St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

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OF WAR (FOUR ARTICLES)

Deinde considerandum est de bello. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. We must now consider war, under which head there are four points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum aliquod bellum sit licitum. (1) Whether some kind of war is lawful?
Secundo, utrum clericis sit licitum bellare. (2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight?
Tertio, utrum liceat bellantibus uti insidiis. (3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes?
Quarto, utrum liceat in diebus festis bellare. (4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?

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Whether it is always sinful to wage war?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bellare semper sit peccatum. Poena enim non infligitur nisi pro peccato. Sed bellantibus a domino indicitur poena, secundum illud Matth. XXVI, omnis qui acceperit gladium gladio peribit. Ergo omne bellum est illicitum. Objection 1: It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war. Because punishment is not inflicted except for sin. Now those who wage war are threatened by Our Lord with punishment, according to Mt. 26:52: "All that take the sword shall perish with the sword." Therefore all wars are unlawful.
Praeterea, quidquid contrariatur divino praecepto est peccatum. Sed bellare contrariatur divino praecepto, dicitur enim Matth. V, ego dico vobis non resistere malo; et Rom. XII dicitur, non vos defendentes, carissimi, sed date locum irae. Ergo bellare semper est peccatum. Objection 2: Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a sin. But war is contrary to a Divine precept, for it is written (Mt. 5:39): "But I say to you not to resist evil"; and (Rm. 12:19): "Not revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath." Therefore war is always sinful.
Praeterea, nihil contrariatur actui virtutis nisi peccatum. Sed bellum contrariatur paci. Ergo bellum semper est peccatum. Objection 3: Further, nothing, except sin, is contrary to an act of virtue. But war is contrary to peace. Therefore war is always a sin.
Praeterea, omne exercitium ad rem licitam licitum est, sicut patet in exercitiis scientiarum. Sed exercitia bellorum, quae fiunt in torneamentis, prohibentur ab Ecclesia, quia morientes in huiusmodi tyrociniis ecclesiastica sepultura privantur. Ergo bellum videtur esse simpliciter peccatum. Objection 4: Further, the exercise of a lawful thing is itself lawful, as is evident in scientific exercises. But warlike exercises which take place in tournaments are forbidden by the Church, since those who are slain in these trials are deprived of ecclesiastical burial. Therefore it seems that war is a sin in itself.
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in sermone de puero centurionis, si Christiana disciplina omnino bella culparet, hoc potius consilium salutis petentibus in Evangelio daretur, ut abiicerent arma, seque militiae omnino subtraherent. Dictum est autem eis, neminem concutiatis; estote contenti stipendiis vestris. Quibus proprium stipendium sufficere praecepit, militare non prohibuit. On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on the son of the centurion [*Ep. ad Marcel. cxxxviii]: "If the Christian Religion forbade war altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the Gospel would rather have been counselled to cast aside their arms, and to give up soldiering altogether. On the contrary, they were told: 'Do violence to no man... and be content with your pay' [*Lk. 3:14]. If he commanded them to be content with their pay, he did not forbid soldiering."
Respondeo dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliquod bellum sit iustum, tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, auctoritas principis, cuius mandato bellum est gerendum. Non enim pertinet ad personam privatam bellum movere, quia potest ius suum in iudicio superioris prosequi. Similiter etiam quia convocare multitudinem, quod in bellis oportet fieri, non pertinet ad privatam personam. Cum autem cura reipublicae commissa sit principibus, ad eos pertinet rem publicam civitatis vel regni seu provinciae sibi subditae tueri. Et sicut licite defendunt eam materiali gladio contra interiores quidem perturbatores, dum malefactores puniunt, secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. XIII, non sine causa gladium portat, minister enim Dei est, vindex in iram ei qui male agit; ita etiam gladio bellico ad eos pertinet rempublicam tueri ab exterioribus hostibus. Unde et principibus dicitur in Psalm., eripite pauperem, et egenum de manu peccatoris liberate. Unde Augustinus dicit, contra Faust., ordo naturalis, mortalium paci accommodatus, hoc poscit, ut suscipiendi belli auctoritas atque consilium penes principes sit. I answer that, In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private individual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private individual to summon together the people, which has to be done in wartime. And as the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common weal against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers, according to the words of the Apostle (Rm. 13:4): "He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil"; so too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal against external enemies. Hence it is said to those who are in authority (Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the poor: and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner"; and for this reason Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 75): "The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority."
Secundo, requiritur causa iusta, ut scilicet illi qui impugnantur propter aliquam culpam impugnationem mereantur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro quaest., iusta bella solent definiri quae ulciscuntur iniurias, si gens vel civitas plectenda est quae vel vindicare neglexerit quod a suis improbe factum est, vel reddere quod per iniuriam ablatum est. Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault. Wherefore Augustine says (Questions. in Hept., qu. x, super Jos.): "A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly."
Tertio, requiritur ut sit intentio bellantium recta, qua scilicet intenditur vel ut bonum promoveatur, vel ut malum vitetur. Unde Augustinus, in libro de verbis Dom., apud veros Dei cultores etiam illa bella pacata sunt quae non cupiditate aut crudelitate, sed pacis studio geruntur, ut mali coerceantur et boni subleventur. Potest autem contingere quod etiam si sit legitima auctoritas indicentis bellum et causa iusta, nihilominus propter pravam intentionem bellum reddatur illicitum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro contra Faust., nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, implacatus et implacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido dominandi, et si qua sunt similia, haec sunt quae in bellis iure culpantur. Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. [*The words quoted are to be found not in St. Augustine's works, but Can. Apud. Caus. xxiii, qu. 1]): "True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good." For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered unlawful through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 74): "The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in II Lib. contra Manich., ille accipit gladium qui, nulla superiori aut legitima potestate aut iubente vel concedente, in sanguinem alicuius armatur. Qui vero ex auctoritate principis vel iudicis, si sit persona privata; vel ex zelo iustitiae, quasi ex auctoritate Dei, si sit persona publica, gladio utitur, non ipse accipit gladium, sed ab alio sibi commisso utitur. Unde ei poena non debetur. Nec tamen illi etiam qui cum peccato gladio utuntur semper gladio occiduntur. Sed ipso suo gladio semper pereunt, quia pro peccato gladii aeternaliter puniuntur, nisi poeniteant. Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 70): "To take the sword is to arm oneself in order to take the life of anyone, without the command or permission of superior or lawful authority." On the other hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private person) by the authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as a public person) through zeal for justice, and by the authority, so to speak, of God, is not to "take the sword," but to use it as commissioned by another, wherefore it does not deserve punishment. And yet even those who make sinful use of the sword are not always slain with the sword, yet they always perish with their own sword, because, unless they repent, they are punished eternally for their sinful use of the sword.
Ad secundum dicendum quod huiusmodi praecepta, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, semper sunt servanda in praeparatione animi, ut scilicet semper homo sit paratus non resistere vel non se defendere si opus fuerit. Sed quandoque est aliter agendum propter commune bonum, et etiam illorum cum quibus pugnatur. Unde Augustinus dicit, in Epist. ad Marcellinum, agenda sunt multa etiam cum invitis benigna quadam asperitate plectendis. Nam cui licentia iniquitatis eripitur, utiliter vincitur, quoniam nihil est infelicius felicitate peccantium, qua poenalis nutritur impunitas, et mala voluntas, velut hostis interior, roboratur. Reply to Objection 2: Such like precepts, as Augustine observes (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19), should always be borne in readiness of mind, so that we be ready to obey them, and, if necessary, to refrain from resistance or self-defense. Nevertheless it is necessary sometimes for a man to act otherwise for the common good, or for the good of those with whom he is fighting. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Marcellin. cxxxviii): "Those whom we have to punish with a kindly severity, it is necessary to handle in many ways against their will. For when we are stripping a man of the lawlessness of sin, it is good for him to be vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than the happiness of sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity, and an evil will, like an internal enemy."
Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam illi qui iusta bella gerunt pacem intendunt. Et ita paci non contrariantur nisi malae, quam dominus non venit mittere in terram, ut dicitur Matth. X. Unde Augustinus dicit, ad Bonifacium, non quaeritur pax ut bellum exerceatur, sed bellum geritur ut pax acquiratur. Esto ergo bellando pacificus, ut eos quos expugnas ad pacis utilitatem vincendo perducas Reply to Objection 3: Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so they are not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace, which Our Lord "came not to send upon earth" (Mt. 10:34). Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix): "We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them to the prosperity of peace."
Ad quartum dicendum quod exercitia hominum ad res bellicas non sunt universaliter prohibita, sed inordinata exercitia et periculosa, ex quibus occisiones et depraedationes proveniunt. Apud antiquos autem exercitationes ad bella sine huiusmodi periculis erant, et ideo vocabantur meditationes armorum, vel bella sine sanguine, ut per Hieronymum patet, in quadam epistola. Reply to Objection 4: Manly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not all forbidden, but those which are inordinate and perilous, and end in slaying or plundering. In olden times warlike exercises presented no such danger, and hence they were called "exercises of arms" or "bloodless wars," as Jerome states in an epistle [*Reference incorrect: cf. Veget., De Re Milit. i].

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Whether it is lawful for clerics and bishops to fight?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod clericis et episcopis liceat pugnare. Bella enim intantum sunt licita et iusta, sicut dictum est, inquantum tuentur pauperes et totam rempublicam ab hostium iniuriis. Sed hoc maxime videtur ad praelatos pertinere, dicit enim Gregorius, in quadam homilia, lupus super oves venit, cum quilibet iniustus et raptor fideles quosque atque humiles opprimit. Sed is qui pastor videbatur esse et non erat, relinquit oves et fugit, quia dum sibi ab eo periculum metuit, resistere eius iniustitiae non praesumit. Ergo praelatis et clericis licitum est pugnare. Objection 1: It would seem lawful for clerics and bishops to fight. For, as stated above (Article [1]), wars are lawful and just in so far as they protect the poor and the entire common weal from suffering at the hands of the foe. Now this seems to be above all the duty of prelates, for Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xiv): "The wolf comes upon the sheep, when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses those who are faithful and humble. But he who was thought to be the shepherd, and was not, leaveth the sheep, end flieth, for he fears lest the wolf hurt him, and dares not stand up against his injustice." Therefore it is lawful for prelates and clerics to fight.
Praeterea, XXIII, qu. VIII, Leo Papa scribit, cum saepe adversa a Saracenorum partibus pervenerint nuntia, quidam in Romanorum portum Saracenos clam furtiveque venturos esse dicebant. Pro quo nostrum congregari praecepimus populum, maritimumque ad littus descendere decrevimus. Ergo episcopis licet ad bella procedere. Objection 2: Further, Pope Leo IV writes (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Igitur): "As untoward tidings had frequently come from the Saracen side, some said that the Saracens would come to the port of Rome secretly and covertly; for which reason we commanded our people to gather together, and ordered them to go down to the seashore." Therefore it is lawful for bishops to fight.
Praeterea, eiusdem rationis esse videtur quod homo aliquid faciat, et quod facienti consentiat, secundum illud Rom. I, non solum digni sunt morte qui faciunt, sed et qui consentiunt facientibus. Maxime autem consentit qui ad aliquid faciendum alios inducit. Licitum autem est episcopis et clericis inducere alios ad bellandum, dicitur enim XXIII, qu. VIII, quod hortatu et precibus Adriani Romanae urbis episcopi, Carolus bellum contra Longobardos suscepit. Ergo etiam eis licet pugnare. Objection 3: Further, apparently, it comes to the same whether a man does a thing himself, or consents to its being done by another, according to Rm. 1:32: "They who do such things, are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them." Now those, above all, seem to consent to a thing, who induce others to do it. But it is lawful for bishops and clerics to induce others to fight: for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Hortatu) that Charles went to war with the Lombards at the instance and entreaty of Adrian, bishop of Rome. Therefore they also are allowed to fight.
Praeterea, illud quod est secundum se honestum et meritorium non est illicitum praelatis et clericis. Sed bellare est quandoque et honestum et meritorium, dicitur enim XXIII, qu. VIII, quod si aliquis pro veritate fidei et salvatione patriae ac defensione Christianorum mortuus fuerit, a Deo caeleste praemium consequetur. Ergo licitum est episcopis et clericis bellare. Objection 4: Further, whatever is right and meritorious in itself, is lawful for prelates and clerics. Now it is sometimes right and meritorious to make war, for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Omni timore) that if "a man die for the true faith, or to save his country, or in defense of Christians, God will give him a heavenly reward." Therefore it is lawful for bishops and clerics to fight.
Sed contra est quod Petro, in persona episcoporum et clericorum, dicitur Matth. XXVI, converte gladium tuum in vaginam. Non ergo licet eis pugnare. On the contrary, It was said to Peter as representing bishops and clerics (Mt. 16:52): "Put up again thy sword into the scabbard [Vulg.: 'its place'] [*"Scabbard" is the reading in Jn. 18:11]." Therefore it is not lawful for them to fight.
Respondeo dicendum quod ad bonum societatis humanae plura sunt necessaria. Diversa autem a diversis melius et expeditius aguntur quam ab uno; ut patet per philosophum, in sua politica. Et quaedam negotia sunt adeo sibi repugnantia ut convenienter simul exerceri non possint. Et ideo illis qui maioribus deputantur prohibentur minora, sicut secundum leges humanas militibus, qui deputantur ad exercitia bellica, negotiationes interdicuntur. I answer that, Several things are requisite for the good of a human society: and a number of things are done better and quicker by a number of persons than by one, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 1), while certain occupations are so inconsistent with one another, that they cannot be fittingly exercised at the same time; wherefore those who are deputed to important duties are forbidden to occupy themselves with things of small importance. Thus according to human laws, soldiers who are deputed to warlike pursuits are forbidden to engage in commerce [*Cod. xii, 35, De Re Milit.].
Bellica autem exercitia maxime repugnant illis officiis quibus episcopi et clerici deputantur, propter duo. Primo quidem, generali ratione, quia bellica exercitia maximas inquietudines habent; unde multum impediunt animum a contemplatione divinorum et laude Dei et oratione pro populo, quae ad officium pertinent clericorum. Et ideo sicut negotiationes, propter hoc quod nimis implicant animum, interdicuntur clericis, ita et bellica exercitia, secundum illud II ad Tim. II, nemo militans Deo implicat se saecularibus negotiis. Secundo, propter specialem rationem. Nam omnes clericorum ordines ordinantur ad altaris ministerium, in quo sub sacramento repraesentatur passio Christi, secundum illud I ad Cor. XI, quotiescumque manducabitis panem hunc et calicem bibetis, mortem domini annuntiabitis, donec veniat. Et ideo non competit eis occidere vel effundere sanguinem, sed magis esse paratos ad propriam sanguinis effusionem pro Christo, ut imitentur opere quod gerunt ministerio. Et propter hoc est institutum ut effundentes sanguinem, etiam sine peccato, sint irregulares. Nulli autem qui est deputatus ad aliquod officium licet id per quod suo officio incongruus redditur. Unde clericis omnino non licet bella gerere, quae ordinantur ad sanguinis effusionem. Now warlike pursuits are altogether incompatible with the duties of a bishop and a cleric, for two reasons. The first reason is a general one, because, to wit, warlike pursuits are full of unrest, so that they hinder the mind very much from the contemplation of Divine things, the praise of God, and prayers for the people, which belong to the duties of a cleric. Wherefore just as commercial enterprises are forbidden to clerics, because they unsettle the mind too much, so too are warlike pursuits, according to 2 Tim. 2:4: "No man being a soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business." The second reason is a special one, because, to wit, all the clerical Orders are directed to the ministry of the altar, on which the Passion of Christ is represented sacramentally, according to 1 Cor. 11:26: "As often as you shall eat this bread, and drink the chalice, you shall show the death of the Lord, until He come." Wherefore it is unbecoming for them to slay or shed blood, and it is more fitting that they should be ready to shed their own blood for Christ, so as to imitate in deed what they portray in their ministry. For this reason it has been decreed that those who shed blood, even without sin, become irregular. Now no man who has a certain duty to perform, can lawfully do that which renders him unfit for that duty. Wherefore it is altogether unlawful for clerics to fight, because war is directed to the shedding of blood.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praelati debent resistere non solum lupis qui spiritualiter interficiunt gregem, sed etiam raptoribus et tyrannis qui corporaliter vexant, non autem materialibus armis in propria persona utendo, sed spiritualibus; secundum illud apostoli, II ad Cor. X, arma militiae nostrae non sunt carnalia, sed spiritualia. Quae quidem sunt salubres admonitiones, devotae orationes, contra pertinaces excommunicationis sententia. Reply to Objection 1: Prelates ought to withstand not only the wolf who brings spiritual death upon the flock, but also the pillager and the oppressor who work bodily harm; not, however, by having recourse themselves to material arms, but by means of spiritual weapons, according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 10:4): "The weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God." Such are salutary warnings, devout prayers, and, for those who are obstinate, the sentence of excommunication.
Ad secundum dicendum quod praelati et clerici, ex auctoritate superioris, possunt interesse bellis, non quidem ut ipsi propria manu pugnent, sed ut iuste pugnantibus spiritualiter subveniant suis exhortationibus et absolutionibus et aliis huiusmodi spiritualibus subventionibus. Sicut et in veteri lege mandabatur, Ios. VI, quod sacerdotes sacris tubis in bellis clangerent. Et ad hoc primo fuit concessum quod episcopi vel clerici ad bella procederent. Quod autem aliqui propria manu pugnent, abusionis est. Reply to Objection 2: Prelates and clerics may, by the authority of their superiors, take part in wars, not indeed by taking up arms themselves, but by affording spiritual help to those who fight justly, by exhorting and absolving them, and by other like spiritual helps. Thus in the Old Testament (Joshua 6:4) the priests were commanded to sound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this purpose that bishops or clerics were first allowed to go to the front: and it is an abuse of this permission, if any of them take up arms themselves.
Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra habitum est, omnis potentia vel ars vel virtus ad quam pertinet finis habet disponere de his quae sunt ad finem. Bella autem carnalia in populo fideli sunt referenda, sicut ad finem, ad bonum spirituale divinum, cui clerici deputantur. Et ideo ad clericos pertinet disponere et inducere alios ad bellandum bella iusta. Non enim interdicitur eis bellare quia peccatum sit, sed quia tale exercitium eorum personae non congruit. Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (Question [23], Article [4], ad 2) every power, art or virtue that regards the end, has to dispose that which is directed to the end. Now, among the faithful, carnal wars should be considered as having for their end the Divine spiritual good to which clerics are deputed. Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and counsel other men to engage in just wars. For they are forbidden to take up arms, not as though it were a sin, but because such an occupation is unbecoming their personality.
Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet exercere bella iusta sit meritorium, tamen illicitum redditur clericis propter hoc quod sunt ad opera magis meritoria deputati. Sicut matrimonialis actus potest esse meritorius, et tamen virginitatem voventibus damnabilis redditur, propter obligationem eorum ad maius bonum Reply to Objection 4: Although it is meritorious to wage a just war, nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their being deputed to works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act may be meritorious; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who have vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater good.

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Whether it is lawful to lay ambushes in war?

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit licitum in bellis uti insidiis. Dicitur enim Deut. XVI, iuste quod iustum est exequeris. Sed insidiae, cum sint fraudes quaedam, videntur ad iniustitiam pertinere. Ergo non est utendum insidiis etiam in bellis iustis Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in war. For it is written (Dt. 16:20): "Thou shalt follow justly after that which is just." But ambushes, since they are a kind of deception, seem to pertain to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to lay ambushes even in a just war.
Praeterea, insidiae et fraudes fidelitati videntur opponi, sicut et mendacia. Sed quia ad omnes fidem debemus servare, nulli homini est mentiendum; ut patet per Augustinum, in libro contra mendacium. Cum ergo fides hosti servanda sit, ut Augustinus dicit, ad Bonifacium, videtur quod non sit contra hostes insidiis utendum. Objection 2: Further, ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith with all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states (Contra Mend. xv). Therefore, as one is bound to keep faith with one's enemy, as Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems that it is unlawful to lay ambushes for one's enemies.
Praeterea, Matth. VII dicitur, quae vultis ut faciant vobis homines, et vos facite illis, et hoc est observandum ad omnes proximos. Inimici autem sunt proximi. Cum ergo nullus sibi velit insidias vel fraudes parari, videtur quod nullus ex insidiis debeat gerere bella. Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mt. 7:12): "Whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them": and we ought to observe this in all our dealings with our neighbor. Now our enemy is our neighbor. Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions to be prepared for himself, it seems that no one ought to carry on war by laying ambushes.
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro quaest., cum iustum bellum suscipitur, utrum aperte pugnet aliquis an ex insidiis, nihil ad iustitiam interest. Et hoc probat auctoritate domini, qui mandavit Iosue ut insidias poneret habitatoribus civitatis hai, ut habetur Ios. VIII. On the contrary, Augustine says (Questions. in Hept. qu. x super Jos): "Provided the war be just, it is no concern of justice whether it be carried on openly or by ambushes": and he proves this by the authority of the Lord, Who commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the city of Hai (Joshua 8:2).
Respondeo dicendum quod insidiae ordinantur ad fallendum hostes. Dupliciter autem aliquis potest falli ex facto vel dicto alterius uno modo, ex eo quod ei dicitur falsum, vel non servatur promissum. Et istud semper est illicitum. Et hoc modo nullus debet hostes fallere, sunt enim quaedam iura bellorum et foedera etiam inter ipsos hostes servanda, ut Ambrosius dicit, in libro de officiis. I answer that, The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive the enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another's word or deed in two ways. First, through being told something false, or through the breaking of a promise, and this is always unlawful. No one ought to deceive the enemy in this way, for there are certain "rights of war and covenants, which ought to be observed even among enemies," as Ambrose states (De Officiis i).
Alio modo potest aliquis falli ex dicto vel facto nostro, quia ei propositum aut intellectum non aperimus. Hoc autem semper facere non tenemur, quia etiam in doctrina sacra multa sunt occultanda, maxime infidelibus, ne irrideant, secundum illud Matth. VII, nolite sanctum dare canibus. Unde multo magis ea quae ad impugnandum inimicos paramus sunt eis occultanda. Unde inter cetera documenta rei militaris hoc praecipue ponitur de occultandis consiliis ne ad hostes perveniant; ut patet in libro stratagematum Frontini. Et talis occultatio pertinet ad rationem insidiarum quibus licitum est uti in bellis iustis. Secondly, a man may be deceived by what we say or do, because we do not declare our purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always bound to do this, since even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have to be concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it, according to Mt. 7:6: "Give not that which is holy, to dogs." Wherefore much more ought the plan of campaign to be hidden from the enemy. For this reason among other things that a soldier has to learn is the art of concealing his purpose lest it come to the enemy's knowledge, as stated in the Book on Strategy [*Stratagematum i, 1] by Frontinus. Such like concealment is what is meant by an ambush which may be lawfully employed in a just war.
Nec proprie huiusmodi insidiae vocantur fraudes; nec iustitiae repugnant; nec ordinatae voluntati, esset enim inordinata voluntas si aliquis vellet nihil sibi ab aliis occultari. Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, nor are they contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man would have an inordinate will if he were unwilling that others should hide anything from him
Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

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Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in diebus festis non liceat bellare. Festa enim sunt ordinata ad vacandum divinis, unde intelliguntur per observationem sabbati, quae praecipitur Exod. XX; sabbatum enim interpretatur requies. Sed bella maximam inquietudinem habent. Ergo nullo modo est in diebus festis pugnandum. Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to fight on holy days. For holy days are instituted that we may give our time to the things of God. Hence they are included in the keeping of the Sabbath prescribed Ex. 20:8: for "sabbath" is interpreted "rest." But wars are full of unrest. Therefore by no means is it lawful to fight on holy days.
Praeterea, Isaiae LVIII reprehenduntur quidam quod in diebus ieiunii repetunt debita et committunt lites, pugno percutientes. Ergo multo magis in diebus festis illicitum est bellare. Objection 2: Further, certain persons are reproached (Is. 58:3) because on fast-days they exacted what was owing to them, were guilty of strife, and of smiting with the fist. Much more, therefore, is it unlawful to fight on holy days.
Praeterea, nihil est inordinate agendum ad vitandum incommodum temporale. Sed bellare in die festo, hoc videtur esse secundum se inordinatum. Ergo pro nulla necessitate temporalis incommodi vitandi debet aliquis in die festo bellare. Objection 3: Further, no ill deed should be done to avoid temporal harm. But fighting on a holy day seems in itself to be an ill deed. Therefore no one should fight on a holy day even through the need of avoiding temporal harm.
Sed contra est quod I Machab. II dicitur, cogitaverunt laudabiliter Iudaei, dicentes, omnis homo quicumque venerit ad nos in bello in die sabbatorum, pugnemus adversus eum. On the contrary, It is written (1 Machab 2:41): The Jews rightly determined... saying: "Whosoever shall come up against us to fight on the Sabbath-day, we will fight against him."
Respondeo dicendum quod observatio festorum non impedit ea quae ordinantur ad hominis salutem etiam corporalem. Unde dominus arguit Iudaeos, dicens, Ioan. VII, mihi indignamini quia totum hominem salvum feci in sabbato? Et inde est quod medici licite possunt medicari homines in die festo. Multo autem magis est conservanda salus reipublicae, per quam impediuntur occisiones plurimorum et innumera mala et temporalia et spiritualia, quam salus corporalis unius hominis. Et ideo pro tuitione reipublicae fidelium licitum est iusta bella exercere in diebus festis, si tamen hoc necessitas exposcat, hoc enim esset tentare Deum, si quis, imminente tali necessitate, a bello vellet abstinere. I answer that, The observance of holy days is no hindrance to those things which are ordained to man's safety, even that of his body. Hence Our Lord argued with the Jews, saying (Jn. 7:23): "Are you angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath-day?" Hence physicians may lawfully attend to their patients on holy days. Now there is much more reason for safeguarding the common weal (whereby many are saved from being slain, and innumerable evils both temporal and spiritual prevented), than the bodily safety of an individual. Therefore, for the purpose of safeguarding the common weal of the faithful, it is lawful to carry on a war on holy days, provided there be need for doing so: because it would be to tempt God, if notwithstanding such a need, one were to choose to refrain from fighting.
Sed necessitate cessante, non est licitum bellare in diebus festis, propter rationes inductas. However, as soon as the need ceases, it is no longer lawful to fight on a holy day, for the reasons given:
Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. wherefore this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

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