to understand is in a way to be passive (pati). But understanding is in the intellect. Hence there is passion in the intellect.

18. Dionysius says of Hierotheus that “by suffering divine things” he learned divine truths. But he could not undergo or suffer divine things in the sensitive part, which is not proportionate to divine things. Then passion is not only in the sensitive part.

19. No definite power of the soul has to be allotted to that which is in the soul accidentally; for there is neither science of things that exist accidentally nor a definite power for them. But the soul does not suffer except accidentally or indirectly. Passion is therefore not in any definite power of the soul, and so not in the sensitive appetite alone.

To the Contrary

1. Damascene says: “A passion is a movement of the appetitive power in imagining good or evil”; and again: “A passion is a movement of the non-rational soul due to the apprehension of good or evil.” Passion is therefore only in the non-rational appetitive part. In the strict sense passion is taken according to the movement of alteration, as has been said..But there is alteration only in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in the Physics. Therefore passion is only in the sensitive part.

REPLY

Strictly speaking, passion is only in the sense appetitive part, as appears from the definitions of passion quoted from Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa. This is shown as follows.

Passion is used in three senses, as was said above. It is taken first in general, in the sense in which all receiving is undergoing or suffering. In this usage passion is in every part of the soul and not only in the sense appetitive part. Understanding passion in this way, the Commentator says that all the powers of the vegetative soul are active; all those of the sensitive soul, passive; and those of the rational soul, partly active (because of the agent intellect) and partly passive (because of the possible intellect). Now, although this sort of passion is compatible with both the apprehensive and the appetitive powers, yet it is more proper to the appetitive. The reason for this is that, since the operation of the apprehensive power is directed to the thing apprehended as it is in the one apprehending, whereas the operation of the appetitive power is directed to the thing as it is in itself, there is less of the individuality of the thing apprehended in what is received into the apprehensive power than there is of the specification of the appetible thing in what is received into the appetitive power. Consequently, truth, which perfects the intellective power, is in the mind, whereas good, which perfects the appetitive, is in things, as is said in the Metaphysics.

In the second sense passion is understood strictly, as consisting in the loss of one contrary and the reception of another by way of a transformation. This sort of passion cannot pertain to the soul except because of the body; and this under two aspects: (1) Inasmuch as it is united to the body as its form. In this respect it suffers along with the body suffering by a bodily passion. (2) Inasmuch as it is united to the body as its mover. In this respect a transformation is produced in the body through the operation of the soul. This latter is called a psychical passion, as was said above.

The bodily passion just mentioned reaches to the powers of the soul as rooted in its essence, by reason of the fact that the soul in its essence is the form of the body; and thus it pertains first to the essence of the soul. This sort of passion can, however, be attributed to a power in three ways: (1) Inasmuch as it is rooted in the essence of the soul. Since all powers are rooted in the soul’s essence, the passion in question pertains to all powers in this way. (2) Inasmuch as the acts of the powers are hindered by an injury to the body. Thtis the passion in question pertains to all powers using bodily organs, since the acts of all of these are hindered when the organs are injured. But indirectly passion in this sense applies also to the powers which do not use bodily organs, the intellective, in so far as they receive something from powers which do use organs. Thus it happens that when the organ of the imaginative power is injured, the operation of the intellect also is hampered because the intellect has need of phantasms in its own operation. (3) It belongs to some power as apprehending it. In this way it properly belongs to the sense of touch; for touch is the sense of the things from which an animal is composed, and likewise of those by which an animal is corrupted.

On the other hand, since by a psychical passion thebody is altered because of an operation of the soul, this kind of passion has to be in a power which is joined to a bodily organ and whose business it is to alter the body. As. a consequence, such a passion is not in the intellective part, which is not the actuality of any bodily organ. Nor again is it in tht sense apprehensive power, because from sense apprehension no movement in the body follows except through the mediation of the appetitive power, which is the immediate mover. According to its manner of operating, then, a bodily organ (the heart) from which motion takes its beginning is at once given a disposition suitable for carrying out that to which the sense appetite inclines. In anger the heart accordingly heats up, and in fear it in a way cools off and tightens up.

Thus psychical passion is properly found only in the sense appetitive faculty. For the powers of the vegetative soul, though using an organ, are clearly not passive but active. Moreover passion more properly attaches to the appetitive power than to the apprehensive, as was said in the beginning of this reply. And this is one reason why the sense appetitive faculty is more properly the subject of passion than the sense apprehensive, just as the higher affective power comes closer to the true character of passion than the intellective.

In the third sense passion was said to be taken more or less figuratively, in so far as a thing is barred in any way whatsoever from what is suited to it. In this sense the powers of the soul suffer in the same way as they are barred from their proper acts. And this occurs in one way or another in all the powers of the soul, as has been said. But we are now speaking of psychical passion properly so called, which is found only in the sense appetitive power, as has been shown.

Answers to Difficulties

1. The whole soul of Christ suffered with a bodily passion; and therefore that passion attached to all the powers, at least inasmuch as they are rooted in the essence of the soul; not, however, in such a way that a psychical passion was in every power of His soul as its proper subject.

2. Augustine is speaking against certain PlatoniStS211 who said that the starting point of all those passions was in the flesh. Augustine shows, however, that even if the flesh were in no respect corrupted, these passions could take their beginning in the soul. He therefore does not say that such passions are brought about apart from the flesh, but that the soul is not moved by these passions because of the flesh alone.

3. Augustine is either taking the term will broadly for any appetite, or he is taking fear and joy and the like as acts of the will similar to passions in the sense appetite. For in some sense joy and sorrow and the like are in the will itself, as was said in the question on sensuality,.but not in the sense that they are passions properly so called.—Or it can be said that Augustine calls these passions acts of the will because man is led into these passions by an act of the will inasmuch as the lower appetite follows the inclination of the higher appetite, as was said in the question on sensuality. Thus Augustine himself afterwards adds: “Just as the will of man is attracted or repelled, so it is changed and turned to these affections or those.”

4. Sense is not an active but a passive power. Not every power that has an act which is an operation is called active, for then every faculty of the soul would be active; but a faculty that is related to its object as an agent to a patient is called active, and that which is related to its object as a patient to an agent is called passive. Now sense is related to the sensible thing as a patient to an agent, because the sensible thing alters the sense; and if the sensible object is sometimes altered by the sense, this is incidental, inasmuch as the organ of sense has some quality by which it is naturally capable of changing another body. Consequently the ruination in question (by which a menstruating woman damages a mirror or a basilisk kills a man by a look) does not contribute anything to the act of seeing; but the seeing is accomplished by the fact that the visible species is received in sight; and this is a sort of passivity or suffering. Sense is therefore a passive power. And even if it were granted that sense acted upon something actively, it would not follow from this that there is no passivity in sense; for nothing prevents the same thing from being active and passive in differcnt respects. And again if it were granted that sense, which designates an apprehensive power, were incapable of any passion, this would not exclude the possibility of passion being in the sensitive appetite.

5. Although what is active is simply and from the same point of view nobler than what is passive, still nothing prevents something passive from being nobler than something active inasmuch as the passive thing suffers by a passion that is nobler than the action by which the active being acts, as is the case with regard to the passion by which the possible intellect is called a passive power. And even sense by receiving something iminaterially is nobler than the action by which the vegetative power acts materially, that is, by means of the qualities of the elements.

6. There is nothing in contrary opposition to that delight which is in the intellective part by reason of its union with a suitable intelligible object, since to have a cause of the contrary passion we should need to have something contrary to that suitable intelligible object. But this is impossible, because nothing is contrary to an intelligible species; for the species of contraries are not contrary in the soul, as is said in the Metaphysics. Man accordingly takes delight not only in understanding good but also in understanding evil, as far as understanding is concerned; for the understanding of evil is a good for the intellect. And so intellectual delight has no contrary. Sadness or pain are nevertheless said to be in the intellective part, broadly speaking, inasmuch as the intellect understands something as harmful to man, to which the will is averse. Because that harmful thing, however, is not harmful to the intellect as understanding it, sadness or pain is not contrarily opposed to the delight of the intellect, which comes from understanding something suitable to the intellect in so far as it understands.

7. The rational power is capable of contrary determinations in its own way and also in a way common to itself and all other powers. To be the subject of contrary accidents is common to the rational and the other powers, because all contraries have the same subject. But to be capable of contrary actions is proper to it alone, for natural powers are determined to one course of action. It is in this sense that the Philosopher is speaking when he says that the rational powers are open to opposites.

8. The absence of the pilot is not the cause of the sinking of the ship except indirectly, inasmuch as it takes away the supervision exercised by the pilot which up to then prevented the sinking of the ship. In the same way the removal or absence of the intelligible object is not the cause of sadness but merely of not being delighted. Effects are proportioned to their causes. Then understanding and not understanding, which are contradictorily opposed, are the cause of being delighted and of not being so, which are likewise contradictories; not of being delighted and of being sad, which are contraries. Furthermore, if we take the contrary of the understanding of truth, namely, error, this cannot be the cause of sadness; for either error is deemed to be truth, in which case it causes delight just as truth does; or it is recognized as error (which can be done only by coming to know the truth), in which case again error causes delight in understanding.

9. Sadness and pain differ in that sadness is a psychical passion, beginning with the apprehension of a source of harm and ending in an operation of the appetite and even further in an alteration of the body, whereas pain is dependent upon a bodily passion. Thus Augustine says that “pain is more commonly said of bodies.” It begins, then, with an injury to the body and ends in an apprehension by the sense of touch, and on this account pain is in the sense of touch as apprehending it, as has been said.

10. That joy and sadness follow upon a passion is said by both Damascene and the Philosopher, but by each with a different meaning. Damascene, as also Gregory of Nyssa, who makes the same statement, is speaking of a bodily passion, which causes joy and sadness when apprehended and pain when experienced by sense. But the Philosopher is without any doubt here speaking of psychical passions, maintaining that joy and sadness follow upon all the passions of the soul. The reason for this is that among all the passions of the concupiscible power joy and sadness, which are caused by the attaining of the agreeable or the harmful, hold the last place; and all the passions of the irascible power terminate in passions of the concupiscible, as was said in the question on sensuality. It remains, then, that all the passions of the soul terminate in joy and sadness. In neither meaning of the words quoted, however, does it follow that passions are in the apprehensive power, because bodily passion is in the very nature of the body, and the other psychical passions are in the same appetitive part in which joy and sadness are found, but only with reference to its previous acts. If, on the other hand, there were no order in the acts of the appetitive part, it would follow from the words of the Philosopher that psychical passions are not in the appetitive part, where joy and sadness are found, but in the apprehensive.

11. Neither sense nor any other apprehensive power moves immediately, but only mediately through the appetitive. Consequently, upon the operation of the sense apprehensive power, the body is changed in its material dispositions only if the movement of the appetitive power supervenes. For the alteration of the body disposing itself to obey follows immediately upon this movement. Accordingly, although the sense apprehensive power is changed together with the bodily organ, passion strictly so called is still not in it, because in the operation of sense the bodily organ undergoes, properly speaking, only a spiritual change, inasmuch as the species of the sensible objects are received into the sense organs “without matter,” as is said in The Soul.

12. Even though something is lost and something else is received in the intellective part, this does not take place by way of a transformation so that reception and loss occur in a continuous succession. In the case of infused habits it comes about through a simple influx; for in an instant grace is infused and by it guilt is instantly expelled. And even an alteration from vice to virtue or from ignorance to knowledge affects theAintellective part only indirectly, while the transformation is directly in the sensitive part, as is made clear in the Ethics. For upon the occurrence of a transformation in the sensitive part there straightway results a perfection in the intellective part, so that the result in the intellective part is the term of the transformation in the sensitive part, just as illumination may be the term of a local motion and generation in an unqualified sense may be the term of an alteration. This is the explanation with regard to acquired habits.

13. From the apprehension of something by the intellect there can follow a passion in the lower appetite in two ways: (1) In so far as that which is understood by the intellect in a universal way is represented in the imagination in particular, thus moving the lower appetite. When, for example, the intellect of a believer assents intelIcctually to future punishment and forms phantasms of the pains, imagining the fire burning and worm gnawing and the like, the passion of fear follows in the sensitive appetite. (2) In so far as the higher appetite is moved by the intellectual apprehension, with the result that the lower appetite also is stirred up by the higher through a kind of overflow or through a command.

14. The hope which remains in the separated soul is not a passion but either a habit or an act of the will, as is clear from what was said previously.

15. From the bestowal of beatitude or the perfecting of the image nothing can be concluded other than that there is passion in the intellective part in the sense in which every reception is called a passion.

16. Passion is said to be a movement from one thing received to another thing received, not from one thing produced to another thing produced. In the former sense there is movement in the intellect from one thing to another.

17.Understanding is said to be passive in the broad use of the term according to which all reception is passivity or passion.

18. The passion of which Dionysius is speaking is nothing but affection for the things of God, which has more of the character of a passion than mere apprehension, as is clear from what has been said above. Por from affection for divine things comes their manifestation, as is written in John (14:21): “And he that loveth me, shall be loved by my Father; and I will love him and will manifest myself to him.”

Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul

ARTICLE IV

In the fourth article we ask:

On what grounds are the contrariety and diversity among the passions of the soul based?

[Parallel readings: III Sent., 26, 1, 3; In II Eth., 5, nn. 291-96; S.T., I-II, q. 23; 46, 1 ad 2.]

Difficulties

It seems that it is not on the grounds of good and evil, for

1. Boldness is opposed to fear. But both of these passions regard evil, because boldness tackles the same thing that fear runs away from. The contrariety of the soul’s passions is therefore not based on good and evil.

2. Hope is opposed to despair. But both regard good, which hope expects to attain and despair has no confidence of attaining. The contrariety of the soul’s passions is therefore not based on good and evil. Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa distinguish the passions of the soul on the basis of the present and the future and on that of good and evil. Thus hope and desire have to do with a future good; pleasure, delight, and gladness, with a present good; fear.has to do with a future evil; sadness, with a present one. But the present and the future are accidental as regards good and evil. Consequently the difference in the soul’s passions is not of itself based on good and evil.

4. Augustine distinguishes3 between sadness and pain in that sadness refers to the soul, pain to the body. But again this distinction is not made on the basis of good and evil. The conclusion is therefore the same as before.

5. Exultation, joy, gladness and pleasure, good humor and mirth are somehow different; otherwise it would be useless to couple two of them as is done for example, in Isaiah (35: 10): “They shall obtain joy and gladness.” Now since all of those terms are used with reference to good, it seems that good and evil do not differentiate the passions of the soul.

6. Damascene distinguishes four kinds of sadness: “boredom, distress, envy, and pity,” in addition to which there is also repentance. All of these are used with reference to evil. The same is therefore to be concluded as before.

7. He also distinguishes six species of fear: laziness, bashfulness, shame, awe, astonishment, and anxiety. These again do not involve the difference in question. The conclusion is therefore the same as before.

8. Dionysius ranks jealousy with love, but both of these are passions regarding good. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.

To the Contrary

l. Acts are distinguished by their objects. But the passions of the soul are acts of the appetitive power, whose object is good and evil. The passions of the soul are therefore distinguished by good and evil.

2. According to the PhilosopherT the passions of the soul are changes from which joy and sadness result. But joy and sadness are distinguished on the basis of good and evil. Good and evil therefore distinguish the passions of the soul.

REPLY

In the passions of the soul a threefold distinction is found. The first is that by which they differ generically, as belonging to distinct powers of the soul. It is in this way that the passions of the concupiscible power are distinguished from those of the irascible. Now the basis of this distinction is taken from the basis for distinguishing the powers. For since the object of the concupiscible power is something sensuously pleasurable and that of the irascible something arduous or lofty, as was said above in the question on sensuality, those passions belong to the concupiscible power in which there is implied a reference to the sensuously pleasurable in an unqualified sense or to its contrary; whereas those belong to the irascible which are referred to something arduous concerning such an object. Thus the difference between desire and hope becomes evident; for desire denotes that the appetite is attracted to something pleasurable, whereas hope expresses a certain raising of the appetite to some good which is deemed arduous or difficult. And the same is to be said of the other passions.

The second distinction of the passions of the soul is that by which they are distinguished in species within the same power. In regard to the passions of the concupiscible power this distinction is made on two different grounds: (1) According to the contrariety of objects. In this way joy, which regards good, is distinguished from sadness, which regards evil. (2) According as the concupiscible power is referred in different ways to the same object, or in other words according to the different stages that can be considered in the course of an appetitive movement. For the pleasurable object is first united psychically with the man who seeks it, by being apprehended as like bini or agreeable to him. From this there follows the passion of love, which is nothing but the specification of the appetite by the form of the appetible object. For that reason love is said to be a sort of union of the lover with the beloved. But what has thus been united psychically is sought further with a view to its being united really, so that the lover enjoys the possession of the beloved. Thus is born the passion of desire, which, when the object has been obtained in reality, begets joy. The first stage, then, in the movement of the concupiscible power is love; the second, desire; and the last, joy. And through the contrary to these the passions bearing upon evil are to be distinguished, with hate opposed to love, aversion to desire, sadness to joy.

The passions of the irascible power, as was said in another question, arise from the passions of the concupiscible and end in them. There is accordingly found in them a distinction conformable to that in the concupiscible power; and there is in them furthermore a distinction proper to them based upon the specific character of their proper object. Deriving from the concupiscible there is the distinction of the passions on the basis of good and evil and on that of the oleasurable and its contrary, and again on that of what is really pbssessed and what is not really possessed. But proper to the irascible power is the distinction of its passions on the basis of what exceeds the capacity of the one who has the appetite and of what does not exceed it, and this according to his evaluation of the matter. For these grounds seem to distinguish the arduous as essential differences.

A passion in the irascible power can therefore regard either good or evil. If it regards good, this can be a good possessed or one not possessed. Regarding a good possessed there can be no passion in the irascible power, because once a good is possessed it causes no diffi culty to the possessor. Consequently the notion of the arduous is not verified in it. But regarding a good not yet possessed, in which the notion of the arduous can be verified because of the difficulty of obtaining it, if that good is judged to exceed the capacity of the one seeking it, despair ensues; but if it is judged not to exceed that capacity, hope arises.

If, on the other hand, the excitation of the irascible power with reference to evil is considered, this will be of two kinds: either with reference to an evil not yet possessed which is regarded as arduous inasmuch as it is difficult to avoid, or with reference to an evil already possessed or joined to oneself, and this again has the character of the arduous inasmuch as it is deemed difficult to get rid of. Now if it is with reference to an evil not yet present, if that evil is regarded as exceeding one’s capacity, then it causes the passion of fear; but if it is regarded as not exceeding one’s capacity, then it causes the passion of boldness. If, however, the evil is present, either it is regarded as not exceeding one’s capacity, and then it arouses the passion of anger; or it is regarded as exceeding that capacity, and then it does not arouse any passion in the irascible power, but in the concupiscible power alone there remains the passion of sadness.

The distinction which is based upon the different stages in the appetitive movement is not the cause of any contrariety, because such passions differ as perfect and imperfect, as is seen, for example, in desire and joy. But the distinction which is based on the contrariety of the object properly effects a contrariety in the passions. In the concupiscible power, accordingly, passions are regarded as contrary on the basis of good and evil, as joy and sadness or love and hate. In the irascible power a twofold contrariety can be considered: (1) According to the distinction of the proper object, as exceeding one’s capacity or not. From this point of view hope and despair, boldness and fear are contrary; and this contrariety is the more proper one. (2) According to the difference in the object of the concupiscible power, i.e., according to good and evil. From this point of view hope and fear seem to be contrarily opposed. From neither point of view, however, can anger have a passion contrary to it—not on the basis of the contrariety of good and evil, because there is no passion in the irascible power regarding a present good; and likewise not on the basis of the contrariety of what exceeds one’s capacity and what does not, because an evil which exceeds one’s capacity does not cause any passion in the irascible, as has been said. Hence among the passions anger has as, proper to itself that nothing is contrary to it.

There is a third difference of the passions of the soul which is, so to speak, accidental. This can come about in two ways: (1) According to the intensity or mildness of the passion, as jealousy implies an intensity of love, and rage an intensity of anger. (2) According to the material differences of good or evil, like the difference of pity and envy, which are both species of sadness; for envy is sadness about the prosperity of someone else in so far as it is regarded as an evil for oneself, whereas pity is sadness about the adversity of someone else in so far as it is regarded as one’s own evil. Certain other passions also can be considered in the same way.

Answers to Difficulties

1. The object of the irascible power is good and evil, not in an unqualified sense, but with the added circumstance of arduousness. There is therefore contrariety in its passions not merely on the basis of good and evil but also on that of the differences which distinguish the arduous both in good and in evil.

2. The answer is clear from what has just been said.

3. Present and future are regarded as differences to distinguish the powers of the soul inasmuch as what is future is not yet really united to the soul and what is present is already united, and the movement of the appetite to what is really united is more perfect than to what is really at a distance. Consequently, although future and present account for some distinction in the passions, like the perfect and the imperfect they cause no contrariety.

4. In its strict sense pain should not be numbered among the passions of the soul, because it involves nothing on the part of the soul bcyond inere apprehension; for pain is the feeling of an injury, but t lie injury itself is in the body. For this reason even Augustine adds in the saine place that he has preferred to use the term sadness rather than pain; for sadness is completed in the appetitive power itself, as appears from what has been said.

5. Pleasure and joy differ in the same way as sadness and pain; for sensible pleasure involves on the part of the body union with something agreeable, and on the part of the soul the feeling of this agreeableness. Similarly spiritual pleasure involves a certain real union of two things that agree with each other, and the perception of this union. Thus in defining sensible pleasure Plato said that pleasure is a sensible process toward a natural state. Aristotle, defining pleasure in general, said that pleasure is the unhampered operation of a habit conformable to nature.” For an agreeable operation is that united agreeable thing which causes pleasure, especially spiritual pleasure. Thus pleasure of either kind begins with a real union and is completed in its apprehension. Joy, however, begins with apprehension and ends in the affections. Thus pleasure is sometimes the cause of joy, just as pain is sometimes the cause of sadness. Joy, on the other hand, differs accidentally from gladness and the rest of the passions mentioned —on the basis of intensity or slackness. For the others express a certain intensity of joy. Either this intensity is considered from the viewpoint of one’s interior disposition; and then it is gladness, which implies an interior expansion or dilation of heart; for gladness (laetitia) is spoken of as a sort of expansiveness (latitia). Or the intensity of inner joy is considered from the viewpoint of its bursting forth into certain outward signs, and then it is exultation; for exultation is so named from the fact that inner joy in a way outwardly leaps (exilit). This leaping is noted either in.a change of countenance, in which the evidences of emotion first appear because of its nearness to the imaginative power; and then the passion is mirth; or it is noted inasmuch as one’s words and deeds are influenced by the intensity of the inner joy; and then it is good humor.

6. The various species of sadness which Damascene lays down are types of sadness which add to it certain accidental differences. These may be regarded from the viewpoint of the intensity of the movement. In that case in so far as the intensity consists in an interior disposition, it is called boredom, which is sadness weighing a man down (that is, his heart) so that he does not care to do anything; or, in so far as the bile proceeds to an external disposition, the passion is distress, which is sadness that takes the voice away. The differences may, on the other hand, be regarded from the viewpoint of the object inasmuch as what is in another is looked upon as one’s own evil. Then if another’s good is considered one’s own evil, the passion will be envy; but if another’s evil is considered one’s own evil, it will be pity. Repentance, however, does not add to sadness in general any specific note, since it concerns one’s own evil taken absolutely. For this reason it is omitted by Damascene. Yet many different types of sadness can be listed if everything that has any accidental bearing upon the evil which causes sadness is taken into account.

7. Since fear is a passion coming from something harmful apprehended as exceeding one’s capacity, the types of fear will be differentiated according to the difference in such harmful things. Now what is harmful can be referred to the one affected in three different respects: (1) With regard to one’s own operation. In this case inasmuch as one’s own operation is feared as laborious, the passion is laziness; and inasmuch as it is feared as disgraceful, the passion is shame, which is fear in a disgraceful action. (2)With regard to knowledge, according as some object of knowledge is apprehended as altogether exceeding cognition. In that case the study of it is looked upon as fruitless and so as harmful. Now its exceeding cognition either is due to its greatness, and then the passion is awe, which is fear from the imagining of something great; or it is due to its unusualness, and then the passion is astonishment, which is “fear from the imagining of something unusual,” as Damascene defines it. (3) With regard to suffering that comes from another. That suffering can be feared either under the aspect of disgrace, and then the passion is bashfulness, which is fear in anticipation of ridicule; or under the aspect of injury, and then the passion is anxiety, by which a man is afraid that some misfortune will befall him.

8. Jealousy adds to love a certain intensity, for it is a vehement love that brooks no sharing of one’s beloved.

Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul

ARTICLE V

In the fifth article we ask:

Are hope, fear, joy, and sadness the four principal passions of the soul?

[Parallel readings: III Sent., 26, 1, 4; S.T., I-II, 25, 4 (cf. aa. 1-3); 84, 4 ad 2; II-II, 141, 7 ad 3.]

Difficulties

It seems that they are not, for

1. In enumerating the four principal passions, Augustine puts cupidity in place of hope. And the same, it seems, can be gathered from the words of Vergil in which he designates the main passions: “Hence men crave and fear, rejoice and sorrow.”

2. The more perfect a thing is, the more important it seems to be. But the movement of boldness is more perfect than that of hope, since it tends to its object with greater intensity. Boldness is therefore a more important passion than hope.

3. Everything takes its name from the most important in its line. But the irascible power gets its name from anger. Anger should therefore be numbered among the principal passions.

4. There is a passion that looks to the future not only in the irascible power but also in the concupiscible. But the passion looking to the future which is in the concupiscible power, desire, is not included as one of the principal passions. Then neither are fear and hope, which in the irascible similarly look to the future.

5. Principal means coming before the rest; for according to Gregory “to be prince (principiari) means to come before the others.” But love comes before the rest of the passions; for from love all the other passions are born. Love should therefore be placed as one of the principal passions.

6. Those passions seem to be the principal ones upon which the others depend. But all the others seem to depend upon joy and sadness; for a passion of the soul is that from which joy or sadness follows, according to the Philosopher.These two passions, joy and sadness, then, are the only principal passions.

7. It was said in answer that joy and sadness are the principal ones in the concupiscible power, but that hope and fear are the principal ones in the irascible.—On the contrary, it is said in Spirit and Soul: “From concupiscibility joy and hope arise; from irascibility, pain and dread.”

8. In accord with the special character of the irascible power hope is opposed to despair, fear to boldness. But on the part of the concupiscible power are listed two chief passions which are contrary on the basis of the special character of the concupiscible power, namely, joy and sadness. Then on the part of the irascible there should be listed as principal passions either hope and despair or fear and boldness.

To the Contrary

11. In Spirit and Soul it is said: “Emotion is distinguished into four kinds, since we already take joy in what we love, or we hope for it as something that will be enjoyed; and we already grieve over what we hate or we dread it as something to make us grieve.” Consequently these four are the principal passions: joy, pain or sadness, hope, and fear.

2. Enumerating the main passions, Boethius says:

Drive away joy, and drive away fear.

Hope put to flight; let grief not stay near.

And so the conclusion is the same as above.

REPLY

There are four principal passions of the soul: sadness, joy, hope, and fear. The reason for this is that passions which come before the others and are their source are called the principal ones. Now, since the passions of the soul are in the sense appetitive part, those passions will come first which arise immediately from the object of the appetitive part; that is, from good and evil. Those which arise through the intermediary of others will be in a sense secondary.

For a passion to arise immediately from good or evil two conditions are required. The first is that it arise from good and evil essentially or directly, because what is accidental or indirect cannot be first. The second is that it arise without presupposing any other. A passion is accordingly said to be a principal one for these two. reasons: it does not conit accidentally from the object, which has the role of an active principle, nor does it come subsequently. Now a passion which proceeds from a good inasmuch as it is good, comes from good essentially; but one which proceeds from a good inasmuch as it is evil, comes from good accidentally. And the inverse is to be understood of evil. Good as such attracts and draws to itself. Hence any passion of an appetite tending to good will be a passion essentially and directly dependent upon good. But it is proper to evil as such to repel the appetite. Hence if there is any passion regarding good by which the good is shunned, that passion will not be from good essentially but in so far as it is apprehended as somehow evil. And the contrary is to be understood of evil: a passion which consists in flight from evil comes from evil essentially or directly, whereas one which consists in an approach to evil comes from evil accidentally. It is therefore clear how a passion arises from good or from evil essentially.

Because, however, to the extent to which a thing is last in the attainment of the end it is first in intention and in desire, those passions which consist in the attainment of the end therefore arise from good or evil without presupposing), any others, and with these presupposed others arise. Now joy and sadness come from the attainment of good or evil, and that essentially; for joy comes from a good inasmuch as it is good, and sadness comes from an evil inasmuch as it is evil. And all other passions of the concupiscible power likewise come from good or evil essentially. This is so because the object of the concupiscible power is good or evil in an absolute sense. Yet the other passions of the concupiscible power presuppose joy and sadness as their cause; for a good becomes loved and desired by the concupiscible by reason of its being apprehended as pleasurable, and an evil becomes hateful and repulsive by being apprehended as saddening. Thus in the order of appetency joy and sadness are prior,.though in the order of execution and attainment they are posterior.

In the irascible power not all the passions follow from good or evil essentially, but some essentially and others accidentally. This is so because good and evil are not the object of the irascible power in their absolute sense, but as they are modified by the condition of arduousness. Under this condition a good is repudiated as being beyond one’s capabilities, and an evil is tended to as able to be driven away or mastered. But in the irascible power there cannot be any passion which follows from good or evil without any other being presupposed; for after the good is possessed, it does not arouse any passion in the irascible power, as was said above.An evil that is present, on the other hand, does arouse a passion in the irascible power not essentially but accidentally, inasmuch as the person tends to something evil that is present as something to be driven away or mastered. This is evident in the case of anger.

It is clear, then, from what has been said that there are some passions which first and essentially arise from good and evil, as joy and sadness, and some others that essentially but not first so arise, as the other passions of the concupiscible power and two of those of the irascible, fear and hope, one of which expresses a flight from evil, the other an approach to good. And there are some other passions which neither essentially nor first arise from good and evil, as the others in the irascible power, such as despair, boldness, and anger, which express an approach to evil or a withdrawal from good.

The most important passions, therefore, are joy and sadness. But fear and hope are the principal ones in their own class, because they do not presuppose any other passions in the power in which they are found, the irascible. Although the other passions of the concupiscible power, such as love and desire, hate and aversion, are from good or evil essentially, they are nevertheless not the first in their class, since they presuppose others in the same power. Thus they cannot be called the principal passions either simply or in their genus. It remains, then, that there are only four principal passions: joy and sadness, hope and fear.

Answers to Difficulties

1. Cupidity or desire is preceded by another passion in the same power, joy, which is the reason for desiring. Desire therefore cannot be a principal passion. Even though hope presupposes another passion, it does not presuppose one in the same power but in the concupiscible. All of the passions of the irascible power, in fact, arise from the passions of the concupiscible, as was said in another question. For this reason it can be one of the principal passions. Augustine, however, lists desire or cupidity in place of hope on account of a certain resemblance between them, because both look to a good not yet possessed.

2. Boldness cannot be one of the principal passions, for it arises from evil accidentally, since it looks to evil with a view to attacking it For a bold man attacks evil inasmuch as he judges victory over evil and its repulse to be a good, and from the hope of such a good boldness arises. When carefully considered in this way, hope is found to be prior to boldness; for the hope of victory or at least of escape causes boldness.

3. Anger too arises from evil accidentally, inasmuch as an angry person considers revenge for an evil done to him a good and seeks it. Thus the hope of revenge to be obtained is the cause of anger. Therefore, when a person is injured by someone upon whom he does not hope to be able to get revenge, he does not become angry, but he merely grows sad or he fears, as Avicenna points out,—if a country bumpkin is injured by a king, for instance. Consequently anger cannot be a principal passion; for it presupposes not only sadness, which is in the concupiscible power, but also hope, which is in the irascible. The irascible power gets its name from anger, however, because it is the last of the passions which are in the irascible.

4. The passions regarding the future which are in the concupiscible power arise in some sense from the passions in the same power regarding the present. But the passions regarding the future in the irascible do not arise from any passions regarding the present in the same power but rather from such passions in another power, that is, from joy and sadness. Hence there is no parallel.

5. In the line of execution and attainment love is the first passion, but in the line of intention joy is prior to love and is the reason for loving, especially in the sense in which love is a passion of the concupiscible power.

6. Joy and sadness are the most Important among the passions, as has been said. Nonetheless hope and fear are the principal ones in their own class, as is clear from what has been said.

7. Since that work is not by Augustine, it does not impose upon us any necessity of accepting its dicta as authoritative. Here especially it is seen to contain a patent error. For hope is not in the concupiscible but in the irascible power; and sadness is not in the irascible but in the concupiscible. Yet if we must uphold its authority, we can say that it is speaking of those powers according to the meaning of their names: concupiscence is concerned with good, and on this basis all passions directed to good can be attributed to the concupiscible power; and because anger is concerned with an evil inflicted, all the passions which regard evil can be attributed to the irascible power. On this basis sadness is attributed to the irascible power and hope to the concupiscible.

8. The contrariety which is proper to the passions of the irascible power, namely, exceeding one’s capacity or not, makes the second passion arise from good or evil accidentally. For something which exceeds one’s capacity leads to withdrawal, whereas something which does not exceed it leads to approach. If these differences are taken with reference to good, then, a passion which follows from something which exceeds one’s capacity will come from good accidentally. If, on the other hand, they are taken with reference to evil, then a passion which follows from something that does not exceed one’s capacity will be accidental. Consequently in the irascible power there cannot be two principal passions which are directly contrary (e.g., hope and despair, or boldness and fear), as are joy and sadness inn the concupiscible.

Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul

ARTICLE VI

In the sixth article we ask:

Do we merit by our passions?

[Parallel readings: De malo, 12, 1; S.T., I-II, 24, 1; 3 ad 1; II-II, 158.]

Difficulties

It seems that we do, for

1. We merit by fulfilling commands. But by divine commandments we are induced to rejoice, to fear, to grieve, and to have other such passions, as Augustine says. We therefore merit by our passions.

2. According to Augustine such passions of the soul are not had without the will. In fact they are nothing but acts of will. But by our acts of will we can merit not only materially but also formally. Then so can we by such passions.

3. Psychical passions come closer to being voluntary than do bodily passions, because the psychical passions are to some extent within our power in so far as the concupiscible and the irascible powers obey reason, whereas bodily passions are not. But bodily passions or sufferings are meritorious, as is evident in the case of martyrs, who merit the aureola of martyrs by their bodily passions. With all the more reason, then, are psychical passions meritorious.

4. The answer was given that bodily passions or sufferings are meritorious in so far as they are willed.—On the contrary, the will to suffer for Christ can also be in one who will never suffer, and yet he will not get the aureola. A bodily passion therefore merits the aureola not only by reason of being willed but by being actually undergone.

5. If from the intensification of a given thing there follows the intensification of reward, that thing is essentially and not just materially meritorious. But from the intensification of bodily passion or suffering there follows the intensification of reward, because the more a person suffers, the more gloriously he will be crowned, as is said. We consequently merit by our passions or sufferings essentially and not just materially.

6. Hugh of St. Victor says: “After the act of will there follows the deed, so that the will is increased in its own work. Thus the external deed contributes something to merit. But the will can similarly be increased in passion. Passion therefore contributes something to merit; and so the conclusion is the same as before.

7. Since merit is situated in the will, that in which the will terminates as formally completing it must pertain to merit as formally completing it. But in so far as a passion is willed, it is the object of the will; and so it determines the will more or less formally. The passion itself therefore pertains formally to merit.

8. Some of the confessors endured more grievous trials than some of the martyrs. It is accordingly said of them that they underwent a protracted martyrdom, though the passion of certain martyrs was finished in a short space of time. Yet the aureola is not due to the confessors. It accordingly seems that the bodily passion of the martyrs in itself directly merits the aureola.

9. Commenting on the words of the Epistle of St. James (1:12: “My brethren, count it all joy...” the Gloss says: “Tribulation increases justice in the present life and the crown in the future.” But it increases these only by meriting. Since tribulation is suffering or passion, passion is meritorious.

10. The same appears from what is said in the Psalm (115:15): “Precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of his saints.” But precious means worthy of a price. Now the price of our labors is the reward which we merit by our labors. We can therefore merit by our passions. assions or sufferings

11. It was said in answer that we merit by our passions or sufferings in so far as they are willed.—On the contrary, there is the truth which St. Lucy expressed: “If you cause me to be violated against my will, my chastity will be doubled in value for my crown. Even the undergoing of rape, then, which she would have suffered in this life, would have been meritorious for a crown. Thus passion or suffering does not merit merely because it is voluntary.

12. Difficulty is a necessary condition for merit. This is clear from what the Master says: in the state of innocence man did not merit, because nothing urged him to evil or drew him away from good. Now since passions or sufferings occasion difficulty, they therefore seem to have a direct influence upon merit.

13. Fear is a type of passion. Now we can merit by it even formally, since it is in the intellective part, as is clear when we fear things that we know only by the intellect, as eternal punishment. We can therefore merit by our passions.

14. Reward corresponds to merit. But the reward of glory will be not only in the soul but also in the body. Then merit too consists not only in the action of the soul but also in the passion of the body.

15. Where there is greater difficulty there is a greater score of merit. But there is greater difficulty regarding sufferings and passions than regarding the operations of the will. Sufferings and passions are therefore more meritorious than the acts of the will, which are, however, formally meritorious.

16. We formally merit by virtues. But certain passions are listed by the saints9 as virtues—pity and repentance, for example. And certain ones are set down by the philosophers as laudable and the mean between extreme vices, as shame and indignation are instanced by the Philosopher. But all this refers to virtue. We therefore merit formally by passions.

17. Merit and demerit, being contraries, are in the same genus. But demerit is found in the genus of passions; for the first movements, which are sins, are passions. Anger and sloth also are passions, and yet they are listed as capital sins. The Apostle (Romans 1:26) calls sins against nature “shameful passions.” Then we also merit by passions.

To the Contrary

1. Nothing can be meritorious unless it is within our power, because according to Augustine “it is by the will that one sins or lives rightly.” But passions are not in our power, because, as Augustine says, “we yield to passions unwilfingly.”We therefore do not merit by passions.

2. Whatever is a preamble to willing cannot be meritorious, since merit depends upon the will. But the passions of the soul precede the act of the will, since they are in the sensitive part, whereas the act of the will is in the intellective part; but the intellective part receives its object from the sensitive. The passions of the soul therefore cannot be meritorious.

3. Every meritorious deed is praiseworthy. But according to the Philosopher “we are neither praised nor blamed for passions.” We therefore do not merit by our passions.

4. The ability to merit was greater in Christ than it is in us. But Christ did not merit by His passion. Then neither do we merit by our passions.—Proof of the minor: To merit is to make one’s own something which is not one’s own or at least to make more one’s own what is less one’s own. But Christ was not able to make His own what was not His own or to make more His own what was less so, because from the first instant of His conception everything that comes under the heading of merit was most completely due to Him. Christ therefore merited nothing by His passion.

5. It was answered that He merited by making what was His in one way His in more ways.—On the contrary, a double bond makes the obligation greater. In like fashion a double reason for indebtedness makes a greater debt. Therefore, if Christ was not able to cause something to be more due to Him, neither was He able to make something due to Him in more ways.

6. Difficulty diminishes voluntariness. Since merit must be voluntary, difficulty therefore seems to diminish merit. But passions cause difficulty. They therefore diminish merit rather than contribute to it.

REPLY

If meriting is taken in the strict sense, we do not merit by our passions directly but, so to speak, indirectly. Since we speak of meriting in connection with recompense, to merit in the proper sense is to acquire something for oneself as a recompense. Now this is not done unless we give something that is equal in value to that which we are said to merit. We cannot give anything, however, unless it is ours and we have dominion over it. But we have dominion over our acts through our will—not only over those which are immediately elicited by the will, such as loving or willing, but also over those which are elicited by other powers at the command of the will, such as walking, speaking, and the like. These actions, however, are not equal to eternal life in value as if they were a price paid for it, except in so far as they are informed by grace and charity. Consequently, in order that an act may be directly meritorious, it must be an act either commanded or elicited by the will, and must moreover be informed by charity.

Because the principle of an act consists in the habit and the power and even the object, we are on this account said to merit secondarily, as it were, by our habits and powers and objects. But what is primarily and directly meritorious is a voluntary act informed by grace. Passions, however, do not belong to the will either as commanding or as eliciting them; for the principle of passions as such is not in our power, whereas things are said to be voluntary from the fact that they are in our power. Passions accordingly sometimes even anticipate the act of the will. Directly, then, we do not merit by passions. Yet, in so far as they in some way accompany the will, they somehow have a bearing upon merit so that they can be called meritorious indirectly.

Now a passion has a bearing upon the will in three ways: (1) As the object of the will. In this sense passions are said to be meritorious inasmuch as they are willed or loved. That by which we essentially merit in this case will not be the passion itself but the willing of the passion. (2) As arousing or intensifying the act of the will. This can come about in two ways, either directly or indirectly—directly when the passion arouses the will to something like itself, as when the will is inclined by concupiscence to consent to the thing coveted or by anger to will revenge; or indirectly when by furnishing the occasion a passion arouses the will to its contrary, as in the case of a chaste person, when the passion of concupiscence wells up, the will resists with a greater effort; for we try harder in regard to difficult things. Thus passions are said to be meritorious inasmuch as the act of the will aroused by the passion is meritorious. (3) Conversely, when a passion is aroused by the will because the movement of the higher appetite overflows into the lower. For example, when by his will a person detests the filth of sin, the lower appetite is by that very fact moved to shame. In this sense shame is said to be either praiseworthy or meritorious by reason of the act of will which caused it.

In the first way, then, passion has a bearing upon the will as its object, in the second as its principle, and in the third as its effect. Thus the first way is more remote from meritoriousness; for with equal reason gold or silver could be called meritorious or demeritorious on the grounds that by willing these we merit or incur demerit. The last way is closer to merit, since the effect receives something from the cause and not the other way about. Thus if merit is taken in its strict sense, we do not merit by our passions except indirectly.

Merit, however, can be taken broadly in the sense in which any disposition that confers a fitness to receive something is said to merit it; for example, if we should say that by reason of her beauty a woman merits marriage to a king. In this sense even bodily passions are said to merit inasmuch as those passions make us in some sense fit to receive some glory.

Answers must therefore be given to each set of difficulties.

Answers to Difficulties

1. By God’s commandments we are admonished to rejoice or to fear in so far as joy and fear and the like consist in acts of the will and are not passions, as is clear from what was said previously, or also in so far as such passions follow from the will.

2. Augustine says that these passions are acts of will because they come about in us from our will. Thus he adds: “In general depending upon the various things sought or shunned, not only is a man’s will attracted or repelled, but it is also changed and turned into these different affections.” Or else he is speaking of these passions in the sense in which the terms designate acts of the will, as has been said.

3. The bodily passion of a martyr has nothing to do with the meriting of the essential reward except in so far as it is willed, but it has bearing upon an accidental reward, the aureola of martyrs, through the kind of merit which confers a certain fitness for the aureola; for it is fitting that one who is conformed to Christ in His passion should be conformed to Him in His glory, as we gather from the Epistle to the Romans (8:17): “Yet so, if we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified with him.” We should bear in mind, however, that the will cannot have the same attitude toward bodily sufferings when a man is not suffering them as it has because of their keenness while he is actually suffering them. In such matters, then, according to the Philosopher it suffices for a brave man not to be saddened. Consequently the bodily passion actually being experienced is both the sign of a firm and constant will and also that which evokes it, because a man makes an effort regarding difficult things. And so the aureola is not due to the confessor, though it is due to the martyr.

4. The answer is clear from what has just been said.

5. An increase in the rewards follows from an intensification of the suffering either because of a certain fittingness or because of the intensity of the will.

6. Even though the will is increased in both a passion and an exernal act, the case is not the same for both; for the act is commanded by the will, but the passion is not. They therefore do not have the same bearing upon merit.

7. The object determines the will as to the species of the act. Strictly speaking, however, merit consists in the act, not from the viewpoint of the species of the act, but from that of its root, which is charity. Thus it is not necessary that we formally merit by a passion even though it does stand as the object.

8. All the toil which a confessor endures over a long, period of time cannot, under the aspect of the genus of the deed, equal the death which a martyr undergoes even in a moment. For by death one is deprived of what is most valued, life and being; and for this reason it is the ultimate among things that strike terror, according to the Philosopher, and in its regard the virtue of bravery is exercised most of all. This appears very clearly from the fact that men worn out with long-continued afflictions shrink away from death, choosing in effect to undergo further afflictions rather than death. The Philosopher accordingly says that a man of virtue exposes himself to death, choosing rather “ one good and great deed than many small ones,” as if that act of bravery in facing death outweighed many other virtuous deeds. Consequently, from the standpoint of the genus of his deed, the least martyr merits more than any confessor whatever. From that of the root of his deed, however, the confessor can merit more to the extent that he acts from greater charity, because the essential reward corresponds to the root, charity, whereas the accidental reward corresponds to the genus of the act. Hence it is that a confessor can surpass a martyr in the essential reward, but the martyr surpasses him in the accidental reward.

9. That comment in the Gloss is speaking of tribulation in so far as it is willed or excites the will.

10. The same is to be said of this difficulty.

11. For a virgin who would be violated for the sake of Christ, that very violation would be meritorious, just like the other sufferings of the martyrs, not because the violation itself would be voluntary, but because its antecedents, her remaining constant in the confession of Christ, from which the violation followed as a consequence, would be voluntary. Thus that violation would be voluntary, not with an absolute will but with a will in some sense conditioned, seeing that the virgin chooses to suffer this disgrace rather than deny Christ.

12. There are two kinds of difficulty: one which comes from the magnitude and excellence of the task, and this kind is required for virtue; another which is from the agent himself to the extent that he is deficient or hampered in his correct operations, and this kind is removed or diminished by virtue. It is in the latter sense that passions cause difficulty. The first kind of difficulty, on the part of the task, has a direct bearing upon merit in the same way as the excellence of the act; whereas the second, from the weakness of the agent, has no bearing upon merit unless perhaps as an occasion, inasmuch as it supplies the occasion for a greater effort. It is not true, however, that in his first state Adam would not have been able to merit—if we grant that he had grace, even though there were nothing drawing him away from good or urging him to evil—because, if he had stood fast, he would have arrived eventually at glory; and it is clear that this would not have been without merit. Nor does the Master say that he would not have been able to merit in the first state, but he does say that he would have been able to avoid sin without meriting; for he could avoid sin without grace because nothing was pushing him to evil, and without grace nothing can be meritorious.

13. That fear of eternal punishment which is directly meritorious is in the will and is not a passion strictly speaking, as is clear from what has alrcady been said. A passion of fear can, however, be aroused in the lower appetite by reason of eternal punishment either because of an overflow from the higher appetite into the lower or because the intellect’s conception of eternal punishment is represented in the imagination, with the consequence that the lower appetite is moved through the passion of fear. But such fear does not have anything to do with merit except indirectly, as has been said.

14. [This answer is missing.]

15. If we are speaking of difficulty on our part, then passions and sufferings involve more difficulty than acts of the will. But in that case the difficulty does not contribute anything to merit except indirectly, as has been said; and similarly neither do passions and sufferings. But if we are speaking of the difficulty which comes from the excellence or goodness of the task, which does contribute to merit directly, then there is greater difficulty in acts of the will.

16. Some passions are called laudable by the philosophers because they are the effects and signs of a good will, as is evident in the example of shame, which shows that the man’s will is averse to the filth of sin, and in that of pity, which is a sign of love. On this account the names of these passions are sometimes used by the saints for the habits which elicit the act of will which is the source of these passions.

17. First movements do not have the complete nature of sin or demerit but are in a way dispositions for demerit just as venial sin is a disposition for mortal sin. The movements of sensuality themselves, then, do not have to be directly meritorious, because what is meritorious cannot be anything but a voluntary act, as has been said. But those passions are sometimes called vices or sins inasmuch as acts of the will or even habits are designated by the names of passions. Moreover, vices against nature are called passions even though they are voluntary acts, inasmuch as by such vices nature is disturbed from its proper order.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties

l. We yield to passions unwillingly, not as regards consent, since we do not consent to them except by our will, but as regards some bodily alteration such as laughter and weeping and the like. Consequently, in so far as by our will we consent or refuse consent to them, they are meritorious or demeritorious.

2. Though the passions of the lower appetite sometimes anticipate the act of the will, they do not always; for the appetitive powers do not stand in the same relationship as the apprehensive. Our intellect receives its object from sense; consequently there cannot be an operation of the intellect unless there is some previous operation of sense. The will, however, does not receive anything from the lower appetite, but rather moves it; and so it is not necessary that a passion of the lower appetite precede the act of the will.

3. Even though passions are not directly praiseworthy, they can nevertheless be praiseworthy indirectly, as has been said.

4. By His passion Christ merited for Himself and for us. For Himself He merited the glory of His body; for although He merited this through His other merits which preceded it, yet the splendor of the resurrection is by a certain fittingness properly a reward of the passion, because exaltation is the proper reward of humility. He merited for us, moreover, inasmuch as in His passion He gave satisfaction for the sin of the whole human race, but not by His preceding works, though He did merit for us by them. Retribution by way of suffering is required for satisfaction as a sort of compensation for the pleasure of sin.

5. By His passion Christ did not make the glory of His body due after it was not due, nor did He make it more due after it was less due. He did, however, make it due in another way than that in which it was due before. But it does not follow that He made it more due. This would follow if the cause for which it was due were either increased or multiplied, as happens when an obligation is increased by a two-fold promise. But that did not occur in the case of the merit of Christ, because His grace was not augmented.

6. Directly difficulty hampers voluntariness, but indirectly it increases it in so far as a person makes an effort against the difficulty. But the difficulty itself contributes to satisfaction by reason of its penal character.

Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul

ARTICLE VII

In the seventh article we ask:

Does a passion accompanying a meritorious act detract from its merit?

[Parallel readings: De malo, 3, 11; 12, 1; S.T., I-II, 24, 3; 77, 6 ad 2.]

That is to say, who merits the more, he who helps a poor man with a certain compassion of pity, or he who does it without any passion solely because of a judgment of reason?

Difficulties

It seems that he who does it solely because of a judgment of reason merits the more, for

1. Merit is opposed to sin. But a man who commits a sin solely by choice sins more than one who sins under the urging of passion; for the first is said to sin out of definite malice, the second out of weakness. Then a man who does a good deed solely because of a judgment of reason also merits more than one who does it with a passion of pity.

2. The answer was given that for something to be meritorious or to be an act of virtue there is required not only a good which is done but also a good manner of doing it, which in this case cannot be had without the emotion of pity.—On the contrary, for an act to be done in a good manner there are three requisites according to the Philosopher: the will choosing the act, reason establishing the mean in the act, and the relation of the act to the due end. Now these requisites can all be met without the passion of pity in one who gives an alms. Without it, then, there can be not only the good which is done but also the good manner of doing it.—Proof of the Minor: All three requisites mentioned are fulfilled by an act of the will and of reason. But an act of the will and of reason does not depend upon a passion, because reason and the will move the lower powers in which the passions are found, and the motion of the mover does not depend upon the motion of the thing moved. The three requisites mentioned can therefore be fulfilled without any passion.

3. For an act ofyirtue the discernment of reason is needed. Thus Gregory says that unless the other virtues do with prudence the things to which they tend, they cannot be virtues at all. All passions, however, hinder the judgment or discernment of reason. Hence Sallust says: “All men who deliberate about doubtful matters ought fittingly to be free of anger, love, hate, and pity; for the spirit does not readily see truth where these emotions hold sway.” Such passions therefore detract from the praiseworthiness of virtue, and so from merit.

4. The concupiscible power hampers the judgment of reason no less than the irascible. But a passion of the irascible accompanying even an act of virtue disturbs the judgment of reason. Thus Gregory says: “By its fervor anger disturbs the eye.” Then pity, which is a passion of the concupiscible, similarly disturbs the judgment of reason.

5. Virtue is “a disposition of a perfect being for what is best,” as is said in the Physics. Then that in which we most closely approach perfect beings is most virtuous in us. But we approach God and the angels most closely when we act without passion from a judgment of reason; for God punishes without anger and alleviates misery without the passion of pity. It is therefore more virtuous to do good without these passions.

6. The virtues of a purified soul are more noble than those of other kinds. But, as Macrobius says, the virtues of a purified soul make one forget passions altogether. An act of virtue performed without passion is therefore more praiseworthy and meritorious.

7. The more the love of charity in us is purified of carnal love, the more praiseworthy it is; “for the affection among us should not be carnal but spiritual,” as Augustine says. But as a passion love is to some extent carnal. Consequently an act of charity is more praiseworthy without the passion of love. And the same holds true of the other passions.

8. Tully says that it is fitting that “benevolence should be characterized not by the ardor of love but by steadfastness” of mind. But ardor is a matter of passion. Passion therefore lessens the praiseworthiness of an act of virtue.

To the Contrary

1. Augustine says: “So long as we bear the infirmity of this life, if we have no passions at all, then we do not live correctly; for the Apostle heaped blame and scorn upon some who he said were, among other things, without feeling (Rom. 1:31). The sacred Psalmist found fault with those of whom he said (Psalm 68:2 1): “I looked for one that would grieve together with me, but there was none.” Thus it seems that without passions we cannot live correctly.

2. Augustine says: “To be angry with a sinner that he may reform, to sympathize with an afflicted person that he may be delivered, to fear for one in danger lest he perish.—I do not know whether anyone of sound judgment would find fault with these. The Stoics, indeed, are wont to blame even pity. But Cicero spoke far better and more conformably to human nature and to the feelings of the pious when he said in praise of Caesar: ‘No one of your virtues is either more admirable or more pleasing than your pity.’” And so the conclusion is the same as before.

REPLY

The passions of the soul can stand in either of two relationships to the will, either as preceding it or as consequent upon it: as preceding it, inasmuch as the passions spur the will to will something; as consequent upon it, inasmuch. as the lower appetite is stirred up with these passions as a result of the vehemence of the will through a sort of overflow, or even inasmuch as the will itself brings them about and arouses them of its own accord.

When the passions precede the will they detract from its praiseworthiness, because the act of the will is praiseworthy in so far as it is directed by reason to good in due measure and manner. Now this manner and measure is not kept except when the action takes place from discretion; and discretion is not kept when a man is stirred up to will something, even though good, by the onslaught of passion; for then the manner of the action will depend upon whether the onslaught of passion is great or small; and so it will happen only by chance that the due measure is kept.

When the passions are consequent upon the will they do not lessen the praiseworthiness of the act or its goodness, because they will be moderated in conformity with the judgment of reason upon which the act of will follows; but they will rather add to the goodness of the act. This will be done under two aspects:

(1) As a sign, because the passion itself consequent in the lower appetite is a sign that the movement of the will is intense. For in a nature subject to passion it is impossible for the will to be strongly moved to anything without some passion following in the lower part. Thus Augustine says: “So long as we bear the infirmity of this life, if we have no passions, we do not live correctly.”And after a few other remarks he adds the cause, saying: “For not to grieve at all while we are in this place of misery... takes place only at the great cost of inhumanity in the soul and stupor in the body.”

(2) As a help, because when by a judgment of reason the will chooses anything, it does so more promptly and easily if in addition a passion is aroused in the lower part, since the lower appetitive power is closely connected with a change in the body. Thus Augustine says: “The movement of pity is of service to reason when pity is shown in such a way that justice is preserved.”And this is what the Philosopher also says, bringing in the verse of Homer: “Stir up your courage and rage,”“ because when a man is virtuous with the virtue of courage, the passion of anger following upon the choice of virtue makes for greater alacrity in the act. If it preceded, however, it would disturb the manner requisite for virtue.

Answers to Difficulties

1. Praiseworthiness and reprehensibility consist essentially in voluntariness. Consequently whatever detracts from voluntariness diminishes the praiseworthiness in a good and the reprehensibility in an evil. Now a passion which precedes choice diminishes voluntariness, and therefore diminishes the praise of a good act and the blame of a bad one. But a passion which follows is a sign of the greatness of the will, as has been said. Then not only does it add to the praise in the case of a good act, but it also adds to the blame in that of a bad act. A man is said to sin from passion, however, if it is passion which leads him to choose sin. But if because of the choice of a sin he falls into the passion connected with that sin, he is said to sin not from passion but with passion. It is true, then, that acting from passion lessens praise and blame, but acting with passion can increase both of them.

2. The movement of virtue, which consists in a perfect act of will, cannot be had without any passion, not because the act of will depends upon the passion, but because in a nature subject to passion a passion necessarily follows upon a perfect act of will.

3. Both choice and execution are necessary in a virtuous deed. Discernment is required for choice. For the execution of what has been decided upon, alacrity is required. It is not, however, highly necessary that a man actually engaged in the execution of the deed deliberate very much about the deed. This would rather stand in the way than be of help, as Avicenna points out. Take the case of a lute player, who would be greatly handicapped if he had to give thought to each touch of the strings; or that of a penman if he had to stop and think in the formation of each letter. This is why a passion which precedes choice hinders the act of virtue by hampering the judgment of reason necessary in choosing. But after the choice has already been made purely by a rational judgment, a passion that follows helps more than it hurts, because even if it should disturb rational judgment somewhat, it does make for alacrity in execution.

4. The answer is evident from what has just been said.

5. God and the angels are not susceptible of passions, and so in their case no passion follows upon a perfect act of will, though it would follow if they were capable of passions. Consequently, because of a certain resemblance in the operations, in the usage of human speech the names of passions are applied to the angels; it is not because of any infirmity in their affection.

6. Those who have the virtues of a purified soul are in some sense free from passions that incline us to the contrary of that which virtue chooses, and likewise from passions that influence the will, but not from those consequent upon the will.

7. There is question of the carnality of spiritual affection only if the passion of love precedes the affection of the will, but not if it follows. For in the latter event there would be question of the fervor of charity, which consists in the fact that the spiritual affection, which is in the higher part, by reason of its vehemence overflows to the extent of altering the lower part.

8. The answer to this is clear from the above.

Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul

ARTICLE VIII

In the eighth article we ask:

Were there any such passions in Christ?

[Parallel readings: III Sent., 13, 1, 2 sol. I ad 2; 15, 2, 1 sol. 3; aa. 2 & 3; 33, expos. text.; In Matt., c. 26, §5 (P 10:252b, 253a, 254b); In Joan., c. 12, lect. 5, §1 (P 10:514ab); c. 13, lect. 4, §1 (534a-535b); S.T., III, 15, 4-9; Comp. theol., I, 232.]

Difficulties

It seems that there were not, for

1. According to Augustine, every agent is nobler than a patient. But nothing created is nobler than the soul of Christ. There would therefore not be any passion in the soul of Christ.

2. According to Macrobius, “it is characteristic of the strength of the purified soul to have no experience of passions, not to conquer them.” But Christ had the virtues of the purified soul in the highest degree. There were therefore no such passions in Him.

3. According to Damascene passion is “a movement of the appetitive soul because of a surmise about good or evil. But in Christ there was no surmise, for that implies ignorance. There was therefore no passion of soul in Christ.

4. According to Augustine passion is “a movement of the soul against reason.” But no movement in Christ was against reason. Consequently there was no passion of soul in Christ.

5. Christ was not made less than the angels as to His soul but only as to the infirmity of His body. But there are no passions in the angels, as Augustine says. Then neither were there any in the soul of Christ.

6. Christ was more perfect in soul than man in the first state. But man in the first state was not subject to these passions, because as Augustine says, “it is a part of the infirmity of our present life to undergo emotion of this kind even in every one of our good works.”s But there was no infirmity in the first state. Then neither were there such passions in Christ.

7. According to Augustine pain is “the feeling of dissolution and destruction.”.But in Christ there neither was the feeling of destruction and dissolution (because, as Hilary says, He had “the violence of punishment without the feeling of punishment”), nor was there actual dissolution ind destruction in Him (because from the highest good there can be no loss). Consequently there was no pain in Christ.

8. Where the cause is the same, the effect is the same. But the cause of the absence of passion in the bodies of the blessed will be that they are purified from the “fuel of sin” and united to glorious souls. Now since this was verified in Christ’s body, it therefore seems that there could be in Him no pain of a bodily passion.

9. No wise man grieves or is saddened except at the loss of his own good. For the reason why evil itself is lamentable is that it takes away good. But man’s good is virtue, for only by this is he himself made good. Therefore, since that good was not taken away in Christ’s case, there was no sadness or grief in Him.

10. According to Augustine “when we refuse consent to what happens to us against our will, our state of will is sadness.” But in Christ nothing happened that He Himself did not will. The passion of sadness or grief was therefore not in Christ.

11. No one is reasonably saddened or grieved except for some injury. But, as Chrysostom proves, no one is injured except by himself; and a wise man does not do that. Consequently, since Christ was most wise, there was no sadness in Him.

To the Contrary

1. It is written in Mark (14:33): “(Jesus) began to fear and to be heavy and to be sad.”

2. Augustine says that an upright will “has these movements... not only without blame but also laudably.” But there was an upright will in Christ. Then these movements were in Him.

3. In Christ there were the deficiencies of this life which are not inconsistent with the perfection of grace. But such passions are not inconsistent with the perfection of grace but are rather caused by grace, as Augustine brings out: “These movements, these emotions come from the love of good and from holy charity.” Such passions were therefore in Christ.

REPLY

The passions in question are in sinners in one way; in the just, both the perfect and the imperfect, in another way; in Christ as man in another; and in the first man and the blessed in still another. They are not in the angels or in God at all, because in them there is no sense appetite, of which such passions are movements.

For the clarification of the statements quoted it should be borne in mind that such affections of the soul can be distinguished on four different grounds, all concerned with whether these affections have the character of passion more or less properly:

(1) According to whether a person is affected with a passion of the soul by something contrary or harmful or by something suited and advantageous. The character of passion or suffering is more fully kept when the affection follows from something harmful than if it should follow from something advantageous, because passion implies an alteration of the patient from its natural state to a contrary one. This is why grief and sadness and fear and other such passions which have to do with evil possess the character of passion or suffering more than do joy and love and other emotions that have to do with good, though in these latter also the character of passion is kept inasmuch as the heart is dilated or stimulated by such things or is in any way modified from its ordinary state, so that it can happen that a man dies from such emotions.

(2) According to whether the passion is entirely from the outside or is from some internal principle. The character of passion is better preserved when it is from without than when it is from within. It is from without when the passion is suddenly stirred up from the chance meeting with something suited or something harmful. It is from within when the passions are caused by the will itself in the manner explained, in which case they are not sudden, since they follow the judgment of reason.

(3) According to whether a thing is transformed completely or not. We do not so properly say that a thing which is altered to some extent but is not completely transformed suffers, as we say this of one which is completely transformed to the contrary. We more properly say, for example, that a man suffers an illness if his whole body is ill than if a disease attacks some particular part of it. Now a man is completely transformed by such emotions when they do not stay in thelower appetite but carry along the higher appetite as well. When, however, they remain in the lower appetite alone, then the man is changed by them only as it were in part. In this case they are called “propassions,” while in the first case “passions.”

(4) According to whether the transformation is slight or intense. Slight transformations are less properly called passions. Thus Damascene says: “Not all passive movements are called passion, but those which are more vehement and become sensible; for those which are slight and insensible are not yet passions.”

It should therefore be noted that in men in this present life, if they are sinners, there are passions with regard to good and with regard to evil, not only foreseen but also sudden and intense ones and frequently even complete. These men are accordingly called in the Ethics “followers of passion.” In the just, on the other hand, the passions are never complete, because in such men reason is never led by passions. In the imperfect they are vehement, whereas in the perfect they are weak, with the lower powers kept in check by the habit of the moral virtues. Yet these do have not only foreseen but also sudden passions, and not only regarding good but also regarding evil.

In the blessed, however, and in man in the first state, and in Christ as subject to our infirmity, such passions are never sudden, seeing that because of the perfect obedience of the lower powers to the higher no movement arises in the lower appetite except at the dictate of reason. Thus Damascene says: “In our Lord natural tendencies did not precede the will; for he hungered willing it, he feared willing it, etc.” And the same is to be understood of the blessed after the resurrection and of men in the first state. But there is this difference: in Christ there were not only passions with regard to good but also with regard to evil; for He had a passible body, and therefore from the imagining of something harmful the passion of fear and of sadness and the like could naturally arise in Him. But in the first state and in the blessed there cannot be the apprehension of anything as harmful; and therefore there is in them no passion except with regard to good, as love, joy, and the like, but not sadness or fear or anger or anything of the sort.

We therefore concede that there were true passions in Christ. Hence Augustine says: “For a very definite providential purpose Christ took these movements upon Himself in His human soul when He willed, just as He became man when He willed.”

Answers to Difficulties

1. It is not necessary for the agent to be more noble than the patient absolutely, but it suffices that it be so in a certain respect: in so far as it is an agent. Thus nothing prevents the object of Christ’s soul from being nobler than His soul in so far as the object is active and the soul of Christ has some passive potentiality.

2. According to Augustine there was a dispute on this question between the Stoics and the Pcripatetics which seemed, however, to be more one of words than of fact. The Stoics, who called wise a man perfect in virtue, having the virtue of a purified soul, said that such passions were not found in the soul of a wise man at all. The Peripatetics, on the other hand, say that these passions of the soul do occur even in a wise man, but under control and subject to reason. Now Augustine proves from the admission of a certain Stoic that even the Stoics held that such emotions were in the soul of a wise man, but sudden and without being approved or consented to; and they did not call them passions but appearances or phantasies of the soul. From this it is clear that the Stoics really did not hold anything different from the Peripatetics, but that there was disagreement only in words, because what the Peripatetics named passions the Stoics called by another name.

Following the opinion of the Stoics, Macrobius and Plotinus say that passions are not found together with the virtue of a pur e soul, not because there are no sudden movements of passion in those who have this kind of virtue, but because they neither draw reason along with them nor are so vehement as to disturb seriously one’s peace of mind. In agreement with this the Philosopher says that cravings in the temperate are not strong as they are in the self-controlled, though in neither is reason drawn to consent.

Or it can be said (and this is better) that, since these passions arise from good and evil, they should be distinguished on the basis of the difference in goods and evils. For there are certain natural goods and evils, such as food and drink, health or sickness of body, and others of the sort; and some not natural, such as wealth, honors, and the like. With these latter civic life is concerned. Now Plotinus and Macrobius distinguish the virtues of the purified soul from political virtues. From this it appears that they place the virtues of the purified soul in those who are entirely removed from civic affairs, giving their time exclusively to the contemplation of wisdom. In them, as a consequence, certain passions do not arise from civic goods and evils; yet they are not immune to those passions which arise from natural goods and evils.

3. Whatever is caused by a weak cause can be caused also by a stronger one. Now a certain judgment is a stronger cause for arousing the passions than a surmise. Damascene accordingly set down that minimum which can cause passion, giving us to understand by this that a stronger passion is caused by a stronger cause.

4. According to Augustine, impassibility is spoken of in two ways: (1) as doing away with emotions that occur against reason and disturb the mind, and (2) as excluding all emotion. In the passage quoted passion is understood as opposed to the first sort of impassibility, not as opposed to the second. Only the first sort was found in Christ.

5. In His intellective soul Christ was superior to the angels. Nevertheless He had sensitive appetite, according to which passions could be in Him, and the angels did not have this.

6. In the first man there were certain passions, such as joy and love, which have to do with good, but not fear or grief, which have to do with evil. The latter are a part of our present infirmity which Adam did not have but Christ voluntarily assumed.

7. In Christ there was a true injuring of the body and a true feeling of the injury. In His divinity He is the highest good from which nothing can be taken away, but not in His body. The statement of Hilary, moreover, was afterward (as some say) retracted by him.Or it can be said that he asserts that Christ did not have the feeling of punishment, not because He did not feel the pains, but because that feeling did not go so far as to affect His reason.

8. By the very fact that a soul has been glorified, the body united to it in the ordinary course of events is made glorious and incapable of suffering injury. Thus Augustine says: “God made the soul of so potent a nature that from its complete happiness, which is promised to the saints at the end of time, there will overflow into man’s lower nature, the body, not the happiness which is proper to one capable of enjoying and understanding, but the fullness of health, namely, the vigor of incorruptibility.” But having in His power His own soul and body in virtue of His divinity, by a dispensation Christ had both happiness in His soul and passibility in His body, since the Word allowed to the body what is proper to it, as Damascene says. It was therefore a singular occurrence in Christ that from the soul’s fullness of beatitude glory did not overflow into the body.

9. The Stoics called the good of man only that by which men are said to be good, the virtues of the soul. Other things, such as those which pertain to the body or to external fortune, they did not call goods but conveniences. These latter the Peripatetics called goods, but the least goods, and virtues they called the greatest goods. The difference was merely one in terminology. Just as from the “least goods” of the Peripatetics, so also from the “conveniences” of the Stoics there arise certain movements in the soul of the wise man, though not such as to disturb reason. It is not true, then, that sadness can arise in the soul of the wise man only from the lack of virtue.

10. Although the injuring of His body did not occur in Christ with His reason unwilling, yet it did occur against the appetitive tendency of sensuality. In this way there was sadness there.

11. Chrysostom is speaking of an injury by which someone is made miserable, i.e., one by which he is deprived of the good of virtue. But the passion of sadness does not arise exclusively from such an injury, as has been said. The conclusion therefore does not follow.

p style="text-align: center; margin-bottom: 0.125in"> Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul

ARTICLE IX

In the ninth article we ask:

Was the passion of pain in the soul of Christ as regards higher reason?

[Parallel readings: III Sent., 15, 2, 3 sol. 2; Quodl. VII, (2), 5; S.T., III, 15, 5; 46, 7; Comp. theol., I, 232.]

Difficulties

It seems that it was not, for

1. A man is said to be disturbed and to be led by passion when the turmoil of passion reaches all the way to reason. Now it is not the part of a wise man to be disturbed and led by passion. Therefore, since Christ was most wise, it seems that in His case pain did not reach all the way to higher reason.

2. Every power is said to get pleasure as a result of the appropriateness of its proper object. Pain should therefore not be attributed to any power except by reason of harm which comes from its object. But in regard to eternal things, which are the objects of higher reason, Christ did not suffer any defect or encumberment. The passion o pain was therefore not in Christ’s higher reason.

3. According to Augustine’ pain is one of the bodily passions. It therefore does not apply to the soul except in so far as it is joined to the body. But as regards higher reason the soul is not joined to the body, since according to the Philosopher the intellect is not the act of any body. Pain therefore cannot be in higher reason.

4. It was said in answer that higher reason is not joined to the body by its operation, but it is joined to it as its form.—On the contrary, according to the Philosopher “power and action belong to the same subject.”Consequently, if the action of the intellect belongs to the soul without any participation in it by the body, the intellective power also will belong to the soul independently of its union with the body; and so higher reason will not be joined to the body as its form.

5. According to Damascene4 passion is a movement of the irrational and appetitive soul. But pain and sadness and the like are passions. They were therefore not in the realm of higher reason in Christ.

6. According to Augustine, pain or sadness is among the things which happen to us against our will. But Christ willed His bodily passion in His higher reason, and nothing happened to Him against His will, which was most perfectly conformed to the divine will. Sadness or pain was therefore not in Christ as regards His higher reason.

7. It was said that His higher reason as reason willed the passion of His body, but not as a nature.—On the contrary, reason is the same power considered as reason or as a nature, for a different way of looking at it does not differentiate the substance of the thing. Now if higher reason as reason willed anything and as a nature did not will it, the same power at one and the same time willed something and did not will it. But that is impossible.

8. According to the Philosopher, there is no sadness contrary to the pleasure which is taken in contemplation. But higher reason finds its pleasure in contemplating eternal truths. Consequently there cannot be any pain or sadness in it, for this sadness or pain would be opposed to the pleasure of contemplation. Thus there was no passion of pain or sadness in Christ’s soul as regards higher reason.

To the Contrary

1. It is written in the Psalm (87:4): “My soul is filled with evils,” which is interpreted in the Gloss: “Not with vices but with pains.” Pain was accordingly in every part of Christ’s soul, and therefore in higher reason.

2. Atonement corresponds to the fault. But by His passion Christ atoned for the fault of the first man. Now since that fault reached as far as higher reason, the passion of Christ must also have reached to higher reason.

3. As the Gloss says in comment upon the words “My soul is filled with evils” (Psalm 87:4), in feeling pain the soul suffers together with the body to which it is united. But reason as reason implies a reference to the body. This appears from the fact that we do not speak of reason but of intellect in the angels, who do not have a body naturally united to them; whereas we do speak of reason in souls united to bodies. Therefore the pain of Christ’s passion was in higher reason inasmuch as it is reason.

4. According to Augustine “the whole soul is in the whole body.”, Every part of it, then, is united to the body. But higher reason as reason is a part of the soul. It is therefore united to the body, and so suffers pain along with the suffering body.

REPLY

As is evident from what was said above, there are two kinds of passion by which the soul suffers indirectly, one bodily, which begins with the body and ends in the soul as united to the body, the other psychical, which is caused by the soul’s apprehending something by which the appetite is moved, with a resultant bodily alteration.

If we are speaking of the first kind of passion, to which pain belongs according to Augustine, then it must be said that the pain of Christ’s passion was in some sense in higher reason and in some sense not. For there are two elements in pain: an injury, and the experiential perception of that injury. The injury is principally in the body, but resultantly in the soul as united to the body. Now the soul is united to the body by its essence, and in the essence of the soul all its powers are rooted. In ttiis respect, then, that injury in Christ had reference to the soul and to all its parts, even to higher reason in so far as it is grounded in the essence of the soul. The experiential perception of the injury, however, has reference only to the sense of touch, as was said above.

If, on the other hand, we are speaking of psychical passion, sadness, which is properly a passion of this kind, can be only in that part of the soul whose object, when apprehended and appetitively attained, begets sadness. Now in Christ’s soul no reason for sadness could derive from the object of higher reason, that is, from the eternal verities of which He was in perfect possession. Consequently psychical sadnes could not have been in the higher reason of Christ’s soul.

In Christ, therefore, higher reason suffered with bodily pain in so far as this power is rooted in the essence of the soul, but it did not suffer with psychical sadness in so far as by its proper act it was directed to the contemplation of eternal truths.

Answers to Difficulties

1. A man is disturbed and led by passion when reason in its own operation follows the inclination of passion by consenting and choosing. Bodily pain, however, reached the higher reason of Christ’s soul, not by changing its proper operation, but only in so far as it is rooted in the essence, as has been said. Thus the conclusion does not follow.

2. Although pain was not in the higher reason of Christ’s soul with relation to its proper object, it was in it nevertheless as referred to its proper root, which is the essence of the soul.

3. A power can be the act of the body in two ways: (1) Inasmuch as it is a power; and thus it is said to be the act of the body as informing some bodily organ in order to carry out its own act. The visual power, for example, perfects the eye in order to carry out the act of seeing. In this sense the intellect is not the act of the body. (2) By reason of the essence in which it is grounded. In this sense the intellect as well as the other powers are joined to the body as its form inasmuch as they are in the soul which by its essence is the form of the body.

4. That difficulty is speaking of a power under the aspect of its being a power, not under that of its being rooted in the essence of the soul.

5. Damascene is speaking of Psychical passion, which is in the sense appetitive power as its proper subject, but in the apprehensive power causally, so to speak, inasmuch as the movement of passion arises in the appetitive from the apprehended object. There are, however, in the higher appetite certain operations similar to the passions of the lower appetite, and by reason of this similarity the names of the passions are sometimes attributed to the angels or to God, as Augustine says. In this way too sadness is sometimes said to be in higher reason as regards the apprehensive and the appetitive powers. We do not, however, say that pain was in the higher reason of Christ’s soul in this way, but in so far as it is rooted in the essence of the soul, as has been said.

6. This difficulty proves that pain was not in higher reason as referred to its object through its own operation. In that sense nothing occurs against its will.

7. The distinction made between reason as reason and reason as a nature can be understood in two ways:

(1) In such a way that “reason as a nature” is used to mean reason in so far as it is the nature of a rational creature, that is, as being grounded in the essence of the soul and giving natural existence to the body; and “reason as reason” is spoken of from the point of view of the distinguishing characteristic of reason inasmuch as it is reason; and that is its act, since powers are defined by their acts. Because, then, pain is not in higher reason as referred to its object on the basis of its proper act but as rooted in the essence of the soul, it is said for this reason that higher reason suffered pain as a nature, not as reason.

It is like the case of sight, which is founded on the sense of touch inasmuch as the organ of sight is also an organ of touch. Sight can accordingly suffer an injury in two different ways: through its proper act, as when sight is blurred by too strong a light, in which case this is a passion of sight as sight; or again as founded upon the sense of touch, as when the eye is punctured or dissolved by heat, in which case the passion is one of sight not as sight but as a sort of sense of touch.

(2) The distinction mentioned can be understood in such a way that we use “reason as a nature” to mean reason as referred to the things which it naturally knows and tends to, and “reason as reason” to mean reason as directed to an object of knowledge or desire by means of a comparison, since it is the proper function of reason to compare. For there are certain things which are to be shunned when considered in themselves, but are sought because of their relation to something else. Thus hunger and thirst considered in themselves are to be shunned, but to the extent that they are considered useful for the health of the soul or body they are sought. Reason as reason accordingly takes pleasure in them, whereas reason as nature is saddened by them. So too, the bodily passion of Christ considered in itself was something to be shunned, and reason as nature was as a consequence saddened by it and did not want it. But from the point of view of its being destined for the salvation of the human race it was something good and desirable, and so reason as reason willed it and then rejoiced in it.

This cannot be referred to higher reason, however, but only to lower reason, which directs its attention to the things of the body as its proper object. Hence it can be directed to bodily passions both absolutely and comparatively. But higher reason is not concerned with the things of the body as its objects, for it is directed in this way only to eternal things. It does, however, look at corporeal things to judge them in the light of eternal standards, to which it directs its gaze not only to look upon them but also to consult them. In Christ, accordingly, higher reason did not look at the passion of His body except with reference to the eternal standards, and in the light of them it rejoiced in the passion as pleasing to God. Hence sadness or pain by no means occurred in higher reason in virtue of its proper operation.

Now it is not out of keeping for one and the same power to will in relation to something else the same thing that it does not will in itself, for it is possible for something which is not good in itself to take on a certain goodness from its relation to something else. This did not take place, however, in higher reason in Christ with regard to the passion of His body; for it is not directed to such a passion except as willed [by God], as is apparent from what has just been said.

8. Contemplation can cause pleasure in two different ways: (1) From the standpoint of the operation, that is, contemplating. In this sense there is no sadness contrary to the pleasure which is taken in contemplating, because opposed to this contemplation which is the cause of pleasure there is no contrary contemplation which would be the cause of sadness; for all contemplation is pleasurable. This is not the case, however, on the part of sense, because from the point of view of its operation sense can be both saddened and pained; for example, we take pleasure in touching something suited to the sense, but we experience pain from touching something harmful. (2) Contemplation causes pleasure from the standpoint of the thing contemplated; that is, according as the object is considered as good or as evil. Thus either pleasure or contrary sadness can arise from contemplation; for even failure to understand causes sadness when considered as an evil, though in itself it does not cause anything but the negation of pleasure. Nevertheless it is not in this way that we say that pain was in the higher reason of Christ’s soul, but as being rooted in the essence of the soul.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties

1. The Gloss does not say that the soul of Christ was filled with sadness but that it was filled with pains in the sense that it was suffering along with the body. It is accordingly not necessary for the suffering of pain to be ascribed to higher reason except in so far as it is in the essence of the soul; for in that way it is united to the body.

2. Christ’s passion would not have atoned except in so far as it was undertaken voluntarily and from charity. It is accordingly not necessary that, just because the fault was in Adam through the operation of higher reason, pain be in the higher part of Christ’s reason as regards its proper operation; for the sufferer’s movement of charity, which is in the higher part of reason, corresponds for the purpose of atonement to whatever was in the fault from higher reason.

3. In reason there are two aspects to be kept in mind: a certain participation in the power of understanding, and also the clouding or defectiveness of understanding. The defectiveness of the power of understanding is a consequence of the soul’s ordination to union with a body, but the power of understanding is in the soul inasmuch as it is not immersed in the body like other material forms. Consequently, since the operation of reason is in the soul as participating in the power of understanding, such an operation is not exercised by means of the body.

4. “Reason as reason” does not designate a power distinct from reason as a nature, but it designates a way of looking at that power. Now even though, in one way of looking at it, suffering does not apply to some particular power of the soul, that does not prevent the whole soul from suffering.

Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul

ARTICLE X

In the tenth article we ask:

Did the pain of the passion which was in Christ’s higher reason prevent the joy of fruition, and conversely?

[Parallel readings: De ver., 10, 11 ad 3; III Sent., 15, 3 sol. 2 ad 5; Quodl. VII, (2), 5; S.T., III, 46, 8; Comp. theol., I, 232.]

Difficulties

It seems that it did, for

1. Blessedness is more properly in the soul than in the body. But the body cannot be said to be blessed an, d glorious while it is suffering, because impassibility belongs to the glory of the body. Then neither could there at the same time be the suffering of pain and the joy of blessed fruition in Christ’s higher reason.

2. The Philosopher says that any pleasure drives out the sadness which is contrary to it, and if it is keen it drives out all sadness. But the pleasure with which higher reason in the soul of Christ enjoyed the divinity, was most keen. It therefore drove from Christ all sadness and pain.

3. Christ’s higher reason was engaged in a more vivid contemplation than Paul in his rapture. But by the force of his contemplation Paul’s soul was carried out of his body not only as regards the operation of reason but also as regards sense operations. Then Christ too did not experience any pain either in reason or in sense.

4. From a strong cause there comes a strong effect. Now the operation of the soul is the cause of bodily change; for example, when terrors or delights are represented in imagination, the body is made cold or hot. Consequently, since there was the keenest joy in Christ’s soul as to His higher reason, it seems that even His body was changed by this joy; and so pain could not have been either in His body or in His higher reason under the aspect of its being united to the, body.

5. The vision of God in His essence is more effective than the vision of God in a creature serving as a medium. But the vision by which Moses saw God in a creature resulted in his not suffering from hunger during his fast of forty days. With all the more reason, then, did the vision of God in His essence, which belonged to Christ in His higher reason, remove all bodily affliction. And so the conclusion is the same as before.

6. Whatever exists in the highest degree of anything but yet can fall off, does not admit of any admixture of the contrary. Thus the heat of fire, which stands at the highest degree of heat, does not admit of any admixture of cold, though that heat is exchangeable. But the joy of fruition was in Christ’s higher reason in the highest degree and unchangeably. There was therefore no pain mixed with it.

7. Man is made blessed in both his soul and his body, and he lost both kinds of blessedness by sin. In Christ, however, human nature was re-established in blessedness of soul, which consists in the enjoyment of the divinity by higher reason. All the more, then, was it re-established in blessedness of body, which is something less; and consequently there was no pain in Him even as to His body, and so neither \vas there in higher reason in virtue of its union with the body.

8. Not only Christ’s soul but also His flesh was united to the Word. Ilut if His flesh were glorified through union with the Word, there could not be any pain in it. Therefore, since His higher reason is made blessed through union with the Word, there can be no pain in it.

9. According to Augustine joy and pain are in the soul essentially. But joy and pain are contraries. Since contraries cannot be in the same subject cssentially, it therefore seems that the joy of fruition and the pain of the passion could not have been in the higher part of Christ’s reason at the same time.

10. Pain follows from the apprehension of something harmful; joy, from the apprehension of something agreeable. But it is not possible to apprehend simultaneously something harmful and something agreeable, because according to the Philosopher it is possible to understand only one thing. Pain and joy could therefore not have been in Christ’s higher reason at the same time.

11. In uncorrupted nature reason has more power over sensuality than sensuality has over reason in corrupted nature. But in corrupted nature sensuality draws reason along with it. All the more surely, then, in the case of Christ, in whom human nature was uncorrupted, does reason draw sensuality along with it. Thus sensuality shared in the joy of fruition which was in reason. From this it seems that the soul of Christ was altogether free from pain.

12. An infirmity contracted is greater than one assumed; and similarly union in person is stronger than union by grace. But in the three young men,” whose infirmity was contracted, union with God by grace kept their bodies incapable of suffering injury from fire. All the more, then, in the case of Christ, who had only an assumed infirmity, did union with God in the person of the Word and fruition of Him keep His reason free from the pain of the passion.

13. The joy of fruition is in higher reason from its being turned to God, and the pain of suffering from its being turned to the body. But reason, being simple, cannot at the same time be turned to God and to the body, because when anything simple turns to something, it turns as a whole. In Christ’s higher reason, then, there could not have been at the same time the joy of fruition and the pain of the passion.

14. It was said in answer that there was a twofold state in Christ, that of a wayfarer and that of a possessor, and that on the basis of these two states there could be in Him both the joy of fruition and the pain of the passion.—On the contrary, the duality of states in Christ neither removes the contrariety between joy and pain nor differentiates the subject of the joy and of the pain. Now contraries can not be in the same subject. The duality of states in Christ therefore does not make it possible for pain and joy to be in Him as regards higher reason at the same time.

15. The states of a wayfarer and of a possessor are either contrary or not. If they are contrary, they cannot be in Christ at the same time. If, on the other hand, they are not contrary, seeing that contraries have contrary causes, it seems that the duality of states cannot be the cause by which the contraries, joy and pain, were in Christ at the same time.

16. When one power becomes intense in its act, another is withdrawn from its act. With all the more reason, then, when one power is intense in one act, is the very same power withdrawn from another act. But in higher reason there was intense joy. By this fact, then, it was altogether withdrawn from pain.

17. It was said that pain was material with reference to joy, and for this reason joy was not prevented by pain.—On the contrary, the pain was from the suffering of the body, the joy, from the vision of God. The pain of the passion was therefore not material with reference to the joy of fruition. Then pain and joy could not be in Christ’s higher reason at the same time.

To the Contrary

1. There is a proportion among effects similar to that among their causes. But the union of Christ’s soul with His body was the cause of pain, whereas its union with the divinity was the cause of joy. But these two unions do not preclude each other. Then neither do pain and joy preclude each other.

2. At the same instant Christ was a true wayfarer and a true possessor. He therefore had the attributes of each. But it is proper to a possessor to rejoice intensely from the divine fruition, and of a wayfarer to feel bodily pains. Therefore in Christ there were at the same time the pain of the passion and the joy of fruition.

REPLY

In Christ the two dispositions in question, the joy of fruition and the pain of the bodily passion, by no means precluded each other. For the clarification of this matter it should be borne in mind that, in conformity with the order of nature, because of the conjunction of the powers of the soul in one essence and of the soul and body in the one existence of the composite, the higher powers and the lower, and even the body and the soul, let flow from one to the other whatever superabounds in any one of them. And hence it is that because of the soul’s apprehension the body is altered with regard to heat and cold, and sometimes even to the extent of health and sickness and even to death; for it does happen that a person meets with death from joy or sadness or love. For this reason too there occurs an overflow from the very glory of the soul into the body, glorifying it, as is made clear in the passage from Augustine cited above. And contrariwise the alteration of the body overflows into the soul. For a soul joined to a body imitates its make-up in point of insanity or docility and the like, as is said in the work Six Principles.

In the same way too there occurs an overflow from the higher powers into the lower, as when a passion in sense appetite follows upon an intense movement of the will, and the animal powers are withdrawn or barred from their acts by intense contemplation. And conversely there occurs an overflow from the lower powers into the higher, as when a man’s reason is clouded because of the vehemence of passions in sense appetite, with the result that it judges as simply good that to which the man is moved by passion.

In Christ, however, the situation is quite different. Because of the divine power of the Word the order of nature was subject to His will. It was therefore possible that the above-mentioned overflow, whether from the soul into the body or vice versa, or from the higher powers into the lower or vice versa, should not take place; and the Word saw to this in order that the genuineness of His human nature in all its parts might be clearly proved and that the mystery of our reparation might be fittingly fulfilled in all respects. Damascene thus says: “He was moved in conformity with this nature, while the Word in the manner of a supervisor so willed and permitted, to suffer and to perform all works proper to it, in order that through its works the nature’s genuineness might be believed.”

It is therefore evident that, since there was the most complete joy in His higher reason in view of the fact that by its activity His soul was enjoying the possession of God, that joy remained in higher reason and did not flow out to the lower powers of the soul or to the body; otherwise there could not have been any pain or passion in Him. Accordingly too the effect of fruition did not reach to the essence of the soul as the form of the body or as the root of the lower powers. Had it done so it would have reached the body and the lower powers, as happens in the blessed after the resurrection. Conversely also the pain which was in the body itself from the injury of the body and in the essence of the soul as the form of the body and in the lower powers, was not able to reach to higher reason in so far as by its act it turns towards God, in such a way that this turning might thereby be hindered in the least degree.

It therefore remains that the pain itself attained higher reason as rooted in the essence of the soul and that the greatest joy was there inasmuch as reason was enjoying the possession of God by its act. Thus the joy belonged to higher reason directly, because by its proper act, whereas pain was there as if indirectly, because by reason of the essence of the soul in which it was grounded.

Answers to Difficulties

1. Just as God is the good and the life of the soul, so the soul is the good and life of the body, but not contrariwise so that the body should be the good of the soul. Now the ability to suffer is a sort of barrier or harmful factor as regards the union of the soul with the body. Thus the body cannot be blessed in its own way while still able to suffer, having a barrier to participation in its own good. For this reason impassibility is a part of the glory of the body. The soul’s blessedness, however, consists entirely in the enjoyment of its own good, which is God. Hence the soul which enjoys the possession of God is perfectly happy, even if it happens to be passible from the point of view of its being united to the body, as was the case in Christ.

2. The fact that keen joy drives out all sadness, even that which is not contrary, is due to the overflow of the powers upon one another (which did not take place in Christ), as has been explained. In this way because of the intensity of St. Paul’s contemplation his lower powers were withdrawn from their acts.

3. The answer is clear from that just given.

4 In the same way there results from the operation of the soul some change in the body. From this the answer to this difficulty is obvious.

5. In the same way also Moses suffered from thirst and hunger not at all or little, because of his contemplation of God even though in a creature serving as a medium. Thus the answer to this difficulty is clear.

6. In Christ there was no mingling of joy and pain. For joy was in His higher reason viewed under the aspect of its being the principle of its own act, for it was in this way that it enjoyed the possession of God. Pain, however, was not in it except in so far as the injuring of the body touched it as the act of the body through the essence in which it was rooted, yet in such a way that the act of higher reason was in no wise hampered. Thus there was pure joy and likewise pure pain, and both in the highest degree.

7. It happened by a sort of dispensation that glory of soul, though not that of body, was conferred upon Christ from the first moment of His conception, so that He was conformed to God by the glory of His soul while by the passibility of His body He was like us. Thus He was a fitting mediator between God and man, leading us to glory and offering His passion to God in our name in accordance with the words of the Epistle to the Hebrews (2:10): “For it became him... who had brought many children into glory, to be perfected by his passion.”

8. The soul of Christ was joined to the Word in two ways: (1) by the act of fruition, and this union made it blessed; (2) by union, and this did not furnish the reason for its blessedness but did account for its being the soul of God. Now if one were to suppose that the soul was assumed in a unity of person without fruition, it would not be blessed properly speaking, because not even God Himself is blessed except by the fact that He enjoys the possession of Himself. The body of Christ is therefore not glorious by reason of being assumed by the Son of God in a unity of person, but only because glory came down into it from the soul; but this was not the case before the passion, because it was not glorious then.

9. It is impossible for contraries to be in the same subject directly; yet it does happen that contrary movements are in the same subject in such a way that one of them belongs to it directly and the other indirectly, as when a person walking in a ship is borne in a direction contrary to that in which the ship is moving. So too in the higher reason of Christ’s soul there was joy directly, because by its proper act, but pain indirectly, because through the suffering of the body. It can also be said that that joy and that pain were not contraries since they were not about the same thing.

10. The intellect cannot understand many things at the same time by means of different species, but it can understand many things at once by means of one species or by understanding in any other way many as one. It is in this way that the intellect of Christ’s soul and of any one of the blessed understands many things at once, since in seeing the divine essence it knows other things.

Yet granted that the soul of Christ could understand only one thing at a time, the possibility is not thereby removed of its understanding one thing and at the same time sensing something else with a bodily sense. And as a matter of fact from those two different objects of apprehension in Christ’s soul there followed joy from the vision of God and the pain of the passion from the feeling of injury.

Granted further that it could not simultaneously understand one thing and sense or imagine another, nonetheless from that one object of understanding higher and lower appetite could be affected in different ways, so that the higher would rejoice and the lower fear or grieve, as happens in one who hopes to get health from some horrible remedy. For considered by reason as health-giving, the remedy begets joy in the will; but because of its horribleness it arouses fear in the lower appetite.

11. That argument proceeds on the assumption of the ordinary course of events. In Christ, however, it occurred by way of exception that there should not take place the overflow from one power into another.

12. The bodies of the three young men were not made impassible in the furnace; but by the divine power it was miraculously brought about that while remaining passible their bodies should not be injured by the fire, as it also could have happened by the divine power that neither Christ’s soul nor His body should suffer anything. But why this was not done has been explained.

13. The turning of a power towards something takes place by means of its act. Thus joy was in Christ’s higher reason by means of it turning to God, to whom it was kept turned entirely, whereas pain was in His higher reason as a result of the inhesion or adherence by which it clung to the essence of the soul as its root.

14. The state of a wayfarer is a state of imperfection, whereas that of a possessor is a state of perfection. Christ therefore had the state

of a wayfarer by reason of bearing a body capable of suffering, and likewise such a soul; but He had the state of a possessor by reason of perfectly enjoying the possession of God through the act of higher reason. This was possible in Christ because by the divine power the overflow from one to another was inhibited, as has been said. This is the reason also why joy and sadness could be in Him simultaneously. It is accordingly said that these two feelings were in Him in accordance with His two states because His having two states and His simultaneously experiencing pain and joy came from the same cause.

15. Even though the states of a wayfarer and of a possessor are in a sense contrary, they could still be in Christ at the same time, not in the same respect but in different respects. For the state of a possessor was in Him according as He adhered to God by fruition in higher reason; and the state of a wayfarer, according as His soul was joined to a body capable of suffering and His higher reason joined to the soul itself by a sort of natural conjunction. As a result the state of a possessor has reference to the act of higher reason, and that of a wayfarer to His passible body and its consequent properties.

16. It was something special in Christ, for the reason already explained, that however much one power was intensified in its act, another was not withdrawn from its act or in any way hampered. The joy of higher reason was accordingly hindered neither by the pain which was in sense as a consequence of the act of sensing nor by the pain which was in higher reason itself, because that pain was not in it as a consequence of its act, but it attained it in some manner as a consequence of its being grounded in the essence of the soul.

17. Just as blessed knowledge is principally of the divine essence and secondarily of the things which are known in the divine essence, in the same way the affection and joy of the blessed is principally about God but secondarily about the things that have God as the reason why we rejoice over them. The pain of the passion can accordingly be in some sense material with reference to the joy of fruition, for that joy was principally over God and secondarily over the things which were pleasing to God; and so it was even over the pain in so far as it was acceptable to God as destined for the salvation of the human race.