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| Deinde considerandum est de maledictione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | We must now consider cursing. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum licite possit aliquis maledicere homini. | (1) Whether one may lawfully curse another? |
| Secundo, utrum licite possit aliquis maledicere irrationali creaturae. | (2) Whether one may lawfully curse an irrational creature? |
| Tertio, utrum maledictio sit peccatum mortale. | (3) Whether cursing is a mortal sin? |
| Quarto, de comparatione eius ad alia peccata. | (4) Of its comparison with other sins. |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non liceat maledicere aliquem. Non est enim licitum praeterire mandatum apostoli, in quo Christus loquebatur, ut dicitur II ad Cor. XIII. Sed ipse praecipit, Rom. XII, benedicite, et nolite maledicere. Ergo non licet aliquem maledicere. |
Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to curse anyone. For it is unlawful to disregard the command of the Apostle in whom Christ spoke, according to 2 Cor. 13:3. Now he commanded (Rm. 12:14), "Bless and curse not." Therefore it is not lawful to curse anyone. |
| Praeterea, omnes tenentur Deum benedicere, secundum illud Dan. III, benedicite, filii hominum, domino. Sed non potest ex ore eodem procedere benedictio Dei et maledictio hominis, ut probatur Iac. III. Ergo nulli licet aliquem maledicere | Objection 2: Further, all are bound to bless God, according to Dan. 3:82, "O ye sons of men, bless the Lord." Now the same mouth cannot both bless God and curse man, as proved in the third chapter of James. Therefore no man may lawfully curse another man. |
| Praeterea, ille qui aliquem maledicit, videtur optare eius malum culpae vel poenae, quia maledictio videtur esse imprecatio quaedam. Sed non licet desiderare malum alterius, quinimmo orare oportet pro omnibus ut liberentur a malo. Ergo nulli licet maledicere. | Objection 3: Further, he that curses another would seem to wish him some evil either of fault or of punishment, since a curse appears to be a kind of imprecation. But it is not lawful to wish ill to anyone, indeed we are bound to pray that all may be delivered from evil. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to curse. |
| Praeterea, Diabolus per obstinationem maxime subiectus est malitiae. Sed non licet alicui maledicere Diabolum, sicut nec seipsum, dicitur enim Eccli. XXI, cum maledicit impius Diabolum, maledicit ipse animam suam. Ergo multo minus licet maledicere hominem. | Objection 4: Further, the devil exceeds all in malice on account of his obstinacy. But it is not lawful to curse the devil, as neither is it lawful to curse oneself; for it is written (Ecclus. 21:30): "While the ungodly curseth the devil, he curseth his own soul." Much less therefore is it lawful to curse a man. |
| Praeterea, Num. XXIII, super illud, quomodo maledicam cui non maledixit dominus? Dicit Glossa, non potest esse iusta maledicendi causa ubi peccantis ignoratur affectus. Sed homo non potest scire affectum alterius hominis, nec etiam utrum sit maledictus a Deo. Ergo nulli licet aliquem hominem maledicere. | Objection 5: Further, a gloss on Num. 23:8, "How shall I curse whom God hath not cursed?" says: "There cannot be a just cause for cursing a sinner if one be ignorant of his sentiments." Now one man cannot know another man's sentiments, nor whether he is cursed by God. Therefore no man may lawfully curse another. |
| Sed contra est quod Deut. XXVII dicitur, maledictus qui non permanet in sermonibus legis huius. Elisaeus etiam pueris sibi illudentibus maledixit, ut habetur IV Reg. II. |
On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 27:26): "Cursed be he that abideth not in the words of this law." Moreover Eliseus cursed the little boys who mocked him (4 Kgs. 2:24). |
| Respondeo dicendum quod maledicere idem est quod malum dicere. Dicere autem tripliciter se habet ad id quod dicitur. Uno modo, per modum enuntiationis, sicut aliquis exprimitur modo indicativo. Et sic maledicere nihil est aliud quam malum alterius referre, quod pertinet ad detractionem. Unde quandoque maledici detractores dicuntur. Alio modo dicere se habet ad id quod dicitur per modum causae. Et hoc quidem primo et principaliter competit Deo, qui omnia suo verbo fecit, secundum illud Psalm., dixit, et facta sunt. Consequenter autem competit hominibus, qui verbo suo alios movent per imperium ad aliquid faciendum. Et ad hoc instituta sunt verba imperativi modi. Tertio modo ipsum dicere se habet ad id quod dicitur quasi expressio quaedam affectus desiderantis id quod verbo exprimitur. Et ad hoc instituta sunt verba optativi modi. | I answer that, To curse [maledicere] is the same as to speak ill [malum dicere]. Now "speaking" has a threefold relation to the thing spoken. First, by way of assertion, as when a thing is expressed in the indicative mood: in this way "maledicere" signifies simply to tell someone of another's evil, and this pertains to backbiting, wherefore tellers of evil [maledici] are sometimes called backbiters. Secondly, speaking is related to the thing spoken, by way of cause, and this belongs to God first and foremost, since He made all things by His word, according to Ps. 32:9, "He spoke and they were made"; while secondarily it belongs to man, who, by his word, commands others and thus moves them to do something: it is for this purpose that we employ verbs in the imperative mood. Thirdly, "speaking" is related to the thing spoken by expressing the sentiments of one who desires that which is expressed in words; and for this purpose we employ the verb in the optative mood. |
| Praetermisso igitur primo modo maledictionis, qui est per simplicem enuntiationem mali, considerandum est de aliis duobus. Ubi scire oportet quod facere aliquid et velle illud se consequuntur in bonitate et malitia, ut ex supradictis patet. Unde in istis duobus modis, quibus malum dicitur per modum imperantis vel per modum optantis, eadem ratione est aliquid licitum et illicitum. Si enim aliquis imperet vel optet malum alterius inquantum est malum, quasi ipsum malum intendens, sic maledicere utroque modo erit illicitum. Et hoc est maledicere per se loquendo. Si autem aliquis imperet vel optet malum alterius sub ratione boni, sic est licitum. Nec erit maledictio per se loquendo, sed per accidens, quia principalis intentio dicentis non fertur ad malum, sed ad bonum. | Accordingly we may omit the first kind of evil speaking which is by way of simple assertion of evil, and consider the other two kinds. And here we must observe that to do something and to will it are consequent on one another in the matter of goodness and wickedness, as shown above (FS, Question [20], Article [3]). Hence in these two ways of evil speaking, by way of command and by way of desire, there is the same aspect of lawfulness and unlawfulness, for if a man commands or desires another's evil, as evil, being intent on the evil itself, then evil speaking will be unlawful in both ways, and this is what is meant by cursing. On the other hand if a man commands or desires another's evil under the aspect of good, it is lawful; and it may be called cursing, not strictly speaking, but accidentally, because the chief intention of the speaker is directed not to evil but to good. |
| Contingit autem malum aliquod dici imperando vel optando sub ratione duplicis boni. Quandoque quidem sub ratione iusti. Et sic iudex licite maledicit illum cui praecipit iustam poenam inferri. Et sic etiam Ecclesia maledicit anathematizando. Sic etiam prophetae quandoque imprecantur mala peccatoribus, quasi conformantes voluntatem suam divinae iustitiae (licet huiusmodi imprecationes possint etiam per modum praenuntiationis intelligi). Quandoque vero dicitur aliquod malum sub ratione utilis, puta cum aliquis optat aliquem peccatorem pati aliquam aegritudinem, aut aliquod impedimentum, vel ut ipse melior efficiatur, vel ut saltem ab aliorum nocumento cesset. | Now evil may be spoken, by commanding or desiring it, under the aspect of a twofold good. Sometimes under the aspect of just, and thus a judge lawfully curses a man whom he condemns to a just penalty: thus too the Church curses by pronouncing anathema. In the same way the prophets in the Scriptures sometimes call down evils on sinners, as though conforming their will to Divine justice, although such like imprecation may be taken by way of foretelling. Sometimes evil is spoken under the aspect of useful, as when one wishes a sinner to suffer sickness or hindrance of some kind, either that he may himself reform, or at least that he may cease from harming others. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus prohibet maledicere per se loquendo, cum intentione mali. | Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle forbids cursing strictly so called with an evil intent: |
| Et similiter dicendum ad secundum. | and the same answer applies to the Second Objection. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod optare alicui malum sub ratione boni non contrariatur affectui quo quis simpliciter alicui optat bonum, sed magis habet conformitatem ad ipsum. | Reply to Objection 3: To wish another man evil under the aspect of good, is not opposed to the sentiment whereby one wishes him good simply, in fact rather is it in conformity therewith. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod in Diabolo est considerare naturam, et culpam. Natura quidem eius bona est, et a Deo, nec eam maledicere licet. Culpa autem eius est maledicenda, secundum illud Iob III, maledicant ei qui maledicunt diei. Cum autem peccator maledicit Diabolum propter culpam, seipsum simili ratione iudicat maledictione dignum. Et secundum hoc dicitur maledicere animam suam. | Reply to Objection 4: In the devil both nature and guilt must be considered. His nature indeed is good and is from God nor is it lawful to curse it. On the other hand his guilt is deserving of being cursed, according to Job 3:8, "Let them curse it who curse the day." Yet when a sinner curses the devil on account of his guilt, for the same reason he judges himself worthy of being cursed; and in this sense he is said to curse his own soul. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod affectus peccantis, etsi in se non videatur, potest tamen percipi ex aliquo manifesto peccato, pro quo poena est infligenda. Similiter etiam, quamvis sciri non possit quem Deus maledicit secundum finalem reprobationem, potest tamen sciri quis sit maledictus a Deo secundum reatum praesentis culpae. | Reply to Objection 5: Although the sinner's sentiments cannot be perceived in themselves, they can be perceived through some manifest sin, which has to be punished. Likewise although it is not possible to know whom God curses in respect of final reprobation, it is possible to know who is accursed of God in respect of being guilty of present sin. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non liceat creaturam irrationalem maledicere. Maledictio enim praecipue videtur esse licita inquantum respicit poenam. Sed creatura irrationalis non est susceptiva nec culpae nec poenae. Ergo eam maledicere non licet. | Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to curse an irrational creature. Cursing would seem to be lawful chiefly in its relation to punishment. Now irrational creatures are not competent subjects either of guilt or of punishment. Therefore it is unlawful to curse them. |
| Praeterea, in creatura irrationali nihil invenitur nisi natura, quam Deus fecit. Hanc autem maledicere non licet, etiam in Diabolo, ut dictum est. Ergo creaturam irrationalem nullo modo licet maledicere. |
Objection 2: Further, in an irrational creature there is nothing but the nature which God made. But it is unlawful to curse this even in the devil, as stated above (Article [1]). Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an irrational creature. |
| Praeterea, creatura irrationalis aut est permanens, sicut corpora; aut est transiens, sicut tempora. Sed sicut Gregorius dicit, in IV Moral., otiosum est maledicere non existenti; vitiosum vero si existeret. Ergo nullo modo licet maledicere creaturae irrationali. | Objection 3: Further, irrational creatures are either stable, as bodies, or transient, as the seasons. Now, according to Gregory (Moral. iv, 2), "it is useless to curse what does not exist, and wicked to curse what exists." Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an irrational creature. |
| Sed contra est quod dominus maledixit ficulneae, ut habetur Matth. XXI; et Iob maledixit diei suo, ut habetur Iob III. | On the contrary, our Lord cursed the fig tree, as related in Mt. 21:19; and Job cursed his day, according to Job 3:1. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod benedictio vel maledictio ad illam rem proprie pertinet cui potest aliquid bene vel male contingere, scilicet rationali creaturae. Creaturis autem irrationalibus bonum vel malum dicitur contingere in ordine ad creaturam rationalem, propter quam sunt. Ordinantur autem ad eam multipliciter. Uno quidem modo, per modum subventionis, inquantum scilicet ex creaturis irrationalibus subvenitur humanae necessitati. Et hoc modo dominus homini dixit, Gen. III, maledicta terra in opere tuo, ut scilicet per eius sterilitatem homo puniretur. Et ita etiam intelligitur quod habetur Deut. XXVIII, benedicta horrea tua, et infra, maledictum horreum tuum. Sic etiam David maledixit montes Gelboe, secundum Gregorii expositionem. Alio modo creatura irrationalis ordinatur ad rationalem per modum significationis. Et sic dominus maledixit ficulneam, in significationem Iudaeae. Tertio modo ordinatur creatura irrationalis ad rationalem per modum continentis, scilicet temporis vel loci. Et sic maledixit Iob diei nativitatis suae, propter culpam originalem, quam nascendo contraxit, et propter sequentes poenalitates. Et propter hoc etiam potest intelligi David maledixisse montibus Gelboe, ut legitur II Reg. I, scilicet propter caedem populi quae in eis contigerat. |
I answer that, Benediction and malediction, properly speaking, regard things to which good or evil may happen, viz. rational creatures: while good and evil are said to happen to irrational creatures in relation to the rational creature for whose sake they are. Now they are related to the rational creature in several ways. First by way of ministration, in so far as irrational creatures minister to the needs of man. In this sense the Lord said to man (Gn. 3:17): "Cursed is the earth in thy work," so that its barrenness would be a punishment to man. Thus also David cursed the mountains of Gelboe, according to Gregory's expounding (Moral. iv, 3). Again the irrational creature is related to the rational creature by way of signification: and thus our Lord cursed the fig tree in signification of Judea. Thirdly, the irrational creature is related to rational creatures as something containing them, namely by way of time or place: and thus Job cursed the day of his birth, on account of the original sin which he contracted in birth, and on account of the consequent penalties. In this sense also we may understand David to have cursed the mountains of Gelboe, as we read in 2 Kgs. 1:21, namely on account of the people slaughtered there. |
| Maledicere autem rebus irrationalibus inquantum sunt creaturae Dei, est peccatum blasphemiae. Maledicere autem eis secundum se consideratis, est otiosum et vanum, et per consequens illicitum. | But to curse irrational beings, considered as creatures of God, is a sin of blasphemy; while to curse them considered in themselves is idle and vain and consequently unlawful. |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. | From this the Replies to the objections may easily be gathered. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod maledicere non sit peccatum mortale. Augustinus enim, in homilia de igne Purgatorio, numerat maledictionem inter levia peccata. Haec autem sunt venialia. Ergo maledictio non est peccatum mortale, sed veniale. | Objection 1: It would seem that cursing is not a mortal sin. For Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the appendix of St. Augustine's works] reckons cursing among slight sins. But such sins are venial. Therefore cursing is not a mortal but a venial Sin. |
| Praeterea, ea quae ex levi motu mentis procedunt non videntur esse peccata mortalia. Sed interdum maledictio ex levi motu procedit. Ergo maledictio non est peccatum mortale. | Objection 2: Further, that which proceeds from a slight movement of the mind does not seem to be generically a mortal sin. But cursing sometimes arises from a slight movement. Therefore cursing is not a mortal sin. |
| Praeterea, gravius est male facere quam maledicere. Sed male facere non semper est peccatum mortale. Ergo multo minus maledicere. | Objection 3: Further, evil deeds are worse than evil words. But evil deeds are not always mortal sins. Much less therefore is cursing a mortal sin. |
| Sed contra, nihil excludit a regno Dei nisi peccatum mortale. Sed maledictio excludit a regno Dei, secundum illud I ad Cor. VI, neque maledici neque rapaces regnum Dei possidebunt. Ergo maledictio est peccatum mortale. | On the contrary, Nothing save mortal sin excludes one from the kingdom of God. But cursing excludes from the kingdom of God, according to 1 Cor. 6:10, "Nor cursers [Douay: 'railers'], nor extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God." Therefore cursing is a mortal sin. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod maledictio de qua nunc loquimur, est per quam pronuntiatur malum contra aliquem vel imperando vel optando. Velle autem, vel imperio movere ad malum alterius, secundum se repugnat caritati, qua diligimus proximum volentes bonum ipsius. Et ita secundum suum genus est peccatum mortale. Et tanto gravius quanto personam cui maledicimus magis amare et revereri tenemur, unde dicitur Levit. XX, qui maledixerit patri suo et matri, morte moriatur. | I answer that, The evil words of which we are speaking now are those whereby evil is uttered against someone by way of command or desire. Now to wish evil to another man, or to conduce to that evil by commanding it, is, of its very nature, contrary to charity whereby we love our neighbor by desiring his good. Consequently it is a mortal sin, according to its genus, and so much the graver, as the person whom we curse has a greater claim on our love and respect. Hence it is written (Lev. 20:9): "He that curseth his father, or mother, dying let him die." |
| Contingit tamen verbum maledictionis prolatum esse peccatum veniale, vel propter parvitatem mali quod quis alteri, maledicendo, imprecatur, vel etiam propter affectum eius qui profert maledictionis verba, dum ex levi motu, vel ex ludo, aut ex subreptione aliqua talia verba profert; quia peccata verborum maxime ex affectu pensantur, ut supra dictum est. |
It may happen however that the word uttered in cursing is a venial sin either through the slightness of the evil invoked on another in cursing him, or on account of the sentiments of the person who utters the curse; because he may say such words through some slight movement, or in jest, or without deliberation, and sins of word should be weighed chiefly with regard to the speaker's intention, as stated above (Question [72], Article [2]). |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. | From this the Replies to the Objections may be easily gathered. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod maledictio sit gravius peccatum quam detractio. Maledictio enim videtur esse blasphemia quaedam, ut patet per id quod dicitur in canonica Iudae, quod cum Michael Archangelus, cum Diabolo disputans, altercaretur de Moysi corpore, non est ausus iudicium inferre blasphemiae; et accipitur ibi blasphemia pro maledictione, secundum Glossam. Blasphemia autem est gravius peccatum quam detractio. Ergo maledictio est gravior detractione. | Objection 1: It would seem that cursing is a graver sin than backbiting. Cursing would seem to be a kind of blasphemy, as implied in the canonical epistle of Jude (verse 9) where it is said that "when Michael the archangel, disputing with the devil, contended about the body of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment of blasphemy [Douay: 'railing speech']," where blasphemy stands for cursing, according to a gloss. Now blasphemy is a graver sin than backbiting. Therefore cursing is a graver sin than backbiting. |
| Praeterea, homicidium est detractione gravius, ut supra dictum est. Sed maledictio est par peccato homicidii, dicit enim Chrysostomus, super Matth., cum dixeris, maledic ei, et domum everte, et omnia perire fac, nihil ab homicida differs. Ergo maledictio est gravior quam detractio. |
Objection 2: Further, murder is more grievous than backbiting, as stated above (Question [73], Article [3]). But cursing is on a par with the sin of murder; for Chrysostom says (Hom. xix, super Matth.): "When thou sayest: 'Curse him down with his house, away with everything,' you are no better than a murderer." Therefore cursing is graver than backbiting. |
| Praeterea, causa praeeminet signo. Sed ille qui maledicit causat malum suo imperio, ille autem qui detrahit solum significat malum iam existens. Gravius ergo peccat maledicus quam detractor. | Objection 3: Further, to cause a thing is more than to signify it. But the curser causes evil by commanding it, whereas the backbiter merely signifies an evil already existing. Therefore the curser sins more grievously than the backbiter. |
| Sed contra est quod detractio non potest bene fieri. Maledictio autem fit bene et male, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo gravior est detractio quam maledictio. |
On the contrary, It is impossible to do well in backbiting, whereas cursing may be either a good or an evil deed, as appears from what has been said (Article [1]). Therefore backbiting is graver than cursing. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in primo habitum est, duplex est malum, scilicet culpae, et poenae. Malum autem culpae peius est, ut ibidem ostensum est. Unde dicere malum culpae peius est quam dicere malum poenae, dummodo sit idem modus dicendi. Ad contumeliosum igitur, susurronem et detractorem, et etiam derisorem, pertinet dicere malum culpae, sed ad maledicentem, prout nunc loquimur, pertinet dicere malum poenae, non autem malum culpae nisi forte sub ratione poenae. Non tamen est idem modus dicendi. Nam ad praedicta quatuor vitia pertinet dicere malum culpae solum enuntiando, per maledictionem vero dicitur malum poenae vel causando per modum imperii, vel optando. Ipsa autem enuntiatio culpae peccatum est inquantum aliquod nocumentum ex hoc proximo infertur. Gravius autem est nocumentum inferre quam nocumentum desiderare, ceteris paribus. |
I answer that, As stated in the FP, Question [48], Article [5], evil is twofold, evil of fault, and evil of punishment; and of the two, evil of fault is the worse (FP, Question [48], Article [6]). Hence to speak evil of fault is worse than to speak evil of punishment, provided the mode of speaking be the same. Accordingly it belongs to the reviler, the tale-bearer, the backbiter and the derider to speak evil of fault, whereas it belongs to the evil-speaker, as we understand it here, to speak evil of punishment, and not evil of fault except under the aspect of punishment. But the mode of speaking is not the same, for in the case of the four vices mentioned above, evil of fault is spoken by way of assertion, whereas in the case of cursing evil of punishment is spoken, either by causing it in the form of a command, or by wishing it. Now the utterance itself of a person's fault is a sin, in as much as it inflicts an injury on one's neighbor, and it is more grievous to inflict an injury, than to wish to inflict it, other things being equal. |
| Unde detractio, secundum communem rationem, gravius peccatum est quam maledictio simplex desiderium exprimens. Maledictio vero quae fit per modum imperii, cum habeat rationem causae, potest esse detractione gravior, si maius nocumentum inferat quam sit denigratio famae; vel levior, si minus. Et haec quidem accipienda sunt secundum ea quae per se pertinent ad rationem horum vitiorum. Possunt autem et alia per accidens considerari quae praedicta vitia vel augent vel minuunt. | Hence backbiting considered in its generic aspect is a graver sin than the cursing which expresses a mere desire; while the cursing which is expressed by way of command, since it has the aspect of a cause, will be more or less grievous than backbiting, according as it inflicts an injury more or less grave than the blackening of a man's good name. Moreover this must be taken as applying to these vices considered in their essential aspects: for other accidental points might be taken into consideration, which would aggravate or extenuate the aforesaid vices. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod maledictio creaturae inquantum creatura est, redundat in Deum, et sic per accidens habet rationem blasphemiae, non autem si maledicatur creatura propter culpam. Et eadem ratio est de detractione. | Reply to Objection 1: To curse a creature, as such, reflects on God, and thus accidentally it has the character of blasphemy; not so if one curse a creature on account of its fault: and the same applies to backbiting. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, maledictio uno modo includit desiderium mali. Unde si ille qui maledicit velit malum occisionis alterius, desiderio non differt ab homicida. Differt tamen inquantum actus exterior aliquid adiicit voluntati. |
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Article [3]), cursing, in one way, includes the desire for evil, where if the curser desire the evil of another's violent death, he does not differ, in desire, from a murderer, but he differs from him in so far as the external act adds something to the act of the will. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de maledictione secundum quod importat imperium. | Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers cursing by way of command. |