CONTENTS
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Distinction 1: Why Incarnation? Why the Son? Distinction 2: Why human nature? How assumed? Distinction 3: Sanctification of Mary; conception of Christ Distinction 4: Role of Holy Spirit; Mary mother; grace of Christ Distinction 5: Union of divine and human
| Distinction 16: Why he suffered and died; the Transfiguration Distinction 17: Christ's human and divine wills Distinction 18: Christ's merit Distinction 19: What Christ's suffering freed us from; Mediator Distinction 20: Satisfaction; other ways of redemption? Distinction 21: The death and resurrection of Christ Distinction 22: Death, descent to underworld, ascension Distinction 23: Virtues in general, faith Distinction 24: Objects and merit of faith Distinction 25: Articles of Creed; explicit, implicit faith Distinction 26: Hope Distinction 27: Charity Distinction 28: Whom we must love Distinction 29: Order and grades of love Distinction 30: Love of enemies Distinction 31: Loss of charity; the book of life; charity in next life Distinction 32: God's love Distinction 33: Moral virtues in general; cardinal and adjunct virtues Distinction 34: Gifts of Holy Spirit Distinction 35: Active and contemplative life Distinction 36: The connection of virtues Distinction 37: The ten commandments Distinction 38: Kinds of lying Distinction 39: Perjury Distinction 40: Old and New Law compared |
| Utrum unio sit facta in natura. Ad secundum sic proceditur. | "Whether the Union was Brought about in the Nature?" |
| Videtur quod unio sit facta in natura. Quod enim constat ex duabus naturis, videtur habere unam naturam mediam inter illa, sicut mixtum quod constat ex quatuor elementis. Sed Christus constat ex duabus naturis, secundum Augustinum, qui dicit, quod ex utraque substantia, scilicet divina et humana, est unus Dei et hominis Filius. Ergo videtur habere unam naturam ex utrisque compactam. | 1. It seems that the union was brought about in the nature. For what consists of two natures seems to have one nature in the middle between them, as a mixed thing which consists of the four elements. But Christ consists of two natures according to Augustine (Enchir. 35) who says, that from each substance, namely divine and human, there is one Son of God and of man. Therefore, he seems to have one nature composed from both. |
| Praeterea, natura, secundum quod hic loquimur, est unumquodque informans specifica differentia, ut dicit Boetius in lib. de duabus naturis. Sed Philosophus dicit, quod semper una differentia addita mutat speciem, sicut in numeris quaelibet unitas addita facit novam speciem numeri. Ergo humana natura addita divinae facit novam naturam secundum speciem. | 2. Further, nature, in the sense we are speaking of here, is the specific difference informing each and every thing, as Boethius says in the book Concerning the Two Natures. But the Philosopher says (Metaphysics 8, 10) that one added difference always changes the species, as in numbers any added unity makes a new species of number. Therefore, human nature added to the divine nature makes a new nature according to species. |
| Si dicatur, quod non potest una natura constitui ex duabus, quia oportet utramque naturam servari in Incarnatione; contra. Anima et corpus constituunt humanam naturam. Utrumque tamen, scilicet corpus et anima, intransmutatum permanet in sua natura. Ergo ex duabus naturis potest tertia constitui, utraque remanente salva. | 3. If it is said that one nature cannot be constituted from two because it is necessary that each nature be preserved in the Incarnation, then one may reply as follows. A soul and body constitute a human nature. Yet, each, namely soul and body, remains unchanged in its own nature. Therefore a third nature can be constituted from two natures, while each of the two is preserved. |
| Praeterea, proprietas sequitur naturam eius cuius est proprietas. Sed proprietates divinae naturae dicuntur de illo homine: dicitur enim, quod ille homo creavit stellas; et e converso dicitur, quod Filius Dei est passus. Ergo videtur quod aliquid divinae naturae est in humana natura, et aliquid humanae sit in divina; et sic videtur esse facta quaedam coniunctio naturarum in unam naturam. | 4. A property follows the nature of that whose property it is. But, the properties of the divine nature are attributed to that man. For, it is said that that man created the stars and conversely, it is said that the Son of God suffered. Therefore, it seems that something of the divine nature is in the human nature, and that something of the human is in the divine; and so there seems to be a certain joining of natures in one nature. |
| Praeterea, quando aliqua duo coniunguntur quorum unum multum superat alterum, hoc quod superatur transit in naturam superantis, sicut si gutta vini in mille amphoras proiiciatur aquae. Sed natura divina in infinitum superat humanam. Ergo humana natura coniuncta divinae, tota convertitur in divinam. | 5. Further, when any two things are joined, one of which goes beyond the other, the one which is exceeded changes into the nature of the one which exceeds, just as if a drop of wine were thrown into a thousand vessels of water. But the divine nature infinitely exceeds the human nature. Therefore, [when] the human nature is joined to the divine, the whole is changed into the divine. |
| Praeterea, hoc videtur per hoc quod caro Christi dicitur deificata a sanctis, sicut Damascenus narrat. | 6. Besides, this [natural union] seems to be the case because the flesh of Christ is called deified by the saints as Damascene reports (5,11). |
| Sed contra, filiatio requirit similitudinem in natura. Sed Christus dicitur Filius Dei Patris et Virginis matris. Ergo est similis in natura utrique. Sed Virgo et Deus Pater non communicant in aliqua natura. Ergo oportet Christum ponere duarum naturarum. | To the contrary, filiation requires a similarity in nature. But Christ is called the Son of God the Father and of the Virgin mother. Therefore, he is similar in nature to both. But the Virgin and God the Father do not share in any nature. Therefore, it is necessary to posit a Christ of two natures. |
| Praeterea, per proprietates naturales in cognitionem naturae devenimus. Sed in Christo invenimus proprietates duarum naturarum, ut humanae et divinae. Ergo oportet Christum duarum naturarum ponere. | Further, we arrive at an understanding of a nature through natural properties. But in Christ we find the properties of two natures, that of human nature and that of divine nature. Therefore, it is necessary to posit a Christ of two natures. |
| Respondeo dicendum, quod ad huius quaestionis evidentiam oportet scire, quid nomen naturae significet. Natura autem a nascendo nomen accepit; quae proprie dicitur generatio viventium ex similibus similia in specie producentium; unde secundum primam sui institutionem natura significat generationem ipsam viventium, scilicet nativitatem. Item translatum est nomen naturae ad significandum principium activum illius generationis: quia virtutes agentes ex actibus nominari consueverunt. Inde ulterius procedit nomen naturae ad significandum principium activum cuiuslibet motus naturalis: et ulterius ad significandum etiam principium materiale cuiuslibet generationis: et inde etiam ad significandum principium formale, quod est terminus generationis. Sed quia non solum generatio terminatur ad formam, sed ad substantiam compositam; ideo translatum est ad significandum quamlibet substantiam, secundum quod dicit Philosophus in 5 metaph., et ad significandum etiam quodlibet ens, sicut dicit Boetius. | Solution: I answer that for a clear understanding of this question it is necessary to know what the name "nature" signifies. But, "nature" takes its name from being born (nascendo) and this is properly called the generation of living things producing things similar in species from similar things. Hence, according to the first institution [of the word] nature signifies the generation itself of living things, namely, nativity. Further, the name "nature" was transferred to signifying the active principle of that generation: because the agent powers are accustomed to be named from [their] acts. From this the name "nature" came to be used to signify the active principle of any natural motion: and further to signifying even the material principle of any generation: and from that to also signifying the formal principle, which is the terminus of generation. But because generation is not terminated merely at form, but at a composite substance, [the word nature] was thus transferred to signifying any substance, according to what the Philosopher says in 5 Metaphys. (text 5), and also for signifying any being (ens) as well, as Boethius says. |
| Substantia autem, praeter significationes quibus forma vel materia dicitur substantia, dicitur duobus modis, secundum Philosophum 5 metaph. Uno modo subiectum ipsum quod dicitur hoc aliquid, et de altero non praedicatur, ut hic homo, secundum quod substantia significatur nomine hypostasis; et secundum hanc significationem substantia dicitur natura secundum quod natura est quod agere vel pati potest, ut dicit Boetius in praedicto libro. Alio modo dicitur substantia quod quid erat esse, idest quidditas et essentia, quam significat definitio cuiuslibet rei, prout significatur nomine usiae; et sic etiam substantia dicitur natura, secundum quod Boetius dicit, quod natura est unumquodque informans specifica differentia: quia ultima differentia est quae definitionem complet. | However, "substance", besides the significations by which form or matter are called substance, is used in two ways according to the Philosopher. In one way, substance is used of the subject itself which is called a "this something" and is not predicated of another, e.g. this man, insofar as a substance is signified by the name hypostasis; and according to this signification a substance is called a nature insofar as nature is what can act and be acted upon, as Boethius says in the aforementioned book. In another way substance is used of "that which it was to be", that is the quiddity and essence which the definition of anything signifies. This is the sense of substance signified by the name " ousia "; and so a substance is also called a nature, in accordance with what Boethius says, that "nature is the specific difference informing each and every thing"; since the ultimate difference is what completes the definition. |
| Relictis ergo omnibus aliis significationibus naturae, secundum hanc tantum significationem quaeritur, utrum in Christo sit una natura vel plures. Si autem sit una tantum, vel altera earum tantum, vel composita ex utrisque. Si altera earum tantum, hoc erit dupliciter. Uno modo nulla adiunctione interveniente unius ad alteram; et sic si sit divina tantum, nihil novum accidit in hoc quod Verbum caro factum est, et incarnatio nihil est. Si vero sit humana tantum, non differt Christus ab aliis hominibus, et perit incarnatio. Alio modo altera naturarum transeunte in alteram; quod non potest esse: quia quae non communicant in materia, non possunt in invicem transire; divina autem natura penitus est immaterialis, nedum ut communicet humanae in materia. Praeterea si divina natura transiret in humanam, tolleretur simplicitas et immutabilitas divinae naturae; si vero humana verteretur in divinam, tolleretur veritas passionis, et omnium quae corporaliter operatus est Christus. | Leaving aside all other significations of nature, we ask, according to this signification alone, whether there is one nature in Christ or many. But, if there were only one [nature], then [there would be] either one of these [natures] alone or a nature composed from both. If one of these alone, this would come about in two ways. In one way, with no joining of one nature to another intervening; and thus if there were only the divine nature, nothing new would happen in this, that the Word was made flesh, and the incarnation is nothing. But, if it were only the human nature, Christ would not differ from other men, and the incarnation perishes. In the second way, one of the natures passes over into the other; which cannot be: since those things which do not share in matter are not able to pass over into one another. But, the divine nature is entirely immaterial, still less does it share a human nature in matter. Further, if the divine nature passed over into the human nature, the simplicity and immutability of the divine nature would be destroyed; but, if the human were changed into the divine, the truth of the passion and of everything which Christ did corporeally would be destroyed. |
| Si autem esset una natura composita ex duabus, hoc posset esse dupliciter. Uno modo quia tertia natura componeretur ex duabus naturis non manentibus, sicut ex quatuor elementis componitur mixtum; et secundum hoc poneretur divina natura passibilis et materialis, quia mixtio non est nisi eorum quae communicant in materia, et nata sunt agere et pati ad invicem; et tolleretur fides confitens Christum esse verum Deum et verum hominem. Alio modo quod componeretur ex duabus naturis manentibus: et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo secundum commensurationem vel continuationis vel contiguationis; et secundum hoc poneretur divina natura corporea: quia continuatio et contactus corporum est. Alio modo secundum informationem, sicut ex anima et corpore fit unum; et hoc etiam non potest esse: quia per modum istum non fit unum ex duobus actibus nec ex duabus potentiis, sed ex actu et potentia, secundum Philosophum: divina autem natura et humana, utraque est ens actu. Praeterea divina natura non habet aliquid potentialitatis, nec potest esse actus veniens in compositionem alicuius, cum sit esse primum infinitum per se subsistens. Patet igitur quod quocumque modo ponatur una natura in Christo, sequitur error: et ideo Eutyches, qui hoc posuit, ut haereticus condemnatus est. | However, if one nature were composed from two, this could be in two ways. In one way, some third nature would be composed from two natures which do not remain, as a mixed thing is composed from the four elements; and according to this a passible and material divine nature would be posited, because there is no mixture except of those things which share in matter, and which they are fitted to act upon one another and to be acted upon; and the faith confessing Christ to be true God and true man would be destroyed. In another way, something is composed from two natures which remain; and this in two ways. In one way according to commensuration, either of succession or of contiguity; and according to this a corporeal divine nature would be posited: because succession and contact belong to bodily things. In another way, according to formation, as one thing comes out of a body and a soul, and this also cannot be, because through that way one thing does not come to be from two acts or two potencies, but from act and potency, according to the Philosopher, (De Anima, 2,2): but, the divine nature and the human nature are each a being in act. Moreover, the divine nature does not have any potentiality, nor can it be an act joining into the composition of another, since it is the first infinite being subsisting through itself. Therefore, it is obvious that in whatever way one nature is posited in Christ an error follows. Thus, Eutyches, who posited this, was condemned as a heretic. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliquid constat ex duabus naturis, non tamen ex duabus sicut mixtum ex elementis: quia et in talibus oportet quod sit media natura constituta ex duabus non manentibus. Christus autem constat ex duabus naturis ita quod in duabus naturis salvatis subsistit: est enim naturae divinae et humanae: et ideo ratio non sequitur. | Resp. 1: Something consists of two natures, yet it is not from two natures as a mixed thing is from elements: because in such things it is necessary that there be a middle nature constituted from two which do not remain. But, Christ consists of two natures in such a way that he subsists in two remaining natures. For he is of human and divine nature. Therefore, the argument does not follow. |
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Avicenna, differentia nominat totam naturam speciei; alias non praedicaretur de specie; sed non nominat ex toto, sed ex parte, scilicet formali principio: dicitur enim rationale habens rationem. Genus autem e converso nominat totum ex principio materiali. Unde differentia non additur differentiae per hoc quod natura additur naturae, sed per hoc quod ulterius principium formale additur, sicut intellectivum supra sensitivum. Talis autem additio non est in Christo: non enim una natura additur alteri sicut formalis respectu illius, ut dictum est. | Resp. 2: As Avicenna says the difference names the whole nature of the species; otherwise, it would not be predicated of the species; but it does not name from the whole, but from the part, namely, from the formal principle. For example, something is called rational as having reason. But conversely, the genus names the whole from the material principle. Hence the difference is not added to a difference through this, that the nature is added to a nature, but through this, that a further formal principle is added, as the intellective principle is added above the sensitive principle. But, there is not such an addition in Christ; for one nature is not added to another as if it were the formal principle of that thing, as was said. |
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod anima et corpus secundum quod sunt partes hominis, proprie loquendo, non sunt duae naturae, prout in proposito de natura loquimur; sed utrumque est pars naturae, alterum sicut forma, alterum autem sicut materia; unde non est instantia. | Resp. 3: The soul and the body, insofar as they are parts of a man, are not, properly speaking, two natures, as we are speaking of nature in the matter under discussion; but each is part of a nature, the one as a form, the other as matter; hence there is no objection. |
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod proprietates humanae naturae nunquam dicuntur de divina, nec e converso, nisi secundum quamdam participationem; sed dicuntur utraeque de habente naturam, vel humanam vel divinam, quae significatur hoc nomine deus, et hoc nomine homo: idem enim est qui utrasque naturas habet. | Resp. 4: Properties of the human nature are never said about the divine nature, nor conversely, except according to a certain participation. But, [the properties of] both [natures] are said of the thing which has a human or a divine [nature], which is signified both by the name "God" and by the name "man", for it is the same thing which has both natures. |
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod ratio ista procedit in illis quae communicant in materia, et agunt et patiuntur ad invicem: et ideo non est ad propositum. | Resp. 5: That argument holds good in those things which share in matter, those which both act upon one another and are acted upon, and thus it is not to the point. |
| Ad sextum dicendum, quod caro dicitur deificata, non quia sit facta ipsa Divinitas, sed quia facta est Dei caro, et etiam quia abundantius dona Divinitatis participat ex hoc quod est unita Divinitati, et quia est quasi instrumentum per quod divina virtus salutem nostram operatur: tangendo enim leprosum carne sanavit per Divinitatis virtutem, et moriendo carne mortem vicit per virtutem Divinitatis. Virtus autem agentis aliquo modo est in instrumento, quo mediante aliquid agit. | Resp. 6: The flesh is called deified not because it was made the Godhead, but because it was made the flesh of God, and also because it shares more abundantly the gifts of the Godhead from the fact that it was united to the Godhead, and because it is like an instrument through which the divine power accomplishes our salvation: for by touching the leper in the flesh he healed by the power of the Godhead, and by dying in the flesh he conquered death through the power of the Godhead. Now, the power of an agent is in some way in the instrument, by which means the agent does something. |
| Utrum unio sit facta in persona, et si Christus est una persona. Ad tertium sic proceditur. | "Whether the union was brought about in the person, and if Christ is one person?" |
| Videtur quod in Christo non sit una tantum persona, et sic non sit unio facta in persona. Nulla enim natura invenitur sine illis quae per se consequuntur ad naturam illam. Sed personalitas per se consequitur naturam humanam, et similiter divinam. Ergo utraque natura tenet suam personalitatem. | 1. It would seem that there is not only one person in Christ and, thus, the union was not brought about in the person. For no nature is found without those things which result from that nature per se. But, personality results from the human nature per se, and likewise as regards the divine nature. Therefore, each nature has its own personality. |
| Praeterea, natura humana est dignior in Christo quam in Petro. Sed personalitas ad dignitatem pertinet: unde in substantiis ignobilibus non invenitur persona. Ergo sicut humanitas Petri habet suam personalitatem, ita et humanitas Christi. | 2. Further, the human nature is of a greater dignity in Christ than in Peter. But, personality pertains to dignity. Hence, a person is not found in inferior substances. Therefore, just as the humanity of Peter has its own personality, so too does the humanity of Christ. |
| Praeterea, in persona non videtur aliquid esse nisi natura, et distinguentia suppositum naturae ab aliis suppositis. Sed naturae in Christo sunt diversae, et distinctiva diversa, quia per relationes aeternas distinguitur a Patre et Spiritu Sancto; per divisionem autem materiae et accidentium distinguitur ab aliis hominibus. Ergo est ibi duplex personalitas. | 3. Further, nothing seems to be in a person except a nature and the things distinguishing the suppositum of the nature from other supposita. But, the natures in Christ are different, and [each nature] is distinctively diverse, because he is distinguished from the Father and the Holy Spirit through eternal relations. Now, he is distinguished from other men by the division of matter and of accidents. Therefore, there is a two-fold personality there. |
| Praeterea, maior est convenientia in persona quam in genere vel specie: quia illa est in aliquo quod secundum rem unum est, hoc autem est secundum rationem unum. Sed propter maximam distantiam naturae divinae et humanae non potest esse earum convenientia in genere vel in specie. Ergo multo minus possunt convenire in una persona. | 4. Further, there is a greater agreement in a person than in a genus or species, because agreement in a person is in something which is one thing in reality, but agreement in a genus or species is one thing according to reason. But, on account of the great distance [between] the human and divine natures there cannot be an agreement of them in a genus or species. Much less, then, can they agree in one person. |
| Praeterea, Philosophus dicit in 5 metaph., quod ad diversitatem in genere sequitur diversitas in specie, et ad hanc diversitas secundum numerum. Sed in Christo invenitur diversitas secundum speciem: quia sunt diversae naturae secundum illam acceptionem qua natura dicitur unumquodque informans specifica differentia. Ergo etiam secundum numerum differentia invenitur. Sed ubi est eadem persona, est idem secundum numerum. Ergo in Christo non est una persona. | 5. Further, the Philosopher says in 5 Metaphys. (l. 16), that diversity in a species follows on diversity in the genus and on this follows diversity according to number. But diversity according to species is found in Christ: because there are different natures [in him], according to that sense by which a nature is called the specific difference informing each and every thing. Therefore, a difference is also found according to number. But, where the person is the same, the thing is the same according to number. Therefore, there is not only one person in Christ. |
| Praeterea, non est minor affinitas naturae ad personam quam formae ad materiam. Sed secundum diversitatem formarum est diversitas materiae: quia proprius actus fit in propria materia. Ergo secundum diversitatem naturarum est etiam diversitas in persona; et sic idem quod prius. | 6. Further, there is no less an affinity between nature and person than between form and matter. But there is a difference of matter according to the difference of forms, because one's own act happens in one's own matter. Therefore, according to the diversity of natures there is also a diversity of persons; and thus the same conclusion as in the first objection follows. |
| Sed contra, ea quae secundum personam differunt et naturam, quod dicitur de uno, non dicitur de altero. Sed ea quae sunt Dei, in Scripturis attribuuntur homini: Psalmus 86, 5: homo natus est in ea, et ipse fundavit eam Altissimus; et quae sunt hominis, attribuuntur Deo; 1 Corinth., 2, 8: nunquam Dominum gloriae crucifixissent. Ergo Deus et homo conveniunt in persona. | To the contrary, in those things which differ according to person and nature, what is said of one, is not said of the other. But things which are God's are attributed to man in the Scriptures: Ps. 86:5, Man was born in her, and the Most High established her; and those things which are man's are attributed to God; 1 Cor., 2:8: "They never would have crucified the Lord of glory". Therefore, God and man belong to [the same] person. |
| Praeterea, quod attribuitur Filio et non Patri, convenit ei secundum id in quo a Patre distinguitur. Sed unio passive accepta convenit Filio, et non Patri. Ergo convenit ei secundum id in quo a Patre distinguitur. Sed hoc est in persona. Ergo unio facta est in persona. | Further, what is attributed to the Son and not to the Father belongs to him according to that in which he is distinguished from the Father. But passively receiving the union belongs to the Son and not to the Father. Therefore, it belongs to him according to the thing which distinguishes him from the Father. But, this [distinguishing feature] is in the person, therefore, the union was brought about in the person. |
| Praeterea, ad hoc quod fiat redemptio humani generis, oportet quod sit agens satisfactionem unus Deus qui potest, et homo qui debet, ut patet ex dictis in 1 dist., quaest. 1, art. 2. Sed nullo modo duae personae possunt esse unum agens. Ergo si sunt duae personae, nondum facta est satisfactio; et ita adhuc sumus in servitute peccati, quod est contra sacram Scripturam Novi Testamenti. | Further, for the redemption of mankind, it is necessary that there be one agent who is God, capable [of making] satisfaction, and who is a man, owing satisfaction, as is obvious from the things said in 1 d., q. 1, a. 2. But two persons cannot be one agent in any way. Therefore, if there are two persons, satisfaction would not yet be accomplished; and thus we are still in slavery to sin, which is contrary to the sacred Scripture of the New Testament. |
| Respondeo dicendum, quod Nestorius, qui ponit duas in Christo personas, ex hoc deceptus fuit, ut dicit Boetius, quia credidit idem esse personam et naturam; unde credidit, cum sint duae naturae in Christo, quod sint duae personae: et ex eodem fonte processit error Eutychetis, qui cum audivit unam personam in Christo, aestimavit unam naturam: et ex eodem fonte contra trinitatem processit error Arii et Sabellii. Sciendum est ergo, quod in quibusdam differunt natura et persona secundum rem, in quibusdam vero secundum rationem tantum. | I answer that, Nestorius, who posited two persons in Christ, was deceived from this, as Boethius says, because he believed that person and nature are the same thing; hence, he believed that since there are two natures in Christ, there are two persons. And the error of Eutyches, who, since he heard that there was one person in Christ, judged that there was one nature, proceeded from the same source. And the error of Arius and Sabellius, against the Trinity, also proceeded from the same source. Therefore, it is necessary to know how person and nature differ in reality, and in which ways they differ only according to our idea (ratio) of them. |
| Natura enim, secundum quod hic loquimur, est quidditas rei quam signat sua definitio; persona autem est hoc aliquid quod subsistit in natura illa. In simplicibus autem quae carent materia, ut dicit Avicenna, ipsum simplex est sua quidditas; quidditas vero compositi non est ipsum compositum: humanitas enim non est homo. Cuius ratio est, quia in significatione humanitatis, sive quidditatis, sive naturae, continentur tantum essentialia principia hominis, secundum quod homo est; non autem ea quae pertinent ad determinationem materiae, per quam natura individuatur, quae tantum continentur in significatione Socratis, quia per ea Socrates est hic, et divisus ab aliis: et ideo, quia humanitas non includit in sua significatione totum quod est in re subsistente in natura, cum sit quasi pars, non praedicatur: et quia non subsistit nisi quod est compositum, et pars habetur a suo toto, ideo anima non subsistit, sed Socrates, et ipse est habens humanitatem. | For nature, as we speak here, is the quiddity of a thing which its definition signifies; but, a person is that something which subsists in that nature. Now in simple things, which lack matter, as Avicenna says, the simple thing is its own quiddity. But the quiddity of a composite thing is not the composite: for humanity is not a man. The reason for this is that only the essential principles of a man, according to which he is a man, are contained in the signification of humanity, whether of the quiddity, or of the nature, but not those things which pertain to the determination of matter, through which a nature is individuated, [for] these are only contained in the signification of Socrates because through them Socrates is a "this", and is distinguished from other things. And thus, because humanity does not include in its own signification the whole that is in a thing subsisting in a nature, for it is as it were a part, [hence,] it is not predicated, and since nothing subsists unless it is a composite, and a part belongs to its whole, so, the soul does not subsist, but Socrates subsists, and he has humanity [i.e. he is the whole to which the parts belong]. |
| Homo autem significat utrumque, et essentialia, et individuantia, sed diversimode: quia significat essentialia determinate, individuantia vero indeterminate haec vel illa: et ideo homo, cum sit totum, potest praedicari de Socrate, et dicitur habens humanitatem; sed quia esse indistinctum est incompletum, quasi ens in potentia, ideo homo non subsistit, sed hic homo, cui convenit ratio personae. Est ergo ratio personae quod sit subsistens distinctum et omnia comprehendens quae in re sunt; natura autem essentialia tantum comprehendit. In simplicibus autem non differt re natura et persona: quia natura non recipitur in aliqua materia per quam individuetur, sed est per se subsistens: tamen inquantum considerantur essentialia rei, sic dicimus ibi naturam; inquantum autem invenitur ibi aliquid subsistens, sic dicimus ibi personam. Patet igitur quod ex quo de ratione personae est quod comprehendit omnia quae in re sunt, si aliquid est extra illud quod comprehendit persona, hoc non est unitum rei, nisi forte secundum similitudinem in genere vel in specie vel accidente: et ideo, ut Boetius dicit, si non est una persona in Christo, nulla unio facta est divinitatis et humanitatis, nisi secundum similitudinem gratiae; quod etiam Nestorius posuit: et hoc non est novum, nec Christo proprium; neque per eum redemptio fieri potuisset, nec ipse esset verus Deus, sed per participationem, sicut alii sancti. Unde simpliciter est concedendum, in Christo esse unam personam. | Now, "man" signifies both the individual and the essential principles, but in diverse ways, because it signifies the essential principles determinately, but the individual ones indeterminately [as] these or those [i.e. the principles]. And thus, man, since it is a whole, can be predicated of Socrates, and he is said to have humanity; but, because an undetermined being is incomplete, as if [it were] a being in potency, thus man does not subsist, but this man, to whom the character of a person belongs. Therefore, it is the character of a person to be a distinct subsisting thing, embracing all things which are in reality. But, nature only includes the essential principles. But in simple things nature and person do not differ in reality; because nature [in these things] is not received in some matter which individuates it, but it [i.e. the nature] is subsisting through itself. Yet, insofar as the essential principles of a thing are considered, we use the term nature there; but, insofar as something subsisting is found there, we use the term person. Therefore, it is evident from the fact that the character of a person includes all things that exist in reality, if something is outside of that which person includes, this is not a united thing, unless perhaps according to a similarity in the genus or in species or in an accident. And thus, Boethius says, if there is not one person in Christ no union of the divinity and the humanity took place, except according to some similitude of grace; which even Nestorius posited. And this is not new nor unique to Christ; neither could the redemption take place this way, nor would he be true God, but only through participation, just as the other saints. Hence it must be conceded simply that there is one person in Christ. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod humana natura in Christo non est sine personalitate, sed est in persona una Verbi cum natura divina. | Resp. 1: The human nature in Christ is not without personality, but it is in the one person of the Word with the divine nature. |
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex hoc natura Christi maxime nobilis est quod est in persona divina. | Resp. 2: Christ's human nature is most noble from the fact that it is in the divine person. |
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod de ratione personae est quod comprehendat omnia essentialia, et proprietates individuantes simul coniunctorum; unde non sequitur quod si sint duae naturae et diversae proprietates, sint diversae personae. Si enim essent naturae cum suis proprietatibus seorsum positae, utrinque esset totalitas, quam requirit ratio personae, non est autem nisi una totalitas, quando coniunguntur; et ideo est una persona. | Resp. 3: The character of a person includes all the essentials and the individuating properties of the conjoined things at the same time. Hence, it does not follow that if there were two natures and diverse properties, there would be two persons. For if the natures were posited separately with their own properties, each would be a totality, which requires the character of a person, but there is only one totality when they are joined; and thus there is one person. |
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod ea quae differunt genere vel specie, differunt numero essentiae vel naturae; non autem oportet quod differant numero suppositi vel subiecti: quia ea quae secundum se considerata diversorum sunt generum vel specierum, in unum suppositum vel subiectum congregari possunt; sicut caro et os ad constituendum corpus, et albedo et longitudo in eodem subiecto sunt; et similiter quamvis divina natura et humana differant plus quam specie vel genere, in unam tamen personam uniri possunt. | Resp. 4: Those things which differ in genus or species differ in the number of the essences or natures. But it is not necessary that they differ in the number of the supposita or subjects: because those things which are considered to be of different genera or species according to themselves can be gathered together into one suppositum or subject; just as flesh and bone are for constituting a body, and whiteness and length are in the same subject, and likewise, although the divine and human natures differ more than a genus or species do, yet they can be united into one person. |
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Boetius, species est totum esse individuorum, et etiam genus aliquo modo, ut dicit Avicenna, secundum quod indistincte significat totum: et quia natura humana non comprehendit totum esse Christi, ideo non habet in Christo naturam speciei; et ideo non sequitur quod in Christo sint diversae species. Vel dicendum, quod illud Philosophi est intelligendum quando naturae diversorum generum non coniunguntur: accidens enim et subiectum, quia coniunguntur (quamvis sint diversa genere), non faciunt numerum. | Resp. 5: As Boethius says, (book 3 On Porphyr. chapter concerning species), the species is the entire being of individual things, and so too is the genus in some way, as Avicenna says, insofar as it indistinctly signifies a whole. And because the human nature does not embrace the whole being of Christ, thus, it does not posses the nature of a species in Christ; and thus it does not follow that there are diverse species in Christ. One can saythat this [teaching] of the Philosopher must be understood [to refer to] the case when natures of different genera are not joined. For an accident and a subject (although they are in a different genus) do not make a difference of number because they are joined. |
| Ad sextum dicendum, quod forma adunatur materiae informando eam; et ideo oportet quod ad diversas formas diversae sint materiae dispositae; sed ad rationem personae requiritur tantum adunatio, quae potest esse etiam quantumcumque diversorum; et ideo non oportet quod diversae naturae habeant diversas personas. | Resp. 6: Form unites to matter by informing it; and thus it is necessary that different material things be disposed to different forms. But, the charachter of a person needs only the sort of unity which can come about between very different things. Thus, it is not necessary that different natures have different persons. |
| Utrum Christus sit duo neutraliter. | Whether Christ is two in the neuter. |
| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur, quod Christus sit duo neutraliter. Isidorus enim dicit in lib. de Trinit.: Mediator Dei et hominum, homo Iesus Christus, quamvis aliud sit de Patre, aliud de Virgine, non tamen alius. Sed ubicumque est aliud et aliud, ibi sunt duo. Ergo Christus est duo. | Obj. 1:It seems that Christ is two in the neuter. For Isidore says in the book on the Trinity(1): The Mediator of God and men, the man Jesus Christ, although he is other than the Father, and other than the Virgin, yet he is not other (alius). But, wherever there is one thing and another, there are two things. Therefore, Christ is two. |
| Praeterea, Christus est unum unitate increata, et est unum unitate creata. Unitas autem creata non est unitas increata. Ergo Christus est duo. | Obj. 2:Further, Christ is one thing by an uncreated unity and he is one thing by a created unity. But a created unity is not an uncreated unity. Therefore Christ is two. |
| Praeterea, sicut in trinitate sunt tres personae in una essentia; ita in Christo sunt duae naturae in una persona. sed propter unitatem naturae dicuntur Pater et Filius unum, quamvis non unus. Ergo et propter unitatem personae Christus debet dici unus, et non unum, sed duo propter dualitatem naturarum. | Obj. 3:Further, just as there are three persons in one essence in the Trinity; so too there are two natures in one person in Christ. But on account of the unity of nature, the Father and the Son are called one thing (unum), although [they are] not [called] one (unus). Therefore on account of the personal unity Christ ought to be called one, and also not one thing, but two things because of the duality of natures. |
| Praeterea, Christus secundum quod est Deus, est aliquid quod est Pater; et secundum quod est homo, est aliquid quod est mater. Sed hoc quod est Pater, non est hoc quod est mater. Ergo Christus est aliquid et aliquid; et ita est duo. | Obj. 4:Further, Christ insofar as he is God, is something which is the Father; and insofar as he is a man, he is something which is the mother. But the Father is not the mother. Therefore, Christ is something and something; and thus he is two. |
| Praeterea, Christus est aliquid passibile et aliquid impassibile. Sed passibile non est impassibile. Ergo Christus est aliquid et aliquid. Ergo non est unum. | Obj. 5:Further, Christ is something passible and something impassible. But a passible thing is not an impassible thing. Therefore Christ is something and something. Therefore, Christ is not one thing. |
| Praeterea, secundum Damascenum, Christus totus est ubique, non tamen totum. Sed est ubique secundum quod est Deus. Ergo Christus non est totum Deus. Sed ex hoc quod est Deus, est aliquid. Ergo est aliquid et aliquid; et sic idem quod prius. | Obj. 6:Further, according to Damascene (De Fide 3,7), the whole (totus) Christ is everywhere, but not the whole thing (totum). But, he is everywhere inasmuch as he is God. Therefore, Christ is not the whole God. But from the fact that he is God, he is something. Therefore he is something and something; and thus the previous objection follows. |
| Praeterea, Christus non est tantum homo. Sed homo praedicat aliquid unum de ipso. Ergo Christus non est tantum unum aliquid: ergo est duo. | Obj. 7:Further, Christ is not only a man. But "man" predicates some one thing of him. Therefore, Christ is not only something one, therefore he is two. |
| Sed contra, quidquid est, ideo est, quia unum numero est. Si ergo Christus non est unum, nihilest; quod falsum est. | To the Contrary, whatever is, is thus, because it is one in number. Therefore, if Christ is not one thing, he is nothing, which is false. |
| Praeterea, maior est convenientia naturae humanae in Christo ad naturam divinam, quam accidentis ad subiectum. Sed accidens cum subiecto non facit numerum. Ergo nec ratione naturae humanae et divinae dicetur Christus esse duo. | Further, the human nature in Christ is more harmonious with the divine nature than an accident is with a subject. But an accident with a subject does not produce something numbered. Therefore, neither may we call Christ two by reason of the human and divine nature. |
| Praeterea, ea quae non sunt unum, non possunt de se invicem praedicari. Sed Deus praedicatur de homine Christo, et e converso. Ergo Christus est unum. | Further, those things which are not one thing cannot be predicated of each other. But we predicate God of the man Christ, and conversely. Therefore Christ is one thing. |
| Respondeo dicendum, quod neutrum genus est informe et indistinctum; masculinum vero est formatum et determinatum; unde masculinum non praedicatur absolute nisi de re perfecta subsistente; neutrum vero genus de re perfecta subsistente, et de non perfecta; unde non potest dici, quod albedo vel humanitas Petri est aliquis, sed quod est aliquid; de Petro autem possumus dicere, quod est aliquis, et quod est aliquid. Similiter in Christo de persona potest dici est aliquis, et est aliquid: de natura autem quod est aliquid, et non quod est aliquis. Secundum igitur secundam opinionem, de qua agitur, illud aliquid quod est natura assumpta, non praedicatur de Christo: quia non habet rationem hominis, sed humanitatis. Aliquid ergo, secundum quod praedicatur de Christo, non significat tantum naturam, sed suppositum naturae: et quia plurale est geminatum singulare, ideo Christus non posset dici aliqua, nisi essent in eo duo supposita naturarum; quod negat secunda opinio, et similiter tertia; et ideo utraque opinio dicit, quod Christus est unum; sed secunda dicit, quod est unum per se; tertia vero, quod est unum per accidens, sicut albus homo. Sed prima opinio dicit, quod assumptum non tantum habet rationem humanitatis, sed etiam hominis; et tamen non potest dici aliquis, quia est alteri digniori adiunctum, sed dicitur aliquid, et illud aliquid praedicatur de persona assumente; et ideo sequitur quod Christus sit aliquis, scilicet assumens, et aliquod, scilicet assumptum; et quod sit duo neutraliter, sed non masculine. | I answer that the neuter genus is unformed and indistinct; but the masculine is formed and determinate; hence the masculine is not predicated absolutely except of a complete (perfecta) subsisting thing; but the neuter genus is predicated absolutely of either a complete or incomplete subsisting thing. Hence we cannot say that the whiteness or humanity of Peter is someone, but we can say that it is something. Now we can say that Peter is someone, and that he is something. Likewise, we can say of the person in Christ "it is someone" and "it is something", but of the nature we can say that it is something and not that it is someone. Therefore, according to the second opinion, of which we are treating, the "something" which is the assumed nature is not predicated of Christ: because it does not have the character of a man, but of humanity. Therefore, "something" insofar as it is predicated of Christ does not signify merely the nature, but the suppositum of the nature: and since the plural is the singular doubled, thus Christ could not be called some things (aliqua), unless there were two supposits of the natures in him; which the second, and also the third, opinion denies; and thus each opinion says that Christ is one; but the second says that he is one per se; while the third says that he is one accidentally, like a white man. But the first opinion says that the thing assumed does not only have the character of humanity, but also of a man; and yet we cannot call [this] "someone", since it is joined to another thing of higher dignity, but it is called "something", and that "something" is predicated of the person assuming; and thus it follows that Christ is someone, namely the one assuming, and something, namely the thing assumed; and that he is two in the neuter, but not in the masculine. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliud partitivum est; unde requiritur aliquod a quo dividatur. Cum autem dicitur, Christus est aliud et aliud, cum aliud non praedicet naturam tantum, sed suppositum naturae (quia humana natura de Christo non praedicatur), requiritur quod sit ibi aliquid distinctum vel divisum a supposito humanae naturae, quod de Christo praedicetur. Hoc autem non potest esse secundum secundam opinionem: quia suppositum divinae naturae non est aliud a supposito humanae naturae; nec divina natura, quae de Christo praedicatur, est aliud a supposito eius, nec per consequens a supposito humanae naturae. Unde secundum hanc opinionem Christus non dicitur proprie aliud et aliud; sed exponendum est, alterius et alterius naturae. Prima vero opinio, quae distinguit supposita naturarum, potest dicere quod Christus est aliud et aliud. | Reply 1: "Other" is a partitive term; hence it requires something from which it is divided. Now when we say, "Christ is one thing and another thing", since "other" does not predicate the nature alone, but the supposit of the nature (since human nature is not predicated of Christ), it is necessary that there be here something distinct or divided from the supposit of the human nature, which is predicated of Christ. But this cannot be according to the second opinion: because the supposit of the divine nature is not anything other than the supposit of the human nature; nor is the divine nature, which is predicated of Christ, other than its supposit, neither consequently is it other than the supposit of the human nature. Hence according to this opinion Christ is not properly called one thing and another; but we must explain that he is of one nature and of another nature. But the first opinion which distinguishes the supposits of the natures, can say that Christ is one thing and another thing. |
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod termini numerales, ut in 1 dictum est, se habent communiter ad personam et naturam; unde loquendo de unitate personali, est tantum una in Christo, secundum quam dicitur unus Christus; loquendo autem de unitate naturali, est duplex unitas. Non tamen sequitur quod Christus sit unum et unum: quia unum quod de Christo praedicatur, non refertur tantum ad naturam, sed ad suppositum naturae, quod non geminatur. | Reply 2: Numerical terms, as was said in 1, are related commonly to the person and the nature; hence speaking of personal unity, there is only one in Christ, inasmuch as we say one Christ; but speaking of the natural unity there is a twofold unity. Yet it does not follow that Christ is one thing and one thing; since the one thing which is predicated of Christ, does not refer only to the nature, but to the supposit of the nature, which is not doubled. |
| Ad tertium dicendum, quod natura divina praedicatur in recto de personis propter identitatem rei; sed duae naturae quae sunt in Christo, non praedicantur de eo in recto: quamvis enim divina natura praedicetur de eo in recto, non tamen humana, sicut nec de aliquo alio homine. Si autem tres personae differrent secundum rem a natura, quamvis esset una numero in eis, non tamen posset propter hoc dici, quod tres personae essent unum simpliciter; sed forte quod essent unus Deus; sicut multi homines dicuntur unus populus. | Reply 3: The divine nature is predicated of the person in the nominative on account of the identity of the thing; but the two natures which are in Christ are not predicated of him in the nominative: for although the divine nature is predicated of him in the nominative, yet the human nature is not, just as it is not predicated of any other man. But if the three persons really differed from the nature, although it [s.c. nature] would be in number in them, nevertheless on account of this we could not say, that the three persons were one simply; but perhaps that they were one God; just as many men are called one people. |
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod cum dicitur, Christus est aliquid quod est mater, ly aliquid non praedicat tantum naturam, sed suppositum naturae, ut patet ex praedictis; relativum autem refert suum antecedens, non gratia suppositi, sed gratia naturae: mater enim non convenit cum Filio in supposito, sed in natura: relativum autem non refert idem secundum suppositum, sed quandoque idem secundum naturam speciei. Cum vero dicitur: est aliquid quod est Pater, ly aliquid praedicat naturam divinam: unde ex hoc sequitur quod humana natura non sit divina natura, non autem quod Christus sit duo. | Reply 4: When we say "Christ is something which is the mother", the "something" does not predicate the nature alone, but the supposit of the nature; as is evident from the aforesaid; but a relative term refers to the antecedent supposit, not because of the supposit, but the because of the nature; for the mother does not agree with the Son in a supposit, but in a nature. But the relative term does not refer to the same thing according to the supposit, whenever it refers to the same thing, it is according to the nature of the species; but when we say there is something which is the Father the "something" predicates the divine nature: hence from this it follows that the human nature is not the divine, but not that Christ is two. |
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod cum dicitur, Christus est aliquid passibile, ly aliquid non praedicat naturam, sed suppositum humanae naturae; quia proprietates naturae denominative praedicantur de supposito, quamvis natura de eo non praedicetur, et etiam proprietates partium. Petrus enim quamvis non sit capillus, est tamen crispus. Cum vero dicitur, Christus est aliquid impassibile, ly aliquid praedicat suppositum divinae naturae, quod non est aliud quam suppositum humanae naturae; vel etiam divinam naturam, quae non est aliud a suo supposito. Unde non sequitur quod sit ibi aliud et aliud: media enim falsa est quae dicit quod aliquid passibile non est aliquid impassibile: idem enim suppositum quod est passibile secundum unam naturam, est impassibile secundum aliam. | Reply 5: When we say Christ is something passible, "something" does not predicate the nature, but the supposit of the human nature; since the properties of the nature are predicated denominatively of the supposit, although the nature is not predicated of it, and likewise the properties of the parts. For although Peter is not hair, yet he is curly. But when we say, "Christ is something impassible", the "something" predicates the supposit of the divine nature, which is none other than the supposit of the human nature; or even the divine nature, which is not other than its supposit. Hence it does not follow that there is one thing and another thing here: for the middle [proposition] is false which says that something passible is not something impassible: for the same supposit which is passible according to one nature, and impassible according to the other. |
| Ad sextum dicendum, quod totus refertur ad personam, totum autem ad naturam. Totum autem, secundum quod hic sumitur, est cui nihil deest: et quia nihil deest de personalitate Filii, quam significat nomen Christi, secundum quod est ubique, quia est persona aeterna; ideo dicitur totus ubique. Deest autem aliquid de natura ei, secundum quod non est ubique; sed tamen illud aliquid non praedicatur de Christo. Unde non sequitur quod Christus sit aliquid et aliquid; sed quod in eo sit aliquid et aliquid. | Reply 6: "Whole" [totus] refers to the person, but "a whole thing" [totum] refers to the nature. Now wholes, as it is taken here, are that from which nothing is lacking: and since nothing is lacking from the personality of the Son, which the name Christ signifies, insofar as he is everywhere, since he is an eternal person; thus we say the whole [totus] is everywhere. But something of the nature is lacking to him, insofar as he is not everywhere; but yet that [sense of] "something" is not predicated of Christ. Hence it does not follow that Christ is something and something; but that there is something and something in him. |
| Ad septimum dicendum, quod termini in praedicato positi tenentur formaliter: unde non conceditur ista, quod Christus sit tantum homo; quia excluderetur omnis alia natura. Ly aliquid autem, et ly unum non determinant aliquam formam vel naturam; sed determinatum suppositum, secundum quod de Christo praedicantur: non enim determinant nisi illud circa quod ponuntur. Unde si diceretur: Christus est tantum unum, vel tantum aliquid, non excludit aliam naturam, sed aliud suppositum: et ideo haec est vera: Christus est tantum aliquid unum; et est in processu illo fallacia consequentis, quia aliquid unum est superius ad hominem. Procedit ergo negative ab inferiori ad superius, cum dictione exclusiva. | Reply 7: Terms posited in the predicate are taken formally (Cf. S.T. I, q. 13, a. 12 ): hence we do not concede that Christ is only a man; since every other nature would be excluded from him. But "something" and "one" do not determine any form or nature; but the supposit is determined, insofar as they are predicated of Christ: for they do not determine [anything] except that concerning which they are posited. Hence if we should say: "Christ is only one thing", or "only something", we do not exclude another nature, but another supposit: and thus this is true: "Christ is only some one thing"; and there is a fallacy of the consequent in that reasoning, since the "something one" is wider in extension than "man". Therefore it proceeds negatively from a term of less extension to one of wider extension, with an exclusive expression. |
| Utrum in Christo non sit tantum unum esse. | Whether there is not only one being in Christ. |
| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo non sit tantum unum esse. Omnis enim forma substantialis dat esse. Sed anima est forma substantialis. Ergo dat esse. Sed non dat esse divinae personae, quia hoc est aeternum. Ergo dat aliud esse: ergo in Christo non tantum est unum esse. | Obj. 1: It seems that there is not only one being in Christ. For every substantial form gives being. But the soul is a substantial form. Therefore it gives being. But it does not give the being of the divine person, since this is eternal. Therefore it gives another being: therefore there is not only one being in Christ. |
| Praeterea, unum est esse Filii Dei et Patris. Si ergo unum est esse huius hominis et Filii Dei, unum erit esse huius hominis et Dei Patris. Sed nulla est maior unio quam ea quae est aliquorum secundum esse unum. Ergo humanitas est unita Deo Patri. | Obj. 2: Further, there is one being of the Son of God and of the Father. Therefore, if the being of this man and of the Son of God is one thing, then the being of this man and of the Father will be one. But there is no greater union than that which is of things according to one being. Therefore, humanity was united to God the Father. |
| Praeterea, in divinis non est esse nisi essentiale. Si ergo unio humanae naturae ad divinam facta est in esse Filii Dei, facta est in essentia: quod est impossibile. | Obj. 3: Further, in divine persons there is no being except essential being. Therefore if the union of the human nature to the divine took place in the being of the Son of God, it took place in the essence, which is impossible. |
| Praeterea, definitio est oratio indicans quid est esse. Sed homo secundum eamdem definitionem praedicatur de Christo et de Petro. Ergo est idem esse humanitas illius hominis cum esse Petri secundum speciem. Sed esse Filii Dei non est idem specie cum esse Petri. Ergo in Christo non est tantum unum esse. | Obj. 4: Further, a phrase indicating what it is to be. But "man" is predicated of Christ and of Peter according to the same definition. Therefore, the human being of this man is the same as that of Peter according to the species. But the being of the Son of God is not the same species as the being of Peter. Therefore there is not only one being in Christ. |
| Praeterea, de quocumque responderi potest ad quaestionem factam per an est, habet proprium esse. Sed haec quaestio fit non tantum de persona, sed etiam de natura. Ergo esse non tantum est personae, sed etiam naturae. In Christo autem sunt duae naturae. Ergo in Christo sunt duo esse. | Obj. 5: Further, Of whatever can produce an [affirmative] answer to the question "Is it?" has its own being. But this question is asked not only of the person, but also of the nature. Therefore being is not only of the person, but of the nature. But there are two natures in Christ. Therefore there is a two-fold being in Christ. |
| Sed contra, omne quod habet per se esse, est subsistens. Si ergo in Christo est duplex esse, sunt ibi duo subsistentia: ergo duae hypostases: quod supra improbatum est. | To the Contrary, everything which has being per se, is a subsisting thing. If therefore there is a two-fold being in Christ, there are two subsisting things there; therefore there are two hypostases: which was disproved above. |
| Praeterea, quaecumque differunt secundum esse, unum eorum non praedicatur de altero. Sed Deus est homo, et e converso. Ergo est esse unum Dei et hominis. | Further, [regarding] wherever things differ according to being, one of them is not predicated of the other. But God is man and conversely. Therefore, there is one being of God and man. |
| Praeterea, unius non est nisi unum esse. Sed Christus est unum, ut dictum est. Ergo habet unum esse tantum. | Further, of one thing there is only one being. But Christ is one thing, as was said. Therefore he has only one being. |
| Respondeo dicendum, quod secundum Philosophum 5 Metaph., esse duobus modis dicitur. Uno modo secundum quod significat veritatem propositionis, secundum quod est copula; et sic, ut Commentator ibidem dicit, ens est praedicatum accidentale; et hoc esse non est in re, sed in mente, quae coniungit praedicatum cum subiecto, ut dicit Philosophus in 6 Metaph. Unde de hoc non est hic quaestio. Alio modo dicitur esse, quod pertinet ad naturam rei, secundum quod dividitur secundum decem genera; et hoc quidem esse est in re, et est actus entis resultans ex principiis rei, sicut lucere est actus lucentis. | I answer that, according to the Philosopher 5 Metaphys. Text 6, being is said in two ways. In one way it signifies the truth of a proposition, insofar as it is a copula; and thus as Averroes says in the same place, a being [ens] is an accidental predicate; and this is not being [esse] in reality, but in the mind, which joins the predicate with the subject, as the Philosopher says in 6 Metaphys. Text 6. Hence the present question does not concern this. In another way we use the term being as it pertains to the nature of a thing, insofar as it falls under the ten categories; and this indeed is being in reality, and is the act of a being resulting from the principles of the thing, just as to light is the act of lighting. |
| Aliquando tamen sumitur esse pro essentia, secundum quam res est: quia per actus consueverunt significari eorum principia, ut potentiae vel habitus. Loquendo igitur de esse secundum quod est actus entis, sic dico, quod secundum secundam opinionem oportet ponere tantum unum esse; secundum alias autem duas oportet ponere duo esse. Ens enim subsistens, est quod habet esse tamquam eius quod est, quamvis sit naturae vel formae tamquam eius quo est: unde nec natura rei nec partes eius proprie dicuntur esse, si esse praedicto modo accipiatur; similiter autem nec accidentia, sed suppositum completum, quod est secundum omnia illa. Unde etiam Philosophus dicit in 2 Metaph., quod accidens magis proprie est entis quam ens. Prima ergo opinio, quae ponit duo subsistentia, ponit duo esse substantialia; similiter tertia opinio, quia ponit quod partes humanae naturae adveniunt divinae personae accidentaliter, ponit duo esse, unum substantiale, et aliud accidentale; secunda vero opinio, quia ponit unum subsistens, et ponit humanitatem non accidentaliter advenire divinae personae, oportet quod ponat unum esse. Impossibile est enim quod unum aliquid habeat duo esse substantialia; quia unum fundatur super ens: unde si sint plura esse, secundum quae aliquid dicitur ens simpliciter, impossibile est quod dicatur unum. Sed non est inconveniens quod esse unius subsistentis sit per respectum ad plura, sicut esse petri est unum, habens tamen respectum ad diversa principia constituentia ipsum: et similiter suo modo unum esse Christi habet duos respectus, unum ad naturam humanam, alterum ad divinam. | Yet, sometimes being is used for the essence, according as it is a thing, since their principles [s.c. of things] are customarily signified through acts, such as potency or habit. Therefore, speaking of being insofar as it is the act of a being, thus I say, that according to the second opinion it is necessary to posit only one being; but according to the others it is necessary to posit a two-fold being. For a subsisting being [ens], is what has being [esse] as if this is its "that which is" [quod est], although it [s.c. the divine esse] is of a nature or form, as if this is its "that by which it is" [quo est]. Hence, neither the nature of a thing nor its parts are properly said to be [esse], if "to be" [esse] is taken in the aforesaid manner; likewise neither are accidents, but the complete supposit, [i.e.] that which is in virtue of all of these things. Hence, also the Philosopher says in 2 Metaphys., 3, that an accident is more properly of a being, than a being. Therefore, the first opinion, which posits two subsistences posits a two-fold substantial being. Likewise the third opinion, since it posits that the parts of the human nature come to the divine person accidentally, posits a two-fold being, one substantial, and the other accidental. But the second opinion, since it posits one subsisting thing, and that humanity does not come to the divine person accidentally, must posit one being. For it is impossible that something one should have a two-fold substantial being, since one [unum] is founded upon a being [ens]: hence if there are several beings [esse], according to which something is called a being simply, it is impossible that it be called one thing. But it is suitable that the being of one subsisting thing be related to many, just as Peter's being is one thing, yet it is related to the diverse principles constituting him: and likewise in its own way, Christ's one being has two relations, one to the human nature, the other to the divine. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod forma facit esse; non ita quod illud esse sit materiae aut formae, sed subsistentis. Quando ergo compositum ex materia et forma est per se subsistens, acquiritur ex forma illi composito esse absolutum per se; quando autem non est per se subsistens, non acquiritur per formam esse illi composito; sed subsistenti cui hoc adiungitur, acquiritur respectus secundum esse ad hoc quod ei additur: sicut si ponamus hominem nasci sine manu, et manum per se separatim fieri, et postea ei miraculose coniungi, constat quod forma manus causabit esse manus per se subsistentis: sed postquam coniungitur homini, non acquiritur ex forma manus aliquod esse manui, quia manus non habet esse proprium; sed acquiritur homini respectus ad manum secundum suum esse. Ita etiam dico, quod anima in Christo non acquirit proprium esse humanae naturae; sed Filio Dei acquirit respectum secundum suum esse ad naturam humanam, qui tamen respectus non est aliquid secundum rem in divina persona, sed aliquid secundum rationem, ut dictum est de unione, supra, dist. 2, qu. 2, art. 2, quaestiunc. 3, ad 3. | Reply 1: Form produces being; not so that that being is of matter or of form, but of a subsisting thing. Therefore when a thing composed from matter and form is subsisting per se, absolute being per se is acquired by that composite from the form. But when it is not subsisting per se, being is not acquired by that composite through the form; but by virtue of the subsisting thing to which it is adjoined, it acquires a relation according to being to this thing which is added to it: just as if we posit that a man is born without a hand, and a hand by itself is separately formed, and later it is miraculously joined to him, it is obvious that the form of a hand will cause the being of a hand which is a subsistent thing per se: but after it is joined to a man, no being is acquired from the hand's form by the hand, since a hand does not have its own being, but a relationship to the and according to his being [esse] is acquired by the man. So too I say that the soul in Christ does not acquire its own being of a human nature: but from the son of God it acquires a relation according to its being to the human nature, yet this relation is not something really in the divine person, but only something according to reason as was said above of the union d. 2, q. 2, a. 2 sub-quest. 3 ad 3. |
| Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliud est de Deo et de omnibus aliis rebus: quia in Deo ipsa essentia subsistens est, unde sibi secundum se debetur esse; immo ipsa est suum esse subsistens: unde essentia a persona non differt secundum rem: et ideo esse essentiae est etiam personae; et tamen persona et essentia ratione differunt. Quamvis ergo unum sit esse, potest tamen esse considerari vel prout est essentiae; et sic non unitur humanitas in esse divino, unde non unitur Patri: vel potest considerari prout est personae; et sic unitur in esse divino. | Reply 2: [The being] of God is different from [the being] of all other things: since in God his essence is subsisting, hence for him being must be according to himself; nay rather he is his own subsisting being: hence essence does not really differ from person: and thus the essential being is also personal being; and yet person and essence differ by reason. Therefore although there is one being, still being can be considered either as just as it is essential, and thus humanity is not united to the divine being, hence it is not united to the Father: or it can be considered just as it is personal.; and in this way it is united to the divine being. |
| Et per hoc patet solutio ad tertium. | And through this the solution to the third objection is obvious. |
| Ad quartum dicendum, quod Philosophus accipit ibi esse pro essentia, vel quidditate, quam signat definitio. | Reply 4: The Philosopher here takes being for essence, or quiddity, which the definition signifies. |
| Ad quintum dicendum, quod illa obiectio procedit de esse secundum quod signat veritatem propositionis: sic enim potest dici non tantum de his quae sunt in re, sed de his quae sunt in intellectu: de quibus potest locutio formari. | Reply 5: That objection proceeds from being insofar as it signifies the truth of a proposition: for this can be said not only of those things which are in reality, but of those things which are in the intellect, about which we can form a statement. |