St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

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OF IDOLATRY (FOUR ARTICLES)

Deinde considerandum est de idololatria. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. We must now consider idolatry: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum idololatria sit species superstitionis. (1) Whether idolatry is a species of superstition?
Secundo, utrum sit peccatum. (2) Whether it is a sin?
Tertio, utrum sit gravissimum peccatorum. (3) Whether it is the gravest sin?
Quarto, de causa huius peccati. Utrum autem cum idololatris sit communicandum, dictum est supra, cum de infidelitate ageretur. (4) Of the cause of this sin.

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Whether idolatry is rightly reckoned a species of superstition?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod idololatria non recte ponatur species superstitionis. Sicut enim haeretici sunt infideles, ita et idololatrae. Sed haeresis est species infidelitatis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo et idololatria, non autem superstitionis. Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not rightly reckoned a species of superstition. Just as heretics are unbelievers, so are idolaters. But heresy is a species of unbelief, as stated above (Question [11], Article [1]). Therefore idolatry is also a species of unbelief and not of superstition.
Praeterea, latria pertinet ad virtutem religionis, cui opponitur superstitio. Sed idololatria videtur univoce dici latria cum ea quae ad veram religionem pertinet, sicut enim appetitus falsae beatitudinis univoce dicitur cum appetitu verae beatitudinis, ita cultus falsorum deorum, qui dicitur idololatria, univoce videtur dici cum cultu veri Dei, qui est latria verae religionis. Ergo idololatria non est species superstitionis. Objection 2: Further, latria pertains to the virtue of religion to which superstition is opposed. But latria, apparently, is univocally applied to idolatry and to that which belongs to the true religion. For just as we speak univocally of the desire of false happiness, and of the desire of true happiness, so too, seemingly, we speak univocally of the worship of false gods, which is called idolatry, and of the worship of the true God, which is the latria of true religion. Therefore idolatry is not a species of superstition.
Praeterea, id quod nihil est non potest esse alicuius generis species. Sed idololatria nihil esse videtur. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. VIII, scimus quia nihil est idolum in mundo, et infra, X, quid ergo? Dico quod idolis immolatum sit aliquid? Aut quod idolum sit aliquid? Quasi dicat, non. Immolare autem idolis proprie ad idololatriam pertinet. Ergo idololatria, quasi nihil existens, non potest esse superstitionis species. Objection 3: Further, that which is nothing cannot be the species of any genus. But idolatry, apparently, is nothing: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:4): "We know that an idol is nothing in the world," and further on (1 Cor. 10:19): "What then? Do I say that what is offered in sacrifice to idols is anything? Or that the idol is anything?" implying an answer in the negative. Now offering things to idols belongs properly to idolatry. Therefore since idolatry is like to nothing, it cannot be a species of superstition.
Praeterea, ad superstitionem pertinet exhibere cultum divinum cui non debetur. Sed cultus divinus, sicut non debetur idolis, ita nec aliis creaturis, unde Rom. I quidam vituperantur de hoc quod coluerunt et servierunt potius creaturis quam creatori. Ergo inconvenienter huiusmodi superstitionis species idololatria nominatur, sed deberet potius nominari latria creaturae. Objection 4: Further, it belongs to superstition to give divine honor to whom that honor is not due. Now divine honor is undue to idols, just as it is undue to other creatures, wherefore certain people are reproached (Rm. 1:25) for that they "worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator." Therefore this species of superstition is unfittingly called idolatry, and should rather be named "worship of creatures."
Sed contra est quod Act. XVII dicitur quod Paulus cum Athenis expectaret, incitabatur spiritus eius in ipso, videns idololatriae deditam civitatem, et postea dixit, viri Athenienses, per omnia quasi superstitiosos vos iudico. Ergo idololatria ad superstitionem pertinet. On the contrary, It is related (Acts 17:16) that when Paul awaited Silas and Timothy at Athens, "his spirit was stirred within him seeing the whole city given to idolatry," and further on (Acts 17:22) he says: "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things you are too superstitious." Therefore idolatry belongs to superstition.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad superstitionem pertinet excedere debitum modum divini cultus. Quod quidem praecipue fit quando divinus cultus exhibetur cui non debet exhiberi. Debet autem exhiberi soli summo Deo increato, ut supra habitum est, cum de religione ageretur. Et ideo, cuicumque creaturae divinus cultus exhibeatur, superstitiosum est. I answer that, As stated above (Question [92], Article [2]), it belongs to superstition to exceed the due mode of divine worship, and this is done chiefly when divine worship is given to whom it should not be given. Now it should be given to the most high uncreated God alone, as stated above (Question [81], Article [1]) when we were treating of religion. Therefore it is superstition to give worship to any creature whatsoever.
Huiusmodi autem cultus divinus, sicut creaturis sensibilibus exhibebatur per aliqua sensibilia signa, puta sacrificia, ludos et alia huiusmodi; ita etiam exhibebatur creaturae repraesentatae per aliquam sensibilem formam seu figuram, quae idolum dicitur. Diversimode tamen cultus divinus idolis exhibebatur. Quidam enim per quandam nefariam artem imagines quasdam construebant quae virtute Daemonum aliquos certos effectus habebant, unde putabant in ipsis imaginibus esse aliquid divinitatis; et quod per consequens divinus cultus eis deberetur. Et haec fuit opinio Hermetis Trimegisti; ut Augustinus dicit, in VIII de Civ. Dei. Alii vero non exhibebant cultum divinitatis ipsis imaginibus, sed creaturis quarum erant imagines. Et utrumque horum tangit apostolus, ad Rom. I. Nam quantum ad primum, dicit, mutaverunt gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis, et volucrum et quadrupedum et serpentum. Quantum autem ad secundum, subdit, coluerunt et servierunt potius creaturae quam creatori. Now just as this divine worship was given to sensible creatures by means of sensible signs, such as sacrifices, games, and the like, so too was it given to a creature represented by some sensible form or shape, which is called an "idol." Yet divine worship was given to idols in various ways. For some, by means of a nefarious art, constructed images which produced certain effects by the power of the demons: wherefore they deemed that the images themselves contained something God-like, and consequently that divine worship was due to them. This was the opinion of Hermes Trismegistus [*De Natura Deorum, ad Asclep], as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 23): while others gave divine worship not to the images, but to the creatures represented thereby. The Apostle alludes to both of these (Rm. 1:23,25). For, as regards the former, he says: "They changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of creeping things," and of the latter he says: "Who worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator."
Horum tamen fuit triplex opinio. Quidam enim aestimabant quosdam homines deos fuisse, quos per eorum imagines colebant, sicut Iovem, Mercurium, et alios huiusmodi. Quidam vero aestimabant totum mundum esse unum Deum, non propter corporalem substantiam, sed propter animam, quam Deum esse credebant, dicentes Deum nihil aliud esse quam animam motu et ratione mundum gubernantem; sicut et homo dicitur sapiens propter animam, non propter corpus. Unde putabant toti mundo, et omnibus partibus eius, esse cultum divinitatis exhibendum, caelo, aeri, aquae, et omnibus huiusmodi. Et ad haec referebant nomina et imagines suorum deorum, sicut Varro dicebat, et narrat Augustinus, VII de Civ. Dei. Alii vero, scilicet Platonici, posuerunt unum esse summum Deum, causam omnium; post quem ponebant esse substantias quasdam spirituales a summo Deo creatas, quas deos nominabant, participatione scilicet divinitatis, nos autem eos Angelos dicimus; post quos ponebant animas caelestium corporum; et sub his Daemones, quos dicebant esse aerea quaedam animalia; et sub his ponebant animas hominum, quas per virtutis meritum ad deorum vel Daemonum societatem assumi credebant. Et omnibus his cultum divinitatis exhibebant, ut Augustinus narrat, in XVIII de Civ. Dei. These latter were of three ways of thinking. For some deemed certain men to have been gods, whom they worshipped in the images of those men: for instance, Jupiter, Mercury, and so forth. Others again deemed the whole world to be one god, not by reason of its material substance, but by reason of its soul, which they believed to be God, for they held God to be nothing else than a soul governing the world by movement and reason: even as a man is said to be wise in respect not of his body but of his soul. Hence they thought that divine worship ought to be given to the whole world and to all its parts, heaven, air, water, and to all such things: and to these they referred the names of their gods, as Varro asserted, and Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 5). Lastly, others, namely, the Platonists, said that there is one supreme god, the cause of all things. After him they placed certain spiritual substances created by the supreme god. These they called "gods," on account of their having a share of the godhead; but we call them "angels." After these they placed the souls of the heavenly bodies, and beneath these the demons which they stated to be certain animal denizens of the air, and beneath these again they placed human souls, which they believed to be taken up into the fellowship of the gods or of the demons by reason of the merit of their virtue. To all these they gave divine worship, as Augustine relates (De Civ.. Dei xviii, 14).
Has autem duas ultimas opiniones dicebant pertinere ad physicam theologiam, quam philosophi considerabant in mundo, et docebant in scholis. Aliam vero, de cultu hominum, dicebant pertinere ad theologiam fabularem, quae secundum figmenta poetarum repraesentabatur in theatris. Aliam vero opinionem, de imaginibus, dicebant pertinere ad civilem theologiam, quae per pontifices celebrabatur in templis. The last two opinions were held to belong to "natural theology" which the philosophers gathered from their study of the world and taught in the schools: while the other, relating to the worship of men, was said to belong to "mythical theology" which was wont to be represented on the stage according to the fancies of poets. The remaining opinion relating to images was held to belong to "civil theology," which was celebrated by the pontiffs in the temples [*De Civ. Dei vi, 5].
Omnia autem haec ad superstitionem idololatriae pertinebant. Unde Augustinus dicit, in II de Doct. Christ., superstitiosum est quidquid institutum ab hominibus est ad facienda et colenda idola pertinens, vel ad colendam sicut Deum creaturam partemve ullam creaturae. Now all these come under the head of the superstition of idolatry. Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20): "Anything invented by man for making and worshipping idols, or for giving Divine worship to a creature or any part of a creature, is superstitious."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut religio non est fides, sed fidei protestatio per aliqua exteriora signa, ita superstitio est quaedam infidelitatis protestatio per exteriorem cultum. Quam quidem protestationem nomen idololatriae significat, non autem nomen haeresis, sed solum falsam opinionem. Et ideo haeresis est species infidelitatis, sed idololatria est species superstitionis. Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is not faith, but a confession of faith by outward signs, so superstition is a confession of unbelief by external worship. Such a confession is signified by the term idolatry, but not by the term heresy, which only means a false opinion. Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, but idolatry is a species of superstition.
Ad secundum dicendum quod nomen latriae dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo potest significare humanum actum ad cultum Dei pertinentem. Et secundum hoc, non variatur significatio huius nominis latria, cuicumque exhibeatur, quia illud cui exhibetur non cadet, secundum hoc, in eius definitione. Et secundum hoc latria univoce dicetur secundum quod pertinet ad veram religionem, et secundum quod pertinet ad idololatriam, sicut solutio tributi univoce dicitur sive exhibeatur vero regi, sive falso. Alio modo accipitur latria prout est idem religioni. Et sic, cum sit virtus, de ratione eius est quod cultus divinus exhibeatur ei cui debet exhiberi. Et secundum hoc latria aequivoce dicetur de latria verae religionis, et de idololatria, sicut prudentia aequivoce dicitur de prudentia quae est virtus, et de prudentia quae est carnis. Reply to Objection 2: The term latria may be taken in two senses. In one sense it may denote a human act pertaining to the worship of God: and then its signification remains the same, to whomsoever it be shown, because, in this sense, the thing to which it is shown is not included in its definition. Taken thus latria is applied univocally, whether to true religion or to idolatry, just as the payment of a tax is univocally the same, whether it is paid to the true or to a false king. In another sense latria denotes the same as religion, and then, since it is a virtue, it is essential thereto that divine worship be given to whom it ought to be given; and in this way latria is applied equivocally to the latria of true religion, and to idolatry: just as prudence is applied equivocally to the prudence that is a virtue, and to that which is carnal.
Ad tertium dicendum quod apostolus intelligit nihil esse in mundo quia imagines illae quae idola dicebantur, non erant animatae aut aliquam virtutem divinitatis habentes, sicut Hermes ponebat, quasi esset aliquid compositum ex spiritu et corpore. Et similiter intelligendum est quod idolis immolatum non est aliquid, quia per huiusmodi immolationem carnes immolatitiae neque aliquam sanctificationem consequebantur, ut gentiles putabant; neque aliquam immunditiam, ut putabant Iudaei. Reply to Objection 3: The saying of the Apostle that "an idol is nothing in the world" means that those images which were called idols, were not animated, or possessed of a divine power, as Hermes maintained, as though they were composed of spirit and body. In the same sense we must understand the saying that "what is offered in sacrifice to idols is not anything," because by being thus sacrificed the sacrificial flesh acquired neither sanctification, as the Gentiles thought, nor uncleanness, as the Jews held.
Ad quartum dicendum quod ex communi consuetudine qua creaturas quascumque colebant gentiles sub quibusdam imaginibus, impositum est hoc nomen idololatria ad significandum quemcumque cultum creaturae, et etiam si sine imaginibus fieret. Reply to Objection 4: It was owing to the general custom among the Gentiles of worshipping any kind of creature under the form of images that the term "idolatry" was used to signify any worship of a creature, even without the use of images.

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Whether idolatry is a sin?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod idololatria non sit peccatum. Nihil enim est peccatum quod vera fides in cultum Dei assumit. Sed vera fides imagines quasdam assumit ad divinum cultum, nam et in tabernaculo erant imagines Cherubin, ut legitur Exod. XXV; et in Ecclesia quaedam imagines ponuntur quas fideles adorant. Ergo idololatria, secundum quam idola adorantur, non est peccatum. Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not a sin. Nothing is a sin that the true faith employs in worshipping God. Now the true faith employs images for the divine worship: since both in the Tabernacle were there images of the cherubim, as related in Ex. 25, and in the Church are images set up which the faithful worship. Therefore idolatry, whereby idols are worshipped, is not a sin.
Praeterea, cuilibet superiori est reverentia exhibenda. Sed Angeli et animae sanctorum sunt nobis superiores. Ergo, si eis exhibeatur reverentia per aliquem cultum vel sacrificiorum vel aliquorum huiusmodi, non erit peccatum. Objection 2: Further, reverence should be paid to every superior. But the angels and the souls of the blessed are our superiors. Therefore it will be no sin to pay them reverence by worship, of sacrifices or the like.
Praeterea, summus Deus interiori cultu mentis est colendus, secundum illud Ioan. IV, Deum oportet adorare in spiritu et veritate. Et Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod Deus colitur fide, spe et caritate. Potest autem contingere quod aliquis exterius idola colat, interius tamen a vera fide non discedat. Ergo videtur quod sine praeiudicio divini cultus possit aliquis exterius idola colere. Objection 3: Further, the most high God should be honored with an inward worship, according to Jn. 4:24, "God... they must adore... in spirit and in truth": and Augustine says (Enchiridion iii), that "God is worshipped by faith, hope and charity." Now a man may happen to worship idols outwardly, and yet not wander from the true faith inwardly. Therefore it seems that we may worship idols outwardly without prejudice to the divine worship.
Sed contra est quod Exod. XX dicitur, non adorabis ea, scilicet exterius, neque coles, scilicet interius, ut Glossa exponit et loquitur de sculptilibus et imaginibus. Ergo peccatum est idolis exteriorem vel interiorem cultum exhibere. On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 20:5): "Thou shalt not adore them," i.e. outwardly, "nor serve them," i.e. inwardly, as a gloss explains it: and it is a question of graven things and images. Therefore it is a sin to worship idols whether outwardly or inwardly.
Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc aliqui dupliciter erraverunt. Quidam enim putaverunt quod offerre sacrificium et alia ad latriam pertinentia non solum summo Deo, sed etiam aliis supra dictis, est debitum et per se bonum, eo quod superiori cuilibet naturae divinam reverentiam exhibendam putant, quasi Deo propinquiori. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur. Nam etsi omnes superiores revereri debeamus, non tamen eadem reverentia omnibus debetur, sed aliquid speciale debetur summo Deo, qui singulari ratione omnes excellit, et hic est latriae cultus. I answer that, There has been a twofold error in this matter. For some [*The School of Plato] have thought that to offer sacrifices and other things pertaining to latria, not only to God but also to the others aforesaid, is due and good in itself, since they held that divine honor should be paid to every superior nature, as being nearer to God. But this is unreasonable. For though we ought to revere all superiors, yet the same reverence is not due to them all: and something special is due to the most high God Who excels all in a singular manner: and this is the worship of latria.
Nec potest dici, sicut quidam putaverunt, haec visibilia sacrificia diis aliis congruere, illi vero summo Deo, tanquam meliori, meliora, scilicet purae mentis officia, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in X de Civ. Dei, exteriora sacrificia ita sunt signa interiorum sicut verba sonantia signa sunt rerum. Quocirca, sicut orantes atque laudantes ad eum dirigimus significantes voces cui res ipsas in corde quas significamus offerimus, ita, sacrificantes, non alteri visibile sacrificium offerendum esse noverimus quam ei cuius in cordibus nostris invisibile sacrificium nos ipsi esse debemus. Nor can it be said, as some have maintained, that "these visible sacrifices are fitting with regard to other gods, and that to the most high God, as being better than those others, better sacrifices, namely, the service of a pure mind, should be offered" [*Augustine, as quoted below]. The reason is that, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19), "external sacrifices are signs of internal, just as audible words are signs of things. Wherefore, just as by prayer and praise we utter significant words to Him, and offer to Him in our hearts the things they signify, so too in our sacrifices we ought to realize that we should offer a visible sacrifice to no other than to Him Whose invisible sacrifice we ourselves should be in our hearts."
Alii vero aestimaverunt latriae cultum exteriorem non esse idolis exhibendum tanquam per se bonum aut opportunum, sed tanquam vulgari consuetudini consonum, ut Augustinus, in VI de Civ. Dei, introducit Senecam dicentem, sic, inquit, adorabimus ut meminerimus huiusmodi cultum magis ad morem quam ad rem pertinere. Et in libro de vera Relig. Augustinus dicit non esse religionem a philosophis quaerendam, qui eadem sacra recipiebant cum populis, et de suorum deorum natura ac summo bono diversas contrariasque sententias in scholis personabant. Et hunc etiam errorem secuti sunt quidam haeretici asserentes non esse perniciosum si quis, persecutionis tempore deprehensus, exterius idola colat, dum tamen fidem servat in mente. Others held that the outward worship of latria should be given to idols, not as though it were something good or fitting in itself, but as being in harmony with the general custom. Thus Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) quotes Seneca as saying: "We shall adore," says he, "in such a way as to remember that our worship ss in accordance with custom rather than with the reality": and (De Vera Relig. v) Augustine says that "we must not seek religion from the philosophers, who accepted the same things for sacred, as did the people; and gave utterance in the schools to various and contrary opinions about the nature of their gods, and the sovereign good." This error was embraced also by certain heretics [*The Helcesaitae], who affirmed that it is not wrong for one who is seized in time of persecution to worship idols outwardly so long as he keeps the faith in his heart.
Sed hoc apparet manifeste falsum. Nam cum exterior cultus sit signum interioris cultus, sicut est perniciosum mendacium si quis verbis asserat contrarium eius quod per veram fidem tenet in corde, ita etiam est perniciosa falsitas si quis exteriorem cultum exhibeat alicui contra id quod sentit in mente. Unde Augustinus dicit contra Senecam, in VI de Civ. Dei, quod eo damnabilius colebat idola, quo illa quae mendaciter agebat sic ageret ut cum populo veraciter agere existimaretur. But this is evidently false. For since outward worship is a sign of the inward worship, just as it is a wicked lie to affirm the contrary of what one holds inwardly of the true faith so too is it a wicked falsehood to pay outward worship to anything counter to the sentiments of one's heart. Wherefore Augustine condemns Seneca (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) in that "his worship of idols was so much the more infamous forasmuch as the things he did dishonestly were so done by him that the people believed him to act honestly."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod neque in veteris legis tabernaculo seu templo, neque etiam nunc in Ecclesia imagines instituuntur ut eis cultus latriae exhibeatur, sed ad quandam significationem, ut per huiusmodi imagines mentibus hominum imprimatur et confirmetur fides de excellentia Angelorum et sanctorum. Secus autem est de imagine Christi, cui, ratione deitatis, latria debetur, ut dicetur in tertio. Reply to Objection 1: Neither in the Tabernacle or Temple of the Old Law, nor again now in the Church are images set up that the worship of latria may be paid to them, but for the purpose of signification, in order that belief in the excellence of angels and saints may be impressed and confirmed in the mind of man. It is different with the image of Christ, to which latria is due on account of His Divinity, as we shall state in the TP, Question [25], Article [3].
Ad secundum et tertium patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. The Replies to the Second and Third Objections are evident from what has been said above.

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Whether idolatry is the gravest of sins?

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod idololatria non sit gravissimum peccatorum. Pessimum enim optimo opponitur, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Sed cultus interior, qui consistit in fide, spe et caritate, est melior quam cultus exterior. Ergo infidelitas, desperatio et odium Dei, quae opponuntur cultui interiori, sunt graviora peccata quam idololatria, quae opponitur cultui exteriori. Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not the gravest of sins. The worst is opposed to the best (Ethic. viii, 10). But interior worship, which consists of faith, hope and charity, is better than external worship. Therefore unbelief, despair and hatred of God, which are opposed to internal worship, are graver sins than idolatry, which is opposed to external worship.
Praeterea, tanto aliquod peccatum est gravius quanto magis est contra Deum. Sed directius videtur aliquis contra Deum agere blasphemando, vel fidem impugnando, quam cultum Dei alii exhibendo, quod pertinet ad idololatriam. Ergo blasphemia vel impugnatio fidei est gravius peccatum quam idololatria. Objection 2: Further, the more a sin is against God the more grievous it is. Now, seemingly, a man acts more directly against God by blaspheming, or denying the faith, than by giving God's worship to another, which pertains to idolatry. Therefore blasphemy and denial of the faith are more grievous sins than idolatry.
Praeterea, minora mala maioribus malis puniri videntur. Sed peccatum idololatriae punitum est peccato contra naturam, ut dicitur Rom. I. Ergo peccatum contra naturam est gravius peccato idololatriae. Objection 3: Further, it seems that lesser evils are punished with greater evils. But the sin of idolatry was punished with the sin against nature, as stated in Rm. 1:26. Therefore the sin against nature is a graver sin than idolatry.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XX contra Faust., neque vos, scilicet Manichaeos, Paganos dicimus, aut schisma Paganorum, sed habere cum eis quandam similitudinem, eo quod multos colatis deos. Verum vos esse eis longe deteriores, quod illi ea colunt quae sunt, sed pro diis colenda non sunt; vos autem ea colitis quae omnino non sunt. Ergo vitium haereticae pravitatis est gravius quam idololatria. Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xx, 5): "Neither do we say that you," viz. the Manichees, "are pagans, or a sect of pagans, but that you bear a certain likeness to them since you worship many gods: and yet you are much worse than they are, for they worship things that exist, but should not be worshiped as gods, whereas you worship things that exist not at all." Therefore the vice of heretical depravity is more grievous than idolatry.
Praeterea, super illud Gal. IV, quomodo convertimini iterum ad infirma et egena elementa? Dicit Glossa Hieronymi, legis observantia, cui dediti tunc erant, erat peccatum paene par servituti idolorum, cui ante conversionem vacaverant. Non ergo peccatum idololatriae est gravissimum. Objection 5: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Gal. 4:9, "How turn you again to the weak and needy elements?" says: "The observance of the Law, to which they were then addicted, was a sin almost equal to the worship of idols, to which they had been given before their conversion." Therefore idolatry is not the most grievous sin.
Sed contra est quod Levit. XV, super illud quod dicitur de immunditia mulieris patientis fluxum sanguinis, dicit Glossa, omne peccatum est immunditia animae, sed idololatria maxime. On the contrary, A gloss on the saying of Lev. 15:25, about the uncleanness of a woman suffering from an issue of blood, says: "Every sin is an uncleanness of the soul, but especially idolatry."
Respondeo dicendum quod gravitas alicuius peccati potest attendi dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius peccati. Et sic peccatum idololatriae est gravissimum. Sicut enim in terrena republica gravissimum esse videtur quod aliquis honorem regium alteri impendat quam vero regi, quia quantum in se est, totum reipublicae perturbat ordinem; ita in peccatis quae contra Deum committuntur, quae tamen sunt maxima, gravissimum esse videtur quod aliquis honorem divinum creaturae impendat, quia quantum est in se, facit alium Deum in mundo, minuens principatum divinum. Alio modo potest attendi gravitas peccati ex parte peccantis, sicut dicitur esse gravius peccatum eius qui peccat scienter quam eius qui peccat ignoranter. Et secundum hoc nihil prohibet gravius peccare haereticos, qui scienter corrumpunt fidem quam acceperunt, quam idololatras ignoranter peccantes. Et similiter etiam aliqua alia peccata possunt esse maiora propter maiorem contemptum peccantis. I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the sin itself, and thus idolatry is the most grievous sin. For just as the most heinous crime in an earthly commonwealth would seem to be for a man to give royal honor to another than the true king, since, so far as he is concerned, he disturbs the whole order of the commonwealth, so, in sins that are committed against God, which indeed are the greater sins, the greatest of all seems to be for a man to give God's honor to a creature, since, so far as he is concerned, he sets up another God in the world, and lessens the divine sovereignty. Secondly, the gravity of a sin may be considered on the part of the sinner. Thus the sin of one that sins knowingly is said to be graver than the sin of one that sins through ignorance: and in this way nothing hinders heretics, if they knowingly corrupt the faith which they have received, from sinning more grievously than idolaters who sin through ignorance. Furthermore other sins may be more grievous on account of greater contempt on the part of the sinner.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod idololatria praesupponit interiorem infidelitatem, et adiicit exterius indebitum cultum. Si vero sit exterior tantum idololatria absque interiori infidelitate, additur culpa falsitatis, ut prius dictum est. Reply to Objection 1: Idolatry presupposes internal unbelief, and to this it adds undue worship. But in a case of external idolatry without internal unbelief, there is an additional sin of falsehood, as stated above (Article [2]).
Ad secundum dicendum quod idololatria includit magnam blasphemiam, inquantum Deo subtrahitur dominii singularitas. Et fidem opere impugnat idololatria. Reply to Objection 2: Idolatry includes a grievous blasphemy, inasmuch as it deprives God of the singleness of His dominion and denies the faith by deeds.
Ad tertium dicendum quod quia de ratione poenae est quod sit contra voluntatem, peccatum per quod aliud punitur oportet esse magis manifestum, ut ex hoc homo sibi ipsi et aliis detestabilis reddatur, non autem oportet quod sit gravius. Et secundum hoc, peccatum contra naturam minus est quam peccatum idololatriae, sed quia est manifestius, ponitur quasi conveniens poena peccati idololatriae, ut scilicet, sicut homo per idololatriam pervertit ordinem divini honoris, ita per peccatum contra naturam propriae naturae confusibilem perversitatem patiatur. Reply to Objection 3: Since it is essential to punishment that it be against the will, a sin whereby another sin is punished needs to be more manifest, in order that it may make the man more hateful to himself and to others; but it need not be a more grievous sin: and in this way the sin against nature is less grievous than the sin of idolatry. But since it is more manifest, it is assigned as a fitting punishment of the sin of idolatry, in order that, as by idolatry man abuses the order of the divine honor, so by the sin against nature he may suffer confusion from the abuse of his own nature.
Ad quartum dicendum quod haeresis Manichaeorum, etiam quantum ad genus peccati, gravior est quam peccatum aliorum idololatrarum, quia magis derogant divino honori, ponentes duos deos contrarios, et multa vana fabulosa de Deo fingentes. Secus autem est de aliis haereticis, qui unum Deum confitentur et eum solum colunt Reply to Objection 4: Even as to the genus of the sin, the Manichean heresy is more grievous than the sin of other idolaters, because it is more derogatory to the divine honor, since they set up two gods in opposition to one another, and hold many vain and fabulous fancies about God. It is different with other heretics, who confess their belief in one God and worship Him alone.
Ad quintum dicendum quod observatio legis tempore gratiae non est omnino aequalis idololatriae secundum genus peccati, sed paene aequalis, quia utrumque est species pestiferae superstitionis. Reply to Objection 5: The observance of the Law during the time of grace is not quite equal to idolatry as to the genus of the sin, but almost equal, because both are species of pestiferous superstition.

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Whether the cause of idolatry was on the part of man?

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod causa idololatriae non fuerit ex parte hominis. In homine enim nihil est nisi vel natura, vel virtus, vel culpa. Sed causa idololatriae non potuit esse ex parte naturae hominis, quin potius naturalis ratio hominis dictat quod sit unus Deus, et quod non sit mortuis cultus divinus exhibendus, neque rebus inanimatis. Similiter etiam nec idololatria habet causam in homine ex parte virtutis, quia non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere, ut dicitur Matth. VII. Neque etiam ex parte culpae, quia, ut dicitur Sap. XIV, infandorum idolorum cultura omnis mali causa est, et initium et finis. Ergo idololatria non habet causam ex parte hominis. Objection 1: It would seem that the cause of idolatry was not on the part of man. In man there is nothing but either nature, virtue, or guilt. But the cause of idolatry could not be on the part of man's nature, since rather does man's natural reason dictate that there is one God, and that divine worship should not be paid to the dead or to inanimate beings. Likewise, neither could idolatry have its cause in man on the part of virtue, since "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit," according to Mt. 7:18: nor again could it be on the part of guilt, because, according to Wis. 14:27, "the worship of abominable idols is the cause and the beginning and end of all evil." Therefore idolatry has no cause on the part of man.
Praeterea, ea quae ex parte hominis causantur, omni tempore in hominibus inveniuntur. Non autem semper fuit idololatria, sed in secunda aetate legitur esse adinventa, vel a Nemrod, qui, ut dicitur, cogebat homines ignem adorare; vel a Nino, qui imaginem patris sui Beli adorari fecit. Apud Graecos autem, ut Isidorus refert, Prometheus primus simulacra hominum de luto finxit. Iudaei vero dicunt quod Ismael primus simulacra de luto fecit. Cessavit etiam in sexta aetate idololatria ex magna parte. Ergo idololatria non habuit causam ex parte hominis. Objection 2: Further, those things which have a cause in man are found among men at all times. Now idolatry was not always, but is stated [*Peter Comestor, Hist. Genes. xxxvii, xl] to have been originated either by Nimrod, who is related to have forced men to worship fire, or by Ninus, who caused the statue of his father Bel to be worshiped. Among the Greeks, as related by Isidore (Etym. viii, 11), Prometheus was the first to set up statues of men: and the Jews say that Ismael was the first to make idols of clay. Moreover, idolatry ceased to a great extent in the sixth age. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man.
Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XXI de Civ. Dei, neque potuit primum, nisi illis, scilicet Daemonibus, docentibus, disci quid quisque illorum appetat, quid exhorreat, quo invitetur nomine, quo cogatur, unde magicae artes, earumque artifices extiterunt. Eadem autem ratio videtur esse de idololatria. Ergo idololatriae causa non est ex parte hominum. Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): "It was not possible to learn, for the first time, except from their" (i.e. the demons') "teaching, what each of them desired or disliked, and by what name to invite or compel him: so as to give birth to the magic arts and their professors": and the same observation seems to apply to idolatry. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. XIV, supervacuitas hominum haec, scilicet idola, adinvenit in orbe terrarum. On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 14:14): "By the vanity of men they," i.e. idols, "came into the world."
Respondeo dicendum quod idololatriae est duplex causa. Una quidem dispositiva. Et haec fuit ex parte hominum. Et hoc tripliciter. Primo quidem, ex inordinatione affectus, prout scilicet homines aliquem hominem vel nimis amantes vel nimis venerantes, honorem divinum ei impenderunt. Et haec causa assignatur Sap. XIV, acerbo luctu dolens pater cito sibi rapti filii fecit imaginem; et illum qui tunc, quasi homo, mortuus fuerat, tanquam Deum colere coepit. Et ibidem etiam subditur quod homines, aut affectui aut regibus deservientes, incommunicabile nomen, scilicet divinitatis, lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt. Secundo, propter hoc quod homo naturaliter de repraesentatione delectatur, ut philosophus dicit, in poetria sua. Et ideo homines rudes a principio videntes per diligentiam artificum imagines hominum expressive factas, divinitatis cultum eis impenderunt. Unde dicitur Sap. XIII, si quis artifex faber de silva lignum rectum secuerit; et per scientiam suae artis figuret illud et assimilet imagini hominis, de substantia sua, et filiis et nuptiis, votum faciens, inquirit. Tertio, propter ignorantiam veri Dei, cuius excellentiam homines non considerantes, quibusdam creaturis, propter pulchritudinem seu virtutem, divinitatis cultum exhibuerunt. Unde dicitur Sap. XIII, neque, operibus attendentes, agnoverunt quis esset artifex. Sed aut ignem, aut spiritum, aut citatum aerem, aut gyrum stellarum, aut nimiam aquam, aut solem, aut lunam, rectores orbis terrarum, deos putaverunt. I answer that, Idolatry had a twofold cause. One was a dispositive cause; this was on the part of man, and in three ways. First, on account of his inordinate affections, forasmuch as he gave other men divine honor, through either loving or revering them too much. This cause is assigned (Wis. 14:15): "A father being afflicted with bitter grief, made to himself the image of his son, who was quickly taken away: and him who then had died as a man he began to worship as a god." The same passage goes on to say (Wis. 14:21) that "men serving either their affection, or their kings, gave the incommunicable name [Vulg.: 'names']," i.e. of the Godhead, "to stones and wood." Secondly, because man takes a natural pleasure in representations, as the Philosopher observes (Poet. iv), wherefore as soon as the uncultured man saw human images skillfully fashioned by the diligence of the craftsman, he gave them divine worship; hence it is written (Wis. 13:11-17): "If an artist, a carpenter, hath cut down a tree, proper for his use, in the wood... and by the skill of his art fashioneth it, and maketh it like the image of a man... and then maketh prayer to it, inquiring concerning his substance, and his children, or his marriage." Thirdly, on account of their ignorance of the true God, inasmuch as through failing to consider His excellence men gave divine worship to certain creatures, on account of their beauty or power, wherefore it is written (Wis. 13:1,2): "All men... neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was the workman, but have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and the moon, to be the gods that rule the world."
Alia autem causa idololatriae fuit consummativa, ex parte Daemonum, qui se colendos hominibus errantibus exhibuerunt in idolis, dando responsa et aliqua quae videbantur hominibus mirabilia faciendo. Unde et in Psalm. dicitur, omnes dii gentium Daemonia. The other cause of idolatry was completive, and this was on the part of the demons, who offered themselves to be worshipped by men, by giving answers in the idols, and doing things which to men seemed marvelous. Hence it is written (Ps. 95:5): "All the gods of the Gentiles are devils."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod causa dispositiva idololatriae fuit, ex parte hominis, naturae defectus vel per ignorantiam intellectus vel per deordinationem affectus, ut dictum est. Et hoc etiam ad culpam pertinet. Dicitur autem idololatria esse causa, initium et finis omnis peccati, quia non est aliquod genus peccati quod interdum idololatria non producat, vel expresse inducendo, per modum causae; vel occasionem praebendo, per modum initii; vel per modum finis, inquantum peccata aliqua assumebantur in cultum idolorum, sicut occisiones hominum et mutilationes membrorum, et alia huiusmodi. Et tamen aliqua peccata possunt idololatriam praecedere, quae ad ipsam hominem disponunt. Reply to Objection 1: The dispositive cause of idolatry was, on the part of man, a defect of nature, either through ignorance in his intellect, or disorder in his affections, as stated above; and this pertains to guilt. Again, idolatry is stated to be the cause, beginning and end of all sin, because there is no kind of sin that idolatry does not produce at some time, either through leading expressly to that sin by causing it, or through being an occasion thereof, either as a beginning or as an end, in so far as certain sins were employed in the worship of idols; such as homicides, mutilations, and so forth. Nevertheless certain sins may precede idolatry and dispose man thereto.
Ad secundum dicendum quod in prima aetate non fuit idololatria propter recentem memoriam creationis mundi, ex qua adhuc vigebat cognitio unius Dei in mente hominum. In sexta autem aetate idololatria est exclusa per doctrinam et virtutem Christi, qui de Diabolo triumphavit. Reply to Objection 2: There was no idolatry in the first age, owing to the recent remembrance of the creation of the world, so that man still retained in his mind the knowledge of one God. In the sixth age idolatry was banished by the doctrine and power of Christ, who triumphed over the devil.
Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de causa consummativa idololatriae. Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the consummative cause of idolatry.

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