Index [<<� | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 4 [ << | >> ]
| Deinde, considerandum est de his quae exiguntur ad beatitudinem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. | We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness: and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum delectatio requiratur ad beatitudinem. | (1) Whether delight is required for happiness? |
| Secundo, quid sit principalius in beatitudine, utrum delectatio vel visio. | (2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision? |
| Tertio, utrum requiratur comprehensio. | (3) Whether comprehension is required? |
| Quarto, utrum requiratur rectitudo voluntatis. | (4) Whether rectitude of the will is required? |
| Quinto, utrum ad beatitudinem hominis requiratur corpus. | (5) Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness? |
| Sexto, utrum perfectio corporis. | (6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary? |
| Septimo, utrum aliqua exteriora bona. | (7) Whether any external goods are necessary? |
| Octavo, utrum requiratur societas amicorum. |
(8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary? |
Index [<<� | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 4 [ << | >> ]
Article: 1 [ << | >> ]
| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non requiratur ad beatitudinem. Dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Trin., quod visio est tota merces fidei. Sed id quod est praemium vel merces virtutis, est beatitudo, ut patet per philosophum in I Ethic. Ergo nihil aliud requiritur ad beatitudinem nisi sola visio. | Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not required for happiness. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "vision is the entire reward of faith." But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing besides vision is required for happiness. |
| Praeterea, beatitudo est per se sufficientissimum bonum, ut philosophus dicit I Ethic. Quod autem eget aliquo alio, non est per se sufficiens. Cum igitur essentia beatitudinis in visione Dei consistat, ut ostensum est; videtur quod ad beatitudinem non requiratur delectatio. |
Objection 2: Further, happiness is "the most self-sufficient of all goods," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which needs something else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above (Question [3], Article [8]); it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness. |
| Praeterea, operationem felicitatis seu beatitudinis oportet esse non impeditam, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Sed delectatio impedit actionem intellectus corrumpit enim aestimationem prudentiae, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo delectatio non requiritur ad beatitudinem. | Objection 3: Further, the "operation of bliss or happiness should be unhindered" (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of the intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X Confess., quod beatitudo est gaudium de veritate. | On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod quadrupliciter aliquid requiritur ad aliud. Uno modo, sicut praeambulum vel praeparatorium ad ipsum, sicut disciplina requiritur ad scientiam. Alio modo, sicut perficiens aliquid, sicut anima requiritur ad vitam corporis. Tertio modo, sicut coadiuvans extrinsecum, sicut amici requiruntur ad aliquid agendum. Quarto modo, sicut aliquid concomitans, ut si dicamus quod calor requiritur ad ignem. Et hoc modo delectatio requiritur ad beatitudinem. Delectatio enim causatur ex hoc quod appetitus requiescit in bono adepto. Unde, cum beatitudo nihil aliud sit quam adeptio summi boni, non potest esse beatitudo sine delectatione concomitante. | I answer that, One thing may be necessary for another in four ways. First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is necessary for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is necessary for the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from without: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat is necessary for fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happiness. For it is caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod merces alicui redditur, voluntas merentis requiescit, quod est delectari. Unde in ipsa ratione mercedis redditae delectatio includitur. | Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that a reward is given to anyone, the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this consists delight. Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of reward. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ex ipsa visione Dei causatur delectatio. Unde ille qui Deum videt, delectatione indigere non potest. | Reply to Objection 2: The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod delectatio concomitans operationem intellectus, non impedit ipsam, sed magis eam confortat, ut dicitur, in X Ethic., ea enim quae delectabiliter facimus, attentius et perseverantius operamur. Delectatio autem extranea impedit operationem, quandoque quidem ex intentionis distractione; quia, sicut dictum est, ad ea in quibus delectamur, magis intenti sumus; et dum uni vehementer intendimus, necesse est quod ab alio intentio retrahatur. Quandoque autem etiam ex contrarietate, sicut delectatio sensus contraria rationi, impedit aestimationem prudentiae magis quam aestimationem speculativi intellectus. | Reply to Objection 3: Delight that is attendant upon the operation of the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated in Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is extraneous to the operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the attention because, as already observed, we are more attentive to those things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to one thing, we must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on account of opposition; thus a sensual delight that is contrary to reason, hinders the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the speculative intellect. |
Index [<<� | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 4 [ << | >> ]
Article: 2 [ << | >> ]
| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio sit principalius in beatitudine quam visio. Delectatio enim, ut dicitur in X Ethic., est perfectio operationis. Sed perfectio est potior perfectibili. Ergo delectatio est potior operatione intellectus, quae est visio. | Objection 1: It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before vision. For "delight is the perfection of operation" (Ethic. x, 4). But perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, i.e. vision. |
| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio sit principalius in beatitudine quam visio. Delectatio enim, ut dicitur in X Ethic., est perfectio operationis. Sed perfectio est potior perfectibili. Ergo delectatio est potior operatione intellectus, quae est visio. | Objection 2: Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the delight they afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those operations which are necessary for the preservation of the individual and of the species, lest animals should disregard such operations. Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, which is vision. |
| Praeterea, visio respondet fidei, delectatio autem, sive fruitio, caritati. Sed caritas est maior fide, ut dicit apostolus I ad Cor. XIII. Ergo delectatio, sive fruitio, est potior visione. |
Objection 3: Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks before vision. |
| Sed contra, causa est potior effectu. Sed visio est causa delectationis. Ergo visio est potior quam delectatio. | On the contrary, The cause is greater than its effect. But vision is the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod istam quaestionem movet philosophus in X Ethic., et eam insolutam dimittit. Sed si quis diligenter consideret, ex necessitate oportet quod operatio intellectus, quae est visio, sit potior delectatione. Delectatio enim consistit in quadam quietatione voluntatis. Quod autem voluntas in aliquo quietetur, non est nisi propter bonitatem eius in quo quietatur. Si ergo voluntas quietatur in aliqua operatione, ex bonitate operationis procedit quietatio voluntatis. Nec voluntas quaerit bonum propter quietationem, sic enim ipse actus voluntatis esset finis, quod est contra praemissa. Sed ideo quaerit quod quietetur in operatione, quia operatio est bonum eius. Unde manifestum est quod principalius bonum est ipsa operatio in qua quietatur voluntas, quam quietatio voluntatis in ipso. |
I answer that, The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully, the operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of the will. Now that the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore the will reposes in an operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness of the operation. Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act of the will would be the end, which has been disproved above (Question [1], Article [1], ad 2; Question [3], Article [4]): but it seeks to be at rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently it is evident that the operation in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, delectatio perficit operationem sicut decor iuventutem, qui est ad iuventutem consequens. Unde delectatio est quaedam perfectio concomitans visionem; non sicut perfectio faciens visionem esse in sua specie perfectam. | Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight perfects operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of youth. Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own species. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod apprehensio sensitiva non attingit ad communem rationem boni, sed ad aliquod bonum particulare quod est delectabile. Et ideo secundum appetitum sensitivum, qui est in animalibus, operationes quaeruntur propter delectationem. Sed intellectus apprehendit universalem rationem boni, ad cuius consecutionem sequitur delectatio. Unde principalius intendit bonum quam delectationem. Et inde est quod divinus intellectus, qui est institutor naturae, delectationes apposuit propter operationes. Non est autem aliquid aestimandum simpliciter secundum ordinem sensitivi appetitus, sed magis secundum ordinem appetitus intellectivi. | Reply to Objection 2: The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But the intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the operations. And we should form our estimate of things not simply according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the intellectual appetite. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod caritas non quaerit bonum dilectum propter delectationem, sed hoc est ei consequens, ut delectetur in bono adepto quod amat. Et sic delectatio non respondet ei ut finis, sed magis visio, per quam primo finis fit ei praesens. | Reply to Objection 3: Charity does not seek the beloved good for the sake of delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in the good gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made present to charity. |
Index [<<� | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 4 [ << | >> ]
Article: 3 [ << | >> ]
| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem non requiratur comprehensio. Dicit enim Augustinus, ad Paulinam de videndo Deum, attingere mente Deum magna est beatitudo, comprehendere autem est impossibile. Ergo sine comprehensione est beatitudo. | Objection 1: It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf. Serm. xxxciii De Verb. Dom.]): "To reach God with the mind is happiness, to comprehend Him is impossible." Therefore happiness is without comprehension. |
| Praeterea, beatitudo est perfectio hominis secundum intellectivam partem, in qua non sunt aliae potentiae quam intellectus et voluntas, ut in primo dictum est. Sed intellectus sufficienter perficitur per visionem Dei, voluntas autem per delectationem in ipso. Ergo non requiritur comprehensio tanquam aliquod tertium. | Objection 2: Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect and will, as stated in the FP, Questions [79] and following. But the intellect is sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will by enjoying Him. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third. |
| Praeterea, beatitudo in operatione consistit. Operationes autem determinantur secundum obiecta. Obiecta autem generalia sunt duo, verum et bonum, verum correspondet visioni, et bonum correspondet delectationi. Ergo non requiritur comprehensio quasi aliquod tertium. | Objection 3: Further, happiness consists in an operation. But operations are determined by their objects: and there are two universal objects, the true and the good: of which the true corresponds to vision, and good to delight. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third. |
| Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. IX, sic currite ut comprehendatis. Sed spiritualis cursus terminatur ad beatitudinem, unde ipse dicit, II ad Tim. ult., bonum certamen certavi, cursum consummavi, fidem servavi; in reliquo reposita est mihi corona iustitiae. Ergo comprehensio requiritur ad beatitudinem. |
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:24): "So run that you may comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']." But happiness is the goal of the spiritual race: hence he says (2 Tim. 4:7,8): "I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest there is laid up for me a crown of justice." Therefore comprehension is necessary for Happiness. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, cum beatitudo consistat in consecutione ultimi finis, ea quae requiruntur ad beatitudinem sunt consideranda ex ipso ordine hominis ad finem. Ad finem autem intelligibilem ordinatur homo partim quidem per intellectum, partim autem per voluntatem. Per intellectum quidem, inquantum in intellectu praeexistit aliqua cognitio finis imperfecta. Per voluntatem autem, primo quidem per amorem, qui est primus motus voluntatis in aliquid, secundo autem, per realem habitudinem amantis ad amatum, quae quidem potest esse triplex. Quandoque enim amatum est praesens amanti, et tunc iam non quaeritur. Quandoque autem non est praesens, sed impossibile est ipsum adipisci, et tunc etiam non quaeritur. Quandoque autem possibile est ipsum adipisci, sed est elevatum supra facultatem adipiscentis, ita ut statim haberi non possit, et haec est habitudo sperantis ad speratum, quae sola habitudo facit finis inquisitionem. Et istis tribus respondent aliqua in ipsa beatitudine. Nam perfecta cognitio finis respondet imperfectae; praesentia vero ipsius finis respondet habitudini spei; sed delectatio in fine iam praesenti consequitur dilectionem, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo necesse est ad beatitudinem ista tria concurrere, scilicet visionem, quae est cognitio perfecta intelligibilis finis; comprehensionem, quae importat praesentiam finis; delectationem, vel fruitionem, quae importat quietationem rei amantis in amato. |
I answer that, Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, those things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the way in which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible end partly through his intellect, and partly through his will: through his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect: through the will, first by love which is the will's first movement towards anything; secondly, by a real relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is present to the lover: and then it is no longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is impossible to attain it: and then, too, it is not sought for. But sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the capability of the attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and this is the relation of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and this relation alone causes a search for the end. To these three, there are a corresponding three in Happiness itself. For perfect knowledge of the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight in the end now present results from love, as already stated (Article [2], ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with Happiness; to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end; and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod comprehensio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, inclusio comprehensi in comprehendente, et sic omne quod comprehenditur a finito, est finitum. Unde hoc modo Deus non potest comprehendi ab aliquo intellectu creato. Alio modo comprehensio nihil aliud nominat quam tentionem alicuius rei iam praesentialiter habitae, sicut aliquis consequens aliquem, dicitur eum comprehendere quando tenet eum. Et hoc modo comprehensio requiritur ad beatitudinem. | Reply to Objection 1: Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means nothing but the holding of something already present and possessed: thus one who runs after another is said to comprehend [*In English we should say 'catch.'] him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense comprehension is necessary for Happiness. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut ad voluntatem pertinet spes et amor, quia eiusdem est amare aliquid et tendere in illud non habitum; ita etiam ad voluntatem pertinet et comprehensio et delectatio, quia eiusdem est habere aliquid et quiescere in illo. | Reply to Objection 2: Just as hope and love pertain to the will, because it is the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards it while not possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to the will, since it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes therein. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod comprehensio non est aliqua operatio praeter visionem, sed est quaedam habitudo ad finem iam habitum. Unde etiam ipsa visio, vel res visa secundum quod praesentialiter adest, est obiectum comprehensionis. | Reply to Objection 3: Comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision; but a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore even vision itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the object of comprehension. |
Index [<<� | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 4 [ << | >> ]
Article: 4 [ << | >> ]
| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod rectitudo voluntatis non requiratur ad beatitudinem. Beatitudo enim essentialiter consistit in operatione intellectus, ut dictum est. Sed ad perfectam intellectus operationem non requiritur rectitudo voluntatis, per quam homines mundi dicuntur, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro Retract., non approbo quod in oratione dixi, Deus qui non nisi mundos verum scire voluisti. Responderi enim potest multos etiam non mundos multa scire vera. Ergo rectitudo voluntatis non requiritur ad beatitudinem. |
Objection 1: It would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an operation of the intellect, as stated above (Question [3], Article [4]). But rectitude of the will, by reason of which men are said to be clean of heart, is not necessary for the perfect operation of the intellect: for Augustine says (Retract. i, 4) "I do not approve of what I said in a prayer: O God, Who didst will none but the clean of heart to know the truth. For it can be answered that many who are not clean of heart, know many truths." Therefore rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness. |
| Praeterea, prius non dependet a posteriori. Sed operatio intellectus est prior quam operatio voluntatis. Ergo beatitudo, quae est perfecta operatio intellectus, non dependet a rectitudine voluntatis. | Objection 2: Further, what precedes does not depend on what follows. But the operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the will. Therefore Happiness, which is the perfect operation of the intellect, does not depend on rectitude of the will. |
| Praeterea, quod ordinatur ad aliquid tanquam ad finem, non est necessarium adepto iam fine, sicut navis postquam pervenitur ad portum. Sed rectitudo voluntatis, quae est per virtutem, ordinatur ad beatitudinem tanquam ad finem. Ergo, adepta beatitudine, non est necessaria rectitudo voluntatis. | Objection 3: Further, that which is ordained to another as its end, is not necessary, when the end is already gained; as a ship, for instance, after arrival in port. But rectitude of will, which is by reason of virtue, is ordained to Happiness as to its end. Therefore, Happiness once obtained, rectitude of the will is no longer necessary. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. V, beati mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt. Et Heb. XII, pacem sequimini cum omnibus, et sanctimoniam, sine qua nemo videbit Deum. |
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of heart; for they shall see God": and (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod rectitudo voluntatis requiritur ad beatitudinem et antecedenter et concomitanter. Antecedenter quidem, quia rectitudo voluntatis est per debitum ordinem ad finem ultimum. Finis autem comparatur ad id quod ordinatur ad finem, sicut forma ad materiam. Unde sicut materia non potest consequi formam, nisi sit debito modo disposita ad ipsam, ita nihil consequitur finem, nisi sit debito modo ordinatum ad ipsum. Et ideo nullus potest ad beatitudinem pervenire, nisi habeat rectitudinem voluntatis. Concomitanter autem, quia, sicut dictum est, beatitudo ultima consistit in visione divinae essentiae, quae est ipsa essentia bonitatis. Et ita voluntas videntis Dei essentiam, ex necessitate amat quidquid amat, sub ordine ad Deum; sicut voluntas non videntis Dei essentiam, ex necessitate amat quidquid amat, sub communi ratione boni quam novit. Et hoc ipsum est quod facit voluntatem rectam. Unde manifestum est quod beatitudo non potest esse sine recta voluntate. |
I answer that, Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, because rectitude of the will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. Now the end in comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared to matter. Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be duly disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except it be duly ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without rectitude of the will. Concomitantly, because as stated above (Question [3], Article [8]), final Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness. So that the will of him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in subordination to God; just as the will of him who sees not God's Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common notion of good which he knows. And this is precisely what makes the will right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness cannot be without a right will. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de cognitione veri quod non est ipsa essentia bonitatis. | Reply to Objection 1: [missing in Benziger] Augustine speaks of knowledge of the true which is not the very essence of goodness. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod omnis actus voluntatis praeceditur ab aliquo actu intellectus, aliquis tamen actus voluntatis est prior quam aliquis actus intellectus. Voluntas enim tendit in finalem actum intellectus, qui est beatitudo. Et ideo recta inclinatio voluntatis praeexigitur ad beatitudinem, sicut rectus motus sagittae ad percussionem signi. | Reply to Objection 2: Every act of the will is preceded by an act of the intellect: but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of the intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect which is happiness. And consequently right inclination of the will is required antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a right course in order to strike the target. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod non omne quod ordinatur ad finem, cessat adveniente fine, sed id tantum quod se habet in ratione imperfectionis, ut motus. Unde instrumenta motus non sunt necessaria postquam pervenitur ad finem, sed debitus ordo ad finem est necessarius. | Reply to Objection 3: Not everything that is ordained to the end, ceases with the getting of the end: but only that which involves imperfection, such as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer necessary when the end has been gained: but the due order to the end is necessary. |
Index [<<� | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 4 [ << | >> ]
Article: 5 [ << | >> ]
| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem requiratur corpus. Perfectio enim virtutis et gratiae praesupponit perfectionem naturae. Sed beatitudo est perfectio virtutis et gratiae. Anima autem sine corpore non habet perfectionem naturae, cum sit pars naturaliter humanae naturae, omnis autem pars est imperfecta a suo toto separata. Ergo anima sine corpore non potest esse beata. | Objection 1: It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness. For the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection of nature. But Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace. Now the soul, without the body, has not the perfection of nature; since it is naturally a part of human nature, and every part is imperfect while separated from its whole. Therefore the soul cannot be happy without the body. |
| Praeterea, beatitudo est operatio quaedam perfecta, ut supra dictum est. Sed operatio perfecta sequitur esse perfectum, quia nihil operatur nisi secundum quod est ens in actu. Cum ergo anima non habeat esse perfectum quando est a corpore separata, sicut nec aliqua pars quando separata est a toto; videtur quod anima sine corpore non possit esse beata. |
Objection 2: Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated above (Question [3], Articles [2],5). But perfect operation follows perfect being: since nothing operates except in so far as it is an actual being. Since, therefore, the soul has not perfect being, while it is separated from the body, just as neither has a part, while separate from its whole; it seems that the soul cannot be happy without the body. |
| Praeterea, beatitudo est perfectio hominis. Sed anima sine corpore non est homo. Ergo beatitudo non potest esse in anima sine corpore. | Objection 3: Further, Happiness is the perfection of man. But the soul, without the body, is not man. Therefore Happiness cannot be in the soul separated from the body. |
| Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in VII Ethic., felicitatis operatio, in qua consistit beatitudo, est non impedita. Sed operatio animae separatae est impedita, quia, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad Litt., inest ei naturalis quidam appetitus corpus administrandi, quo appetitu retardatur quodammodo ne tota intentione pergat in illud summum caelum, idest in visionem essentiae divinae. Ergo anima sine corpore non potest esse beata. | Objection 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13) "the operation of bliss," in which operation happiness consists, is "not hindered." But the operation of the separate soul is hindered; because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the soul "has a natural desire to rule the body, the result of which is that it is held back, so to speak, from tending with all its might to the heavenward journey," i.e. to the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore the soul cannot be happy without the body. |
| Praeterea, beatitudo est sufficiens bonum, et quietat desiderium. Sed hoc non convenit animae separatae, quia adhuc appetit corporis unionem, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo anima separata a corpore non est beata. | Objection 5: Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls desire. But this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet desires to be united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore the soul is not happy while separated from the body. |
| Praeterea, homo in beatitudine est Angelis aequalis. Sed anima sine corpore non aequatur Angelis, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo non est beata. | Objection 6: Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the soul without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Apoc. XIV, beati mortui qui in domino moriuntur. |
On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 14:13): "Happy [Douay: 'blessed'] are the dead who die in the Lord." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est beatitudo, una imperfecta, quae habetur in hac vita; et alia perfecta, quae in Dei visione consistit. Manifestum est autem quod ad beatitudinem huius vitae, de necessitate requiritur corpus. Est enim beatitudo huius vitae operatio intellectus, vel speculativi vel practici. Operatio autem intellectus in hac vita non potest esse sine phantasmate, quod non est nisi in organo corporeo, ut in primo habitum est. Et sic beatitudo quae in hac vita haberi potest, dependet quodammodo ex corpore. Sed circa beatitudinem perfectam, quae in Dei visione consistit, aliqui posuerunt quod non potest animae advenire sine corpore existenti; dicentes quod animae sanctorum a corporibus separatae, ad illam beatitudinem non perveniunt usque ad diem iudicii, quando corpora resument. Quod quidem apparet esse falsum et auctoritate, et ratione. Auctoritate quidem, quia apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. V, quandiu sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a domino; et quae sit ratio peregrinationis ostendit, subdens, per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem. Ex quo apparet quod quandiu aliquis ambulat per fidem et non per speciem, carens visione divinae essentiae, nondum est Deo praesens. Animae autem sanctorum a corporibus separatae, sunt Deo praesentes, unde subditur, audemus autem, et bonam voluntatem habemus peregrinari a corpore, et praesentes esse ad dominum. Unde manifestum est quod animae sanctorum separatae a corporibus, ambulant per speciem, Dei essentiam videntes, in quo est vera beatitudo. | I answer that, Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God. Now it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this life. For the happiness of this life consists in an operation of the intellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the intellect in this life cannot be without a phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ, as was shown in the FP, Question [84], Articles [6],7. Consequently that happiness which can be had in this life, depends, in a way, on the body. But as to perfect Happiness, which consists in the vision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul separated from the body; and have said that the souls of saints, when separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness until the Day of Judgment, when they will receive their bodies back again. And this is shown to be false, both by authority and by reason. By authority, since the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord"; and he points out the reason of this absence, saying: "For we walk by faith and not by sight." Now from this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by sight, bereft of the vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present to the Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are in God's presence; wherefore the text continues: "But we are confident and have a good will to be absent... from the body, and to be present with the Lord." Whence it is evident that the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, "walk by sight," seeing the Essence of God, wherein is true Happiness. |
| Hoc etiam per rationem apparet. Nam intellectus ad suam operationem non indiget corpore nisi propter phantasmata, in quibus veritatem intelligibilem contuetur, ut in primo dictum est. Manifestum est autem quod divina essentia per phantasmata videri non potest, ut in primo ostensum est. Unde, cum in visione divinae essentiae perfecta hominis beatitudo consistat, non dependet beatitudo perfecta hominis a corpore. Unde sine corpore potest anima esse beata. | Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms, wherein it looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the FP, Question [84], Article [7]. Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms, as stated in the FP, Question [12], Article [3]. Wherefore, since man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, it does not depend on the body. Consequently, without the body the soul can be happy. |
| Sed sciendum quod ad perfectionem alicuius rei dupliciter aliquid pertinet. Uno modo, ad constituendam essentiam rei, sicut anima requiritur ad perfectionem hominis. Alio modo requiritur ad perfectionem rei quod pertinet ad bene esse eius, sicut pulchritudo corporis, et velocitas ingenii pertinet ad perfectionem hominis. Quamvis ergo corpus primo modo ad perfectionem beatitudinis humanae non pertineat, pertinet tamen secundo modo. Cum enim operatio dependeat ex natura rei, quando anima perfectior erit in sua natura, tanto perfectius habebit suam propriam operationem, in qua felicitas consistit. Unde Augustinus, in XII super Gen. ad Litt., cum quaesivisset, utrum spiritibus defunctorum sine corporibus possit summa illa beatitudo praeberi, respondet quod non sic possunt videre incommutabilem substantiam, ut sancti Angeli vident; sive alia latentiore causa, sive ideo quia est in eis naturalis quidam appetitus corpus administrandi. | We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence thereof; thus the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as necessary for its well-being: thus, beauty of body and keenness of perfection belong to man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong in the first way to the perfection of human Happiness, yet it does in the second way. For since operation depends on a thing's nature, the more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its proper operation, wherein its happiness consists. Hence, Augustine, after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) "whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the souls of the dead separated from their bodies," answers "that they cannot see the Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It; either for some other more hidden reason, or because they have a natural desire to rule the body." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod beatitudo est perfectio animae ex parte intellectus, secundum quem anima transcendit corporis organa, non autem secundum quod est forma naturalis corporis. Et ideo illa naturae perfectio manet secundum quam ei beatitudo debetur, licet non maneat illa naturae perfectio secundum quam est corporis forma. | Reply to Objection 1: Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the part of the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the organs of the body; but not according as the soul is the natural form of the body. Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection in respect of which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that natural perfection in respect of which it is the form of the body. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod anima aliter se habet ad esse quam aliae partes. Nam esse totius non est alicuius suarum partium, unde vel pars omnino desinit esse, destructo toto, sicut partes animalis destructo animali; vel, si remanent, habent aliud esse in actu, sicut pars lineae habet aliud esse quam tota linea. Sed animae humanae remanet esse compositi post corporis destructionem, et hoc ideo, quia idem est esse formae et materia, et hoc est esse compositi. Anima autem subsistit in suo esse, ut in primo ostensum est. Unde relinquitur quod post separationem a corpore perfectum esse habeat, unde et perfectam operationem habere potest; licet non habeat perfectam naturam speciei. | Reply to Objection 2: The relation of the soul to being is not the same as that of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any individual part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be, when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when the animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual being, just as a part of a line has another being from that of the whole line. But the human soul retains the being of the composite after the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the form is the same as that of its matter, and this is the being of the composite. Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the FP, Question [75], Article [2]. It follows, therefore, that after being separated from the body it has perfect being and that consequently it can have a perfect operation; although it has not the perfect specific nature. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod beatitudo est hominis secundum intellectum, et ideo, remanente intellectu, potest inesse ei beatitudo. Sicut dentes Aethiopis possunt esse albi, etiam post evulsionem, secundum quos Aethiops dicitur albus. | Reply to Objection 3: Happiness belongs to man in respect of his intellect: and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have Happiness. Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is said to be white, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod dupliciter aliquid impeditur ab alio. Uno modo, per modum contrarietatis, sicut frigus impedit actionem caloris, et tale impedimentum operationis repugnat felicitati. Alio modo, per modum cuiusdam defectus, quia scilicet res impedita non habet quidquid ad omnimodam sui perfectionem requiritur, et tale impedimentum operationis non repugnat felicitati, sed omnimodae perfectioni ipsius. Et sic separatio a corpore dicitur animam retardare, ne tota intentione tendat in visionem divinae essentiae. Appetit enim anima sic frui Deo, quod etiam ipsa fruitio derivetur ad corpus per redundantiam, sicut est possibile. Et ideo quandiu ipsa fruitur Deo sine corpore, appetitus eius sic quiescit in eo quod habet, quod tamen adhuc ad participationem eius vellet suum corpus pertingere. | Reply to Objection 4: One thing is hindered by another in two ways. First, by way of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and such a hindrance to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of some kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is hindered has not all that is necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a hindrance to operation is not incompatible with Happiness, but prevents it from being perfect in every way. And thus it is that separation from the body is said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might to the vision of the Divine Essence. For the soul desires to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body, as far as possible. And therefore, as long as it enjoys God, without the fellowship of the body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has, in such a way, that it would still wish the body to attain to its share. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod desiderium animae separatae totaliter quiescit ex parte appetibilis, quia scilicet habet id quod suo appetitui sufficit. Sed non totaliter requiescit ex parte appetentis, quia illud bonum non possidet secundum omnem modum quo possidere vellet. Et ideo, corpore resumpto, beatitudo crescit non intensive, sed extensive. | Reply to Objection 5: The desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which suffices its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that it would wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent. |
| Ad sextum dicendum quod id quod ibidem dicitur, quod spiritus defunctorum non sic vident Deum sicut Angeli, non est intelligendum secundum inaequalitatem quantitatis, quia etiam modo aliquae animae beatorum sunt assumptae ad superiores ordines Angelorum, clarius videntes Deum quam inferiores Angeli. Sed intelligitur secundum inaequalitatem proportionis, quia Angeli, etiam infimi, habent omnem perfectionem beatitudinis quam sunt habituri, non autem animae separatae sanctorum. | Reply to Objection 6: The statement made (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) to the effect that "the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do," is not to be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because even now some souls of the Blessed are raised to the higher orders of the angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it refers to inequality of proportion: because the angels, even the lowest, have every perfection of Happiness that they ever will have, whereas the separated souls of the saints have not. |
Index [<<� | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 4 [ << | >> ]
Article: 6 [ << | >> ]
| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod perfectio corporis non requiratur ad beatitudinem hominis perfectam. Perfectio enim corporis est quoddam corporale bonum. Sed supra ostensum est quod beatitudo non consistit in corporalibus bonis. Ergo ad beatitudinem hominis non requiritur aliqua perfecta dispositio corporis. |
Objection 1: It would seem that perfection of the body is not necessary for man's perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is a bodily good. But it has been shown above (Question [2]) that Happiness does not consist in bodily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body is necessary for man's Happiness. |
| Praeterea, beatitudo hominis consistit in visione divinae essentiae, ut ostensum est. Sed ad hanc operationem nihil exhibet corpus, ut dictum est. Ergo nulla dispositio corporis requiritur ad beatitudinem. |
Objection 2: Further, man's Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, as shown above (Question [3], Article [8]). But the body has not part in this operation, as shown above (Article [5]). Therefore no disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness. |
| Praeterea, quanto intellectus est magis abstractus a corpore, tanto perfectius intelligit. Sed beatitudo consistit in perfectissima operatione intellectus. Ergo oportet omnibus modis animam esse abstractam a corpore. Nullo ergo modo requiritur aliqua dispositio corporis ad beatitudinem. | Objection 3: Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the body, the more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in the most perfect operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore, in no way is a disposition of the body necessary for Happiness. |
| Sed contra, praemium virtutis est beatitudo, unde dicitur Ioan. XIII, beati eritis, si feceritis ea. Sed sanctis repromittitur pro praemio non solum visio Dei et delectatio, sed etiam corporis bona dispositio, dicitur enim Isaiae ult., videbitis, et gaudebit cor vestrum, et ossa vestra quasi herba germinabunt. Ergo bona dispositio corporis requiritur ad beatitudinem. |
On the contrary, Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is written (Jn. 13:17): "You shall be blessed, if you do them." But the reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and enjoy God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is written (Is. 66:14): "You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and your bones shall flourish like a herb." Therefore good disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, si loquamur de beatitudine hominis qualis in hac vita potest haberi, manifestum est quod ad eam ex necessitate requiritur bona dispositio corporis. Consistit enim haec beatitudo, secundum philosophum, in operatione virtutis perfectae. Manifestum est autem quod per invaletudinem corporis, in omni operatione virtutis homo impediri potest. | I answer that, If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in "an operation according to perfect virtue"; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of the body, from every operation of virtue. |
| Sed si loquamur de beatitudine perfecta, sic quidam posuerunt quod non requiritur ad beatitudinem aliqua corporis dispositio, immo requiritur ad eam ut omnino anima sit a corpore separata. Unde Augustinus, XXII de Civ. Dei, introducit verba Porphyrii dicentis quod ad hoc quod beata sit anima, omne corpus fugiendum est. Sed hoc est inconveniens. Cum enim naturale sit animae corpori uniri, non potest esse quod perfectio animae naturalem eius perfectionem excludat. | But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that it is necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words of Porphyry who said that "for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything corporeal." But this is unreasonable. For since it is natural to the soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of the soul to exclude its natural perfection. |
| Et ideo dicendum est quod ad beatitudinem omnibus modis perfectam, requiritur perfecta dispositio corporis et antecedenter et consequenter. Antecedenter quidem, quia, ut Augustinus dicit XII super Gen. ad Litt., si tale sit corpus, cuius sit difficilis et gravis administratio, sicut caro quae corrumpitur et aggravat animam, avertitur mens ab illa visione summi caeli. Unde concludit quod, cum hoc corpus iam non erit animale, sed spirituale, tunc Angelis adaequabitur, et erit ei ad gloriam, quod sarcinae fuit. Consequenter vero, quia ex beatitudine animae fiet redundantia ad corpus, ut et ipsum sua perfectione potiatur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in Epist. ad Dioscorum, tam potenti natura Deus fecit animam, ut ex eius plenissima beatitudine redundet in inferiorem naturam incorruptionis vigor. | Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that Happiness which is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), "if body be such, that the governance thereof is difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corruptible and weighs upon the soul, the mind is turned away from that vision of the highest heaven." Whence he concludes that, "when this body will no longer be 'natural,' but 'spiritual,' then will it be equalled to the angels, and that will be its glory, which erstwhile was its burden." Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul there will be an overflow on to the body, so that this too will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) that "God gave the soul such a powerful nature that from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor of incorruption overflows into the lower nature." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in corporali bono non consistit beatitudo sicut in obiecto beatitudinis, sed corporale bonum potest facere ad aliquem beatitudinis decorem vel perfectionem. | Reply to Objection 1: Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its object: but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to Happiness. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, etsi corpus nihil conferat ad illam operationem intellectus qua Dei essentia videtur, tamen posset ab hac impedire. Et ideo requiritur perfectio corporis, ut non impediat elevationem mentis. | Reply to Objection 2: Although the body has not part in that operation of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove a hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary, lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod ad perfectam operationem intellectus requiritur quidem abstractio ab hoc corruptibili corpore, quod aggravat animam, non autem a corpore spirituali, quod erit totaliter spiritui subiectum, de quo in tertia parte huius operis dicetur. |
Reply to Objection 3: The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which weighs upon the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will be wholly subject to the spirit. On this point we shall treat in the Third Part of this work (SS, Question [82], seqq.). |
Index [<<� | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 4 [ << | >> ]
Article: 7 [ << | >> ]
| Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem requirantur etiam exteriora bona. Quod enim in praemium sanctis promittitur, ad beatitudinem pertinet. Sed sanctis repromittuntur exteriora bona, sicut cibus et potus, divitiae et regnum, dicitur enim Luc. XXII, ut edatis et bibatis super mensam meam in regno meo; et Matth. VI, thesaurizate vobis thesauros in caelo; et Matth. XXV, venite, benedicti patris mei, possidete regnum. Ergo ad beatitudinem requiruntur exteriora bona. |
Objection 1: It would seem that external goods also are necessary for Happiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs to Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for instance, food and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said (Lk. 22:30): "That you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom": and (Mt. 6:20): "Lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven": and (Mt. 25:34): "Come, ye blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom." Therefore external goods are necessary for Happiness. |
| Praeterea, secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., beatitudo est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus. Sed exteriora sunt aliqua hominis bona, licet minima, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo ipsa etiam requiruntur ad beatitudinem. | Objection 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But some of man's goods are external, although they be of least account, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore they too are necessary for Happiness. |
| Praeterea, dominus, Matth. V, dicit, merces vestra multa est in caelis. Sed esse in caelis significat esse in loco. Ergo saltem locus exterior requiritur ad beatitudinem. |
Objection 3: Further, Our Lord said (Mt. 5:12): "Your reward is very great in heaven." But to be in heaven implies being in a place. Therefore at least external place is necessary for Happiness. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXII, quid enim mihi est in caelo? Et a te quid volui super terram? Quasi dicat, nihil aliud volo nisi hoc quod sequitur, mihi adhaerere Deo bonum est. Ergo nihil aliud exterius ad beatitudinem requiritur. |
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 72:25): "For what have I in heaven? and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth?" As though to say: "I desire nothing but this,"—"It is good for me to adhere to my God." Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod ad beatitudinem imperfectam, qualis in hac vita potest haberi, requiruntur exteriora bona, non quasi de essentia beatitudinis existentia, sed quasi instrumentaliter deservientia beatitudini, quae consistit in operatione virtutis, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Indiget enim homo in hac vita necessariis corporis tam ad operationem virtutis contemplativae quam etiam ad operationem virtutis activae, ad quam etiam plura alia requiruntur, quibus exerceat opera activae virtutis. | I answer that, For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in an operation of virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. For man needs in this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of contemplative virtue, and for the operation of active virtue, for which latter he needs also many other things by means of which to perform its operations. |
| Sed ad beatitudinem perfectam, quae in visione Dei consistit, nullo modo huiusmodi bona requiruntur. Cuius ratio est quia omnia huiusmodi bona exteriora vel requiruntur ad sustentationem animalis corporis; vel requiruntur ad aliquas operationes quas per animale corpus exercemus, quae humanae vitae conveniunt. Illa autem perfecta beatitudo quae in visione Dei consistit, vel erit in anima sine corpore; vel erit in anima corpori unita non iam animali, sed spirituali. Et ideo nullo modo huiusmodi exteriora bona requiruntur ad illam beatitudinem, cum ordinentur ad vitam animalem. Et quia in hac vita magis accedit ad similitudinem illius perfectae beatitudinis felicitas contemplativa quam activa, utpote etiam Deo similior, ut ex dictis patet; ideo minus indiget huiusmodi bonis corporis, ut dicitur in X Ethic. | On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise necessary for perfect Happiness, which consists in seeing God. The reason of this is that all suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support of the animal body; or for certain operations which belong to human life, which we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that perfect Happiness which consists in seeing God, will be either in the soul separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then no longer animal but spiritual. Consequently these external goods are nowise necessary for that Happiness, since they are ordained to the animal life. And since, in this life, the felicity of contemplation, as being more Godlike, approaches nearer than that of action to the likeness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it stands in less need of these goods of the body as stated in Ethic. x, 8. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes illae corporales promissiones quae in sacra Scriptura continentur, sunt metaphorice intelligendae, secundum quod in Scripturis solent spiritualia per corporalia designari, ut ex his quae novimus, ad desiderandum incognita consurgamus, sicut Gregorius dicit in quadam homilia. Sicut per cibum et potum intelligitur delectatio beatitudinis; per divitias, sufficientia qua homini sufficiet Deus; per regnum, exaltatio hominis usque ad coniunctionem cum Deo. | Reply to Objection 1: All those material promises contained in Holy Scripture, are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture is wont to express spiritual things under the form of things corporeal, in order "that from things we know, we may rise to the desire of things unknown," as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang.). Thus food and drink signify the delight of Happiness; wealth, the sufficiency of God for man; the kingdom, the lifting up of man to union of God. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod bona ista deservientia animali vitae, non competunt vitae spirituali in qua beatitudo perfecta consistit. Et tamen erit in illa beatitudine omnium bonorum congregatio, quia quidquid boni invenitur in istis, totum habebitur in summo fonte bonorum. | Reply to Objection 2: These goods that serve for the animal life, are incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness consists. Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate of all good things, because whatever good there be in these things, we shall possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, merces sanctorum non dicitur esse in corporeis caelis, sed per caelos intelligitur altitudo spiritualium bonorum. Nihilominus tamen locus corporeus, scilicet caelum Empyreum, aderit beatis, non propter necessitatem beatitudinis, sed secundum quandam congruentiam et decorem. | Reply to Objection 3: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 5), it is not material heaven that is described as the reward of the saints, but a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods. Nevertheless a bodily place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be appointed to the Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of a certain fitness and adornment. |
Index [<<� | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 4 [ << | >> ]
Article: 8 [ << | >> ]
| Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amici sint necessarii ad beatitudinem. Futura enim beatitudo in Scripturis frequenter nomine gloriae designatur. Sed gloria consistit in hoc quod bonum hominis ad notitiam multorum deducitur. Ergo ad beatitudinem requiritur societas amicorum. | Objection 1: It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness. For future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under the name of "glory." But glory consists in man's good being brought to the notice of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness. |
| Praeterea, Boetius dicit quod nullius boni sine consortio iucunda est possessio. Sed ad beatitudinem requiritur delectatio. Ergo etiam requiritur societas amicorum. | Objection 2: Further, Boethius [*Seneca, Ep. 6] says that "there is no delight in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it with us." But delight is necessary for Happiness. Therefore fellowship of friends is also necessary. |
| Praeterea, caritas in beatitudine perficitur. Sed caritas se extendit ad dilectionem Dei et proximi. Ergo videtur quod ad beatitudinem requiratur societas amicorum. | Objection 3: Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But charity includes the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems that fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. VII, venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter cum illa, scilicet cum divina sapientia, quae consistit in contemplatione Dei. Et sic ad beatitudinem nihil aliud requiritur. | On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with divine wisdom, which consists in contemplating God. Consequently nothing else is necessary for Happiness. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, si loquamur de felicitate praesentis vitae, sicut philosophus dicit in IX Ethic., felix indiget amicis, non quidem propter utilitatem, cum sit sibi sufficiens; nec propter delectationem, quia habet in seipso delectationem perfectam in operatione virtutis; sed propter bonam operationem, ut scilicet eis benefaciat, et ut eos inspiciens benefacere delectetur, et ut etiam ab eis in benefaciendo adiuvetur. Indiget enim homo ad bene operandum auxilio amicorum, tam in operibus vitae activae, quam in operibus vitae contemplativae. | I answer that, If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, to make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do good; and again that he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order that man may do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends. |
| Sed si loquamur de perfecta beatitudine quae erit in patria, non requiritur societas amicorum de necessitate ad beatitudinem, quia homo habet totam plenitudinem suae perfectionis in Deo. Sed ad bene esse beatitudinis facit societas amicorum. Unde Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod creatura spiritualis, ad hoc quod beata sit, non nisi intrinsecus adiuvatur aeternitate, veritate, caritate creatoris. Extrinsecus vero, si adiuvari dicenda est, fortasse hoc solo adiuvatur, quod invicem vident, et de sua societate gaudent in Deo. | But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential to Happiness; since man has the entire fulness of his perfection in God. But the fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being of Happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that "the spiritual creatures receive no other interior aid to happiness than the eternity, truth, and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and rejoice in God, at their fellowship." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gloria quae est essentialis beatitudini, est quam habet homo non apud hominem, sed apud Deum. | Reply to Objection 1: That glory which is essential to Happiness, is that which man has, not with man but with God. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum illud intelligitur, quando in eo bono quod habetur, non est plena sufficientia. Quod in proposito dici non potest, quia omnis boni sufficientiam habet homo in Deo. | Reply to Objection 2: This saying is to be understood of the possession of good that does not fully satisfy. This does not apply to the question under consideration; because man possesses in God a sufficiency of every good. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod perfectio caritatis est essentialis beatitudini quantum ad dilectionem Dei, non autem quantum ad dilectionem proximi. Unde si esset una sola anima fruens Deo, beata esset, non habens proximum quem diligeret. Sed supposito proximo, sequitur dilectio eius ex perfecta dilectione Dei. Unde quasi concomitanter se habet amicitia ad beatitudinem perfectam. | Reply to Objection 3: Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness, as to the love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor. Wherefore if there were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy, though having no neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor to be there, love of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently, friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect Happiness. |