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| Deinde considerandum est de potentia animae Christi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | We must now consider the power of Christ's soul; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum habuerit omnipotentiam simpliciter. | (1) Whether He had omnipotence simply? |
| Secundo, utrum habuerit omnipotentiam respectu corporalium creaturarum. | (2) Whether He had omnipotence with regard to corporeal creatures? |
| Tertio, utrum habuerit omnipotentiam respectu proprii corporis. | (3) Whether He had omnipotence with regard to His own body? |
| Quarto, utrum habuerit omnipotentiam respectu executionis propriae voluntatis. | (4) Whether He had omnipotence as regards the execution of His own will? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi habuit omnipotentiam. Dicit enim Ambrosius, super Luc., potentiam quam Dei filius naturaliter habet, homo erat ex tempore accepturus. Sed hoc praecipue videtur esse secundum animam, quae est potior pars hominis. Cum ergo filius Dei ab aeterno omnipotentiam habuerit, videtur quod anima Christi ex tempore omnipotentiam acceperit. | Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had omnipotence. For Ambrose [*Gloss, Ord.] says on Lk. 1:32: "The power which the Son of God had naturally, the Man was about to receive in time." Now this would seem to regard the soul principally, since it is the chief part of man. Hence since the Son of God had omnipotence from all eternity, it would seem that the soul of Christ received omnipotence in time. |
| Praeterea, sicut potentia Dei est infinita, sic et eius scientia. Sed anima Christi habet omnium scientiam eorum quae scit Deus quodammodo, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam habet omnem potentiam. Et ita est omnipotens. |
Objection 2: Further, as the power of God is infinite, so is His knowledge. But the soul of Christ in a manner had the knowledge of all that God knows, as was said above (Question [10], Article [2]). Therefore He had all power; and thus He was omnipotent. |
| Praeterea, anima Christi habet omnem scientiam. Sed scientiarum quaedam est practica, quaedam speculativa. Ergo habet eorum quae scit scientiam practicam, ut scilicet sciat facere ea quae scit. Et sic videtur quod omnia facere possit. | Objection 3: Further, the soul of Christ has all knowledge. Now knowledge is either practical or speculative. Therefore He has a practical knowledge of what He knows, i.e. He knew how to do what He knows; and thus it seems that He can do all things. |
| Sed contra est, quod proprium est Dei, non potest alicui creaturae convenire. Sed proprium est Dei esse omnipotentem, secundum illud Exodi XV, iste Deus meus, et glorificabo eum; et postea subditur, omnipotens nomen eius. Ergo anima Christi, cum sit creatura, non habet omnipotentiam. | On the contrary, What is proper to God cannot belong to any creature. But it is proper to God to be omnipotent, according to Ex. 15:2,3: "He is my God and I will glorify Him," and further on, "Almighty is His name." Therefore the soul of Christ, as being a creature, has not omnipotence. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in mysterio incarnationis ita facta est unio in persona quod tamen remansit distinctio naturarum, utraque scilicet natura retinente id quod sibi est proprium. Potentia autem activa cuiuslibet rei sequitur formam ipsius, quae est principium agendi. Forma autem vel est ipsa natura rei, sicut in simplicibus, vel est constituens ipsam rei naturam, sicut in his quae sunt composita ex materia et forma. Unde manifestum est quod potentia activa cuiuslibet rei consequitur naturam ipsius. |
I answer that, As was said above (Question [2], Article [1]; Question [10], Article [1]) in the mystery of the Incarnation the union in person so took place that there still remained the distinction of natures, each nature still retaining what belonged to it. Now the active principle of a thing follows its form, which is the principle of action. But the form is either the very nature of the thing, as in simple things; or is the constituent of the nature of the thing; as in such as are composed of matter and form. |
| Et per hunc modum omnipotentia consequenter se habet ad divinam naturam. Quia enim natura divina est ipsum esse Dei incircumscriptum, ut patet per Dionysium, V cap. de Div. Nom., inde est quod habet potentiam activam respectu omnium quae possunt habere rationem entis, quod est habere omnipotentiam, sicut et quaelibet alia res habet potentiam activam respectu eorum ad quae se extendit perfectio suae naturae, sicut calidum ad calefaciendum. Cum igitur anima Christi sit pars humanae naturae, impossibile est quod habeat omnipotentiam. | And it is in this way that omnipotence flows, so to say, from the Divine Nature. For since the Divine Nature is the very uncircumscribed Being of God, as is plain from Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), it has an active power over everything that can have the nature of being; and this is to have omnipotence; just as every other thing has an active power over such things as the perfection of its nature extends to; as what is hot gives heat. Therefore since the soul of Christ is a part of human nature, it cannot possibly have omnipotence. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo accepit ex tempore omnipotentiam quam filius Dei habuit ab aeterno, per ipsam unionem personae, ex qua factum est ut, sicut homo dicitur Deus, ita dicatur omnipotens, non quasi sit alia omnipotentia hominis quam filii Dei sicut nec alia deitas; sed eo quod est una persona Dei et hominis. | Reply to Objection 1: By union with the Person, the Man receives omnipotence in time, which the Son of God had from eternity; the result of which union is that as the Man is said to be God, so is He said to be omnipotent; not that the omnipotence of the Man is distinct (as neither is His Godhead) from that of the Son of God, but because there is one Person of God and man. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod alia ratio est de scientia, et de potentia activa, sicut quidam dicunt. Nam potentia activa consequitur ipsam naturam rei, eo quod actio consideratur ut egrediens ab agente. Scientia autem non semper habetur per ipsam essentiam scientis, sed potest haberi per assimilationem scientis ad res scitas secundum similitudines susceptas. Sed haec ratio non videtur sufficere. Quia sicut aliquis potest cognoscere per similitudinem susceptam ab alio, ita etiam potest agere per formam ab alio susceptam, sicut aqua vel ferrum calefacit per calorem susceptum ab igne. Non igitur per hoc prohibetur quin, sicut anima Christi per similitudines omnium rerum sibi a Deo inditas potest omnia cognoscere, ita per easdem similitudines possit ea facere. | Reply to Objection 2: According to some, knowledge and active power are not in the same ratio; for an active power flows from the very nature of the thing, inasmuch as action is considered to come forth from the agent; but knowledge is not always possessed by the very essence or form of the knower, since it may be had by assimilation of the knower to the thing known by the aid of received species. But this reason seems not to suffice, because even as we may understand by a likeness obtained from another, so also may we act by a form obtained from another, as water or iron heats, by heat borrowed from fire. Hence there would be no reason why the soul of Christ, as it can know all things by the similitudes of all things impressed upon it by God, cannot do these things by the same similitudes. |
| Est ergo ulterius considerandum quod id quod a superiori natura in inferiori recipitur, habetur per inferiorem modum, non enim calor in eadem perfectione et virtute recipitur ab aqua qua est in igne. Quia igitur anima Christi inferioris naturae est quam divina natura, similitudines rerum non recipiuntur in ipsa anima Christi secundum eandem perfectionem et virtutem secundum quam sunt in natura divina. Et inde est quod scientia animae Christi est inferior scientia divina, quantum ad modum cognoscendi, quia Deus perfectius cognoscit quam anima Christi; et etiam quantum ad numerum scitorum, quia anima Christi non cognoscit omnes res quas Deus potest facere, quae tamen Deus cognoscit scientia simplicis intelligentiae; licet cognoscat omnia praesentia, praeterita et futura, quae Deus cognoscit scientia visionis. Et similiter similitudines rerum animae Christi inditae non adaequant virtutem divinam in agendo, ut scilicet possint omnia agere quae Deus potest; vel etiam eo modo agere sicut Deus agit, qui agit per virtutem infinitam, cuius creatura non est capax. Nulla autem res est ad cuius cognitionem aliqualiter habendam requiratur virtus infinita, licet aliquis modus cognoscendi sit virtutis infinitae, quaedam tamen sunt quae non possunt fieri nisi a virtute infinita sicut creatio et alia huiusmodi, ut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt. Et ideo anima Christi, cum sit creatura et virtutis finitae, potest quidem omnia cognoscere, sed non per omnem modum, non autem potest omnia facere, quod pertinet ad rationem omnipotentiae et inter cetera, manifestum est quod non potest creare seipsam. | It has, therefore, to be further considered that what is received in the lower nature from the higher is possessed in an inferior manner; for heat is not received by water in the perfection and strength it had in fire. Therefore, since the soul of Christ is of an inferior nature to the Divine Nature, the similitudes of things are not received in the soul of Christ in the perfection and strength they had in the Divine Nature. And hence it is that the knowledge of Christ's soul is inferior to Divine knowledge as regards the manner of knowing, for God knows (things) more perfectly than the soul of Christ; and also as regards the number of things known, since the soul of Christ does not know all that God can do, and these God knows by the knowledge of simple intelligence; although it knows all things present, past, and future, which God knows by the knowledge of vision. So, too, the similitudes of things infused into Christ's soul do not equal the Divine power in acting, i.e. so as to do all that God can do, or to do in the same manner as God does, Who acts with an infinite might whereof the creature is not capable. Now there is no thing, to know which in some way an infinite power is needed, although a certain kind of knowledge belongs to an infinite power; yet there are things which can be done only by an infinite power, as creation and the like, as is plain from what has been said in the FP, Question [45]. Hence Christ's soul which, being a creature, is finite in might, can know, indeed, all things, but not in every way; yet it cannot do all things, which pertains to the nature of omnipotence; and, amongst other things, it is clear it cannot create itself. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod anima Christi habuit et scientiam practicam et speculativam, non tamen oportet quod omnium illorum habeat scientiam practicam quorum habuit scientiam speculativam. Ad scientiam enim speculativam habendam sufficit sola conformitas vel assimilatio scientis ad rem scitam, ad scientiam autem practicam requiritur quod formae rerum quae sunt in intellectu sint factivae. Plus autem est habere formam et imprimere formam habitam in alterum, quam solum habere formam, sicut plus est lucere et illuminare quam solum lucere. Et inde est quod anima Christi habet quidem speculativam scientiam creandi, scit enim qualiter Deus creat, sed non habet huius modi scientiam practicam, quia non habet scientiam creationis factivam. | Reply to Objection 3: Christ's soul has practical and speculative knowledge; yet it is not necessary that it should have practical knowledge of those things of which it has speculative knowledge. Because for speculative knowledge a mere conformity or assimilation of the knower to the thing known suffices; whereas for practical knowledge it is required that the forms of the things in the intellect should be operative. Now to have a form and to impress this form upon something else is more than merely to have the form; as to be lightsome and to enlighten is more than merely to be lightsome. Hence the soul of Christ has a speculative knowledge of creation (for it knows the mode of God's creation), but it has no practical knowledge of this mode, since it has no knowledge operative of creation. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi habeat omnipotentiam respectu immutationis creaturarum. Dicit enim ipse Matth. ult., data est mihi omnis potestas in caelo et in terra. Sed nomine caeli et terrae intelligitur omnis creatura, ut patet cum dicitur, Gen. I, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Ergo videtur quod anima Christi habeat omnipotentiam respectu immutationis creaturarum. |
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures. For He Himself says (Mt. 28:18): "All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth." Now by the words "heaven and earth" are meant all creatures, as is plain from Gn. 1:1: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Therefore it seems that the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures. |
| Praeterea, anima Christi est perfectior qualibet creatura. Sed quaelibet creatura potest moveri ab aliqua alia creatura, dicit enim Augustinus, in III de Trin., quod sicut corpora grossiora et inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine reguntur, ita omnia corpora per spiritum vitae rationalem; et spiritus vitae rationalis desertor atque peccator per spiritum vitae rationalem, pium et iustum. Anima autem Christi etiam ipsos supremos spiritus movet, illuminando eos, ut dicit Dionysius, VII cap. Cael. Hier. Ergo videtur quod anima Christi habeat omnipotentiam respectu immutationis creaturarum. | Objection 2: Further, the soul of Christ is the most perfect of all creatures. But every creature can be moved by another creature; for Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "even as the denser and lower bodies are ruled in a fixed way by the subtler and stronger bodies; so are all bodies by the spirit of life, and the irrational spirit of life by the rational spirit of life, and the truant and sinful rational spirit of life by the rational, loyal, and righteous spirit of life." But the soul of Christ moves even the highest spirits, enlightening them, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it seems that the soul of Christ has omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures. |
| Praeterea, anima Christi habuit plenissime gratiam miraculorum seu virtutum, sicut et ceteras gratias. Sed omnis immutatio creaturae potest ad gratiam miraculorum pertinere, cum etiam miraculose caelestia corpora a suo ordine immutata fuerint, sicut probat Dionysius, in epistola ad Polycarpum. Ergo anima Christi habuit omnipotentiam respectu immutationis creaturarum. | Objection 3: Further, Christ's soul had in its highest degree the "grace of miracles" or works of might. But every transmutation of the creature can belong to the grace of miracles; since even the heavenly bodies were miraculously changed from their course, as Dionysius proves (Ep. ad Polycarp). Therefore Christ's soul had omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures. |
| Sed contra est quod eiusdem est transmutare creaturas cuius est conservare eas. Sed hoc est solius Dei, secundum illud Heb. I, portans omnia verbo virtutis suae. Ergo solius Dei est habere omnipotentiam respectu immutationis creaturarum. Non ergo hoc convenit animae Christi. | On the contrary, To transmute creatures belongs to Him Who preserves them. Now this belongs to God alone, according to Heb. 1:3: "Upholding all things by the word of His power." Therefore God alone has omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures. Therefore this does not belong to Christ's soul. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod hic duplici distinctione est opus. Quarum prima est ex parte transmutationis creaturarum, quae triplex est. Una quidem est naturalis, quae scilicet fit a proprio agente secundum ordinem naturae. Alia vero est miraculosa, quae fit ab agente supernaturali, supra consuetum ordinem et cursum naturae, sicut resuscitatio mortuorum. Tertia autem est secundum quod omnis creatura vertibilis est in nihil. | I answer that, Two distinctions are here needed. of these the first is with respect to the transmutation of creatures, which is three-fold. The first is natural, being brought about by the proper agent naturally; the second is miraculous, being brought about by a supernatural agent above the wonted order and course of nature, as to raise the dead; the third is inasmuch as every creature may be brought to nothing. |
| Secunda autem distinctio est accipienda ex parte animae Christi, quae dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum propriam naturam et virtutem, sive naturalem sive gratuitam. Alio modo, prout est instrumentum verbi Dei sibi personaliter uniti. Si ergo loquamur de anima Christi secundum propriam naturam et virtutem, sive naturalem sive gratuitam, potentiam habuit ad illos effectus faciendos qui sunt animae convenientes, puta ad gubernandum corpus, et ad disponendum actus humanos; et etiam ad illuminandum, per gratiae et scientiae plenitudinem, omnes creaturas rationales ab eius perfectione deficientes, per modum quo hoc est conveniens creaturae rationali. Si autem loquamur de anima Christi secundum quod est instrumentum verbi sibi uniti, sic habuit instrumentalem virtutem ad omnes immutationes miraculosas faciendas ordinabiles ad incarnationis finem, qui est instaurare omnia, sive quae in caelis sive quae in terris sunt. Immutationes vero creaturarum secundum quod sunt vertibiles in nihil, correspondent creationi rerum, prout scilicet producuntur ex nihilo. Et ideo, sicut solus Deus potest creare, ita solus potest creaturas in nihilum redigere, qui etiam solus eas in esse conservat, ne in nihilum decidant. Sic ergo dicendum est quod anima Christi non habet omnipotentiam respectu immutationis creaturarum. | The second distinction has to do with Christ's soul, which may be looked at in two ways: first in its proper nature and with its power of nature or of grace; secondly, as it is the instrument of the Word of God, personally united to Him. Therefore if we speak of the soul of Christ in its proper nature and with its power of nature or of grace, it had power to cause those effects proper to a soul (e.g. to rule the body and direct human acts, and also, by the fulness of grace and knowledge to enlighten all rational creatures falling short of its perfection), in a manner befitting a rational creature. But if we speak of the soul of Christ as it is the instrument of the Word united to Him, it had an instrumental power to effect all the miraculous transmutations ordainable to the end of the Incarnation, which is "to re-establish all things that are in heaven and on earth" [*Eph. 1:10]. But the transmutation of creatures, inasmuch as they may be brought to nothing, corresponds to their creation, whereby they were brought from nothing. And hence even as God alone can create, so, too, He alone can bring creatures to nothing, and He alone upholds them in being, lest they fall back to nothing. And thus it must be said that the soul of Christ had not omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Hieronymus, illi potestas data est qui paulo ante crucifixus et sepultus in tumulo, qui postea resurrexit, idest, Christo secundum quod homo. Dicitur autem sibi omnis potestas data ratione unionis, per quam factum est ut homo esset omnipotens, ut supra dictum est. Et quamvis hoc ante resurrectionem innotuerit Angelis, post resurrectionem innotuit omnibus hominibus, ut Remigius dicit. Tunc autem dicuntur res fieri, quando innotescunt. Et ideo post resurrectionem dominus dicit sibi potestatem esse datam in caelo et in terra. |
Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says (on the text quoted): "Power is given Him," i.e. to Christ as man, "Who a little while before was crucified, buried in the tomb, and afterwards rose again." But power is said to have been given Him, by reason of the union whereby it was brought about that a Man was omnipotent, as was said above (Article [1], ad 1). And although this was made known to the angels before the Resurrection, yet after the Resurrection it was made known to all men, as Remigius says (cf. Catena Aurea). Now, "things are said to happen when they are made known" [*Hugh of St. Victor: Qq. in Ep. ad Philip.]. Hence after the Resurrection our Lord says "that all power is given" to Him "in heaven and on earth." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet omnis creatura sit mutabilis ab alia creatura, praeter supremum Angelum, qui tamen potest illuminari ab anima Christi; non tamen omnis immutatio quae potest fieri circa creaturam, potest fieri a creatura; sed quaedam immutationes possunt fieri a solo Deo. Quaecumque tamen immutationes creaturarum possunt fieri per creaturas, possunt etiam fieri per animam Christi secundum quod est instrumentum verbi. Non autem secundum propriam naturam et virtutem, quia quaedam huiusmodi immutationum non pertinent ad animam, neque quantum ad ordinem naturae neque quantum ad ordinem gratiae. | Reply to Objection 2: Although every creature is transmutable by some other creature, except, indeed, the highest angel, and even it can be enlightened by Christ's soul; yet not every transmutation that can be made in a creature can be made by a creature; since some transmutations can be made by God alone. Yet all transmutations that can be made in creatures can be made by the soul of Christ, as the instrument of the Word, but not in its proper nature and power, since some of these transmutations pertain to the soul neither in the order of nature nor in the order of grace. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est in secunda parte, gratia virtutum, seu miraculorum, datur animae alicuius sancti, non ut propria virtute eius, sed ut per virtutem divinam huiusmodi miracula fiant. Et haec quidem gratia excellentissime data est animae Christi, ut scilicet non solum ipse miracula faceret, sed etiam hanc gratiam in alios transfunderet. Unde dicitur, Matth. X, quod, convocatis duodecim discipulis, dedit illis potestatem spirituum immundorum, ut eiicerent eos; et curarent omnem languorem et omnem infirmitatem. |
Reply to Objection 3: As was said in the SS, Question [178], Article [1], ad 1, the grace of mighty works or miracles is given to the soul of a saint, so that these miracles are wrought not by his own, but by Divine power. Now this grace was bestowed on Christ's soul most excellently, i.e. not only that He might work miracles, but also that He might communicate this grace to others. Hence it is written (Mt. 10:1) that, "having called His twelve disciples together, He gave them power over unclean spirits, to cast them out, and to heal all manner of diseases, and all manner of infirmities." |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi habuerit omnipotentiam respectu proprii corporis. Dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod omnia naturalia fuerunt Christo voluntaria, volens enim esurivit, volens sitivit, volens timuit, volens mortuus est. Sed ex hoc Deus dicitur omnipotens quia omnia quaecumque voluit, fecit. Ergo videtur quod anima Christi habuit omnipotentiam respectu naturalium operationum proprii corporis. |
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's soul had omnipotence with regard to His own body. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 20,23) that "all natural things were voluntary to Christ; He willed to hunger, He willed to thirst, He willed to fear, He willed to die." Now God is called omnipotent because "He hath done all things whatsoever He would" (Ps. 113:11). Therefore it seems that Christ's soul had omnipotence with regard to the natural operations of the body. |
| Praeterea, in Christo fuit perfectius humana natura quam in Adam, in quo, secundum originalem iustitiam quam habuit in statu innocentiae, corpus habebat omnino subiectum animae, ut nihil in corpore posset accidere contra animae voluntatem. Ergo multo magis anima Christi habuit omnipotentiam respectu sui corporis. | Objection 2: Further, human nature was more perfect in Christ than in Adam, who had a body entirely subject to the soul, so that nothing could happen to the body against the will of the soul---and this on account of the original justice which it had in the state of innocence. Much more, therefore, had Christ's soul omnipotence with regard to His body. |
| Praeterea, ad imaginationem animae naturaliter corpus immutatur; et tanto magis, quanto anima fuerit fortioris imaginationis; ut in prima parte habitum est. Sed anima Christi habuit virtutem perfectissimam, et quantum ad imaginationem, et quantum ad alias vires. Ergo anima Christi fuit omnipotens in respectu ad corpus proprium. | Objection 3: Further, the body is naturally changed by the imaginations of the soul; and so much more changed, the stronger the soul's imagination, as was said in the FP, Question [117], Article [3], ad 3. Now the soul of Christ had most perfect strength as regards both the imagination and the other powers. Therefore the soul of Christ was omnipotent with regard to His own body. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Heb. II, quod debuit per omnia fratribus assimilari, et praecipue in his quae pertinent ad conditionem humanae naturae. Sed ad conditionem humanae naturae pertinet quod valetudo corporis, et eius nutritio et augmentum, imperio rationis, seu voluntati, non subdantur, quia naturalia soli Deo, qui est auctor naturae, subduntur. Ergo nec in Christo subdebantur. Non igitur anima Christi fuit omnipotens respectu proprii corporis. |
On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 2:17) that "it behooved Him in all things to be made like unto His brethren," and especially as regards what belongs to the condition of human nature. But it belongs to the condition of human nature that the health of the body and its nourishment and growth are not subject to the bidding of reason or will, since natural things are subject to God alone Who is the author of nature. Therefore they were not subject in Christ. Therefore Christ's soul was not omnipotent with regard to His own body. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, anima Christi potest dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum propriam virtutem et naturam. Et hoc modo, sicut non poterat immutare exteriora corpora a cursu et ordine naturae, ita etiam non poterat immutare proprium corpus a naturali dispositione, quia anima, secundum propriam naturam, habet determinatam proportionem ad suum corpus. Alio modo potest considerari anima Christi secundum quod est instrumentum unitum verbo Dei in persona. Et sic subdebatur eius potestati totaliter omnis dispositio proprii corporis. Quia tamen virtus actionis non proprie attribuitur instrumento, sed principali agenti, talis omnipotentia attribuitur magis ipsi verbo Dei quam animae Christi. |
I answer that, As stated above (Article [2]), Christ's soul may be viewed in two ways. First, in its proper nature and power; and in this way, as it was incapable of making exterior bodies swerve from the course and order of nature, so, too, was it incapable of changing its own body from its natural disposition, since the soul, of its own nature, has a determinate relation to its body. Secondly, Christ's soul may be viewed as an instrument united in person to God's Word; and thus every disposition of His own body was wholly subject to His power. Nevertheless, since the power of an action is not properly attributed to the instrument, but to the principal agent, this omnipotence is attributed to the Word of God rather than to Christ's soul. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Damasceni est intelligendum quantum ad voluntatem divinam Christi. Quia, sicut ipse in praecedenti capitulo dicit, beneplacito divinae voluntatis permittebatur carni pati et operari quae propria. | Reply to Objection 1: This saving of Damascene refers to the Divine will of Christ, since, as he says in the preceding chapter (De Fide Orth. xix, 14,15), it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was allowed to suffer and do what was proper to it. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod non pertinebat hoc ad originalem iustitiam quam Adam habuit in statu innocentiae, quod anima hominis haberet virtutem transmutandi corpus proprium in quamcumque formam, sed quod posset ipsum conservare absque nocumento. Et hanc etiam virtutem Christus assumere potuisset, si voluisset. Sed, cum sint tres status hominum, scilicet innocentiae culpae et gloriae; sicut de statu gloriae assumpsit comprehensionem, et de statu innocentiae immunitatem a peccato, ita et de statu culpae assumpsit necessitatem subiacendi poenalitatibus huius vitae, ut infra dicetur. |
Reply to Objection 2: It was no part of the original justice which Adam had in the state of innocence that a man's soul should have the power of changing his own body to any form, but that it should keep it from any hurt. Yet Christ could have assumed even this power if He had wished. But since man has three states---viz. innocence, sin, and glory, even as from the state of glory He assumed comprehension and from the state of innocence, freedom from sin---so also from the state of sin did He assume the necessity of being under the penalties of this life, as will be said (Question [14], Article [2]). |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod imaginationi, si fortis fuerit, naturaliter obedit corpus quantum ad aliqua. Puta quantum ad casum de trabe in alto posita; quia imaginatio nata est esse principium motus localis, ut dicitur in III de anima. Similiter etiam quantum ad alterationem quae est secundum calorem et frigus, et alia consequentia, eo quod ex imaginatione consequenter natae sunt consequi passiones animae, secundum quas movetur cor, et sic per commotionem spirituum totum corpus alteratur. Aliae vero dispositiones corporales, quae non habent naturalem ordinem ad imaginationem, non transmutantur ab imaginatione, quantumcumque sit fortis, puta figura manus vel pedis, vel aliquid simile. | Reply to Objection 3: If the imagination be strong, the body obeys naturally in some things, e.g. as regards falling from a beam set on high, since the imagination was formed to be a principle of local motion, as is said De Anima iii, 9,10. So, too, as regards alteration in heat and cold, and their consequences; for the passions of the soul, wherewith the heart is moved, naturally follow the imagination, and thus by commotion of the spirits the whole body is altered. But the other corporeal dispositions which have no natural relation to the imagination are not transmuted by the imagination, however strong it is, e.g. the shape of the hand, or foot, or such like. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi non habuerit omnipotentiam respectu executionis propriae voluntatis. Dicitur enim Marc. VII quod, ingressus domum, neminem voluit scire sed non potuit latere. Non ergo potuit exequi in omnibus propositum suae voluntatis. | Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had not omnipotence as regards the execution of His own will. For it is written (Mk. 7:24) that "entering into a house, He would that no man should know it, and He could not be hid." Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His will in all things. |
| Praeterea, praeceptum est signum voluntatis, ut in prima parte dictum est. Sed dominus quaedam facienda praecepit quorum contraria acciderunt, dicitur enim Matth. IX quod caecis illuminatis comminatus est Iesus, dicens, videte ne aliquis sciat, illi autem egressi diffamaverunt illum per totam terram illam. Non ergo in omnibus potuit exequi propositum suae voluntatis. |
Objection 2: Further, a command is a sign of will, as was said in the FP, Question [19], Article [12]. But our Lord commanded certain things to be done, and the contrary came to pass, for it is written (Mt. 9:30, 31) that Jesus strictly charged them whose eyes had been opened, saying: "See that no man know this. But they going out spread His fame abroad in all that country." Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His will in everything. |
| Praeterea, id quod aliquis potest facere, non petit ab alio. Sed dominus petivit a patre, orando, illud quod fieri volebat, dicitur enim Luc. VI quod exivit in montem orare, et erat pernoctans in oratione Dei. Ergo non potuit exequi in omnibus propositum suae voluntatis. |
Objection 3: Further, a man does not ask from another for what he can do himself. But our Lord besought the Father, praying for what He wished to be done, for it is written (Lk. 6:12): "He went out into a mountain to pray, and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God." Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His will in all things. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de quaest. Nov. et Vet. Test., impossibile est ut salvatoris voluntas non impleatur, nec potest velle quod scit fieri non debere. | On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., qu. 77): "It is impossible for the will of the Saviour not to be fulfilled: nor is it possible for Him to will what He knows ought not to come to pass." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod anima Christi dupliciter aliquid voluit. Uno modo, quasi per se implendum. Et sic, dicendum est quod quidquid voluit, potuit. Non enim conveniret sapientiae eius ut aliquid vellet per se facere quod suae voluntati non subiaceret. Alio modo voluit aliquid ut implendum virtute divina, sicut resuscitationem proprii corporis, et alia huiusmodi miraculosa opera. Quae quidem non poterat propria virtute, sed secundum quod erat instrumentum divinitatis, ut dictum est. |
I answer that, Christ's soul willed things in two ways. First, what was to be brought about by Himself; and it must be said that He was capable of whatever He willed thus, since it would not befit His wisdom if He willed to do anything of Himself that was not subject to His will. Secondly, He wished things to be brought about by the Divine power, as the resurrection of His own body and such like miraculous deeds, which He could not effect by His own power, except as the instrument of the Godhead, as was said above (Article [2]). |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de quaest. Nov. et Vet. Test., quod factum est, hoc voluisse dicendus est Christus. Advertendum est enim quod illud in finibus gestum est gentilium, quibus adhuc tempus praedicandi non erat. Ultro tamen venientes ad fidem non suscipere invidiae erat. A suis ergo noluit praedicari, requiri autem se voluit. Et ita factum est. Vel potest dici quod haec voluntas Christi non fuit de eo quod per eum fiendum erat, sed de eo quod erat fiendum per alios, quod non subiacebat humanae voluntati ipsius. Unde in epistola Agathonis Papae, quae est recepta in sexta synodo, legitur, ergone ille omnium conditor ac redemptor, in terris latere volens, non potuit, nisi hoc ad humanam eius voluntatem, quam temporaliter dignatus est assumere, redigatur? | Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., qu. 77): "What came to pass, this Christ must be said to have willed. For it must be remarked that this happened in the country of the Gentiles, to whom it was not yet time to preach. Yet it would have been invidious not to welcome such as came spontaneously for the faith. Hence He did not wish to be heralded by His own, and yet He wished to be sought; and so it came to pass." Or it may be said that this will of Christ was not with regard to what was to be carried out by it, but with regard to what was to be done by others, which did not come under His human will. Hence in the letter of Pope Agatho, which was approved in the Sixth Council [*Third Council of Constantinople, Act. iv], we read: "When He, the Creator and Redeemer of all, wished to be hid and could not, must not this be referred only to His human will which He deigned to assume in time?" |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Gregorius, XIX Moral., per hoc quod dominus praecepit taceri virtutes suas, servis suis se sequentibus exemplum dedit, ut ipsi quidem virtutes suas occultari desiderent, et tamen, ut alii eorum exemplo proficiant, prodantur inviti. Sic ergo praeceptum illud designabat voluntatem ipsius qua humanam gloriam refugiebat, secundum illud Ioan. VIII, ego gloriam meam non quaero. Volebat tamen absolute, praesertim secundum divinam voluntatem, ut publicaretur miraculum factum, propter aliorum utilitatem. | Reply to Objection 2: As Gregory says (Moral. xix), by the fact that "Our Lord charged His mighty works to be kept secret, He gave an example to His servants coming after Him that they should wish their miracles to be hidden; and yet, that others may profit by their example, they are made public against their will." And thus this command signified His will to fly from human glory, according to Jn. 8:50, "I seek not My own glory." Yet He wished absolutely, and especially by His Divine will, that the miracle wrought should be published for the good of others. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus orabat etiam pro his quae virtute divina fienda erant, et pro his etiam quae humana voluntate erat facturus. Quia virtus et operatio animae Christi dependebat a Deo, qui operatur in omnibus velle et perficere, ut dicitur Philipp. II. |
Reply to Objection 3: Christ prayed both for things that were to be brought about by the Divine power, and for what He Himself was to do by His human will, since the power and operation of Christ's soul depended on God, "Who works in all [Vulg.: 'you'], both to will and to accomplish" (Phil. 2:13). |