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Second Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 1 [ << | >> ]
translated by Joseph Kenny, O.P.
Post communem considerationem de virtutibus et vitiis et aliis ad materiam moralem pertinentibus, necesse est considerare singula in speciali, sermones enim morales universales sunt minus utiles, eo quod actiones in particularibus sunt. Potest autem aliquid in speciali considerari circa moralia dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte ipsius materiae moralis, puta cum consideratur de hac virtute vel hoc vitio; alio modo, quantum ad speciales status hominum, puta cum consideratur de subditis et praelatis, de activis et contemplativis, vel quibuscumque aliis differentiis hominum.
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After a general consideration of virtues, vices, and other things pertaining to moral matters, it is necessary to consider each of them in particular. For universal moral discourse is less useful, since actions are singulars. Particular moral matters can be considered in two ways: first, with respect to the moral matter itself, for example, this virtue or that vice; secondly, with respect to the special states of men, for example, subjects and prelates, people in active or contemplative life, and so one for other differences of men.
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Est autem considerandum circa primum quod, si seorsum determinaremus de virtutibus, donis, vitiis et praeceptis, oporteret idem multoties dicere, qui enim sufficienter vult tractare de hoc praecepto, non moechaberis, necesse habet inquirere de adulterio, quod est quoddam peccatum, cuius etiam cognitio dependet ex cognitione oppositae virtutis. Erit igitur compendiosior et expeditior considerationis via si simul sub eodem tractatu consideratio procedit de virtute et dono sibi correspondente, et vitiis oppositis, et praeceptis affirmativis vel negativis. Erit autem hic considerationis modus conveniens ipsis vitiis secundum propriam speciem, ostensum est enim supra quod vitia et peccata diversificantur specie secundum materiam vel obiectum, non autem secundum alias differentias peccatorum, puta cordis, oris et operis, vel secundum infirmitatem, ignorantiam et malitiam, et alias huiusmodi differentias; est autem eadem materia circa quam et virtus recte operatur et vitia opposita a rectitudine recedunt. Sic igitur tota materia morali ad considerationem virtutum reducta, omnes virtutes sunt ulterius reducendae ad septem,
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It should first be remarked that, if we were to treat virtues, gifts, vices and commandments separately, we would have to say the same thing many times over. For, if you were adequately to treat the commandment "Do not commit adultery," you would have to examine adultery, which is a particular sin, and to understand it you must understand the opposite virtue. Therefore, it will be a briefer and quicker to treat together the virtue and the gift corresponding to it, along with the opposite vices and the affirmative and negative commandments. This is the most convenient procedure for treating vices in their proper species, for it was shown above that vices and sins differ in species according to their matter or object, not according to other factors differentiating sins, such is by thought, word and deed, or by way of weakness, ignorance or malice, and other such differentiations. But virtues act correctly with regard to the same matter as the opposite vices deviate from. Therefore, as all moral matters are reduced to the consideration of the virtues, all the virtues are furthermore reduced to seven:
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Virtutum autem intellectualium una quidem est prudentia, quae inter cardinales virtutes continetur et numeratur; ars vero non pertinet ad moralem, quae circa agibilia versatur, cum ars sit recta ratio factibilium, ut supra dictum est; aliae vero tres intellectuales virtutes, scilicet sapientia, intellectus et scientia, communicant etiam in nomine cum donis quibusdam spiritus sancti, unde simul etiam de eis considerabitur in consideratione donorum virtutibus correspondentium. | As for intellectual virtues, one is prudence, which is included and numbered among the cardinal virtues. Art, which has to do with making things, does not pertain to morals, as was said above. The other three intellectual virtues, i.e. wisdom, understanding and knowledge, share names with some gifts of the Holy Spirit. So they will be treated along with the gifts corresponding to virtues. |
Aliae vero virtutes morales omnes aliqualiter reducuntur ad virtutes cardinales, ut ex supradictis patet, unde in consideratione alicuius virtutis cardinalis considerabuntur etiam omnes virtutes ad eam qualitercumque pertinentes et vitia opposita. Et sic nihil moralium erit praetermissum. | All the other moral virtues are somehow reducible to the cardinal virtues, as was show previously. So along with each cardinal virtue we will treat also all the virtues that are in some way related to it, as well as the contrary vices. In this way nothing pertaining to morals will be omitted. |