St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

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Question: 72 [ << | >> ]

OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS (NINE ARTICLES)

Deinde considerandum est de distinctione peccatorum vel vitiorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur novem. We must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which head there are nine points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum peccata distinguantur specie secundum obiecta. (1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects?
Secundo, de distinctione peccatorum spiritualium et carnalium. (2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins;
Tertio, utrum secundum causas. (3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes?
Quarto, utrum secundum eos in quos peccatur. (4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against?
Quinto, utrum secundum diversitatem reatus. (5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment?
Sexto, utrum secundum omissionem et commissionem. (6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission?
Septimo, utrum secundum diversum processum peccati. (7) Whether they differ according to their various stages?
Octavo, utrum secundum abundantiam et defectum. (8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency?
Nono, utrum secundum diversas circumstantias. (9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances?

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Question: 72 [ << | >> ]
Article: 1  [ << | >> ]

Whether sins differ in species according to their objects?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata non differant specie secundum obiecta. Actus enim humani praecipue dicuntur boni vel mali per comparationem ad finem, ut supra ostensum est. Cum igitur peccatum nihil aliud sit quam actus hominis malus, sicut dictum est, videtur quod secundum fines peccata debeant distingui specie, magis quam secundum obiecta. Objection 1: It would seem that sins do not differ in species, according to their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil, in relation, chiefly, to their end, as shown above (Question [1], Article [3]; Question [18], Articles [4],6). Since then sin is nothing else than a bad human act, as stated above (Question [71], Article [1]), it seems that sins should differ specifically according to their ends rather than according to their objects.
Praeterea, malum, cum sit privatio, distinguitur specie secundum diversas species oppositorum. Sed peccatum est quoddam malum in genere humanorum actuum. Ergo peccata magis distinguuntur specie secundum opposita, quam secundum obiecta. Objection 2: Further, evil, being a privation, differs specifically according to the different species of opposites. Now sin is an evil in the genus of human acts. Therefore sins differ specifically according to their opposites rather than according to their objects.
Praeterea, si peccata specie differrent secundum obiecta, impossibile esset idem peccatum specie circa diversa obiecta inveniri. Sed inveniuntur aliqua huiusmodi peccata, nam superbia est et in rebus spiritualibus et in corporalibus, ut Gregorius dicit, in libro XXXIV Moral.; avaritia etiam est circa diversa genera rerum. Ergo peccata non distinguuntur specie secundum obiecta. Objection 3: Further, if sins differed specifically according to their objects, it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with diverse objects: and yet such sins are to be found. For pride is about things spiritual and material as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 18); and avarice is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins do not differ in species according to their objects.
Sed contra est quod peccatum est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem Dei. Sed dicta vel facta vel concupita distinguuntur specie secundum diversa obiecta, quia actus per obiecta distinguuntur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam peccata secundum obiecta specie distinguuntur. On the contrary, "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against God's law." Now words, deeds, and desires differ in species according to their various objects: since acts differ by their objects, as stated above (Question [18], Article [2]). Therefore sins, also differ in species according to their objects.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad rationem peccati duo concurrunt, scilicet actus voluntarius; et inordinatio eius, quae est per recessum a lege Dei. Horum autem duorum unum per se comparatur ad peccantem, qui intendit talem actum voluntarium exercere in tali materia, aliud autem, scilicet inordinatio actus, per accidens se habet ad intentionem peccantis; nullus enim intendens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque, consequitur speciem secundum illud quod est per se, non autem secundum id quod est per accidens, quia ea quae sunt per accidens, sunt extra rationem speciei. Et ideo peccata specie distinguuntur ex parte actuum voluntariorum, magis quam ex parte inordinationis in peccato existentis. Actus autem voluntarii distinguuntur specie secundum obiecta, ut in superioribus ostensum est. Unde sequitur quod peccata proprie distinguantur specie secundum obiecta. I answer that, As stated above (Question [71], Article [6]), two things concur in the nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its inordinateness, which consists in departing from God's law. Of these two, one is referred essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act in such and such matter; while the other, viz. the inordinateness of the act, is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for "no one acts intending evil," as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). Now it is evident that a thing derives its species from that which is essential and not from that which is accidental: because what is accidental is outside the specific nature. Consequently sins differ specifically on the part of the voluntary acts rather than of the inordinateness inherent to sin. Now voluntary acts differ in species according to their objects, as was proved above (Question [18], Article [2]). Therefore it follows that sins are properly distinguished in species by their objects.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod finis principaliter habet rationem boni, et ideo comparatur ad actum voluntatis, qui est primordialis in omni peccato, sicut obiectum. Unde in idem redit quod peccata differant secundum obiecta, vel secundum fines. Reply to Objection 1: The aspect of good is found chiefly in the end: and therefore the end stands in the relation of object to the act of the will which is at the root of every sin. Consequently it amounts to the same whether sins differ by their objects or by their ends.
Ad secundum dicendum quod peccatum non est pura privatio, sed est actus debito ordine privatus. Et ideo peccata magis distinguuntur specie secundum obiecta actuum, quam secundum opposita. Quamvis etiam si distinguantur secundum oppositas virtutes, in idem rediret, virtutes enim distinguuntur specie secundum obiecta, ut supra habitum est. Reply to Objection 2: Sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived of its due order: hence sins differ specifically according to their objects of their acts rather than according to their opposites, although, even if they were distinguished in reference to their opposite virtues, it would come to the same: since virtues differ specifically according to their objects, as stated above (Question [60], Article [5]).
Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet in diversis rebus specie vel genere differentibus, invenire unam formalem rationem obiecti, a qua peccatum speciem recipit. Et hoc modo superbia circa diversas res excellentiam quaerit, avaritia vero abundantiam eorum quae usui humano accommodantur. Reply to Objection 3: In various things, differing in species or genus, nothing hinders our finding one formal aspect of the object, from which aspect sin receives its species. It is thus that pride seeks excellence in reference to various things; and avarice seeks abundance of things adapted to human use.

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Question: 72 [ << | >> ]
Article: 2  [ << | >> ]

Whether spiritual sins are fittingly distinguished from carnal sins?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur peccata spiritualia a carnalibus. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Galat. V, manifesta sunt opera carnis, quae sunt fornicatio, immunditia, impudicitia, luxuria, idolorum servitus, veneficia, etc., ex quo videtur quod omnia peccatorum genera sunt opera carnis. Sed peccata carnalia dicuntur opera carnis. Ergo non sunt distinguenda peccata carnalia a spiritualibus. Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly distinguished from carnal sins. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcrafts," etc. from which it seems that all kinds of sins are works of the flesh. Now carnal sins are called works of the flesh. Therefore carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins.
Praeterea, quicumque peccat, secundum carnem ambulat, secundum illud Rom. VIII, si secundum carnem vixeritis, moriemini; si autem spiritu facta carnis mortificaveritis, vivetis. Sed vivere vel ambulare secundum carnem, videtur pertinere ad rationem peccati carnalis. Ergo omnia peccata sunt carnalia. Non ergo sunt distinguenda peccata carnalia a spiritualibus. Objection 2: Further, whosoever sins, walks according to the flesh, as stated in Rm. 8:13: "If you live according to the flesh, you shall die. But if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live." Now to live or walk according to the flesh seems to pertain to the nature of carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins.
Praeterea, superior pars animae, quae est mens vel ratio, spiritus nominatur, secundum illud Ephes. IV, renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae, ubi spiritus pro ratione ponitur, ut ibi Glossa dicit. Sed omne peccatum quod secundum carnem committitur, a ratione derivatur per consensum, quia superioris rationis est consentire in actum peccati, ut infra dicetur. Ergo eadem peccata sunt carnalia et spiritualia. Non ergo sunt distinguenda ad invicem. Objection 3: Further, the higher part of the soul, which is the mind or reason, is called the spirit, according to Eph. 4:23: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind," where spirit stands for reason, according to a gloss. Now every sin, which is committed in accordance with the flesh, flows from the reason by its consent; since consent in a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as we shall state further on (Question [74], Article [7]). Therefore the same sins are both carnal and spiritual, and consequently they should not be distinguished from one another.
Praeterea, si aliqua peccata specialiter sunt carnalia, hoc potissime intelligendum videtur de illis peccatis quibus aliquis in corpus suum peccat. Sed sicut apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. VI, omne peccatum quodcumque fecerit homo, extra corpus est, qui autem fornicatur, in corpus suum peccat. Ergo sola fornicatio esset peccatum carnale, cum tamen apostolus, ad Ephes. V, etiam avaritiam carnalibus peccatis annumeret. Objection 4: Further, if some sins are carnal specifically, this, seemingly, should apply chiefly to those sins whereby man sins against his own body. But, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), "every sin that a man doth, is without the body: but he that committeth fornication, sinneth against his own body." Therefore fornication would be the only carnal sin, whereas the Apostle (Eph. 5:3) reckons covetousness with the carnal sins.
Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., dicit quod septem capitalium vitiorum quinque sunt spiritualia, et duo carnalia. On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) says that "of the seven capital sins five are spiritual, and two carnal."
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, peccata recipiunt speciem ex obiectis. Omne autem peccatum consistit in appetitu alicuius commutabilis boni quod inordinate appetitur, et per consequens in eo iam habito inordinate aliquis delectatur. Ut autem ex superioribus patet, duplex est delectatio. Una quidem animalis, quae consummatur in sola apprehensione alicuius rei ad votum habitae, et haec etiam potest dici delectatio spiritualis, sicut cum aliquis delectatur in laude humana, vel in aliquo huiusmodi. Alia vero delectatio est corporalis, sive naturalis, quae in ipso tactu corporali perficitur, quae potest etiam dici delectatio carnalis. I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), sins take their species from their objects. Now every sin consists in the desire for some mutable good, for which man has an inordinate desire, and the possession of which gives him inordinate pleasure. Now, as explained above (Question [31], Article [3]), pleasure is twofold. One belongs to the soul, and is consummated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed in accordance with desire; this can also be called spiritual pleasure, e.g. when one takes pleasure in human praise or the like. The other pleasure is bodily or natural, and is realized in bodily touch, and this can also be called carnal pleasure.
Sic igitur illa peccata quae perficiuntur in delectatione spirituali, vocantur peccata spiritualia, illa vero quae perficiuntur in delectatione carnali, vocantur peccata carnalia; sicut gula, quae perficitur in delectatione ciborum, et luxuria, quae perficitur in delectatione venereorum. Unde et apostolus dicit II ad Cor. VII. Emundemus nos ab omni inquinamento, carnis et spiritus. Accordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual pleasure, are called spiritual sins; while those which consist in carnal pleasure, are called carnal sins, e.g. gluttony, which consists in the pleasures of the table; and lust, which consists in sexual pleasures. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:1): "Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit, illa vitia dicuntur opera carnis, non quia in voluptate carnis perficiantur, sed caro sumitur ibi pro homine, qui dum secundum se vivit, secundum carnem vivere dicitur; ut etiam Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei. Et huius ratio est ex hoc, quod omnis rationis humanae defectus ex sensu carnali aliquo modo initium habet. Reply to Objection 1: As a gloss says on the same passage, these vices are called works of the flesh, not as though they consisted in carnal pleasure; but flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according to the flesh, when he lives according to himself, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 2,3). The reason of this is because every failing in the human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense.
Et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad secundum. This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Ad tertium dicendum quod in peccatis etiam carnalibus est aliquis actus spiritualis, scilicet actus rationis, sed finis horum peccatorum, a quo denominantur, est delectatio carnis. Reply to Objection 3: Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act, viz. the act of reason: but the end of these sins, from which they are named, is carnal pleasure.
Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit, specialiter in fornicationis peccato servit anima corpori, intantum ut nihil aliud in ipso momento cogitare homini liceat. Delectatio autem gulae, etsi sit carnalis, non ita absorbet rationem. Vel potest dici quod in hoc peccato etiam quaedam iniuria fit corpori, dum inordinate maculatur. Et ideo per hoc solum peccatum dicitur specialiter homo in corpus peccare. Avaritia vero quae in carnalibus peccatis connumeratur, pro adulterio ponitur, quod est iniusta usurpatio uxoris alienae. Vel potest dici quod res in qua delectatur avarus, corporale quoddam est, et quantum ad hoc, connumeratur peccatis carnalibus. Sed ipsa delectatio non pertinet ad carnem, sed ad spiritum, et ideo secundum Gregorium, est spirituale peccatum. Reply to Objection 4: As the gloss says, "in the sin of fornication the soul is the body's slave in a special sense, because at the moment of sinning it can think of nothing else": whereas the pleasure of gluttony, although carnal, does not so utterly absorb the reason. It may also be said that in this sin, an injury is done to the body also, for it is defiled inordinately: wherefore by this sin alone is man said specifically to sin against his body. While covetousness, which is reckoned among the carnal sins, stands here for adultery, which is the unjust appropriation of another's wife. Again, it may be said that the thing in which the covetous man takes pleasure is something bodily, and in this respect covetousness is numbered with the carnal sins: but the pleasure itself does not belong to the body, but to the spirit, wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that it is a spiritual sin.

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Article: 3  [ << | >> ]

Whether sins differ specifically in reference to their causes?

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata distinguantur specie secundum causas. Ab eodem enim habet res speciem, a quo habet esse. Sed peccata habent esse ex suis causis. Ergo ab eis etiam speciem sortiuntur. Differunt ergo specie secundum diversitatem causarum. Objection 1: It would seem that sins differ specifically in reference to their causes. For a thing takes its species from that whence it derives its being. Now sins derive their being from their causes. Therefore they take their species from them also. Therefore they differ specifically in reference to their causes.
Praeterea, inter alias causas minus videtur pertinere ad speciem causa materialis. Sed obiectum in peccato est sicut causa materialis. Cum ergo secundum obiecta peccata specie distinguantur, videtur quod peccata multo magis secundum alias causas distinguantur specie. Objection 2: Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to have least reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like its material cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically according to their objects, it seems that much more do they differ in reference to their other causes.
Praeterea, Augustinus, super illud Psalmi, incensa igni et suffossa, dicit quod omne peccatum est ex timore male humiliante, vel ex amore male inflammante. Dicitur etiam I Ioan. II, quod omne quod est in mundo, aut est concupiscentia carnis, aut concupiscentia oculorum, aut superbia vitae, dicitur autem aliquid esse in mundo, propter peccatum, secundum quod mundi nomine amatores mundi significantur, ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan. Gregorius etiam, XXXI Moral., distinguit omnia peccata secundum septem vitia capitalia. Omnes autem huiusmodi divisiones respiciunt causas peccatorum. Ergo videtur quod peccata differant specie secundum diversitatem causarum. Objection 3: Further, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 79:17, "Things set on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to fear inducing false humility, or to love enkindling us to undue ardor." For it is written (1 Jn. 2:16) that "all that is in the world, is the concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] the concupiscence of the eyes, or [Vulg.: 'and'] the pride of life." Now a thing is said to be in the world on account of sin, in as much as the world denotes lovers of the world, as Augustine observes (Tract. ii in Joan.). Gregory, too (Moral. xxxi, 17), distinguishes all sins according to the seven capital vices. Now all these divisions refer to the causes of sins. Therefore, seemingly, sins differ specifically according to the diversity of their causes.
Sed contra est quia secundum hoc omnia peccata essent unius speciei, cum ex una causa causentur, dicitur enim Eccli. X, quod initium omnis peccati est superbia; et I ad Tim. ult., quod radix omnium malorum est cupiditas. Manifestum est autem esse diversas species peccatorum. Non ergo peccata distinguuntur specie secundum diversitates causarum. On the contrary, If this were the case all sins would belong to one species, since they are due to one cause. For it is written (Ecclus. 10:15) that "pride is the beginning of all sin," and (1 Tim. 6:10) that "the desire of money is the root of all evils." Now it is evident that there are various species of sins. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to their different causes.
Respondeo dicendum quod, cum quatuor sint causarum genera, diversimode diversis attribuuntur. Causa enim formalis et materialis respiciunt proprie substantiam rei, et ideo substantiae secundum formam et materiam specie et genere distinguuntur. Agens autem et finis respiciunt directe motum et operationem, et ideo motus et operationes secundum huiusmodi causas specie distinguuntur; diversimode tamen. Nam principia activa naturalia sunt determinata semper ad eosdem actus, et ideo diversae species in actibus naturalibus attenduntur non solum secundum obiecta, quae sunt fines vel termini, sed etiam secundum principia activa; sicut calefacere et infrigidare distinguuntur specie secundum calidum et frigidum. Sed principia activa in actibus voluntariis, cuiusmodi sunt actus peccatorum, non se habent ex necessitate ad unum, et ideo ex uno principio activo vel motivo possunt diversae species peccatorum procedere; sicut ex timore male humiliante potest procedere quod homo furetur, et quod occidat, et quod deserat gregem sibi commissum; et haec eadem possunt procedere ex amore. Unde manifestum est quod peccata non differant specie secundum diversas causas activas vel motivas; sed solum secundum diversitatem causae finalis. Finis autem est obiectum voluntatis, ostensum est enim supra quod actus humani habent speciem ex fine. I answer that, Since there are four kinds of causes, they are attributed to various things in various ways. Because the "formal" and the "material" cause regard properly the substance of a thing; and consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and form, both in species and in genus. The "agent" and the "end" regard directly movement and operation: wherefore movements and operations differ specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways, however, because the natural active principles are always determined to the same acts; so that the different species of natural acts are taken not only from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those acts, but also from their active principles: thus heating and cooling are specifically distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the other hand, the active principles in voluntary acts, such as the acts of sins, are not determined, of necessity, to one act, and consequently from one active or motive principle, diverse species of sins can proceed: thus from fear engendering false humility man may proceed to theft, or murder, or to neglect the flock committed to his care; and these same things may proceed from love enkindling to undue ardor. Hence it is evident that sins do not differ specifically according to their various active or motive causes, but only in respect of diversity in the final cause, which is the end and object of the will. For it has been shown above (Question [1], Article [3]; Question [18], Articles [4],6) that human acts take their species from the end.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod principia activa in actibus voluntariis, cum non sint determinata ad unum, non sufficiunt ad producendum humanos actus, nisi determinetur voluntas ad unum per intentionem finis; ut patet per philosophum, in IX Metaphys. Et ideo a fine perficitur et esse et species peccati. Reply to Objection 1: The active principles in voluntary acts, not being determined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human acts, unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the end, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15,16), and consequently sin derives both its being and its species from the end.
Ad secundum dicendum quod obiecta, secundum quod comparantur ad actus exteriores, habent rationem materiae circa quam, sed secundum quod comparantur ad actum interiorem voluntatis, habent rationem finium; et ex hoc habent quod dent speciem actui. Quamvis etiam secundum quod sunt materia circa quam, habeant rationem terminorum; a quibus motus specificantur, ut dicitur in V Physic. et in X Ethic. Sed tamen etiam termini motus dant speciem motibus, inquantum habent rationem finis. Reply to Objection 2: Objects, in relation to external acts, have the character of matter "about which"; but, in relation to the interior act of the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to this that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even considered as the matter "about which," they have the character of term, from which movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4; Ethic. x, 4); yet even terms of movement specify movements, in so far as term has the character of end.
Ad tertium dicendum quod illae divisiones peccatorum non dantur ad distinguendas species peccatorum; sed ad manifestandas diversas causas eorum. Reply to Objection 3: These distinctions of sins are given, not as distinct species of sins, but to show their various causes.

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Question: 72 [ << | >> ]
Article: 4  [ << | >> ]

Whether sin is fittingly divided into sin against God, against oneself, and against one's neighbor?

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter peccatum distinguatur per peccatum quod est in Deum, in proximum, et in seipsum. Illud enim quod est commune omni peccato, non debet poni quasi pars in divisione peccati. Sed commune est omni peccato quod sit contra Deum, ponitur enim in definitione peccati quod sit contra legem Dei, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo peccatum in Deum debet poni quasi pars in divisione peccatorum. Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin against God, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against God: for it is stated in the definition of sin that it is "against God's law," as stated above (Question [66], Article [6]). Therefore sin against God should not be reckoned a part of the division of sin.
Praeterea, omnis divisio debet fieri per opposita. Sed ista tria genera peccatorum non sunt opposita, quicumque enim peccat in proximum, peccat etiam in seipsum et in Deum. Non ergo peccatum convenienter dividitur secundum haec tria. Objection 2: Further, every division should consist of things in opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not opposed to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins against himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly divided into these three.
Praeterea, ea quae sunt extrinsecus, non conferunt speciem. Sed Deus et proximus sunt extra nos. Ergo per haec non distinguuntur peccata secundum speciem. Inconvenienter igitur secundum haec tria peccatum dividitur. Objection 3: Further, specification is not taken from things external. But God and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are not distinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin is unfittingly divided according to these three.
Sed contra est quod Isidorus, in libro de summo bono, distinguens peccata, dicit quod homo dicitur peccare in se, in Deum, et in proximum. On the contrary, Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of sins, says that "man is said to sin against himself, against God, and against his neighbor."
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum est actus inordinatus. Triplex autem ordo in homine debet esse. Unus quidem secundum comparationem ad regulam rationis, prout scilicet omnes actiones et passiones nostrae debent secundum regulam rationis commensurari. Alius autem ordo est per comparationem ad regulam divinae legis, per quam homo in omnibus dirigi debet. Et si quidem homo naturaliter esset animal solitarium, hic duplex ordo sufficeret, sed quia homo est naturaliter animal politicum et sociale, ut probatur in I Polit., ideo necesse est quod sit tertius ordo, quo homo ordinetur ad alios homines, quibus convivere debet. Horum autem ordinum secundus continet primum, et excedit ipsum. Quaecumque enim continentur sub ordine rationis, continentur sub ordine ipsius Dei, sed quaedam continentur sub ordine ipsius Dei, quae excedunt rationem humanam, sicut ea quae sunt fidei, et quae debentur soli Deo. Unde qui in talibus peccat, dicitur in Deum peccare, sicut haereticus et sacrilegus et blasphemus. Similiter etiam secundus ordo includit tertium, et excedit ipsum. Quia in omnibus in quibus ordinamur ad proximum, oportet nos dirigi secundum regulam rationis, sed in quibusdam dirigimur secundum rationem quantum ad nos tantum, non autem quantum ad proximum. Et quando in his peccatur, dicitur homo peccare in seipsum, sicut patet de guloso, luxurioso et prodigo. Quando vero peccat homo in his quibus ad proximum ordinatur, dicitur peccare in proximum, sicut patet de fure et homicida. Sunt autem diversa quibus homo ordinatur ad Deum, et ad proximum, et ad seipsum. Unde haec distinctio peccatorum est secundum obiecta, secundum quae diversificantur species peccatorum. Unde haec distinctio peccatorum proprie est secundum diversas peccatorum species. Nam et virtutes, quibus peccata opponuntur, secundum hanc differentiam specie distinguuntur, manifestum est enim ex dictis quod virtutibus theologicis homo ordinatur ad Deum, temperantia vero et fortitudine ad seipsum, iustitia autem ad proximum. I answer that, As stated above (Question [71], Articles [1],6), sin is an inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in relation to the rule of reason, in so far as all our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason: another order is in relation to the rule of the Divine Law, whereby man should be directed in all things: and if man were by nature a solitary animal, this twofold order would suffice. But since man is naturally a civic and social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2, hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed in relation to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of these orders the second contains the first and surpasses it. For whatever things are comprised under the order of reason, are comprised under the order of God Himself. Yet some things are comprised under the order of God, which surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith, and things due to God alone. Hence he that sins in such matters, for instance, by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is said to sin against God. In like manner, the first order includes the third and surpasses it, because in all things wherein we are directed in reference to our neighbor, we need to be directed according to the order of reason. Yet in some things we are directed according to reason, in relation to ourselves only, and not in reference to our neighbor; and when man sins in these matters, he is said to sin against himself, as is seen in the glutton, the lustful, and the prodigal. But when man sins in matters concerning his neighbor, he is said to sin against his neighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer. Now the things whereby man is directed to God, his neighbor, and himself are diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their objects, according to which the species of sins are diversified: and consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different species of sins: because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed, differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from what has been said (Question [62], Articles [1],2,3) that by the theological virtues man is directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to himself; and by justice to his neighbor.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccare in Deum, secundum quod ordo qui est ad Deum, includit omnem humanum ordinem, commune est omni peccato. Sed quantum ad id quod ordo Dei excedit alios duos ordines, sic peccatum in Deum est speciale genus peccati. Reply to Objection 1: To sin against God is common to all sins, in so far as the order to God includes every human order; but in so far as order to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a special kind of sin.
Ad secundum dicendum quod quando aliqua quorum unum includit alterum, ab invicem distinguuntur, intelligitur fieri distinctio non secundum illud quod unum continetur in altero, sed secundum illud quod unum excedit alterum. Sicut patet in divisione numerorum et figurarum, non enim triangulus dividitur contra quadratum secundum quod continetur in eo, sed secundum quod exceditur ab eo; et similiter est de ternario et quaternario. Reply to Objection 2: When several things, of which one includes another, are distinct from one another, this distinction is understood to refer, not to the part contained in another, but to that in which one goes beyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers and figures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not in respect of its being contained thereby, but in respect of that in which it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies to the numbers three and four.
Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus et proximus, quamvis sint exteriora respectu ipsius peccantis, non tamen sunt extranea respectu actus peccati; sed comparantur ad ipsum sicut propria obiecta ipsius. Reply to Objection 3: Although God and our neighbor are external to the sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are related to it as to its object.

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Whether the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species?

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod divisio peccatorum quae est secundum reatum, diversificet speciem, puta cum dividitur secundum veniale et mortale. Ea enim quae in infinitum differunt, non possunt esse unius speciei, nec etiam unius generis. Sed veniale et mortale peccatum differunt in infinitum, veniali enim debetur poena temporalis, mortali poena aeterna; mensura autem poenae respondet quantitati culpae, secundum illud Deut. XXV, pro mensura delicti erit et plagarum modus. Ergo veniale et mortale non sunt unius generis, nedum quod sint unius speciei. Objection 1: It would seem that the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when sin is divided into "mortal" and "venial." For things which are infinitely apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even to the same genus. But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since temporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal punishment to mortal sin; and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the gravity of the fault, according to Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure be also of the stripes be." Therefore venial and mortal sins are not of the same genus, nor can they be said to belong to the same species.
Praeterea, quaedam peccata sunt mortalia ex genere, sicut homicidium et adulterium, quaedam vero ex suo genere sunt peccata venialia, sicut verbum otiosum et risus superfluus. Ergo peccatum veniale et mortale specie differunt. Objection 2: Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species [*"Ex genere," genus in this case denoting the species], as murder and adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial and mortal sins differ specifically.
Praeterea, sicut se habet actus virtuosus ad praemium, ita se habet peccatum ad poenam. Sed praemium est finis virtuosi actus. Ergo et poena est finis peccati. Sed peccata distinguuntur specie secundum fines, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam distinguuntur specie secundum reatum poenae. Objection 3: Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward is the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of sin. Now sins differ specifically in relation to their ends, as stated above (Article [1], ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically distinct according to the debt of punishment.
Sed contra, ea quae constituunt speciem, sunt priora, sicut differentiae specificae. Sed poena sequitur culpam, sicut effectus eius. Ergo peccata non differunt specie secundum reatum poenae. On the contrary, Those things that constitute a species are prior to the species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin as the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to the debt of punishment.
Respondeo dicendum quod eorum quae specie differunt, duplex differentia invenitur. Una quidem quae constituit diversitatem specierum, et talis differentia nunquam invenitur nisi in speciebus diversis; sicut rationale et irrationale, animatum et inanimatum. Alia autem differentia est consequens diversitatem speciei, et talis differentia, etsi in aliquibus consequatur diversitatem speciei, in aliis tamen potest inveniri in eadem specie; sicut album et nigrum consequuntur diversitatem speciei corvi et cygni, tamen invenitur huiusmodi differentia in eadem hominis specie. I answer that, In things that differ specifically we find a twofold difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to be found save in different species, e.g. "rational" and "irrational," "animate," and "inanimate": the other difference is consequent to specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may be consequent to specific diversity, yet, in others, it may be found within the same species; thus "white" and "black" are consequent to the specific diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within the one species of man.
Dicendum est ergo quod differentia venialis et mortalis peccati, vel quaecumque alia differentia sumitur penes reatum, non potest esse differentia constituens diversitatem speciei. Nunquam enim id quod est per accidens, constituit speciem. Id autem quod est praeter intentionem agentis, est per accidens, ut patet in II Physic. Manifestum est autem quod poena est praeter intentionem peccantis. Unde per accidens se habet ad peccatum, ex parte ipsius peccantis. Ordinatur tamen ad peccatum ab exteriori, scilicet ex iustitia iudicantis, qui secundum diversas conditiones peccatorum diversas poenas infligit. Unde differentia quae est ex reatu poenae, potest consequi diversam speciem peccatorum; non autem constituit diversitatem speciei. We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal sin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of punishment, cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is accidental never constitutes a species; and what is outside the agent's intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is evident that punishment is outside the intention of the sinner, wherefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless it is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, viz. the justice of the judge, who imposes various punishments according to the various manners of sin. Therefore the difference derived from the debt of punishment, may be consequent to the specific diversity of sins, but cannot constitute it.
Differentia autem peccati venialis et mortalis consequitur diversitatem inordinationis, quae complet rationem peccati. Duplex enim est inordinatio, una per subtractionem principii ordinis; alia qua, salvato principio ordinis, fit inordinatio circa ea quae sunt post principium. Sicut in corpore animalis quandoque quidem inordinatio complexionis procedit usque ad destructionem principii vitalis, et haec est mors, quandoque vero, salvo principio vitae, fit inordinatio quaedam in humoribus, et tunc est aegritudo. Principium autem totius ordinis in moralibus est finis ultimus, qui ita se habet in operativis, sicut principium indemonstrabile in speculativis, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Unde quando anima deordinatur per peccatum usque ad aversionem ab ultimo fine, scilicet Deo, cui unimur per caritatem, tunc est peccatum mortale, quando vero fit deordinatio citra aversionem a Deo, tunc est peccatum veniale. Sicut enim in corporalibus deordinatio mortis, quae est per remotionem principii vitae, est irreparabilis secundum naturam; inordinatio autem aegritudinis reparari potest, propter id quod salvatur principium vitae; similiter est in his quae pertinent ad animam. Nam in speculativis qui errat circa principia, impersuasibilis est, qui autem errat salvatis principiis, per ipsa principia revocari potest. Et similiter in operativis qui peccando avertitur ab ultimo fine, quantum est ex natura peccati, habet lapsum irreparabilem, et ideo dicitur peccare mortaliter, aeternaliter puniendus. Qui vero peccat citra aversionem a Deo, ex ipsa ratione peccati reparabiliter deordinatur, quia salvatur principium, et ideo dicitur peccare venialiter, quia scilicet non ita peccat ut mereatur interminabilem poenam. Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the diversity of that inordinateness which constitutes the notion of sin. For inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of order, and another which, without destroying the principle of order, implies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle: thus, in an animal's body, the frame may be so out of order that the vital principle is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death; while, on the other hand, saving the vital principle, there may be disorder in the bodily humors; and then there is sickness. Now the principle of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable principle does to matters of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8). Therefore when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away from its last end, viz. God, to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; but when it is disordered without turning away from God, there is venial sin. For even as in the body, the disorder of death which results from the destruction of the principle of life, is irreparable according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be repaired by reason of the vital principle being preserved, so it is in matters concerning the soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is impossible to convince one who errs in the principles, whereas one who errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the truth by means of the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he who, by sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider the nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin mortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas when a man sins without turning away from God, by the very nature of his sin, his disorder can be repaired, because the principle of the order is not destroyed; wherefore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he does not sin so as to deserve to be punished eternally.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccatum mortale et veniale differunt in infinitum ex parte aversionis, non autem ex parte conversionis, per quam respicit obiectum, unde peccatum speciem habet. Unde nihil prohibet in eadem specie inveniri aliquod peccatum mortale et veniale, sicut primus motus in genere adulterii est peccatum veniale; et verbum otiosum, quod plerumque est veniale, potest etiam esse mortale. Reply to Objection 1: Mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart as regards what they "turn away from," not as regards what they "turn to," viz. the object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same species from including mortal and venial sins; for instance, in the species "adultery" the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may even be a mortal sin.
Ad secundum dicendum quod ex hoc quod invenitur aliquod peccatum mortale ex genere, et aliquod peccatum veniale ex genere, sequitur quod talis differentia consequatur diversitatem peccatorum secundum speciem, non autem quod causet eam. Talis autem differentia potest inveniri etiam in his quae sunt eiusdem speciei, ut dictum est, Reply to Objection 2: From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its species, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows that this difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins, not that it is the cause thereof. And this difference may be found even in things of the same species, as stated above.
Ad tertium dicendum quod praemium est de intentione merentis vel virtuose agentis, sed poena non est de intentione peccantis, sed magis est contra voluntatem ipsius. Unde non est similis ratio. Reply to Objection 3: The reward is intended by him that merits or acts virtually; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner, but, on the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails.

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Whether sins of commission and omission differ specifically?

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum commissionis et omissionis specie differant. Delictum enim contra peccatum dividitur, Ephes. II, ubi dicitur, cum essetis mortui delictis et peccatis vestris. Et exponit ibi Glossa, delictis, idest dimittendo quae iubentur; et peccatis, scilicet agendo prohibita, ex quo patet quod per delictum intelligitur peccatum omissionis, per peccatum, peccatum commissionis. Differunt igitur specie, cum ex opposito dividantur, tanquam diversae species. Objection 1: It would seem that sins of commission and omission differ specifically. For "offense" and "sin" are condivided with one another (Eph. 2:1), where it is written: "When you were dead in your offenses and sins," which words a gloss explains, saying: "'Offenses,' by omitting to do what was commanded, and 'sins,' by doing what was forbidden." Whence it is evident that "offenses" here denotes sins of omission; while "sin" denotes sins of commission. Therefore they differ specifically, since they are contrasted with one another as different species.
Praeterea, peccato per se convenit quod sit contra legem Dei, ponitur enim in eius definitione, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed in lege Dei alia sunt praecepta affirmativa, contra quae est peccatum omissionis; et alia praecepta negativa, contra quae est peccatum commissionis. Ergo peccatum omissionis et peccatum commissionis differunt specie. Objection 2: Further, it is essential to sin to be against God's law, for this is part of its definition, as is clear from what has been said (Question [71], Article [6]). Now in God's law, the affirmative precepts, against which is the sin of omission, are different from the negative precepts, against which is the sin of omission. Therefore sins of omission and commission differ specifically.
Praeterea, omissio et commissio differunt sicut affirmatio et negatio. Sed affirmatio et negatio non possunt esse unius speciei, quia negatio non habet speciem; non entis enim non sunt neque species neque differentiae, ut philosophus dicit. Ergo omissio et commissio non possunt esse unius speciei. Objection 3: Further, omission and commission differ as affirmation and negation. Now affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species, since negation has no species; for "there is neither species nor difference of non-being," as the Philosopher states (Phys. iv, text. 67). Therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the same species.
Sed contra, in eadem specie peccati invenitur omissio et commissio, avarus enim et aliena rapit, quod est peccatum commissionis; et sua non dat quibus dare debet, quod est peccatum omissionis. Ergo omissio et commissio non differunt specie. On the contrary, Omission and commission are found in the same species of sin. For the covetous man both takes what belongs to others, which is a sin of commission; and gives not of his own to whom he should give, which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission and commission do not differ specifically.
Respondeo dicendum quod in peccatis invenitur duplex differentia, una materialis, et alia formalis. Materialis quidem attenditur secundum naturalem speciem actuum peccati, formalis autem secundum ordinem ad unum finem proprium, quod est obiectum proprium. Unde inveniuntur aliqui actus materialiter specie differentes, qui tamen formaliter sunt in eadem specie peccati, quia ad idem ordinantur, sicut ad eandem speciem homicidii pertinet iugulatio, lapidatio et perforatio, quamvis actus sint specie differentes secundum speciem naturae. Sic ergo si loquamur de specie peccati omissionis et commissionis materialiter, differunt specie, large tamen loquendo de specie, secundum quod negatio vel privatio speciem habere potest. Si autem loquamur de specie peccati omissionis et commissionis formaliter, sic non differunt specie, quia ad idem ordinantur, et ex eodem motivo procedunt. Avarus enim ad congregandum pecuniam et rapit, et non dat ea quae dare debet; et similiter gulosus ad satisfaciendum gulae, et superflua comedit, et ieiunia debita praetermittit; et idem est videre in ceteris. Semper enim in rebus negatio fundatur super aliqua affirmatione, quae est quodammodo causa eius, unde etiam in rebus naturalibus eiusdem rationis est quod ignis calefaciat, et quod non infrigidet. I answer that, There is a twofold difference in sins; a material difference and a formal difference: the material difference is to be observed in the natural species of the sinful act; while the formal difference is gathered from their relation to one proper end, which is also their proper object. Hence we find certain acts differing from one another in the material specific difference, which are nevertheless formally in the same species of sin, because they are directed to the one same end: thus strangling, stoning, and stabbing come under the one species of murder, although the actions themselves differ specifically according to the natural species. Accordingly, if we refer to the material species in sins of omission and commission, they differ specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far as negation and privation may have a species. But if we refer to the formal species of sins of omission and commission, they do not differ specifically, because they are directed to the same end, and proceed from the same motive. For the covetous man, in order to hoard money, both robs, and omits to give what he ought, and in like manner, the glutton, to satiate his appetite, both eats too much and omits the prescribed fasts. The same applies to other sins: for in things, negation is always founded on affirmation, which, in a manner, is its cause. Hence in the physical order it comes under the same head, that fire gives forth heat, and that it does not give forth cold.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa divisio quae est per commissionem et omissionem, non est secundum diversas species formales, sed materiales tantum, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1: This division in respect of commission and omission, is not according to different formal species, but only according to material species, as stated.
Ad secundum dicendum quod necesse fuit in lege Dei proponi diversa praecepta affirmativa et negativa, ut gradatim homines introducerentur ad virtutem, prius quidem abstinendo a malo, ad quod inducimur per praecepta negativa; et postmodum faciendo bonum, ad quod inducimur per praecepta affirmativa. Et sic praecepta affirmativa et negativa non pertinent ad diversas virtutes, sed ad diversos gradus virtutis. Et per consequens non oportet quod contrarientur diversis peccatis secundum speciem. Peccatum etiam non habet speciem ex parte aversionis, quia secundum hoc est negatio vel privatio, sed ex parte conversionis, secundum quod est actus quidam. Unde secundum diversa praecepta legis non diversificantur peccata secundum speciem. Reply to Objection 2: In God's law, the necessity for various affirmative and negative precepts, was that men might be gradually led to virtue, first by abstaining from evil, being induced to this by the negative precepts, and afterwards by doing good, to which we are induced by the affirmative precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and negative precepts do not belong to different virtues, but to different degrees of virtue; and consequently they are not of necessity, opposed to sins of different species. Moreover sin is not specified by that from which it turns away, because in this respect it is a negation or privation, but by that to which it turns, in so far as sin is an act. Consequently sins do not differ specifically according to the various precepts of the Law.
Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de materiali diversitate speciei. Sciendum est tamen quod negatio, etsi proprie non sit in specie, constituitur tamen in specie per reductionem ad aliquam affirmationem quam sequitur. Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers the material diversity of sins. It must be observed, however, that although, properly speaking, negation is not in a species, yet it is allotted to a species by reduction to the affirmation on which it is based.

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Whether sins are fittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed?

Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter dividatur peccatum in peccatum cordis, oris, et operis. Augustinus enim, in XII de Trin., ponit tres gradus peccati, quorum primus est, cum carnalis sensus illecebram quandam ingerit, quod est peccatum cogitationis, secundus gradus est, quando sola cogitationis delectatione aliquis contentus est; tertius gradus est, quando faciendum decernitur per consensum. Sed tria haec pertinent ad peccatum cordis. Ergo inconvenienter peccatum cordis ponitur quasi unum genus peccati. Objection 1: It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) describes three stages of sin, of which the first is "when the carnal sense offers a bait," which is the sin of thought; the second stage is reached "when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought"; and the third stage, "when consent is given to the deed." Now these three belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it is unfitting to reckon sin of thought as one kind of sin.
Praeterea, Gregorius, in IV Moral., ponit quatuor gradus peccati, quorum primus est culpa latens in corde; secundus, cum exterius publicatur; tertius est, cum consuetudine roboratur; quartus est, cum usque ad praesumptionem divinae misericordiae, vel ad desperationem, homo procedit. Ubi non distinguitur peccatum operis a peccato oris; et adduntur duo alii peccatorum gradus. Ergo inconveniens fuit prima divisio. Objection 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons four degrees of sin; the first of which is "a fault hidden in the heart"; the second, "when it is done openly"; the third, "when it is formed into a habit"; and the fourth, "when man goes so far as to presume on God's mercy or to give himself up to despair": where no distinction is made between sins of deed and sins of word, and two other degrees of sin are added. Therefore the first division was unfitting.
Praeterea, non potest esse peccatum in ore vel in opere, nisi fiat prius in corde. Ergo ista peccata specie non differunt. Non ergo debent contra se invicem dividi. Objection 3: Further, there can be no sin of word or deed unless there precede sin of thought. Therefore these sins do not differ specifically. Therefore they should not be condivided with one another.
Sed contra est quod Hieronymus dicit, super Ezech., tria sunt generalia delicta quibus humanum subiacet genus, aut enim cogitatione, aut sermone, aut opere peccamus. On the contrary, Jerome in commenting on Ezech. 43:23: "The human race is subject to three kinds of sin, for when we sin, it is either by thought, or word, or deed."
Respondeo dicendum quod aliqua inveniuntur differre specie dupliciter. Uno modo, ex eo quod utrumque habet speciem completam, sicut equus et bos differunt specie. Alio modo, secundum diversos gradus in aliqua generatione vel motu accipiuntur diversae species, sicut aedificatio est completa generatio domus, collocatio autem fundamenti et erectio parietis sunt species incompletae, ut patet per philosophum, in X Ethic.; et idem etiam potest dici in generationibus animalium. Sic igitur peccatum dividitur per haec tria, scilicet peccatum oris, cordis et operis, non sicut per diversas species completas, nam consummatio peccati est in opere, unde peccatum operis habet speciem completam. Sed prima inchoatio eius est quasi fundatio in corde; secundus autem gradus eius est in ore, secundum quod homo prorumpit facile ad manifestandum conceptum cordis; tertius autem gradus iam est in consummatione operis. Et sic haec tria differunt secundum diversos gradus peccati. Patet tamen quod haec tria pertinent ad unam perfectam peccati speciem, cum ab eodem motivo procedant, iracundus enim, ex hoc quod appetit vindictam, primo quidem perturbatur in corde; secundo, in verba contumeliosa prorumpit; tertio vero, procedit usque ad facta iniuriosa. Et idem patet in luxuria, et in quolibet alio peccato. I answer that, Things differ specifically in two ways: first, when each has the complete species; thus a horse and an ox differ specifically: secondly, when the diversity of species is derived from diversity of degree in generation or movement: thus the building is the complete generation of a house, while the laying of the foundations, and the setting up of the walls are incomplete species, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 4); and the same can apply to the generation of animals. Accordingly sins are divided into these three, viz. sins of thought, word, and deed, not as into various complete species: for the consummation of sin is in the deed, wherefore sins of deed have the complete species; but the first beginning of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the sin of thought; the second degree is the sin of word, in so far as man is ready to break out into a declaration of his thought; while the third degree consists in the consummation of the deed. Consequently these three differ in respect of the various degrees of sin. Nevertheless it is evident that these three belong to the one complete species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man, through desire of vengeance, is at first disturbed in thought, then he breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful deeds; and the same applies to lust and to any other sin.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omne peccatum cordis convenit in ratione occulti, et secundum hoc ponitur unus gradus. Qui tamen per tres gradus distinguitur, scilicet cogitationis, delectationis et consensus. Reply to Objection 1: All sins of thought have the common note of secrecy, in respect of which they form one degree, which is, however, divided into three stages, viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent.
Ad secundum dicendum quod peccatum oris et operis conveniunt in manifestatione, et propter hoc a Gregorio sub uno computantur. Hieronymus autem distinguit ea, quia in peccato oris est manifestatio tantum, et principaliter intenta, in peccato vero operis est principaliter expletio interioris conceptus cordis, sed manifestatio est ex consequenti. Consuetudo vero et desperatio sunt gradus consequentes post speciem perfectam peccati, sicut adolescentia et iuventus post perfectam hominis generationem. Reply to Objection 2: Sins of words and deed are both done openly, and for this reason Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons them under one head: whereas Jerome (in commenting on Ezech. 43:23) distinguishes between them, because in sins of word there is nothing but manifestation which is intended principally; while in sins of deed, it is the consummation of the inward thought which is principally intended, and the outward manifestation is by way of sequel. Habit and despair are stages following the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and youth follow the complete generation of a man.
Ad tertium dicendum quod peccatum cordis et oris non distinguuntur a peccato operis, quando simul cum eo coniunguntur, sed prout quodlibet horum per se invenitur. Sicut etiam pars motus non distinguitur a toto motu, quando motus est continuus, sed solum quando motus sistit in medio. Reply to Objection 3: Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from the sin of deed when they are united together with it, but when each is found by itself: even as one part of a movement is not distinct from the whole movement, when the movement is continuous, but only when there is a break in the movement.

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Whether excess and deficiency diversify the species of sins?

Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superabundantia et defectus non diversificent species peccatorum. Superabundantia enim et defectus differunt secundum magis et minus. Sed magis et minus non diversificant speciem. Ergo superabundantia et defectus non diversificant speciem peccatorum. Objection 1: It would seem that excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. For excess and deficiency differ in respect of more and less. Now "more" and "less" do not diversify a species. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins.
Praeterea, sicut peccatum in agibilibus est ex hoc quod receditur a rectitudine rationis, ita falsitas in speculativis est ex hoc quod receditur a veritate rei. Sed non diversificatur species falsitatis ex hoc quod aliquis dicit plus vel minus esse quam sit in re. Ergo etiam non diversificatur species peccati ex hoc quod recedit a rectitudine rationis in plus vel in minus. Objection 2: Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due to straying from the rectitude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative matters, is due to straying from the truth of the reality. Now the species of falsehood is not diversified by saying more or less than the reality. Therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by straying more or less from the rectitude of reason.
Praeterea, ex duabus speciebus non constituitur una species, ut Porphyrius dicit. Sed superabundantia et defectus uniuntur in uno peccato, sunt enim simul quidam illiberales et prodigi, quorum duorum illiberalitas est peccatum secundum defectum, prodigalitas autem secundum superabundantiam. Ergo superabundantia et defectus non diversificant speciem peccatorum. Objection 3: Further, "one species cannot be made out of two," as Porphyry declares [*Isagog.; cf. Arist. Metaph. i]. Now excess and deficiency are united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal and wasteful—illiberality being a sin of deficiency, and prodigality, by excess. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins.
Sed contra, contraria differunt secundum speciem, nam contrarietas est differentia secundum formam, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed vitia quae differunt secundum superabundantiam et defectum, sunt contraria, sicut illiberalitas prodigalitati. Ergo differunt secundum speciem. On the contrary, Contraries differ specifically, for "contrariety is a difference of form," as stated in Metaph. x, text. 13,14. Now vices that differ according to excess and deficiency are contrary to one another, as illiberality to wastefulness. Therefore they differ specifically.
Respondeo dicendum quod, cum in peccato sint duo, scilicet ipse actus, et inordinatio eius, prout receditur ab ordine rationis et legis divinae; species peccati attenditur non ex parte inordinationis, quae est praeter intentionem peccantis, ut supra dictum est; sed magis ex parte ipsius actus, secundum quod terminatur ad obiectum, in quod fertur intentio peccantis. Et ideo ubicumque occurrit diversum motivum inclinans intentionem ad peccandum, ibi est diversa species peccati. Manifestum est autem quod non est idem motivum ad peccandum in peccatis quae sunt secundum superabundantiam, et in peccatis quae sunt secundum defectum; quinimmo sunt contraria motiva; sicut motivum in peccato intemperantiae est amor delectationum corporalium, motivum autem in peccato insensibilitatis est odium earum. Unde huiusmodi peccata non solum differunt specie, sed etiam sunt sibi invicem contraria. I answer that, While there are two things in sin, viz. the act itself and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a departure from the order of reason and the Divine law, the species of sin is gathered, not from its inordinateness, which is outside the sinner's intention, as stated above (Article [1]), but one the contrary, from the act itself as terminating in the object to which the sinner's intention is directed. Consequently wherever we find a different motive inclining the intention to sin, there will be a different species of sin. Now it is evident that the motive for sinning, in sins by excess, is not the same as the motive for sinning, in sins of deficiency; in fact, they are contrary to one another, just as the motive in the sin of intemperance is love for bodily pleasures, while the motive in the sin of insensibility is hatred of the same. Therefore these sins not only differ specifically, but are contrary to one another.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod magis et minus, etsi non sint causa diversitatis speciei, consequuntur tamen quandoque species differentes, prout proveniunt ex diversis formis, sicut si dicatur quod ignis est levior aere. Unde philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod qui posuerunt non esse diversas species amicitiarum propter hoc quod dicuntur secundum magis et minus, non sufficienti crediderunt signo. Et hoc modo superexcedere rationem, vel deficere ab ea, pertinet ad diversa peccata secundum speciem, inquantum consequuntur diversa motiva. Reply to Objection 1: Although "more" and "less" do not cause diversity of species, yet they are sometimes consequent to specific difference, in so far as they are the result of diversity of form; thus we may say that fire is lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 1) that "those who held that there are no different species of friendship, by reason of its admitting of degree, were led by insufficient proof." In this way to exceed reason or to fall short thereof belongs to sins specifically different, in so far as they result from different motives.
Ad secundum dicendum quod intentio peccantis non est ut recedat a ratione, et ideo non efficitur eiusdem rationis peccatum superabundantiae et defectus propter recessum ab eadem rationis rectitudine. Sed quandoque ille qui dicit falsum, intendit veritatem occultare, unde quantum ad hoc, non refert utrum dicat vel plus vel minus. Si tamen recedere a veritate sit praeter intentionem, tunc manifestum est quod ex diversis causis aliquis movetur ad dicendum plus vel minus, et secundum hoc diversa est ratio falsitatis. Sicut patet de iactatore, qui superexcedit dicendo falsum, quaerens gloriam; et de deceptore, qui diminuit, evadens debiti solutionem. Unde et quaedam falsae opiniones sunt sibi invicem contrariae. Reply to Objection 2: It is not the sinner's intention to depart from reason; and so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one kind through departing from the one rectitude of reason. On the other hand, sometimes he who utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth, wherefore in this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or less. If, however, departure from the truth be not outside the intention, it is evident that then one is moved by different causes to tell more or less; and in this respect there are different kinds of falsehood, as is evident of the "boaster," who exceeds in telling untruths for the sake of fame, and the "cheat," who tells less than the truth, in order to escape from paying his debts. This also explains how some false opinions are contrary to one another.
Ad tertium dicendum quod prodigus et illiberalis potest esse aliquis secundum diversa, ut scilicet sit aliquis illiberalis in accipiendo quae non debet, et prodigus in dando quae non debet. Nihil autem prohibet contraria inesse eidem secundum diversa. Reply to Objection 3: One may be prodigal and illiberal with regard to different objects: for instance one may be illiberal [*Cf. SS, Question [119], Article [1], ad 1] in taking what one ought not: and nothing hinders contraries from being in the same subject, in different respects.

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Whether sins differ specifically in respect of different circumstances?

Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitia et peccata diversificentur specie secundum diversas circumstantias. Quia, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., malum contingit ex singularibus defectibus. Singulares autem defectus sunt corruptiones singularum circumstantiarum. Ergo ex singulis circumstantiis corruptis singulae species peccatorum consequuntur. Objection 1: It would seem that vices and sins differ in respect of different circumstances. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "evil results from each single defect." Now individual defects are corruptions of individual circumstances. Therefore from the corruption of each circumstance there results a corresponding species of sin.
Praeterea, peccata sunt quidam actus humani. Sed actus humani interdum accipiunt speciem a circumstantiis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo peccata differunt specie secundum quod diversae circumstantiae corrumpuntur. Objection 2: Further, sins are human acts. But human acts sometimes take their species from circumstances, as stated above (Question [18], Article [10]). Therefore sins differ specifically according as different circumstances are corrupted.
Praeterea, diversae species gulae assignantur secundum particulas quae in hoc versiculo continentur,
praepropere, laute, nimis, ardenter, studiose.
Haec autem pertinent ad diversas circumstantias, nam praepropere est antequam oportet, nimis plus quam oportet, et idem patet in aliis. Ergo species peccati diversificantur secundum diversas circumstantias.
Objection 3: Further, diverse species are assigned to gluttony, according to the words contained in the following verse:
'Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.'
Now these pertain to various circumstances, for "hastily" means sooner than is right; "too much," more than is right, and so on with the others. Therefore the species of sin is diversified according to the various circumstances.
Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III et IV Ethic., quod singula vitia peccant agendo et plus quam oportet, et quando non oportet, et similiter secundum omnes alias circumstantias. Non ergo secundum hoc diversificantur peccatorum species. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7; iv, 1) that "every vice sins by doing more than one ought, and when one ought not"; and in like manner as to the other circumstances. Therefore the species of sins are not diversified in this respect.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ubi occurrit aliud motivum ad peccandum, ibi est alia peccati species, quia motivum ad peccandum est finis et obiectum. Contingit autem quandoque quod in corruptionibus diversarum circumstantiarum est idem motivum, sicut illiberalis ab eodem movetur quod accipiat quando non oportet, et ubi non oportet, et plus quam oportet, et similiter de aliis circumstantiis; hoc enim facit propter inordinatum appetitum pecuniae congregandae. Et in talibus diversarum circumstantiarum corruptiones non diversificant species peccatorum, sed pertinent ad unam et eandem peccati speciem. I answer that, As stated above (Article [8]), wherever there is a special motive for sinning, there is a different species of sin, because the motive for sinning is the end and object of sin. Now it happens sometimes that although different circumstances are corrupted, there is but one motive: thus the illiberal man, for the same motive, takes when he ought not, where he ought not, and more than he ought, and so on with the circumstances, since he does this through an inordinate desire of hoarding money: and in such cases the corruption of different circumstances does not diversify the species of sins, but belongs to one and the same species.
Quandoque vero contingit quod corruptiones diversarum circumstantiarum proveniunt a diversis motivis. Puta quod aliquis praepropere comedat, potest provenire ex hoc quod homo non potest ferre dilationem cibi, propter facilem consumptionem humiditatis; quod vero appetat immoderatum cibum, potest contingere propter virtutem naturae potentem ad convertendum multum cibum; quod autem aliquis appetat cibos deliciosos, contingit propter appetitum delectationis quae est in cibo. Unde in talibus diversarum circumstantiarum corruptiones inducunt diversas peccati species. Sometimes, however, the corruption of different circumstances arises from different motives: for instance that a man eat hastily, may be due to the fact that he cannot brook the delay in taking food, on account of a rapid exhaustion of the digestive humors; and that he desire too much food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion; that he desire choice meats, is due to his desire for pleasure in taking food. Hence in such matters, the corruption of different circumstances entails different species of sins.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod malum, inquantum huiusmodi, privatio est, et ideo diversificatur specie secundum ea quae privantur, sicut et ceterae privationes. Sed peccatum non sortitur speciem ex parte privationis vel aversionis, ut supra dictum est; sed ex conversione ad obiectum actus. Reply to Objection 1: Evil, as such, is a privation, and so it has different species in respect of the thing which the subject is deprived, even as other privations. But sin does not take its species from the privation or aversion, as stated above (Article [1]), but from turning to the object of the act.
Ad secundum dicendum quod circumstantia nunquam transfert actum in aliam speciem, nisi quando est aliud motivum. Reply to Objection 2: A circumstance never transfers an act from one species to another, save when there is another motive.
Ad tertium dicendum quod in diversis speciebus gulae diversa sunt motiva, sicut dictum est. Reply to Objection 3: In the various species of gluttony there are various motives, as stated.

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