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| Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis praedictis iustitiae partibus. Et primo, de acceptione personarum, quae opponitur iustitiae distributivae; secundo, de peccatis quae opponuntur iustitiae commutativae. | We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid parts of justice. First we shall consider respect of persons which is opposed to distributive justice; secondly we shall consider the vices opposed to commutative justice. |
| Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. | Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum personarum acceptio sit peccatum. | (1) Whether respect of persons is a sin? |
| Secundo, utrum habeat locum in dispensatione spiritualium. | (2) Whether it takes place in the dispensation of spiritualities? |
| Tertio, utrum in exhibitione honorum. | (3) Whether it takes place in showing honor? |
| Quarto, utrum in iudiciis. | (4) Whether it takes place in judicial sentences? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod personarum acceptio non sit peccatum. In nomine enim personae intelligitur personae dignitas. Sed considerare dignitates personarum pertinet ad distributivam iustitiam. Ergo personarum acceptio non est peccatum. | Objection 1: It would seem that respect of persons is not a sin. For the word "person" includes a reference to personal dignity [*Cf. FP, Question [29], Article [3], ad 2]. Now it belongs to distributive justice to consider personal dignity. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin. |
| Praeterea, in rebus humanis personae sunt principaliores quam res, quia res sunt propter personas, et non e converso. Sed rerum acceptio non est peccatum. Ergo multo minus acceptio personarum. | Objection 2: Further, in human affairs persons are of more importance than things, since things are for the benefit of persons and not conversely. But respect of things is not a sin. Much less, therefore, is respect of persons. |
| Praeterea, apud Deum nulla potest esse iniquitas vel peccatum. Sed Deus videtur personas accipere, quia interdum duorum hominum unius conditionis unum assumit per gratiam, et alterum relinquit in peccato, secundum illud Matth. XXIV, duo erunt in lecto, unus assumetur et alius relinquetur. Ergo acceptio personarum non est peccatum. | Objection 3: Further, no injustice or sin can be in God. Yet God seems to respect persons, since of two men circumstanced alike He sometimes upraises one by grace, and leaves the other in sin, according to Mt. 24:40: "Two shall be in a bed [Vulg.: 'field' [*'Bed' is the reading of Lk. 17:34]], one shall be taken, and one shall be left." Therefore respect of persons is not a sin. |
| Sed contra, nihil prohibetur in lege divina nisi peccatum. Sed personarum acceptio prohibetur Deut. I, ubi dicitur, non accipietis cuiusquam personam. Ergo personarum acceptio est peccatum. | On the contrary, Nothing but sin is forbidden in the Divine law. Now respect of persons is forbidden, Dt. 1:17: "Neither shall you respect any man's person." Therefore respect of persons is a sin. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod personarum acceptio opponitur distributivae iustitiae. Consistit enim aequalitas distributivae iustitiae in hoc quod diversis personis diversa tribuuntur secundum proportionem ad dignitates personarum. Si ergo aliquis consideret illam proprietatem personae propter quam id quod ei confertur est ei debitum, non erit acceptio personae, sed causae, unde Glossa, super illud ad Ephes. VI, non est personarum acceptio apud Deum, dicit quod iudex iustus causas discernit, non personas. Puta si aliquis promoveat aliquem ad magisterium propter sufficientiam scientiae, hic attenditur causa debita, non persona, si autem aliquis consideret in eo cui aliquid confert, non id propter quod id quod ei datur esset ei proportionatum vel debitum, sed solum hoc quod est iste homo, puta Petrus vel Martinus, est hic acceptio personae, quia non attribuitur ei aliquid propter aliquam causam quae faciat eum dignum, sed simpliciter attribuitur personae. Ad personam autem refertur quaecumque conditio non faciens ad causam propter quam sit dignus hoc dono, puta si aliquis promoveat aliquem ad praelationem vel magisterium quia est dives, vel quia est consanguineus suus, est acceptio personae. Contingit tamen aliquam conditionem personae facere eam dignam respectu unius rei, et non respectu alterius, sicut consanguinitas facit aliquem dignum ad hoc quod instituatur heres patrimonii, non autem ad hoc quod conferatur ei praelatio ecclesiastica. Et ideo eadem conditio personae in uno negotio considerata facit acceptionem personae, in alio autem non facit. Sic ergo patet quod personarum acceptio opponitur iustitiae distributivae in hoc quod praeter proportionem agitur. Nihil autem opponitur virtuti nisi peccatum. Unde consequens est quod personarum acceptio sit peccatum. | I answer that, Respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice. For the equality of distributive justice consists in allotting various things to various persons in proportion to their personal dignity. Accordingly, if one considers that personal property by reason of which the thing allotted to a particular person is due to him, this is respect not of the person but of the cause. Hence a gloss on Eph. 6:9, "There is no respect of persons with God [Vulg.: 'Him']," says that "a just judge regards causes, not persons." For instance if you promote a man to a professorship on account of his having sufficient knowledge, you consider the due cause, not the person; but if, in conferring something on someone, you consider in him not the fact that what you give him is proportionate or due to him, but the fact that he is this particular man (e.g. Peter or Martin), then there is respect of the person, since you give him something not for some cause that renders him worthy of it, but simply because he is this person. And any circumstance that does not amount to a reason why this man be worthy of this gift, is to be referred to his person: for instance if a man promote someone to a prelacy or a professorship, because he is rich or because he is a relative of his, it is respect of persons. It may happen, however, that a circumstance of person makes a man worthy as regards one thing, but not as regards another: thus consanguinity makes a man worthy to be appointed heir to an estate, but not to be chosen for a position of ecclesiastical authority: wherefore consideration of the same circumstance of person will amount to respect of persons in one matter and not in another. It follows, accordingly, that respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice in that it fails to observe due proportion. Now nothing but sin is opposed to virtue: and therefore respect of persons is a sin. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in distributiva iustitia considerantur conditiones personarum quae faciunt ad causam dignitatis vel debiti. Sed in acceptione personarum considerantur conditiones quae non faciunt ad causam, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1: In distributive justice we consider those circumstances of a person which result in dignity or right, whereas in respect of persons we consider circumstances that do not so result. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod personae proportionantur et dignae redduntur aliquibus quae eis distribuuntur, propter aliquas res quae pertinent ad conditionem personae, et ideo huiusmodi conditiones sunt attendendae tanquam propriae causae. Cum autem considerantur ipsae personae, attenditur non causa ut causa. Et ideo patet quod, quamvis personae sint digniores simpliciter, non tamen sunt digniores quoad hoc. | Reply to Objection 2: Persons are rendered proportionate to and worthy of things which are distributed among them, by reason of certain things pertaining to circumstances of person, wherefore such conditions ought to be considered as the proper cause. But when we consider the persons themselves, that which is not a cause is considered as though it were; and so it is clear that although persons are more worthy, absolutely speaking, yet they are not more worthy in this regard. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est datio. Una quidem pertinens ad iustitiam, qua scilicet aliquis dat alicui quod ei debetur. Et circa tales dationes attenditur personarum acceptio. Alia est datio ad liberalitatem pertinens, qua scilicet gratis datur alicui quod ei non debetur. Et talis est collatio munerum gratiae, per quae peccatores assumuntur a Deo. Et in hac donatione non habet locum personarum acceptio, quia quilibet potest absque iniustitia de suo dare quantum vult et cui vult, secundum illud Matth. XX, an non licet mihi quod volo facere? Tolle quod tuum est, et vade. | Reply to Objection 3: There is a twofold giving. one belongs to justice, and occurs when we give a man his due: in such like givings respect of persons takes place. The other giving belongs to liberality, when one gives gratis that which is not a man's due: such is the bestowal of the gifts of grace, whereby sinners are chosen by God. In such a giving there is no place for respect of persons, because anyone may, without injustice, give of his own as much as he will, and to whom he will, according to Mt. 20:14,15, "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?... Take what is thine, and go thy way." |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in dispensatione spiritualium locum non habeat personarum acceptio. Conferre enim dignitatem ecclesiasticam seu beneficium alicui propter consanguinitatem videtur ad acceptionem personarum pertinere, quia consanguinitas non est causa faciens hominem dignum ecclesiastico beneficio. Sed hoc non videtur esse peccatum, cum hoc ex consuetudine praelati Ecclesiae faciant. Ergo peccatum personarum acceptionis non videtur locum habere in dispensatione spiritualium. | Objection 1: It would seem that respect of persons does not take place in the dispensation of spiritual goods. For it would seem to savor of respect of persons if a man confers ecclesiastical dignity or benefice on account of consanguinity, since consanguinity is not a cause whereby a man is rendered worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice. Yet this apparently is not a sin, for ecclesiastical prelates are wont to do so. Therefore the sin of respect of persons does not take place in the conferring of spiritual goods. |
| Praeterea, praeferre divitem pauperi videtur ad acceptionem personarum pertinere, ut patet Iac. II. Sed facilius dispensatur cum divitibus et potentibus quod contrahant matrimonium in gradu prohibito, quam cum aliis. Ergo peccatum personarum acceptionis non videtur locum habere circa dispensationem spiritualium. | Objection 2: Further, to give preference to a rich man rather than to a poor man seems to pertain to respect of persons, according to James 2:2,3. Nevertheless dispensations to marry within forbidden degrees are more readily granted to the rich and powerful than to others. Therefore the sin of respect of persons seems not to take place in the dispensation of spiritual goods. |
| Praeterea, secundum iura sufficit eligere bonum, non autem requiritur quod aliquis eligat meliorem. Sed eligere minus bonum ad aliquid altius videtur ad acceptionem personarum pertinere. Ergo personarum acceptio non est peccatum in spiritualibus. | Objection 3: Further, according to jurists [*Cap. Cum dilectus.] it suffices to choose a good man, and it is not requisite that one choose the better man. But it would seem to savor of respect of persons to choose one who is less good for a higher position. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin in spiritual matters. |
| Praeterea, secundum statuta Ecclesiae eligendus est aliquis de gremio Ecclesiae. Sed hoc videtur ad acceptionem personarum pertinere, quia quandoque sufficientiores alibi inveni | Objection 4: Further, according to the law of the Church (Cap. Cum dilectus.) the person to be chosen should be "a member of the flock." Now this would seem to imply respect of persons, since sometimes more competent persons would be found elsewhere. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin in spiritual matters. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Iac. II, nolite in personarum acceptione habere fidem domini nostri Iesu Christi. Ubi dicit Glossa Augustini, quis ferat si quis divitem eligat ad sedem honoris Ecclesiae, contempto paupere instructiore et sanctiore? |
On the contrary, It is written (James 2:1): "Have not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ... with respect of persons." On these words a gloss of Augustine says: "Who is there that would tolerate the promotion of a rich man to a position of honor in the Church, to the exclusion of a poor man more learned and holier?" [*Augustine, Ep. ad Hieron. clxvii.] |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, acceptio personarum est peccatum inquantum contrariatur iustitiae. Quanto autem in maioribus aliquis iustitiam transgreditur, tanto gravius peccat. Unde cum spiritualia sint temporalibus potiora, gravius peccatum est personas accipere in dispensatione spiritualium quam in dispensatione temporalium. Et quia personarum acceptio est cum aliquid personae attribuitur praeter proportionem dignitatis ipsius, considerare oportet quod dignitas alicuius personae potest attendi dupliciter. Uno modo, simpliciter et secundum se, et sic maioris dignitatis est ille qui magis abundat in spiritualibus gratiae donis. Alio modo, per comparationem ad bonum commune, contingit enim quandoque quod ille qui est minus sanctus et minus sciens, potest maius conferre ad bonum commune, propter potentiam vel industriam saecularem, vel propter aliquid huiusmodi. Et quia dispensationes spiritualium principalius ordinantur ad utilitatem communem, secundum illud I ad Cor. XII, unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem; ideo quandoque absque acceptione personarum in dispensatione spiritualium illi qui sunt simpliciter minus boni, melioribus praeferuntur, sicut etiam et Deus gratias gratis datas quandoque concedit minus bonis. |
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), respect of persons is a sin, in so far as it is contrary to justice. Now the graver the matter in which justice is transgressed, the more grievous the sin: so that, spiritual things being of greater import than temporal, respect of persons is a more grievous sin in dispensing spiritualities than in dispensing temporalities. And since it is respect of persons when something is allotted to a person out of proportion to his deserts, it must be observed that a person's worthiness may be considered in two ways. First, simply and absolutely: and in this way the man who abounds the more in the spiritual gifts of grace is the more worthy. Secondly, in relation to the common good; for it happens at times that the less holy and less learned man may conduce more to the common good, on account of worldly authority or activity, or something of the kind. And since the dispensation of spiritualities is directed chiefly to the common good, according to 1 Cor. 12:7, "The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit," it follows that in the dispensation of spiritualities the simply less good are sometimes preferred to the better, without respect of persons, just as God sometimes bestows gratuitous graces on the less worthy. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod circa consanguineos praelati distinguendum est. Quia quandoque sunt minus digni et simpliciter, et per respectum ad bonum commune. Et sic si dignioribus praeferantur, est peccatum personarum acceptionis in dispensatione spiritualium, quorum praelatus ecclesiasticus non est dominus, ut possit ea dare pro libito, sed dispensator, secundum illud I ad Cor. IV, sic nos existimet homo ut ministros Christi, et dispensatores mysteriorum Dei. Quandoque vero consanguinei praelati ecclesiastici sunt aeque digni ut alii. Et sic licite potest, absque personarum acceptione, consanguineos suos praeferre, quia saltem in hoc praeeminent, quod de ipsis magis confidere potest ut unanimiter secum negotia Ecclesiae tractent. Esset tamen hoc propter scandalum dimittendum, si ex hoc aliqui exemplum sumerent, etiam praeter dignitatem, bona Ecclesiae consanguineis dandi. | Reply to Objection 1: We must make a distinction with regard to a prelate's kinsfolk: for sometimes they are less worthy, both absolutely speaking, and in relation to the common good: and then if they are preferred to the more worthy, there is a sin of respect of persons in the dispensation of spiritual goods, whereof the ecclesiastical superior is not the owner, with power to give them away as he will, but the dispenser, according to 1 Cor. 4:1, "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God." Sometimes however the prelate's kinsfolk are as worthy as others, and then without respect of persons he can lawfully give preference to his kindred since there is at least this advantage, that he can trust the more in their being of one mind with him in conducting the business of the Church. Yet he would have to forego so doing for fear of scandal, if anyone might take an example from him and give the goods of the Church to their kindred without regard to their deserts. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod dispensatio matrimonii contrahendi principaliter fieri consuevit propter foedus pacis firmandum, quod quidem magis est necessarium communi utilitati circa personas excellentes. Ideo cum eis facilius dispensatur absque peccato acceptionis personarum. | Reply to Objection 2: Dispensations for contracting marriage came into use for the purpose of strengthening treaties of peace: and this is more necessary for the common good in relation to persons of standing, so that there is no respect of persons in granting dispensations more readily to such persons. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod quantum ad hoc quod electio impugnari non possit in foro iudiciali, sufficit eligere bonum, nec oportet eligere meliorem, quia sic omnis electio posset habere calumniam. Sed quantum ad conscientiam eligentis, necesse est eligere meliorem vel simpliciter, vel in comparatione ad bonum commune. Quia si potest haberi aliquis magis idoneus erga aliquam dignitatem et alius praeferatur, oportet quod hoc sit propter aliquam causam. Quae quidem si pertineat ad negotium, quantum ad hoc erit ille qui eligitur magis idoneus. Si vero non pertineat ad negotium id quod consideratur ut causa, erit manifeste acceptio personae. | Reply to Objection 3: In order that an election be not rebutted in a court of law, it suffices to elect a good man, nor is it necessary to elect the better man, because otherwise every election might have a flaw. But as regards the conscience of an elector, it is necessary to elect one who is better, either absolutely speaking, or in relation to the common good. For if it is possible to have one who is more competent for a post, and yet another be preferred, it is necessary to have some cause for this. If this cause have anything to do with the matter in point, he who is elected will, in this respect, be more competent; and if that which is taken for cause have nothing to do with the matter, it will clearly be respect of persons. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod ille qui de gremio Ecclesiae assumitur, ut in pluribus consuevit esse utilior quantum ad bonum commune, quia magis diligit Ecclesiam in qua est nutritus. Et propter hoc etiam mandatur Deut. XVII, non poteris alterius gentis facere regem, qui non sit frater tuus. |
Reply to Objection 4: The man who is taken from among the members of a particular Church, is generally speaking more useful as regards the common good, since he loves more the Church wherein he was brought up. For this reason it was commanded (Dt. 17:15): "Thou mayest not make a man of another nation king, who is not thy brother." |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in exhibitione honoris et reverentiae non habeat locum peccatum acceptionis personarum. Honor enim nihil aliud esse videtur quam reverentia quaedam alicui exhibita in testimonium virtutis, ut patet per philosophum, in I Ethic. Sed praelati et principes sunt honorandi, etiam si sint mali; sicut etiam et parentes, de quibus mandatur Exod. XX, honora patrem tuum et matrem tuam; et etiam domini sunt a servis honorandi, etiam si sint mali, secundum illud I ad Tim. VI, quicumque sunt sub iugo servi, dominos suos honore dignos arbitrentur. Ergo videtur quod acceptio personae non sit peccatum in exhibitione honoris. |
Objection 1: It would seem that respect of persons does not take place in showing honor and respect. For honor is apparently nothing else than "reverence shown to a person in recognition of his virtue," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 5). Now prelates and princes should be honored although they be wicked, even as our parents, of whom it is written (Ex. 20:12): "Honor thy father and thy mother." Again masters, though they be wicked, should be honored by their servants, according to 1 Tim. 6:1: "Whoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honor." Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor. |
| Praeterea, Levit. XIX praecipitur, coram cano capite consurge, et honora personam senis. Sed hoc videtur ad acceptionem personarum pertinere, quia quandoque senes non sunt virtuosi, secundum illud Dan. XIII, egressa est iniquitas a senioribus populi. Ergo acceptio personarum non est peccatum in exhibitione honoris. | Objection 2: Further, it is commanded (Lev. 19:32): "Rise up before the hoary head, and, honor the person of the aged man." But this seems to savor of respect of persons, since sometimes old men are not virtuous; according to Dan. 13:5: "Iniquity came out from the ancients of the people [*Vulg.: 'Iniquity came out of Babylon from the ancient judges, that seemed to govern the people.']." Therefore it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor. |
| Praeterea, super illud Iac. II, nolite in personarum acceptione habere etc., dicit Glossa Augustini, si hoc quod Iacobus dicit, si introierit in conventum vestrum vir habens anulum aureum etc., intelligatur de quotidianis consessibus quis hic non peccat, si tamen peccat? Sed haec est acceptio personarum, divites propter divitias honorare, dicit enim Gregorius, in quadam homilia, superbia nostra retunditur, quia in hominibus non naturam, qua ad imaginem Dei facti sunt, sed divitias honoramus; et sic, cum divitiae non sint debita causa honoris, pertinebit hoc ad personarum acceptionem. Ergo personarum acceptio non est peccatum circa exhibitionem honoris. | Objection 3: Further, on the words of James 2:1, "Have not the faith... with respect of persons," a gloss of Augustine [*Ep. ad Hieron. clxvii.] says: "If the saying of James, 'If there shall come into your assembly a man having a golden ring,' etc., refer to our daily meetings, who sins not here, if however he sin at all?" Yet it is respect of persons to honor the rich for their riches, for Gregory says in a homily (xxviii in Evang.): "Our pride is blunted, since in men we honor, not the nature wherein they are made to God's image, but wealth," so that, wealth not being a due cause of honor, this will savor of respect of persons. Therefore it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur in Glossa Iac. II, quicumque divitem propter divitias honorat, peccat. Et pari ratione, si aliquis honoretur propter alias causas quae non faciunt dignum honore, quod pertinet ad acceptionem personarum. Ergo acceptio personarum in exhibitione honoris est peccatum. | On the contrary, A gloss on James 2:1, says: "Whoever honors the rich for their riches, sins," and in like manner, if a man be honored for other causes that do not render him worthy of honor. Now this savors of respect of persons. Therefore it is a sin to respect persons in showing honor. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod honor est quoddam testimonium de virtute eius qui honoratur, et ideo sola virtus est debita causa honoris. Sciendum tamen quod aliquis potest honorari non solum propter virtutem propriam, sed etiam propter virtutem alterius. Sicut principes et praelati honorantur etiam si sint mali, inquantum gerunt personam Dei et communitatis cui praeficiuntur, secundum illud Prov. XXVI, sicut qui immittit lapides in acervum Mercurii, ita qui tribuit insipienti honorem. Quia gentiles rationem attribuebant Mercurio, acervus Mercurii dicitur cumulus ratiocinii, in quo mercator quandoque mittit unum lapillum loco centum marcarum, ita etiam honoratur insipiens, quia ponitur loco Dei et loco totius communitatis. Et eadem ratione parentes et domini sunt honorandi, propter participationem divinae dignitatis, qui est omnium pater et dominus. Senes autem sunt honorandi propter signum virtutis, quod est senectus, licet hoc signum quandoque deficiat. Unde, ut dicitur Sap. IV, senectus vere honoranda est non diuturna neque annorum numero computata, cani autem sunt sensus hominis, et aetas senectutis vita est immaculata. Divites autem honorandi sunt propter hoc quod maiorem locum in communitatibus obtinent. Si autem solum intuitu divitiarum honorentur, erit peccatum acceptionis personarum. | I answer that, To honor a person is to recognize him as having virtue, wherefore virtue alone is the due cause of a person being honored. Now it is to be observed that a person may be honored not only for his own virtue, but also for another's: thus princes and prelates, although they be wicked, are honored as standing in God's place, and as representing the community over which they are placed, according to Prov. 26:8, "As he that casteth a stone into the heap of Mercury, so is he that giveth honor to a fool." For, since the gentiles ascribed the keeping of accounts to Mercury, "the heap of Mercury" signifies the casting up of an account, when a merchant sometimes substitutes a pebble [*'Lapillus' or 'calculus' whence the English word 'calculate'] for one hundred marks. So too, is a fool honored if he stand in God's place or represent the whole community: and in the same way parents and masters should be honored, on account of their having a share of the dignity of God Who is the Father and Lord of all. The aged should be honored, because old age is a sign of virtue, though this sign fail at times: wherefore, according to Wis. 4:8,9, "venerable old age is not that of long time, nor counted by the number of years; but the understanding of a man is gray hairs, and a spotless life is old age." The rich ought to be honored by reason of their occupying a higher position in the community: but if they be honored merely for their wealth, it will be the sin of respect of persons. |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. | Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in iudiciis locum non habeat peccatum acceptionis personarum. Acceptio enim personarum opponitur distributivae iustitiae, ut dictum est. Sed iudicia maxime videntur ad iustitiam commutativam pertinere. Ergo personarum acceptio non habet locum in iudiciis. |
Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences. For respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice, as stated above (Article [1]): whereas judicial sentences seem to pertain chiefly to commutative justice. Therefore respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences. |
| Praeterea, poenae secundum aliquod iudicium infliguntur. Sed in poenis accipiuntur personae absque peccato, quia gravius puniuntur qui inferunt iniuriam in personas principum quam qui in personas aliorum. Ergo personarum acceptio non habet locum in iudiciis. | Objection 2: Further, penalties are inflicted according to a sentence. Now it is not a sin to respect persons in pronouncing penalties, since a heavier punishment is inflicted on one who injures the person of a prince than on one who injures the person of others. Therefore respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences. |
| Praeterea, Eccli. IV dicitur, in iudicando esto pupillis misericors. Sed hoc videtur accipere personam pauperis. Ergo acceptio personae in iudiciis non est peccatum. | Objection 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:10): "In judging be merciful to the fatherless." But this seems to imply respect of the person of the needy. Therefore in judicial sentences respect of persons is not a sin. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. XVIII, accipere personam in iudicio non est bonum. |
On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 18:5): "It is not good to accept the person in judgment [*Vulg.: 'It is not good to accept the person of the wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment.']." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, iudicium est actus iustitiae, prout iudex ad aequalitatem iustitiae reducit ea quae inaequalitatem oppositam facere possunt. Personarum autem acceptio inaequalitatem quandam habet, inquantum attribuitur alicui personae praeter proportionem suam, in qua consistit aequalitas iustitiae. Et ideo manifestum est quod per personarum acceptionem iudicium corrumpitur. |
I answer that, As stated above (Question [60], Article [1]), judgment is an act of justice, in as much as the judge restores to the equality of justice, those things which may cause an opposite inequality. Now respect of persons involves a certain inequality, in so far as something is allotted to a person out of that proportion to him in which the equality of justice consists. Wherefore it is evident that judgment is rendered corrupt by respect of persons. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iudicium dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, quantum ad ipsam rem iudicatam. Et sic iudicium se habet communiter ad commutativam et ad distributivam iustitiam, potest enim iudicio definiri qualiter aliquid commune sit distribuendum in multos, et qualiter unus alteri restituat quod ab eo accepit. Alio modo potest considerari quantum ad ipsam formam iudicii, prout scilicet iudex, etiam in ipsa commutativa iustitia, ab uno accipit et alteri dat. Et hoc pertinet ad distributivam iustitiam. Et secundum hoc in quolibet iudicio locum habere potest personarum acceptio. | Reply to Objection 1: A judgment may be looked at in two ways. First, in view of the thing judged, and in this way judgment is common to commutative and distributive justice: because it may be decided by judgment how some common good is to be distributed among many, and how one person is to restore to another what he has taken from him. Secondly, it may be considered in view of the form of judgment, in as much as, even in commutative justice, the judge takes from one and gives to another, and this belongs to distributive justice. In this way respect of persons may take place in any judgment. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod cum punitur gravius aliquis propter iniuriam in maiorem personam commissam, non est personarum acceptio, quia ipsa diversitas personae facit, quantum ad hoc, diversitatem rei, ut supra dictum est. |
Reply to Objection 2: When a person is more severely punished on account of a crime committed against a greater person, there is no respect of persons, because the very difference of persons causes, in that case, a diversity of things, as stated above (Question [58], Article [10], ad 3; Question [61], Article [2], ad 3). |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod homo in iudicio debet pauperi subvenire quantum fieri potest, tamen sine laesione iustitiae. Alioquin habet locum illud quod dicitur Exod. XXIII, pauperis quoque non misereberis in iudicio | Reply to Objection 3: In pronouncing judgment one ought to succor the needy as far as possible, yet without prejudice to justice: else the saying of Ex. 23:3 would apply: "Neither shalt thou favor a poor man in judgment." |