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| Deinde considerandum est de praedestinatione Christi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | We shall now consider the predestination of Christ. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum sit praedestinatus. | (1) Whether Christ was predestinated? |
| Secundo, utrum sit praedestinatus secundum quod homo. | (2) Whether He was predestinated as man? |
| Tertio, utrum eius praedestinatio sit exemplar praedestinationis nostrae. | (3) Whether His predestination is the exemplar of ours? |
| Quarto, utrum sit causa praedestinationis nostrae. | (4) Whether it is the cause of our predestination? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christo non conveniat praedestinatum esse. Terminus enim cuiuslibet praedestinationis videtur esse adoptio filiorum, secundum illud Ephes. I, praedestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum. Sed Christo non convenit esse filium adoptivum, ut dictum est. Ergo Christo non convenit praedestinatum esse. |
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should be predestinated. For the term of anyone's predestination seems to be the adoption of sons, according to Eph. 1:5: "Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children." But it is not befitting to Christ to be an adopted Son, as stated above (Question [23], Article [4]). Therefore it is not fitting that Christ be predestinated. |
| Praeterea, in Christo duo est considerare, scilicet naturam humanam, et personam. Sed non potest dici quod Christus est praedestinatus ratione naturae humanae, quia haec est falsa, humana natura est filius Dei. Similiter etiam neque ratione personae, quia illa persona non habet ex gratia quod sit filius Dei, sed ex natura; praedestinatio autem est eorum quae sunt ex gratia, ut in prima parte dictum est. Ergo Christus non est praedestinatus filius Dei. | Objection 2: Further, we may consider two things in Christ: His human nature and His person. But it cannot be said that Christ is predestinated by reason of His human nature; for this proposition is false---"The human nature is Son of God." In like manner neither by reason of the person; for this person is the Son of God, not by grace, but by nature: whereas predestination regards what is of grace, as stated in the FP, Question [23], Articles [2],5. Therefore Christ was not predestinated to be the Son of God. |
| Praeterea, sicut illud quod est factum non semper fuit, ita et illud quod fuit praedestinatum, eo quod praedestinatio antecessionem quandam importat. Sed, quia Christus semper fuit Deus et filius Dei, non proprie dicitur quod homo ille sit factus filius Dei. Ergo, pari ratione, non debet dici quod Christus sit praedestinatus filius Dei. | Objection 3: Further, just as that which has been made was not always, so also that which was predestinated; since predestination implies a certain antecedence. But, because Christ was always God and the Son of God, it cannot be said that that Man was "made the Son of God." Therefore, for a like reason, we ought not to say that Christ was "predestinated the Son of God." |
| Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. I, de Christo loquens, qui praedestinatus est filius Dei in virtute. |
On the contrary, The Apostle says, speaking of Christ (Rm. 1:4): "Who was predestinated the Son of God in power." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt, praedestinatio, proprie accepta, est quaedam divina praeordinatio ab aeterno de his quae per gratiam Dei sunt fienda in tempore. Est autem hoc in tempore factum per gratiam unionis a Deo, ut homo esset Deus et Deus esset homo. Nec potest dici quod Deus ab aeterno non praeordinaverit hoc se facturum in tempore, quia sequeretur quod divinae menti aliquid accideret de novo. Et oportet dicere quod ipsa unio naturarum in persona Christi cadat sub aeterna Dei praedestinatione. Et ratione huius Christus dicitur esse praedestinatus. | I answer that, As is clear from what has been said in the FP, Question [23], Articles [1],2, predestination, in its proper sense, is a certain Divine preordination from eternity of those things which are to be done in time by the grace of God. Now, that man is God, and that God is man, is something done in time by God through the grace of union. Nor can it be said that God has not from eternity pre-ordained to do this in time: since it would follow that something would come anew into the Divine Mind. And we must needs admit that the union itself of natures in the Person of Christ falls under the eternal predestination of God. For this reason do we say that Christ was predestinated. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus ibi loquitur de praedestinatione qua nos praedestinamur ut simus filii adoptivi. Sicut autem Christus singulari modo prae aliis est Dei filius naturalis, ita quodam singulari modo est praedestinatus. | Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle there speaks of that predestination by which we are predestinated to be adopted sons. And just as Christ in a singular manner above all others is the natural Son of God, so in a singular manner is He predestinated. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Glossa Rom. I, quidam dixerunt praedestinationem illam intelligendam esse de natura, non de persona, quia scilicet humanae naturae facta est haec gratia ut uniretur filio Dei in unitate personae. | Reply to Objection 2: As a gloss [*From St. Augustine, De Praed. Sanct. xv] says on Rm. 1:4, some understood that predestination to refer to the nature and not to the Person---that is to say, that on human nature was bestowed the grace of being united to the Son of God in unity of Person. |
| Sed secundum hoc locutio apostoli est impropria, propter duo. Primo quidem, ratione communi. Non enim dicimus naturam alicuius praedestinari, sed personam, quia praedestinari est dirigi in salutem, quod quidem est suppositi agentis propter beatitudinis finem. Secundo, ratione speciali. Quia esse filium Dei non convenit humanae naturae, est enim haec falsa, natura humana est filius Dei. Nisi forte quis velit sic exponere, extorta expositione, qui praedestinatus est filius Dei in virtute, idest, praedestinatum est ut humana natura uniretur filio Dei in persona. | But in that case the phrase of the Apostle would be improper, for two reasons. First, for a general reason: for we do not speak of a person's nature, but of his person, as being predestinated: because to be predestinated is to be directed towards salvation, which belongs to a suppositum acting for the end of beatitude. Secondly, for a special reason. Because to be Son of God is not befitting to human nature; for this proposition is false: "The human nature is the Son of God": unless one were to force from it such an exposition as: "Who was predestinated the Son of God in power"---that is, "It was predestinated that the Human nature should be united to the Son of God in the Person." |
| Relinquitur ergo quod praedestinatio attribuatur personae Christi, non quidem secundum se, vel secundum quod subsistit in divina natura; sed secundum quod subsistit in humana natura. Unde, cum praedixisset apostolus, qui factus est ei ex semine David secundum carnem, subiunxit, qui praedestinatus est filius Dei in virtute, ut daret intelligere quod, secundum hoc quod est factus ex semine David secundum carnem, est praedestinatus filius Dei in virtute. Quamvis enim sit naturale illi personae secundum se consideratae quod sit filius Dei in virtute, non tamen est ei naturale secundum naturam humanam, secundum quam hoc sibi competit per gratiam unionis. | Hence we must attribute predestination to the Person of Christ: not, indeed, in Himself or as subsisting in the Divine Nature, but as subsisting in the human nature. Wherefore the Apostle, after saying, "Who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh," added, "Who was predestinated the Son of God in power": so as to give us to understand that in respect of His being of the seed of David according to the flesh, He was predestinated the Son of God in power. For although it is natural to that Person, considered in Himself, to be the Son of God in power, yet this is not natural to Him, considered in the human nature, in respect of which this befits Him according to the grace of union. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod Origenes, super epistolam ad Rom., dicit hanc esse litteram apostoli, qui destinatus est filius Dei in virtute, ita quod non designetur aliqua antecessio. Et sic nihil habet difficultatis. Alii vero antecessionem quae designatur in hoc participio praedestinatus, referunt, non ad id quod est esse filius Dei, sed ad eius manifestationem, secundum illum consuetum modum loquendi in Scripturis quo res dicuntur fieri quando innotescunt, ut sit sensus quod Christus praedestinatus est manifestari filius Dei. Sed sic non proprie praedestinatio accipitur. Nam aliquis dicitur proprie praedestinari secundum quod dirigitur in finem beatitudinis. Beatitudo autem Christi non dependet ex nostra cognitione. | Reply to Objection 3: Origen commenting on Rm. 1:4 says that the true reading of this passage of the Apostle is: "Who was destined to be the Son of God in power"; so that no antecedence is implied. And so there would be no difficulty. Others refer the antecedence implied in the participle "predestinated," not to the fact of being the Son of God, but to the manifestation thereof, according to the customary way of speaking in Holy Scripture, by which things are said to take place when they are made known; so that the sense would be---"Christ was predestinated to be made known as the Son of God." But this is an improper signification of predestination. For a person is properly said to be predestinated by reason of his being directed to the end of beatitude: but the beatitude of Christ does not depend on our knowledge thereof. |
| Et ideo melius dicendum est quod illa antecessio quam importat hoc participium praedestinatus, non refertur ad personam secundum seipsam, sed ratione humanae naturae, quia scilicet persona illa etsi ab aeterno fuerit filius Dei, hoc tamen non fuit semper, quod subsistens in natura humana fuerit filius Dei. Unde dicit Augustinus, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., praedestinatus est Iesus ut qui futurus erat secundum carnem filius David, esset tamen in virtute filius Dei. | It is therefore better to say that the antecedence implied in the participle "predestinated" is to be referred to the Person not in Himself, but by reason of the human nature: since, although that Person was the Son of God from eternity, it was not always true that one subsisting in human nature was the Son of God. Hence Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "Jesus was predestinated, so that He Who according to the flesh was to be the son of David, should be nevertheless Son of God in power." |
| Et est considerandum quod, licet hoc participium praedestinatus importet antecessionem, sicut et hoc participium factus, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam fieri pertinet ad ipsam rem secundum quod in se est, praedestinari autem pertinet ad aliquem secundum quod est in apprehensione alicuius praeordinantis. Id autem quod subest alicui formae vel naturae secundum rem, potest apprehendi vel prout est sub forma illa, vel etiam absolute. Et quia absolute non convenit personae Christi quod incoeperit esse filius Dei, convenit autem ei secundum quod intelligitur vel apprehenditur ut in natura humana existens, quia scilicet hoc aliquando incoepit esse quod in natura humana existens esset filius Dei, ideo magis est haec vera, Christus est praedestinatus filius Dei, quam ista, Christus est factus filius Dei. | Moreover, it must be observed that, although the participle "predestinated," just as this participle "made," implies antecedence, yet there is a difference. For "to be made" belongs to the thing in itself: whereas "to be predestinated" belongs to someone as being in the apprehension of one who pre-ordains. Now that which is the subject of a form or nature in reality, can be apprehended either as under that form or absolutely. And since it cannot be said absolutely of the Person of Christ that He began to be the Son of God, yet this is becoming to Him as understood or apprehended to exist in human nature, because at one time it began to be true that one existing in human nature was the Son of God; therefore this proposition---"Christ was predestinated the Son of God"---is truer than this---"Christ was made the Son of God." |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod haec sit falsa, Christus, secundum quod homo, est praedestinatus esse filius Dei. Hoc enim est unusquisque secundum aliquod tempus quod est praedestinatus esse, eo quod praedestinatio Dei non fallitur. Si ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, est praedestinatus filius Dei, videtur sequi quod sit filius Dei secundum quod homo. Hoc autem est falsum. Ergo et primum. | Objection 1: It would seem that this proposition is false: "Christ as man was predestinated to be the Son of God." For at some time a man is that which he was predestinated to be: since God's predestination does not fail. If, therefore, Christ as man was predestinated the Son of God, it seems to follow that as man He is the Son of God. But the latter is false. Therefore the former is false. |
| Praeterea, illud quod convenit Christo secundum quod homo, convenit cuilibet homini, eo quod ipse est unius speciei cum aliis hominibus. Si ergo Christus, secundum quod homo, est praedestinatus esse filius Dei, sequetur quod cuilibet homini hoc conveniat. Hoc autem est falsum. Ergo et primum. | Objection 2: Further, what is befitting to Christ as man is befitting to any man; since He belongs to the same species as other men. If, therefore, Christ, as man, was predestinated the Son of God, it will follow that this is befitting to any other man. But the latter is false. Therefore the former is false. |
| Praeterea, hoc ab aeterno praedestinatur quod est aliquando fiendum in tempore. Sed magis est haec vera, filius Dei factus est homo, quam ista, homo factus est filius Dei. Ergo magis est haec vera, Christus, secundum quod filius Dei, est praedestinatus esse homo, quam e converso, Christus, secundum quod homo, praedestinatus est esse filius Dei. | Objection 3: Further, that is predestinated from eternity which is to take place at some time. But this proposition, "The Son of God was made man," is truer than this, "Man was made the Son of God." Therefore this proposition, "Christ, as the Son of God, was predestinated to be man," is truer than this, "Christ as Man was predestinated to be the Son of God." |
| [47920] III q. 24 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., ipsum dominum gloriae, inquantum homo factus est Dei filius, praedestinatum esse dicimus. | On the contrary, Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) says: "Forasmuch as God the Son was made Man, we say that the Lord of Glory was predestinated." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod in praedestinatione duo possunt considerari. Unum quidem ex parte ipsius praedestinationis aeternae, et secundum hoc importat antecessionem quandam respectu eius quod sub praedestinatione cadit. Alio modo potest considerari secundum effectum temporalem, qui quidem est aliquod gratuitum Dei donum. Dicendum est ergo quod secundum utrumque istorum attribuitur praedestinatio Christo ratione solius humanae naturae, nam humana natura non semper fuit verbo unita; et ei etiam per gratiam hoc est collatum, ut filio Dei in persona uniretur. Et ideo solum ratione naturae humanae praedestinatio competit Christo. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., praedestinata est ista humanae naturae tanta et tam celsa et summa subvectio, ut quo attolleretur altius non haberet. Hoc autem dicimus convenire alicui secundum quod homo, quod convenit ei ratione humanae naturae. Et ideo dicendum est quod Christus, secundum quod homo, est praedestinatus esse filius Dei. | I answer that, Two things may be considered in predestination. One on the part of eternal predestination itself: and in this respect it implies a certain antecedence in regard to that which comes under predestination. Secondly, predestination may be considered as regards its temporal effect, which is some gratuitous gift of God. Therefore from both points of view we must say that predestination is ascribed to Christ by reason of His human nature alone: for human nature was not always united to the Word; and by grace bestowed an it was it united in Person to the Son of God. Consequently, by reason of human nature alone can predestination be attributed to Christ. Wherefore Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "This human nature of ours was predestinated to be raised to so great, so lofty, so exalted a position, that it would be impossible to raise it higher." Now that is said to belong to anyone as man which belongs to him by reason of human nature. Consequently, we must say that "Christ, as Man, was predestinated the Son of God." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum dicitur, Christus, secundum quod homo, est praedestinatus esse filius Dei, haec determinatio secundum quod homo potest referri ad actum significatum per participium dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte eius quod materialiter cadit sub praedestinatione. Et hoc modo est falsa. Est enim sensus quod praedestinatum sit ut Christus, secundum quod homo, sit filius Dei. Et in hoc sensu procedit obiectio. | Reply to Objection 1: When we say, "Christ, as Man, was predestinated the Son of God," this qualification, "as Man," can be referred in two ways to the action signified by the participle. First, as regards what comes under predestination materially, and thus it is false. For the sense would be that it was predestinated that Christ, as Man, should be the Son of God. And in this sense the objection takes it. |
| Alio modo, potest referri ad ipsam propriam rationem actus, prout scilicet praedestinatio importat in sui ratione antecessionem et effectum gratuitum. Et hoc modo convenit Christo praedestinatio ratione humanae naturae, ut dictum est. Et secundum hoc dicitur praedestinatus secundum quod homo. | Secondly, it may be referred to the very nature of the action itself: that is, forasmuch as predestination implies antecedence and gratuitous effect. And thus predestination belongs to Christ by reason of His human nature, as stated above. And in this sense He is said to be predestinated as Man. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquid potest convenire alicui homini ratione humanae naturae dupliciter. Uno modo, sic quod humana natura sit causa illius, sicut esse risibile convenit Socrati ratione humanae naturae, ex cuius principiis causatur. Et hoc modo praedestinatio non convenit nec Christo nec alteri homini ratione humanae naturae. Et in hoc sensu procedit obiectio. Alio modo dicitur aliquid convenire alicui ratione humanae naturae, cuius humana natura est susceptiva. Et sic dicimus Christum esse praedestinatum ratione humanae naturae, quia praedestinatio refertur ad exaltationem humanae naturae in ipso, sicut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: Something may be befitting to a man by reason of human nature, in two ways. First, so that human nature be the cause thereof: thus risibility is befitting to Socrates by reason of human nature, being caused by its principles. In this manner predestination is not befitting either to Christ or to any other man, by reason of human nature. This is the sense of the objection. Secondly, a thing may be befitting to someone by reason of human nature, because human nature is susceptible of it. And in this sense we say that Christ was predestinated by reason of human nature; because predestination refers to the exaltation of human nature in Him, as stated above. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., ipsa est illa ineffabiliter facta hominis a Deo verbo susceptio singularis, ut filius hominis simul propter susceptum hominem, et filius Dei propter suscipientem unigenitum Deum, veraciter et proprie diceretur. Et ideo, quia illa susceptio sub praedestinatione cadit tanquam gratuita, utrumque potest dici, quod et filius Dei praedestinatus sit esse homo, et filius hominis praedestinatus sit esse filius Dei. Quia tamen gratia non est facta filio Dei ut esset homo, sed potius humanae naturae ut filio Dei uniretur, magis proprie potest dici quod Christus, secundum quod homo, est praedestinatus esse filius Dei, quam quod Christus, secundum quod filius Dei, sit praedestinatus esse homo. | Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Praedest. Sanct. xv): "The Word of God assumed Man to Himself in such a singular and ineffable manner that at the same time He may be truly and correctly called the Son of Man, because He assumed Men to Himself; and the Son of God, because it was the Only-begotten of God Who assumed human nature." Consequently, since this assumption comes under predestination by reason of its being gratuitous, we can say both that the Son of God was predestinated to be man, and that the Son of Man was predestinated to be the Son of God. But because grace was not bestowed on the Son of God that He might be man, but rather on human nature, that it might be united to the Son of God; it is more proper to say that "Christ, as Man, was predestinated to be the Son of God," than that, "Christ, as Son of God, was predestinated to be Man." |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christi praedestinatio non sit exemplar nostrae praedestinationis. Exemplar enim praeexistit exemplato. Nihil autem praeexistit aeterno. Cum ergo praedestinatio nostra sit aeterna, videtur quod praedestinatio Christi non sit exemplar nostrae praedestinationis. | Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's predestination is not the exemplar of ours. For the exemplar exists before the exemplate. But nothing exists before the eternal. Since, therefore, our predestination is eternal, it seems that Christ's predestination is not the exemplar of ours. |
| Praeterea, exemplar ducit in cognitionem exemplati. Sed non oportuit quod Deus duceretur in cognitionem nostrae praedestinationis ex aliquo alio, cum dicatur Rom. VIII, quos praescivit, hos et praedestinavit. Ergo praedestinatio Christi non est exemplar nostrae praedestinationis. |
Objection 2: Further, the exemplar leads us to knowledge of the exemplate. But there was no need for God to be led from something else to knowledge of our predestination; since it is written (Rm. 8:29): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated." Therefore Christ's predestination is not the exemplar of ours. |
| Praeterea, exemplar est conforme exemplato. Sed alterius rationis videtur esse praedestinatio Christi quam praedestinatio nostra, quia nos praedestinamur in filios adoptivos, Christus autem est praedestinatus filius Dei in virtute, ut dicitur Rom. I. Ergo eius praedestinatio non est exemplar nostrae praedestinationis. |
Objection 3: Further, the exemplar is conformed to the exemplate. But Christ's predestination seems to be of a different nature from ours: because we are predestinated to the sonship of adoption, whereas Christ was predestinated "Son of God in power," as is written (Rm. 1:4). Therefore His predestination is not the exemplar of ours. |
| Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., est praeclarissimum lumen praedestinationis et gratiae ipse salvator, ipse mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus. Dicitur autem lumen praedestinationis et gratiae inquantum per eius praedestinationem et gratiam manifestatur nostra praedestinatio, quod videtur ad rationem exemplaris pertinere. Ergo praedestinatio Christi est exemplar nostrae praedestinationis. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "The Saviour Himself, the Mediator of God and men, the Man Christ Jesus is the most splendid light of predestination and grace." Now He is called the light of predestination and grace, inasmuch as our predestination is made manifest by His predestination and grace; and this seems to pertain to the nature of an exemplar. Therefore Christ's predestination is the exemplar of ours. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod praedestinatio dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, secundum ipsum actum praedestinantis. Et sic praedestinatio Christi non potest dici exemplar nostrae praedestinationis, uno enim modo, et eodem actu aeterno, praedestinavit Deus nos et Christum. | I answer that, Predestination may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the act of predestination: and thus Christ's predestination cannot be said to be the exemplar of ours: for in the same way and by the same eternal act God predestinated us and Christ. |
| Alio modo potest praedestinatio considerari secundum id ad quod aliquis praedestinatur, quod est praedestinationis terminus et effectus. Et secundum hoc praedestinatio Christi est exemplar nostrae praedestinationis. Et hoc dupliciter. Primo quidem, quantum ad bonum ad quod praedestinamur. Ipse enim praedestinatus est ad hoc quod esset Dei filius naturalis, nos autem praedestinamur ad filiationem adoptionis, quae est quaedam participata similitudo filiationis naturalis. Unde dicitur Rom. VIII, quos praescivit, hos et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis filii eius. Alio modo, quantum ad modum consequendi istud bonum, quod est per gratiam. Quod quidem in Christo est manifestissimum, quia natura humana in ipso, nullis suis praecedentibus meritis, unita est filio Dei. Et de plenitudine gratiae eius nos omnes accepimus, ut dicitur Ioan. I. |
Secondly, predestination may be considered on the part of that to which anyone is predestinated, and this is the term and effect of predestination. In this sense Christ's predestination is the exemplar of ours, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the good to which we are predestinated: for He was predestinated to be the natural Son of God, whereas we are predestinated to the adoption of sons, which is a participated likeness of natural sonship. Whence it is written (Rm. 8:29): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son." Secondly, in respect of the manner of obtaining this good---that is, by grace. This is most manifest in Christ; because human nature in Him, without any antecedent merits, was united to the Son of God: and of the fulness of His grace we all have received, as it is written (Jn. 1:16). |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa ratio procedit ex parte ipsius actus praedestinantis. | Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the aforesaid act of the predestinator. |
| Et similiter dicendum ad secundum. | The same is to be said of the second objection. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod non est necessarium quod exemplatum exemplari quantum ad omnia conformetur, sed sufficit quod aliqualiter exemplatum imitetur suum exemplar. | Reply to Objection 3: The exemplate need not be conformed to the exemplar in all respects: it is sufficient that it imitate it in some. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praedestinatio Christi non sit causa nostrae praedestinationis. Aeternum enim non habet causam. Sed praedestinatio nostra est aeterna. Ergo praedestinatio Christi non est causa nostrae praedestinationis. | Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's predestination is not the cause of ours. For that which is eternal has no cause. But our predestination is eternal. Therefore Christ's predestination is not the cause of ours. |
| Praeterea, illud quod dependet ex simplici Dei voluntate, non habet aliam causam nisi Dei voluntatem. Sed praedestinatio nostra ex simplici voluntate Dei dependet, dicitur enim Ephes. I, praedestinati secundum propositum eius, qui omnia operatur secundum consilium voluntatis suae. Ergo praedestinatio Christi non est causa nostrae praedestinationis. |
Objection 2: Further, that which depends on the simple will of God has no other cause but God's will. Now, our predestination depends on the simple will of God, for it is written (Eph. 1:11): "Being predestinated according to the purpose of Him, Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Therefore Christ's predestination is not the cause of ours. |
| Praeterea, remota causa, removetur effectus. Sed, remota praedestinatione Christi, non removetur nostra praedestinatio, quia etiam si filius Dei non incarnaretur, erat alius modus possibilis nostrae salutis, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Trin. Praedestinatio ergo Christi non est causa nostrae praedestinationis. | Objection 3: Further, if the cause be taken away, the effect is also taken away. But if we take away Christ's predestination, ours is not taken away; since even if the Son of God were not incarnate, our salvation might yet have been achieved in a different manner, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 10). Therefore Christ's predestination is. not the cause of ours. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes. I, praedestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum per Iesum Christum. |
On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:5): "(Who) hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, si consideretur praedestinatio secundum ipsum praedestinationis actum, praedestinatio Christi non est causa praedestinationis nostrae, cum uno et eodem actu Deus praedestinaverit Christum et nos. Si autem consideretur praedestinatio secundum terminum praedestinationis, sic praedestinatio Christi est causa nostrae praedestinationis, sic enim Deus praeordinavit nostram salutem, ab aeterno praedestinando, ut per Iesum Christum compleretur. Sub praedestinatione enim aeterna non solum cadit id quod est fiendum in tempore, sed etiam modus et ordo secundum quod est complendum ex tempore. | I answer that, if we consider predestination on the part of the very act of predestinating, then Christ's predestination is not the cause of ours; because by one and the same act God predestinated both Christ and us. But if we consider predestination on the part of its term, thus Christ's predestination is the cause of ours: for God, by predestinating from eternity, so decreed our salvation, that it should be achieved through Jesus Christ. For eternal predestination covers not only that which is to be accomplished in time, but also the mode and order in which it is to be accomplished in time. |
| Ad primum ergo et secundum dicendum quod rationes illae procedunt de praedestinatione secundum praedestinationis actum. | Replies OBJ 1 and 2: These arguments consider predestination on the part of the act of predestinating. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, si Christus non fuisset incarnandus, Deus praeordinasset homines salvari per aliam causam. Sed quia praeordinavit incarnationem Christi, simul cum hoc praeordinavit ut esset causa nostrae salutis. | Reply to Objection 3: If Christ were not to have been incarnate, God would have decreed men's salvation by other means. But since He decreed the Incarnation of Christ, He decreed at the same time that He should be the cause of our salvation. |