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| Deinde considerandum est de loco hominis, qui est Paradisus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | We next consider man's abode, which is paradise. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum Paradisus sit locus corporeus. | (1) Whether paradise is a corporeal place? |
| Secundo, utrum sit conveniens locus habitationis humanae. | (2) Whether it is a place apt for human habitation? |
| Tertio, ad quid homo in Paradiso positus fuit. | (3) For what purpose was man placed in paradise? |
| Quarto, utrum in Paradiso debuit fieri. | (4) Whether he should have been created in paradise? |
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Article: 1 [ << | >> ]
| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Paradisus non sit locus corporeus. Dicit enim Beda quod Paradisus pertingit usque ad lunarem circulum. Sed nullus locus terrenus talis esse potest, tum quia contra naturam terrae esset quod tantum elevaretur; tum etiam quia sub globo lunari est regio ignis, qui terram consumeret. Non est ergo Paradisus locus corporeus. | Objection 1: It would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place. For Bede [*Strabus, Gloss on Gn. 2:8] says that "paradise reaches to the lunar circle." But no earthly place answers that description, both because it is contrary to the nature of the earth to be raised up so high, and because beneath the moon is the region of fire, which would consume the earth. Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place. |
| Praeterea, Scriptura commemorat quatuor flumina in Paradiso oriri, ut patet Gen. II. Illa autem flumina quae ibi nominantur, alibi habent manifestas origines; ut patet etiam per philosophum in libro Meteor. Ergo Paradisus non est locus corporeus. |
Objection 2: Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise (Gn. 2:10). But the rivers there mentioned have visible sources elsewhere, as is clear from the Philosopher (Meteor. i). Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place. |
| Praeterea, aliqui diligentissime inquisierunt omnia loca terrae habitabilis, qui tamen nullam mentionem faciunt de loco Paradisi. Ergo non videtur esse locus corporeus. | Objection 3: Further, although men have explored the entire habitable world, yet none have made mention of the place of paradise. Therefore apparently it is not a corporeal place. |
| Praeterea, in Paradiso describitur lignum vitae esse. Sed lignum vitae est aliquid spirituale, dicitur enim Prov. III, de sapientia, quod est lignum vitae his qui apprehendunt eam. Ergo et Paradisus non est locus corporeus, sed spiritualis. |
Objection 4: Further, the tree of life is described as growing in paradise. But the tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is written of Wisdom that "She is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her" (Prov. 3:18). Therefore paradise also is not a corporeal, but a spiritual place. |
| Praeterea, si Paradisus est locus corporalis, oportet quod et ligna Paradisi sint corporalia. Sed hoc non videtur, cum corporalia ligna sint producta tertio die; de plantatione autem lignorum Paradisi legitur Gen. II, post opera sex dierum. Ergo Paradisus non est locus corporeus. | Objection 5: Further, if paradise be a corporeal place, the trees also of paradise must be corporeal. But it seems they were not; for corporeal trees were produced on the third day, while the planting of the trees of paradise is recorded after the work of the six days. Therefore paradise was not a corporeal place. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., tres sunt de Paradiso generales sententiae, una eorum qui tantummodo corporaliter Paradisum intelligi volunt; alia eorum qui spiritualiter tantum; tertia eorum qui utroque modo Paradisum accipiunt, quam mihi fateor placere sententiam. | On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1): "Three general opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place merely corporeal; others a place entirely spiritual; while others, whose opinion, I confess, hold that paradise was both corporeal and spiritual." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XIII de Civ. Dei, quae commode dici possunt de intelligendo spiritualiter Paradiso, nemine prohibente dicantur; dum tamen et illius historiae fidelissima veritas rerum gestarum narratione commendata credatur. Ea enim quae de Paradiso in Scriptura dicuntur, per modum narrationis historicae proponuntur, in omnibus autem quae sic Scriptura tradit, est pro fundamento tenenda veritas historiae, et desuper spirituales expositiones fabricandae. Est ergo Paradisus, ut Isidorus dicit in libro Etymol., locus in orientis partibus constitutus, cuius vocabulum a Graeco in Latinum vertitur hortus. Convenienter autem in parte Orientali dicitur situs. Quia credendum est quod in nobilissimo loco totius terrae sit constitutus. Cum autem oriens sit dextera caeli, ut patet per philosophum in II de caelo; dextera autem est nobilior quam sinistra; conveniens fuit ut in Orientali parte Paradisus terrenus institueretur a Deo. | I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 21): "Nothing prevents us from holding, within proper limits, a spiritual paradise; so long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having there occurred." For whatever Scripture tells us about paradise is set down as matter of history; and wherever Scripture makes use of this method, we must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer. And so paradise, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), "is a place situated in the east, its name being the Greek for garden." It was fitting that it should be in the east; for it is to be believed that it was situated in the most excellent part of the earth. Now the east is the right hand on the heavens, as the Philosopher explains (De Coel. ii, 2); and the right hand is nobler than the left: hence it was fitting that God should place the earthly paradise in the east. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Bedae verbum non est verum, si secundum sensum manifestum intelligatur. Potest tamen exponi quod usque ad locum lunaris globi ascendit, non secundum situs eminentiam, sed secundum similitudinem, quia est ibi perpetua aeris temperies, ut Isidorus dicit, et in hoc assimilatur corporibus caelestibus, quae sunt absque contrarietate. Magis tamen fit mentio de lunari globo quam de aliis sphaeris, quia lunaris globus est terminus caelestium corporum versus nos; et luna etiam est magis terrae affinis inter omnia corpora caelestia; unde et quasdam tenebras nebulosas habet, quasi accedens ad opacitatem. Quidam autem dicunt quod Paradisus pertingebat usque ad lunarem globum, idest usque ad medium aeris interstitium, in quo generantur pluviae et venti et huiusmodi, quia dominium super huiusmodi evaporationes maxime attribuitur lunae. Sed secundum hoc, locus ille non esset conveniens habitationi humanae, tum quia ibi est maxima intemperies; tum quia non est contemperatus complexioni humanae, sicut aer inferior magis terrae vicinus. | Reply to Objection 1: Bede's assertion is untrue, if taken in its obvious sense. It may, however, be explained to mean that paradise reaches to the moon, not literally, but figuratively; because, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), the atmosphere there is "a continually even temperature"; and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies, which are devoid of opposing elements. Mention, however, is made of the moon rather than of other bodies, because, of all the heavenly bodies, the moon is nearest to us, and is, moreover, the most akin to the earth; hence it is observed to be overshadowed by clouds so as to be almost obscured. Others say that paradise reached to the moon—that is, to the middle space of the air, where rain, and wind, and the like arise; because the moon is said to have influence on such changes. But in this sense it would not be a fit place for human dwelling, through being uneven in temperature, and not attuned to the human temperament, as is the lower atmosphere in the neighborhood of the earth. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit VIII super Gen. ad Litt., credendum est, quoniam locus Paradisi a cognitione hominum est remotissimus, flumina, quorum fontes noti esse dicuntur, alicubi isse sub terras, et post tractus prolixarum regionum, locis aliis erupisse. Nam hoc solere nonnullas aquas facere, quis ignorat? | Reply to Objection 2: Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 7): "It is probable that man has no idea where paradise was, and that the rivers, whose sources are said to be known, flowed for some distance underground, and then sprang up elsewhere. For who is not aware that such is the case with some other streams?" |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod locus ille seclusus est a nostra habitatione aliquibus impedimentis vel montium, vel marium, vel alicuius aestuosae regionis, quae pertransiri non potest. Et ideo scriptores locorum de hoc loco mentionem non fecerunt. | Reply to Objection 3: The situation of paradise is shut off from the habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which cannot be crossed; and so people who have written about topography make no mention of it. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod lignum vitae est quaedam materialis arbor, sic dicta quia eius fructus habebat virtutem conservandi vitam, ut supra dictum est. Et tamen aliquid significabat spiritualiter, sicut et petra in deserto fuit aliquod materiale, et tamen significavit Christum. Similiter etiam lignum scientiae boni et mali materialis arbor fuit, sic nominata propter eventum futurum, quia post eius esum homo, per experimentum poenae, didicit quid interesset inter obedientiae bonum et inobedientiae malum. Et tamen spiritualiter potuit significare liberum arbitrium, ut quidam dicunt. |
Reply to Objection 4: The tree of life is a material tree, and so called because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as above stated (Question [97], Article [4]). Yet it had a spiritual signification; as the rock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified Christ. In like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material tree, so called in view of future events; because, after eating of it, man was to learn, by experience of the consequent punishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of rebellion. It may also be said to signify spiritually the free-will as some say. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, tertio die productae sunt plantae non in actu, sed secundum quasdam rationes seminales; sed post opera sex dierum productae sunt plantae tam Paradisi quam aliae in actu. Secundum alios vero sanctos, oportet dicere quod omnes plantae productae sunt in actu tertio die, et etiam ligna Paradisi, sed quod dicitur de plantatione lignorum Paradisi post opera sex dierum, intelligitur per recapitulationem esse dictum. Unde littera nostra habet, plantaverat dominus Deus Paradisum voluptatis a principio. | Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3), the plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their seminal virtues; whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants, both of paradise and others, were actually produced. According to other holy writers, we ought to say that all the plants were actually produced on the third day, including the trees of paradise; and what is said of the trees of paradise being planted after the work of the six days is to be understood, they say, by way of recapitulation. Whence our text reads: "The Lord God had planted a paradise of pleasure from the beginning" (Gn. 2:8). |
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Question: 102 [ << | >> ]
Article: 2 [ << | >> ]
| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Paradisus non fuerit locus conveniens habitationi humanae. Homo enim et Angelus similiter ad beatitudinem ordinantur. Sed Angelus statim a principio factus est habitator loci beatorum, scilicet caeli Empyrei. Ergo etiam ibi debuit institui habitatio hominis. | Objection 1: It would seem that paradise was not a place adapted to be the abode of man. For man and angels are similarly ordered to beatitude. But the angels from the very beginning of their existence were made to dwell in the abode of the blessed—that is, the empyrean heaven. Therefore the place of man's habitation should have been there also. |
| Praeterea, si locus aliquis debetur homini, aut debetur ei ratione animae, aut ratione corporis. Si ratione animae, debetur ei pro loco caelum, qui videtur esse locus naturalis animae, cum omnibus insitus sit appetitus caeli. Ratione autem corporis, non debetur ei alius locus quam aliis animalibus. Ergo Paradisus nullo modo fuit locus conveniens habitationi humanae. | Objection 2: Further, if some definite place were required for man's abode, this would be required on the part either of the soul or of the body. If on the part of the soul, the place would be in heaven, which is adapted to the nature of the soul; since the desire of heaven is implanted in all. On the part of the body, there was no need for any other place than the one provided for other animals. Therefore paradise was not at all adapted to be the abode of man. |
| Praeterea, frustra est locus in quo nullum locatum continetur. Sed post peccatum Paradisus non est locus habitationis humanae. Ergo, si est locus habitationi humanae congruus, in vanum videtur a Deo institutus fuisse. | Objection 3: Further, a place which contains nothing is useless. But after sin, paradise was not occupied by man. Therefore if it were adapted as a dwelling-place for man, it seems that God made paradise to no purpose. |
| Praeterea, homini, cum sit temperatae complexionis congruus est locus temperatus. Sed locus Paradisi non est locus temperatus, dicitur enim esse sub aequinoctiali circulo, qui locus videtur esse calidissimus, cum bis in anno sol pertranseat super summitatem capitum eorum qui ibi habitant. Ergo Paradisus non est locus congruus habitationi humanae. | Objection 4: Further, since man is of an even temperament, a fitting place for him should be of even temperature. But paradise was not of an even temperature; for it is said to have been on the equator—a situation of extreme heat, since twice in the year the sun passes vertically over the heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradise was not a fit dwelling-place for man. |
| Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit de Paradiso, quod est divina regio, et digna eius qui secundum imaginem Dei erat, conversatio. | On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was a divinely ordered region, and worthy of him who was made to God's image." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, homo sic erat incorruptibilis et immortalis, non quia corpus eius dispositionem incorruptibilitatis haberet, sed quia inerat animae vis quaedam ad praeservandum corpus a corruptione. Corrumpi autem potest corpus humanum et ab interiori et ab exteriori. Ab interiori quidem corrumpitur per consumptionem humidi, et per senectutem, ut supra dictum est, cui corruptioni occurrere poterat primus homo per esum ciborum. Inter ea vero quae exterius corrumpunt, praecipuum videtur esse distemperatus aer, unde huic corruptioni maxime occurritur per temperiem aeris. In Paradiso autem utrumque invenitur, quia, ut Damascenus dicit, est locus temperato et tenuissimo et purissimo aere circumfulgens, plantis semper floridis comatus. Unde manifestum est quod Paradisus est locus conveniens habitationi humanae, secundum primae immortalitatis statum. |
I answer that, As above stated (Question [97], Article [1]), Man was incorruptible and immortal, not because his body had a disposition to incorruptibility, but because in his soul there was a power preserving the body from corruption. Now the human body may be corrupted from within or from without. From within, the body is corrupted by the consumption of the humors, and by old age, as above explained (Question [97], Article [4]), and man was able to ward off such corruption by food. Among those things which corrupt the body from without, the chief seems to be an atmosphere of unequal temperature; and to such corruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. In paradise both conditions were found; because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was permeated with the all pervading brightness of a temperate, pure, and exquisite atmosphere, and decked with ever-flowering plants." Whence it is clear that paradise was most fit to be a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his original state of immortality. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caelum Empyreum est supremum corporalium locorum, et est extra omnem mutabilitatem. Et quantum ad primum horum, est locus congruus naturae angelicae, quia, sicut Augustinus dicit in III de Trin., Deus regit creaturam corporalem per spiritualem; unde conveniens est quod spiritualis natura sit supra omnem corporalem constituta, sicut ei praesidens. Quantum autem ad secundum, convenit statui beatitudinis, qui est firmatus in summa stabilitate. Sic igitur locus beatitudinis congruit Angelo secundum naturam suam, unde ibi creatus est. Non autem congruit homini secundum suam naturam, cum non praesideat toti corporali creaturae per modum gubernationis, sed competit ei solum ratione beatitudinis. Unde non est positus a principio in caelo Empyreo; sed illuc transferendus erat in statu finalis beatitudinis. | Reply to Objection 1: The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places, and is outside the region of change. By the first of these two conditions, it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as Augustine says (De Trin. ii), "God rules corporeal creatures through spiritual creatures." Hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature should be established above the entire corporeal nature, as presiding over it. By the second condition, it is a fitting abode for the state of beatitude, which is endowed with the highest degree of stability. Thus the abode of beatitude was suited to the very nature of the angel; therefore he was created there. But it is not suited to man's nature, since man is not set as a ruler over the entire corporeal creation: it is a fitting abode for man in regard only to his beatitude. Wherefore he was not placed from the beginning in the empyrean heaven, but was destined to be transferred thither in the state of his final beatitude. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ridiculum est dicere quod animae, aut alicui spirituali substantiae, sit aliquis locus naturalis, sed per congruentiam quandam aliquis specialis locus creaturae incorporali attribuitur. Paradisus ergo terrestris erat locus congruens homini et quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus, inquantum scilicet in anima erat vis praeservandi corpus humanum a corruptione. Quod non competebat aliis animalibus. Et ideo, ut Damascenus dicit, in Paradiso nullum irrationalium habitabat, licet ex quadam dispensatione animalia fuerint illuc divinitus adducta ad Adam, et serpens illuc accesserit per operationem Diaboli. | Reply to Objection 2: It is ridiculous to assert that any particular place is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some particular place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual substances. For the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as regards both his body and his soul—that is, inasmuch as in his soul was the force which preserved the human body from corruption. This could not be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "No irrational animal inhabited paradise"; although, by a certain dispensation, the animals were brought thither by God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the complicity of the devil. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod non propter hoc locus est frustra, quia non est ibi hominum habitatio post peccatum, sicut etiam non frustra fuit homini attributa immortalitas quaedam, quam conservaturus non erat. Per huiusmodi enim ostenditur benignitas Dei ad hominem, et quid homo peccando amiserit. Quamvis, ut dicitur, nunc Enoch et Elias in illo Paradiso habitent. | Reply to Objection 3: Paradise did not become useless through being unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred on man in vain, though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God's kindness to man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod illi qui dicunt Paradisum esse sub circulo aequinoctiali, opinantur sub circulo illo esse locum temperatissimum, propter aequalitatem dierum et noctium omni tempore; et quia sol nunquam multum ab eis elongatur, ut sit apud eos superabundantia frigoris; nec iterum est apud eos, ut dicunt, superabundantia caloris, quia etsi sol pertranseat super eorum capita, non tamen diu moratur ibi in hac dispositione. Aristoteles tamen, in libro Meteor., expresse dicit quod regio illa est inhabitabilis propter aestum. Quod videtur probabilius, quia terrae per quas nunquam sol pertransit in directum capitis, sunt intemperatae in calore propter solam vicinitatem solis. Quidquid autem de hoc sit, credendum est Paradisum in loco temperatissimo constitutum esse, vel sub aequinoctiali vel alibi. | Reply to Objection 4: Those who say that paradise was on the equinoctial line are of opinion that such a situation is most temperate, on account of the unvarying equality of day and night; that it is never too cold there, because the sun is never too far off; and never too hot, because, although the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants, it does not remain long in that position. However, Aristotle distinctly says (Meteor. ii, 5) that such a region is uninhabitable on account of the heat. This seems to be more probable; because, even those regions where the sun does not pass vertically overhead, are extremely hot on account of the mere proximity of the sun. But whatever be the truth of the matter, we must hold that paradise was situated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator or elsewhere. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non sit positus in Paradiso ut operaretur et custodiret illum. Quod enim introductum est in poenam peccati, non fuisset in Paradiso in statu innocentiae. Sed agricultura introducta est in poenam peccati, ut dicitur Gen. III. Ergo homo non fuit positus in Paradiso ut operaretur ipsum. |
Objection 1: It would seem that man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. For what was brought on him as a punishment of sin would not have existed in paradise in the state of innocence. But the cultivation of the soil was a punishment of sin (Gn. 3:17). Therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. |
| Praeterea, custodia non est necessaria, ubi non timetur violentus invasor. Sed in Paradiso nullus timebatur violentus invasor. Ergo non erat necessarium ut Paradisum custodiret. | Objection 2: Further, there is no need of a keeper when there is no fear of trespass with violence. But in paradise there was no fear of trespass with violence. Therefore there was no need for man to keep paradise. |
| Praeterea, si homo positus est in Paradiso ut operaretur et custodiret ipsum, videtur sequi quod homo factus sit propter Paradisum, et non e converso, quod videtur esse falsum. Ergo homo non est positus in Paradiso ut operaretur et custodiret illum. | Objection 3: Further, if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep it, man would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise, and not contrariwise; which seems to be false. Therefore man was not place in paradise to dress and keep it. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, tulit dominus Deus hominem, et posuit illum in Paradiso voluptatis, ut operaretur et custodiret illum. |
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2: 15): "The Lord God took man and placed in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit VIII super Gen. ad Litt., verbum istud Genesis dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo sic, quod Deus posuit hominem in Paradiso, ut ipse Deus operaretur et custodiret hominem, operaretur, inquam, iustificando ipsum, cuius operatio si ab homine cesset, continuo obtenebratur, sicut aer obtenebratur si cesset influentia luminis; ut custodiret vero ab omni corruptione et malo. Alio modo potest intelligi, ut homo operaretur et custodiret Paradisum. Nec tamen illa operatio esset laboriosa, sicut post peccatum, sed fuisset iucunda, propter experientiam virtutis naturae. Custodia etiam illa non esset contra invasores, sed esset ad hoc quod homo sibi Paradisum custodiret, ne ipsum peccando amitteret. Et hoc totum in bonum hominis cedebat, et sic Paradisus ordinatur ad bonum hominis, et non e converso. | I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 10), these words in Genesis may be understood in two ways. First, in the sense that God placed man in paradise that He might Himself work in man and keep him, by sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man at once relapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases to shine); and by keeping man from all corruption and evil. Secondly, that man might dress and keep paradise, which dressing would not have involved labor, as it did after sin; but would have been pleasant on account of man's practical knowledge of the powers of nature. Nor would man have kept paradise against a trespasser; but he would have striven to keep paradise for himself lest he should lose it by sin. All of which was for man's good; wherefore paradise was ordered to man's benefit, and not conversely. |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. | Whence the Replies to the Objections are made clear. |
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Question: 102 [ << | >> ]
Article: 4 [ << | >> ]
| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo factus fuerit in Paradiso. Angelus enim in loco suae habitationis creatus fuit, scilicet in caelo Empyreo. Sed Paradisus fuit locus congruus habitationi humanae ante peccatum. Ergo videtur quod in Paradiso homo debuit fieri. | Objection 1: It would seem that man was created in paradise. For the angel was created in his dwelling-place—namely, the empyrean heaven. But before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it seems that man was created in paradise. |
| Praeterea, alia animalia conservantur in loco suae generationis; sicut pisces in aquis, et animalia gressibilia in terra, unde producta sunt. Homo autem conservatus fuisset in Paradiso, ut dictum est. Ergo in Paradiso fieri debuit. |
Objection 2: Further, other animals remain in the place where they are produced, as the fish in the water, and walking animals on the earth from which they were made. Now man would have remained in paradise after he was created (Question [97], Article [4]). Therefore he was created in paradise. |
| Praeterea, mulier in Paradiso facta fuit. Sed vir dignior est muliere. Ergo multo magis vir debuit fieri in Paradiso. | Objection 3: Further, woman was made in paradise. But man is greater than woman. Therefore much more should man have been made in paradise. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. II, tulit Deus hominem, et posuit eum in Paradiso. |
On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:15): "God took man and placed him in paradise." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod Paradisus fuit locus congruus habitationi humanae, quantum ad incorruptionem primi status. Incorruptio autem illa non erat hominis secundum naturam, sed ex supernaturali Dei dono. Ut ergo hoc gratiae Dei imputaretur, non humanae naturae, Deus hominem extra Paradisum fecit, et postea ipsum in Paradiso posuit, ut habitaret ibi toto tempore animalis vitae, postmodum, cum spiritualem vitam adeptus esset, transferendus in caelum. | I answer that, Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this incorruptibility was man's, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God. Therefore that this might be attributed to God, and not to human nature, God made man outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him there to live there during the whole of his animal life; and, having attained to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caelum Empyreum est locus congruus Angelis etiam quantum ad eorum naturam, et ideo ibi sunt creati. | Reply to Objection 1: The empyrean heaven was a fitting abode for the angels as regards their nature, and therefore they were created there. |
| Et similiter dicendum ad secundum. Loca enim illa congruunt animalibus secundum suam naturam. | In the same way I reply to the second objection, for those places befit those animals in their nature. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod mulier facta fuit in Paradiso non propter dignitatem suam, sed propter dignitatem principii ex quo corpus eius formabatur. Quia similiter et filii in Paradiso fuissent nati, in quo parentes iam erant positi. | Reply to Objection 3: Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which her body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been born in paradise, where their parents were already. |