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Consequenter, post Christi conceptionem, agendum est de eius nativitate.
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After considering Christ's conception, we must treat of His nativity.
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| Circa primum quaeruntur octo. | Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum nativitas sit naturae, vel personae. | (1) Whether nativity regards the nature or the person? |
| Secundo, utrum Christo sit attribuenda alia nativitas praeter aeternam. |
(2) Whether another, besides His eternal, birth should be attributed to Christ? |
| Tertio, utrum secundum nativitatem temporalem beata virgo sit mater eius. |
(3) Whether the Blessed Virgin is His Mother in respect of His temporal birth? |
| Quarto, utrum debeat dici mater Dei. | (4) Whether she ought to be called the Mother of God? |
| Quinto, utrum Christus secundum duas filiationes sit filius Dei patris et virginis matris. |
(5) Whether Christ is the Son of God the Father and of the Virgin Mother in respect of two filiations? |
| Sexto, de modo nativitatis. | (6) Of the mode of the Nativity; |
| Septimo, de loco. | (7) Of its place; |
| Octavo, de tempore nativitatis. | (8) Of the time of the Nativity. |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nativitas naturae conveniat magis quam personae. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de fide ad Petrum, natura aeterna atque divina non posset concipi et nasci ex humana natura, nisi secundum veritatem humanae naturae. Sic igitur naturae divinae convenit concipi et nasci ratione humanae naturae. Multo magis igitur convenit humanae naturae. | Objection 1: It would seem that nativity regards the nature rather than the person. For Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum): "The eternal Divine Nature could not be conceived and born of human nature, except in a true human nature." Consequently it becomes the Divine Nature to be conceived and born by reason of the human nature. Much more, therefore, does it regard human nature itself. |
| Praeterea, secundum philosophum in V Metaphys., nomen naturae a nascendo sumptum est. Sed denominationes fiunt secundum similitudinis convenientiam. Ergo videtur quod nativitas magis pertineat ad naturam quam ad personam. | Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), "nature" is so denominated from "nativity." But things are denominated from one another by reason of some likeness. Therefore it seems that nativity regards the nature rather than the person. |
| Praeterea, illud proprie nascitur quod per nativitatem incipit esse. Sed per nativitatem Christi non incoepit esse persona Christi, sed eius natura humana. Ergo videtur quod nativitas proprie pertineat ad naturam, non ad personam. | Objection 3: Further, properly speaking, that is born which begins to exist by nativity. But Christ's Person did not begin to exist by His nativity, whereas His human nature did. Therefore it seems that the nativity properly regards the nature, and not the person. |
| Sed contra est quod dicit Damascenus, in III libro, nativitas hypostasis est, non naturae. | On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "Nativity regards the hypostasis, not the nature." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod nativitas potest attribui alicui dupliciter, uno modo, sicut subiecto; alio modo, sicut termino. Sicut subiecto quidem attribuitur ei quod nascitur. Hoc autem proprie est hypostasis, non natura. Cum enim nasci sit quoddam generari, sicut generatur aliquid ad hoc quod sit, ita nascitur aliquid ad hoc quod sit. Esse autem proprie rei subsistentis est, nam forma quae non subsistit, dicitur esse solum quia ea aliquid est. Persona autem, vel hypostasis, significatur per modum subsistentis, natura autem significatur per modum formae in qua aliquid subsistit. Et ideo nativitas, tanquam subiecto proprie nascendi, attribuitur personae vel hypostasi, non naturae. | I answer that, Nativity can be attributed to someone in two ways: first, as to its subject; secondly, as to its terminus. To him that is born it is attributed as to its subject: and this, properly speaking, is the hypostasis, not the nature. For since to be born is to be generated; as a thing is generated in order for it to be, so is a thing born in order for it to be. Now, to be, properly speaking, belongs to that which subsists; since a form that does not subsist is said to be only inasmuch as by it something is: and whereas person or hypostasis designates something as subsisting, nature designates form, whereby something subsists. Consequently, nativity is attributed to the person or hypostasis as to the proper subject of being born, but not to the nature. |
| Sed sicut termino, attribuitur nativitas naturae. Terminus enim generationis, et cuiuslibet nativitatis, est forma. Natura autem per modum formae significatur. Unde nativitas dicitur via in naturam, ut patet per philosophum, II Physic., terminatur enim naturae intentio ad formam, seu naturam speciei. | But to the nature nativity is attributed as to its terminus. For the terminus of generation and of every nativity is the form. Now, nature designates something as a form: wherefore nativity is said to be "the road to nature," as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii): for the purpose of nature is terminated in the form or nature of the species. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, propter identitatem quae in divinis est inter naturam et hypostasim, quandoque natura ponitur pro persona vel hypostasi. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus naturam divinam esse conceptam et natam, quia scilicet persona filii est concepta et nata secundum humanam naturam. | Reply to Objection 1: On account of the identity of nature and hypostasis in God, nature fs sometimes put instead of person or hypostasis. And in this sense Augustine says that the Divine Nature was conceived and born, inasmuch as the Person of the Son was conceived and born in the human nature. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod nullus motus seu mutatio denominatur a subiecto quod movetur, sed a termino motus, a quo speciem habet. Et propter hoc nativitas non denominatur a persona quae nascitur, sed a natura ad quam nativitas terminatur. | Reply to Objection 2: No movement or change is denominated from the subject moved, but from the terminus of the movement, whence the subject has its species. For this reason nativity is not denominated from the person born, but from nature, which is the terminus of nativity. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod natura, proprie loquendo, non incipit esse sed magis persona incipit esse in aliqua natura. Quia, sicut dictum est, natura significatur ut quo aliquid est, persona vero significatur ut quae habet esse subsistens. | Reply to Objection 3: Nature, properly speaking, does not begin to exist: rather is it the person that begins to exist in some nature. Because, as stated above, nature designates that by which something is; whereas person designates something as having subsistent being. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christo non sit attribuenda aliqua nativitas temporalis. Nasci enim est sicut quidam motus rei non existentis antequam nascatur, id agens beneficio nativitatis, ut sit. Sed Christus ab aeterno fuit. Ergo non potuit temporaliter nasci. | Objection 1: It would seem that temporal nativity is not to be attributed to Christ. For "to be born is a certain movement of a thing that did not exist before it was born, which movement procures for it the benefit of existence" [*Cf. Augustine, De Unit. Trin. xii]. But Christ was from all eternity. Therefore He could not be born in time. |
| Praeterea, illud quod est in se perfectum, nativitate non indiget. Sed persona filii Dei ab aeterno fuit perfecta. Ergo non indiget temporali nativitate. Et ita videtur quod non sit temporaliter natus. | Objection 2: Further, what is perfect in itself needs not to be born. But the Person of the Son of God was perfect from eternity. Therefore He needs not to be born in time. Therefore it seems that He had no temporal birth. |
| Praeterea, nativitas proprie personae convenit. Sed in Christo tantum est una persona. Ergo in Christo tantum est una nativitas. | Objection 3: Further, properly speaking, nativity regards the person. But in Christ there is only one person. Therefore in Christ there is but one nativity. |
| Praeterea, quod duabus nativitatibus nascitur, bis nascitur. Sed haec videtur esse falsa, Christus est bis natus. Quia nativitas eius qua de patre est natus, interruptionem non patitur, cum sit aeterna. Quod tamen requiritur ad hoc adverbium bis, ille enim dicitur bis currere qui cum interruptione currit. Ergo videtur quod in Christo non sit ponenda duplex nativitas. | Objection 4: Further, what is born by two nativities is born twice. But this proposition is false; "Christ was born twice": because the nativity whereby He was born of the Father suffers no interruption; since it is eternal. Whereas interruption is required to warrant the use of the adverb "twice": for a man is said to run twice whose running is interrupted. Therefore it seems that we should not admit a double nativity in Christ. |
| Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, confitemur Christi duas nativitates, unam quae est ex patre, aeternam; et unam quae est in ultimis temporibus propter nos. | On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "We confess two nativities in Christ: one of the Father---eternal; and one which occurred in these latter times for our sake." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, natura comparatur ad nativitatem sicut terminus ad motum vel mutationem. Motus autem diversificatur secundum diversitatem terminorum, ut patet per philosophum, in V Physic. In Christo autem est duplex natura, quarum unam accepit ab aeterno a patre, alteram autem accepit temporaliter a matre. Et ideo necesse est attribuere Christo duas nativitates, unam qua aeternaliter natus est a patre, aliam qua temporaliter natus est a matre. |
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), nature is compared to nativity, as the terminus to movement or change. Now, movement is diversified according to the diversity of its termini, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. v). But, in Christ there is a twofold nature: one which He received of the Father from eternity, the other which He received from His Mother in time. Therefore we must needs attribute to Christ a twofold nativity: one by which He was born of the Father from all eternity; one by which He was born of His Mother in time. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod haec fuit obiectio cuiusdam Feliciani haeretici, quam Augustinus, in libro contra Felicianum, sic solvit. Fingamus, inquit, sicut plerique volunt, esse in mundo animam generalem, quae sic ineffabili motu semina cuncta vivificet ut non sit concreta cum genitis, sed vitam praestet ipsa gignendis. Nempe cum haec in uterum, passibilem materiam ad usus suos formatura, pervenerit, unam facit secum esse personam eius rei, quam non eandem constat habere substantiam, et fit, operante anima et patiente materia, ex duabus substantiis unus homo. Sicque animam nasci fatemur ex utero, non quia, antequam nasceretur, quantum ad se attinet, ipsa penitus non fuisset. Sic ergo, immo sublimius, natus est filius Dei secundum hominem, eo pacto quo cum corpore nasci docetur et animus, non quia utriusque sit una substantia, sed quia ex utraque fit una persona. Non tamen ab hoc incoepisse initio dicimus Dei filium, ne temporalem credat aliquis divinitatem. Non ab aeterno filii Dei novimus carnem, ne non veritatem humani corporis, sed quandam eum suscepisse putemus imaginem. | Reply to Objection 1: This was the argument of a certain heretic, Felician, and is solved thus by Augustine (Contra Felic. xii). "Let us suppose," says he, "as many maintain, that in the world there is a universal soul, which, by its ineffable movement, so gives life to all seed, that it is not compounded with things begotten, but bestows life that they may be begotten. Without doubt, when this soul reaches the womb, being intent on fashioning the passible matter to its own purpose, it unites itself to the personality thereof, though manifestly it is not of the same substance; and thus of the active soul and passive matter, one man is made out of two substances. And so we confess that the soul is born from out the womb; but not as though, before birth, it was nothing at all in itself. Thus, then, but in a way much more sublime, the Son of God was born as man, just as the soul is held to be born together with the body: not as though they both made one substance, but that from both, one person results. Yet we do not say that the Son of God began thus to exist: lest it be thought that His Divinity is temporal. Nor do we acknowledge the flesh of the Son of God to have been from eternity: lest it be thought that He took, not a true human body, but some resemblance thereof." |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod haec fuit ratio Nestorii, quam solvit Cyrillus, in quadam epistola, dicens, non dicimus quod filius Dei indiguerit necessario propter se secunda nativitate, post eam quae ex patre est, est enim fatuum et indoctum existentem ante omnia saecula, et consempiternum patri, indigere dicere initio ut sit secundo. Quoniam autem, propter nos, et propter nostram salutem, uniens sibi secundum subsistentiam quod est humanum, processit ex muliere, ob hoc dicitur nasci carnaliter. | Reply to Objection 2: This was an argument of Nestorius, and it is thus solved by Cyril in an epistle [*Cf. Acta Concil. Ephes., p. 1, cap. viii]: "We do not say that the Son of God had need, for His own sake, of a second nativity, after that which is from the Father: for it is foolish and a mark of ignorance to say that He who is from all eternity, and co-eternal with the Father, needs to begin again to exist. But because for us and for our salvation, uniting the human nature to His Person, He became the child of a woman, for this reason do we say that He was born in the flesh." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod nativitas est personae ut subiecti, naturae autem ut termini. Possibile est autem uni subiecto plures transmutationes inesse, quas tamen necesse est secundum terminos variari. Quod tamen non dicimus quasi aeterna nativitas sit transmutatio aut motus, sed quia significatur per modum mutationis aut motus. | Reply to Objection 3: Nativity regards the person as its subject, the nature as its terminus. Now, it is possible for several transformations to be in the same subject: yet must they be diversified in respect of their termini. But we do not say this as though the eternal nativity were a transformation or a movement, but because it is designated by way of a transformation or movement. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod Christus potest dici bis natus, secundum duas nativitates. Sicut enim dicitur bis currere qui currit duobus temporibus, ita potest dici bis nasci qui semel nascitur in aeternitate, et semel in tempore, quia aeternitas et tempus multo magis differunt quam duo tempora, cum tamen utrumque designet mensuram durationis. | Reply to Objection 4: Christ can be said to have been born twice in respect of His two nativities. For just as he is said to run twice who runs at two different times, so can He be said to be born twice who is born once from eternity and once in time: because eternity and time differ much more than two different times, although each signifies a measure of duration. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod secundum temporalem nativitatem Christi beata virgo non possit dici mater eius. Ut enim supra dictum est, beata virgo Maria nihil active in generatione Christi operata est, sed solam materiam ministravit. Sed hoc non videtur sufficere ad rationem matris, alioquin, lignum diceretur mater lecti aut scamni. Ergo videtur quod beata virgo non possit dici mater Christi. |
Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin cannot be called Christ's Mother in respect of His temporal nativity. For, as stated above (Question [32], Article [4]), the Blessed Virgin Mary did not cooperate actively in begetting Christ, but merely supplied the matter. But this does not seem sufficient to make her His Mother: otherwise wood might be called the mother of the bed or bench. Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin cannot be called the Mother of Christ. |
| Praeterea, Christus ex beata virgine miraculose natus est. Sed miraculosa generatio non sufficit ad rationem maternitatis vel filiationis, non enim dicimus Hevam fuisse filiam Adae. Ergo videtur quod nec Christus debeat dici filius beatae virginis. | Objection 2: Further, Christ was born miraculously of the Blessed Virgin. But a miraculous begetting does not suffice for motherhood or sonship: for we do not speak of Eve as being the daughter of Adam. Therefore neither should Christ be called the Son of the Blessed Virgin. |
| Praeterea, ad matrem pertinere videtur decisio seminis. Sed, sicut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, corpus Christi non seminaliter, sed conditive a spiritu sancto formatum est. Ergo videtur quod beata virgo non debeat dici mater Christi. | Objection 3: Further, motherhood seems to imply partial separation of the semen. But, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii), "Christ's body was formed, not by a seminal process, but by the operation of the Holy Ghost." Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin should not be called the Mother of Christ. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. I, Christi generatio sic erat. Cum esset desponsata mater Iesu Maria Ioseph, et cetera. |
On the contrary, It is written (Mt. 1:18): "The generation of Christ was in this wise. When His Mother Mary was espoused to Joseph," etc. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod beata virgo Maria est vera et naturalis mater Christi. Sicut enim supra dictum est, corpus Christi non est de caelo allatum, sicut Valentinus haereticus posuit, sed de virgine matre sumptum, et ex purissimis sanguinibus eius formatum. Et hoc solum requiritur ad rationem matris, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde beata virgo vere est mater Christi. |
I answer that, The Blessed Virgin Mary is in truth and by nature the Mother of Christ. For, as we have said above (Question [5], Article [2]; Question [31], Article [5]), Christ's body was not brought down from heaven, as the heretic Valentine maintained, but was taken from the Virgin Mother, and formed from her purest blood. And this is all that is required for motherhood, as has been made clear above (Question [31], Article [5]; Question [32], Article [4]). Therefore the Blessed Virgin is truly Christ's Mother. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, paternitas seu maternitas et filiatio non competunt in quacumque generatione sed in sola generatione viventium. Et ideo, si aliqua inanimata ex aliqua materia fiant, non propter hoc consequitur in eis relatio maternitatis et filiationis, sed solum in generatione viventium, quae proprie nativitas dicitur. |
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Question [32], Article [3]), not every generation implies fatherhood or motherhood and sonship, but only the generation of living things. Consequently when inanimate things are made from some matter, the relationship of motherhood and sonship does not follow from this, but only in the generation of living things, which is properly called nativity. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, nativitas temporalis, qua Christus est natus propter nostram salutem, est quodammodo secundum nos, quoniam natus est homo ex muliere, et tempore conceptionis debito, super nos autem, quoniam non ex semine, sed ex sancto spiritu et sancta virgine, super legem conceptionis. Sic igitur ex parte matris nativitas illa fuit naturalis, sed ex parte operationis spiritus sancti fuit miraculosa. Unde beata virgo est vera et naturalis mater Christi. | Reply to Objection 2: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "The temporal nativity by which Christ was born for our salvation is, in a way, natural, since a Man was born of a woman, and after the due lapse of time from His conception: but it is also supernatural, because He was begotten, not of seed, but of the Holy Ghost and the Blessed Virgin, above the law of conception." Thus, then, on the part of the mother, this nativity was natural, but on the part of the operation of the Holy Ghost it was supernatural. Therefore the Blessed Virgin is the true and natural Mother of Christ. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, resolutio seminis feminae non pertinet ad necessitatem conceptus. Et ideo resolutio seminis non ex necessitate requiritur ad matrem. |
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (Question [31], Article [5], ad 3; Question [32], Article [4]), the resolution of the woman's semen is not necessary for conception; neither, therefore, is it required for motherhood. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beata virgo non debeat dici mater Dei. Non enim est dicendum circa divina mysteria nisi quod ex sacra Scriptura habetur. Sed nunquam in sacra Scriptura legitur quod sit mater aut genitrix Dei, sed quod sit mater Christi, aut mater pueri, ut patet Matth. I. Ergo non est dicendum quod beata virgo sit mater Dei. | Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin should not be called the Mother of God. For in the Divine mysteries we should not make any assertion that is not taken from Holy Scripture. But we read nowhere in Holy Scripture that she is the mother or parent of God, but that she is the "mother of Christ" or of "the Child," as may be seen from Mt. 1:18. Therefore we should not say that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God. |
| Praeterea, Christus dicitur Deus secundum divinam naturam. Sed divina natura non accepit initium essendi ex virgine. Ergo beata virgo non est dicenda mater Dei. | Objection 2: Further, Christ is called God in respect of His Divine Nature. But the Divine Nature did not first originate from the Virgin. Therefore the Blessed Virgin should not be called the Mother of God. |
| Praeterea, hoc nomen Deus communiter praedicatur de patre et filio et spiritu sancto. Si ergo beata virgo est mater Dei, videtur sequi quod beata virgo sit mater patris et filii et spiritus sancti, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo beata virgo debet dici mater Dei. | Objection 3: Further, the word "God" is predicated in common of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. If, therefore, the Blessed Virgin is Mother of God it seems to follow that she was the Mother of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, which cannot be allowed. Therefore the Blessed Virgin should not be called Mother of God. |
| Sed contra est quod in capitulis Cyrilli, approbatis in Ephesina synodo, legitur, si quis non confitetur Deum esse secundum veritatem Emmanuel, et propter hoc Dei genitricem sanctam virginem, genuit enim carnaliter carnem factam ex Deo verbum, anathema sit. | On the contrary, In the chapters of Cyril, approved in the Council of Ephesus (P. 1, Cap. xxvi), we read: "If anyone confess not that the Emmanuel is truly God, and that for this reason the Holy Virgin is the Mother of God, since she begot of her flesh the Word of God made flesh, let him be anathema." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omne nomen significans in concreto naturam aliquam, potest supponere pro qualibet hypostasi illius naturae. Cum autem unio incarnationis sit facta in hypostasi, sicut supra dictum est, manifestum est quod hoc nomen Deus potest supponere pro hypostasi habente humanam naturam et divinam. Et ideo quidquid convenit divinae naturae et humanae, potest attribui illi personae, sive secundum quod pro ea supponit nomen significans divinam naturam; sive secundum quod pro ea supponit nomen significans humanam naturam. Concipi autem et nasci personae attribuitur et hypostasi secundum naturam illam in qua concipitur et nascitur. Cum igitur in ipso principio conceptionis fuerit humana natura assumpta a divina persona, sicut praedictum est, consequens est quod vere posset dici Deum esse conceptum et natum de virgine. Ex hoc autem dicitur aliqua mulier alicuius mater, quod eum concepit et genuit. Unde consequens est quod beata virgo vere dicatur mater Dei. Solum enim sic negari posset beatam virginem esse matrem Dei, si vel humanitas prius fuisset subiecta conceptioni et nativitati quam homo ille fuisset filius Dei, sicut Photinus posuit, vel humanitas non fuisset assumpta in unitatem personae vel hypostasis verbi Dei, sicut posuit Nestorius. Utrumque autem horum est erroneum. Unde haereticum est negare beatam virginem esse matrem Dei. |
I answer that, As stated above (Question [16], Article [1]), every word that signifies a nature in the concrete can stand for any hypostasis of that nature. Now, since the union of the Incarnation took place in the hypostasis, as above stated (Question [2], Article [3]), it is manifest that this word "God" can stand for the hypostasis, having a human and a Divine nature. Therefore whatever belongs to the Divine and to the human nature can be attributed to that Person: both when a word is employed to stand for it, signifying the Divine Nature, and when a word is used signifying the human nature. Now, conception and birth are attributed to the person and hypostasis in respect of that nature in which it is conceived and born. Since, therefore, the human nature was taken by the Divine Person in the very beginning of the conception, as stated above (Question [33], Article [3]), it follows that it can be truly said that God was conceived and born of the Virgin. Now from this is a woman called a man's mother, that she conceived him and gave birth to him. Therefore the Blessed Virgin is truly called the Mother of God. For the only way in which it could be denied that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God would be either if the humanity were first subject to conception and birth, before this man were the Son of God, as Photinus said; or if the humanity were not assumed unto unity of the Person or hypostasis of the Word of God, as Nestorius maintained. But both of these are erroneous. Therefore it is heretical to deny that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod haec fuit obiectio Nestorii. Quae quidem solvitur ex hoc quod, licet non inveniatur expresse in Scriptura dictum quod beata virgo sit mater Dei, invenitur tamen expresse in Scriptura quod Iesus Christus est verus Deus, ut patet I Ioan. ult.; et quod beata virgo est mater Iesu Christi, ut patet Matth. I. Unde sequitur ex necessitate ex verbis Scripturae quod sit mater Dei. | Reply to Objection 1: This was an argument of Nestorius, and it is solved by saying that, although we do not find it said expressly in Scripture that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God, yet we do find it expressly said in Scripture that "Jesus Christ is true God," as may be seen 1 Jn. 5:20, and that the Blessed Virgin is the "Mother of Jesus Christ," which is clearly expressed Mt. 1:18. Therefore, from the words of Scripture it follows of necessity that she is the Mother of God. |
| Dicitur etiam Rom. IX, quod ex Iudaeis est secundum carnem Christus, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula. Non autem est ex Iudaeis nisi mediante beata virgine. Unde ille qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula, est vere natus ex beata virgine sicut ex sua matre. |
Again, it is written (Rm. 9:5) that Christ is of the Jews "according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed for ever." But He is not of the Jews except through the Blessed Virgin. Therefore He who is "above all things, God blessed for ever," is truly born of the Blessed Virgin as of His Mother. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod illa est obiectio Nestorii. Sed Cyrillus, in quadam epistola contra Nestorium, eam solvit sic dicens, sicut hominis anima cum proprio corpore nascitur, et tanquam unum reputatur; et si voluerit dicere quispiam quia est genitrix carnis, non tamen et animae genitrix, nimis superflue loquitur, tale aliquid gestum percipimus in generatione Christi. Natum est enim ex Dei patris substantia Dei verbum, quia vero carnem assumpsit, necesse est confiteri quia natum est secundum carnem ex muliere. Dicendum est ergo quod beata virgo dicitur mater Dei, non quia sit mater divinitatis, sed quia personae habentis divinitatem et humanitatem est mater secundum humanitatem. | Reply to Objection 2: This was an argument of Nestorius. But Cyril, in a letter against Nestorius [*Cf. Acta Conc. Ephes., p. 1, cap. ii], answers it thus: "Just as when a man's soul is born with its body, they are considered as one being: and if anyone wish to say that the mother of the flesh is not the mother of the soul, he says too much. Something like this may be perceived in the generation of Christ. For the Word of God was born of the substance of God the Father: but because He took flesh, we must of necessity confess that in the flesh He was born of a woman." Consequently we must say that the Blessed Virgin is called the Mother of God, not as though she were the Mother of the Godhead, but because she is the mother, according to His human nature, of the Person who has both the divine and the human nature. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus, quamvis sit commune tribus personis, tamen quandoque supponit pro sola persona patris, quandoque pro sola persona filii vel spiritus sancti, ut supra habitum est. Et ita, cum dicitur, beata virgo est mater Dei hoc nomen Deus supponit pro sola persona filii incarnata. |
Reply to Objection 3: Although the name "God" is common to the three Persons, yet sometimes it stands for the Person of the Father alone, sometimes only for the Person of the Son or of the Holy Ghost, as stated above (Question [16], Article [1]; FP, Question [39], Article [4]). So that when we say, "The Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God," this word "God" stands only for the incarnate Person of the Son. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo sint duae filiationes. Nativitas enim est causa filiationis. Sed in Christo sunt duae nativitates. Ergo etiam in Christo sunt duae filiationes. | Objection 1: It would seem that there are two filiations in Christ. For nativity is the cause of filiation. But in Christ there are two nativities. Therefore in Christ there are also two filiations. |
| Praeterea, filiatio, qua quis dicitur filius alicuius ut matris vel patris, dependet aliqualiter ab ipso, quia esse relationis est ad aliud aliqualiter se habere; unde et, interempto uno relativorum, interimitur aliud. Sed filiatio aeterna, qua Christus est filius Dei patris, non dependet a matre, quia nullum aeternum dependet a temporali. Ergo Christus non est filius matris filiatione aeterna. Aut ergo nullo modo est filius eius, quod est contra praedicta, aut oportet quod sit filius eius quadam alia filiatione temporali. Sunt ergo in Christo duae filiationes. |
Objection 2: Further, filiation, which is said of a man as being the son of someone, his father or his mother, depends, in a way, on him: because the very being of a relation consists "in being referred to another"; wherefore if one of two relatives be destroyed, the other is destroyed also. But the eternal filiation by which Christ is the Son of God the Father depends not on His Mother, because nothing eternal depends on what is temporal. Therefore Christ is not His Mother's Son by temporal filiation. Either, therefore, He is not her Son at all, which is in contradiction to what has been said above (Articles [3],4), or He must needs be her Son by some other temporal filiation. Therefore in Christ there are two filiations. |
| Praeterea, unum relativorum ponitur in definitione alterius, ex quo patet quod unum relativorum specificatur ex alio. Sed unum et idem non potest esse in diversis speciebus. Ergo impossibile videtur quod una et eadem relatio terminetur ad extrema omnino diversa. Sed Christus dicitur filius patris aeterni, et matris temporalis, qui sunt termini omnino diversi. Ergo videtur quod non possit eadem relatione Christus dici filius patris et matris. Sunt ergo in Christo duae filiationes. | Objection 3: Further, one of two relatives enters the definition of the other; hence it is clear that of two relatives, one is specified from the other. But one and the same cannot be in diverse species. Therefore it seems impossible that one and the same relation be referred to extremes which are altogether diverse. But Christ is said to be the Son of the Eternal Father and a temporal mother, who are terms altogether diverse. Therefore it seems that Christ cannot, by the same relation, be called the Son of the Father and of His Mother Therefore in Christ there are two filiations. |
| Sed contra est quod, sicut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, ea quae sunt naturae, multiplicantur in Christo, non autem ea quae sunt personae. Sed filiatio maxime pertinet ad personam, est enim proprietas personalis, ut patet ex his quae in prima parte dicta sunt. Ergo in Christo est una tantum filiatio. | On the contrary, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii), things pertaining to the nature are multiple in Christ; but not those things that pertain to the Person. But filiation belongs especially to the Person, since it is a personal property, as appears from what was said in the FP, Question [32], Article [3]; FP, Question [40], Article [2]. Therefore there is but one filiation in Christ. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc sunt diversae opiniones. Quidam enim, attendentes ad causam filiationis, quae est nativitas, ponunt in Christo duas filiationes, sicut et duas nativitates. Alii vero, attendentes ad subiectum filiationis, quod est persona vel hypostasis, ponunt in Christo tantum unam filiationem, sicut et unam hypostasim vel personam. Unitas enim relationis vel eius pluralitas non attenditur secundum terminos, sed secundum causam vel subiectum. Si enim secundum terminos attenditur, oporteret quod quilibet homo in se duas filiationes haberet, unam qua refertur ad patrem, et aliam qua refertur ad matrem. Sed recte consideranti apparet eadem relatione referri unumquemque ad suum patrem et matrem, propter unitatem causae. Eadem enim nativitate homo nascitur ex patre et matre, unde eadem relatione ad utrumque refertur. Et eadem ratio est de magistro qui docet multos discipulos eadem doctrina; et de domino qui gubernat diversos subiectos eadem potestate. Si vero sint diversae causae specie differentes, ex consequenti videntur relationes specie differre. Unde nihil prohibet plures tales relationes eidem inesse. Sicut, si aliquis est aliquorum magister in grammatica et aliorum in logica, alia est ratio magisterii utriusque, et ideo diversis relationibus unus et idem homo potest esse magister vel diversorum vel eorundem secundum diversas doctrinas. Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquis habet relationem ad plures secundum diversas causas, eiusdem tamen speciei, sicut cum aliquis est pater diversorum filiorum secundum diversos generationis actus. Unde paternitas non potest specie differre, cum actus generationum sint iidem specie. Et quia plures formae eiusdem speciei non possunt simul inesse eidem subiecto, non est possibile quod sint plures paternitates in eo qui est pater plurium filiorum generatione naturali. Secus autem esset si esset pater unius generatione naturali, et alterius per adoptionem. | I answer that, opinions differ on this question. For some, considering only the cause of filiation, which is nativity, put two filiations in Christ, just as there are two nativities. On the contrary, others, considering only the subject of filiation, which is the person or hypostasis, put only one filiation in Christ, just as there is but one hypostasis or person. Because the unity or plurality of a relation is considered in respect, not of its terms, but of its cause or of its subject. For if it were considered in respect of its terms, every man would of necessity have in himself two filiations---one in reference to his father, and another in reference to his mother. But if we consider the question aright, we shall see that every man bears but one relation to both his father and his mother, on account of the unity of the cause thereof. For man is born by one birth of both father and mother: whence he bears but one relation to both. The same is said of one master who teaches many disciples the same doctrine, and of one lord who governs many subjects by the same power. But if there be various causes specifically diverse, it seems that in consequence the relations differ in species: wherefore nothing hinders several such relations being in the same subject. Thus if a man teach grammar to some and logic to others, his teaching is of a different kind in one case and in the other; and therefore one and the same man may have different relations as the master of different disciples, or of the same disciples in regard to diverse doctrines. Sometimes, however, it happens that a man bears a relation to several in respect of various causes, but of the same species: thus a father may have several sons by several acts of generation. Wherefore the paternity cannot differ specifically, since the acts of generation are specifically the same. And because several forms of the same species cannot at the same time be in the same subject, it is impossible for several paternities to be in a man who is the father of several sons by natural generation. But it would not be so were he the father of one son by natural generation and of another by adoption. |
| Manifestum est autem quod non una et eadem nativitate Christus est natus ex patre ab aeterno, et ex matre ex tempore. Nec nativitas est unius speciei. Unde, quantum ad hoc, oporteret dicere in Christo esse diversas filiationes, unam temporalem et aliam aeternam. Sed quia subiectum filiationis non est natura aut pars naturae, sed solum persona vel hypostasis; in Christo autem non est hypostasis vel persona nisi aeterna, non potest in Christo esse aliqua filiatio nisi quae sit in hypostasi aeterna. Omnis autem relatio quae ex tempore de Deo dicitur, non ponit in ipso Deo aeterno aliquid secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum, sicut in prima parte habitum est. Et ideo filiatio qua Christus refertur ad matrem, non potest esse realis relatio, sed solum secundum rationem. | Now, it is manifest that Christ was not born by one and the same nativity, of the Father from eternity, and of His Mother in time: indeed, these two nativities differ specifically. Wherefore, as to this, we must say that there are various filiations, one temporal and the other eternal. Since, however, the subject of filiation is neither the nature nor part of the nature, but the person or hypostasis alone; and since in Christ there is no other hypostasis or person than the eternal, there can be no other filiation in Christ but that which is in the eternal hypostasis. Now, every relation which is predicated of God from time does not put something real in the eternal God, but only something according to our way of thinking, as we have said in the FP, Question [13], Article [7]. Therefore the filiation by which Christ is referred to His Mother cannot be a real relation, but only a relation of reason. |
| Et sic quantum ad aliquid utraque opinio verum dicit. Nam si attendamus ad perfectas rationes filiationis, oportet dicere duas filiationes, secundum dualitatem nativitatum. Si autem attendamus ad subiectum filiationis, quod non potest esse nisi suppositum aeternum, non potest in Christo esse realiter nisi filiatio aeterna. Dicitur tamen relative filius ad matrem relatione quae cointelligitur relationi maternitatis ad Christum. Sicut Deus dicitur dominus relatione quae cointelligitur reali relationi qua creatura subiicitur Deo. Et quamvis relatio dominii non sit realis in Deo, tamen realiter est dominus, ex reali subiectione creaturae ad ipsum. Et similiter Christus dicitur realiter filius virginis matris ex relatione reali maternitatis ad Christum. | Consequently each opinion is true to a certain extent. For if we consider the adequate causes of filiation, we must needs say that there are two filiations in respect of the twofold nativity. But if we consider the subject of filiation, which can only be the eternal suppositum, then no other than the eternal filiation in Christ is a real relation. Nevertheless, He has the relation of Son in regard to His Mother, because it is implied in the relation of motherhood to Christ. Thus God is called Lord by a relation which is implied in the real relation by which the creature is subject to God. And although lordship is not a real relation in God, yet is He really Lord through the real subjection of the creature to Him. In the same way Christ is really the Son of the Virgin Mother through the real relation of her motherhood to Christ. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nativitas temporalis causaret in Christo temporalem filiationem realem, si esset ibi subiectum huiusmodi filiationis capax. Quod quidem esse non potest, ipsum enim suppositum aeternum non potest esse susceptivum relationis temporalis, ut dictum est. Nec etiam potest dici quod sit susceptivum filiationis temporalis ratione humanae naturae, sicut etiam et temporalis nativitatis, quia oporteret naturam humanam aliqualiter esse subiectam filiationi, sicut est aliqualiter subiecta nativitati; cum enim Aethiops dicitur albus ratione dentis, oportet quod dens Aethiopis sit albedinis subiectum. Natura autem humana nullo modo potest esse subiectum filiationis, quia haec relatio directe respicit personam. | Reply to Objection 1: Temporal nativity would cause a real temporal filiation in Christ if there were in Him a subject capable of such filiation. But this cannot be; since the eternal suppositum cannot be receptive of a temporal relation, as stated above. Nor can it be said that it is receptive of temporal filiation by reason of the human nature, just as it is receptive of the temporal nativity; because human nature would need in some way to be the subject of filiation, just as in a way it is the subject of nativity; for since an Ethiopian is said to be white by reason of his teeth, it must be that his teeth are the subject of whiteness. But human nature can nowise be the subject of filiation, because this relation regards directly the person. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod filiatio aeterna non dependet a matre temporali, sed huic filiationi aeternae cointelligitur quidam respectus temporalis dependens a matre, secundum quem Christus dicitur filius matris. | Reply to Objection 2: Eternal filiation does not depend on a temporal mother, but together with this eternal filiation we understand a certain temporal relation dependent on the mother, in respect of which relation Christ is called the Son of His Mother. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod unum et ens se consequuntur, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys. Et ideo, sicut contingit quod in uno extremorum relatio sit quoddam ens, in alio autem non sit ens, sed ratio tantum, sicut de scibili et scientia philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., ita etiam contingit quod ex parte unius extremi est una relatio, ex parte autem alterius extremi sunt multae relationes. Sicut in hominibus ex parte parentum invenitur duplex relatio, una paternitatis et alia maternitatis, quae sunt specie differentes, propter hoc quod alia ratione pater, et alia mater est generationis principium (si vero essent plures eadem ratione principium unius actionis, puta cum multi simul trahunt navem, in omnibus esset una et eadem relatio), ex parte autem prolis est una sola filiatio secundum rem, sed duplex secundum rationem, inquantum correspondet utrique relationi parentum secundum duos respectus intellectus. Et sic etiam quantum ad aliquid in Christo est tantum una filiatio realis, quae respicit patrem aeternum, est tamen ibi alius respectus temporalis, qui respicit matrem temporalem. | Reply to Objection 3: One and being are mutually consequent, as is said Metaph. iv. Therefore, just as it happens that in one of the extremes of a relation there is something real, whereas in the other there is not something real, but merely a certain aspect, as the Philosopher observes of knowledge and the thing known; so also it happens that on the part of one extreme there is one relation, whereas on the part of the other there are many. Thus in man on the part of his parents there is a twofold relation, the one of paternity, the other of motherhood, which are specifically diverse, inasmuch as the father is the principle of generation in one way, and the mother in another (whereas if many be the principle of one action and in the same way---for instance, if many. together draw a ship along---there would be one and the same relation in all of them); but on the part of the child there is but one filiation in reality, though there be two in aspect, corresponding to the two relations in the parents, as considered by the intellect. And thus in one way there is only one real filiation in Christ, which is in respect of the Eternal Father: yet there is another temporal relation in regard to His temporal mother. |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit natus sine dolore matris. Sicut enim mors hominum subsecuta est ex peccato primorum parentum, secundum illud Gen. II, quacumque die comederitis, morte moriemini; ita etiam dolor partus, secundum illud Gen. III, in dolore paries filios. Sed Christus mortem subire voluit. Ergo videtur quod pari ratione eius partus esse debuerit cum dolore. | Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not born without His Mother suffering. For just as man's death was a result of the sin of our first parents, according to Gn. 2:17: "In what day soever ye shall eat, ye shall [Vulg.: 'thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt] die"; so were the pains of childbirth, according to Gn. 3:16: "In sorrow shalt thou bring forth children." But Christ was willing to undergo death. Therefore for the same reason it seems that His birth should have been with pain. |
| Praeterea, finis proportionatur principio. Sed finis vitae Christi fuit cum dolore, secundum illud Isaiae LIII, vere dolores nostros ipse tulit. Ergo videtur quod etiam in sua nativitate fuerit dolor partus. | Objection 2: Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But Christ ended His life in pain, according to Is. 53:4: "Surely... He hath carried our sorrows." Therefore it seems that His nativity was not without the pains of childbirth. |
| Praeterea, in libro de ortu salvatoris narratur quod ad Christi nativitatem obstetrices occurrerunt, quae videntur necessariae parienti propter dolorem. Ergo videtur quod beata virgo peperit cum dolore. | Objection 3: Further, in the book on the birth of our Saviour [*Protevangelium Jacobi xix, xx] it is related that midwives were present at Christ's birth; and they would be wanted by reason of the mother's suffering pain. Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin suffered pain in giving birth to her Child. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in sermone de nativitate, alloquens virginem matrem, nec in conceptione, inquit, inventa es sine pudore, nec in partu inventa es cum dolore. | On the contrary, Augustine says (Serm. de Nativ. [*Supposititious]), addressing himself to the Virgin-Mother: "In conceiving thou wast all pure, in giving birth thou wast without pain." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod dolor parientis causatur ex apertione meatuum per quos proles egreditur. Dictum est autem supra quod Christus est egressus ex clauso utero matris, et sic nulla apertio meatuum ibi fuit. Et propter hoc in illo partu nullus fuit dolor, sicut nec aliqua corruptio, sed fuit ibi maxima iucunditas, ex hoc quod homo Deus natus est in mundum, secundum illud Isaiae XXXV, germinans germinabit sicut lilium, et exultabit laetabunda et laudans. |
I answer that, The pains of childbirth are caused by the infant opening the passage from the womb. Now it has been said above (Question [28], Article [2], Replies to objections), that Christ came forth from the closed womb of His Mother, and, consequently, without opening the passage. Consequently there was no pain in that birth, as neither was there any corruption; on the contrary, there was much joy therein for that God-Man "was born into the world," according to Is. 35:1,2: "Like the lily, it shall bud forth and blossom, and shall rejoice with joy and praise." |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dolor partus consequitur in muliere commixtionem virilem. Unde Gen. III, postquam dictum est, in dolore paries, subditur, et sub viri potestate eris. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus, in sermone de assumptione beatae virginis, ab hac sententia excipitur virgo mater Dei, quae, quia sine peccati colluvione et sine virilis admixtionis detrimento Christum suscepit, sine dolore genuit, sine integritatis violatione, pudore virginitatis integra permansit. Christus autem mortem suscepit spontanea voluntate, ut pro nobis satisfaceret, non quasi ex necessitate illius sententiae, quia ipse mortis debitor non erat. |
Reply to Objection 1: The pains of childbirth in the woman follow from the mingling of the sexes. Wherefore (Gn. 3:16) after the words, "in sorrow shalt thou bring forth children," the following are added: "and thou shalt be under thy husband's power." But, as Augustine says (Serm. de Assumpt. B. Virg., [*Supposititious]), from this sentence we must exclude the Virgin-Mother of God; who, "because she conceived Christ without the defilement of sin, and without the stain of sexual mingling, therefore did she bring Him forth without pain, without violation of her virginal integrity, without detriment to the purity of her maidenhood." Christ, indeed, suffered death, but through His own spontaneous desire, in order to atone for us, not as a necessary result of that sentence, for He was not a debtor unto death. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Christus moriendo destruxit mortem nostram, ita suo dolore nos a doloribus liberavit, et ita mori voluit cum dolore. Sed dolor parientis matris non pertinebat ad Christum, qui pro peccatis nostris satisfacere veniebat. Et ideo non oportuit quod mater eius pareret cum dolore. | Reply to Objection 2: As "by His death" Christ "destroyed our death" [*Preface of the Mass in Paschal-time], so by His pains He freed us from our pains; and so He wished to die a painful death. But the mother's pains in childbirth did not concern Christ, who came to atone for our sins. And therefore there was no need for His Mother to suffer in giving birth. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod Luc. II dicitur quod beata virgo ipsamet puerum, quem pepererat, pannis involvit et posuit in praesepio. Et ex hoc ostenditur narratio huius libri, qui est apocryphus, esse falsa. Unde Hieronymus dicit, contra Helvidium, nulla ibi obstetrix, nulla muliercularum sedulitas intercessit. Et mater et obstetrix fuit. Pannis, inquit, involvit infantem, et posuit in praesepio. Quae sententia apocryphorum deliramenta convincit. |
Reply to Objection 3: We are told (Lk. 2:7) that the Blessed Virgin herself "wrapped up in swaddling clothes" the Child whom she had brought forth, "and laid Him in a manger." Consequently the narrative of this book, which is apocryphal, is untrue. Wherefore Jerome says (Adv. Helvid. iv): "No midwife was there, no officious women interfered. She was both mother and midwife. 'With swaddling clothes,' says he, 'she wrapped up the child, and laid Him in a manger.'" These words prove the falseness of the apocryphal ravings. |
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| Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non debuit in Bethlehem nasci. Dicitur enim Isaiae II, de Sion exibit lex, et verbum domini de Ierusalem. Sed Christus est vere verbum Dei. Ergo de Ierusalem debuit prodire in mundum. |
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been born in Bethlehem. For it is written (Is. 2:3): "The law shall come forth from Sion, and the Word of the Lord from Jerusalem." But Christ is truly the Word of God. Therefore He should have come into the world at Jerusalem. |
| Praeterea, Matth. II dicitur scriptum esse de Christo quod Nazaraeus vocabitur, quod sumitur ex eo quod scribitur Isaiae XI, flos de radice eius ascendet; Nazareth enim flos interpretatur. Sed maxime aliquis denominatur a loco suae nativitatis. Ergo videtur quod in Nazareth nasci debuerit, ubi etiam fuit conceptus et nutritus. |
Objection 2: Further, it is said (Mt. 2:23) that it is written of Christ that "He shall be called a Nazarene"; which is taken from Is. 11:1: "A flower shall rise up out of his root"; for "Nazareth" is interpreted "a flower." But a man is named especially from the place of his birth. Therefore it seems that He should have been born in Nazareth, where also He was conceived and brought up. |
| Praeterea, ad hoc dominus natus est in mundo ut veritatis fidem annuntiaret, secundum illud Ioan. XVIII, in hoc natus sum, et ad hoc veni in mundum, ut testimonium perhibeam veritati. Sed hoc facilius fieri potuisset si natus fuisset in civitate Romana, quae tunc dominatum orbis habebat, unde et Paulus, Romanis scribens, dicit, Rom. I, fides vestra annuntiatur universo mundo. Ergo videtur quod non debuit nasci in Bethlehem. | Objection 3: Further, for this was our Lord born into the world, that He might make known the true faith. according to Jn. 18:37: "For this was I born, and for this came I into the world; that I should give testimony to the truth." But this would have been easier if He had been born in the city of Rome, which at that time ruled the world; whence Paul, writing to the Romans (1:8) says: "Your faith is spoken of in the whole world." Therefore it seems that He should not have been born in Bethlehem. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Mich. V, et tu, Bethlehem Ephrata, ex te mihi egredietur qui sit dominator in Israel. | On the contrary, It is written (Mich. 5:2): "And thou, Bethlehem, Ephrata... out of thee shall He come forth unto Me, that is to be the ruler in Israel." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod Christus in Bethlehem nasci voluit duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia factus est ex semine David secundum carnem, ut dicitur Rom. I, cui etiam fuerat facta repromissio specialis de Christo, secundum illud II Reg. XXIII, dixit vir cui constitutum de Christo Dei Iacob. Et ideo in Bethlehem, de qua natus fuit David, nasci voluit, ut ex ipso loco nativitatis promissio ei facta impleta ostenderetur. Et hoc designat Evangelista dicens, eo quod esset de domo et familia David. Secundo quia, ut Gregorius dicit, in homilia, Bethlehem domus panis interpretatur. Ipse Christus est qui ait, ego sum panis vivus, qui de caelo descendi. |
I answer that, Christ willed to be born in Bethlehem for two reasons. First, because "He was made... of the seed of David according to the flesh," as it is written (Rm. 1:3); to whom also was a special promise made concerning Christ; according to 2 Kgs. 23:1: "The man to whom it was appointed concerning the Christ of the God of Jacob... said." Therefore He willed to be born at Bethlehem, where David was born, in order that by the very birthplace the promise made to David might be shown to be fulfilled. The Evangelist points this out by saying: "Because He was of the house and of the family of David." Secondly, because, as Gregory says (Hom. viii in Evang.): "Bethlehem is interpreted 'the house of bread.' It is Christ Himself who said, 'I am the living Bread which came down from heaven.'" |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut David in Bethlehem natus est, ita etiam Ierusalem elegit ut in ea sedem regni constitueret, et templum Dei ibi aedificaret, et sic Ierusalem esset civitas simul regalis et sacerdotalis. Sacerdotium autem Christi, et eius regnum, praecipue consummatum est in eius passione. Et ideo convenienter Bethlehem elegit nativitati, Ierusalem vero passioni. | Reply to Objection 1: As David was born in Bethlehem, so also did he choose Jerusalem to set up his throne there, and to build there the Temple of God, so that Jerusalem was at the same time a royal and a priestly city. Now, Christ's priesthood and kingdom were "consummated" principally in His Passion. Therefore it was becoming that He should choose Bethlehem for His Birthplace and Jerusalem for the scene of His Passion. |
| Simul etiam per hoc hominum gloriam confutavit, qui gloriantur de hoc quod ex civitatibus nobilibus originem ducunt, in quibus etiam praecipue volunt honorari. Christus autem e converso in civitate ignobili nasci voluit, et in civitate nobili pati opprobrium. | At the same time, too, He put to silence the vain boasting of men who take pride in being born in great cities, where also they desire especially to receive honor. Christ, on the contrary, willed to be born in a mean city, and to suffer reproach in a great city. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus florere voluit secundum virtuosam conversationem, non secundum carnis originem. Et ideo in civitate Nazareth educari voluit et nutriri. In Bethlehem autem voluit quasi peregre nasci, quia, ut Gregorius dicit, per humanitatem quam assumpserat, quasi in alieno nascebatur, non secundum potestatem, sed secundum naturam. Et, ut etiam Beda dicit, per hoc quod in diversorio loco eget, nobis multas mansiones in domo patris sui praepararet. | Reply to Objection 2: Christ wished "to flower" by His holy life, not in His carnal birth. Therefore He wished to be fostered and brought up at Nazareth. But He wished to be born at Bethlehem away from home; because, as Gregory says (Hom. viii in Evang.), through the human nature which He had taken, He was born, as it were, in a foreign place---foreign not to His power, but to His Nature. And, again, as Bede says on Lk. 2:7: "In order that He who found no room at the inn might prepare many mansions for us in His Father's house." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in quodam sermone Ephesini Concilii, si maximam Romam elegisset civitatem, propter potentiam civium mutationem orbis terrarum putarent. Si filius fuisset imperatoris, potestati utilitatem adscriberent. Sed ut divinitas cognosceretur orbem transformasse terrarum, pauperculam elegit matrem, pauperiorem patriam. | Reply to Objection 3: According to a sermon in the Council of Ephesus [*P. iii, cap. ix]: "If He had chosen the great city of Rome, the change in the world would be ascribed to the influence of her citizens. If He had been the son of the Emperor, His benefits would have been attributed to the latter's power. But that we might acknowledge the work of God in the transformation of the whole earth, He chose a poor mother and a birthplace poorer still." |
| Elegit autem Deus infirma mundi ut confundat fortia, sicut dicitur I Cor. I. Et ideo, ut suam potestatem magis ostenderet, in ipsa Roma, quae caput orbis erat, statuit caput Ecclesiae suae, in signum perfectae victoriae, ut exinde fides derivaretur ad universum mundum, secundum illud Isaiae XXVI, civitatem sublimem humiliabit, et conculcabit eam pes pauperis, idest Christi, gressus egenorum, idest apostolorum Petri et Pauli. |
"But the weak things of the world hath God chosen, that He may confound the strong" (1 Cor. 1:27). And therefore, in order the more to show His power, He set up the head of His Church in Rome itself, which was the head of the world, in sign of His complete victory, in order that from that city the faith might spread throughout the world; according to Is. 26:5,6: "The high city He shall lay low... the feet of the poor," i.e. of Christ, "shall tread it down; the steps of the needy," i.e. of the apostles Peter and Paul. |
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| Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit congruo tempore natus. Ad hoc enim Christus venerat ut suos in libertatem revocaret. Natus est autem tempore servitutis, quo scilicet totus orbis praecepto Augusti describitur, quasi tributarius factus, ut habetur Luc. II. Ergo videtur quod non congruo tempore Christus fuerit natus. | Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not born at a fitting time. Because Christ came in order to restore liberty to His own. But He was born at a time of subjection---namely, when the whole world, as it were, tributary to Augustus, was being enrolled, at his command as Luke relates (2:1). Therefore it seems that Christ was not born at a fitting time. |
| Praeterea, promissiones de Christo nascituro non gentilibus fuerant factae, secundum illud Rom. IX, quorum sunt promissa. Sed Christus natus est tempore quo rex alienigena dominabatur, sicut patet Matth. II, cum natus esset Iesus in diebus Herodis regis. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit congruo tempore natus. | Objection 2: Further, the promises concerning the coming of Christ were not made to the Gentiles; according to Rm. 9:4: "To whom belong... the promises." But Christ was born during the reign of a foreigner, as appears from Mt. 2:1: "When Jesus was born in the days of King Herod." Therefore it seems that He was not born at a fitting time. |
| Praeterea, tempus praesentiae Christi in mundo diei comparatur, propter id quod ipse est lux mundi, unde ipse dicit, Ioan. IX, me oportet operari opera eius qui misit me, donec dies est. Sed in aestate sunt dies longiores quam in hieme. Ergo, cum natus fuerit in profundo hiemis octo Kalendas Ianuarii, videtur quod non fuerit convenienti tempore natus. |
Objection 3: Further, the time of Christ's presence on earth is compared to the day, because He is the "Light of the world"; wherefore He says Himself (Jn. 9:4): "I must work the works of Him that sent Me, whilst it is day." But in summer the days are longer than in winter. Therefore, since He was born in the depth of winter, eight days before the Kalends of January, it seems that He was not born at a fitting time. |
| Sed contra est quod dicitur Galat. IV, cum venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus filium suum, factum ex muliere, factum sub lege. |
On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 4:4): "When the fulness of the time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod haec est differentia inter Christum et alios homines, quod alii homines nascuntur subiecti necessitati temporis, Christus autem, tanquam dominus et conditor omnium temporum, elegit sibi tempus in quo nasceretur, sicut et matrem et locum. Et quia quae a Deo sunt ordinata sunt, et convenienter disposita, consequens est quod convenientissimo tempore Christus nasceretur. | I answer that, There is this difference between Christ and other men, that, whereas they are born subject to the restrictions of time, Christ, as Lord and Maker of all time, chose a time in which to be born, just as He chose a mother and a birthplace. And since "what is of God is well ordered" and becomingly arranged, it follows that Christ was born at a most fitting time. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus venerat nos in statum libertatis reducere de statu servitutis. Et ideo, sicut mortalitatem nostram suscepit ut nos ad vitam reduceret, ita, ut Beda dicit, eo tempore dignatus est incarnari quo, mox natus, censu Caesaris adscriberetur atque, ob nostri liberationem, ipse servitio subderetur. | Reply to Objection 1: Christ came in order to bring us back from a state of bondage to a state of liberty. And therefore, as He took our mortal nature in order to restore us to life, so, as Bede says (Super Luc. ii, 4,5), "He deigned to take flesh at such a time that, shortly after His birth, He would be enrolled in Caesar's census, and thus submit Himself to bondage for the sake of our liberty." |
| Tempore etiam illo, quo totus orbis sub uno principe vivebat, maxime pax fuit in mundo. Et ideo decebat ut illo tempore Christus nasceretur, qui est pax nostra, faciens utraque unum, ut dicitur Ephes. II. Unde Hieronymus dicit, super Isaiam, veteres revolvamus historias, et inveniemus usque ad vigesimum octavum annum Caesaris Augusti in toto orbe terrarum fuisse discordiam, orto autem domino, omnia bella cessaverunt, secundum illud Isaiae II, non levabit gens contra gentem gladium. |
Moreover, at that time, when the whole world lived under one ruler, peace abounded on the earth. Therefore it was a fitting time for the birth of Christ, for "He is our peace, who hath made both one," as it is written (Eph. 2:14). Wherefore Jerome says on Is. 2:4: "If we search the page of ancient history, we shall find that throughout the whole world there was discord until the twenty-eighth year of Augustus Caesar: but when our Lord was born, all war ceased"; according to Is. 2:4: "Nation shall not lift up sword against nation." |
| Congruebat etiam ut illo tempore quo unus princeps dominabatur in mundo, Christus nasceretur, qui venerat suos congregare in unum, ut esset unum ovile et unus pastor, ut dicitur Ioan. X. |
Again, it was fitting that Christ should be born while the world was governed by one ruler, because "He came to gather His own [Vulg.: 'the children of God'] together in one" (Jn. 11:52), that there might be "one fold and one shepherd" (Jn. 10:16). |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus regis alienigenae tempore nasci voluit, ut impleretur prophetia Iacob dicentis, Gen. penult., non auferetur sceptrum de Iuda, et dux de femore eius, donec veniat qui mittendus est. Quia, ut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., quandiu Iudaica gens sub Iudaicis regibus, quamvis peccatoribus, tenebatur, prophetae mittebantur ad remedium eius. Nunc autem, quando lex Dei sub potestate regis iniqui tenebatur, nascitur Christus, quia magna et desperabilis infirmitas medicum artificiosiorem quaerebat. |
Reply to Objection 2: Christ wished to be born during the reign of a foreigner, that the prophecy of Jacob might be fulfilled (Gn. 49:10): "The sceptre shall not be taken away from Juda, nor a ruler from his thigh, till He come that is to be sent." Because, as Chrysostom says (Hom. ii in Matth. [*Opus Imperf., falsely ascribed to Chrysostom]), as long as the Jewish "people was governed by Jewish kings, however wicked, prophets were sent for their healing. But now that the Law of God is under the power of a wicked king, Christ is born; because a grave and hopeless disease demanded a more skilful physician." |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in libro de quaest. novi et Vet. Test., tunc Christus nasci voluit, quando lux diei crementum incipit accipere, ut ostenderetur quod ipse venerat ut homines crescerent in lucem divinam, secundum illud Luc. I, illuminare his qui in tenebris et umbra mortis sedent. | Reply to Objection 3: As says the author of the book De Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., "Christ wished to be born, when the light of day begins to increase in length," so as to show that He came in order that man might come nearer to the Divine Light, according to Lk. 1:79: "To enlighten them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death." |
| Similiter etiam asperitatem hiemis elegit ad nativitatem, ut ex tunc carnis afflictionem pateretur pro nobis. | In like manner He chose to be born in the rough winter season, that He might begin from then to suffer in body for us. |