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| Deinde considerandum est de incontinentia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | We must now consider incontinence: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum incontinentia pertineat ad animam, vel ad corpus. | (1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body? |
| Secundo, utrum incontinentia sit peccatum. | (2) Whether incontinence is a sin? |
| Tertio, de comparatione incontinentiae ad intemperantiam. | (3) The comparison between incontinence and intemperance; |
| Quarto, quis sit turpior, utrum incontinens irae, vel incontinens concupiscentiae. | (4) Which is the worse, incontinence in anger, or incontinence in desire? |
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Article: 1 [ << | >> ]
| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod incontinentia non pertineat ad animam, sed ad corpus. Diversitas enim sexuum non est ex parte animae, sed ex parte corporis. Sed diversitas sexuum facit diversitatem circa incontinentiam, dicit enim philosophus, in VII Ethic., quod mulieres non dicuntur neque continentes neque incontinentes. Ergo continentia non pertinet ad animam, sed ad corpus. | Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body. For sexual diversity comes not from the soul but from the body. Now sexual diversity causes diversity of incontinence: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that women are not described either as continent or as incontinent. Therefore incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body. |
| Praeterea, illud quod pertinet ad animam, non sequitur corporis complexiones. Sed incontinentia sequitur corporis complexionem, dicit enim philosophus, in VII Ethic., quod maxime acuti, idest cholerici, et melancholici secundum irrefrenatam concupiscentiam sunt incontinentes. Ergo incontinentia pertinet ad corpus. | Objection 2: Further, that which pertains to the soul does not result from the temperament of the body. But incontinence results from the bodily temperament: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is especially people of a quick or choleric and atrabilious temper whose incontinence is one of unbridled desire." Therefore incontinence regards the body. |
| Praeterea, victoria magis pertinet ad eum qui vincit quam ad eum qui vincitur. Sed ex hoc dicitur aliquis esse incontinens quod caro concupiscens adversus spiritum superat ipsum. Ergo incontinentia magis pertinet ad carnem quam ad animam. | Objection 3: Further, victory concerns the victor rather than the vanquished. Now a man is said to be incontinent, because "the flesh lusteth against the spirit," and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence pertains to the flesh rather than to the soul. |
| Sed contra est quod homo differt a bestiis principaliter secundum animam. Differt autem secundum rationem continentiae et incontinentiae, bestias autem dicimus neque continentes neque incontinentes, ut patet per philosophum, in VII Ethic. Ergo incontinentia maxime est ex parte animae. | On the contrary, Man differs from beast chiefly as regards the soul. Now they differ in respect of continence and incontinence, for we ascribe neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly on the part of the soul. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque attribuitur magis ei quod est causa per se quam ei quod solam occasionem praestat. Id autem quod est ex parte corporis, solum occasionem incontinentiae praestat. Ex dispositione enim corporis potest contingere quod insurgant passiones vehementes in appetitu sensitivo, qui est virtus corporei organi, sed huiusmodi passiones, quantumcumque vehementes, non sunt sufficiens causa incontinentiae sed occasio sola; eo quod, durante usu rationis, semper homo potest passionibus resistere. Si vero passiones adeo increscant quod totaliter auferant usum rationis, sicut accidit in his qui propter vehementiam passionum amentiam incurrunt, non remanebit ratio continentiae neque incontinentiae, quia non salvatur in eis iudicium rationis, quod continens servat et incontinens deserit. Et sic relinquitur quod per se causa incontinentiae sit ex parte animae, quae ratione passioni non resistit. Quod quidem fit duobus modis, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic. Uno modo, quando anima passionibus cedit antequam ratio consilietur, quae quidem vocatur irrefrenata incontinentia, vel praevolatio. Alio modo, quando non permanet homo in his quae consiliata sunt, eo quod debiliter est firmatus in eo quod ratio iudicavit, unde et haec incontinentia vocatur debilitas. Et sic patet quod incontinentia principaliter ad animam pertinet. | I answer that, Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather than to those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the part of the body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since it is owing to a bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise in the sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body. Yet these passions, however vehement they be, are not the sufficient cause of incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so long as the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his passions. If, however, the passions gain such strength as to take away the use of reason altogether—as in the case of those who become insane through the vehemence of their passions—the essential conditions of continence or incontinence cease, because such people do not retain the judgment of reason, which the continent man follows and the incontinent forsakes. From this it follows that the direct cause of incontinence is on the part of the soul, which fails to resist a passion by the reason. This happens in two ways, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7): first, when the soul yields to the passions, before the reason has given its counsel; and this is called "unbridled incontinence" or "impetuosity": secondly, when a man does not stand to what has been counselled, through holding weakly to reason's judgment; wherefore this kind of incontinence is called "weakness." Hence it is manifest that incontinence pertains chiefly to the soul. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima humana est corporis forma, et habet quasdam vires corporeis organis utentes, quarum operationes aliquid conferunt etiam ad illa opera animae quae sunt sine corporeis instrumentis, idest ad actum intellectus et voluntatis, inquantum scilicet intellectus a sensu accipit, et voluntas impellitur a passione appetitus sensitivi. Et secundum hoc, quia femina secundum corpus habet quandam debilem complexionem, fit ut in pluribus quod etiam debiliter inhaereat quibuscumque inhaeret, etsi raro in aliquibus aliter accidat, secundum illud Proverb. ult., mulierem fortem quis inveniet? Et quia id quod est parvum vel debile reputatur quasi nullum, inde est quod philosophus loquitur de mulieribus quasi non habentibus iudicium rationis firmum, quamvis in aliquibus mulieribus contrarium accidat. Et propter hoc dicit quod mulieres non dicimus continentes, quia non ducunt, quasi habentes solidam rationem, sed ducuntur, quasi de facili sequentes passiones. | Reply to Objection 1: The human soul is the form of the body, and has certain powers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these organs conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are accomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of the intellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect receives from the senses, and the will is urged by passions of the sensitive appetite. Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak temperament, the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds to, she holds to it weakly; although in /rare cases the opposite occurs, according to Prov. 31:10, "Who shall find a valiant woman?" And since small and weak things "are accounted as though they were not" [*Aristotle, Phys. ii, 5] the Philosopher speaks of women as though they had not the firm judgment of reason, although the contrary happens in some women. Hence he states that "we do not describe women as being continent, because they are vacillating" through being unstable of reason, and "are easily led" so that they follow their passions readily. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ex impetu passionis contingit quod aliquis statim passionem sequatur, ante consilium rationis. Impetus autem passionis provenire potest vel ex velocitate, sicut in cholericis; vel ex vehementia, sicut in melancholicis, qui propter terrestrem complexionem vehementissime inflammantur. Sicut et e contrario contingit quod aliquis non persistat in eo quod consiliatum est, ex eo quod debiliter inhaeret, propter mollitiem complexionis, ut de mulieribus dictum est. Quod etiam videtur in phlegmaticis contingere, propter eandem causam sicut etiam in mulieribus. Haec autem accidunt inquantum ex complexione corporis datur aliqua incontinentiae occasio, non autem causa sufficiens, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: It is owing to the impulse of passion that a man at once follows his passion before his reason counsels him. Now the impulse of passion may arise either from its quickness, as in bilious persons [*Cf. FS, Question [46], Article [5]], or from its vehemence, as in the melancholic, who on account of their earthy temperament are most vehemently aroused. Even so, on the other hand, a man fails to stand to that which is counselled, because he holds to it in weakly fashion by reason of the softness of his temperament, as we have stated with regard to woman (ad 1). This is also the case with phlegmatic temperaments, for the same reason as in women. And these results are due to the fact that the bodily temperament is an occasional but not a sufficient cause of incontinence, as stated above. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod concupiscentia carnis in eo qui est incontinens, superat spiritum non ex necessitate, sed per quandam negligentiam spiritus non resistentis fortiter. | Reply to Objection 3: In the incontinent man concupiscence of the flesh overcomes the spirit, not necessarily, but through a certain negligence of the spirit in not resisting strongly. |
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Article: 2 [ << | >> ]
| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod incontinentia non sit peccatum. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arbit., nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest. Sed incontinentiam nullus potest ex seipso vitare, secundum illud Sap. VIII, scio quod non possum esse continens nisi Deus det. Ergo incontinentia non est peccatum. | Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence is not a sin. For as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "No man sins in what he cannot avoid." Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to Wis. 8:21, "I know [Vulg.: 'knew'] that I could not... be continent, except God gave it." Therefore incontinence is not a sin. |
| Praeterea, omne peccatum in ratione videtur consistere. Sed in eo qui est incontinens, vincitur iudicium rationis. Ergo incontinentia non est peccatum. | Objection 2: Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason. But the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man. Therefore incontinence is not a sin. |
| Praeterea, nullus peccat ex eo quod vehementer Deum amat. Sed ex vehementia divini amoris aliquis fit incontinens, dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod Paulus per incontinentiam divini amoris dixit, vivo ego, iam non ego. Ergo incontinentia non est peccatum. |
Objection 3: Further, no one sins in loving God vehemently. Now a man becomes incontinent through the vehemence of divine love: for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul, through incontinence of divine love, exclaimed: I live, now not I" (Gal. 2:20). Therefore incontinence is not a sin. |
| Sed contra est quod connumeratur aliis peccatis, II ad Tim. III, ubi dicitur, criminatores, incontinentes, immites, et cetera. Ergo incontinentia est peccatum. |
On the contrary, It is numbered together with other sins (2 Tim. 3:3) where it is written: "Slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful," etc. Therefore incontinence is a sin. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod incontinentia potest attendi circa aliquid tripliciter. Uno modo, proprie et simpliciter. Et sic incontinentia attenditur circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus, sicut et intemperantia, ut supra dictum est de continentia. Et hoc modo incontinentia est peccatum, duplici ratione, uno modo, ex eo quod incontinens recedit ab eo quod est secundum rationem; alio modo, ex eo quod se immergit quibusdam turpibus delectationibus. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod incontinentia vituperatur non solum sicut peccatum, quod scilicet est per recessum a ratione, sed sicut malitia quaedam, inquantum scilicet pravas concupiscentias sequitur. | I answer that, Incontinence about a matter may be considered in two ways. First it may be considered properly and simply: and thus incontinence is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch, even as intemperance is, as we have said in reference to continence (Question [155], Article [2]). In this way incontinence is a sin for two reasons: first, because the incontinent man goes astray from that which is in accord with reason; secondly, because he plunges into shameful pleasures. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that "incontinence is censurable not only because it is wrong"—that is, by straying from reason—"but also because it is wicked"—that is, by following evil desires. |
| Alio modo incontinentia dicitur circa aliquid, proprie quidem, inquantum homo recedit ab eo quod est secundum rationem, sed non simpliciter, puta cum aliquis non servat modum rationis in concupiscentia honoris, divitiarum et aliorum huiusmodi, quae secundum se videntur esse bona; circa quae non est incontinentia simpliciter, sed secundum quid, sicut supra de continentia dictum est. Et sic incontinentia est peccatum, non ex eo quod aliquis ingerat se pravis concupiscentiis, sed eo quod non servat modum debitum rationis, etiam in concupiscentia rerum per se appetendarum. |
Secondly, incontinence about a matter is considered, properly—inasmuch as it is a straying from reason—but not simply; for instance when a man does not observe the mode of reason in his desire for honor, riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in themselves. About such things there is incontinence, not simply but relatively, even as we have said above in reference to continence (Question [155], Article [2], ad 3). In this way incontinence is a sin, not from the fact that one gives way to wicked desires, but because one fails to observe the mode of reason even in the desire for things that are of themselves desirable. |
| Tertio modo incontinentia dicitur esse circa aliquid non proprie, sed secundum similitudinem, puta circa concupiscentias eorum quibus non potest aliquis male uti, puta circa concupiscentias virtutum. Circa quas potest dici aliquis esse incontinens per similitudinem, quia sicut ille qui est incontinens totaliter ducitur per concupiscentiam malam, ita aliquis totaliter ducitur per concupiscentiam bonam, quae est secundum rationem. Et talis incontinentia non est peccatum, sed pertinet ad perfectionem virtutis. | Thirdly, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not properly, but metaphorically. for instance about the desires for things of which one cannot make an evil use, such as the desire for virtue. A man may be said to be incontinent in these matters metaphorically, because just as the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire, even so is a man entirely led by his good desire which is in accord with reason. Such like incontinence is no sin, but pertains to the perfection of virtue. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo potest vitare peccatum et facere bonum, non tamen sine divino auxilio, secundum illud Ioan. XV, sine me nihil potestis facere. Unde per hoc quod homo indiget divino auxilio ad hoc quod sit continens, non excluditur quin incontinentia sit peccatum, quia, ut dicitur in III Ethic., quae per amicos possumus, aliqualiter per nos possumus. | Reply to Objection 1: Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without God's help, according to Jn. 15:5: "Without Me you can do nothing." Wherefore the fact that man needs God's help in order to be continent, does not show incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, "what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a way, ourselves." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod in eo qui est incontinens vincitur iudicium rationis, non quidem ex necessitate, quod auferret rationem peccati, sed ex negligentia quadam hominis non firmiter intendentis ad resistendum passioni per iudicium rationis quod habet. | Reply to Objection 2: The judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man, not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but through a certain negligence on account of his not standing firm in resisting the passion by holding to the judgment formed by his reason. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de incontinentia per similitudinem dicta, et non proprie. | Reply to Objection 3: This argument takes incontinence metaphorically and not properly. |
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Question: 156 [ << | >> ]
Article: 3 [ << | >> ]
| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod incontinens plus peccet quam intemperatus. Tanto enim aliquis videtur gravius peccare, quanto magis contra conscientiam agit, secundum illud Luc. XII, servus sciens voluntatem domini sui et faciens digna plagis, vapulabit multis. Sed incontinens magis videtur agere contra conscientiam quam intemperatus, quia, ut dicitur in VII Ethic., incontinens, sciens quoniam prava sunt quae concupiscit, nihilominus agit, propter passionem; intemperatus autem iudicat ea quae concupiscit esse bona. Ergo incontinens gravius peccat quam intemperatus. | Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts against his conscience, the more gravely he sins, according to Lk. 12:47, "That servant who knew the will of his lord... and did not... shall be beaten with many stripes." Now the incontinent man would seem to act against his conscience more than the intemperate because, according to Ethic. vii, 3, the incontinent man, though knowing how wicked are the things he desires, nevertheless acts through passion, whereas the intemperate man judges what he desires to be good. Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate. |
| Praeterea, quanto aliquod peccatum gravius est, tanto videtur esse minus sanabile, unde et peccata in spiritum sanctum, quae sunt gravissima, dicuntur esse irremissibilia. Sed peccatum incontinentiae videtur esse insanabilius quam peccatum intemperantiae. Sanatur enim peccatum alicuius per admonitionem et correctionem, quae nihil videtur conferre incontinenti, qui scit se male agere, et nihilominus male agit, intemperato autem videtur quod bene agat, et sic aliquid ei conferre posset admonitio. Ergo videtur quod incontinens gravius peccet quam intemperatus. | Objection 2: Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more incurable it is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Ghost, being most grave, are declared to be unpardonable. Now the sin of incontinence would appear to be more incurable than the sin of intemperance. For a person's sin is cured by admonishment and correction, which seemingly are no good to the incontinent man, since he knows he is doing wrong, and does wrong notwithstanding: whereas it seems to the intemperate man that he is doing well, so that it were good for him to be admonished. Therefore it would appear that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate. |
| Praeterea, quanto aliquis ex maiori libidine peccat, tanto gravius peccat. Sed incontinens peccat ex maiori libidine quam intemperatus, quia incontinens habet vehementes concupiscentias, quas non semper habet intemperatus. Ergo incontinens magis peccat quam intemperatus. | Objection 3: Further, the more eagerly man sins, the more grievous his sin. Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate, since the incontinent man has vehement passions and desires, which the intemperate man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate. |
| Sed contra est quod impoenitentia aggravat omne peccatum, unde Augustinus, in libro de Verb. Dom., dicit quod impoenitentia est peccatum in spiritum sanctum. Sed sicut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., intemperatus non est poenitivus, immanet enim electioni, incontinens autem omnis est poenitivus. Ergo intemperatus gravius peccat quam incontinens. | On the contrary, Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, 12,13) that "impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost." Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) "the intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent, for he holds on to his choice: but every incontinent man is inclined to repentance." Therefore the intemperate man sins more gravely than the incontinent. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum, secundum Augustinum, praecipue in voluntate consistit, voluntas enim est qua peccatur et recte vivitur. Et ideo ubi est maior inclinatio voluntatis ad peccandum, ibi est gravius peccatum. In eo autem qui est intemperatus, voluntas inclinatur ad peccandum ex propria electione, quae procedit ex habitu per consuetudinem acquisito. In eo autem qui est incontinens, voluntas inclinatur ad peccandum ex aliqua passione. Et quia passio cito transit, habitus autem est qualitas difficile mobilis, inde est quod incontinens statim poenitet, transeunte passione, quod non accidit de intemperato, quinimmo gaudet se peccasse, eo quod operatio peccati est sibi facta connaturalis secundum habitum. Unde de his dicitur Proverb. II, quod laetantur cum male fecerint, et exultant in rebus pessimis. Unde patet quod intemperatus est multo peior quam incontinens, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic. |
I answer that, According to Augustine [*De Duab. Anim. x, xi] sin is chiefly an act of the will, because "by the will we sin and live aright" [*Retract. i, 9]. Consequently where there is a greater inclination of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in the intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom: whereas in the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a passion. And since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is "a disposition difficult to remove," the result is that the incontinent man repents at once, as soon as the passion has passed; but not so the intemperate man; in fact he rejoices in having sinned, because the sinful act has become connatural to him by reason of his habit. Wherefore in reference to such persons it is written (Prov. 2:14) that "they are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things." Hence it follows that "the intemperate man is much worse than the incontinent," as also the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 7). |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ignorantia intellectus quandoque quidem praecedit inclinationem appetitus, et causat eam. Et sic, quanto est maior ignorantia, tanto magis peccatum diminuit, vel totaliter excusat, inquantum causat involuntarium. Alio modo e converso ignorantia rationis sequitur inclinationem appetitus. Et talis ignorantia quanto est maior, tanto peccatum est gravius, quia ostenditur inclinatio appetitus esse maior. Ignorantia autem tam incontinentis quam intemperati provenit ex eo quod appetitus est in aliquid inclinatus, sive per passionem, sicut in incontinente; sive per habitum, sicut in intemperato. Maior autem ignorantia causatur ex hoc in intemperato quam in incontinente. Et uno quidem modo, quantum ad durationem. Quia in incontinente durat illa ignorantia solum passione durante, sicut accessio febris tertianae durat, durante commotione humoris. Ignorantia autem intemperati durat assidue, propter permanentiam habitus, unde assimilatur phthisicae, vel cuicumque morbo continuo, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic. Alio autem modo est maior ignorantia intemperati, quantum ad id quod ignoratur. Nam ignorantia incontinentis attenditur quantum ad aliquod particulare eligibile, prout scilicet aestimat hoc nunc esse eligendum, sed intemperatus habet ignorantiam circa ipsum finem, inquantum scilicet iudicat hoc esse bonum, ut irrefrenate concupiscentias sequatur. Unde philosophus, in VII Ethic., dicit quod incontinens est melior intemperato, quia salvatur in eo optimum principium, scilicet recta existimatio de fine. | Reply to Objection 1: Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the inclination of the appetite and causes it, and then the greater the ignorance, the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in so far as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in the reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and then such like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver the sin, because the inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be greater. Now in both the incontinent and the intemperate man, ignorance arises from the appetite being inclined to something, either by passion, as in the incontinent, or by habit, as in the intemperate. Nevertheless greater ignorance results thus in the intemperate than in the incontinent. In one respect as regards duration, since in the incontinent man this ignorance lasts only while the passion endures, just as an attack of intermittent fever lasts as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas the ignorance of the intemperate man endures without ceasing, on account of the endurance of the habit, wherefore it is likened to phthisis or any chronic disease, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 8). In another respect the ignorance of the intemperate man is greater as regards the thing ignored. For the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some particular detail of choice (in so far as he deems that he must choose this particular thing now): whereas the intemperate man's ignorance is about the end itself, inasmuch as he judges this thing good, in order that he may follow his desires without being curbed. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7,8) that "the incontinent man is better than the intemperate, because he retains the best principle [*{To beltiston, e arche}, 'the best thing, i.e. the principle']," to wit, the right estimate of the end. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ad sanationem incontinentis non sufficit sola cognitio, sed requiritur interius auxilium gratiae concupiscentiam mitigantis, et adhibetur etiam exterius remedium admonitionis et correctionis, ex quibus aliquis incipit concupiscentiis resistere, ex quo concupiscentia debilitatur, ut supra dictum est. Et iisdem etiam modis potest sanari intemperatus, sed difficilior est eius sanatio, propter duo. Quorum primum est ex parte rationis, quae corrupta est circa aestimationem ultimi finis, quod se habet sicut principium in demonstrativis, difficilius autem reducitur ad veritatem ille qui errat circa principium, et similiter in operativis ille qui errat circa finem. Aliud autem est ex parte inclinationis appetitus, quae in intemperato est ex habitu, qui difficile tollitur, inclinatio autem incontinentis est ex passione, quae facilius reprimi potest. |
Reply to Objection 2: Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the incontinent man, for he needs the inward assistance of grace which quenches concupiscence, besides the application of the external remedy of admonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his desires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above (Question [142], Article [2]). By these same means the intemperate man can be cured. But his curing is more difficult, for two reasons. The first is on the part of reason, which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the last end, which holds the same position as the principle in demonstrations. Now it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one who errs as to the principle; and it is the same in practical matters with one who errs in regard to the end. The other reason is on the part of the inclination of the appetite: for in the intemperate man this proceeds from a habit, which is difficult to remove, whereas the inclination of the incontinent man proceeds from a passion, which is more easily suppressed. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod libido voluntatis, quae auget peccatum, maior est in intemperato quam in incontinente, ut ex dictis patet. Sed libido concupiscentiae appetitus sensitivi quandoque maior est in incontinente, quia incontinens non peccat nisi a gravi concupiscentia; sed intemperatus etiam ex levi concupiscentia peccat, et quandoque eam praevenit. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod magis intemperatum vituperamus, quia non concupiscens, vel quiete, idest remisse concupiscens, persequitur delectationes. Quid enim faceret si adesset concupiscentia iuvenilis? | Reply to Objection 3: The eagerness of the will, which increases a sin, is greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as explained above. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite is sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he does not sin except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate man sins even through slight concupiscence and sometimes forestalls it. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more the intemperate man, "because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or with calm," i.e. slight desire. "For what would he have done if he had desired it with passion?" |
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Question: 156 [ << | >> ]
Article: 4 [ << | >> ]
| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod incontinens irae sit peior quam incontinens concupiscentiae. Quanto enim difficilius est resistere passioni, tanto incontinentia videtur esse levior, unde philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., non enim, si quis a fortibus et superexcellentibus delectationibus vincitur vel tristitiis, est admirabile, sed condonabile. Sed, sicut Heraclitus dixit, difficilius est pugnare contra concupiscentiam quam contra iram. Ergo levior est incontinentia concupiscentiae quam incontinentia irae. | Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire. For the more difficult it is to resist the passion, the less grievous, apparently is incontinence: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): "It is not wonderful, indeed it is pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains." Now, "as Heraclitus says, it is more difficult to resist desire than anger" [*Ethic. ii. 3]. Therefore incontinence of desire is less grievous than incontinence of anger. |
| Praeterea, si passio per suam vehementiam totaliter auferat iudicium rationis, omnino excusatur aliquis a peccato, sicut patet in eo qui incidit ex passione in furiam. Sed plus remanet de iudicio rationis in eo qui est incontinens irae, quam in eo qui est incontinens concupiscentiae, iratus enim aliqualiter audit rationem, non autem concupiscens, ut patet per philosophum, in VII Ethic. Ergo incontinens irae est peior quam incontinens concupiscentiae. | Objection 2: Further, one is altogether excused from sin if the passion be so vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason, as in the case of one who becomes demented through passion. Now he that is incontinent in anger retains more of the judgment of reason, than one who is incontinent in desire: since "anger listens to reason somewhat, but desire does not" as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire. |
| Praeterea, tanto aliquod peccatum videtur esse gravius, quanto est periculosius. Sed incontinentia irae videtur esse periculosior, quia perducit hominem ad maius peccatum, scilicet ad homicidium, quod est gravius peccatum quam adulterium, ad quod perducit incontinentia concupiscentiae. Ergo incontinentia irae est gravior quam incontinentia concupiscentiae. | Objection 3: Further, the more dangerous a sin the more grievous it is. Now incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous, since it leads a man to a greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more grievous sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire leads. Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than incontinence of desire. |
| Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod minus turpis est incontinentia irae quam incontinentia concupiscentiae. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of desire." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum incontinentiae potest dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, ex parte passionis ex qua ratio superatur. Et sic incontinentia concupiscentiae est turpior quam incontinentia irae, quia motus concupiscentiae habet maiorem inordinationem quam motus irae. Et hoc propter quatuor, quae philosophus tangit in VII Ethic. Primo quidem, quia motus irae participat aliqualiter ratione, inquantum scilicet iratus tendit ad vindicandum iniuriam sibi factam, quod aliqualiter ratio dictat, sed non perfecte, quia non intendit debitum modum vindictae. Sed motus concupiscentiae totaliter est secundum sensum, et nullo modo secundum rationem. Secundo, quia motus irae magis consequitur corporis complexionem, propter velocitatem motus cholerae, quae intendit ad iram. Unde magis est in promptu quod ille qui est secundum complexionem corporis dispositus ad irascendum, irascatur, quam quod ille qui est dispositus ad concupiscendum, concupiscat. Unde etiam frequentius ex iracundis nascuntur iracundi quam ex concupiscentibus concupiscentes. Quod autem provenit ex naturali corporis dispositione, reputatur magis venia dignum. Tertio, quia ira quaerit manifeste operari. Sed concupiscentia quaerit latebras, et dolose subintrat. Quarto, quia concupiscens delectabiliter operatur, sed iratus quasi quadam tristitia praecedente coactus. | I answer that, The sin of incontinence may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the passion which occasions the downfall of reason. In this way incontinence of desire is worse than incontinence of anger, because the movement of desire is more inordinate than the movement of anger. There are four reasons for this, and the Philosopher indicates them, Ethic. vii, 6: First, because the movement of anger partakes somewhat of reason, since the angry man tends to avenge the injury done to him, and reason dictates this in a certain degree. Yet he does not tend thereto perfectly, because he does not intend the due mode of vengeance. on the other hand, the movement of desire is altogether in accord with sense and nowise in accord with reason. Secondly, because the movement of anger results more from the bodily temperament owing to the quickness of the movement of the bile which tends to anger. Hence one who by bodily temperament is disposed to anger is more readily angry than one who is disposed to concupiscence is liable to be concupiscent: wherefore also it happens more often that the children of those who are disposed to anger are themselves disposed to anger, than that the children of those who are disposed to concupiscence are also disposed to concupiscence. Now that which results from the natural disposition of the body is deemed more deserving of pardon. Thirdly, because anger seeks to work openly, whereas concupiscence is fain to disguise itself and creeps in by stealth. Fourthly, because he who is subject to concupiscence works with pleasure, whereas the angry man works as though forced by a certain previous displeasure. |
| Alio modo potest considerari peccatum incontinentiae quantum ad malum in quod quis incidit a ratione discedens. Et sic incontinentia irae est, ut plurimum, gravior, quia ducit in ea quae pertinent ad proximi nocumentum. | Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered with regard to the evil into which one falls through forsaking reason; and thus incontinence of anger is, for the most part, more grievous, because it leads to things that are harmful to one's neighbor. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod difficilius est assidue pugnare contra delectationem quam contra iram, quia concupiscentia est magis continua, sed ad horam difficilius est resistere irae, propter eius impetum. | Reply to Objection 1: It is more difficult to resist pleasure perseveringly than anger, because concupiscence is enduring. But for the moment it is more difficult to resist anger, on account of its impetuousness. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod concupiscentia dicitur esse sine ratione, non quia totaliter auferat iudicium rationis, sed quia in nullo procedit secundum iudicium rationis. Et ex hoc est turpior. | Reply to Objection 2: Concupiscence is stated to be without reason, not as though it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason, but because nowise does it follow the judgment of reason: and for this reason it is more disgraceful. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex parte eorum in quae incontinens deducitur. | Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers incontinence with regard to its result. |