St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

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Question: 119 [ << | >> ]

OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)

Deinde considerandum est de propagatione hominis quantum ad corpus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. We now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning this there are two points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum aliquid de alimento convertatur in veritatem humanae naturae. (1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature?
Secundo, utrum semen, quod est humanae generationis principium, sit de superfluo alimenti. (2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation, is produced from the surplus food?

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Article: 1  [ << | >> ]

Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nihil de alimento transeat in veritatem humanae naturae. Dicitur enim Matth. XV, omne quod in os intrat, in ventrem vadit, et per secessum emittitur. Sed quod emittitur, non transit in veritatem humanae naturae. Ergo nihil de alimento in veritatem humanae naturae transit. Objection 1: It would seem that none of the food is changed into true human nature. For it is written (Mt. 15:17): "Whatsoever entereth into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy." But what is cast out is not changed into the reality of human nature. Therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature.
Praeterea, philosophus, in I de Generat., distinguit carnem secundum speciem, et secundum materiam; et dicit quod caro secundum materiam advenit et recedit. Quod autem ex alimento generatur, advenit et recedit. Ergo id in quod alimentum convertitur, est caro secundum materiam, non autem caro secundum speciem. Sed hoc pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, quod pertinet ad speciem eius. Ergo alimentum non transit in veritatem humanae naturae. Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) distinguishes flesh belonging to the "species" from flesh belonging to "matter"; and says that the latter "comes and goes." Now what is formed from food comes and goes. Therefore what is produced from food is flesh belonging to matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature belongs to the species. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature.
Praeterea, ad veritatem humanae naturae pertinere videtur humidum radicale; quod si deperdatur, restitui non potest, ut medici dicunt. Posset autem restitui, si alimentum converteretur in ipsum humidum. Ergo nutrimentum non convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae. Objection 3: Further, the "radical humor" seems to belong to the reality of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according to physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed into the humor. Therefore food is not changed into true human nature.
Praeterea, si alimentum transiret in veritatem humanae naturae, quidquid in homine deperditur, restaurari posset. Sed mors hominis non accidit nisi per deperditionem alicuius. Posset igitur homo per sumptionem alimenti in perpetuum se contra mortem tueri. Objection 4: Further, if the food were changed into true human nature, whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man's death is due only to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking food to insure himself against death in perpetuity.
Praeterea, si alimentum in veritatem humanae naturae transiret, nihil esset in homine quod non posset recedere et reparari, quia id quod in homine generatur ex alimento, et recedere et reparari potest. Si ergo homo diu viveret, sequeretur quod nihil quod in eo fuit materialiter in principio suae generationis, finaliter remaneret in ipso. Et sic non esset idem homo numero per totam vitam suam, cum ad hoc quod aliquid sit idem numero, requiratur identitas materiae. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Non ergo alimentum transit in veritatem humanae naturae. Objection 5: Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for what is generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow that in the end nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically the same man throughout his life; since for the thing to be numerically the same, identity of matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature.
Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., alimenta carnis corrupta, idest amittentia formam suam, in membrorum fabricam migrant. Sed fabrica membrorum pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae. Ergo alimenta transeunt in veritatem humanae naturae. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): "The bodily food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into the texture of the members." But the texture of the members belongs to true human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality of human nature.
Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, II Metaphys., hoc modo se habet unumquodque ad veritatem, sicut se habet ad esse. Illud ergo pertinet ad veritatem naturae alicuius, quod est de constitutione naturae ipsius. Sed natura dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, in communi, secundum rationem speciei; alio modo, secundum quod est in hoc individuo. Ad veritatem igitur naturae alicuius in communi consideratae, pertinet forma et materia eius in communi accepta, ad veritatem autem naturae in hoc particulari consideratae, pertinet materia individualis signata, et forma per huiusmodi materiam individuata. Sicut de veritate humanae naturae in communi, est anima humana et corpus, sed de veritate humanae naturae in Petro et Martino, est haec anima et hoc corpus. I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), "The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being." Therefore that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered in two ways: firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as in the individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong to a thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate matter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body.
Sunt autem quaedam, quorum formae non possunt salvari nisi in una materia signata, sicut forma solis non potest salvari nisi in materia quae actu sub ea continetur. Et secundum hunc modum, aliqui posuerunt quod forma humana non potest salvari nisi in materia quadam signata, quae scilicet a principio fuit tali forma formata in primo homine. Ita quod quidquid aliud praeter illud quod ex primo parente in posteros derivatur, additum fuerit, non pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, quasi non vere accipiat formam humanae naturae. Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that the human form cannot exist but in a certain individual matter, which, they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man. So that whatever may have been added to that which was derived by posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature.
Sed illa materia quae in primo homine formae humanae fuit subiecta, in seipsa multiplicatur, et hoc modo multitudo humanorum corporum a corpore primi hominis derivatur. Et secundum hos, alimentum non convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae, sed dicunt quod alimentum accipitur ut quoddam fomentum naturae, idest ut resistat actioni caloris naturalis, ne consumat humidum radicale; sicut plumbum vel stannum adiungitur argento, ne consumatur per ignem. But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in this way the multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to these, the food is not changed into true human nature; we take food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural heat, and prevent the consumption of the "radical humor"; just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed by fire.
Sed haec positio est multipliciter irrationabilis. Primo quidem, quia eiusdem rationis est quod aliqua forma possit fieri in alia materia, et quod possit propriam materiam deserere, et ideo omnia generabilia sunt corruptibilia, et e converso. Manifestum est autem quod forma humana potest deficere ab hac materia quae ei subiicitur, alioquin corpus humanum corruptibile non esset. Unde relinquitur quod et alii materiae advenire possit, aliquo alio in veritatem humanae naturae transeunte. Secundo, quia in omnibus quorum materia invenitur tota sub uno individuo, non est nisi unum individuum in una specie, sicut patet in sole et luna, et huiusmodi. Sic igitur non esset nisi unum individuum humanae speciei. Tertio, quia non est possibile quod multiplicatio materiae attendatur nisi vel secundum quantitatem tantum, sicut accidit in rarefactis, quorum materia suscipit maiores dimensiones; vel etiam secundum substantiam materiae. Sola autem eadem substantia materiae manente, non potest dici quod sit multiplicata, quia idem ad seipsum non constituit multitudinem, cum necesse sit omnem multitudinem ex aliqua divisione causari. Unde oportet quod aliqua alia substantia materiae adveniat, vel per creationem, vel per conversionem alterius in ipsam. Unde relinquitur quod non potest aliqua materia multiplicari, nisi vel per rarefactionem, sicut cum ex aqua fit aer; vel per conversionem alterius rei, sicut multiplicatur ignis per additionem lignorum; vel per creationem materiae. Sed manifestum est multiplicationem materiae in humanis corporibus non accidere per rarefactionem, quia sic corpora hominum perfectae aetatis essent imperfectiora quam corpora puerorum. Nec iterum per creationem novae materiae, quia secundum Gregorium, omnia sunt simul creata secundum substantiam materiae, licet non secundum speciem formae. Unde relinquitur quod multiplicatio corporis humani non fit nisi per hoc, quod alimentum convertitur in veritatem humani corporis. Quarto, quia cum homo non differat ab animalibus et plantis secundum animam vegetabilem, sequeretur quod etiam corpora animalium et plantarum non multiplicarentur per conversionem alimenti in corpus nutritum, sed per quandam multiplicationem. Quae non potest esse naturalis, cum materia secundum naturam non extendatur nisi usque ad certam quantitatem; nec iterum inveniatur aliquid naturaliter crescere, nisi per rarefactionem, vel conversionem alterius in ipsum. Et sic totum opus generativae et nutritivae, quae dicuntur vires naturales, esset miraculosum. Quod est omnino inconveniens. But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to the same that a form can be produced in another matter, or that it can cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can be generated are corruptible, and conversely. Now it is manifest that the human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its subject: else the human body would not be corruptible. Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that something else be changed into true human nature. Secondly, because in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual there is only one individual in the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and such like. Thus there would only be one individual of the human species. Thirdly, because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of the substance itself of the matter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it cannot be said to be multiplied; for multitude cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result from division. Therefore some other substance must be added to matter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into it. Consequently no matter can be multiplied save either by rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some other things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or lastly by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body of a child. Nor does it occur by creation of flesh matter: for, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): "All things were created together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific form." Consequently the multiplication of the human body can only be the result of the food being changed into the true human nature. Fourthly, because, since man does not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants do not increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication. Which multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does anything increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change of something else into it. Consequently the whole process of generation and nourishment, which are called "natural forces," would be miraculous. Which is altogether inadmissible.
Unde alii dixerunt quod forma humana potest quidem fieri de novo in aliqua alia materia, si consideretur natura humana in communi, non autem si accipiatur prout est in hoc individuo, in quo forma humana fixa manet in quadam materia determinata, cui primo imprimitur in generatione huius individui, ita quod illam materiam nunquam deserit usque ad ultimam individui corruptionem. Et hanc materiam dicunt principaliter pertinere ad veritatem humanae naturae. Sed quia huiusmodi materia non sufficit ad quantitatem debitam, requiritur ut adveniat alia materia per conversionem alimenti in substantiam nutriti, quantum sufficiat ad debitum augmentum. Et hanc materiam dicunt secundario pertinere ad veritatem humanae naturae, quia non requiritur ad primum esse individui, sed ad quantitatem eius. Iam vero si quid aliud advenit ex alimento, non pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, proprie loquendo. Sed hoc etiam est inconveniens. Primo quidem, quia haec opinio iudicat de materia corporum viventium, ad modum corporum inanimatorum; in quibus etsi sit virtus ad generandum simile in specie, non tamen est virtus in eis ad generandum aliquid sibi simile secundum individuum; quae quidem virtus in corporibus viventibus est virtus nutritiva. Nihil ergo per virtutem nutritivam adderetur corporibus viventibus, si alimentum in veritatem naturae ipsorum non converteretur. Secundo quia virtus activa quae est in semine, est quaedam impressio derivata ab anima generantis, sicut supra dictum est. Unde non potest esse maioris virtutis in agendo, quam ipsa anima a qua derivatur. Si ergo ex virtute seminis vere assumit aliqua materia formam naturae humanae, multo magis anima in nutrimentum coniunctum poterit veram formam naturae humanae imprimere per potentiam nutritivam. Tertio, quia nutrimento indigetur non solum ad augmentum, alioquin terminato augmento necessarium non esset, sed etiam ad restaurandum illud quod deperditur per actionem caloris naturalis. Non autem esset restauratio, nisi id quod ex alimento generatur, succederet in locum deperditi. Unde sicut id quod primo inerat, est de veritate humanae naturae, ita et id quod ex alimento generatur. Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature in general: but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the individual the form remains confined to a certain determinate matter, on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution of the individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the true human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the requisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through the change of food into the substance of the individual partaking thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase required. And this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human nature: because it is not required for the primary existence of the individual, but for the quantity due to him. And if anything further is produced from the food, this does not belong to true human nature, properly speaking. However, this also is inadmissible. First, because this opinion judges of living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in which, although there be a power of generating their like in species, there is not the power of generating their like in the individual; which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing, therefore, would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power, if their food were not changed into their true nature. Secondly, because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from the soul of the begetter, as stated above (Question [118], Article [1]). Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal power a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true form of human nature on the food which is assimilated. Thirdly, because food is needed not only for growth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the action of natural heat. But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food, took the place of what is lost. Wherefore just as that which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that which is formed from the food.
Et ideo, secundum alios, dicendum est quod alimentum vere convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae, inquantum vere accipit speciem carnis et ossis et huiusmodi partium. Et hoc est quod dicit philosophus in II de anima, quod alimentum nutrit inquantum est potentia caro. Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): "Food nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus non dicit quod totum quod in os intrat, per secessum emittatur, sed omne, quia de quolibet cibo aliquid impurum per secessum emittitur. Vel potest dici quod quidquid ex alimento generatur, potest etiam per calorem naturalem resolvi, et per poros quosdam occultos emitti, ut Hieronymus exponit. Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord does not say that the "whole" of what enters into the mouth, but "all"—because something from every kind of food is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and be cast aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage.
Ad secundum dicendum quod aliqui per carnem secundum speciem intellexerunt id quod primo accipit speciem humanam, quod sumitur a generante, et hoc dicunt semper manere, quousque individuum durat. Carnem vero secundum materiam dicunt esse quae generatur ex alimento, et hanc dicunt non semper permanere, sed quod sicut advenit, ita abscedit. Sed hoc est contra intentionem Aristotelis. Dicit enim ibi quod, sicut in unoquoque habentium speciem in materia, puta in ligno et lapide, ita et in carne hoc est secundum speciem, et illud secundum materiam. Manifestum est autem quod praedicta distinctio locum non habet in rebus inanimatis, quae non generantur ex semine, nec nutriuntur. Et iterum, cum id quod ex alimento generatur, adiungatur corpori nutrito per modum mixtionis, sicut aqua miscetur vino, ut ponit exemplum ibidem philosophus; non potest alia esse natura eius quod advenit, et eius cui advenit, cum iam sit factum unum per veram mixtionem. Unde nulla ratio est quod unum consumatur per calorem naturalem, et alterum maneat. Reply to Objection 2: By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood that which first receives the human species, which is derived from the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does. By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what is generated from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For he says there, that "just as in things which have their species in matter"—for instance, wood or stone—"so in flesh, there is something belonging to the species, and something belonging to matter." Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things, which are not generated seminally, or nourished. Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing with, the body so nourished, just as water is mixed with wine, as the Philosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and that to which it is added, cannot be different natures, since they are already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason for saying that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains.
Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod haec distinctio philosophi non est secundum diversas carnes, sed est eiusdem carnis secundum diversam considerationem. Si enim consideretur caro secundum speciem, idest secundum id quod est formale in ipsa, sic semper manet, quia semper manet natura carnis, et dispositio naturalis ipsius. Sed si consideretur caro secundum materiam, sic non manet, sed paulatim consumitur et restauratur, sicut patet in igne fornacis, cuius forma manet, sed materia paulatim consumitur, et alia in locum eius substituitur. It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh considered from different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according to the species, that is, according to that which is formed therein, thus it remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains together with its natural disposition. But if we consider flesh according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter is substituted in its place.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ad humidum radicale intelligitur pertinere totum id in quo fundatur virtus speciei. Quod si subtrahatur, restitui non potest, sicut si amputetur manus aut pes, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Sed humidum nutrimentale est quod nondum pervenit ad suscipiendum perfecte naturam speciei, sed est in via ad hoc; sicut est sanguis, et alia huiusmodi. Unde si talia subtrahantur, remanet adhuc virtus speciei in radice, quae non tollitur. Reply to Objection 3: The "radical humor" is said to comprise whatever the virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot be renewed; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the "nutritive humor" is that which has not yet received perfectly the specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue of the species remains in its root, which is not destroyed.
Ad quartum dicendum quod omnis virtus in corpore passibili per continuam actionem debilitatur, quia huiusmodi agentia etiam patiuntur. Et ideo virtus conversiva in principio quidem tam fortis est, ut possit convertere non solum quod sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, sed etiam ad augmentum. Postea vero non potest convertere nisi quantum sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, et tunc cessat augmentum. Demum nec hoc potest, et tunc fit diminutio. Deinde, deficiente huiusmodi virtute totaliter, animal moritur. Sicut virtus vini convertentis aquam admixtam, paulatim per admixtionem aquae debilitatur, ut tandem totum fiat aquosum, ut philosophus exemplificat in I de Generat. Reply to Objection 4: Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this; and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether, the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further additions of water, so as to become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5).
Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I de Generat. quando aliqua materia per se convertitur in ignem, tunc dicitur ignis de novo generari, quando vero aliqua materia convertitur in ignem praeexistentem, dicitur ignis nutriri. Unde si tota materia simul amittat speciem ignis, et alia materia convertatur in ignem, erit alius ignis numero. Si vero, paulatim combusto uno ligno, aliud substituatur, et sic deinceps quousque omnia prima consumantur, semper remanet idem ignis numero, quia semper quod additur, transit in praeexistens. Et similiter est intelligendum in corporibus viventibus, in quibus ex nutrimento restauratur id quod per calorem naturalem consumitur. Reply to Objection 5: As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to be generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire already existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the entire matter together loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into fire, there will be another distinct fire. But if, while one piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on until the first piece is entirely consumed, the same identical fire will remain all the time: because that which is added passes into what pre-existed. It is the same with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed by natural heat.

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First Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 119 [ << | >> ]
Article: 2  [ << | >> ]

Whether the semen is produced from surplus food?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod semen non sit de superfluo alimenti, sed de substantia generantis. Dicit enim Damascenus quod generatio est opus naturae ex substantia generantis producens quod generatur. Sed id quod generatur, generatur ex semine. Ergo semen est de substantia generantis. Objection 1: It would seem that the semen is not produced from the surplus food, but from the substance of the begetter. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 8) that "generation is a work of nature, producing, from the substance of the begetter, that which is begotten." But that which is generated is produced from the semen. Therefore the semen is produced from the substance of the begetter.
Praeterea, secundum hoc filius assimilatur patri, quod ab eo aliquid accipit. Sed si semen ex quo aliquid generatur, sit de superfluo alimenti; nihil acciperet aliquis ab avo et praecedentibus, in quibus hoc alimentum nullo modo fuit. Ergo non assimilaretur aliquis avo et praecedentibus, magis quam aliis hominibus. Objection 2: Further, the son is like his father, in respect of that which he receives from him. But if the semen from which something is generated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom the food never existed. Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or ancestors, than to any other men.
Praeterea, alimentum hominis generantis quandoque est ex carnibus bovis, vel porci, et aliorum huiusmodi. Si igitur semen esset de superfluo alimenti, homo generatus ex semine maiorem affinitatem haberet cum bove et porco, quam cum patre et aliis consanguineis. Objection 3: Further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh of cows, pigs and suchlike. If therefore, the semen were produced from surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to the cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, X super Gen. ad Litt., quod nos fuimus in Adam non solum secundum seminalem rationem, sed etiam secundum corpulentam substantiam. Hoc autem non esset, si semen esset ex superfluo alimenti. Ergo semen non est superfluo alimenti. Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were in Adam "not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance of the body." But this would not be, if the semen were produced from surplus food. Therefore the semen is not produced therefrom.
Sed contra est quod philosophus probat multipliciter, in libro de Generat. Animal., quod semen est superfluum alimenti. On the contrary, The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener. Animal. i, 18) that "the semen is surplus food."
Respondeo dicendum quod ista quaestio aliqualiter dependet ex praemissis. Si enim in natura humana est virtus ad communicandum suam formam materiae alienae non solum in alio, sed etiam in ipso; manifestum est quod alimentum, quod est in principio dissimile, in fine fit simile per formam communicatam. Est autem naturalis ordo ut aliquid gradatim de potentia reducatur in actum, et ideo in his quae generantur, invenimus quod primo unumquodque est imperfectum, et postea perficitur. Manifestum est autem quod commune se habet ad proprium et determinatum, ut imperfectum ad perfectum, et ideo videmus quod in generatione animalis prius generatur animal, quam homo vel equus. Sic igitur et ipsum alimentum primo quidem accipit quandam virtutem communem respectu omnium partium corporis, et in fine determinatur ad hanc partem vel ad illam. I answer that, This question depends in some way on what has been stated above (Article [1]; Question [118], Article [1]). For if human nature has a virtue for the communication of its form to alien matter not only in another, but also in its own subject; it is clear that the food which at first is dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form communicated to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a thing should be reduced from potentiality to act gradually: hence in things generated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is afterwards perfected. But it is clear that the common is to the proper and determinate, as imperfect is to perfect: therefore we see that in the generation of an animal, the animal is generated first, then the man or the horse. So therefore food first of all receives a certain common virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which virtue is subsequently determinate to this or that part.
Non autem est possibile quod accipiatur pro semine id quod iam conversum est in substantiam membrorum, per quandam resolutionem. Quia illud resolutum, si non retineret naturam eius a quo resolvitur, tunc iam esset recedens a natura generantis, quasi in via corruptionis existens; et sic non haberet virtutem convertendi aliud in similem naturam. Si vero retineret naturam eius a quo resolvitur, tunc, cum esset contractum ad determinatam partem, non haberet virtutem movendi ad naturam totius, sed solum ad naturam partis. Nisi forte quis dicat quod esset resolutum ab omnibus partibus corporis, et quod retineat naturam omnium partium. Et sic semen esset quasi quoddam parvum animal in actu; et generatio animalis ex animali non esset nisi per divisionem, sicut lutum generatur ex luto, et sicut accidit in animalibus quae decisa vivunt. Hoc autem est inconveniens. Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what is already transformed into the substance of the members. For this solution, if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken from, it would no longer be of the nature of the begetter, and would be due to a process of corruption; and consequently it would not have the power of transforming something else into the likeness of that nature. But if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from, then, since it is limited to a certain part of the body, it would not have the power of moving towards (the production of) the whole nature, but only the nature of that part. Unless one were to say that the solution is taken from all the parts of the body, and that it retains the nature of each part. Thus the semen would be a small animal in act; and generation of animal from animal would be a mere division, as mud is generated from mud, and as animals which continue to live after being cut in two: which is inadmissible.
Relinquitur ergo quod semen non sit decisum ab eo quod erat actu totum; sed magis sit in potentia totum, habens virtutem ad productionem totius corporis, derivatam an anima generantis, ut supra dictum est. Hoc autem quod est in potentia ad totum, est illud quod generatur ex alimento, antequam convertatur in substantiam membrorum. Et ideo ex hoc semen accipitur. Et secundum hoc, virtus nutritiva dicitur deservire generativae, quia id quod est conversum per virtutem nutritivam, accipitur a virtute generativa ut semen. Et huius signum ponit philosophus, quod animalia magni corporis, quae indigent multo nutrimento, sunt pauci seminis secundum quantitatem sui corporis, et paucae generationis; et similiter homines pingues sunt pauci seminis, propter eandem causam. It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something separated from what was before the actual whole; rather is it the whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of the begetter, to produce the whole body, as stated above (Article [1]; Question [108], Article [1]). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into the substance of the members. Therefore the semen is taken from this. In this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power: because what is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as semen by the generative power. A sign of this, according to the Philosopher, is that animals of great size, which require much food, have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and generated seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod generatio est de substantia generantis in animalibus et plantis, inquantum semen habet virtutem ex forma generantis, et inquantum est in potentia ad substantiam ipsius. Reply to Objection 1: Generation is from the substance of the begetter in animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the form of the begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the substance.
Ad secundum dicendum quod assimilatio generantis ad genitum non fit propter materiam, sed propter formam agentis, quod generat sibi simile. Unde non oportet ad hoc quod aliquis assimiletur avo, quod materia corporalis seminis fuerit in avo; sed quod sit in semine aliqua virtus derivata ab anima avi, mediante patre. Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is on account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that generates its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a virtue derived from the soul of the grandfather through the father.
Et similiter dicendum est ad tertium. Nam affinitas non attenditur secundum materiam, sed magis secundum derivationem formae. Reply to Objection 3: In like manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms.
Ad quartum dicendum quod verbum Augustini non est sic intelligendum, quasi in Adam actu fuerit aut seminalis ratio huius hominis propinqua, aut corpulenta eius substantia, sed utrumque fuit in Adam secundum originem. Nam et materia corporalis, quae ministrata est a matre, quam vocat corpulentam substantiam, derivatur originaliter ab Adam, et similiter virtus activa existens in semine patris, quae est huius hominis propinqua ratio seminalis. Reply to Objection 4: These words of Augustine are not to be understood as though the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from which this individual was formed were actually in Adam: but so that both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal matter, which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal substance, is originally derived from Adam: and likewise the active seminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal virtue (in the production) of this man.
Sed Christus dicitur fuisse in Adam secundum corpulentam substantiam, sed non secundum seminalem rationem. Quia materia corporis eius, quae ministrata est a matre virgine, derivata est ab Adam, sed virtus activa non est derivata ab Adam, quia corpus eius non est formatum per virtutem virilis seminis, sed operatione spiritus sancti. Talis enim partus decebat eum, qui est super omnia benedictus Deus in saecula. Amen. But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the "corporeal substance," not according to the seminal virtue. Because the matter from which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin Mother, was derived from Adam; whereas the active virtue was not derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal virtue of a man, but by the operation of the Holy Ghost. For "such a birth was becoming to Him," [*Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary, O. P.], WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen.


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