| utrum ad jejunium ab ecclesia institutum omnes teneantur absque dispensatione. | Article 2: Whether all are obliged without dispensation to keep the fast instituted by the Church. |
| ad secundum sic proceditur. videtur quod ad jejunium ab ecclesia institutum omnes teneantur absque dispensatione. | Sub-article 1: It would seem that all are obliged without dispensation to keep the fast instituted by the Church. |
| praecepta enim ecclesiae obligant sicut praecepta dei; unde apostolis dicitur luc. 10, 16: qui vos audit, me audit. sed ad praecepta dei omnes tenentur absque dispensatione. ergo et ad praecepta ecclesiae. | Objection 1: For precepts of the Church bind as (do) the precepts of God. Hence, the Apostle states at Luke 10:16 "He who hears you, hears me." But all are held to the precepts of God without dispensation. Therefore so too are all held to the precepts of the Church. |
| praeterea, illud quod utiliter statutum est, non potest sine nocumento relaxari. sed non sine utilitate statutum est ecclesiae jejunium. ergo non potest per dispensationem sine nocumento relaxari. | Objection 2: Furthermore, that which is usefully decreed cannot be relaxed without harm. But the fasting decreed by the Church is not without use. Therefore it cannot be relaxed through dispensation without harm. |
| praeterea, secundum bernardum in lib. de dispensatione et praecepto, in praecepto superioris non potest inferior dispensare. sed quaelibet singularis persona est inferior quam ecclesia, quae jejunium sub praecepto statuit, nisi forte ille qui est caput totius ecclesiae, vel loco capitis, scilicet papa. ergo nullus alius potest in jejunio dispensare nisi papa. | Objection 3: Furthermore, according to Bernard in his book "Concerning Dispensation and Precept", the lesser cannot dispense of the higher precept. But individual persons are lesser than the Church which establishes fasting under precept, expect perhaps that one who is the head of the whole Church, or the place of the head, namely the Pope. Therefore no one else can dispense of fasting except the Pope. |
| sed contra, innocentius iii in quadam decretali, loquens de materia ista, dicit, quod non subjacet legi necessitas. ergo necessitate imminente potest aliquis sine peccato jejunium ab ecclesia institutum praetermittere per dispensationem. | First on the contrary: Innocent III, speaking on this very subject in his Decretals, says that the necessity does not bind (one) to the law. Therefore, in imminent necessity, one can overlook through dispensation the fast instituted by the Church. |
| praeterea, praecepta legis naturalis non possunt per aliquod statutum immutari. sed praeceptum legis naturalis est ut homo ad necessitatem cibum sumat. ergo si necessitas exposceret, posset jejunii abstinentiam non servare. | Second on the contrary: The precepts of the natural law cannot be altered through a statute. But there is a precept of the natural law that man by necessity take food. Therefore if necessity demands, one is able not to keep the abstinence of the fast. |
| ulterius. videtur quod justi non teneantur ad jejunium ecclesiae, | Sub-article 2: It would seem that the just are not held to the Church's fast. |
| 2 corinth. 3, 17: ubi spiritus domini, ibi libertas. sed justi spiritu dei sunt imbuti. ergo liberi sunt ab onere statutorum ecclesiae; et sic non obligantur ad jejunium ab ecclesia institutum. | Objection 1: (For there is) 2 Corinthians 3:17 (which states) "Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom." But the just are imbued by the spirit of God. Therefore they are freed from the burden of the statutes of the Church, and thus are not obliged to the fast instituted by the Church. |
| praeterea, matth. 9, 15, dominus dicit: non possunt filii, quamdiu cum eis est sponsus, lugere. jejunium autem ad luctum pertinet. sed cum justis sponsus ecclesiae christus spiritualiter est; eph. 3, 17: habitare christum per fidem in cordibus vestris. ergo cum spiritualis praesentia corporali praeemineat, videtur quod non teneantur ad jejunium. | Objection 2: Furthermore, at Matthew 9:15, Our Lord says: "Can the children of the bride-chamber mourn as long as the bridegroom is with them?" But fasting pertains to mourning. However, the bridegroom of the Church, Christ, is spiritually with the just - Ephesians 3:17 "That Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith." Therefore since spiritual presence excels that of the body, it would seem that they are not held to the fast. |
| praeterea, nullus tenetur satisfacere qui non peccavit. sed jejunium est quaedam satisfactionis pars. ergo si sunt aliqui justi qui nunquam peccaverunt, videtur quod tales ad jejunium non tenentur. | Objection 3: Furthermore, no one is bound to make reparation who has not sinned. But fasting is a part of reparation. Therefore if there are just people who have never sinned, it would seem that such are not bound to the fast. |
| sed contra, apostolus perfecte justus fuit. sed ipse corpus suum castigavit per jejunia et alia corporalia exercitia, ut dicitur 1 corinth. 9, 27: ne forte reprobus efficiar. ergo et alii justi debent jejunare. | First on the contrary: The Apostle was perfectly just. But he chastised his body through fasting and other corporeal disciplines, as is said at 1 Corinthians 9:27 "Lest I should become disapproved." Therefore, the rest of the just ought to fast. |
| praeterea, justitia hominis ordinem ecclesiae non subvertit, sed perficit. sed quamdiu manet ordo, manet obedientia inferioris ad superiorem praecepta: quia hoc eis est debitum. ergo per justitiam homo non absolvitur quin teneatur jejunare, et alia praecepta ecclesiae dei debeat servare. | Second on the contrary: The justice of man does not destroy the order of the Church, but rather completes it. But as long as the order remains, obedience of an inferior to a superior precept remains. Therefore, through justice, a man is not absolved who does not keep the fast, and who ought to preserve the other precepts of God's Church. |
| ulterius. videtur quod etiam pueri teneantur ad jejunium. | Sub-article 3: It would seem that even children are bound to keep the fast. |
| joel. 2, 15, dicitur: sanctificate jejunium; et postea sequitur: congregate parvulos, et sugentes ubera. ergo parvuli ad jejunium tenentur. | Objection 1: (For there is) Joel 2:15 "Sanctify a fast" and is followed later by "Gather the children and those that suck at the breast." Therefore, children are bound to keep the fast. |
| praeterea, magis propinquus est praecepto puer quam bestia. sed jonae 2, 7, dicitur: homines et jumenta... non gustent quidquam, nec aquam bibant. ergo multo magis pueri ad jejunium tenentur. | Objection 2: Furthermore, the precept is more related to children than to beasts. But it is said at Jonah 3:7 "Let neither men nor beasts...taste anything...nor drink water." Therefore, all the more are children bound to keep the fast. |
| praeterea, pueri plus possunt jejunare quam (ut videtur) provecti, quia habent plus de humido. sed qui plus habet, magis tenetur. ergo pueri magis tenentur ad jejunium quam provecti. | Objection 3: Furthermore, children are able to fast more (it would seem) than those advanced in years, since the former have more moisture. But he who has more, is more greatly bound. Therefore, children are more greatly held to the fast than those of advanced age. |
| sed contra, praeceptum ecclesiae necessitatem cibi subtrahere non debet. sed pueri indigent frequenti cibo: quia non possunt semel tantum sine laesione alimentum accipere quod eis ad totam diem sufficiat, propter debilitatem naturae. ergo ad jejunium non tenentur. | First on the contrary: The Church's precept ought not to deny the necessity of food. But children frequently are in need of food since they are not able at only one sitting to take the nourishment which would be sufficient to them for the entire day without harm, and this on account of the weakness of their nature. Therefore, they are not bound to keep the fast. |
| praeterea, jejunium est ordinatum ad satisfaciendum, et concupiscentiam comprimendum. sed satisfactio pro peccatis praeteritis non competit pueris; quia innocenti vita degunt, et a puritate pueri dicuntur; similiter nec est in eis concupiscentia impugnans, etsi habitus eis insit, ut augustinus dicit. ergo non tenentur ad jejunium. | Second on the contrary: Fasting is ordained to the making of reparation, and for the restraining of concupiscence. But reparation for sins committed is not appropriate to children since they live the life of innocence, and are called "children" (pueri) from (the word) "purity" (puritas). In a similar fashion, resisting concupiscence is not in them, even if the habitus is in them, as Augustine says. Therefore, they are not bound to keep the fast. |
| ulterius. videtur quod provecti et sani non excusentur a jejunio propter peregrinationem. | Sub-article 4: It would seem that the aged and the healthy are not excused from fasting on account of a pilgrimage. |
| est enim dimittendum illud quod non est necessitatis, ut servetur id quod est necessitatis. sed peregrinatio non est necessitatis. cum ergo jejunium ab ecclesia institutum sit necessitatis, quia cadit sub praecepto; videtur quod non debeat propter peregrinationem aut iter, jejunium intermitti. | Objection 1: For one ought to be released from that which is not of necessity so that that which is necessary may be attended to. But a pilgrimage is not of necessity. Therefore since fasting instituted by the Church is of necessity, and since it falls under precept, it would seem that it ought not to be neglected on account of pilgrimage or journey. |
| praeterea, videtur quod nec ratione paupertatis. quia paupertas de se inducit ad jejunandum. ergo non est causa quare aliquis jejunare non debeat. | Objection 2: Furthermore, it would not seem (to be excused either) by reason of poverty, since poverty in itself induces one to fast. Therefore, it is not the cause why someone ought not to fast. |
| praeterea, videtur quod nec ratione operis alicujus servilis quis a jejunio excusetur. quia lucrum spirituale debet praeponderare lucro corporali. sed hujusmodi opera ad lucrum corporale ordinantur, jejunium autem ad spirituale. ergo non est jejunium propter hujusmodi opera intermittendum. | Objection 3: Furthermore, one would not seem to be excused from fasting by reason of some sort of servile work, since spiritual gain ought to outweigh bodily profit. But work of this kind is ordained to bodily profit, while fasting is ordered to spiritual gain. Therefore, the fast is not to be left aside on account of this kind of work. |
| sed contra, afflictio non est addenda afflicto. sed omnia praedicta habent de se afflictionem. ergo aliquo modo excusantur ab afflictione jejunii. | On the contrary: Affliction is not to be added to affliction. But all of the aforesaid things have of themselves affliction. Therefore, in some way they are excused from the affliction of fasting. |
| respondeo dicendum ad primam quaestionem, quod per praecepta juris positivi, ut dictum est, removentur aliqua quae non sunt de se mala et semper; unde in aliquo casu possunt esse bona et necessaria quae talibus prohibentur praeceptis; et ideo non fuit intentio legislatoris ut semper observaretur praeceptum suum, nisi in illis casibus in quibus bonum virtutis potest conservari. et ideo dicendum ad primam quaestionem de jure naturali et positivo, quod jus positivum a jure naturali procedere dicitur, inquantum per jus positivum modus observandi jus naturale determinatur; quia intentio cujuslibet legislatoris est inducere homines ad virtutes, ut dicitur in 2 ethic., quae pertinent ad jus naturale. modus autem observandi ea quae sunt de lege naturali, non potest esse uniformis in omnibus propter diversitates quae in singularibus contingunt, sicut nec idem modus curationis potest adhiberi omnibus laborantibus eadem aegritudine; et ideo legislator non potest aliquod praeceptum ponere quod non oporteat in casu aliquo praetermitti. tamen considerans quod frequentius accidit, legem ponit, in illis casibus in quibus modus determinatus per legem non competit judicium reservans aliquibus qui hoc habeant definire; et haec est dispensatio praelatis commissa in jejunio ab ecclesia instituto, et in aliis hujusmodi ecclesiae praeceptis. | I respond to the 1st. question (sub-article 1) saying that through the precepts of the positive law (as was said), some things are denied which are not of themselves and always evil. Hence, in some situation they can be good and necessary which sort are prohibited by precepts. Thus, it was not the intention of the legislator that his precept always be observed, except in those situations in which the good of virtue can be preserved. Thus it is to be said to the first question concerning natural and positive law, that the positive law is said to proceed from the natural law insofar as the way of observing the natural law is determined through the postive law, since the intention of any legislator is to lead men to virtue, as is said in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics, which pertains to the natural law. However, the mode of observing these things which are of the natural law cannot be uniform in all situations because of the differences which are found among the particulars, just as the same mode of cure cannot be employed for all of those suffering the same illness. Therefore, the legislator cannot impose a precept which does not allow, in some cases, to be put aside. Nevertheless, considering what occurs for the most part, he determines a law, and in those situations in which the mode determined by law is not appropriate, he reserves judgment to those to whom it belong to determine this; and this is the dispensation that is given out by prelates with respect to the fast instituted by the Church, and with respect to other such precepts. |
| ad primum ergo dicendum, quod praecepta dei sunt de eo quod est de necessitate salutis secundum se; et ideo in quolibet casu observare illa oportet; sed praecepta ecclesiae quamvis vim obligandi habeant ex actu praecipientium, non tamen semper obligant propter materiam in qua proponuntur. | Response to the first objection: The precepts of God are of that which concern the necessity of salvation itself. Thus, in any situation whatsoever it is appropriate to keep (them). But the precepts of the Church, even though they have the force of obligation by reason of the activity of (her) teachers, nevertheless they do not always bind on account of the situation for which they are put forth. |
| ad secundum dicendum, quod secundum utilitatem quae ut frequentius accidit, utiliter hujusmodi praecepta instituta sunt; sed propter necessitatem in aliquo casu emergentem etiam utiliter dimittuntur. | Response to the second objection: Precepts of this sort are usefully instituted according to use which happens for for the most part. But in some situations they are usefully released according to an arising necessity. |
| ad tertium dicendum, quod inferior potest dispensare in praecepto superioris quando dispensatio sibi a superiori relinquitur. | Response to the third objection: The lesser is able to dispense of the precept of the superior when the dispensation that he receives is released by the superior. |
| ad secundam quaestionem dicendum, quod praeceptum a legislatore positum, tunc solum ad observandum non obligat, quando observatio intentionem legislatoris evacuat vel impedit, qua intendit homines inducere ad virtutem, vel bonum statum eorum quibus legem proponit. cum autem justitia profectum jejunii quem legislator intendit, non impediat, sed augeat, quia efficitur magis meritorium ex hoc quod aliquis est justus, non absolvitur a jejuniorum observatione. | I respond to the 2nd question (sub-article 2) saying that the precept set down by the legislator does not bind one to observance only at that time when the observance destroys the intention of the legislator or impedes it, by which he intends to draw men to virtue, or the good condition of those for whom he sets forth the law. For when justice does not hinder but rather increases the progress of the fast, because it (the fast) produces to a greater extent the merit because of which a person is just, then a person is not absolved from observation of fasts. |
| ad primum ergo dicendum, quod libertas quam spiritus dei inducit, est libertas justitiae, quae opponitur servituti peccati, sed conjungitur servituti dei; et ita ad obedientiam mandatorum ejus, et eorum qui vicem dei gerunt in terris obligatur. | Response to the first objection: Freedom which draws one to the spirit of God is the freedom of justice which is opposed to the servitude of sin, but is conjoined to the servitude of God. And so, one is bound to the obedience of His mandates and of those whom bear the duty of God on this earth. |
| ad secundum dicendum, quod duplex est jejunium; luctus, et exultationis; et dicitur jejunium luctus, quod quidem cum amaritudine peccatorum vel praesentis miseriae geritur; jejunium vero exultationis, cum ex spirituali jucunditate a carnalibus se abstrahit; quia gustato spiritu, desipit omnis caro justis. ergo semper habitu spiritualiter sponsus praesens est, sed non est semper actu; immo quandoque est eis praesens ut judex, cum sua peccata recogitant, vel quae fecerunt, vel in quae cadere possunt, nisi carnem cohibeant; et tunc eis competit jejunium moeroris. aliquando autem est eis praesens actu, ut sponsus, quando ejus dulcedine perfruuntur: et tunc competit eis exultationis jejunium, et non maeroris. | Response to the second objection: Fasting is two-fold, namely of mourning and of exultation. The fasting of mourning is so called since it is borne in the bitterness of sins or the presence of miseries. The fasting of exultation (is so called) since it withdraws one from carnal things because of the enjoyment of spiritual matters. For having tasted of the spirit, the (desire for the) flesh is insipid in every way to the just. Therefore, the bridegroom is always present, spiritually in habitus, but not always actually. Sometimes, on the other hand, he is present to them as a judge when they consider their sins which they have committed or into which they can fall, unless they restrain their flesh. And then to these belongs the fasting of mourning. Sometime, however, he is actually present to them, as a bridegroom, when they thoroughly enjoy his sweetness. And then to these belong the fasting of exultation and not of mourning. |
| ad tertium dicendum, quod jejunium non tantum inducitur pro peccatis praeteritis, sed etiam ad praeservandum a futuris; et ideo in his quae non peccaverunt, competit ut medicina praeservans. tamen praesens vita sine peccato omnino agi non potest, quamvis a criminibus aliquis abstineat, ut augustinus in lib. de poenitentia dicit; et ideo sicut omnibus in hac vita existentibus competit poenitentia, ita et jejunium. | Response to the third objection: One is impelled to fasting not only for his past sins, but also to be preserved from future ones. And so, with respect to those who have not sinned, (fasting is) appropriate (to them) as a preserving medicine. Nevertheless, the present life cannot be wholly conducted without sin, although some abstain from offenses, as Augustine says in his book Concerning Penance. And so, just as penance belongs to all abiding in this life, so too does fasting. |
| ad tertiam quaestionem dicendum, quod pueri indigent multo cibo, eo quod cibus in eis non solum exigitur ad actum nutritivae, sed etiam ad actum augmentativae virtutis, quia de residuo nutrimenti fit augmentum. et quia virtus naturae in eis nondum convaluit, non possunt simul multum de cibo assumere, quia naturalis virtus illud convertere non posset; et ideo indigent frequenti cibi sumptione; et propter hoc eis non competit jejunium, dum sunt in augmento. tempus enim augmenti, secundum philosophum, est usque ad finem tertii septennii ut in pluribus, quia res naturales non currunt semper eodem modo, sed ut frequenter; et ideo ante hoc tempus non arctantur pueri ad omnia jejunia ecclesiae servanda. sed quia quanto ad terminum praedictum appropinquant, tanto virtus naturae magis roboratur, et augmentum tardius procedit, cum in primis quinque annis perveniat puer ad medietatem totius augmenti, ut philosophus dicit; ideo secundum quod magis appropinquant ad praedictum terminum, sunt eis jejunia magis commensuranda. | I respond to the 3rd question (sub-article 3) saying that children stand in need of much food in that food is required by them not only for the activity of the nutritive power, but also of the augmentative. For from whatever remains over and above (what is required for) nutrition, an increase of growth arises. And since the natural power has not yet grown strong in them, they are not able to take much of food at one sitting, since the natural power is not able to convert it (into the quantities required for their health and growth). And thus, they stand in need of the frequent taking of food. Because of this, fasting is not appropriate to them while they are in their stage of growth. For the time of growth, according to the Philosopher, is up to the end of their 21st year for many, since natural affairs do not always proceed in the same way, but only for the most part. Thus, before that time, children are not bound to every obligatory fast of the Church. But as they approach the aforesaid limit, so much more is the natural power made stronger, and growth proceeds more slowly, since the child arrives at the mid-point of his entire growth in the first five years, as the Philosopher states. Thus, the more they approach the aforesaid limit, the more are they made suitable to fasting. |
| ad primum ergo dicendum, quod loquitur in casu quando magna tribulatione imminente major afflictio ad placandum deum superaddenda est. | Response to the first objection: (This text) is said of a situation where in great and immanent trouble, a greater affliction is to be taken upon oneself so as to placate God. |
| et similiter dicendum ad secundum. | Response to the second objection: And in a like fashion is the second objection to be answered. |
| ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis pueri plus habeant de humido quam provecti; quia tamen illud est minus inspissatum, citius potest a calore consumi; et ideo frequentiori refectione indigent. | Response to the third objection: Although children have more moisture than the aged, nevertheless, because it is less thickened, it can be more quickly consumed by heat. Thus they stand in need of food more frequently. |
| ad quartam quaestionem dicendum, quod sicut dictum est, intentio legislatoris est conservare homines et inducere ad bonum statum virtutis; qui quidem consistit in conservatione vitae, et valetudine sufficienti ad opera quae quis facere debet; nec tamen suo praecepto exigit ab homine totum quod potest, cum non intendat ordinare statum hominis quantum ad unum diem vel ad parvum tempus, sed ad totam vitam; a quo deficeret, si semel homo totum quod posset, faceret; et ideo sive aegritudine imminente, sive labore viae, sive quocumque alio, cum quo simul et jejunio praedictus status conservari non potest, non tenetur ex praecepto jejunare; sed secundum dispensationem superioris, ut supra dictum est, jejunium solvere potest. | I respond to the 4th. question (sub-article 4) saying that, as has been said, the intention of the legislator is to preserve men and to draw them towards the good condition of virtue. This consists in the preservation of life and in a state of health sufficient for the work which one has to do. Not by any means does he, by his precept, exact from a man the whole of what he is capable. For he does not intend to order a man's condition for one day, or for a short time, but rather for the whole of his life. And he would fail (in his intentions for this man) if (he exacted from him) the performance of the whole of what he is capable. And therefore, during impending illness, the suffering of life, or of any such like thing, one is not bound by the precept to fast, when the aforesaid status (of the preservation of life and a state of health sufficient for one's work) cannot be preserved together with the fast. In accordance with the dispensation from one's superior, as was said previously, the fast can be broken. |
| ad primum ergo dicendum, quod si sit talis peregrinatio quae possit sine incommodo differri, debet peregrinationem differre, si simul cum ea jejunare non potest. si autem peregrinatio commode differri non potest, vel quia tempus jejunii hominem in via praeoccupat, vel quia dies festus alicui imminet, ad quem ex devotione homo pergere cupit, vel quia mora in poenitentia periculum habet vel spirituale vel corporale, potest cum dispensatione sui superioris omnia praedicta pensantis peregrinari, et jejunium solvere. hoc tamen intelligitur de his qui labore itineris adeo affliguntur, quod simul cum jejunio itinerari non possunt. nec obstat quod praeceptum debet praeponi consilio; quia intentio praeceptum hujusmodi dantis non est alias pias et magis necessarias causas excludere. secus autem est de praeceptis legis naturae, quae hoc prohibent quod secundum se et semper malum est. | Response to the first objection: If it is the kind of pilgrimage which can be postponed without inconvenience, one ought to defer the pilgrimage if one is unable to fast at the same time during it. However, if the pilgrimage cannot be deferred conveniently; or because the time of the fast preoccupies man along the way; or because a feast day is close to the pilgrimage which one desires to undertake out of devotion; or because a delay in penance will pose a danger to either spirit or body; in any of these cases, one is able, with a dispensation from one's superiors (who have weighed the matter carefully), to undertake one's pilgrimage and to be released from the fast. This, however, is to be understood of those who are afflicted to such an extent by the labor of the journey which, together with the fasting, they would not be able to undertake. It does not matter that the precept ought to have more weight than a counsel because the intention of the one who has given this kind of precept is not to exclude other pious and more necessary causes. However, it is otherwise concerning the precepts of the natural law which prohibit that which is in itself and always evil. |
| ad secundum dicendum, quod paupertas non semper excusat a jejunio, sed in illo casu quando simul habere non potest tantum hora comestionis quod ad victum totius diei sufficiat, sicut frequenter egenis contingit, qui frustatim eleemosynas quaerunt; vel etiam quando ex praecedenti inedia tantum debilitati sunt quod jejunium sufferre non possunt. | Response to the second objection: Poverty does not always excuse one from fasting, but (only) in that situation where one is not able to have at the hour of taking food what suffices for one's nourishment for the entire day, as frequently happens with the very poor who seek alms in a piecemeal fashion; or (in that situation) where by reason of a previous lack of food, they would be weakened to such an extent that they are not able to endure fasting. |
| ad tertium dicendum, quod de operariis distinguendum videtur: quia si jejunando possunt competenter victum pro persona sua habere, et pro familia cujus cura eis incumbit (sive quia alias divites sunt, sive quia de eo quod minori labore fit, qui secum jejunium compatiatur, lucrari sufficientia possunt), a jejunio non excusantur. si autem alias non possunt tantum laborare quod victum sufficientem acquirant, nisi jejunium frangendo; possunt secundum dispensationem sacerdotis sui jejunium solvere, et laborare. ex quo patet quod intentio majoris lucri non necessarii eos a peccato non excusat, si jejunium frangant: nec iterum illi a peccato immunes sunt qui operarios conducere nolunt nisi tali pacto ut jejunium solvant, nisi forte sit causa necessaria, quae festinationem operis pro quo laboratur, exposcat. | Response to the third objection: It would seem that one ought to make some distinctions concerning works. For if, by fasting, they are able fittingly to have nourishment for their own persons, and for the families whose care is incumbent upon them (or because the others are rich; or they are able to acquire, through less work, that which is agreeable with fasting itself; or they are able to obtain what is sufficient), (in these situations) they are not excused from fasting. If, however, they are not able to work to the point where they acquire sufficient nourishment, except by breaking the fast, they can quit the fast and work in accordance with a dispensation from their priest. From this, it is clear that the intention of the greater benefit does not of necessity excuse them from sin if they break the fast. Nor, again, are those immune from sin who are unwilling to take up their work except by some kind of agreement so that they are released from fasting, unless by chance there is a necessary reason which demands the hastening of work on behalf of which it is endured. |
� Stephen Loughlin
(sjl1@desales.edu)