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| Deinde considerandum est de causa prophetiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. | We must now consider the cause of prophecy. Under this head there are six points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum prophetia sit naturalis. | (1) Whether prophecy is natural? |
| Secundo, utrum sit a Deo mediantibus Angelis. | (2) Whether it is from God by means of the angels? |
| Tertio, utrum ad prophetiam requiratur dispositio naturalis. | (3) Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy? |
| Quarto, utrum requiratur bonitas morum. | (4) Whether a good life is requisite? |
| Quinto, utrum sit aliqua prophetia a Daemonibus. | (5) Whether any prophecy is from the demons? |
| Sexto, utrum prophetae Daemonum aliquando dicant verum. | (6) Whether prophets of the demons ever tell what is true? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prophetia possit esse naturalis. Dicit enim Gregorius in IV Dialog., quod ipsa aliquando animarum vis sua subtilitate aliquid praevidet. Et Augustinus dicit, in XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod animae humanae, secundum quod a sensibus corporis abstrahitur competit futura praevidere. Hoc autem pertinet ad prophetiam. Ergo anima naturaliter potest assequi prophetiam. | Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy can be natural. For Gregory says (Dial. iv, 26) that "sometimes the mere strength of the soul is sufficiently cunning to foresee certain things": and Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13) that the human soul, according as it is withdrawn from the sense of the body, is able to foresee the future [*Cf. FP, Question [86], Article [4], ad 2]. Now this pertains to prophecy. Therefore the soul can acquire prophecy naturally. |
| Praeterea, cognitio animae humanae magis viget in vigilando quam in dormiendo. Sed in dormiendo quidam naturaliter praevident quaedam futura, ut patet per philosophum, in libro de somno et Vigil. Ergo multo magis potest homo naturaliter futura praecognoscere. | Objection 2: Further, the human soul's knowledge is more alert while one wakes than while one sleeps. Now some, during sleep, naturally foresee the future, as the Philosopher asserts (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divinat. per Somn. ii, which is annexed to the work quoted]). Much more therefore can a man naturally foreknow the future. |
| Praeterea, homo secundum suam naturam est perfectior animalibus brutis. Sed quaedam animalia bruta habent praecognitionem futurorum ad se pertinentium, sicut formicae praecognoscunt pluvias futuras, quod patet ex hoc quod ante pluviam incipiunt grana in foramen reponere; et similiter etiam pisces praecognoscunt tempestates futuras, ut perpenditur ex eorum motu, dum loca tempestuosa declinant. Ergo multo magis homines naturaliter praecognoscere possunt futura ad se pertinentia, de quibus est prophetia. Est ergo prophetia a natura. | Objection 3: Further, man, by his nature, is more perfect than dumb animals. Yet some dumb animals have foreknowledge of future things that concern them. Thus ants foreknow the coming rains, which is evident from their gathering grain into their nest before the rain commences; and in like manner fish foreknow a coming storm, as may be gathered from their movements in avoiding places exposed to storm. Much more therefore can men foreknow the future that concerns themselves, and of such things is prophecy. Therefore prophecy comes from nature. |
| Praeterea, Prov. XXIX dicitur, cum prophetia defecerit, dissipabitur populus, et sic patet quod prophetia necessaria est ad hominum conservationem. Sed natura non deficit in necessariis. Ergo videtur quod prophetia sit a natura. |
Objection 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 29:18): "When prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad"; wherefore it is evident that prophecy is necessary for the stability of the human race. Now "nature does not fail in necessaries" [*Aristotle, de Anima iii, 9]. Therefore it seems that prophecy is from nature. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur II Pet. I, non enim voluntate humana allata est aliquando prophetia, sed spiritu sancto inspirante, locuti sunt sancti Dei homines. Ergo prophetia non est a natura, sed ex dono spiritus sancti. |
On the contrary, It is written (2 Pt. 1:21): "For prophecy came not by the will of man at any time, but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost." Therefore prophecy comes not from nature, but through the gift of the Holy Ghost. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, prophetica praecognitio potest esse de futuris dupliciter, uno modo, secundum quod sunt in seipsis; alio modo, secundum quod sunt in suis causis. Praecognoscere autem futura secundum quod sunt in seipsis, est proprium divini intellectus, cuius aeternitati sunt omnia praesentia, ut in primo dictum est. Et ideo talis praecognitio futurorum non potest esse a natura, sed solum ex revelatione divina. Futura vero in suis causis possunt praecognosci naturali cognitione etiam ab homine, sicut medicus praecognoscit sanitatem vel mortem futuram in aliquibus causis, quarum ordinem ad tales effectus experimento praecognoverunt. Et talis praecognitio futurorum potest intelligi esse in homine a natura dupliciter. Uno modo, sic quod statim anima, ex eo quod in seipsa habet, possit futura praecognoscere. Et sic sicut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quidam voluerunt animam humanam habere quandam vim divinationis in seipsa. Et hoc videtur esse secundum opinionem Platonis, qui posuit quod animae habent omnium rerum cognitionem per participationem idearum, sed ista cognitio obnubilatur in eis per coniunctionem corporis, in quibusdam tamen plus, in quibusdam vero minus, secundum corporis puritatem diversam. Et secundum hoc, posset dici quod homines habentes animas non multum obtenebratas ex corporum unione, possunt talia futura praecognoscere secundum propriam scientiam. Contra hoc autem obiicit Augustinus, cur non semper potest, scilicet vim divinationis habere anima, cum semper velit? |
I answer that, As stated above (Question [171], Article [6], ad 2) prophetic foreknowledge may regard future things in two ways: in one way, as they are in themselves; in another way, as they are in their causes. Now, to foreknow future things, as they are in themselves, is proper to the Divine intellect, to Whose eternity all things are present, as stated in the FP, Question [14], Article [13]. Wherefore such like foreknowledge of the future cannot come from nature, but from Divine revelation alone. On the other hand, future things can be foreknown in their causes with a natural knowledge even by man: thus a physician foreknows future health or death in certain causes, through previous experimental knowledge of the order of those causes to such effects. Such like knowledge of the future may be understood to be in a man by nature in two ways. In one way that the soul, from that which it holds, is able to foreknow the future, and thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): "Some have deemed the human soul to contain a certain power of divination." This seems to be in accord with the opinion of Plato [*Phaed. xxvii; Civit. vi], who held that our souls have knowledge of all things by participating in the ideas; but that this knowledge is obscured in them by union with the body; yet in some more, in others less, according to a difference in bodily purity. According to this it might be said that men, whose souls are not much obscured through union with the body, are able to foreknow such like future things by their own knowledge. Against this opinion Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): "How is it that the soul cannot always have this power of divination, since it always wishes to have it?" |
| Sed quia verius esse videtur quod anima ex sensibilibus cognitionem acquirat, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, ut in primo dictum est; ideo melius est dicendum alio modo, quod praecognitionem talium futurorum homines non habent sed, acquirere possunt per viam experimentalem; in qua iuvantur per naturalem dispositionem secundum quam in homine invenitur perfectio virtutis imaginativae et claritas intelligentiae. | Since, however, it seems truer, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that the soul acquires knowledge from sensibles, as stated in the FP, Question [84], Article [6], it is better to have recourse to another explanation, and to hold that men have no such foreknowledge of the future, but that they can acquire it by means of experience, wherein they are helped by their natural disposition, which depends on the perfection of a man's imaginative power, and the clarity of his understanding. |
| Et tamen haec praecognitio futurorum differt a prima, quae habetur ex revelatione divina, dupliciter. Primo quidem, quia prima potest esse quorumcumque eventuum, et infallibiliter. Haec autem praecognitio quae naturaliter haberi potest, est circa quosdam effectus ad quos se potest extendere experientia humana. Secundo, quia prima prophetia est secundum immobilem veritatem, non autem secunda, sed potest ei subesse falsum. Prima autem praecognitio proprie pertinet ad prophetiam, non secunda, quia, sicut supra dictum est, prophetica cognitio est eorum quae excedunt universaliter humanam cognitionem. Et ideo dicendum est quod prophetia simpliciter dicta non potest esse a natura, sed solum ex revelatione divina. |
Nevertheless this latter foreknowledge of the future differs in two ways from the former, which comes through Divine revelation. First, because the former can be about any events whatever, and this infallibly; whereas the latter foreknowledge, which can be had naturally, is about certain effects, to which human experience may extend. Secondly, because the former prophecy is "according to the unchangeable truth" [*Question [171], Article [3], Objection [1]], while the latter is not, and can cover a falsehood. Now the former foreknowledge, and not the latter, properly belongs to prophecy, because, as stated above (Question [171], Article [3]), prophetic knowledge is of things which naturally surpass human knowledge. Consequently we must say that prophecy strictly so called cannot be from nature, but only from Divine revelation. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima, quando abstrahitur a corporalibus, aptior redditur ad percipiendum influxum spiritualium substantiarum, et etiam ad percipiendum subtiles motus qui ex impressionibus causarum naturalium in imaginatione humana relinquuntur, a quibus percipiendis anima impeditur cum fuerit circa sensibilia occupata. Et ideo Gregorius dicit quod anima quando appropinquat ad mortem, praecognoscit quaedam futura subtilitate suae naturae, prout scilicet percipit etiam modicas impressiones. Aut etiam cognoscit futura revelatione angelica. Non autem propria virtute. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., si hoc esset, tunc haberet quandocumque vellet, in sua potestate futura praecognoscere, quod patet esse falsum. | Reply to Objection 1: When the soul is withdrawn from corporeal things, it becomes more adapted to receive the influence of spiritual substances, and also is more inclined to receive the subtle motions which take place in the human imagination through the impression of natural causes, whereas it is hindered from receiving them while occupied with sensible things. Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv, 26) that "the soul, at the approach of death, foresees certain future things, by reason of the subtlety of its nature," inasmuch as it is receptive even of slight impressions. Or again, it knows future things by a revelation of the angels; but not by its own power, because according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13), "if this were so, it would be able to foreknow the future whenever it willed," which is clearly false. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod praecognitio futurorum quae fit in somnis, est aut ex revelatione substantiarum spiritualium, aut ex causa corporali, ut dictum est cum de divinationibus ageretur. Utrumque autem melius potest fieri in dormientibus quam in vigilantibus, quia anima vigilantis est occupata circa exteriora sensibilia, unde minus potest percipere subtiles impressiones vel spiritualium substantiarum vel etiam causarum naturalium. Quantum tamen ad perfectionem iudicii, plus viget ratio in vigilando quam in dormiendo. |
Objection 2: Knowledge of the future by means of dreams, comes either from the revelation of spiritual substances, or from a corporeal cause, as stated above (Question [95], Article [6]), when we were treating of divination. Now both these causes are more applicable to a person while asleep than while awake, because, while awake, the soul is occupied with external sensibles, so that it is less receptive of the subtle impressions either of spiritual substances, or even of natural causes; although as regards the perfection of judgment, the reason is more alert in waking than in sleeping. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod bruta etiam animalia non habent praecognitionem futurorum effectuum nisi secundum quod ex suis causis praecognoscuntur, ex quibus eorum phantasiae moventur. Et magis quam hominum, quia phantasiae hominum, maxime in vigilando, disponuntur magis secundum rationem quam secundum impressionem naturalium causarum. Ratio autem facit in homine multo abundantius id quod in brutis facit impressio causarum naturalium. Et adhuc magis adiuvat hominem divina gratia prophetas inspirans. | Reply to Objection 3: Even dumb animals have no foreknowledge of future events, except as these are foreknown in their causes, whereby their imagination is moved more than man's, because man's imagination, especially in waking, is more disposed according to reason than according to the impression of natural causes. Yet reason effects much more amply in man, that which the impression of natural causes effects in dumb animals; and Divine grace by inspiring the prophecy assists man still more. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod lumen propheticum se extendit etiam ad directiones humanorum actuum. Et secundum hoc, prophetia necessaria est ad populi gubernationem. Et praecipue in ordine ad cultum divinum, ad quem natura non sufficit, sed requiritur gratia. | Reply to Objection 4: The prophetic light extends even to the direction of human acts; and in this way prophecy is requisite for the government of a people, especially in relation to Divine worship; since for this nature is not sufficient, and grace is necessary. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prophetica revelatio non fiat per Angelos. Dicitur enim Sap. VII, quod sapientia Dei in animas sanctas se transfert, et amicos Dei et prophetas constituit. Sed amicos Dei constituit immediate. Ergo etiam prophetas facit immediate, non mediantibus Angelis. | Objection 1: It would seem that prophetic revelation does not come through the angels. For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that Divine wisdom "conveyeth herself into holy souls," and "maketh the friends of God, and the prophets." Now wisdom makes the friends of God immediately. Therefore it also makes the prophets immediately, and not through the medium of the angels. |
| Praeterea, prophetia ponitur inter gratias gratis datas. Sed gratiae gratis datae sunt a spiritu sancto, secundum illud, divisiones gratiarum sunt, idem autem spiritus. Non ergo prophetica revelatio fit Angelo mediante. | Objection 2: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces. But the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:4, "There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit." Therefore the prophetic revelation is not made by means of an angel. |
| Praeterea, Cassiodorus dicit quod prophetia est divina revelatio. Si autem fieret per Angelos, diceretur angelica revelatio. Non ergo prophetia fit per Angelos. | Objection 3: Further, Cassiodorus [*Prol. in Psalt. i] says that prophecy is a "Divine revelation": whereas if it were conveyed by the angels, it would be called an angelic revelation. Therefore prophecy is not bestowed by means of the angels. |
| Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. Cael. Hier., divinas visiones gloriosi patres nostri adepti sunt per medias caelestes virtutes. Loquitur autem ibi de visionibus propheticis. Ergo revelatio prophetica fit Angelis mediantibus. | On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "Our glorious fathers received Divine visions by means of the heavenly powers"; and he is speaking there of prophetic visions. Therefore prophetic revelation is conveyed by means of the angels. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII, quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. Habet autem hoc divinitatis ordo, sicut Dionysius dicit, ut infima per media disponat. Angeli autem medii sunt inter Deum et homines, utpote plus participantes de perfectione divinae bonitatis quam homines. Et ideo illuminationes et revelationes divinae a Deo ad homines per Angelos deferuntur. Prophetica autem cognitio fit secundum illuminationem et revelationem divinam. Unde manifestum est quod fiat per Angelos. |
I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rm. 13:1), "Things that are of God are well ordered [*Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of God.']." Now the Divine ordering, according to Dionysius [*Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v], is such that the lowest things are directed by middle things. Now the angels hold a middle position between God and men, in that they have a greater share in the perfection of the Divine goodness than men have. Wherefore the Divine enlightenments and revelations are conveyed from God to men by the angels. Now prophetic knowledge is bestowed by Divine enlightenment and revelation. Therefore it is evident that it is conveyed by the angels. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caritas, secundum quam fit homo amicus Dei, est perfectio voluntatis, in quam solus Deus imprimere potest. Sed prophetia est perfectio intellectus, in quem etiam Angelus potest imprimere, ut in primo dictum est. Et ideo non est similis ratio de utroque. | Reply to Objection 1: Charity which makes man a friend of God, is a perfection of the will, in which God alone can form an impression; whereas prophecy is a perfection of the intellect, in which an angel also can form an impression, as stated in the FP, Question [111], Article [1], wherefore the comparison fails between the two. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod gratiae gratis datae attribuuntur spiritui sancto sicut primo principio, qui tamen operatur huiusmodi gratias in hominibus mediante ministerio Angelorum. | Reply to Objection 2: The gratuitous graces are ascribed to the Holy Ghost as their first principle: yet He works grace of this kind in men by means of the angels. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod operatio instrumenti attribuitur principali agenti, in cuius virtute instrumentum agit. Et quia minister est sicut instrumentum, idcirco prophetica revelatio, quae fit ministerio Angelorum, dicitur esse divina. | Reply to Objection 3: The work of the instrument is ascribed to the principal agent by whose power the instrument acts. And since a minister is like an instrument, prophetic revelation, which is conveyed by the ministry of the angels, is said to be Divine. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad prophetiam requiratur dispositio naturalis. Prophetia enim recipitur in propheta secundum dispositionem recipientis. Quia super illud Amos I, dominus de Sion rugiet, dicit Glossa Hieronymi, naturale est ut omnes qui volunt rem rei comparare, ex eis rebus sumant comparationes quas sunt experti et in quibus sunt nutriti, verbi gratia, nautae suos inimicos ventis, damnum naufragio comparant. Sic et Amos, qui fuit pastor pecorum timorem Dei rugitui leonis assimilat. Sed quod recipitur in aliquo secundum modum recipientis, requirit naturalem dispositionem. Ergo prophetia requirit naturalem dispositionem. | Objection 1: It would seem that a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy. For prophecy is received by the prophet according to the disposition of the recipient, since a gloss of Jerome on Amos 1:2, "The Lord will roar from Sion," says: "Anyone who wishes to make a comparison naturally turns to those things of which he has experience, and among which his life is spent. For example, sailors compare their enemies to the winds, and their losses to a shipwreck. In like manner Amos, who was a shepherd, likens the fear of God to that which is inspired by the lion's roar." Now that which is received by a thing according to the mode of the recipient requires a natural disposition. Therefore prophecy requires a natural disposition. |
| Praeterea, speculatio prophetiae est altior quam scientiae acquisitae. Sed indispositio naturalis impedit speculationem scientiae acquisitae, multi enim, ex indispositione naturali pertingere non possunt ad scientiarum speculamina capienda. Multo ergo magis requiritur ad contemplationem propheticam. | Objection 2: Further, the considerations of prophecy are more lofty than those of acquired science. Now natural indisposition hinders the considerations of acquired science, since many are prevented by natural indisposition from succeeding to grasp the speculations of science. Much more therefore is a natural disposition requisite for the contemplation of prophecy. |
| Praeterea, indispositio naturalis magis impedit aliquem quam impedimentum accidentale. Sed per aliquid accidentale superveniens impeditur speculatio prophetiae, dicit enim Hieronymus, super Matth., quod tempore illo quo coniugales actus geruntur, praesentia spiritus sancti non dabitur, etiam si propheta esse videatur qui officio generationis obsequitur. Ergo multo magis indispositio naturalis impedit prophetiam. Et sic videtur quod bona dispositio naturalis ad prophetiam requiratur. | Objection 3: Further, natural indisposition is a much greater obstacle than an accidental impediment. Now the considerations of prophecy are hindered by an accidental occurrence. For Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew [*The quotation is from Origen, Hom. vi in Num.] that "at the time of the marriage act, the presence of the Holy Ghost will not be vouchsafed, even though it be a prophet that fulfils the duty of procreation." Much more therefore does a natural indisposition hinder prophecy; and thus it would seem that a good natural disposition is requisite for prophecy. |
| Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in homilia Pentecostes, implet scilicet spiritus sanctus, citharaedum puerum, et Psalmistam facit, pastorem armentorum sycomoros vellicantem, et prophetam facit. Non ergo requiritur aliqua praecedens dispositio ad prophetiam, sed dependet ex sola voluntate spiritus sancti, de quo dicitur, I ad Cor. XII, haec omnia operatur unus atque idem spiritus, dividens singulis prout vult. | On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in Ev.): "He," namely the Holy Ghost, "fills the boy harpist and makes him a Psalmist; He fills the herdsman plucking wild figs, and makes him a prophet." Therefore prophecy requires no previous disposition, but depends on the will alone of the Holy Ghost, of Whom it is written (1 Cor. 12:2): "All these things, one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, prophetia vere et simpliciter dicta est ex inspiratione divina, quae autem est ex causa naturali, non dicitur prophetia nisi secundum quid. Est autem considerandum quod, sicut Deus, quia est causa universalis in agendo, non praeexigit materiam, nec aliquam materiae dispositionem, in corporalibus effectibus, sed simul potest et materiam et dispositionem et formam inducere; ita etiam in effectibus spiritualibus non praeexigit aliquam dispositionem, sed potest simul cum effectu spirituali inducere dispositionem convenientem, qualis requireretur secundum ordinem naturae. Et ulterius posset etiam simul per creationem producere ipsum subiectum, ut scilicet animam in ipsa sui creatione disponeret ad prophetiam, et daret ei gratiam prophetalem. |
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), prophecy in its true and exact sense comes from Divine inspiration; while that which comes from a natural cause is not called prophecy except in a relative sense. Now we must observe that as God Who is the universal efficient cause requires neither previous matter nor previous disposition of matter in His corporeal effects, for He is able at the same instant to bring into being matter and disposition and form, so neither does He require a previous disposition in His spiritual effects, but is able to produce both the spiritual effect and at the same time the fitting disposition as requisite according to the order of nature. More than this, He is able at the same time, by creation, to produce the subject, so as to dispose a soul for prophecy and give it the prophetic grace, at the very instant of its creation. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod indifferens est ad prophetiam quibuscumque similitudinibus res prophetica exprimatur. Et ideo hoc ex operatione divina non immutatur circa prophetam. Removetur autem divina virtute; si quid prophetiae repugnat. | Reply to Objection 1: It matters not to prophecy by what comparisons the thing prophesied is expressed; and so the Divine operation makes no change in a prophet in this respect. Yet if there be anything in him incompatible with prophecy, it is removed by the Divine power. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod speculatio scientiae fit ex causa naturali. Natura autem non potest operari nisi dispositione praecedente in materia. Quod non est dicendum de Deo, qui est prophetiae causa. | Reply to Objection 2: The considerations of science proceed from a natural cause, and nature cannot work without a previous disposition in matter. This cannot be said of God Who is the cause of prophecy. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod aliqua naturalis indispositio, si non removeretur, impedire posset prophetalem revelationem, puta si aliquis esset totaliter sensu naturali destitutus. Sicut etiam impeditur aliquis ab actu prophetandi per aliquam vehementem passionem vel irae vel concupiscentiae, qualis est in coitu vel per quamcumque aliam passionem. Sed talem indispositionem naturalem removet virtus divina, quae est prophetiae causa. | Reply to Objection 3: A natural indisposition, if not removed, might be an obstacle to prophetic revelation, for instance if a man were altogether deprived of the natural senses. In the same way a man might be hindered from the act of prophesying by some very strong passion, whether of anger, or of concupiscence as in coition, or by any other passion. But such a natural indisposition as this is removed by the Divine power, which is the cause of prophecy. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonitas morum requiratur ad prophetiam. Dicitur enim Sap. VII, quod sapientia Dei per nationes in animas sanctas se transfert, et amicos Dei et prophetas constituit. Sed sanctitas non potest esse sine bonitate morum et sine gratia gratum faciente. Ergo prophetia non potest esse sine bonitate morum et gratia gratum faciente. | Objection 1: It would seem that a good life is requisite for prophecy. For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that the wisdom of God "through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls," and "maketh the friends of God, and prophets." Now there can be no holiness without a good life and sanctifying grace. Therefore prophecy cannot be without a good life and sanctifying grace. |
| Praeterea, secreta non revelantur nisi amicis, secundum illud Ioan. XV, vos autem dixi amicos, quia omnia quaecumque audivi a patre meo, nota feci vobis. Sed prophetis Deus sua secreta revelat, ut dicitur Amos III. Ergo videtur quod prophetae sint Dei amici. Quod non potest esse sine caritate. Ergo videtur quod prophetia non possit esse sine caritate, quae non est sine gratia gratum faciente. | Objection 2: Further, secrets are not revealed save to a friend, according to Jn. 15:15, "But I have called you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard of My Father, I have made known to you." Now God reveals His secrets to the prophets (Amos 3:7). Therefore it would seem that the prophets are the friends of God; which is impossible without charity. Therefore seemingly prophecy cannot be without charity; and charity is impossible without sanctifying grace. |
| Praeterea, Matth. VII dicitur, attendite a falsis prophetis, qui veniunt ad vos in vestimentis ovium, intrinsecus autem sunt lupi rapaces. Sed quicumque sunt sine gratia interius, videntur esse lupi rapaces. Ergo omnes sunt falsi prophetae. Nullus est ergo verus propheta nisi bonus per gratiam. |
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mt. 7:15): "Beware of false prophets, who come to you in the clothing of sheep, but inwardly they are ravening wolves." Now all who are without grace are likened inwardly to a ravening wolf, and consequently all such are false prophets. Therefore no man is a true prophet except he be good by grace. |
| Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in libro de Somn. et Vigil., quod si divinatio somniorum est a Deo, inconveniens est eam immittere quibuslibet, et non optimis viris. Sed constat donum prophetiae esse a Deo. Ergo donum prophetiae non datur nisi optimis viris. | Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*Cf. De Divinat. per Somn. i, which is annexed to the work quoted]) that "if interpretation of dreams is from God, it is unfitting for it to be bestowed on any but the best." Now it is evident that the gift of prophecy is from God. Therefore the gift of prophecy is vouchsafed only to the best men. |
| Sed contra est quod Matth. VII, his qui dixerant domine nonne in nomine suo prophetavimus? Respondetur, nunquam novi vos. Novit autem dominus eos qui sunt eius, ut dicitur II ad Tim. II. Ergo prophetia potest esse in his qui non sunt Dei per gratiam. |
On the contrary, To those who had said, "Lord, have we not prophesied in Thy name?" this reply is made: "I never knew you" (Mt. 7:22,23). Now "the Lord knoweth who are His" (2 Tim. 2:19). Therefore prophecy can be in those who are not God's by grace. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod bonitas morum potest attendi secundum duo, uno quidem modo, secundum interiorem eius radicem, quae est gratia gratum faciens; alio autem modo, quantum ad interiores animae passiones et exteriores actiones. Gratia autem gratum faciens ad hoc principaliter datur ut anima hominis Deo per caritatem coniungatur, unde Augustinus dicit, in XV de Trin., nisi impertiatur cuique spiritus sanctus, ut eum Dei et proximi faciat amatorem, ille a sinistra non transfertur ad dexteram. Unde quidquid potest esse sine caritate, potest esse sine gratia gratum faciente et per consequens sine bonitate morum. Prophetia autem potest esse sine caritate. Quod apparet ex duobus. Primo quidem, ex actu utriusque, nam prophetia pertinet ad intellectum cuius actus praecedit actum voluntatis, quam perficit caritas. Unde apostolus, I ad Cor. XIII, prophetiam connumerat aliis ad intellectum pertinentibus quae possunt sine caritate haberi. Secundo, ex fine utriusque, datur enim prophetia ad utilitatem Ecclesiae, sicut et aliae gratiae gratis datae secundum illud apostoli, I ad Cor. XII, unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem; non autem ordinatur directe ad hoc quod affectus ipsius prophetae coniungatur Deo, ad quod ordinatur caritas. Et ideo prophetia potest esse sine bonitate morum, quantum ad primam radicem huius bonitatis. |
I answer that, A good life may be considered from two points of view. First, with regard to its inward root, which is sanctifying grace. Secondly, with regard to the inward passions of the soul and the outward actions. Now sanctifying grace is given chiefly in order that man's soul may be united to God by charity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18): "A man is not transferred from the left side to the right, unless he receive the Holy Ghost, by Whom he is made a lover of God and of his neighbor." Hence whatever can be without charity can be without sanctifying grace, and consequently without goodness of life. Now prophecy can be without charity; and this is clear on two counts. First, on account of their respective acts: for prophecy pertains to the intellect, whose act precedes the act of the will, which power is perfected by charity. For this reason the Apostle (1 Cor. 13) reckons prophecy with other things pertinent to the intellect, that can be had without charity. Secondly, on account of their respective ends. For prophecy like other gratuitous graces is given for the good of the Church, according to 1 Cor. 12%3A7, "The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit"; and is not directly intended to unite man's affections to God, which is the purpose of charity. Therefore prophecy can be without a good life, as regards the first root of this goodness. |
| Si vero consideremus bonitatem morum secundum passiones animae et actiones exteriores, secundum hoc impeditur aliquis a prophetia per morum malitiam. Nam ad prophetiam requiritur maxima mentis elevatio ad spiritualium contemplationem, quae quidem impeditur per vehementiam passionum, et per inordinatam occupationem rerum exteriorum. Unde et de filiis prophetarum legitur IV Reg. IV, quod simul habitabant cum Eliseo, quasi solitariam vitam ducentes, ne mundanis occupationibus impedirentur a dono prophetiae. |
If, however, we consider a good life, with regard to the passions of the soul, and external actions, from this point of view an evil life is an obstacle to prophecy. For prophecy requires the mind to be raised very high in order to contemplate spiritual things, and this is hindered by strong passions, and the inordinate pursuit of external things. Hence we read of the sons of the prophets (4 Kgs. 4:38) that they "dwelt together with [Vulg.: 'before']" Eliseus, leading a solitary life, as it were, lest worldly employment should be a hindrance to the gift of prophecy. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod donum prophetiae aliquando datur homini et propter utilitatem aliorum, et propter propriae mentis illustrationem. Et hi sunt in quorum animas sapientia divina per gratiam gratum facientem se transferens, amicos Dei et prophetas eos constituit. Quidam vero consequuntur donum prophetiae solum ad utilitatem aliorum. Qui sunt quasi instrumenta divinae operationis. Unde Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., prophetare, vel virtutes facere et Daemonia eiicere, interdum non est eius meriti qui operatur, sed vel invocatio nominis Christi hoc agit; vel ob condemnationem eorum qui invocant, vel utilitatem eorum qui vident et audiunt, conceditur. | Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes the gift of prophecy is given to a man both for the good of others, and in order to enlighten his own mind; and such are those whom Divine wisdom, "conveying itself" by sanctifying grace to their minds, "maketh the friends of God, and prophets." Others, however, receive the gift of prophecy merely for the good of others. Hence Jerome commenting on Mt. 7:22, says: "Sometimes prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons are accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but either to the invoking the name of Christ, or to the condemnation of those who invoke, and for the good of those who see and hear." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Gregorius, exponens illud, dicit dum audita superna caelestia amamus, amata iam novimus, quia amor ipse notitia est. Omnia ergo eis nota fecerat, quia, a terrenis desideriis immutati, amoris summi facibus ardebant. Et hoc modo non revelantur semper secreta divina prophetis. | Reply to Objection 2: Gregory [*Hom. xxvii in Ev.] expounding this passage [*Jn. 15:15] says: "Since we love the lofty things of heaven as soon as we hear them, we know them as soon as we love them, for to love is to know. Accordingly He had made all things known to them, because having renounced earthly desires they were kindled by the torches of perfect love." In this way the Divine secrets are not always revealed to prophets. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod non omnes mali sunt lupi rapaces, sed solum illi qui intendunt aliis nocere, dicit enim Chrysostomus, super Matth., quod Catholici doctores, etsi fuerint peccatores, servi quidem carnis dicuntur, non tamen lupi rapaces, quia non habent propositum perdere Christianos. Et quia prophetia ordinatur ad utilitatem aliorum, manifestum est tales esse falsos prophetas, quia ad hoc non mittuntur a Deo. | Reply to Objection 3: Not all wicked men are ravening wolves, but only those whose purpose is to injure others. For Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, among the works of St. John Chrysostom, and falsely ascribed to him] that "Catholic teachers, though they be sinners, are called slaves of the flesh, but never ravening wolves, because they do not purpose the destruction of Christians." And since prophecy is directed to the good of others, it is manifest that such are false prophets, because they are not sent for this purpose by God. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod dona divina non semper dantur optimis simpliciter, sed quandoque illis qui sunt optimi quantum ad talis doni perceptionem. Et sic Deus donum prophetiae illis dat quibus optimum iudicat dare. | Reply to Objection 4: God's gifts are not always bestowed on those who are simply the best, but sometimes are vouchsafed to those who are best as regards the receiving of this or that gift. Accordingly God grants the gift of prophecy to those whom He judges best to give it to. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla prophetia sit a Daemonibus. Prophetia enim est divina revelatio, ut Cassiodorus dicit. Sed illud quod fit a Daemone, non est divinum. Ergo nulla prophetia potest esse a Daemone. | Objection 1: It would seem that no prophecy comes from the demons. For prophecy is "a Divine revelation," according to Cassiodorus [*Prol. in Psalt. i]. But that which is done by a demon is not Divine. Therefore no prophecy can be from a demon. |
| Praeterea, ad propheticam cognitionem requiritur aliqua illuminatio, ut supra dictum est. Sed Daemones non illuminant intellectum humanum, ut supra dictum est in primo. Ergo nulla prophetia potest esse a Daemonibus. |
Objection 2: Further, some kind of enlightenment is requisite for prophetic knowledge, as stated above (Question [171], Articles [2],3). Now the demons do not enlighten the human intellect, as stated above in the FP, Question [109], Article [3]. Therefore no prophecy can come from the demons. |
| Praeterea, non est efficax signum quod etiam ad contraria se habet. Sed prophetia est signum confirmationis fidei, unde super illud Rom. XII, sive prophetiam secundum rationem fidei, dicit Glossa, nota quod in numeratione gratiarum a prophetia incipit, quae est prima probatio quod fides nostra sit rationabilis, quia credentes, accepto spiritu, prophetabant. Non ergo prophetia a Daemonibus dari potest. | Objection 3: Further, a sign is worthless if it betokens contraries. Now prophecy is a sign in confirmation of faith; wherefore a gloss on Rm. 12:6, "Either prophecy to be used according to the rule of faith," says: "Observe that in reckoning the graces, he begins with prophecy, which is the first proof of the reasonableness of our faith; since believers, after receiving the Spirit, prophesied." Therefore prophecy cannot be bestowed by the demons. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur III Reg. XVIII, congrega ad me universum Israel in monte Carmeli, et prophetas Baal trecentos quinquaginta, prophetasque lucorum quadringentos, qui comedunt de mensa Iezabel. Sed tales erant Daemonum cultores. Ergo videtur quod etiam a Daemonibus sit aliqua prophetia. |
On the contrary, It is written (3 Kgs. 18:19): "Gather unto me all Israel unto mount Carmel, and the prophets of Baal four hundred and fifty, and the prophets of the grove four hundred, who eat at Jezebel's table." Now these were worshippers of demons. Therefore it would seem that there is also a prophecy from the demons. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, prophetia importat cognitionem quandam procul existentem a cognitione humana. Manifestum est autem quod intellectus superioris ordinis aliqua cognoscere potest quae sunt remota a cognitione intellectus inferioris. Supra intellectum autem humanum est non solum intellectus divinus, sed etiam intellectus Angelorum bonorum et malorum, secundum naturae ordinem. Et ideo quaedam cognoscunt Daemones, etiam sua naturali cognitione, quae sunt remota ab hominum cognitione, quae possunt hominibus revelare. Simpliciter autem et maxime remota sunt quae solus Deus cognoscit. |
I answer that, As stated above (Question [171], Article [1]), prophecy denotes knowledge far removed from human knowledge. Now it is evident that an intellect of a higher order can know some things that are far removed from the knowledge of an inferior intellect. Again, above the human intellect there is not only the Divine intellect, but also the intellects of good and bad angels according to the order of nature. Hence the demons, even by their natural knowledge, know certain things remote from men's knowledge, which they can reveal to men: although those things which God alone knows are remote simply and most of all. |
| Et ideo prophetia proprie et simpliciter dicta fit solum per revelationem divinam. Sed et ipsa revelatio facta per Daemones, potest secundum quid dici prophetia. Unde illi quibus aliquid per Daemones revelatur, non dicuntur in Scripturis prophetae simpliciter, sed cum aliqua additione, puta, prophetae falsi, vel, prophetae idolorum. Unde Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., cum malus spiritus arripit hominem in haec, scilicet visa aut daemoniacos facit, aut arreptitios, aut falsos prophetas. | Accordingly prophecy, properly and simply, is conveyed by Divine revelations alone; yet the revelation which is made by the demons may be called prophecy in a restricted sense. Wherefore those men to whom something is revealed by the demons are styled in the Scriptures as prophets, not simply, but with an addition, for instance as "false prophets," or "prophets of idols." Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19): "When the evil spirit lays hold of a man for such purposes as these," namely visions, "he makes him either devilish, or possessed, or a false prophet." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Cassiodorus ibi definit prophetiam proprie et simpliciter dictam. | Reply to Objection 1: Cassiodorus is here defining prophecy in its proper and simple acceptation. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Daemones ea quae sciunt hominibus manifestant, non quidem per illuminationem intellectus, sed per aliquam imaginariam visionem, aut etiam sensibiliter colloquendo. Et in hoc deficit haec prophetia a vera. | Reply to Objection 2: The demons reveal what they know to men, not by enlightening the intellect, but by an imaginary vision, or even by audible speech; and in this way this prophecy differs from true prophecy. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod aliquibus signis, etiam exterioribus, discerni potest prophetia Daemonum a prophetia divina. Unde dicit Chrysostomus, super Matth., quod quidam prophetant in spiritu Diaboli, quales sunt divinatores, sed sic discernuntur, quoniam Diabolus interdum falsa dicit, spiritus sanctus nunquam. Unde dicitur Deut. XVIII, si tacita cogitatione responderis, quomodo possum intelligere verbum quod non est locutus dominus? Hoc habebis signum, quod in nomine domini propheta ille praedixerit, et non evenerit, hoc dominus non est locutus. |
Reply to Objection 3: The prophecy of the demons can be distinguished from Divine prophecy by certain, and even outward, signs. Hence Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that "some prophesy by the spirit of the devil, such as diviners, but they may be discerned by the fact that the devil sometimes utters what is false, the Holy Ghost never." Wherefore it is written (Dt. 18:21,22): "If in silent thought thou answer: How shall I know the word that the Lord hath spoken? Thou shalt have this sign: Whatsoever that same prophet foretelleth in the name of the Lord, and it come not to pass, that thing the Lord hath not spoken." |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prophetae Daemonum nunquam vera praedicant. Dicit enim Ambrosius quod omne verum, a quocumque dicatur, a spiritu sancto est. Sed prophetae Daemonum non loquuntur a spiritu sancto, quia non est conventio Christi ad Belial, ut dicitur II ad Cor. VI. Ergo videtur quod tales nunquam vera praenuntiant. |
Objection 1: It would seem that the prophets of the demons never foretell the truth. For Ambrose [*Hilary the Deacon (Ambrosiaster) on 1 Cor. 12:3] says that "Every truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from the Holy Ghost." Now the prophets of the demons do not speak from the Holy Ghost, because "there is no concord between Christ and Belial [*'What concord hath Christ with Belial?']" (2 Cor. 6:15). Therefore it would seem that they never foretell the truth. |
| Praeterea, sicut veri prophetae inspirantur a spiritu veritatis, ita prophetae Daemonum inspirantur a spiritu mendacii, secundum illud III Reg. ult., egrediar, et ero spiritus mendax in ore omnium prophetarum eius. Sed prophetae inspirati a spiritu sancto nunquam loquuntur falsum, ut supra habitum est. Ergo prophetae Daemonum nunquam loquuntur verum. |
Objection 2: Further, just as true prophets are inspired by the Spirit of truth, so the prophets of the demons are inspired by the spirit of untruth, according to 3 Kgs. 22:22, "I will go forth, and be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets." Now the prophets inspired by the Holy Ghost never speak false, as stated above (Question [111], Article [6]). Therefore the prophets of the demons never speak truth. |
| Praeterea, Ioan. VIII dicitur de Diabolo quod, cum loquitur mendacium, ex propriis loquitur, quia Diabolus est mendax, et pater eius, idest mendacii. Sed inspirando prophetas suos Diabolus non loquitur nisi ex propriis, non enim instituitur minister Dei ad veritatem enuntiandam, quia non est conventio lucis ad tenebras, ut dicitur II ad Cor. VI. Ergo prophetae Daemonum nunquam vera praedicunt. |
Objection 3: Further, it is said of the devil (Jn. 8:44) that "when he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own, for the devil is a liar, and the father thereof," i.e. of lying. Now by inspiring his prophets, the devil speaks only of his own, for he is not appointed God's minister to declare the truth, since "light hath no fellowship with darkness [*Vulg.: 'What fellowship hath light with darkness?']" (2 Cor. 6:14). Therefore the prophets of the demons never foretell the truth. |
| Sed contra est quod, Num. XXII, dicit quaedam Glossa quod Balaam divinus erat, Daemonum scilicet ministerio, et arte magica, nonnunquam futura praenoscebat. Sed ipse multa praenuntiavit vera, sicut est id quod habetur Num. XXIV, orietur stella ex Iacob, et consurget virga de Israel. Ergo etiam prophetae Daemonum praenuntiant vera. | On the contrary, A gloss on Num. 22:14, says that "Balaam was a diviner, for he sometimes foreknew the future by help of the demons and the magic art." Now he foretold many true things, for instance that which is to be found in Num. 24:17: "A star shall rise out of Jacob, and a scepter shall spring up from Israel." Therefore even the prophets of the demons foretell the truth. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod sicut se habet bonum in rebus, ita verum in cognitione. Impossibile est autem inveniri aliquid in rebus quod totaliter bono privetur. Unde etiam impossibile est esse aliquam cognitionem quae totaliter sit falsa, absque admixtione alicuius veritatis. Unde et Beda dicit quod nulla falsa est doctrina quae non aliquando aliqua vera falsis intermisceat. Unde et ipsa doctrina Daemonum, qua suos prophetas instruunt, aliqua vera continet, per quae receptibilis redditur, sic enim intellectus ad falsum deducitur per apparentiam veritatis, sicut voluntas ad malum per apparentiam bonitatis. Unde et Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., concessum est Diabolo interdum vera dicere, ut mendacium suum rara veritate commendet. | I answer that, As the good is in relation to things, so is the true in relation to knowledge. Now in things it is impossible to find one that is wholly devoid of good. Wherefore it is also impossible for any knowledge to be wholly false, without some mixture of truth. Hence Bede says [*Comment. in Luc. xvii, 12; Cf. Augustine, Questions. Evang. ii, 40] that "no teaching is so false that it never mingles truth with falsehood." Hence the teaching of the demons, with which they instruct their prophets, contains some truths whereby it is rendered acceptable. For the intellect is led astray to falsehood by the semblance of truth, even as the will is seduced to evil by the semblance of goodness. Wherefore Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]: "The devil is allowed sometimes to speak true things, in order that his unwonted truthfulness may gain credit for his lie." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prophetae Daemonum non semper loquuntur ex Daemonum revelatione, sed interdum ex inspiratione divina, sicut manifeste legitur de Balaam, cui dicitur dominus esse locutus, Num. XXII, licet esset propheta Daemonum. Quia Deus utitur etiam malis ad utilitatem bonorum. Unde et per prophetas Daemonum aliqua vera praenuntiat, tum ut credibilior fiat veritas, quae etiam ex adversariis testimonium habet; tum etiam quia, dum homines talibus credunt, per eorum dicta magis ad veritatem inducuntur. Unde etiam Sibyllae multa vera praedixerunt de Christo. Sed et quando prophetae Daemonum a Daemonibus instruuntur, aliqua vera praedicunt, quandoque quidem virtute propriae naturae, cuius auctor est spiritus sanctus; quandoque etiam revelatione bonorum spirituum, ut patet per Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt. Et sic etiam illud verum quod Daemones enuntiant, a spiritu sancto est. |
Reply to Objection 1: The prophets of the demons do not always speak from the demons' revelation, but sometimes by Divine inspiration. This was evidently the case with Balaam, of whom we read that the Lord spoke to him (Num. 22:12), though he was a prophet of the demons, because God makes use even of the wicked for the profit of the good. Hence He foretells certain truths even by the demons' prophets, both that the truth may be rendered more credible, since even its foes bear witness to it, and also in order that men, by believing such men, may be more easily led on to truth. Wherefore also the Sibyls foretold many true things about Christ. |
| Yet even when the demons' prophets are instructed by the demons, they foretell the truth, sometimes by virtue of their own nature, the author of which is the Holy Ghost, and sometimes by revelation of the good spirits, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19): so that even then this truth which the demons proclaim is from the Holy Ghost. | |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod verus propheta semper inspiratur a spiritu veritatis, in quo nihil est falsitatis, et ideo nunquam dicit falsum. Propheta autem falsitatis non semper instruitur a spiritu falsitatis, sed quandoque etiam inspiratur a spiritu veritatis. Ipse etiam spiritus falsitatis quandoque enuntiat vera, quandoque falsa, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: A true prophet is always inspired by the Spirit of truth, in Whom there is no falsehood, wherefore He never says what is not true; whereas a false prophet is not always instructed by the spirit of untruth, but sometimes even by the Spirit of truth. Even the very spirit of untruth sometimes declares true things, sometimes false, as stated above. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod propria Daemonum esse dicuntur illa quae habent a seipsis, scilicet mendacia et peccata. Quae autem pertinent ad propriam naturam, non habent a seipsis, sed a Deo. Per virtutem autem propriae naturae quandoque vera praenuntiant, ut dictum est. Utitur etiam eis Deus ad veritatis manifestationem per ipsos fiendam, dum divina mysteria eis per Angelos revelantur, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3: Those things are called the demons' own, which they have of themselves, namely lies and sins; while they have, not of themselves but of God, those things which belong to them by nature: and it is by virtue of their own nature that they sometimes foretell the truth, as stated above (ad 1). Moreover God makes use of them to make known the truth which is to be accomplished through them, by revealing Divine mysteries to them through the angels, as already stated (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19; FP, Question [109], Article [4], ad 1). |