St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

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Question: 104 [ << | >> ]

OF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)

Consequenter considerandum est de praeceptis iudicialibus.
  • Et primo, considerandum est de ipsis in communi;
  • secundo, de rationibus eorum.
We must now consider the judicial precepts:
  • and first of all we shall consider them in general;
  • in the second place we shall consider their reasons.
Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
Primo, quae sint iudicialia praecepta. (1) What is meant by the judicial precepts?
Secundo, utrum sint figuralia. (2) Whether they are figurative?
Tertio, de duratione eorum. (3) Their duration;
Quarto, de distinctione eorum. (4) Their division.

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Question: 104 [ << | >> ]
Article: 1  [ << | >> ]

Whether the judicial precepts were those which directed man in relation to his neighbor?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio praeceptorum iudicialium non consistat in hoc quod sunt ordinantia ad proximum. Iudicialia enim praecepta a iudicio dicuntur. Sed multa sunt alia quibus homo ad proximum ordinatur, quae non pertinent ad ordinem iudiciorum. Non ergo praecepta iudicialia dicuntur quibus homo ordinatur ad proximum. Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor. For judicial precepts take their name from "judgment." But there are many things that direct man as to his neighbor, which are not subordinate to judgment. Therefore the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor.
Praeterea, praecepta iudicialia a moralibus distinguuntur, ut supra dictum est. Sed multa praecepta moralia sunt quibus homo ordinatur ad proximum, sicut patet in septem praeceptis secundae tabulae. Non ergo praecepta iudicialia dicuntur ex hoc quod ad proximum ordinant. Objection 2: Further, the judicial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts, as stated above (Question [99], Article [4]). But there are many moral precepts which direct man as to his neighbor: as is evidently the case with the seven precepts of the second table. Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor.
Praeterea, sicut se habent praecepta caeremonialia ad Deum, ita se habent iudicialia praecepta ad proximum, ut supra dictum est. Sed inter praecepta caeremonialia sunt quaedam quae pertinent ad seipsum, sicut observantiae ciborum et vestimentorum, de quibus supra dictum est. Ergo praecepta iudicialia non ex hoc dicuntur quod ordinent hominem ad proximum. Objection 3: Further, as the ceremonial precepts relate to God, so do the judicial precepts relate to one's neighbor, as stated above (Question [99], Article [4]; Question [101], Article [1]). But among the ceremonial precepts there are some which concern man himself, such as observances in matter of food and apparel, of which we have already spoken (Question [102], Article [6], ad 1,6). Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Ezech. XVIII, inter cetera bona opera viri iusti, si iudicium verum fecerit inter virum et virum. Sed iudicialia praecepta a iudicio dicuntur. Ergo praecepta iudicialia videntur dici illa quae pertinent ad ordinationem hominum ad invicem. On the contrary, It is reckoned (Ezech. 18:8) among other works of a good and just man, that "he hath executed true judgment between man and man." But judicial precepts are so called from "judgment." Therefore it seems that the judicial precepts were those which directed the relations between man and man.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, praeceptorum cuiuscumque legis quaedam habent vim obligandi ex ipso dictamine rationis, quia naturalis ratio dictat hoc esse debitum fieri vel vitari. Et huiusmodi praecepta dicuntur moralia, eo quod a ratione dicuntur mores humani. Alia vero praecepta sunt quae non habent vim obligandi ex ipso dictamine rationis, quia scilicet in se considerata non habent absolute rationem debiti vel indebiti; sed habent vim obligandi ex aliqua institutione divina vel humana. Et huiusmodi sunt determinationes quaedam moralium praeceptorum. Si igitur determinentur moralia praecepta per institutionem divinam in his per quae ordinatur homo ad Deum, talia dicentur praecepta caeremonialia. Si autem in his quae pertinent ad ordinationem hominum ad invicem, talia dicentur praecepta iudicialia. In duobus ergo consistit ratio iudicialium praeceptorum, scilicet ut pertineant ad ordinationem hominum ad invicem; et ut non habeant vim obligandi ex sola ratione, sed ex institutione.. I answer that, As is evident from what we have stated above (Question [95], Article [2]; Question [99], Article [4]), in every law, some precepts derive their binding force from the dictate of reason itself, because natural reason dictates that something ought to be done or to be avoided. These are called "moral" precepts: since human morals are based on reason. At the same time there are other precepts which derive their binding force, not from the very dictate of reason (because, considered in themselves, they do not imply an obligation of something due or undue); but from some institution, Divine or human: and such are certain determinations of the moral precepts. When therefore the moral precepts are fixed by Divine institution in matters relating to man's subordination to God, they are called "ceremonial" precepts: but when they refer to man's relations to other men, they are called "judicial" precepts. Hence there are two conditions attached to the judicial precepts: viz. first, that they refer to man's relations to other men; secondly, that they derive their binding force not from reason alone, but in virtue of their institution.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iudicia exercentur officio aliquorum principum, qui habent potestatem iudicandi. Ad principem autem pertinet non solum ordinare de his quae veniunt in litigium, sed etiam de voluntariis contractibus qui inter homines fiunt, et de omnibus pertinentibus ad populi communitatem et regimen. Unde praecepta iudicialia non solum sunt illa quae pertinent ad lites iudiciorum; sed etiam quaecumque pertinent ad ordinationem hominum ad invicem, quae subest ordinationi principis tanquam supremi iudicis. Reply to Objection 1: Judgments emanate through the official pronouncement of certain men who are at the head of affairs, and in whom the judicial power is vested. Now it belongs to those who are at the head of affairs to regulate not only litigious matters, but also voluntary contracts which are concluded between man and man, and whatever matters concern the community at large and the government thereof. Consequently the judicial precepts are not only those which concern actions at law; but also all those that are directed to the ordering of one man in relation to another, which ordering is subject to the direction of the sovereign as supreme judge.
Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de illis praeceptis ordinantibus ad proximum, quae habent vim obligandi ex solo dictamine rationis. Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds in respect of those precepts which direct man in his relations to his neighbor, and derive their binding force from the mere dictate of reason.
Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam in his quae ordinant ad Deum, quaedam sunt moralia, quae ipsa ratio fide informata dictat, sicut Deum esse amandum et colendum. Quaedam vero sunt caeremonialia, quae non habent vim obligationis nisi ex institutione divina. Ad Deum autem pertinent non solum sacrificia oblata Deo, sed etiam quaecumque pertinent ad idoneitatem offerentium et Deum colentium. Homines enim ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem, et ideo ad cultum Dei pertinet, et per consequens ad caeremonialia praecepta, quod homo habeat quandam idoneitatem respectu cultus divini. Sed homo non ordinatur ad proximum sicut in finem, ut oporteat eum disponi in seipso in ordine ad proximum, haec enim est comparatio servorum ad dominos, qui id quod sunt, dominorum sunt, secundum philosophum, in I Polit. Et ideo non sunt aliqua praecepta iudicialia ordinantia hominem in seipso, sed omnia talia sunt moralia, quia ratio, quae est principium moralium, se habet in homine respectu eorum quae ad ipsum pertinent, sicut princeps vel iudex in civitate. Sciendum tamen quod, quia ordo hominis ad proximum magis subiacet rationi quam ordo hominis ad Deum, plura praecepta moralia inveniuntur per quae ordinatur homo ad proximum, quam per quae ordinatur ad Deum. Et propter hoc etiam oportuit plura esse caeremonialia in lege quam iudicialia. Reply to Objection 3: Even in those precepts which direct us to God, some are moral precepts, which the reason itself dictates when it is quickened by faith; such as that God is to be loved and worshipped. There are also ceremonial precepts, which have no binding force except in virtue of their Divine institution. Now God is concerned not only with the sacrifices that are offered to Him, but also with whatever relates to the fitness of those who offer sacrifices to Him and worship Him. Because men are ordained to God as to their end; wherefore it concerns God and, consequently, is a matter of ceremonial precept, that man should show some fitness for the divine worship. On the other hand, man is not ordained to his neighbor as to his end, so as to need to be disposed in himself with regard to his neighbor, for such is the relationship of a slave to his master, since a slave "is his master's in all that he is," as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Hence there are no judicial precepts ordaining man in himself; all such precepts are moral: because the reason, which is the principal in moral matters, holds the same position, in man, with regard to things that concern him, as a prince or judge holds in the state. Nevertheless we must take note that, since the relations of man to his neighbor are more subject to reason than the relations of man to God, there are more precepts whereby man is directed in his relations to his neighbor, than whereby he is directed to God. For the same reason there had to be more ceremonial than judicial precepts in the Law.

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Question: 104 [ << | >> ]
Article: 2  [ << | >> ]

Whether the judicial precepts were figurative?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta iudicialia non figurent aliquid. Hoc enim videtur esse proprium caeremonialium praeceptorum, quod sint in figuram alicuius rei instituta. Si igitur etiam praecepta iudicialia aliquid figurent, non erit differentia inter iudicialia et caeremonialia praecepta. Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not figurative. Because it seems proper to the ceremonial precepts to be instituted as figures of something else. Therefore, if the judicial precepts are figurative, there will be no difference between the judicial and ceremonial precepts.
Praeterea, sicuti illi populo Iudaeorum data sunt quaedam iudicialia praecepta, ita etiam aliis populis gentilium. Sed iudicialia praecepta aliorum populorum non figurant aliquid, sed ordinant quid fieri debeat. Ergo videtur quod neque praecepta iudicialia veteris legis aliquid figurarent. Objection 2: Further, just as certain judicial precepts were given to the Jewish people, so also were some given to other heathen peoples. But the judicial precepts given to other peoples were not figurative, but stated what had to be done. Therefore it seems that neither were the judicial precepts of the Old Law figures of anything.
Praeterea, ea quae ad cultum divinum pertinent, figuris quibusdam tradi oportuit, quia ea quae Dei sunt, supra nostram rationem sunt, ut supra dictum est. Sed ea quae sunt proximorum, non excedunt nostram rationem. Ergo per iudicialia, quae ad proximum nos ordinant, non oportuit aliquid figurari. Objection 3: Further, those things which relate to the divine worship had to be taught under certain figures, because the things of God are above our reason, as stated above (Question [101], Article [2], ad 2). But things concerning our neighbor are not above our reason. Therefore the judicial precepts which direct us in relation to our neighbor should not have been figurative.
Sed contra est quod Exod. XXI iudicialia praecepta allegorice et moraliter exponuntur. On the contrary, The judicial precepts are expounded both in the allegorical and in the moral sense (Ex. 21).
Respondeo dicendum quod dupliciter contingit aliquod praeceptum esse figurale. Uno modo, primo et per se, quia scilicet principaliter est institutum ad aliquid figurandum. Et hoc modo praecepta caeremonialia sunt figuralia, ad hoc enim sunt instituta, ut aliquid figurent pertinens ad cultum Dei et ad mysterium Christi. Quaedam vero praecepta sunt figuralia non primo et per se, sed ex consequenti. Et hoc modo praecepta iudicialia veteris legis sunt figuralia. Non enim sunt instituta ad aliquid figurandum; sed ad ordinandum statum illius populi secundum iustitiam et aequitatem. Sed ex consequenti aliquid figurabant, inquantum scilicet totus status illius populi, qui per huiusmodi praecepta disponebatur, figuralis erat; secundum illud I ad Cor. X, omnia in figuram contingebant illis. I answer that, A precept may be figurative in two ways. First, primarily and in itself: because, to wit, it is instituted principally that it may be the figure of something. In this way the ceremonial precepts are figurative; since they were instituted for the very purpose that they might foreshadow something relating to the worship of God and the mystery of Christ. But some precepts are figurative, not primarily and in themselves, but consequently. In this way the judicial precepts of the Old Law are figurative. For they were not instituted for the purpose of being figurative, but in order that they might regulate the state of that people according to justice and equity. Nevertheless they did foreshadow something consequently: since, to wit, the entire state of that people, who were directed by these precepts, was figurative, according to 1 Cor. 10:11: "All... things happened to them in figure."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praecepta caeremonialia alio modo sunt figuralia quam iudicialia, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1: The ceremonial precepts are not figurative in the same way as the judicial precepts, as explained above.
Ad secundum dicendum quod populus Iudaeorum ad hoc electus erat a Deo, quod ex eo Christus nasceretur. Et ideo oportuit totum illius populi statum esse propheticum et figuralem, ut Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum. Et propter hoc etiam iudicialia illi populo tradita, magis sunt figuralia quam iudicialia aliis populis tradita. Sicut etiam bella et gesta illius populi exponuntur mystice; non autem bella vel gesta Assyriorum vel Romanorum, quamvis longe clariora secundum homines. Reply to Objection 2: The Jewish people were chosen by God that Christ might be born of them. Consequently the entire state of that people had to be prophetic and figurative, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xxii, 24). For this reason even the judicial precepts that were given to this people were more figurative that those which were given to other nations. Thus, too, the wars and deeds of this people are expounded in the mystical sense: but not the wars and deeds of the Assyrians or Romans, although the latter are more famous in the eyes of men.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ordo ad proximum in populo illo, secundum se consideratus, pervius erat rationi. Sed secundum quod referebatur ad cultum Dei, superabat rationem. Et ex hac parte erat figuralis. Reply to Objection 3: In this people the direction of man in regard to his neighbor, considered in itself, was subject to reason. But in so far as it was referred to the worship of God, it was above reason: and in this respect it was figurative.

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Question: 104 [ << | >> ]
Article: 3  [ << | >> ]

Whether the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever?

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta iudicialia veteris legis perpetuam obligationem habeant. Praecepta enim iudicialia pertinent ad virtutem iustitiae, nam iudicium dicitur iustitiae executio. Iustitia autem est perpetua et immortalis, ut dicitur Sap. I. Ergo obligatio praeceptorum iudicialium est perpetua. Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever. Because the judicial precepts relate to the virtue of justice: since a judgment is an execution of the virtue of justice. Now "justice is perpetual and immortal" (Wis. 1:15). Therefore the judicial precepts bind for ever.
Praeterea, institutio divina est stabilior quam institutio humana. Sed praecepta iudicialia humanarum legum habent perpetuam obligationem. Ergo multo magis praecepta iudicialia legis divinae. Objection 2: Further, Divine institutions are more enduring than human institutions. But the judicial precepts of human laws bind for ever. Therefore much more do the judicial precepts of the Divine Law.
Praeterea, apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VII, quod reprobatio fit praecedentis mandati propter infirmitatem ipsius et inutilitatem. Quod quidem verum est de mandato caeremoniali quod non poterat facere perfectum iuxta conscientiam servientem solummodo in cibis et in potibus et variis Baptismatibus et iustitiis carnis, ut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. IX. Sed praecepta iudicialia utilia erant et efficacia ad id ad quod ordinabantur, scilicet ad iustitiam et aequitatem inter homines constituendam. Ergo praecepta iudicialia veteris legis non reprobantur, sed adhuc efficaciam habent. Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18) that "there is a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof." Now this is true of the ceremonial precept, which "could [Vulg.: 'can'] not, as to the conscience, make him perfect that serveth only in meats and in drinks, and divers washings and justices of the flesh," as the Apostle declares (Heb. 9:9,10). On the other hand, the judicial precepts were useful and efficacious in respect of the purpose for which they were instituted, viz. to establish justice and equity among men. Therefore the judicial precepts of the Old Law are not set aside, but still retain their efficacy.
Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VII, quod translato sacerdotio, necesse est ut legis translatio fiat. Sed sacerdotium est translatum ab Aaron ad Christum. Ergo etiam et tota lex est translata. Non ergo iudicialia praecepta adhuc obligationem habent. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 7:12) that "the priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law." But the priesthood was transferred from Aaron to Christ. Therefore the entire Law was also transferred. Therefore the judicial precepts are no longer in force.
Respondeo dicendum quod iudicialia praecepta non habuerunt perpetuam obligationem, sed sunt evacuata per adventum Christi, aliter tamen quam caeremonialia. Nam caeremonialia adeo sunt evacuata ut non solum sint mortua, sed etiam mortifera observantibus post Christum, maxime post Evangelium divulgatum. Praecepta autem iudicialia sunt quidem mortua, quia non habent vim obligandi, non tamen sunt mortifera. Quia si quis princeps ordinaret in regno suo illa iudicialia observari, non peccaret, nisi forte hoc modo observarentur, vel observari mandarentur, tanquam habentia vim obligandi ex veteris legis institutione. Talis enim intentio observandi esset mortifera. I answer that, The judicial precepts did not bind for ever, but were annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not in the same way as the ceremonial precepts. For the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far as to be not only "dead," but also deadly to those who observe them since the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation of the Gospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts are dead indeed, because they have no binding force: but they are not deadly. For if a sovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be observed in his kingdom, he would not sin: unless perchance they were observed, or ordered to be observed, as though they derived their binding force through being institutions of the Old Law: for it would be a deadly sin to intend to observe them thus.
Et huius differentiae ratio potest accipi ex praemissis. Dictum est enim quod praecepta caeremonialia sunt figuralia primo et per se, tanquam instituta principaliter ad figurandum Christi mysteria ut futura. Et ideo ipsa observatio eorum praeiudicat fidei veritati, secundum quam confitemur illa mysteria iam esse completa. Praecepta autem iudicialia non sunt instituta ad figurandum, sed ad disponendum statum illius populi, qui ordinabatur ad Christum. Et ideo, mutato statu illius populi, Christo iam veniente, iudicialia praecepta obligationem amiserunt, lex enim fuit paedagogus ducens ad Christum, ut dicitur ad Gal. III. Quia tamen huiusmodi iudicialia praecepta non ordinantur ad figurandum, sed ad aliquid fiendum, ipsa eorum observatio absolute non praeiudicat fidei veritati. Sed intentio observandi tanquam ex obligatione legis, praeiudicat veritati fidei, quia per hoc haberetur quod status prioris populi adhuc duraret, et quod Christus nondum venisset. The reason for this difference may be gathered from what has been said above (Article [2]). For it has been stated that the ceremonial precepts are figurative primarily and in themselves, as being instituted chiefly for the purpose of foreshadowing the mysteries of Christ to come. On the other hand, the judicial precepts were not instituted that they might be figures, but that they might shape the state of that people who were directed to Christ. Consequently, when the state of that people changed with the coming of Christ, the judicial precepts lost their binding force: for the Law was a pedagogue, leading men to Christ, as stated in Gal. 3:24. Since, however, these judicial precepts are instituted, not for the purpose of being figures, but for the performance of certain deeds, the observance thereof is not prejudicial to the truth of faith. But the intention of observing them, as though one were bound by the Law, is prejudicial to the truth of faith: because it would follow that the former state of the people still lasts, and that Christ has not yet come.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iustitia quidem perpetuo est observanda. Sed determinatio eorum quae sunt iusta secundum institutionem humanam vel divinam, oportet quod varietur secundum diversum hominum statum. Reply to Objection 1: The obligation of observing justice is indeed perpetual. But the determination of those things that are just, according to human or Divine institution, must needs be different, according to the different states of mankind.
Ad secundum dicendum quod praecepta iudicialia ab hominibus instituta habent perpetuam obligationem, manente illo statu regiminis. Sed si civitas vel gens ad aliud regimen deveniat, oportet leges mutari. Non enim eaedem leges conveniunt in democratia, quae est potestas populi, et in oligarchia, quae est potestas divitum; ut patet per philosophum, in sua politica. Et ideo etiam, mutato statu illius populi, oportuit praecepta iudicialia mutari. Reply to Objection 2: The judicial precepts established by men retain their binding force for ever, so long as the state of government remains the same. But if the state or nation pass to another form of government, the laws must needs be changed. For democracy, which is government by the people, demands different laws from those of oligarchy, which is government by the rich, as the Philosopher shows (Polit. iv, 1). Consequently when the state of that people changed, the judicial precepts had to be changed also.
Ad tertium dicendum quod illa praecepta iudicialia disponebant populum ad iustitiam et aequitatem secundum quod conveniebat illi statui. Sed post Christum, statum illius populi oportuit mutari, ut iam in Christo non esset discretio gentilis et Iudaei, sicut antea erat. Et propter hoc oportuit etiam praecepta iudicialia mutari. Reply to Objection 3: Those judicial precepts directed the people to justice and equity, in keeping with the demands of that state. But after the coming of Christ, there had to be a change in the state of that people, so that in Christ there was no distinction between Gentile and Jew, as there had been before. For this reason the judicial precepts needed to be changed also.

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First Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 104 [ << | >> ]
Article: 4  [ << | >> ]

Whether it is possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts?

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta iudicialia non possint habere aliquam certam divisionem. Praecepta enim iudicialia ordinant homines ad invicem. Sed ea quae inter homines ordinari oportet, in usum eorum venientia, non cadunt sub certa distinctione, cum sint infinita. Ergo praecepta iudicialia non possunt habere certam distinctionem. Objection 1: It would seem that it is impossible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts. Because the judicial precepts direct men in their relations to one another. But those things which need to be directed, as pertaining to the relationship between man and man, and which are made use of by men, are not subject to division, since they are infinite in number. Therefore it is not possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts.
Praeterea, praecepta iudicialia sunt determinationes moralium. Sed moralia praecepta non videntur habere aliquam distinctionem, nisi secundum quod reducuntur ad praecepta Decalogi. Ergo praecepta iudicialia non habent aliquam certam distinctionem. Objection 2: Further, the judicial precepts are decisions on moral matters. But moral precepts do not seem to be capable of division, except in so far as they are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore there is no distinct division of the judicial precepts.
Praeterea, praecepta caeremonialia quia certam distinctionem habent, eorum distinctio in lege innuitur, dum quaedam vocantur sacrificia, quaedam observantiae. Sed nulla distinctio innuitur in lege praeceptorum iudicialium. Ergo videtur quod non habeant certam distinctionem. Objection 3: Further, because there is a distinct division of the ceremonial precepts, the Law alludes to this division, by describing some as "sacrifices," others as "observances." But the Law contains no allusion to a division of the judicial precepts. Therefore it seems that they have no distinct division.
Sed contra, ubi est ordo, oportet quod sit distinctio. Sed ratio ordinis maxime pertinet ad praecepta iudicialia, per quae populus ille ordinabatur. Ergo maxime debent habere distinctionem certam. On the contrary, Wherever there is order there must needs be division. But the notion of order is chiefly applicable to the judicial precepts, since thereby that people was ordained. Therefore it is most necessary that they should have a distinct division.
Respondeo dicendum quod, cum lex sit quasi quaedam ars humanae vitae instituendae vel ordinandae, sicut in unaquaque arte est certa distinctio regularum artis, ita oportet in qualibet lege esse certam distinctionem praeceptorum, aliter enim ipsa confusio utilitatem legis auferret. Et ideo dicendum est quod praecepta iudicialia veteris legis, per quae homines ad invicem ordinabantur, distinctionem habent secundum distinctionem ordinationis humanae. I answer that, Since law is the art, as it were, of directing or ordering the life of man, as in every art there is a distinct division in the rules of art, so, in every law, there must be a distinct division of precepts: else the law would be rendered useless by confusion. We must therefore say that the judicial precepts of the Old Law, whereby men were directed in their relations to one another, are subject to division according to the divers ways in which man is directed.
Quadruplex autem ordo in aliquo populo inveniri potest, unus quidem, principum populi ad subditos; alius autem, subditorum ad invicem; tertius autem, eorum qui sunt de populo ad extraneos; quartus autem, ad domesticos, sicut patris ad filium, uxoris ad virum, et domini ad servum. Et secundum istos quatuor ordines distingui possunt praecepta iudicialia veteris legis. Dantur enim quaedam praecepta de institutione principum et officio eorum, et de reverentia eis exhibenda, et haec est una pars iudicialium praeceptorum. Dantur etiam quaedam praecepta pertinentia ad concives ad invicem, puta circa emptiones et venditiones, et iudicia et poenas. Et haec est secunda pars iudicialium praeceptorum. Dantur etiam quaedam praecepta pertinentia ad extraneos, puta de bellis contra hostes, et de susceptione peregrinorum et advenarum. Et haec est tertia pars iudicialium praeceptorum. Dantur etiam in lege quaedam praecepta pertinentia ad domesticam conversationem, sicut de servis, et uxoribus, et filiis. Et haec est quarta pars iudicialium praeceptorum. Now in every people a fourfold order is to be found: one, of the people's sovereign to his subjects; a second of the subjects among themselves; a third, of the citizens to foreigners; a fourth, of members of the same household, such as the order of the father to his son; of the wife to her husband; of the master to his servant: and according to these four orders we may distinguish different kinds of judicial precepts in the Old Law. For certain precepts are laid down concerning the institution of the sovereign and relating to his office, and about the respect due to him: this is one part of the judicial precepts. Again, certain precepts are given in respect of a man to his fellow citizens: for instance, about buying and selling, judgments and penalties: this is the second part of the judicial precepts. Again, certain precepts are enjoined with regard to foreigners: for instance, about wars waged against their foes, and about the way to receive travelers and strangers: this is the third part of the judicial precepts. Lastly, certain precepts are given relating to home life: for instance, about servants, wives and children: this is the fourth part of the judicial precepts.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae pertinent ad ordinationem hominum ad invicem, sunt quidem numero infinita; sed tamen reduci possunt ad aliqua certa, secundum differentiam ordinationis humanae, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1: Things pertaining to the ordering of relations between one man and another are indeed infinite in number: yet they are reducible to certain distinct heads, according to the different relations in which one man stands to another, as stated above.
Ad secundum dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi sunt prima in genere moralium, ut supra dictum est, et ideo convenienter alia praecepta moralia secundum ea distinguuntur. Sed praecepta iudicialia et caeremonialia habent aliam rationem obligationis non quidem ex ratione naturali sed ex sola institutione. Et ideo distinctionis eorum est alia ratio. Reply to Objection 2: The precepts of the decalogue held the first place in the moral order, as stated above (Question [100], Article [3]): and consequently it is fitting that other moral precepts should be distinguished in relation to them. But the judicial and ceremonial precepts have a different binding force, derived, not from natural reason, but from their institution alone. Hence there is a distinct reason for distinguishing them.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ex ipsis rebus quae per praecepta iudicialia ordinantur in lege, innuit lex distinctionem iudicialium praeceptorum. Reply to Objection 3: The Law alludes to the division of the judicial precepts in the very things themselves which are prescribed by the judicial precepts of the Law.

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