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| Deinde considerandum est de his quae conveniunt Christo per comparationem ad patrem. Quorum quaedam dicuntur de ipso secundum habitudinem ipsius ad patrem, puta quod est ei subiectus; quod ipsum oravit; quod ei in sacerdotio ministravit. Quaedam vero dicuntur, vel dici possunt, secundum habitudinem patris ad ipsum, puta, si pater eum adoptasset; et quod eum praedestinavit. | We must now consider such things as belong to Christ in relation to the Father. Some of these things are predicated of Him because of His relation to the Father, e.g. that He was subject to Him, that He prayed to Him, that He ministered, to Him by priesthood. And some are predicated, or may be predicated, of Him because of the Father's relation to Him, e.g. that the Father adopted Him and that He predestined Him. |
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Hence we must consider
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| Circa primum quaeruntur duo. | Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum Christus sit subiectus patri. | (1) Whether Christ is subject to the Father? |
| Secundo, utrum sit subiectus sibi ipsi. | (2) Whether He is subject to Himself? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit dicendum Christum esse subiectum patri. Omne enim quod subiicitur Deo patri, est creatura, quia, ut dicitur in libro de Ecclesiast. Dogmat., in Trinitate nihil est serviens neque subiectum. Sed non est simpliciter dicendum quod Christus sit creatura, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam non est simpliciter dicendum quod Christus sit Deo patri subiectus. |
Objection 1: It would seem that we may not say that Christ was subject to the Father. For everything subject to the Father is a creature, since, as is said in De Eccles. Dogm. iv, "in the Trinity there is no dependence or subjection." But we cannot say simply that Christ is a creature, as was stated above (Question [16], Article [8]). Therefore we cannot say simply that Christ is subject to God the Father. |
| Praeterea, ex hoc dicitur aliquid Deo subiectum, quod est eius dominio serviens. Sed humanae naturae in Christo non potest attribui servitus, dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, sciendum quod neque servam ipsam, humanam scilicet naturam Christi, dicere possumus. Servitutis enim et dominationis nomen non naturae sunt cognitiones, sed eorum quae ad aliquid, quemadmodum paternitatis et filiationis. Ergo Christus secundum humanam naturam non est subiectus Deo patri. | Objection 2: Further, a thing is said to be subject to God when it is subservient to His dominion. But we cannot attribute subservience to the human nature of Christ; for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 21): "We must bear in mind that we may not call it" (i.e. Christ's human nature) "a servant; for the words 'subservience' and 'domination' are not names of the nature, but of relations, as the words 'paternity' and 'filiation.'" Hence Christ in His human nature is not subject to God the Father. |
| Praeterea, I Cor. XV dicitur, cum autem subiecta fuerint illi omnia, tunc ipse filius subiectus erit illi qui sibi subiecit omnia. Sed, sicut dicitur Heb. II, nunc necdum videmus ei subiecta omnia. Ergo nondum ipse est subiectus patri, qui ei subiecit omnia. |
Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:28): "And when all things shall be subdued unto Him, then the Son also Himself shall be subject unto Him that put all things under Him." But, as is written (Heb. 2:8): "We see not as yet all things subject to Him." Hence He is not yet subject to the Father, Who has subjected all things to Him. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. XIV, pater maior me est. Et Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., non immerito Scriptura utrumque dicit, aequalem patri filium; et patrem maiorem filio. Illud enim propter formam Dei, hoc autem propter formam servi, sine ulla confusione intelligitur. Sed minor est subiectus maiori. Ergo Christus, secundum formam servi, est patri subiectus. |
On the contrary, Our Lord says (Jn. 14:28), "The Father is greater than I"; and Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): "It is not without reason that the Scripture mentions both, that the Son is equal to the Father and the Father greater than the Son, for the first is said on account of the form of God, and the second on account of the form of a servant, without any confusion." Now the less is subject to the greater. Therefore in the form of a servant Christ is subject to the Father. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod cuilibet habenti aliquam naturam conveniunt ea quae sunt propria illius naturae. Natura autem humana ex sui conditione habet triplicem subiectionem ad Deum. Unam quidem secundum gradum bonitatis, prout scilicet natura divina est ipsa essentia bonitatis, ut patet per Dionysium, I cap. de Div. Nom.; natura autem creata habet quandam participationem divinae bonitatis, quasi radiis illius bonitatis subiecta. Secundo, humana natura subiicitur Deo quantum ad Dei potestatem, prout scilicet humana natura, sicut et quaelibet creatura, subiacet operationi divinae dispositionis. Tertio modo, specialiter humana natura Deo subiicitur per proprium suum actum, inquantum scilicet propria voluntate obedit mandatis eius. Et hanc triplicem subiectionem ad patrem Christus de seipso confitetur. Primam quidem, Matth. XIX, quid me interrogas de bono? Unus est bonus Deus. Ubi Hieronymus dicit quod, quia eum magistrum vocaverat bonum, et non Deum vel Dei filium confessus erat, dixit quamvis sanctum hominem in comparatione Dei non esse bonum. Per quod dedit intelligere quod ipse, secundum humanam naturam, non pertingebat ad gradum bonitatis divinae. Et quia in his quae non mole magna sunt, idem est esse maius quod melius, ut Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin.; ex hac ratione pater dicitur maior Christo secundum humanam naturam. Secunda autem subiectio Christo attribuitur, inquantum omnia quae circa humanitatem Christi acta sunt, divina dispositione gesta creduntur. Unde dicit Dionysius, IV cap. Cael. Hier., quod Christus subiicitur Dei patris ordinationibus. Et haec est subiectio servitutis, secundum quod omnis creatura Deo servit, eius ordinationi subiecta, secundum illud Sap. XVI, creatura tibi factori deserviens. Et secundum hoc etiam filius Dei, Philipp. II, dicitur formam servi accipiens. Tertiam etiam subiectionem attribuit sibi ipsi, Ioan. VIII, dicens, quae placita sunt ei, facio semper. Et haec est subiectio obedientiae. Unde dicitur Philipp. II quod factus est obediens patri usque ad mortem. |
I answer that, Whoever has a nature is competent to have what is proper to that nature. Now human nature from its beginning has a threefold subjection to God. The first regards the degree of goodness, inasmuch as the Divine Nature is the very essence of goodness as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) while a created nature has a participation of the Divine goodness, being subject, so to say, to the rays of this goodness. Secondly, human nature is subject to God, as regards God's power, inasmuch as human nature, even as every creature, is subject to the operation of the Divine ordinance. Thirdly, human nature is especially subject to God through its proper act, inasmuch as by its own will it obeys His command. This triple subjection to God Christ professes of Himself. The first (Mt. 19:17): "Why askest thou Me concerning good? One is good, God." And on this Jerome remarks: "He who had called Him a good master, and had not confessed Him to be God or the Son of God, learns that no man, however holy, is good in comparison with God." And hereby He gave us to understand that He Himself, in His human nature, did not attain to the height of Divine goodness. And because "in such things as are great, but not in bulk, to be great is the same as to be good," as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8), for this reason the Father is said to be greater than Christ in His human nature. The second subjection is attributed to Christ, inasmuch as all that befell Christ is believed to have happened by Divine appointment; hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that Christ "is subject to the ordinance of God the Father." And this is the subjection of subservience, whereby "every creature serves God" (Judith 16:17), being subject to His ordinance, according to Wis. 16:24: "The creature serving Thee the Creator." And in this way the Son of God (Phil. 2:7) is said to have taken "the form of a servant." The third subjection He attributes to Himself, saying (Jn. 8:29): "I do always the things that please Him." And this is the subjection to the Father, of obedience unto death. Hence it is written (Phil. 2:8) that he became "obedient" to the Father "unto death." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut non est simpliciter intelligendum quod Christus sit creatura, sed solum secundum humanam naturam, sive apponatur ei determinatio sive non, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam non est simpliciter intelligendum quod Christus sit subiectus patri, sed solum secundum humanam naturam, etiam si haec determinatio non apponatur. Quam tamen convenientius est apponere, ad evitandum errorem Arii, qui posuit filium minorem patre. |
Reply to Objection 1: As we are not to understand that Christ is a creature simply, but only in His human nature, whether this qualification be added or not, as stated above (Question [16], Article [8]), so also we are to understand that Christ is subject to the Father not simply but in His human nature, even if this qualification be not added; and yet it is better to add this qualification in order to avoid the error of Arius, who held the Son to be less than the Father. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod relatio servitutis et dominii fundatur super actione et passione, inquantum scilicet servi est moveri a domino secundum imperium. Agere autem non attribuitur naturae sicut agenti, sed personae, actus enim suppositorum sunt et singularium, secundum philosophum. Attribuitur tamen actio naturae sicut ei secundum quam persona vel hypostasis agit. Et ideo, quamvis non proprie dicatur quod natura sit domina vel serva, potest tamen proprie dici quod aliqua hypostasis vel persona sit domina vel serva secundum hanc vel illam naturam. Et secundum hoc, nihil prohibet Christum dicere patri subiectum, vel servum, secundum humanam naturam. | Reply to Objection 2: The relation of subservience and dominion is based upon action and passion, inasmuch as it belongs to a servant to be moved by the will of his master. Now to act is not attributed to the nature as agent, but to the person, since "acts belong to supposita and to singulars," according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1). Nevertheless action is attributed to the nature as to that whereby the person or hypostasis acts. Hence, although the nature is not properly said to rule or serve, yet every hypostasis or person may be properly said to be ruling or serving in this or that nature. And in this way nothing prevents Christ being subject or servant to the Father in human nature. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., tunc Christus tradet regnum Deo et patri, quando iustos, in quibus nunc regnat per fidem, perducturus est ad speciem, ut scilicet videant ipsam essentiam communem patri et filio. Et tunc totaliter erit patri subiectus non solum in se, sed etiam in membris suis, per plenam participationem divinae bonitatis. Tunc etiam omnia erunt plene ei subiecta per finalem impletionem suae voluntatis de eis. Licet etiam modo sint omnia ei subiecta quantum ad potestatem, secundum illud Matth. ult., data est mihi omnis potestas in caelo et in terra, et cetera. | Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8): "Christ will give the kingdom to God and the Father, when He has brought the faithful, over whom He now reigns by faith, to the vision," i.e. to see the essence common to the Father and the Son: and then He will be totally subject to the Father not only in Himself, but also in His members by the full participation of the Godhead. And then all things will be fully subject to Him by the final accomplishment of His will concerning them; although even now all things are subject to Him as regards His power, according to Mt. 28:18: "All power is given to Me in heaven and in earth." |
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Article: 2 [ << | >> ]
| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non sit sibi ipsi subiectus. Dicit enim Cyrillus, in epistola synodica, quam scilicet synodus Ephesina recepit, neque, inquit, ipse Christus sibi servus est neque dominus. Fatuum enim est, magis autem et impium, ita dicere vel sapere. Et hoc etiam asseruit Damascenus, in III libro, dicens, unum enim ens Christus non potest servus esse sui ipsius et dominus. Sed intantum dicitur servus patris Christus, inquantum est ei subiectus. Ergo Christus non est subiectus sibi ipsi. | Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not subject to Himself. For Cyril says in a synodal letter which the Council of Ephesus (Part I, ch. xxvi) received: "Christ is neither servant nor master of Himself. It is foolish, or rather impious, to think or say this." And Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. iii, 21): "The one Being, Christ, cannot be the servant or master of Himself." Now Christ is said to be the servant of the Father inasmuch as He is subject to Him. Hence Christ is not subject to Himself. |
| Praeterea, servus refertur ad dominum. Sed relatio non est alicuius ad seipsum, unde et Hilarius dicit, in libro de Trin., quod nihil est sibi simile aut aequale. Ergo Christus non potest dici servus sui ipsius. Et per consequens, nec sibi esse subiectus. | Objection 2: Further, servant has reference to master. Now nothing has a relation to itself, hence Hilary says (De Trin. vii) that nothing is like or equal to itself. Hence Christ cannot be said to be the servant of Himself, and consequently to be subject to Himself. |
| Praeterea, sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus, ut Athanasius dicit. Sed homo non dicitur subiectus sibi ipsi, vel servus sui ipsius, aut maior seipso, propter hoc quod corpus eius subiectum est animae. Ergo neque Christus dicitur subiectus sibi ipsi propter hoc quod eius humanitas subiecta est divinitati ipsius. | Objection 3: Further, "as the rational soul and flesh are one man; so God and man are one Christ," as Athanasius says (Symb. Fid.). Now man is not said to be subject to himself or servant to himself or greater than himself because his body is subject to his soul. Therefore, Christ is not said to be subject to Himself because His Manhood is subject to His Godhead. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., veritas ostendit, secundum istum modum, quo scilicet pater maior est Christo secundum humanam naturam, etiam seipso minorem filium. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): "Truth shows in this way" (i.e. whereby the Father is greater than Christ in human nature) "that the Son is less than Himself." |
| Praeterea, sicut ipse argumentatur ibidem, sic accepta est a filio Dei forma servi ut non amitteretur forma Dei. Sed secundum formam Dei quae est communis patri et filio, pater est filio maior secundum humanam naturam. Ergo etiam filius maior est seipso secundum humanam naturam. | Further, as he argues (De Trin. i, 7), the form of a servant was so taken by the Son of God that the form of God was not lost. But because of the form of God, which is common to the Father and the Son, the Father is greater than the Son in human nature. Therefore the Son is greater than Himself in human nature. |
| Praeterea, Christus, secundum humanam naturam, est servus Dei patris secundum illud Ioan. XX, ascendo ad patrem meum et patrem vestrum, Deum meum et Deum vestrum. Sed quicumque est servus patris, est servus filii, alioquin non omnia quae sunt patris essent filii. Ergo Christus est servus sui ipsius, et sibi subditus. | Further, Christ in His human nature is the servant of God the Father, according to Jn. 20:17: "I ascend to My Father and to your Father to My God and your God." Now whoever is the servant of the Father is the servant of the Son; otherwise not everything that belongs to the Father would belong to the Son. Therefore Christ is His own servant and is subject to Himself. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, esse dominum et servum attribuitur personae vel hypostasi secundum aliquam naturam. Cum ergo Christus dicitur esse dominus vel servus sui ipsius, vel quod verbum Dei est dominus hominis Christi, hoc potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut intelligatur hoc esse dictum ratione alterius hypostasis vel personae, quasi alia sit persona verbi Dei dominantis, et alia hominis servientis, quod pertinet ad haeresim Nestorii. Unde in condemnatione Nestorii dicitur in synodo Ephesina, si quis dicit Deum vel dominum esse Christi ex Deo patre verbum, et non eundem magis confitetur simul Deum et hominem, utpote verbo carne facto, secundum Scripturas, anathema sit. Et hoc modo negatur a Cyrillo et Damasceno. Et sub eodem sensu negandum est Christum esse minorem seipso, vel esse sibi ipsi subiectum. Alio modo potest intelligi secundum diversitatem naturarum in una persona vel hypostasi. Et sic dicere possumus, secundum unam earum, in qua cum patre convenit, simul eum cum patre praeesse et dominari, secundum vero alteram naturam, in qua nobiscum convenit, ipsum subesse et servire. Et secundum hunc modum dicit Augustinus filium esse seipso minorem. |
I answer that, As was said above (Article [1], ad 2), to be master or servant is attributed to a person or hypostasis according to a nature. Hence when it is said that Christ is the master or servant of Himself, or that the Word of God is the Master of the Man Christ, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that this is understood to be said by reason of another hypostasis or person, as if there was the person of the Word of God ruling and the person of the man serving; and this is the heresy of Nestorius. Hence in the condemnation of Nestorius it is said in the Council of Ephesus (Part III, ch. i, anath. 6): "If anyone say that the Word begotten of God the Father is the God or Lord of Christ, and does not rather confess the same to be at once God and man as the Word made flesh, according to the Scriptures, let him be anathema." And in this sense it is denied by Cyril and Damascene (Objection [1]); and in the same sense must it be denied that Christ is less than Himself or subject to Himself. Secondly, it may be understood of the diversity of natures in the one person or hypostasis. And thus we may say that in one of them, in which He agrees with the Father, He presides and rules together with the Father; and in the other nature, in which He agrees with us, He is subject and serves, and in this sense Augustine says that "the Son is less than Himself." |
| Sciendum tamen quod, cum hoc nomen Christus sit nomen personae, sicut et hoc nomen filius, illa per se et absolute possunt dici de Christo quae conveniunt ei ratione suae personae, quae est aeterna, et maxime huiusmodi relationes, quae magis proprie videntur ad personam vel hypostasim pertinere. Sed ea quae conveniunt sibi secundum humanam naturam, sunt ei potius attribuenda cum determinatione. Ut videlicet dicamus Christum simpliciter esse maximum, et dominum, et praesidentem, quod autem sit subiectus, vel servus, vel minor, est ei attribuendum cum determinatione, scilicet, secundum humanam naturam. | Yet it must be borne in mind that since this name "Christ" is the name of a Person, even as the name "Son," those things can be predicated essentially and absolutely of Christ which belong to Him by reason of the Person, Which is eternal; and especially those relations which seem more properly to pertain to the Person or the hypostasis. But whatever pertains to Him in His human nature is rather to be attributed to Him with a qualification; so that we say that Christ is simply greatest, Lord, Ruler, whereas to be subject or servant or less is to be attributed to Him with the qualification, in His human nature. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Cyrillus et Damascenus negant Christum esse dominum sui ipsius, secundum quod per hoc importatur pluralitas suppositorum, quae requiritur ad hoc quod aliquis simpliciter sit dominus alicuius. | Reply to Objection 1: Cyril and Damascene deny that Christ is the head of Himself inasmuch as this implies a plurality of supposita, which is required in order that anyone may be the master of another. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod simpliciter quidem oportet esse alium dominum et alium servum, potest tamen aliqua ratio dominii et servitutis servari prout idem est dominus sui ipsius secundum aliud et aliud. | Reply to Objection 2: Simply speaking it is necessary that the master and the servant should be distinct; yet a certain notion of mastership and subservience may be preserved inasmuch as the same one is master of Himself in different respects. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, propter diversas partes hominis, quarum una est superior et alia inferior, dicit etiam philosophus, in V Ethic., quod iustitia hominis est ad seipsum, inquantum irascibilis et concupiscibilis obediunt rationi. Secundum etiam hunc modum unus homo potest dici sibi subiectus et serviens, secundum diversas sui partes. | Reply to Objection 3: On account of the divers parts of man, one of which is superior and the other inferior, the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11) that there is justice between a man and himself inasmuch as the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason. Hence this way a man may be said to be subject and subservient to Himself as regards His different parts. |
| Ad alia autem argumenta patet responsio ex dictis. Nam Augustinus asserit filium seipso minorem, vel sibi subiectum, secundum humanam naturam, non secundum diversitatem suppositorum. | To the other arguments, the reply is clear from what has been said. For Augustine asserts that the Son is less than, or subject to, Himself in His human nature, and not by a diversity of supposita. |