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[*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum.]
| Deinde considerandum est de honestate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | We must now consider honesty, under which head there are four points of inquiry: |
| Primo, quomodo honestum se habeat ad virtutem. | (1) The relation between the honest and the virtuous; |
| Secundo, quomodo se habeat ad decorem. |
(2) Its relation with the beautiful [*As honesty here denotes moral goodness, so beauty stands for moral beauty]; |
| Tertio, quomodo se habeat ad utile et delectabile. | (3) Its relation with the useful and the pleasant; |
| Quarto, utrum honestas sit pars temperantiae. | (4) Whether honesty is a part of temperance? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod honestum non sit idem virtuti. Dicit enim Tullius, in sua rhetorica honestum esse quod propter se petitur. Virtus autem non petitur propter seipsam, sed propter felicitatem, dicit enim philosophus, in I Ethic., quod felicitas est praemium virtutis et finis. Ergo honestum non est idem virtuti. | Objection 1: It would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) that "the honest is what is desired for its own sake." Now virtue is desired, not for its own sake, but for the sake of happiness, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that "happiness is the reward and the end of virtue." Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue. |
| Praeterea, secundum Isidorum, honestas dicitur quasi honoris status. Sed multis aliis debetur honor quam virtuti, nam virtuti proprie debetur laus, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo honestas non est idem virtuti. | Objection 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x) "honesty means an honorable state." Now honor is due to many things besides virtue, since "it is praise that is the proper due of virtue" (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue. |
| Praeterea, principale virtutis consistit in interiori electione, ut philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic. Honestas autem magis videtur ad exteriorem conversationem pertinere, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIV, omnia honeste et secundum ordinem fiant in vobis. Ergo honestas non est idem virtuti. | Objection 3: Further, the "principal part of virtue is the interior choice," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 13). But honesty seems to pertain rather to exterior conduct, according to 1 Cor. 14:40, "Let all things be done decently [honeste] and according to order" among you. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue. |
| Praeterea, honestas videtur consistere in exterioribus divitiis, secundum illud Eccli. XI, bona et mala, vita et mors, utraque a Deo sunt. Sed in exterioribus divitiis non consistit virtus. Ergo honestas non est idem virtuti. | Objection 4: Further, honesty apparently consists in external wealth. According to Ecclus. 11:14, "good things and evil, life and death [poverty and riches] are from God" [*The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition. For riches the Vulgate has 'honestas']. But virtue does not consist in external wealth. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue. |
| Sed contra est quod Tullius, in I de Offic. et in II Rhet., dividit honestum in quatuor virtutes principales, in quas etiam dividitur virtus. Ergo honestum est idem virtuti. | On the contrary, Tully (De Offic. i, 5; Rhet. ii, 53) divides honesty into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also divided. Therefore honesty is the same as virtue. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Isidorus dicit, honestas dicitur quasi honoris status. Unde ex hoc videtur aliquid dici honestum, quod est honore dignum. Honor autem, ut supra dictum est, excellentiae debetur. Excellentia autem hominis maxime consideratur secundum virtutem, quia est dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Et ideo honestum, proprie loquendo, in idem refertur cum virtute. |
I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) "honesty means an honorable state," wherefore a thing may be said to be honest through being worthy of honor. Now honor, as stated above (Question [144], Article [2], ad 2), is due to excellence: and the excellence of a man is gauged chiefly according to his virtue, as stated in Phys. vii, 17. Therefore, properly speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as virtue. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., eorum quae propter se appetuntur, quaedam appetuntur solum propter se, et nunquam propter aliud, sicut felicitas, quae est ultimus finis. Quaedam vero appetuntur et propter se, inquantum habent in seipsis aliquam rationem bonitatis, etiam si nihil aliud boni per ea nobis accideret, et tamen sunt appetibilia propter aliud, inquantum scilicet perducunt nos in aliquod bonum perfectius. Et hoc modo virtutes sunt propter se appetendae. Unde Tullius dicit, in II Rhet., quod quiddam est quod sua vi nos allicit, et sua dignitate trahit, ut virtus, veritas, scientia. Et hoc sufficit ad rationem honesti. | Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), of those things that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for their own sake alone, and never for the sake of something else, such as happiness which is the last end; while some are desired, not only for their own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in themselves, even if no further good accrued to us through them, but also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are conducive to some more perfect good. It is thus that the virtues are desirable for their own sake: wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52) that "some things allure us by their own force, and attract us by their own worth, such as virtue, truth, knowledge." And this suffices to give a thing the character of honest. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod eorum quae honorantur praeter virtutem, aliquid est virtute excellentius, scilicet Deus et beatitudo. Et huiusmodi non sunt ita nobis per experientiam nota sicut virtutes, secundum quas quotidie operamur. Et ideo virtus magis sibi vindicat nomen honesti. Alia vero, quae sunt infra virtutem, honorantur inquantum coadiuvant ad operationem virtutis, sicut nobilitas, potentia et divitiae. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., huiusmodi honorantur a quibusdam, sed secundum veritatem, solus bonus est honorandus. Bonus autem est aliquis secundum virtutem. Et ideo virtuti quidem debetur laus, secundum quod est appetibilis propter aliud, honor autem, prout est appetibilis propter seipsam. Et secundum hoc habet rationem honesti. | Reply to Objection 2: Some of the things which are honored besides virtue are more excellent than virtue, namely God and happiness, and such like things are not so well known to us by experience as virtue which we practice day by day. Hence virtue has a greater claim to the name of honesty. Other things which are beneath virtue are honored, in so far as they are a help to the practice of virtue, such as rank, power, and riches [*Ethic. i, 8]. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that these things "are honored by some people, but in truth it is only the good man who is worthy of honor." Now a man is good in respect of virtue. Wherefore praise is due to virtue in so far as the latter is desirable for the sake of something else, while honor is due to virtue for its own sake: and it is thus that virtue has the character of honesty. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, honestum importat debitum honoris. Honor autem est contestatio quaedam de excellentia alicuius, ut supra dictum est. Testimonium autem non profertur nisi de rebus notis. Interior autem electio non innotescit homini nisi per exteriores actus. Et ideo exterior conversatio habet rationem honesti secundum quod est demonstrativa interioris rectitudinis. Et propter hoc, radicaliter honestas consistit in interiori electione, significative autem in exteriori conversatione. |
Reply to Objection 3: As we have stated honest denotes that to which honor is due. Now honor is an attestation to someone's excellence, as stated above (Question [103], Articles [1],2). But one attests only to what one knows; and the internal choice is not made known save by external actions. Wherefore external conduct has the character of honesty, in so far as it reflects internal rectitude. For this reason honesty consists radically in the internal choice, but its expression lies in the external conduct. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod quia secundum vulgarem opinionem excellentia divitiarum facit hominem dignum honore, inde est quod quandoque nomen honestatis ad exteriorem prosperitatem transfertur. | Reply to Objection 4: It is because the excellence of wealth is commonly regarded as making a man deserving of honor, that sometimes the name of honesty is given to external prosperity. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod honestum non sit idem quod decorum. Ratio enim honesti sumitur ex appetitu, nam honestum est quod per se appetitur. Sed decorum magis respicit aspectum, cui placet. Ergo decorum non est idem quod honestum. | Objection 1: It would seem that the honest is not the same as the beautiful. For the aspect of honest is derived from the appetite, since the honest is "what is desirable for its own sake" [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. But the beautiful regards rather the faculty of vision to which it is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful is not the same as the honest. |
| Praeterea, decor quandam claritatem requirit, quae pertinet ad rationem gloriae. Honestum autem respicit honorem. Cum igitur honor et gloria differant, ut supra dictum est, videtur quod etiam honestum differat a decoro. |
Objection 2: Further, beauty requires a certain clarity, which is characteristic of glory: whereas the honest regards honor. Since then honor and glory differ, as stated above (Question [103], Article [1], ad 3), it seems also that the honest and the beautiful differ. |
| Praeterea, honestum est idem virtuti, ut supra dictum est. Sed aliquis decor contrariatur virtuti, unde dicitur Ezech. XVI, habens fiduciam in pulchritudine tua, fornicata es in nomine tuo. Ergo honestum non est idem decoro. |
Objection 3: Further, honesty is the same as virtue, as stated above (Article [1]). But a certain beauty is contrary to virtue, wherefore it is written (Ezech. 16:15): "Trusting in thy beauty thou playest the harlot because of thy renown." Therefore the honest is not the same as the beautiful. |
| Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XII, quae inhonesta sunt nostra, abundantiorem honestatem habent, honesta autem nostra nullius egent. Vocat autem ibi inhonesta, membra turpia; honesta autem, membra pulchra. Ergo honestum et decorum idem esse videntur. |
On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:23,24): "Those that are our uncomely [inhonesta] parts, have more abundant comeliness [honestatem], but our comely [honesta] parts have no need." Now by uncomely parts he means the baser members, and by comely parts the beautiful members. Therefore the honest and the beautiful are apparently the same. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut accipi potest ex verbis Dionysii, IV cap. de Div. Nom., ad rationem pulchri, sive decori, concurrit et claritas et debita proportio, dicit enim quod Deus dicitur pulcher sicut universorum consonantiae et claritatis causa. Unde pulchritudo corporis in hoc consistit quod homo habeat membra corporis bene proportionata, cum quadam debiti coloris claritate. Et similiter pulchritudo spiritualis in hoc consistit quod conversatio hominis, sive actio eius, sit bene proportionata secundum spiritualem rationis claritatem. Hoc autem pertinet ad rationem honesti, quod diximus idem esse virtuti, quae secundum rationem moderatur omnes res humanas. Et ideo honestum est idem spirituali decori. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro octogintatrium quaest., honestatem voco intelligibilem pulchritudinem, quam spiritualem nos proprie dicimus. Et postea subdit quod sunt multa pulchra visibilia, quae minus proprie honesta appellantur. |
I answer that, As may be gathered from the words of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of clarity and due proportion. For he states that God is said to be beautiful, as being "the cause of the harmony and clarity of the universe." Hence the beauty of the body consists in a man having his bodily limbs well proportioned, together with a certain clarity of color. In like manner spiritual beauty consists in a man's conduct or actions being well proportioned in respect of the spiritual clarity of reason. Now this is what is meant by honesty, which we have stated (Article [1]) to be the same as virtue; and it is virtue that moderates according to reason all that is connected with man. Wherefore "honesty is the same as spiritual beauty." Hence Augustine says (Questions [83], qu. 30): "By honesty I mean intelligible beauty, which we properly designate as spiritual," and further on he adds that "many things are beautiful to the eye, which it would be hardly proper to call honest." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectum movens appetitum est bonum apprehensum. Quod autem in ipsa apprehensione apparet decorum, accipitur ut conveniens et bonum, et ideo dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod omnibus est pulchrum et bonum amabile. Unde et ipsum honestum, secundum quod habet spiritualem decorem, appetibile redditur. Unde et Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., formam ipsam, et tanquam faciem honesti vides, quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret sapientiae. | Reply to Objection 1: The object that moves the appetite is an apprehended good. Now if a thing is perceived to be beautiful as soon as it is apprehended, it is taken to be something becoming and good. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the beautiful and the good are beloved by all." Wherefore the honest, inasmuch as it implies spiritual beauty, is an object of desire, and for this reason Tully says (De Offic. i, 5): "Thou perceivest the form and the features, so to speak, of honesty; and were it to be seen with the eye, would, as Plato declares, arouse a wondrous love of wisdom." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, gloria est effectus honoris, ex hoc enim quod aliquis honoratur vel laudatur, redditur clarus in oculis aliorum. Et ideo, sicut idem est honorificum et gloriosum, ita etiam idem est honestum et decorum. |
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Question [103], Article [1], ad 3), glory is the effect of honor: because through being honored or praised, a person acquires clarity in the eyes of others. Wherefore, just as the same thing makes a man honorable and glorious, so is the same thing honest and beautiful. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de pulchritudine corporali. Quamvis possit dici quod etiam propter pulchritudinem spiritualem aliquis spiritualiter fornicatur, inquantum de ipsa honestate superbit, secundum illud Ezech. XXVIII, elevatum est cor tuum in decore tuo, perdidisti sapientiam tuam in decore tuo. | Reply to Objection 3: This argument applies to the beauty of the body: although it might be replied that to be proud of one's honesty is to play the harlot because of one's spiritual beauty, according to Ezech. 28:17, "Thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast lost thy wisdom in thy beauty." |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod honestum non differat ab utili et delectabili. Dicitur enim honestum quod propter se appetitur. Sed delectatio propter se appetitur, ridiculum enim videtur quaerere propter quid aliquis velit delectari, ut philosophus dicit, in X Ethic. Ergo honestum non differt a delectabili. | Objection 1: It would seem that the honest does not differ from the useful and the pleasant. For the honest is "what is desirable for its own sake" [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. Now pleasure is desired for its own sake, for "it seems ridiculous to ask a man why he wishes to be pleased," as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore the honest does not differ from the pleasant. |
| Praeterea, divitiae sub bono utili continentur, dicit enim Tullius, in II Rhet., est aliquid non propter suam vim et naturam, sed propter fructum et utilitatem petendum, quod pecunia est. Sed divitiae habent rationem honestatis, dicitur enim Eccli. XI, paupertas et honestas (idest divitiae) a Deo sunt; et XIII, pondus super se tollit qui honestiori (idest ditiori) se communicat. Ergo honestum non differt ab utili. | Objection 2: Further, riches are comprised under the head of useful good: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52): "There is a thing that attracts the desire not by any force of its own, nor by its very nature, but on account of its fruitfulness and utility": and "that is money." Now riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written (Ecclus. 11:14): "Poverty and riches [honestas] are from God," and (Ecclus. 13:2): "He shall take a burden upon him that hath fellowship with one more honorable," i.e. richer, "than himself." Therefore the honest differs not from the useful. |
| Praeterea, Tullius probat, in libro de Offic., quod nihil potest esse utile quod non sit honestum. Et hoc idem habetur per Ambrosium, in libro de Offic. Ergo utile non differt ab honesto. | Objection 3: Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3) that nothing can be useful unless it be honest: and Ambrose makes the same statement (De Offic. ii, 6). Therefore the useful differs not from the honest. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octogintatrium quaest., honestum dicitur quod propter seipsum petendum est, utile autem quod ad aliquid aliud referendum est. |
On the contrary, Augustine says (Question [83], qu. 30): "The honest is that which is desirable for its own sake: the useful implies reference to something else." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod honestum concurrit in idem subiectum cum utili et delectabili, a quibus tamen differt ratione. Dicitur enim aliquid honestum, sicut dictum est, inquantum habet quendam decorem ex ordinatione rationis. Hoc autem quod est secundum rationem ordinatum, est naturaliter conveniens homini. Unumquodque autem naturaliter delectatur in suo convenienti. Et ideo honestum est naturaliter homini delectabile, sicut de operatione virtutis philosophus probat, in I Ethic. Non tamen omne delectabile est honestum, quia potest etiam aliquid esse conveniens secundum sensum, non secundum rationem; sed hoc delectabile est praeter hominis rationem, quae perficit naturam ipsius. Ipsa etiam virtus, quae secundum se honesta est, refertur ad aliud sicut ad finem, scilicet ad felicitatem. Et secundum hoc, idem subiecto est et honestum et utile et delectabile, |
I answer that, The honest concurs in the same subject with the useful and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect. For, as stated above (Article [2]), a thing is said to be honest, in so far as it has a certain beauty through being regulated by reason. Now whatever is regulated in accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man. Again, it is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is becoming to it. Wherefore an honest thing is naturally pleasing to man: and the Philosopher proves this with regard to acts of virtue (Ethic. i, 8). Yet not all that is pleasing is honest, since a thing may be becoming according to the senses, but not according to reason. A pleasing thing of this kind is beside man's reason which perfects his nature. Even virtue itself, which is essentially honest, is referred to something else as its end namely happiness. Accordingly the honest the useful, and the pleasant concur in the one subject. |
| sed ratione differunt. Nam honestum dicitur secundum quod aliquid habet quandam excellentiam dignam honore propter spiritualem pulchritudinem; delectabile autem, inquantum quietat appetitum; utile autem, inquantum refertur ad aliud. In pluribus tamen est delectabile quam utile et honestum, quia omne utile et honestum est aliqualiter delectabile, sed non convertitur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. | Nevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said to be honest as having a certain excellence deserving of honor on account of its spiritual beauty: while it is said to be pleasing, as bringing rest to desire, and useful, as referred to something else. The pleasant, however, extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect, whereas the converse does not hold (Ethic. ii, 3). |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod honestum dicitur quod propter se appetitur appetitu rationali, qui tendit in id quod est conveniens rationi. Delectabile autem propter se appetitur appetitu sensitivo. | Reply to Objection 1: A thing is said to be honest, if it is desired for its own sake by the rational appetite. which tends to that which is in accordance with reason: while a thing is said to be pleasant if it is desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod divitiae vocantur nomine honestatis secundum opinionem multorum, qui divitias honorant, vel inquantum ordinantur organice ad actus virtutum, ut dictum est. |
Reply to Objection 2: Riches are denominated honesty according of the opinion of the many who honor wealth: or because they are intended to be the instruments of virtuous deeds, as stated above (Article [1], ad 2). |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod intentio Tullii et Ambrosii dicere est quod nihil potest esse simpliciter et vere utile quod repugnat honestati, quia oportet quod repugnet ultimo fini hominis, quod est bonum secundum rationem, quamvis forte possit esse utile secundum quid, respectu alicuius finis particularis. Non autem intendunt dicere quod omne utile, in se consideratum, pertingat ad rationem honesti. | Reply to Objection 3: Tully and Ambrose mean to say that nothing incompatible with honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it follows that it is contrary to man's last end, which is a good in accordance with reason; although it may perhaps be useful in some respect, with regard to a particular end. But they do not mean to say that every useful thing as such may be classed among those that are honest. |
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Article: 4 [ << | >> ]
| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod honestas non debeat poni pars temperantiae. Non enim est possibile quod idem, respectu eiusdem, sit pars et totum. Sed temperantia est pars honesti, ut Tullius dicit, in II Rhet. Ergo honestas non est pars temperantiae. | Objection 1: It would seem that honesty should not be reckoned a part of temperance. For it is not possible for a thing to be part and whole in respect of one same thing. Now "temperance is a part of honesty," according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). Therefore honesty is not a part of temperance. |
| Praeterea, III Esdrae dicitur quod vinum praecordia facit honesta. Sed usus vini, praecipue superfluus, de quo ibi loqui videtur, magis pertinet ad intemperantiam quam ad temperantiam. Ergo honestas non est pars temperantiae. | Objection 2: Further, it is stated (3 Esdra 3:21) that "wine... makes all thoughts honest." But the use of wine, especially in excess, in which sense the passage quoted should seemingly be taken, pertains to intemperance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not a part of temperance. |
| Praeterea, honestum dicitur quod est honore dignum. Sed iusti et fortes maxime honorantur, ut dicit philosophus, in I Rhet. Ergo honestas non pertinet ad temperantiam, sed magis ad iustitiam vel fortitudinem. Unde et Eleazarus dixit, ut dicitur II Machab. VI, fortiter pro gravissimis ac sanctissimis legibus honesta morte perfungor. | Objection 3: Further, the honest is that which is deserving of honor. Now "it is the just and the brave who receive most honor," according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 9). Therefore honesty pertains, not to temperance, but rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore Eleazar said as related in 2 Macc. 6:28: "I suffer an honorable [honesta] death, for the most venerable and most holy laws." |
| Sed contra est quod Macrobius honestatem ponit partem temperantiae. Ambrosius etiam, in I de Offic., temperantiae specialiter honestatem attribuit. | On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i] reckons honesty a part of temperance, and Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) ascribes honesty as pertaining especially to temperance. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, honestas est quaedam spiritualis pulchritudo. Pulchro autem opponitur turpe. Opposita autem maxime se invicem manifestant. Et ideo ad temperantiam specialiter honestas pertinere videtur, quae id quod est homini turpissimum et indecentissimum repellit, scilicet brutales voluptates. Unde et in ipso nomine temperantiae maxime intelligitur bonum rationis, cuius est moderari et temperare concupiscentias pravas. Sic igitur honestas, prout speciali quadam ratione temperantiae attribuitur, ponitur pars eius non quidem subiectiva, vel sicut virtus adiuncta, sed pars integralis ipsius, sicut quaedam eius conditio. |
I answer that, As stated above (Article [2]), honesty is a kind of spiritual beauty. Now the disgraceful is opposed to the beautiful: and opposites are most manifest of one another. Wherefore seemingly honesty belongs especially to temperance, since the latter repels that which is most disgraceful and unbecoming to man, namely animal lusts. Hence by its very name temperance is most significative of the good of reason to which it belongs to moderate and temper evil desires. Accordingly honesty, as being ascribed for a special reason to temperance, is reckoned as a part thereof, not as a subjective part, nor as an annexed virtue, but as an integral part or condition attaching thereto. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod temperantia ponitur pars subiectiva honesti prout sumitur in sua communitate. Sic autem non ponitur temperantiae pars. | Reply to Objection 1: Temperance is accounted a subjective part of honesty taken in a wide sense: it is not thus that the latter is reckoned a part of temperance. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod vinum in ebriis facit praecordia honesta secundum eorum reputationem, quia videtur eis quod sint magni et honorandi. | Reply to Objection 2: When a man is intoxicated, "the wine makes his thoughts honest" according to his own reckoning because he deems himself great and deserving of honor [*Cf. Question [148], Article [6]]. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod iustitiae et fortitudini debetur maior honor quam temperantiae propter maioris boni excellentiam. Sed temperantiae debetur maior honor propter cohibitionem vitiorum magis exprobrabilium, ut ex dictis patet. Et sic honestas magis attribuitur temperantiae, secundum regulam apostoli, I ad Cor. XII, quod inhonesta nostra maiorem habent honestatem, scilicet removentem quod inhonestum est. |
Reply to Objection 3: Greater honor is due to justice and fortitude than to temperance, because they excel in the point of a greater good: yet greater honor is due to temperance, because the vices which it holds in check are the most deserving of reproach, as stated above. Thus honesty is more to be ascribed to temperance according to the rule given by the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23) when he says that "our uncomely parts have more abundant comeliness," which, namely, destroys whatever is uncomely. |