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| Deinde considerandum est de his quae consequuntur actus humanos ratione bonitatis vel malitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | We have now to consider the consequences of human actions by reason of their goodness and malice: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum actus humanus, inquantum est bonus vel malus, habeat rationem rectitudinis vel peccati. |
(1) Whether a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil? |
| Secundo, utrum habeat rationem laudabilis vel culpabilis. | (2) Whether it thereby deserves praise or blame? |
| Tertio, utrum habeat rationem meriti vel demeriti. | (3) Whether accordingly, it is meritorious or demeritorious? |
| Quarto, utrum habeat rationem meriti vel demeriti apud Deum. | (4) Whether it is accordingly meritorious or demeritorious before God? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus humanus, inquantum est bonus vel malus, non habeat rationem rectitudinis vel peccati. Peccata enim sunt monstra in natura, ut dicitur in II Physic. Monstra autem non sunt actus, sed sunt quaedam res generatae praeter ordinem naturae. Ea autem quae sunt secundum artem et rationem, imitantur ea quae sunt secundum naturam, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo actus ex hoc quod est inordinatus et malus, non habet rationem peccati. | Objection 1: It seems that a human action is not right or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil. For "monsters are the sins of nature" (Phys. ii, 8). But monsters are not actions, but things engendered outside the order of nature. Now things that are produced according to art and reason imitate those that are produced according to nature (Phys. ii, 8). Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its being inordinate and evil. |
| Praeterea, peccatum, ut dicitur in II Physic., accidit in natura et arte, cum non pervenitur ad finem intentum a natura vel arte. Sed bonitas vel malitia actus humani maxime consistit in intentione finis, et eius prosecutione. Ergo videtur quod malitia actus non inducat rationem peccati. | Objection 2: Further, sin, as stated in Phys. ii, 8 occurs in nature and art, when the end intended by nature or art is not attained. But the goodness or malice of a human action depends, before all, on the intention of the end, and on its achievement. Therefore it seems that the malice of an action does not make it sinful. |
| Praeterea, si malitia actus induceret rationem peccati, sequeretur quod ubicumque esset malum, ibi esset peccatum. Hoc autem est falsum, nam poena, licet habeat rationem mali, non tamen habet rationem peccati. Non ergo ex hoc quod aliquis actus est malus, habet rationem peccati | Objection 3: Further, if the malice of an action makes it sinful, it follows that wherever there is evil, there is sin. But this is false: since punishment is not a sin, although it is an evil. Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its being evil. |
| Sed contra, bonitas actus humani, ut supra ostensum est, principaliter dependet a lege aeterna, et per consequens malitia eius in hoc consistit, quod discordat a lege aeterna. Sed hoc facit rationem peccati, dicit enim Augustinus, XXII contra Faustum, quod peccatum est dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum aliquid contra legem aeternam. Ergo actus humanus ex hoc quod est malus, habet rationem peccati. |
On the contrary, As shown above (Question [19], Article [4]), the goodness of a human action depends principally on the Eternal Law: and consequently its malice consists in its being in disaccord with the Eternal Law. But this is the very nature of sin; for Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that "sin is a word, deed, or desire, in opposition to the Eternal Law." Therefore a human action is sinful by reason of its being evil. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod malum in plus est quam peccatum, sicut et bonum in plus est quam rectum. Quaelibet enim privatio boni in quocumque constituit rationem mali, sed peccatum proprie consistit in actu qui agitur propter finem aliquem, cum non habet debitum ordinem ad finem illum. Debitus autem ordo ad finem secundum aliquam regulam mensuratur. Quae quidem regula in his quae secundum naturam agunt, est ipsa virtus naturae, quae inclinat in talem finem. Quando ergo actus procedit a virtute naturali secundum naturalem inclinationem in finem, tunc servatur rectitudo in actu, quia medium non exit ab extremis, scilicet actus ab ordine activi principii ad finem. Quando autem a rectitudine tali actus aliquis recedit, tunc incidit ratio peccati. | I answer that, Evil is more comprehensive than sin, as also is good than right. For every privation of good, in whatever subject, is an evil: whereas sin consists properly in an action done for a certain end, and lacking due order to that end. Now the due order to an end is measured by some rule. In things that act according to nature, this rule is the natural force that inclines them to that end. When therefore an action proceeds from a natural force, in accord with the natural inclination to an end, then the action is said to be right: since the mean does not exceed its limits, viz. the action does not swerve from the order of its active principle to the end. But when an action strays from this rectitude, it comes under the notion of sin. |
| In his vero quae aguntur per voluntatem, regula proxima est ratio humana; regula autem suprema est lex aeterna. Quando ergo actus hominis procedit in finem secundum ordinem rationis et legis aeternae, tunc actus est rectus, quando autem ab hac rectitudine obliquatur, tunc dicitur esse peccatum. Manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod omnis actus voluntarius est malus per hoc quod recedit ab ordine rationis et legis aeternae, et omnis actus bonus concordat rationi et legi aeternae. Unde sequitur quod actus humanus ex hoc quod est bonus vel malus, habeat rationem rectitudinis vel peccati. |
Now in those things that are done by the will, the proximate rule is the human reason, while the supreme rule is the Eternal Law. When, therefore, a human action tends to the end, according to the order of reason and of the Eternal Law, then that action is right: but when it turns aside from that rectitude, then it is said to be a sin. Now it is evident from what has been said (Question [19], Articles [3],4) that every voluntary action that turns aside from the order of reason and of the Eternal Law, is evil, and that every good action is in accord with reason and the Eternal Law. Hence it follows that a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod monstra dicuntur esse peccata, inquantum producta sunt ex peccato in actu naturae existente. | Reply to Objection 1: Monsters are called sins, inasmuch as they result from a sin in nature's action. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est finis, scilicet ultimus, et propinquus. In peccato autem naturae, deficit quidem actus a fine ultimo, qui est perfectio generati; non tamen deficit a quocumque fine proximo; operatur enim natura aliquid formando. Similiter in peccato voluntatis, semper est defectus ab ultimo fine intento, quia nullus actus voluntarius malus est ordinabilis ad beatitudinem, quae est ultimus finis, licet non deficiat ab aliquo fine proximo, quem voluntas intendit et consequitur. Unde etiam cum ipsa intentio huius finis ordinetur ad finem ultimum, in ipsa intentione huiusmodi finis potest inveniri ratio rectitudinis et peccati. | Reply to Objection 2: The end is twofold; the last end, and the proximate end. In the sin of nature, the action does indeed fail in respect of the last end, which is the perfection of the thing generated; but it does not fail in respect of any proximate end whatever; since when nature works it forms something. In like manner, the sin of the will always fails as regards the last end intended, because no voluntary evil action can be ordained to happiness, which is the last end: and yet it does not fail in respect of some proximate end: intended and achieved by the will. Wherefore also, since the very intention of this end is ordained to the last end, this same intention may be right or sinful. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod unumquodque ordinatur ad finem per actum suum, et ideo ratio peccati, quae consistit in deviatione ab ordine ad finem, proprie consistit in actu. Sed poena respicit personam peccantem, ut in primo dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3: Each thing is ordained to its end by its action: and therefore sin, which consists in straying from the order to the end, consists properly in an action. On the other hand, punishment regards the person of the sinner, as was stated in the FP, Question [48], Article [5], ad 4; Article [6], ad 3. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus humanus, ex hoc quod est bonus vel malus, non habeat rationem laudabilis vel culpabilis. Peccatum enim contingit etiam in his quae aguntur a natura, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed tamen ea quae sunt naturalia, non sunt laudabilia nec culpabilia, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo actus humanus, ex hoc quod est malus vel peccatum, non habet rationem culpae, et per consequens nec ex hoc quod est bonus, habet rationem laudabilis. | Objection 1: It would seem that a human action does not deserve praise or blame by reason of its being good or evil. For "sin happens even in things done by nature" (Phys. ii, 8). And yet natural things are not deserving of praise or blame (Ethic. iii, 5). Therefore a human action does not deserve blame, by reason of its being evil or sinful; and, consequently, neither does it deserve praise, by reason of its being good. |
| Praeterea, sicut contingit peccatum in actibus moralibus, ita et in actibus artis, quia, ut dicitur in II Physic., peccat grammaticus non recte scribens, et medicus non recte dans potionem. Sed non culpatur artifex ex hoc quod aliquod malum facit, quia ad industriam artificis pertinet quod possit et bonum opus facere et malum, cum voluerit. Ergo videtur quod etiam actus moralis, ex hoc quod est malus, non habeat rationem culpabilis. | Objection 2: Further, just as sin occurs in moral actions, so does it happen in the productions of art: because as stated in Phys. ii, 8 "it is a sin in a grammarian to write badly, and in a doctor to give the wrong medicine." But the artist is not blamed for making something bad: because the artist's work is such, that he can produce a good or a bad thing, just as he lists. Therefore it seems that neither is there any reason for blaming a moral action, in the fact that it is evil. |
| Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod malum est infirmum et impotens. Sed infirmitas vel impotentia vel tollit vel diminuit rationem culpae. Non ergo actus humanus est culpabilis ex hoc quod est malus. | Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil is "weak and incapable." But weakness or inability either takes away or diminishes guilt. Therefore a human action does not incur guilt from being evil. |
| Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, quod laudabilia sunt virtutum opera; vituperabilia autem, vel culpabilia, opera contraria. Sed actus boni sunt actus virtutis, quia virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit, ut dicitur in II Ethic., unde actus oppositi sunt actus mali. Ergo actus humanus ex hoc quod est bonus vel malus, habet rationem laudabilis vel culpabilis. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Virt. et Vit. i) that "virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds that are opposed to virtue deserve censure and blame." But good actions are virtuous; because "virtue makes that which has it, good, and makes its action good" (Ethic. ii, 6): wherefore actions opposed to virtue are evil. Therefore a human action deserves praise or blame, through being good or evil. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut malum est in plus quam peccatum, ita peccatum est in plus quam culpa. Ex hoc enim dicitur aliquis actus culpabilis vel laudabilis, quod imputatur agenti, nihil enim est aliud laudari vel culpari, quam imputari alicui malitiam vel bonitatem sui actus. Tunc autem actus imputatur agenti, quando est in potestate ipsius, ita quod habeat dominium sui actus. Hoc autem est in omnibus actibus voluntariis, quia per voluntatem homo dominium sui actus habet, ut ex supradictis patet. Unde relinquitur quod bonum vel malum in solis actibus voluntariis constituit rationem laudis vel culpae; in quibus idem est malum, peccatum et culpa. |
I answer that, Just as evil is more comprehensive than sin, so is sin more comprehensive than blame. For an action is said to deserve praise or blame, from its being imputed to the agent: since to praise or to blame means nothing else than to impute to someone the malice or goodness of his action. Now an action is imputed to an agent, when it is in his power, so that he has dominion over it: because it is through his will that man has dominion over his actions, as was made clear above (Question [1], Articles [1],2). Hence it follows that good or evil, in voluntary actions alone, renders them worthy of praise or blame: and in such like actions, evil, sin and guilt are one and the same thing. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod actus naturales non sunt in potestate naturalis agentis, cum natura sit determinata ad unum. Et ideo, licet in actibus naturalibus sit peccatum, non tamen est ibi culpa. | Reply to Objection 1: Natural actions are not in the power of the natural agent: since the action of nature is determinate. And, therefore, although there be sin in natural actions, there is no blame. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio aliter se habet in artificialibus et aliter in moralibus. In artificialibus enim ratio ordinatur ad finem particularem, quod est aliquid per rationem excogitatum. In moralibus autem ordinatur ad finem communem totius humanae vitae. Finis autem particularis ordinatur ad finem communem. Cum ergo peccatum sit per deviationem ab ordine ad finem, ut dictum est, in actu artis contingit dupliciter esse peccatum. Uno modo, per deviationem a fine particulari intento ab artifice, et hoc peccatum erit proprium arti; puta si artifex, intendens facere bonum opus, faciat malum, vel intendens facere malum, faciat bonum. Alio modo, per deviationem a fine communi humanae vitae, et hoc modo dicetur peccare, si intendat facere malum opus, et faciat, per quod alius decipiatur. Sed hoc peccatum non est proprium artificis inquantum artifex, sed inquantum homo est. Unde ex primo peccato culpatur artifex inquantum artifex, sed ex secundo culpatur homo inquantum homo. Sed in moralibus, ubi attenditur ordo rationis ad finem communem humanae vitae, semper peccatum et malum attenditur per deviationem ab ordine rationis ad finem communem humanae vitae. Et ideo culpatur ex tali peccato homo et inquantum est homo, et inquantum est moralis. Unde philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod in arte volens peccans est eligibilior; circa prudentiam autem minus, sicut et in virtutibus moralibus, quarum prudentia est directiva. |
Reply to Objection 2: Reason stands in different relations to the productions of art, and to moral actions. In matters of art, reason is directed to a particular end, which is something devised by reason: whereas in moral matters, it is directed to the general end of all human life. Now a particular end is subordinate to the general end. Since therefore sin is a departure from the order to the end, as stated above (Article [1]), sin may occur in two ways, in a production of art. First, by a departure from the particular end intended by the artist: and this sin will be proper to the art; for instance, if an artist produce a bad thing, while intending to produce something good; or produce something good, while intending to produce something bad. Secondly, by a departure from the general end of human life: and then he will be said to sin, if he intend to produce a bad work, and does so in effect, so that another is taken in thereby. But this sin is not proper to the artist as such, but as man. Consequently for the former sin the artist is blamed as an artist; while for the latter he is blamed as a man. On the other hand, in moral matters, where we take into consideration the order of reason to the general end of human life, sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order of reason to the general end of human life. Wherefore man is blamed for such a sin, both as man and as a moral being. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art, he who sins voluntarily is preferable; but in prudence, as in the moral virtues," which prudence directs, "he is the reverse." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod illa infirmitas quae est in malis voluntariis, subiacet potestati hominis. Et ideo nec tollit nec diminuit rationem culpae. | Reply to Objection 3: Weakness that occurs in voluntary evils, is subject to man's power: wherefore it neither takes away nor diminishes guilt. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus humanus non habeat rationem meriti et demeriti, propter suam bonitatem vel malitiam. Meritum enim et demeritum dicitur per ordinem ad retributionem, quae locum solum habet in his quae ad alterum sunt. Sed non omnes actus humani boni vel mali sunt ad alterum, sed quidam sunt ad seipsum. Ergo non omnis actus humanus bonus vel malus habet rationem meriti vel demeriti. | Objection 1: It would seem that a human action is not meritorious or demeritorious on account of its goodness or malice. For we speak of merit or demerit in relation to retribution, which has no place save in matters relating to another person. But good or evil actions are not all related to another person, for some are related to the person of the agent. Therefore not every good or evil human action is meritorious or demeritorious. |
| Praeterea, nullus meretur poenam vel praemium ex hoc quod disponit ut vult de eo cuius est dominus, sicut si homo destruat rem suam, non punitur, sicut si destrueret rem alterius. Sed homo est dominus suorum actuum. Ergo ex hoc quod bene vel male disponit de suo actu, non meretur poenam vel praemium. | Objection 2: Further, no one deserves punishment or reward for doing as he chooses with that of which he is master: thus if a man destroys what belongs to him, he is not punished, as if he had destroyed what belongs to another. But man is master of his own actions. Therefore a man does not merit punishment or reward, through putting his action to a good or evil purpose. |
| Praeterea, ex hoc quod aliquis sibi ipsi acquirit bonum, non meretur ut ei bene fiat ab alio, et eadem ratio est de malis. Sed ipse actus bonus est quoddam bonum et perfectio agentis, actus autem inordinatus est quoddam malum ipsius. Non ergo ex hoc quod homo facit malum actum vel bonum, meretur vel demeretur. | Objection 3: Further, if a man acquire some good for himself, he does not on that account deserve to be benefited by another man: and the same applies to evil. Now a good action is itself a kind of good and perfection of the agent: while an inordinate action is his evil. Therefore a man does not merit or demerit, from the fact that he does a good or an evil deed. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae III, dicite iusto quoniam bene, quoniam fructum adinventionum suarum comedet. Vae impio in malum, retributio enim manuum eius fiet ei. |
On the contrary, It is written (Is. 3:10,11): "Say to the just man that it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Woe to the wicked unto evil; for the reward of his hands shall be given him." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod meritum et demeritum dicuntur in ordine ad retributionem quae fit secundum iustitiam. Retributio autem secundum iustitiam fit alicui ex eo quod agit in profectum vel nocumentum alterius. Est autem considerandum quod unusquisque in aliqua societate vivens, est aliquo modo pars et membrum totius societatis. Quicumque ergo agit aliquid in bonum vel malum alicuius in societate existentis, hoc redundat in totam societatem sicut qui laedit manum, per consequens laedit hominem. Cum ergo aliquis agit in bonum vel malum alterius singularis personae, cadit ibi dupliciter ratio meriti vel demeriti. Uno modo, secundum quod debetur ei retributio a singulari persona quam iuvat vel offendit. Alio modo, secundum quod debetur ei retributio a toto collegio. Quando vero aliquis ordinat actum suum directe in bonum vel malum totius collegii, debetur ei retributio primo quidem et principaliter a toto collegio, secundario vero, ab omnibus collegii partibus. Cum vero aliquis agit quod in bonum proprium vel malum vergit, etiam debetur ei retributio, inquantum etiam hoc vergit in commune secundum quod ipse est pars collegii, licet non debeatur ei retributio inquantum est bonum vel malum singularis personae, quae est eadem agenti, nisi forte a seipso secundum quandam similitudinem, prout est iustitia hominis ad seipsum. | I answer that, We speak of merit and demerit, in relation to retribution, rendered according to justice. Now, retribution according to justice is rendered to a man, by reason of his having done something to another's advantage or hurt. It must, moreover, be observed that every individual member of a society is, in a fashion, a part and member of the whole society. Wherefore, any good or evil, done to the member of a society, redounds on the whole society: thus, who hurts the hand, hurts the man. When, therefore, anyone does good or evil to another individual, there is a twofold measure of merit or demerit in his action: first, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the individual to whom he has done good or harm; secondly, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the whole of society. Now when a man ordains his action directly for the good or evil of the whole society, retribution is owed to him, before and above all, by the whole society; secondarily, by all the parts of society. Whereas when a man does that which conduces to his own benefit or disadvantage, then again is retribution owed to him, in so far as this too affects the community, forasmuch as he is a part of society: although retribution is not due to him, in so far as it conduces to the good or harm of an individual, who is identical with the agent: unless, perchance, he owe retribution to himself, by a sort of resemblance, in so far as man is said to be just to himself. |
| Sic igitur patet quod actus bonus vel malus habet rationem laudabilis vel culpabilis, secundum quod est in potestate voluntatis; rationem vero rectitudinis et peccati, secundum ordinem ad finem; rationem vero meriti et demeriti, secundum retributionem iustitiae ad alterum. | It is therefore evident that a good or evil action deserves praise or blame, in so far as it is in the power of the will: that it is right or sinful, according as it is ordained to the end; and that its merit or demerit depends on the recompense for justice or injustice towards another. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quandoque actus hominis boni vel mali, etsi non ordinantur ad bonum vel malum alterius singularis personae, tamen ordinantur ad bonum vel ad malum alterius quod est ipsa communitas. | Reply to Objection 1: A man's good or evil actions, although not ordained to the good or evil of another individual, are nevertheless ordained to the good or evil of another, i.e. the community. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod homo, qui habet dominium sui actus, ipse etiam, inquantum est alterius, scilicet communitatis, cuius est pars meretur aliquid vel demeretur, inquantum actus suos bene vel male disponit, sicut etiam si alia sua, de quibus communitati servire debet, bene vel male dispenset. | Reply to Objection 2: Man is master of his actions; and yet, in so far as he belongs to another, i.e. the community, of which he forms part, he merits or demerits, inasmuch as he disposes his actions well or ill: just as if he were to dispense well or ill other belongings of his, in respect of which he is bound to serve the community. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc ipsum bonum vel malum quod aliquis sibi facit per suum actum, redundat in communitatem, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3: This very good or evil, which a man does to himself by his action, redounds to the community, as stated above. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus hominis bonus vel malus non habeat rationem meriti vel demeriti per comparationem ad Deum. Quia, ut dictum est, meritum et demeritum importat ordinem ad recompensationem profectus vel damni ad alterum illati. Sed actus hominis bonus vel malus non cedit in aliquem profectum vel damnum ipsius Dei, dicitur enim Iob XXXV, si peccaveris quid ei nocebis? Porro si iuste egeris, quid donabis ei? Ergo actus hominis bonus vel malus non habet rationem meriti vel demeriti apud Deum. |
Objection 1: It would seem that man's actions, good or evil, are not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God. Because, as stated above (Article [3]), merit and demerit imply relation to retribution for good or harm done to another. But a man's action, good or evil, does no good or harm to God; for it is written (Job 35:6,7): "If thou sin, what shalt thou hurt Him?... And if thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him?" Therefore a human action, good or evil, is not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God. |
| Praeterea, instrumentum nihil meretur vel demeretur apud eum qui utitur instrumento, quia tota actio instrumenti est utentis ipso. Sed homo in agendo est instrumentum divinae virtutis principaliter ipsum moventis, unde dicitur Isaiae X, numquid gloriabitur securis contra eum qui secat in ea? Aut exaltabitur serra contra eum a quo trahitur? Ubi manifeste hominem agentem comparat instrumento. Ergo homo, bene agendo vel male, nihil meretur vel demeretur apud Deum. |
Objection 2: Further, an instrument acquires no merit or demerit in the sight of him that uses it; because the entire action of the instrument belongs to the user. Now when man acts he is the instrument of the Divine power which is the principal cause of his action; hence it is written (Is. 10:15): "Shall the axe boast itself against him that cutteth with it? Or shall the saw exalt itself against him by whom it is drawn?" where man while acting is evidently compared to an instrument. Therefore man merits or demerits nothing in God's sight, by good or evil deeds. |
| Praeterea, actus humanus habet rationem meriti vel demeriti, inquantum ordinatur ad alterum. Sed non omnes actus humani ordinantur ad Deum. Ergo non omnes actus boni vel mali habent rationem meriti vel demeriti apud Deum. | Objection 3: Further, a human action acquires merit or demerit through being ordained to someone else. But not all human actions are ordained to God. Therefore not every good or evil action acquires merit or demerit in God's sight. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccle. ult., cuncta quae fiunt adducet Deus in iudicium, sive bonum sit sive malum. Sed iudicium importat retributionem, respectu cuius meritum et demeritum dicitur. Ergo omnis actus hominis bonus vel malus habet rationem meriti vel demeriti apud Deum. |
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 12:14): "All things that are done, God will bring into judgment... whether it be good or evil." Now judgment implies retribution, in respect of which we speak of merit and demerit. Therefore every human action, both good and evil, acquires merit or demerit in God's sight. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, actus alicuius hominis habet rationem meriti vel demeriti, secundum quod ordinatur ad alterum, vel ratione eius, vel ratione communitatis. Utroque autem modo actus nostri boni vel mali habent rationem meriti vel demeriti apud Deum. Ratione quidem ipsius, inquantum est ultimus hominis finis, est autem debitum ut ad finem ultimum omnes actus referantur, ut supra habitum est. Unde qui facit actum malum non referibilem in Deum, non servat honorem Dei, qui ultimo fini debetur. Ex parte vero totius communitatis universi, quia in qualibet communitate ille qui regit communitatem, praecipue habet curam boni communis, unde ad eum pertinet retribuere pro his quae bene vel male fiunt in communitate. Est autem Deus gubernator et rector totius universi, sicut in primo habitum est, et specialiter rationalium creaturarum. Unde manifestum est quod actus humani habent rationem meriti vel demeriti per comparationem ad ipsum, alioquin sequeretur quod Deus non haberet curam de actibus humanis. |
I answer that, A human action, as stated above (Article [3]), acquires merit or demerit, through being ordained to someone else, either by reason of himself, or by reason of the community: and in each way, our actions, good and evil, acquire merit or demerit, in the sight of God. On the part of God Himself, inasmuch as He is man's last end; and it is our duty to refer all our actions to the last end, as stated above (Question [19], Article [10]). Consequently, whoever does an evil deed, not referable to God, does not give God the honor due to Him as our last end. On the part of the whole community of the universe, because in every community, he who governs the community, cares, first of all, for the common good; wherefore it is his business to award retribution for such things as are done well or ill in the community. Now God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe, as stated in the FP, Question [103], Article [5]: and especially of rational creatures. Consequently it is evident that human actions acquire merit or demerit in reference to Him: else it would follow that human actions are no business of God's. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per actum hominis Deo secundum se nihil potest accrescere vel deperire, sed tamen homo, quantum in se est, aliquid subtrahit Deo, vel ei exhibet, cum servat vel non servat ordinem quem Deus instituit. | Reply to Objection 1: God in Himself neither gains nor losses anything by the action of man: but man, for his part, takes something from God, or offers something to Him, when he observes or does not observe the order instituted by God. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod homo sic movetur a Deo ut instrumentum, quod tamen non excluditur quin moveat seipsum per liberum arbitrium, ut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo per suum actum meretur vel demeretur apud Deum. |
Reply to Objection 2: Man is so moved, as an instrument, by God, that, at the same time, he moves himself by his free-will, as was explained above (Question [9], Article [6], ad 3). Consequently, by his action, he acquires merit or demerit in God's sight. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod homo non ordinatur ad communitatem politicam secundum se totum, et secundum omnia sua, et ideo non oportet quod quilibet actus eius sit meritorius vel demeritorius per ordinem ad communitatem politicam. Sed totum quod homo est, et quod potest et habet, ordinandum est ad Deum, et ideo omnis actus hominis bonus vel malus habet rationem meriti vel demeriti apud Deum, quantum est ex ipsa ratione actus. | Reply to Objection 3: Man is not ordained to the body politic, according to all that he is and has; and so it does not follow that every action of his acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body politic. But all that man is, and can, and has, must be referred to God: and therefore every action of man, whether good or bad, acquires merit or demerit in the sight of God, as far as the action itself is concerned. |