II Sentences, Distinction 43, Question 1
Concerning the Sin against the Holy Spirit

a. 2: utrum peccatum in spiritum sanctum sit determinatum genus peccati. Article 2: Whether the sin against the Holy Spirit is a particular kind of sin.
ad secundum sic proceditur. videtur quod peccatum in spiritum sanctum non sit determinatum genus peccati. It would seem that the sin against the Holy Spirit is not a particular kind of sin.
sicut enim peccatum quod ex industria geritur, est peccatum in spiritum sanctum; ita peccatum quod est ex infirmitate, est in patrem, et quod ex ignorantia est in filium. sed peccatum ex infirmitate non nominat determinate aliquod genus peccati, sed peccati circumstantiam. ergo nec peccatum in spiritum sanctum est determinatum genus peccati. Objection 1: For just as a sin which is done with intention is a sin against the Holy Spirit, so too a sin which is done through weakness is a sin against the Father, and one done through ignorance, a sin against the Son. But the sin (done) through weakness does not designate particularly a kind of sin, but rather the circumstance of sin. Therefore, the sin against the Holy Spirit is not a particular kind of sin.
praeterea, peccare ex industria vel certa malitia, est peccare ex electione, ut dictum est. sed unusquisque habens habitum vitiosum, ex electione peccat, ut ex 7 ethic. patet, ubi distinguit intemperatum contra incontinentem: quorum primus habens habitum per electionem peccat, secundus per passionem. ergo peccare ex habitu est peccare ex certa malitia, quod est peccatum in spiritum sanctum. sed peccatum ex habitu procedens non nominat determinatum genus peccati. ergo nec peccatum in spiritum sanctum. Objection 2: Furthermore, to sin with intention or with definite malice is to sin by choice, as has been previously stated. But anyone having a vicious habit, sins from choice, as is said in Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, where the intemperate (person) is distinguished from the incontinent, where the first has the habit to sin through choice, while the second has it through passion. Therefore, to sin by reason of habit is to sin by reason of a definite malice, which is the sin against the Holy Spirit. But sin proceeding from a habit does not denote a particular kind of sin. Therefore, neither does the sin against the Holy Spirit.
praeterea, in littera assignantur diversae species peccati in spiritum sanctum, ut desperatio, obstinatio, et multa hujusmodi. sed ista se habent ad omne genus peccati: quia nullum genus peccati est quod interdum ex desperatione oriri non possit, et sic de aliis. ergo peccatum in spiritum sanctum non est determinatum genus peccati. Objection 3: Furthermore,the diverse species of the sin against the Holy Spirit are designated in the (Lombard's) text, (sins) such as despair, obstinance, and many others. But these very species are related to every kind of sin, for there is no kind of sin that cannot arise at times from despair, and so too concerning the others. Therefore, the sin against the Holy Spirit is not a particular kind of sin.
praeterea, peccatum in spiritum sanctum dicitur quod est contra appropriatum spiritui sancto. sed omne peccatum mortale contrariatur gratiae, quae appropriatur spiritui sancto. ergo omne peccatum mortale debet dici in spiritum sanctum. Objection 4: Furthermore, the sin against the Holy Spirit is said to be that which is contrary to an attribute of the Holy Spirit. But every mortal sin is contrary to grace, which itself is attributed to the Holy Spirit. Therefore, every mortal sin should be said to be against the Holy Spirit.
praeterea, mors animae est, ut augustinus dicit separatio animae a deo. sed quodlibet peccatum mortale separat animam a deo. ergo quodlibet mortale est ducens ad mortem. sed peccatum ad mortem est peccatum in spiritum sanctum, ut magister dicit. ergo quodlibet mortale est peccatum in spiritum sanctum. Objection 5: Furthermore, the death of the soul, as Augustine says, is the separation of the soul from God. But every mortal sin separates the soul from God. Therefore, every mortal sin leads to death. But (that) sin (which leads) to death is a sin against the Holy Spirit, as the Lombard says. Therefore, every mortal sin is a sin against the Holy Spirit.
sed contra, quodlibet genus peccati distinguitur ab aliis generibus. sed peccatum in spiritum sanctum, est quoddam genus peccati gravius ceteris, ut magister dicit. ergo est determinatum et distinctum ab aliis. 1st. on the contrary: Every kind of sin is distinguished from the rest. However, the sin against the Holy Spirit is a kind of sin more grave than the rest, as the Lombard says. Therefore, it is particular kind of sin and is distinguished from the others.
praeterea, peccatum in spiritum sanctum, cumsit irremissibile, distinguitur ab aliis quae remissibilia sunt, secundum remissibile et irremissibile. sed istae differentiae sunt maxime distantes. ergo multo magis distincta genera peccatorum facient quam aliquae aliae peccatorum differentiae. 2nd. on the contrary: Furthermore, since the sin against the Holy Spirit is unforgivable, it is distinguished from the other sins which are forgivable (the principle of division is the forgivable versus the unforgivable). But these very differences are most distant. Therefore the more distinct the kinds of sins happen to be, the more distinct are some sins from others.
respondeo dicendum, quod, ut supra dictum est, peccatum in spiritum sanctum dicitur quod est ex certa malitia vel industria sive electione, quod idem est. quod autem aliquis ex certa deliberatione actum peccati eligat, non impulsus aliqua passione, potest contingere dupliciter. aut per positionem alicujus in eligente, per quod inclinatur in talem actum, sicut in sibi similem; sic enim omnis habens habitum vel peccati vel virtutis inclinatur in actus similes suis habitibus, quia naturalis appetitus rei est in id quod sibi simile est; et hoc modo quicumque habet habitum intemperantiae, eligit actum intemperantiae, et sic de aliis peccatis. alio autem modo ex certa deliberatione peccatum eligitur, quando voluntas rejicit illud per quod homo a peccato retrahi posset; verbi gratia, aliquis propter expectationem futuri praemii abstinet a peccato. si ergo aliquis spem futuri praemii abjiciat voluntarie, vel aliquid hujusmodi, quod a peccato retrahebat; eliget hoc quod sibi erit delectabile secundum carnem, quasi per se bonum; et ita ex certa malitia peccabit. Response: As was previously said, the sin against the Holy Spirit is due to a definite malice, intention or choice, which amount to the same thing. The fact that someone chooses a sinful act by way of definite deliberation, and not by some impulse of passion, can occur in two ways. First, by way of one's position (or disposition) in choosing by reason of which one is inclined to a particular kind of act as it is similar (in kind) to oneself (or rather to one's disposition). For every person having a habit, either of sin or of virtue, is inclined to actions similar to these habits, the reason being that the natural appetite of a thing is for that which is similar to (the appetite). In this way, whatever has the habit of intemperance, chooses intemperate activity, and likewise with the other sins. Secondly, a sin is chosen through definite deliberation when the will rejects that by which one could be withdrawn from sin. For example, someone abstains from sin on account of the expectation of future reward. Therefore, if someone voluntarily throws off the hope of future reward, or something of this kind, he withdraws (from this future reward) on account of sin. He chooses that which will be pleasing to him according to the flesh, as if it were good per se. And in this way, he will sin by reason of definite malice.
sumendo ergo primo modo peccatum ex electione, non nominatur aliquod genus peccati determinatum, sed quaedam peccati circumstantia, ut scilicet actus ex habitu procedat; quod in omnibus generibus peccatorum contingit. sed secundo modo speciale peccatum dicitur, quod ex electione contingit. quia speciale peccatum dicitur ex speciali objecto; hoc autem est speciale objectum voluntatis, in quo peccatur, scilicet hoc quod a peccato natum erat retrahere, cui voluntas dissentit, ab eo sponte recedens. peccatum autem in spiritum sanctum non proprie dicitur illud quod ex electione procedit primo modo; sed quod secundo modo ex electione procedit; quia peccata et specificantur et nominantur ab objectis: objectum autem in hoc peccato est hoc quod a peccato retrahebat, et istud est bonitas quaedam, vel aliquis effectus spiritui sancto appropriabilis; et ideo peccatum in spiritum sanctum determinatum genus peccati nominat. By taking the first way of sin through choice, something is not denominated as a particular kind of sin, but rather as a circumstance of sin, namely as an act proceeding from a habit, which happens in every kind of sin. But the second way of sin through choice is denominated as a particular sin. For a particular sin is so called by reason of a particular object. This, however, is the particular object of the will, in which it (the will) sins, namely that one was born to withdraw from sin, with which the will disagrees, pulling back from it spontaneously. The sin against the Holy Spirit is not properly said to be that which arises in the first way from choice, but proceeds, rather, from the second way of choice. For sins are specified and denominated by their objects, and the object of this sin (i.e., against the Holy Spirit) is what withdraws one from sin, and this is a particular goodness (that one is born with, i.e., a natural abhorrence of sin just spoken of above), or some characteristic effect of the Holy Spirit. For this reason, the sin against the Holy Spirit denominates a particular kind of sin.
ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum aliquis hoc secundo modo ex electione peccat, quod proprie peccatum in spiritum sanctum dicitur, considerantur ibi duo actus, quorum uterque peccatum est, et primus est causa secundi. verbi gratia, aliquis uno actu voluntatis praemia aeterna contemnit, eorum spem a se abjiciens; et in hoc ipso peccat: et quia desperat de praemio, incidit in actum fornicationis; et hic actus in eo ex certa electione provenit propter praecedentem actum. unde patet quod cum dicitur peccatum ex industria, ipsa industria, quae notatur esse causa peccati, est quoddam peccatum, et est determinatum peccati genus: et hoc proprie est peccatum in spiritum sanctum. sed infirmitas vel ignorantia, non nominat peccatum aliquod, sed poenam tantum: et ideo ex ea non designatur speciale peccatum. Response to Objection 1: When someone sins by way of choice in the second way, which is properly referred to as the sin against the Holy Spirit, there are two acts that are considered, each one of which is a sin, and the first is the cause of the second. For example, someone despises eternal rewards in one act of the will, throwing aside the hope of them for himself. In this very way, he sins, and because he despairs of this reward, he falls (for example) into an act of fornication. This act occurs by reason of a definite choice on account of the preceding act. Hence it is clear that when a sin is designated by reason of intention, this very intention, which is denoted to be the cause of sin, is a sin and is a particular kind of sin. This properly is the sin against the Holy Spirit. But weakness and ignorance are not designated as sins, but rather only as penalties. For this reason a particular kind of sin is not designated with respect to them.
ad secundum patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt in corp. art.. Response to Objection 2: The response is evident from those things which were said in the body of this article.
ad tertium dicendum, quod peccatum in spiritum sanctum non dicitur ille actus secundus qui ex primo, ut dictum est, causatur, nisi forte secundum quod virtus primi actus manet in eo; sed ipse primus actus est proprie peccatum in spiritum sanctum: et ideo non est inconveniens ut ex uno determinato peccato omnia peccata possint oriri, ut supra dictum est. Response to Objection 3: The sin against the Holy Spirit is not said to be the second act which is caused by the first, except perhaps in so far as the power of the first act remains in (the second act). The first act itself is properly called the sin against the Holy Spirit, for which reason it is not inappropriate that from one definite kind of sin all sins are able to arise, as was said above.
ad quartum dicendum, quod contrariari gratiaecontingit dupliciter. primo directe per se; et hoc fit dum aliquis gratiam actualiter despicit, vel aliquid ad gratiam pertinens; et sic opponitur gratiae peccatum in spiritum sanctum. secundo indirecte et quasi ex consequenti; et sic omne peccatum mortale gratiae opponitur: quia per peccatum mortale quaeritur aliquid quod simul cum gratia esse non potest. Response to Objection 4: Those things contrary to grace happen in two ways. First, directly in themselves. And this comes to be when someone actually despises grace, or something pertaining to grace. And in this way the sin against the Holy Spirit is opposed to grace. Second, indirectly and, as it were, by consequence. And in this way, every mortal sin is opposed to grace, since there is something sought through mortal sin which cannot exist concomitantly with grace.
ad quintum dicendum, quod peccatum mortale quantum ad aliquid est simile morti, et quantum ad aliquid aegritudini: inquantum enim separat a deo, qui vita est, mortis similitudinem habet, et haec est mors prima; inquantum autem adhuc manet possibilitas redeundi ad vitam, habet similitudinem aegritudinis, ducentis ad mortem condemnationis, quae est mors secunda, quae omnino similitudinem mortis retinet, dum per eam homo a deo separatur, et ad vitam gratiae possibilis reditus non est. sicut autem in aegritudinibus corporalibus quaedam sunt curabiles, quaedam autem non, quantum est de natura morbi, et hae dicuntur infirmitates ad mortem; ita etiam in peccatis illa tantum peccatorum mortalium ad mortem dicuntur quae quantum in se est irremissibilia sunt. dicitur ergo peccatum esse mortale a morte prima; sed ad mortem propter mortem secundam. Response to Objection 5: Mortal sin in one way is likened unto death, and in another way to sickness. In so far as it separates one from God, Who is life, it has a likeness to death. And this is the first death (mentioned in the objection). However, in so far as there still remains the possibility of returning to life, it has a likeness to sickness, of drawing one towards the death of condemnation (which is the second death (mentioned) in the objection, which wholly withdraws from its likeness unto death), while through it man is separated from God and has not returned to the life of possible grace. Just as some sicknesses of the body are curable, while some are not (according to the nature of disease, the latter are called infirmities unto death), so too with respect to sins, so far as mortal sins are in themselves unforgivable, they are said to be 'unto death'. Therefore a sin is said to be mortal from the first death (mentioned in the objection), but leading to death according to the second (mention of) death.

Stephen Loughlin
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The Aquinas Translation Project
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