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| Deinde considerandum est de gratia sive gratitudine, et ingratitudine. Circa gratiam autem quaeruntur sex. | We must now consider thankfulness or gratitude, and ingratitude. Concerning thankfulness there are six points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum gratia sit virtus specialis ab aliis distincta. | (1) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct from other virtues? |
| Secundo, quis tenetur ad maiores gratiarum actiones Deo, utrum innocens vel poenitens. | (2) Who owes more thanks to God, the innocent or the penitent? |
| Tertio, utrum semper teneatur homo ad gratias humanis beneficiis reddendas. | (3) Whether man is always bound to give thanks for human favors? |
| Quarto, utrum retributio gratiarum sit differenda. | (4) Whether thanksgiving should be deferred? |
| Quinto, utrum sit mensuranda secundum acceptum beneficium, vel secundum dantis affectum. |
(5) Whether thanksgiving should be measured according to the favor received or the disposition of the giver? |
| Sexto, utrum oporteat aliquid maius rependere. | (6) Whether one ought to pay back more than one has received? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia non sit virtus specialis ab aliis distincta. Maxima enim beneficia a Deo et a parentibus accepimus. Sed honor quem Deo retribuimus, pertinet ad virtutem religionis, honor autem quem retribuimus parentibus, pertinet ad virtutem pietatis. Ergo gratia sive gratitudo non est virtus ab aliis distincta. | Objection 1: It seems that thankfulness is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtue. For we have received the greatest benefits from God, and from our parents. Now the honor which we pay to God in return belongs to the virtue of religion, and the honor with which we repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety. Therefore thankfulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other virtues. |
| Praeterea, retributio proportionalis pertinet ad iustitiam commutativam, ut patet per philosophum, in V Ethic. Sed gratiae redduntur ut retributio sit, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo redditio gratiarum, quod pertinet ad gratitudinem, est actus iustitiae. Non ergo gratitudo est specialis virtus ab aliis distincta. | Objection 2: Further, proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4). Now the purpose of giving thanks is repayment (Ethic. 5,4). Therefore thanksgiving, which belongs to gratitude, is an act of justice. Therefore gratitude is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues. |
| Praeterea, recompensatio requiritur ad amicitiam conservandam, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII et IX Ethic. Sed amicitia se habet ad omnes virtutes, propter quas homo amatur. Ergo gratia sive gratitudo, ad quam pertinet recompensare beneficia, non est specialis virtus. | Objection 3: Further, acknowledgment of favor received is requisite for the preservation of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13; ix, 1). Now friendship is associated with all the virtues, since they are the reason for which man is loved. Therefore thankfulness or gratitude, to which it belongs to repay favors received, is not a special virtue. |
| Sed contra est quod Tullius ponit gratiam specialem iustitiae partem. | On the contrary, Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of justice (De Invent. Rhet. ii). |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, secundum diversas causas ex quibus aliquid debetur, necesse est diversificari debiti reddendi rationem, ita tamen quod semper in maiori illud quod minus est continetur. In Deo autem primo et principaliter invenitur causa debiti, eo quod ipse est primum principium omnium bonorum nostrorum. Secundario autem, in patre, quod est proximum nostrae generationis et disciplinae principium. Tertio autem, in persona quae dignitate praecellit, ex qua communia beneficia procedunt. Quarto autem, in aliquo benefactore a quo aliqua particularia et privata beneficia percepimus, pro quibus particulariter ei obligamur. |
I answer that, As stated above (FS, Question [60], Article [3]), the nature of the debt to be paid must needs vary according to various causes giving rise to the debt, yet so that the greater always includes the lesser. Now the cause of debt is found primarily and chiefly in God, in that He is the first principle of all our goods: secondarily it is found in our father, because he is the proximate principle of our begetting and upbringing: thirdly it is found in the person that excels in dignity, from whom general favors proceed; fourthly it is found in a benefactor, from whom we have received particular and private favors, on account of which we are under particular obligation to him. |
| Quia ergo non quidquid debemus Deo vel patri vel personae dignitate praecellenti, debemus alicui benefactorum a quo aliquod particulare beneficium recepimus; inde est quod post religionem, qua debitum cultum Deo impendimus; et pietatem, qua colimus parentes; et observantiam, qua colimus personas dignitate praecellentes; est gratia sive gratitudo, quae benefactoribus gratiam recompensat. Et distinguitur a praemissis virtutibus, sicut quaelibet posteriorum distinguitur a priori, quasi ab eo deficiens. | Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a person excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe a benefactor from whom we have received some particular favor, it follows that after religion, whereby we pay God due worship, and piety, whereby we worship our parents, and observance, whereby we worship persons excelling in dignity, there is thankfulness or gratitude, whereby we give thanks to our benefactors. And it is distinct from the foregoing virtues, just as each of these is distinct from the one that precedes, as falling short thereof. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut religio est quaedam superexcellens pietas, ita est etiam quaedam excellens gratia seu gratitudo. Unde et gratiarum actio ad Deum supra posita est inter ea quae ad religionem pertinent. |
Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is superexcelling piety, so is it excelling thankfulness or gratitude: wherefore giving thanks to God was reckoned above (Question [83], Article [17]) among things pertaining to religion. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod retributio proportionalis pertinet ad iustitiam commutativam quando attenditur secundum debitum legale, puta si pacto firmetur ut tantum pro tanto retribuatur. Sed ad virtutem gratiae sive gratitudinis pertinet retributio quae fit ex solo debito honestatis, quam scilicet aliquis sponte facit. Unde gratitudo est minus grata si sit coacta, ut Seneca dicit, in libro de beneficiis. | Reply to Objection 2: Proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice, when it answers to the legal due; for instance when it is contracted that so much be paid for so much. But the repayment that belongs to the virtue of thankfulness or gratitude answers to the moral debt, and is paid spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is less thankful when compelled, as Seneca observes (De Beneficiis iii). |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod cum vera amicitia supra virtutem fundetur, quidquid est virtuti contrarium in amico est amicitiae impeditivum, et quidquid est virtuosum est amicitiae provocativum. Et secundum hoc, per recompensationem beneficiorum amicitia conservatur; quamvis recompensatio beneficiorum specialiter ad virtutem gratitudinis pertineat. | Reply to Objection 3: Since true friendship is based on virtue, whatever there is contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle to friendship, and whatever in him is virtuous is an incentive to friendship. In this way friendship is preserved by repayment of favors, although repayment of favors belongs specially to the virtue of gratitude. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magis teneatur ad gratias reddendas Deo innocens quam poenitens. Quanto enim aliquis maius donum percepit a Deo, tanto magis ad gratiarum actiones tenetur. Sed maius est donum innocentiae quam iustitiae restitutae. Ergo videtur quod magis teneatur ad gratiarum actionem innocens quam poenitens. | Objection 1: It seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent. For the greater the gift one has received from God, the more one is bound to give Him thanks. Now the gift of innocence is greater than that of justice restored. Therefore it seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent. |
| Praeterea, sicut benefactori debetur gratiarum actio, ita et dilectio. Sed Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., quis hominum, suam cogitans infirmitatem, audet viribus suis tribuere castitatem atque innocentiam suam, ut minus amet te, quasi minus fuerit ei necessaria misericordia tua donans peccata conversis ad te? Et postea subdit, et ideo tantundem, immo amplius te diligat, quia per quem me videt tantis peccatorum meorum languoribus exui, per eum se videt tantis peccatorum languoribus non implicari. Ergo etiam magis tenetur ad gratiam reddendam innocens quam poenitens. | Objection 2: Further, a man owes love to his benefactor just as he owes him gratitude. Now Augustine says (Confess. ii): "What man, weighing his own infirmity, would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to his own strength; that so he should love Thee the less, as if he had less needed Thy mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins to those that turn to Thee?" And farther on he says: "And for this let him love Thee as much, yea and more, since by Whom he sees me to have been recovered from such deep torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself to have been from the like torpor of sin preserved." Therefore the innocent is also more bound to give thanks than the penitent. |
| Praeterea, quanto gratuitum beneficium est magis continuatum, tanto maior pro eo debetur gratiarum actio. Sed in innocente magis continuatur divinae gratiae beneficium quam in poenitente. Dicit enim Augustinus, ibidem, gratiae tuae deputo, et misericordiae tuae, quod peccata mea tanquam glaciem solvisti. Gratiae tuae deputo et quaecumque non feci mala, quid enim non facere potui? Et omnia mihi dimissa esse fateor, et quae mea sponte feci mala, et quae te duce non feci. Ergo magis tenetur ad gratiarum actionem innocens quam poenitens. | Objection 3: Further, the more a gratuitous favor is continuous, the greater the thanksgiving due for it. Now the favor of divine grace is more continuous in the innocent than in the penitent. For Augustine says (Confess. iii): "To Thy grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy, that Thou hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To Thy grace I ascribe also whatsoever I have not done of evil; for what might I not have done?... Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both what evils I committed by my own wilfulness, and what by Thy guidance committed not." Therefore the innocent is more bound to give thanks than the penitent. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. VII, cui plus dimittitur, plus diligit. Ergo, eadem ratione, plus tenetur ad gratiarum actiones. |
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 7:43): "To whom more is forgiven, he loveth more [*Vulg.: 'To whom less is forgiven, he loveth less' Lk. 7:47]." Therefore for the same reason he is bound to greater thanksgiving. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod actio gratiarum in accipiente respicit gratiam dantis. Unde ubi est maior gratia ex parte dantis, ibi requiritur maior gratiarum actio ex parte recipientis. Gratia autem est quod gratis datur. Unde dupliciter potest esse ex parte dantis maior gratia. Uno modo, ex quantitate dati. Et hoc modo, innocens tenetur ad maiores gratiarum actiones, quia maius donum ei datur a Deo et magis continuatum, ceteris paribus, absolute loquendo. Alio modo potest dici maior gratia quia magis datur gratis. Et secundum hoc, magis tenetur ad gratiarum actiones poenitens quam innocens, quia magis gratis datur illud quod ei datur a Deo; cum enim esset dignus poena, datur ei gratia. Et sic, licet illud donum quod datur innocenti sit, absolute consideratum, maius; tamen donum quod datur poenitenti est maius in comparatione ad ipsum, sicut etiam parvum donum pauperi datum ei est maius quam diviti magnum. Et quia actus circa singularia sunt, in his quae agenda sunt magis consideratur quod est hic vel nunc tale, quam quod est simpliciter tale, sicut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., de voluntario et involuntario. | I answer that, Thanksgiving [gratiarum actio] in the recipient corresponds to the favor [gratia] of the giver: so that when there is greater favor on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on the part of the recipient. Now a favor is something bestowed "gratis": wherefore on the part of the giver the favor may be greater on two counts. First, owing to the quantity of the thing given: and in this way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he receives a greater gift from God, also, absolutely speaking, a more continuous gift, other things being equal. Secondly, a favor may be said to be greater, because it is given more gratuitously; and in this sense the penitent is more bound to give thanks than the innocent, because what he receives from God is more gratuitously given: since, whereas he was deserving of punishment, he has received grace. Wherefore, although the gift bestowed on the innocent is, considered absolutely, greater, yet the gift bestowed on the penitent is greater in relation to him: even as a small gift bestowed on a poor man is greater to him than a great gift is to a rich man. And since actions are about singulars, in matters of action, we have to take note of what is such here and now, rather than of what is such absolutely, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii) in treating of the voluntary and the involuntary. |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. | This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non teneatur ad gratiarum actiones omni homini benefacienti. Potest enim aliquis sibi ipsi benefacere, sicut et sibi ipsi nocere, secundum illud Eccli. XIV, qui sibi nequam est, cui alii bonus erit? Sed homo sibi ipsi non potest gratias agere, quia gratiarum actio videtur transire ab uno in alterum. Ergo non omni benefactori debetur gratiarum actio. | Objection 1: It seems that the a man is not bound to give thanks to every benefactor. For a man may benefit himself just as he may harm himself, according to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?" But a man cannot thank himself, since thanksgiving seems to pass from one person to another. Therefore thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor. |
| Praeterea, gratiarum actio est quaedam gratiae recompensatio. Sed aliqua beneficia non cum gratia dantur, sed magis cum contumelia, et tarditate vel tristitia. Ergo non semper benefactori sunt gratiae reddendae. | Objection 2: Further, gratitude is a repayment of an act of grace. But some favors are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly and grudgingly given. Therefore gratitude is not always due to a benefactor. |
| Praeterea, nulli debetur gratiarum actio ex eo quod suam utilitatem procurat. Sed quandoque aliqui aliqua beneficia dant propter suam utilitatem. Ergo eis non debetur gratiarum actio. | Objection 3: Further, no thanks are due to one who works for his own profit. But sometimes people bestow favors for their own profit. Therefore thanks are not due to them. |
| Praeterea, servo non debetur gratiarum actio, quia hoc ipsum quod est, domini est. Sed quandoque contingit servum in dominum beneficum esse. Ergo non omni benefactori debetur gratiarum actio. | Objection 4: Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for all that he is belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to his master. Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor. |
| Praeterea, nullus tenetur ad id quod facere non potest honeste et utiliter. Sed quandoque contingit quod ille qui beneficium tribuit est in statu magnae felicitatis, cui inutiliter aliquid recompensaretur pro suscepto beneficio. Quandoque etiam contingit quod benefactor mutatur de virtute in vitium, et sic videtur quod ei honeste recompensari non potest. Quandoque etiam ille qui accipit beneficium pauper est, et omnino recompensare non potest. Ergo videtur quod non semper teneatur homo ad gratiarum recompensationem. | Objection 5: Further, no one is bound to do what he cannot do equitably and advantageously. Now it happens at times that the benefactor is very well off, and it would be of no advantage to him to be repaid for a favor he has bestowed. Again it happens sometimes that the benefactor from being virtuous has become wicked, so that it would not seem equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a favor may be a poor man, and is quite unable to repay. Therefore seemingly a man is not always bound to repayment for favors received. |
| Praeterea, nullus debet pro alio facere quod ei non expedit, sed est ei nocivum. Sed quandoque contingit quod recompensatio beneficii est nociva vel inutilis ei cui recompensatur. Ergo non semper est beneficium recompensandum per gratiarum actionem. | Objection 6: Further, no one is bound to do for another what is inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it happens that repayment of a favor would be hurtful or useless to the person repaid. Therefore favors are not always to be repaid by gratitude. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Thess. ult., in omnibus gratias agite. |
On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 5:18): "In all things give thanks." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod omnis effectus naturaliter ad suam causam convertitur. Unde Dionysius dicit, I cap. de Div. Nom., quod Deus omnia in se convertit, tanquam omnium causa, semper enim oportet quod effectus ordinetur ad finem agentis. Manifestum est autem quod benefactor, inquantum huiusmodi, est causa beneficiati. Et ideo naturalis ordo requirit ut ille qui suscipit beneficium, per gratiarum recompensationem convertatur ad benefactorem, secundum modum utriusque. Et sicut de patre supra dictum est, benefactori quidem, inquantum huiusmodi, debetur honor et reverentia, eo quod habet rationem principii, sed per accidens debetur ei subventio vel sustentatio, si indigeat. |
I answer that, Every effect turns naturally to its cause; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "God turns all things to Himself because He is the cause of all": for the effect must needs always be directed to the end of the agent. Now it is evident that a benefactor, as such, is cause of the beneficiary. Hence the natural order requires that he who has received a favor should, by repaying the favor, turn to his benefactor according to the mode of each. And, as stated above with regard to a father (Question [31], Article [3]; Question [101], Article [2]), a man owes his benefactor, as such, honor and reverence, since the latter stands to him in the relation of principle; but accidentally he owes him assistance or support, if he need it. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Seneca dicit, in V de Benefic., sicut non est liberalis qui sibi donat, nec clemens qui sibi ignoscit, nec misericors qui malis suis tangitur, sed qui aliis, ita etiam nemo sibi ipsi beneficium dat, sed naturae suae paret, quae movet ad refutanda nociva et ad appetenda proficua. Unde in his quae sunt ad seipsum non habet locum gratitudo et ingratitudo, non enim potest homo sibi aliquid denegare nisi sibi retinendo. Metaphorice tamen illa quae ad alterum proprie dicuntur, accipiuntur in his quae sunt ad seipsum, sicut de iustitia philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., inquantum scilicet accipiuntur diversae partes hominis sicut diversae personae. | Reply to Objection 1: In the words of Seneca (1 Benef. v), "just as a man is liberal who gives not to himself but to others, and gracious who forgives not himself but others, and merciful who is moved, not by his own misfortunes but by another's, so too, no man confers a favor on himself, he is but following the bent of his nature, which moves him to resist what hurts him, and to seek what is profitable." Wherefore in things that one does for oneself, there is no place for gratitude or ingratitude, since a man cannot deny himself a thing except by keeping it. Nevertheless things which are properly spoken of in relation to others are spoken of metaphorically in relation to oneself, as the Philosopher states regarding justice (Ethic. v, 11), in so far, to wit, as the various parts of man are considered as though they were various persons. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod boni animi est ut magis attendat ad bonum quam ad malum. Et ideo si aliquis beneficium dedit non eo modo quo debuit, non omnino debet recipiens a gratiarum actione cessare. Minus tamen quam si modo debito praestitisset, quia etiam beneficium minus est, quia, ut Seneca dicit, in II de Benefic., multum celeritas fecit, multum abstulit mora. | Reply to Objection 2: It is the mark of a happy disposition to see good rather than evil. Wherefore if someone has conferred a favor, not as he ought to have conferred it, the recipient should not for that reason withhold his thanks. Yet he owes less thanks, than if the favor had been conferred duly, since in fact the favor is less, for, as Seneca remarks (De Benef. ii.) "promptness enhances, delay discounts a favor." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Seneca dicit, in VI de Benefic., multum interest utrum aliquis beneficium nobis det sua causa, an sua et nostra. Ille qui totus ad se spectat, et nobis prodest quia aliter sibi prodesse non potest, eo mihi loco habendus videtur quo qui pecori suo pabulum prospicit. Si me in consortium admisit, si duos cogitavit, ingratus sum et iniustus nisi gaudeo hoc illi profuisse quod proderat mihi. Summae malignitatis est non vocare beneficium nisi quod dantem aliquo incommodo afficit. | Reply to Objection 3: As Seneca observes (De Benef. vi), "it matters much whether a person does a kindness to us for his own sake, or for ours, or for both his and ours. He that considers himself only, and benefits because cannot otherwise benefit himself, seems to me like a man who seeks fodder for his cattle." And farther on: "If he has done it for me in common with himself, having both of us in his mind, I am ungrateful and not merely unjust, unless I rejoice that what was profitable to him is profitable to me also. It is the height of malevolence to refuse to recognize a kindness, unless the giver has been the loser thereby." |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Seneca dicit, in III de Benefic., quandiu servus praestat quod a servo exigi solet, ministerium est, ubi plus quam a servo necesse, beneficium est. Ubi enim in affectum amici transit, incipit vocari beneficium. Et ideo etiam servis ultra debitum facientibus gratiae sunt habendae. | Reply to Objection 4: As Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when a slave does what is wont to be demanded of a slave, it is part of his service: when he does more than a slave is bound to do, it is a favor: for as soon as he does anything from a motive of friendship, if indeed that be his motive, it is no longer called service." Wherefore gratitude is due even to a slave, when he does more than his duty. |
| Ad quintum dicendum quod etiam pauper ingratus non est si faciat quod possit, sicut enim beneficium magis in affectu consistit quam in effectu, ita etiam et recompensatio magis in affectu consistit. Unde Seneca dicit, in II de Benefic., qui grate beneficium accipit, primam eius pensionem solvit. Quam grate autem ad nos beneficia pervenerint, indicemus effusis affectibus, quod non ipso tantum audiente, sed ubique testemur. Et ex hoc patet quod quantumcumque in felicitate existenti potest recompensatio beneficii fieri per exhibitionem reverentiae et honoris. Unde philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod superexcellenti quidem debet fieri honoris retributio, indigenti autem retributio lucri. Et Seneca dicit, in VI de Benefic., multa sunt per quae quidquid debemus reddere et felicibus possumus, fidele consilium, assidua conversatio, sermo communis et sine adulatione iucundus. Et ideo non oportet ut homo optet indigentiam eius seu miseriam qui beneficium dedit, ad hoc quod beneficium recompensetur. Quia, ut Seneca dicit, in VI de Benefic., si hoc ei optares cuius nullum beneficium haberes, inhumanum erat votum. Quanto inhumanius ei optas cui beneficium debes. | Reply to Objection 5: A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if he does what he can. For since kindness depends on the heart rather than on the deed, so too gratitude depends chiefly the heart. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Who receives a favor gratefully, has already begun to pay it back: and that we are grateful for favors received should be shown by the outpourings of the heart, not only in his hearing but everywhere." From this it is evident that however well off a man may be, it is possible to thank him for his kindness by showing him reverence and honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14): "He that abounds should be repaid with honor, he that is in want should be repaid with money": and Seneca writes (De Benef. vi): "There are many ways of repaying those who are well off, whatever we happen to owe them; such as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable and pleasant conversation without flattery." Therefore there is no need for a man to desire neediness or distress in his benefactor before repaying his kindness, because, as Seneca says (De Benef. vi), "it were inhuman to desire this in one from whom you have received no favor; how much more so to desire it in one whose kindness has made you his debtor!" |
| Si autem ille qui beneficium dedit in peius mutatus est, debet tamen sibi fieri recompensatio secundum statum ipsius, ut scilicet ad virtutem reducatur, si sit possibile. Si autem sit insanabilis propter malitiam, tunc alter est effectus quam prius erat, et ideo non debetur ei recompensatio beneficii sicut prius. Et tamen, quantum fieri potest salva honestate, memoria debet haberi praestiti beneficii. Ut patet per philosophum, in IX Ethic. | If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, nevertheless he should be repaid according to his state, that he may return to virtue if possible. But if he be so wicked as to be incurable, then his heart has changed, and consequently no repayment is due for his kindness, as heretofore. And yet, as far as it possible without sin, the kindness he has shown should be held in memory, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3). |
| Ad sextum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, recompensatio beneficii praecipue pendet ex affectu. Et ideo eo modo debet recompensatio fieri quo magis sit utilis, si tamen postea, per eius incuriam, in damnum ipsius vertatur, non imputatur recompensanti. Unde Seneca dicit, in VII de Benefic., reddendum mihi est, non servandum, cum reddidero, ac tuendum. | Reply to Objection 6: As stated in the preceding reply, repayment of a favor depends chiefly on the affection of the heart: wherefore repayment should be made in such a way as to prove most beneficial. If, however, through the benefactor's carelessness it prove detrimental to him, this is not imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca observes (De Benef. vii): "It is my duty to repay, and not to keep back and safeguard my repayment." |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo debeat statim beneficium recompensare. Illa enim quae debemus sine certo termino, tenemur restituere ad statim. Sed non est aliquis terminus praescriptus recompensationi beneficiorum, quae tamen cadit sub debito, ut dictum est. Ergo tenetur homo statim beneficium recompensare. |
Objection 1: It seems that a man is bound to repay a favor at once. For we are bound to restore at once what we owe, unless the term be fixed. Now there is no term prescribed for the repayment of favors, and yet this repayment is a duty, as stated above (Article [3]). Therefore a man is bound to repay a favor at once. |
| Praeterea, quanto aliquod bonum fit ex maiori animi fervore, tanto videtur esse laudabilius. Sed ex fervore animi videtur procedere quod homo nullas moras adhibeat in faciendo quod debet. Ergo videtur esse laudabilius quod homo statim beneficium reddat. | Objection 2: Further, a good action would seem to be all the more praiseworthy according as it is done with greater earnestness. Now earnestness seems to make a man do his duty without any delay. Therefore it is apparently more praiseworthy to repay a favor at once. |
| Praeterea, Seneca dicit, in II de Benefic., quod proprium benefactoris est libenter et cito facere. Sed recompensatio debet beneficium adaequare. Ergo debet statim recompensare. | Objection 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii) that "it is proper to a benefactor to act freely and quickly." Now repayment ought to equal the favor received. Therefore it should be done at once. |
| Sed contra est quod Seneca dicit, in IV de Benefic., qui festinat reddere, non animum habet grati hominis, sed debitoris. | On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. iv): "He that hastens to repay, is animated with a sense, not of gratitude but of indebtedness." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod sicut in beneficio dando duo considerantur, scilicet affectus et donum; ita etiam haec duo considerantur in recompensatione beneficii. Et quantum quidem ad affectum, statim recompensatio fieri debet. Unde Seneca dicit, in II de Benefic., vis reddere beneficium? Benigne accipe. Quantum autem ad donum, debet expectari tempus quo recompensatio sit benefactori opportuna. Si autem, non convenienti tempore, statim velit aliquis munus pro munere reddere, non videtur esse virtuosa recompensatio. Ut enim Seneca dicit, IV de Benefic., qui nimis cito cupit solvere, invitus debet, et qui invitus debet, ingratus est. | I answer that, Just as in conferring a favor two things are to be considered, namely, the affection of the heart and the gift, so also must these things be considered in repaying the favor. As regards the affection of the heart, repayment should be made at once, wherefore Seneca says (De Benef. ii): "Do you wish to repay a favor? Receive it graciously." As regards the gift, one ought to wait until such a time as will be convenient to the benefactor. In fact, if instead of choosing a convenient time, one wished to repay at once, favor for favor, it would not seem to be a virtuous, but a constrained repayment. For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iv), "he that wishes to repay too soon, is an unwilling debtor, and an unwilling debtor is ungrateful." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod debitum legale est statim solvendum, alioquin non esset conservata iustitiae aequalitas, si unus retineret rem alterius absque eius voluntate. Sed debitum morale dependet ex honestate debentis. Et ideo debet reddi debito tempore, secundum quod exigit rectitudo virtutis | Reply to Objection 1: A legal debt must be paid at once, else the equality of justice would not be preserved, if one kept another's property without his consent. But a moral debt depends on the equity of the debtor: and therefore it should be repaid in due time according as the rectitude of virtue demands. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod fervor voluntatis non est virtuosus nisi sit ratione ordinatus. Et ideo si aliquis ex fervore animi praeoccupet debitum tempus, non erit laudandum. | Reply to Objection 2: Earnestness of the will is not virtuous unless it be regulated by reason; wherefore it is not praiseworthy to forestall the proper time through earnestness. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod beneficia etiam sunt opportuno tempore danda. Et tunc non est amplius tardandum cum opportunum tempus advenerit. Et idem etiam observari oportet in beneficiorum recompensatione. | Reply to Objection 3: Favors also should be conferred at a convenient time and one should no longer delay when the convenient time comes; and the same is to be observed in repaying favors. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beneficiorum recompensatio non sit attendenda secundum affectum beneficiantis, sed secundum effectum. Recompensatio enim beneficiis debetur. Sed beneficium in effectu consistit, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Ergo recompensatio debet attendi secundum effectum. | Objection 1: It seems that in repaying favors we should not look at the benefactor's disposition but at the deed. For repayment is due to beneficence, and beneficence consists in deeds, as the word itself denotes. Therefore in repaying favors we should look at the deed. |
| Praeterea, gratia, quae beneficia recompensat, est pars iustitiae. Sed iustitia respicit aequalitatem dati et accepti. Ergo et in gratiarum recompensatione attendendus est magis effectus quam affectus beneficiantis. | Objection 2: Further, thanksgiving, whereby we repay favors, is a part of justice. But justice considers equality between giving and taking. Therefore also in repaying favors we should consider the deed rather than the disposition of the benefactor. |
| Praeterea, nullus potest attendere ad id quod ignorat. Sed solus Deus recognoscit interiorem affectum. Ergo non potest fieri gratiae recompensatio secundum affectum. | Objection 3: Further, no one can consider what he does not know. Now God alone knows the interior disposition. Therefore it is impossible to repay a favor according to the benefactor's disposition. |
| Sed contra est quod Seneca dicit, in I de beneficiis, nonnunquam magis nos obligat qui dedit parva magnifice; qui exiguum tribuit, sed libenter. | On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. i): "We are sometimes under a greater obligation to one who has given little with a large heart, and has bestowed a small favor, yet willingly." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod recompensatio beneficii potest ad tres virtutes pertinere, scilicet ad iustitiam, ad gratiam, et ad amicitiam. Ad iustitiam quidem pertinet quando recompensatio habet rationem debiti legalis, sicut in mutuo et in aliis huiusmodi. Et in tali recompensatio debet attendi secundum quantitatem dati. | I answer that, The repayment of a favor may belong to three virtues, namely, justice, gratitude and friendship. It belongs to justice when the repayment has the character of a legal debt, as in a loan and the like: and in such cases repayment must be made according to the quantity received. |
| Ad amicitiam autem pertinet recompensatio beneficii, et similiter ad virtutem gratiae, secundum quod habet rationem debiti moralis, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam in recompensatione amicitiae oportet respectum haberi ad amicitiae causam. Unde in amicitia utilis debet recompensatio fieri secundum utilitatem quam quis est ex beneficio consecutus. In amicitia autem honesti debet in recompensatione haberi respectus ad electionem, sive ad affectum dantis, quia hoc praecipue requiritur ad virtutem, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Et similiter, quia gratia respicit beneficium secundum quod est gratis impensum, quod quidem pertinet ad affectum; ideo etiam gratiae recompensatio attendit magis affectum dantis quam effectum. | On the other hand, repayment of a favor belongs, though in different ways, to friendship and likewise to the virtue of gratitude when it has the character of a moral debt. For in the repayment of friendship we have to consider the cause of friendship; so that in the friendship that is based on the useful, repayment should be made according to the usefulness accruing from the favor conferred, and in the friendship based on virtue repayment should be made with regard for the choice or disposition of the giver, since this is the chief requisite of virtue, as stated in Ethic. viii, 13. And likewise, since gratitude regards the favor inasmuch as it is bestowed gratis, and this regards the disposition of the giver, it follows again that repayment of a favor depends more on the disposition of the giver than on the effect. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnis actus moralis ex voluntate dependet. Unde beneficium, secundum quod est laudabile, prout ei gratiae recompensatio debetur, materialiter quidem consistit in effectu, sed formaliter et principaliter in voluntate. Unde Seneca dicit, in I de Benefic., beneficium non in eo quod fit aut datur consistit, sed in ipso dantis aut facientis animo. | Reply to Objection 1: Every moral act depends on the will. Hence a kindly action, in so far as it is praiseworthy and is deserving of gratitude, consists materially in the thing done, but formally and chiefly in the will. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. i): "A kindly action consists not in deed or gift, but in the disposition of the giver or doer." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod gratia est pars iustitiae, non quidem sicut species generis, sed per quandam reductionem ad genus iustitiae, ut supra dictum est. Unde non oportet quod eadem ratio debiti attendatur in utraque virtute. |
Reply to Objection 2: Gratitude is a part of justice, not indeed as a species is part of a genus, but by a kind of reduction to the genus of justice, as stated above (Question [80]). Hence it does not follow that we shall find the same kind of debt in both virtues. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod affectum hominis per se quidem solus Deus videt, sed secundum quod per aliqua signa manifestatur, potest etiam ipsum homo cognoscere. Et hoc modo affectus beneficiantis cognoscitur ex ipso modo quo beneficium tribuitur, puta quia gaudenter et prompte aliquis beneficium impendit. | Reply to Objection 3: God alone sees man's disposition in itself: but in so far as it is shown by certain signs, man also can know it. It is thus that a benefactor's disposition is known by the way in which he does the kindly action, for instance through his doing it joyfully and readily. |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non oporteat aliquem plus exhibere in recompensatione quam susceperit in beneficio. Quibusdam enim, sicut parentibus, nec etiam aequalis recompensatio fieri potest, sicut philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic. Sed virtus non conatur ad impossibile. Non ergo gratiae recompensatio tendit ad aliquid maius. | Objection 1: It seems that there is no need for the repayment of gratitude to surpass the favor received. For it is not possible to make even equal repayment to some, for instance, one's parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Now virtue does not attempt the impossible. Therefore gratitude for a favor does not tend to something yet greater. |
| Praeterea, si aliquis plus recompensat quam in beneficio acceperit, ex hoc ipso quasi aliquid de novo dat. Sed ad beneficium de novo datum tenetur homo gratiam recompensare. Ergo ille qui primo beneficium dederat tenebitur aliquid maius recompensare, et sic procederet in infinitum. Sed virtus non conatur ad infinitum, quia infinitum aufert naturam boni, ut dicitur in II Metaphys. Ergo gratiae recompensatio non debet excedere acceptum beneficium. | Objection 2: Further, if one person repays another more than he has received by his favor, by that very fact he gives him something his turn, as it were. But the latter owes him repayment for the favor which in his turn the former has conferred on him. Therefore he that first conferred a favor will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and so on indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite, since "the indefinite removes the nature of good" (Metaph. ii, text. 8). Therefore repayment of gratitude should not surpass the favor received. |
| Praeterea, iustitia in aequalitate consistit. Sed maius est quidam aequalitatis excessus. Cum ergo in qualibet virtute excessus sit vitiosus, videtur quod recompensare aliquid maius accepto beneficio sit vitiosum, et iustitiae oppositum. | Objection 3: Further, justice consists in equality. But "more" is excess of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every virtue, it seems that to repay more than the favor received is sinful and opposed to justice. |
| Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., refamulari oportet ei qui gratiam fecit, et rursum ipsum incipere. Quod quidem fit dum aliquid maius retribuitur. Ergo recompensatio debet tendere ad hoc quod aliquid maius faciat. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5): "We should repay those who are gracious to us, by being gracious to them return," and this is done by repaying more than we have received. Therefore gratitude should incline to do something greater. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, recompensatio gratiae respicit beneficium secundum voluntatem beneficiantis. In quo quidem praecipue hoc commendabile videtur quod gratis beneficium contulit ad quod non tenebatur. Et ideo qui beneficium accepit ad hoc obligatur, ex debito honestatis, ut similiter gratis aliquid impendat. Non autem videtur gratis aliquid impendere nisi excedat quantitatem accepti beneficii, quia quandiu recompensat minus vel aequale, non videtur facere gratis, sed reddere quod accepit. Et ideo gratiae recompensatio semper tendit ut, pro suo posse, aliquid maius retribuat. |
I answer that, As stated above (Article [5]), gratitude regards the favor received according the intention of the benefactor; who seems be deserving of praise, chiefly for having conferred the favor gratis without being bound to do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is under a moral obligation to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not seem to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity of the favor received: because so long as he repays less or an equivalent, he would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return what he has received. Therefore gratitude always inclines, as far as possible, to pay back something more. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, in recompensatione beneficii magis est considerandus affectus benefici quam effectus. Si ergo consideremus effectum beneficii quod filius a parentibus accepit, scilicet esse et vivere, nihil aequale filius recompensare potest, ut philosophus dicit. Si autem attendamus ad ipsam voluntatem dantis et retribuentis, sic potest filius aliquid maius patri retribuere, ut Seneca dicit, in III de Benefic. Si tamen non posset, sufficeret ad gratitudinem recompensandi voluntas. |
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Article [3], ad 5; Article [5]), in repaying favors we must consider the disposition rather than the deed. Accordingly, if we consider the effect of beneficence, which a son receives from his parents namely, to be and to live, the son cannot make an equal repayment, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). But if we consider the will of the giver and of the repayer, then it is possible for the son to pay back something greater to his father, as Seneca declares (De Benef. iii). If, however, he were unable to do so, the will to pay back would be sufficient for gratitude. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod debitum gratitudinis ex caritate derivatur, quae, quanto plus solvitur, tanto magis debetur, secundum illud Rom. XIII, nemini quidquam debeatis, nisi ut invicem diligatis. Et ideo non est inconveniens si obligatio gratitudinis interminabilis sit. | Reply to Objection 2: The debt of gratitude flows from charity, which the more it is paid the more it is due, according to Rm. 13:8, "Owe no man anything, but to love one another." Wherefore it is not unreasonable if the obligation of gratitude has no limit. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut in iustitia quae est virtus cardinalis, attenditur aequalitas rerum, ita in gratitudine attenditur aequalitas voluntatum, ut scilicet sicut ex promptitudine voluntatis beneficus aliquid exhibuit ad quod non tenebatur, ita etiam ille qui suscepit beneficium aliquid supra debitum recompenset. | Reply to Objection 3: As in injustice, which is a cardinal virtue, we consider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider equality of wills. For while on the one hand the benefactor of his own free-will gave something he was not bound to give, so on the other hand the beneficiary repays something over and above what he has received. |