St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

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OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (FOUR ARTICLES)

Deinde considerandum est de causa habituum. Et primo, quantum ad generationem ipsorum; secundo, quantum ad augmentum; tertio, quantum ad diminutionem et corruptionem. We must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as to their diminution and corruption.
Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum aliquis habitus sit a natura. (1) Whether any habit is from nature?
Secundo, utrum aliquis habitus ex actibus causetur. (2) Whether any habit is caused by acts?
Tertio, utrum per unum actum possit generari habitus. (3) Whether any habit can be caused by one act?
Quarto, utrum aliqui habitus sint in hominibus infusi a Deo. (4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God?

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Whether any habit is from nature?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus habitus sit a natura. Eorum enim quae sunt a natura, usus non subiacet voluntati. Sed habitus est quo quis utitur cum voluerit, ut dicit Commentator, in III de anima. Ergo habitus non est a natura. Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use of those things which are from nature does not depend on the will. But habit "is that which we use when we will," as the Commentator says on De Anima iii. Therefore habit is not from nature.
Praeterea, natura non facit per duo quod per unum potest facere. Sed potentiae animae sunt a natura. Si igitur habitus potentiarum a natura essent, habitus et potentia essent unum. Objection 2: Further, nature does not employ two where one is sufficient. But the powers of the soul are from nature. If therefore the habits of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be one.
Praeterea, natura non deficit in necessariis. Sed habitus sunt necessarii ad bene operandum, ut supra dictum est. Si igitur habitus aliqui essent a natura, videtur quod natura non deficeret quin omnes habitus necessarios causaret. Patet autem hoc esse falsum. Ergo habitus non sunt a natura. Objection 3: Further, nature does not fail in necessaries. But habits are necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above (Question [49], Article [4]). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits: but this is clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature.
Sed contra est quod in VI Ethic., inter alios habitus ponitur intellectus principiorum, qui est a natura, unde et principia prima dicuntur naturaliter cognita. On the contrary, In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits, place is given to understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature: wherefore also first principles are said to be known naturally.
Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest esse naturale alicui dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum naturam speciei, sicut naturale est homini esse risibile, et igni ferri sursum. Alio modo, secundum naturam individui, sicut naturale est Socrati vel Platoni esse aegrotativum vel sanativum, secundum propriam complexionem. Rursus, secundum utramque naturam potest dici aliquid naturale dupliciter, uno modo, quia totum est a natura; alio modo, quia secundum aliquid est a natura, et secundum aliquid est ab exteriori principio. Sicut cum aliquis sanatur per seipsum, tota sanitas est a natura, cum autem aliquis sanatur auxilio medicinae, sanitas partim est a natura, partim ab exteriori principio. I answer that, One thing can be natural to another in two ways. First in respect of the specific nature, as the faculty of laughing is natural to man, and it is natural to fire to have an upward tendency. Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural to Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in accordance with their respective temperaments. Again, in respect of both natures, something may be called natural in two ways: first, because it entirely is from the nature; secondly, because it is partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle. For instance, when a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but when a man is healed by means of medicine, health is partly from nature, partly from an extrinsic principle.
Sic igitur si loquamur de habitu secundum quod est dispositio subiecti in ordine ad formam vel naturam, quolibet praedictorum modorum contingit habitum esse naturalem. Est enim aliqua dispositio naturalis quae debetur humanae speciei, extra quam nullus homo invenitur. Et haec est naturalis secundum naturam speciei. Sed quia talis dispositio quandam latitudinem habet, contingit diversos gradus huiusmodi dispositionis convenire diversis hominibus secundum naturam individui. Et huiusmodi dispositio potest esse vel totaliter a natura, vel partim a natura et partim ab exteriori principio, sicut dictum est de his qui sanantur per artem. Thus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either of the foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by the human species, so that no man can be without it. And this disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since such a disposition has a certain latitude, it happens that different grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of the individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle, as we have said of those who are healed by means of art.
Sed habitus qui est dispositio ad operationem, cuius subiectum est potentia animae, ut dictum est, potest quidem esse naturalis et secundum naturam speciei, et secundum naturam individui. Secundum quidem naturam speciei, secundum quod se tenet ex parte ipsius animae, quae, cum sit forma corporis, est principium specificum. Secundum autem naturam individui, ex parte corporis, quod est materiale principium. Sed tamen neutro modo contingit in hominibus esse habitus naturales ita quod sint totaliter a natura. In Angelis siquidem contingit, eo quod habent species intelligibiles naturaliter inditas, quod non competit animae humanae, ut in primo dictum est. But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is a power of the soul, as stated above (Question [50], Article [2]), may be natural whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the individual nature: in respect of the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the specific principle; but in respect of the individual nature, on the part of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way does it happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, since they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which cannot be said of the human soul, as we have said in the FP, Question [55], Article [2]; FP, Question [84], Article [3].
Sunt ergo in hominibus aliqui habitus naturales, tanquam partim a natura existentes et partim ab exteriori principio; aliter quidem in apprehensivis potentiis, et aliter in appetitivis. In apprehensivis enim potentiis potest esse habitus naturalis secundum inchoationem, et secundum naturam speciei, et secundum naturam individui. Secundum quidem naturam speciei, ex parte ipsius animae, sicut intellectus principiorum dicitur esse habitus naturalis. Ex ipsa enim natura animae intellectualis, convenit homini quod statim, cognito quid est totum et quid est pars, cognoscat quod omne totum est maius sua parte, et simile est in ceteris. Sed quid sit totum, et quid sit pars, cognoscere non potest nisi per species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus acceptas. Et propter hoc philosophus, in fine posteriorum, ostendit quod cognitio principiorum provenit nobis ex sensu. There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their existence, partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic principle: in one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive powers there may be a natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature, and in respect of the individual nature. This happens with regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus the understanding of first principles is called a natural habit. For it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part: and in like manner with regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is a part—this he cannot know except through the intelligible species which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason, the Philosopher at the end of the Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses.
Secundum vero naturam individui, est aliquis habitus cognoscitivus secundum inchoationem naturalis, inquantum unus homo, ex dispositione organorum, est magis aptus ad bene intelligendum quam alius, inquantum ad operationem intellectus indigemus virtutibus sensitivis. But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is natural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from the disposition of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well, since we need the sensitive powers for the operation of the intellect.
In appetitivis autem potentiis non est aliquis habitus naturalis secundum inchoationem, ex parte ipsius animae, quantum ad ipsam substantiam habitus, sed solum quantum ad principia quaedam ipsius, sicut principia iuris communis dicuntur esse seminalia virtutum. Et hoc ideo, quia inclinatio ad obiecta propria, quae videtur esse inchoatio habitus, non pertinet ad habitum, sed magis pertinet ad ipsam rationem potentiarum. In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance of the habit; but only as to certain principles thereof, as, for instance, the principles of common law are called the "nurseries of virtue." The reason of this is because the inclination to its proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of a habit, does not belong to the habit, but rather to the very nature of the powers.
Sed ex parte corporis, secundum naturam individui, sunt aliqui habitus appetitivi secundum inchoationes naturales. Sunt enim quidam dispositi ex propria corporis complexione ad castitatem vel mansuetudinem, vel ad aliquid huiusmodi. But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings. For some are disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or such like.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de natura secundum quod dividitur contra rationem et voluntatem, cum tamen ipsa ratio et voluntas ad naturam hominis pertineant. Reply to Objection 1: This objection takes nature as divided against reason and will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of man.
Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquid etiam naturaliter potest superaddi potentiae, quod tamen ad ipsam potentiam pertinere non potest. Sicut in Angelis non potest pertinere ad ipsam potentiam intellectivam quod sit per se cognoscitiva omnium, quia oporteret quod esset actus omnium, quod solius Dei est. Id enim quo aliquid cognoscitur, oportet esse actualem similitudinem eius quod cognoscitur, unde sequeretur, si potentia Angeli per seipsam cognosceret omnia, quod esset similitudo et actus omnium. Unde oportet quod superaddantur potentiae intellectivae ipsius aliquae species intelligibiles, quae sunt similitudines rerum intellectarum, quia per participationem divinae sapientiae, et non per essentiam propriam, possunt intellectus eorum esse actu ea quae intelligunt. Et sic patet quod non omne id quod pertinet ad habitum naturalem, potest ad potentiam pertinere. Reply to Objection 2: Something may be added even naturally to the nature of a power, while it cannot belong to the power itself. For instance, with regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the intellective power itself capable of knowing all things: for thus it would have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone. Because that by which something is known, must needs be the actual likeness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the power of the angel knew all things by itself, that it was the likeness and act of all things. Wherefore there must needs be added to the angels' intellective power, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things understood: for it is by participation of the Divine wisdom and not by their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those things which they understand. And so it is clear that not everything belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power.
Ad tertium dicendum quod natura non aequaliter se habet ad causandas omnes diversitates habituum, quia quidam possunt causari a natura, quidam non, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non sequitur, si aliqui habitus sint naturales, quod omnes sint naturales. Reply to Objection 3: Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the various kinds of habits: since some can be caused by nature, and some not, as we have said above. And so it does not follow that because some habits are natural, therefore all are natural.

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Article: 2  [ << | >> ]

Whether any habit is caused by acts?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus habitus possit ex actu causari. Habitus enim est qualitas quaedam, ut supra dictum est. Omnis autem qualitas causatur in aliquo subiecto, inquantum est alicuius receptivum. Cum igitur agens ex hoc quod agit, non recipiat aliquid, sed magis ex se emittat; videtur quod non possit aliquis habitus in agente ex propriis actibus generari. Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit is a quality, as we have said above (Question [49], Article [1]). Now every quality is caused in a subject, according to the latter's receptivity. Since then the agent, inasmuch as it acts, does not receive but rather gives: it seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own acts.
Praeterea, illud in quo causatur aliqua qualitas, movetur ad qualitatem illam, sicut patet in re calefacta vel infrigidata, quod autem producit actum causantem qualitatem, movet, ut patet de calefaciente vel infrigidante. Si igitur in aliquo causaretur habitus per actum sui ipsius, sequeretur quod idem esset movens et motum, agens et patiens. Quod est impossibile, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Objection 2: Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or cooled: whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as may be seen in that which heats or cools. If therefore habits were caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would be mover and moved, active and passive: which is impossible, as stated in Physics iii, 8.
Praeterea, effectus non potest esse nobilior sua causa. Sed habitus est nobilior quam actus praecedens habitum, quod patet ex hoc, quod nobiliores actus reddit. Ergo habitus non potest causari ab actu praecedente habitum. Objection 3: Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its cause. But habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit; as is clear from the fact that the latter produces more noble acts. Therefore habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes the habit.
Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II Ethic., docet habitus virtutum et vitiorum ex actibus causari. On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1,2) teaches that habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts.
Respondeo dicendum quod in agente quandoque est solum activum principium sui actus, sicut in igne est solum principium activum calefaciendi. Et in tali agente non potest aliquis habitus causari ex proprio actu, et inde est quod res naturales non possunt aliquid consuescere vel dissuescere, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Invenitur autem aliquod agens in quo est principium activum et passivum sui actus, sicut patet in actibus humanis. Nam actus appetitivae virtutis procedunt a vi appetitiva secundum quod movetur a vi apprehensiva repraesentante obiectum, et ulterius vis intellectiva, secundum quod ratiocinatur de conclusionibus, habet sicut principium activum propositionem per se notam. Unde ex talibus actibus possunt in agentibus aliqui habitus causari, non quidem quantum ad primum activum principium, sed quantum ad principium actus quod movet motum. Nam omne quod patitur et movetur ab alio, disponitur per actum agentis, unde ex multiplicatis actibus generatur quaedam qualitas in potentia passiva et mota, quae nominatur habitus. Sicut habitus virtutum moralium causantur in appetitivis potentiis, secundum quod moventur a ratione, et habitus scientiarum causantur in intellectu, secundum quod movetur a primis propositionibus. I answer that, In the agent there is sometimes only the active principle of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active principle of heating. And in such an agent a habit cannot be caused by its own act: for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed or unaccustomed, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a certain agent is to be found, in which there is both the active and the passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and further, the intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self-evident proposition. Wherefore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not indeed with regard to the first active principle, but with regard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is passive and moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent; wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit: just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect, according as it is moved by first propositions.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod agens, inquantum est agens, non recipit aliquid. Sed inquantum agit motum ab alio, sic recipit aliquid a movente, et sic causatur habitus. Reply to Objection 1: The agent, as agent, does not receive anything. But in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives something from that which moves it: and thus is a habit caused.
Ad secundum dicendum quod idem, secundum idem, non potest esse movens et motum. Nihil autem prohibet idem a seipso moveri secundum diversa, ut in VIII Physic. probatur. Reply to Objection 2: The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text. 28,29.
Ad tertium dicendum quod actus praecedens habitum inquantum procedit a principio activo, procedit a nobiliori principio quam sit habitus generatus, sicut ipsa ratio est nobilius principium quam sit habitus virtutis moralis in vi appetitiva per actuum consuetudines generatus; et intellectus principiorum est nobilius principium quam scientia conclusionum. Reply to Objection 3: The act which precedes the habit, in so far as it comes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent principle than is the habit caused thereby: just as the reason is a more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced in the appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of first principles is a more excellent principle than the science of conclusions.

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Article: 3  [ << | >> ]

Whether a habit can be caused by one act?

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod per unum actum possit habitus generari. Demonstratio enim actus rationis est. Sed per unam demonstrationem causatur scientia quae est habitus conclusionis unius. Ergo habitus potest causari ex uno actu. Objection 1: It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit of one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be caused by one act.
Praeterea, sicut contingit actus crescere per multiplicationem, ita contingit actum crescere per intensionem. Sed multiplicatis actibus, generatur habitus. Ergo etiam si multum intendatur unus actus, poterit esse causa generativa habitus. Objection 2: Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication so do they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by multiplication of acts. Therefore also if an act be very intense, it can be the generating cause of a habit.
Praeterea, sanitas et aegritudo sunt habitus quidam. Sed ex uno actu contingit hominem vel sanari vel infirmari. Ergo unus actus potest habitum causare. Objection 3: Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens that a man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. Therefore one act can cause a habit.
Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod una hirundo ver non facit, nec una dies, ita utique nec beatum nec felicem una dies, nec paucum tempus. Sed beatitudo est operatio secundum habitum perfectae virtutis, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo habitus virtutis, et eadem ratione alius habitus, non causatur per unum actum. On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): "As neither does one swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a short time make a man blessed and happy." But "happiness is an operation in respect of a habit of perfect virtue" (Ethic. i, 7,10,13). Therefore a habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused by one act.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, habitus per actum generatur inquantum potentia passiva movetur ab aliquo principio activo. Ad hoc autem quod aliqua qualitas causetur in passivo, oportet quod activum totaliter vincat passivum. Unde videmus quod, quia ignis non potest statim vincere suum combustibile, non statim inflammat ipsum, sed paulatim abiicit contrarias dispositiones, ut sic totaliter vincens ipsum, similitudinem suam ipsi imprimat. Manifestum est autem quod principium activum quod est ratio, non totaliter potest supervincere appetitivam potentiam in uno actu, eo quod appetitiva potentia se habet diversimode et ad multa; iudicatur autem per rationem, in uno actu, aliquid appetendum secundum determinatas rationes et circumstantias. Unde ex hoc non totaliter vincitur appetitiva potentia, ut feratur in idem ut in pluribus, per modum naturae, quod pertinet ad habitum virtutis. Et ideo habitus virtutis non potest causari per unum actum, sed per multos. I answer that, As we have said already (Article [2]), habit is caused by act, because a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in order that some quality be caused in that which is passive the active principle must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that because fire cannot at once overcome the combustible, it does not enkindle at once; but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so that by overcoming it entirely, it may impress its likeness on it. Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot entirely overcome the appetitive power in one act: because the appetitive power is inclined variously, and to many things; while the reason judges in a single act, what should be willed in regard to various aspects and circumstances. Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by many.
In apprehensivis autem potentiis considerandum est quod duplex est passivum, unum quidem ipse intellectus possibilis; aliud autem intellectus quem vocat Aristoteles passivum, qui est ratio particularis, idest vis cogitativa cum memorativa et imaginativa. Respectu igitur primi passivi, potest esse aliquod activum quod uno actu totaliter vincit potentiam sui passivi, sicut una propositio per se nota convincit intellectum ad assentiendum firmiter conclusioni; quod quidem non facit propositio probabilis. Unde ex multis actibus rationis oportet causari habitum opinativum, etiam ex parte intellectus possibilis, habitum autem scientiae possibile est causari ex uno rationis actu, quantum ad intellectum possibilem. Sed quantum ad inferiores vires apprehensivas, necessarium est eosdem actus pluries reiterari, ut aliquid firmiter memoriae imprimatur. Unde philosophus, in libro de memoria et reminiscentia, dicit quod meditatio confirmat memoriam. Habitus autem corporales possibile est causari ex uno actu, si activum fuerit magnae virtutis, sicut quandoque medicina fortis statim inducit sanitatem. But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two passive principles: one is the "possible" [*See FP, Question [79], Article [2] ad 2] intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De Anima iii, text. 20) calls "passive," and is the "particular reason," that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination. With regard then to the former passive principle, it is possible for a certain active principle to entirely overcome, by one act, the power of its passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it gives a firm assent to the conclusion, but a probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many acts of the reason, even on the part of the "possible" intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act of the reason, so far as the "possible" intellect is concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same acts need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. 1) that "meditation strengthens memory." Bodily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle is of great power: sometimes, for instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at once.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.

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Article: 4  [ << | >> ]

Whether any habits are infused in man by God?

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus habitus hominibus infundatur a Deo. Deus enim aequaliter se habet ad omnes. Si igitur quibusdam infundit habitus aliquos, omnibus eos infunderet. Quod patet esse falsum. Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. For God treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some, He would infuse them into all: which is clearly untrue.
Praeterea, Deus operatur in omnibus secundum modum qui convenit naturae ipsorum, quia divinae providentiae est naturam salvare, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed habitus in homine naturaliter causantur ex actibus, ut dictum est. Non ergo causat Deus in hominibus aliquos habitus absque actibus. Objection 2: Further, God works in all things according to the mode which is suitable to their nature: for "it belongs to Divine providence to preserve nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But habits are naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above (Article [2]). Therefore God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts.
Praeterea, si aliquis habitus a Deo infunditur, per illum habitum homo potest multos actus producere. Sed ex illis actibus causatur similis habitus, ut in II Ethic. dicitur. Sequitur ergo duos habitus eiusdem speciei esse in eodem, unum acquisitum, et alterum infusum. Quod videtur esse impossibile, non enim duae formae unius speciei possunt esse in eodem subiecto. Non ergo habitus aliquis infunditur homini a Deo. Objection 3: Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can by that habit perform many acts. But "from those acts a like habit is caused" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Consequently there will be two habits of the same species in the same man, one acquired, the other infused. Now this seems impossible: for the two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject. Therefore a habit is not infused into man by God.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XV, implevit eum dominus spiritu sapientiae et intellectus. Sed sapientia et intellectus quidam habitus sunt. Ergo aliqui habitus homini a Deo infunduntur. On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 15:5): "God filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding." Now wisdom and understanding are habits. Therefore some habits are infused into man by God.
Respondeo dicendum quod duplici ratione aliqui habitus homini a Deo infunduntur. I answer that, Some habits are infused by God into man, for two reasons.
Prima ratio est, quia aliqui habitus sunt quibus homo bene disponitur ad finem excedentem facultatem humanae naturae, qui est ultima et perfecta hominis beatitudo, ut supra dictum est. Et quia habitus oportet esse proportionatos ei ad quod homo disponitur secundum ipsos, ideo necesse est quod etiam habitus ad huiusmodi finem disponentes, excedant facultatem humanae naturae. Unde tales habitus nunquam possunt homini inesse nisi ex infusione divina, sicut est de omnibus gratuitis virtutibus. The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above (Question [5], Article [5]). And since habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues.
Alia ratio est, quia Deus potest producere effectus causarum secundarum absque ipsis causis secundis, ut in primo dictum est. Sicut igitur quandoque, ad ostensionem suae virtutis, producit sanitatem absque naturali causa, quae tamen per naturam posset causari; ita etiam quandoque, ad ostendendam suam virtutem, infundit homini illos etiam habitus qui naturali virtute possunt causari. Sicut apostolis dedit scientiam Scripturarum et omnium linguarum, quam homines per studium vel consuetudinem acquirere possunt, licet non ita perfecte. The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second causes, without these second causes, as we have said in the FP, Question [105], Article [6]. Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He infuses into man even those habits which can be caused by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by custom, but not so perfectly.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus, quantum ad suam naturam, aequaliter se habet ad omnes, sed secundum ordinem suae sapientiae certa ratione quaedam tribuit aliquibus, quae non tribuit aliis. Reply to Objection 1: God, in respect of His Nature, is the same to all, but in respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive, gives certain things to some, which He does not give to others.
Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc quod Deus in omnibus operatur secundum modum eorum, non excludit quin Deus quaedam operetur quae natura operari non potest, sed ex hoc sequitur quod nihil operatur contra id quod naturae convenit. Reply to Objection 2: That God works in all according to their mode, does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot do: but it follows from this that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature.
Ad tertium dicendum quod actus qui producuntur ex habitu infuso, non causant aliquem habitum, sed confirmant habitum praeexistentem, sicut medicinalia remedia adhibita homini sano per naturam, non causant aliquam sanitatem, sed sanitatem prius habitam corroborant. Reply to Objection 3: Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the remedies of medicine given to a man who is naturally health, do not cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he had before.

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