St. Thomas Aquinas

The Summa Theologica

(Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

Index [<<� | >>]
Third Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 50 [ << | >> ]

OF THE DEATH OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)

Deinde considerandum est de morte Christi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. We have now to consider the death of Christ; concerning which there are six subjects of inquiry:
Primo, utrum conveniens fuerit Christum mori. (1) Whether it was fitting that Christ should die?
Secundo, utrum per mortem fuerit separata unio divinitatis et carnis. (2) Whether His death severed the union of Godhead and flesh?
Tertio, utrum fuerit separata unio divinitatis et animae. (3) Whether His Godhead was separated from His soul?
Quarto, utrum Christus in triduo mortis fuerit homo. (4) Whether Christ was a man during the three days of His death?
Quinto, utrum corpus eius fuerit idem numero vivum et mortuum. (5) Whether His was the same body, living and dead?
Sexto, utrum mors eius aliquid sit operata ad nostram salutem. (6) Whether His death conduced in any way to our salvation?

Index [<<� | >>]
Third Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 50 [ << | >> ]
Article: 1  [ << | >> ]

Whether it was fitting that Christ should die?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christum mori. Illud enim quod est primum principium in aliquo genere, non disponitur per id quod est contrarium illi generi, sicut ignis, qui est principium caloris, nunquam potest esse frigidus. Sed filius Dei est principium et fons omnis vitae, secundum illud Psalmi, apud te est fons vitae. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit conveniens Christum mori. Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that Christ should die. For a first principle in any order is not affected by anything contrary to such order: thus fire, which is the principle of heat, can never become cold. But the Son of God is the fountain-head and principle of all life, according to Ps. 35:10: "With Thee is the fountain of life." Therefore it does not seem fitting for Christ to die.
Praeterea, maior est defectus mortis quam morbi, quia per morbum pervenitur ad mortem. Sed non fuit conveniens Christum aliquo morbo languescere, ut Chrysostomus dicit. Ergo etiam non fuit conveniens Christum mori. Objection 2: Further, death is a greater defect than sickness, because it is through sickness that one comes to die. But it was not beseeming for Christ to languish from sickness, as Chrysostom [*Athanasius, Orat. de Incarn. Verbi] says. Consequently, neither was it becoming for Christ to die.
Praeterea, dominus dicit, Ioan. X, ego veni ut vitam habeant, et abundantius habeant. Sed oppositum non perducit ad oppositum. Ergo videtur quod non fuit conveniens Christum mori. Objection 3: Further, our Lord said (Jn. 10:10): "I am come that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly." But one opposite does not lead to another. Therefore it seems that neither was it fitting for Christ to die.
Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. XI, expedit ut moriatur unus homo pro populo, ut non tota gens pereat, quod quidem Caiphas prophetice dixit, ut Evangelista testatur. On the contrary, It is written, (Jn. 11:50): "It is expedient that one man should die for the people... that the whole nation perish not": which words were spoken prophetically by Caiphas, as the Evangelist testifies.
Respondeo dicendum quod conveniens fuit Christum mori. Primo quidem, ad satisfaciendum pro humano genere, quod erat morti adiudicatum propter peccatum, secundum illud Gen. II, quacumque die comederitis, morte moriemini. Est autem conveniens satisfaciendi pro alio modus cum aliquis se subiicit poenae quam alius meruit. Et ideo Christus mori voluit, ut, moriendo, pro nobis satisfaceret, secundum illud I Pet. III, Christus semel pro peccatis nostris mortuus est. Secundo, ad ostendendum veritatem naturae assumptae. Sicut enim Eusebius dicit, si aliter, post conversationem cum hominibus, evanescens subito evolaret fugiens mortem, ab omnibus compararetur phantasmati. Tertio ut, moriendo, nos a timore mortis liberaret. Unde dicitur Heb. II, quod communicavit carni et sanguini, ut per mortem destrueret eum qui habebat mortis imperium, et liberaret eos qui timore mortis per totam vitam obnoxii erant servituti. Quarto ut, corporaliter moriendo similitudini peccati, idest poenalitati, daret nobis exemplum moriendi spiritualiter peccato. Unde dicitur Rom. VI, quod enim mortuus est peccato, mortuus est semel, quod autem vivit, vivit Deo. Ita et vos existimate mortuos esse peccato, viventes autem Deo. Quinto ut, a mortuis resurgendo, virtutem suam ostenderet, qua mortem superavit, et nobis spem resurgendi a mortuis daret. Unde apostolus dicit, I Cor. XV, si Christus praedicatur quod resurrexit a mortuis, quomodo quidam in vobis dicunt quod resurrectio mortuorum non erit? I answer that, It was fitting for Christ to die. First of all to satisfy for the whole human race, which was sentenced to die on account of sin, according to Gn. 2:17: "In what day soever ye shall [Vulg.: 'thou shalt'] eat of it ye shall [Vulg.: 'thou shalt'] die the death." Now it is a fitting way of satisfying for another to submit oneself to the penalty deserved by that other. And so Christ resolved to die, that by dying He might atone for us, according to 1 Pt. 3:18: "Christ also died once for our sins." Secondly, in order to show the reality of the flesh assumed. For, as Eusebius says (Orat. de Laud. Constant. xv), "if, after dwelling among men Christ were suddenly to disappear from men's sight, as though shunning death, then by all men He would be likened to a phantom." Thirdly, that by dying He might deliver us from fearing death: hence it is written (Heb. 2:14,15) that He communicated "to flesh and blood, that through death He might destroy him who had the empire of death and might deliver them who, through the fear of death, were all their lifetime subject to servitude." Fourthly, that by dying in the body to the likeness of sin---that is, to its penalty---He might set us the example of dying to sin spiritually. Hence it is written (Rm. 6:10): "For in that He died to sin, He died once, but in that He liveth, He liveth unto God: so do you also reckon that you are dead to sin, but alive unto God." Fifthly, that by rising from the dead, and manifesting His power whereby He overthrew death, He might instill into us the hope of rising from the dead. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:12): "If Christ be preached that He rose again from the dead, how do some among you say, that there is no resurrection from the dead?"
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus est fons vitae secundum quod Deus, non autem secundum quod homo. Mortuus autem est non secundum quod Deus, sed secundum quod homo. Unde Augustinus dicit, contra Felicianum, absit ut Christus sic senserit mortem ut, quantum est in se vita, vitam perdiderit. Si enim hoc ita esset, vitae fons aruisset. Sensit igitur mortem participatione humani affectus, quem sponte susceperat, non naturae suae perdidit potentiam, per quam cuncta vivificat. Reply to Objection 1: Christ is the fountain of life, as God, and not as man: but He died as man, and not as God. Hence Augustine [*Vigilius Tapsensis] says against Felician: "Far be it from us to suppose that Christ so felt death that He lost His life inasmuch as He is life in Himself; for, were it so, the fountain of life would have run dry. Accordingly, He experienced death by sharing in our human feeling, which of His own accord He had taken upon Himself, but He did not lose the power of His Nature, through which He gives life to all things."
Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus non sustinuit mortem ex morbo provenientem, ne videretur ex necessitate mori propter infirmitatem naturae. Sed sustinuit mortem ab exteriori illatam, cui se spontaneum obtulit, ut mors eius voluntaria ostenderetur. Reply to Objection 2: Christ did not suffer death which comes of sickness, lest He should seem to die of necessity from exhausted nature: but He endured death inflicted from without, to which He willingly surrendered Himself, that His death might be shown to be a voluntary one.
Ad tertium dicendum quod unum oppositorum per se non ducit ad aliud, sed quandoque per accidens, sicut frigidum quandoque per accidens calefacit. Et hoc modo Christus per suam mortem nos perduxit ad vitam, quia de sua morte mortem nostram destruxit, sicut ille qui poenam pro alio sustinet, removet poenam eius. Reply to Objection 3: One opposite does not of itself lead to the other, yet it does so indirectly at times: thus cold sometimes is the indirect cause of heat: and in this way Christ by His death brought us back to life, when by His death He destroyed our death; just as he who bears another's punishment takes such punishment away.

Index [<<� | >>]
Third Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 50 [ << | >> ]
Article: 2  [ << | >> ]

Whether the Godhead was separated from the flesh when Christ died?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in morte Christi fuerit separata divinitas a carne. Ut enim dicitur Matth. XXVII, dominus, in cruce pendens, clamavit, Deus, Deus meus, ut quid me dereliquisti? Quod exponens Ambrosius, dicit, clamat homo separatione divinitatis moriturus. Nam, cum divinitas morte libera sit, utique mors ibi esse non poterat nisi vita discederet, quia vita divinitas est. Et sic videtur quod in morte Christi sit divinitas separata a carne. Objection 1: It would seem that the Godhead was separated from the flesh when Christ died. For as Matthew relates (27:46), when our Lord was hanging upon the cross He cried out: "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" which words Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 23:46, explains as follows: "The man cried out when about to expire by being severed from the Godhead; for since the Godhead is immune from death, assuredly death could not be there, except life departed, for the Godhead is life." And so it seems that when Christ died, the Godhead was separated from His flesh.
Praeterea, remoto medio, separantur extrema. Sed divinitas unita est carni mediante anima, ut supra habitum est. Ergo videtur quod cum in morte Christi anima sit separata a carne, quod per consequens divinitas sit a carne separata. Objection 2: Further, extremes are severed when the mean is removed. But the soul was the mean through which the Godhead was united with the flesh, as stated above (Question [6], Article [1]). Therefore since the soul was severed from the flesh by death, it seems that, in consequence, His Godhead was also separated from it.
Praeterea, remoto medio, separantur extrema. Sed divinitas unita est carni mediante anima, ut supra habitum est. Ergo videtur quod cum in morte Christi anima sit separata a carne, quod per consequens divinitas sit a carne separata. Objection 3: Further, God's life-giving power is greater than that of the soul. But the body could not die unless the soul quitted it. Therefore, much less could it die unless the Godhead departed.
Sed contra, ea quae sunt humanae naturae, non dicuntur de filio Dei nisi ratione unionis, ut supra habitum est. Sed de filio Dei dicitur id quod convenit corpori Christi post mortem, scilicet esse sepultum, ut patet in symbolo fidei, ubi dicitur quod filius Dei conceptus est et natus ex virgine, passus, mortuus et sepultus. Ergo corpus Christi non fuit separatum in morte a divinitate. On the contrary, As stated above (Question [16], Articles [4],5), the attributes of human nature are predicated of the Son of God only by reason of the union. But what belongs to the body of Christ after death is predicated of the Son of God---namely, being buried: as is evident from the Creed, in which it is said that the Son of God "was conceived and born of a Virgin, suffered, died, and was buried." Therefore Christ's Godhead was not separated from the flesh when He died.
Respondeo dicendum quod id quod per gratiam Dei conceditur, nunquam absque culpa revocatur, unde dicitur Rom. XI, quod sine poenitentia sunt dona Dei et vocatio. Multo autem maior est gratia unionis, per quam divinitas unita est carni Christi in persona, quam gratia adoptionis, qua alii sanctificantur, et etiam magis permanens ex sui ratione, quia haec gratia ordinatur ad unionem personalem, gratia autem adoptionis ad quandam unionem affectualem. Et tamen videmus quod gratia adoptionis nunquam perditur sine culpa. Cum igitur in Christo nullum fuerit peccatum, impossibile fuit quod solveretur unio divinitatis a carne ipsius. Et ideo, sicut ante mortem caro Christi unita fuit secundum personam et hypostasim verbo Dei, ita et remansit unita post mortem, ut scilicet non esset alia hypostasis verbi Dei et carnis Christi post mortem, ut Damascenus dicit, in III libro. I answer that, What is bestowed through God's grace is never withdrawn except through fault. Hence it is written (Rm. 11:29): "The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance." But the grace of union whereby the Godhead was united to the flesh in Christ's Person, is greater than the grace of adoption whereby others are sanctified: also it is more enduring of itself, because this grace is ordained for personal union, whereas the grace of adoption is referred to a certain affective union. And yet we see that the grace of adoption is never lost without fault. Since, then there was no sin in Christ, it was impossible for the union of the Godhead with the flesh to be dissolved. Consequently, as before death Christ's flesh was united personally and hypostatically with the Word of God, it remained so after His death, so that the hypostasis of the Word of God was not different from that of Christ's flesh after death, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii).
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod derelictio illa non est referenda ad solutionem unionis personalis, sed ad hoc quod Deus pater eum exposuit passioni. Unde derelinquere ibi non est aliud quam non protegere a persequentibus. Vel dicit se derelictum quantum ad illam orationem qua dixerat, pater, si fieri potest, transeat a me calix iste, ut Augustinus exponit, in libro de gratia novi testamenti. Reply to Objection 1: Such forsaking is not to be referred to the dissolving of the personal union, but to this, that God the Father gave Him up to the Passion: hence there "to forsake" means simply not to protect from persecutors. or else He says there that He is forsaken, with reference to the prayer He had made: "Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass away from Me," as Augustine explains it (De Gratia Novi Test.).
Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum Dei dicitur esse unitum carni mediante anima, inquantum caro per animam pertinet ad humanam naturam, quam filius Dei assumere intendebat, non autem ita quod anima sit quasi medium ligans unita. Habet autem caro ab anima quod pertineat ad humanam naturam, etiam postquam anima separatur ab ea, inquantum scilicet in carne mortua remanet, ex divina ordinatione, quidam ordo ad resurrectionem. Et ideo non tollitur unio divinitatis ad carnem. Reply to Objection 2: The Word of God is said to be united with the flesh through the medium of the soul, inasmuch as it is through the soul that the flesh belongs to human nature, which the Son of God intended to assume; but not as though the soul were the medium linking them together. But it is due to the soul that the flesh is human even after the soul has been separated from it---namely, inasmuch as by God's ordinance there remains in the dead flesh a certain relation to the resurrection. And therefore the union of the Godhead with the flesh is not taken away.
Ad tertium dicendum quod anima habet vim vivificandi formaliter. Et ideo, ea praesente et unita formaliter, necesse est corpus esse vivum. Divinitas autem non habet vim vivificandi formaliter, sed effective, non enim potest esse corporis forma. Et ideo non est necesse quod, manente unione divinitatis ad carnem, caro sit viva, quia Deus non ex necessitate agit, sed ex voluntate. Reply to Objection 3: The soul formally possesses the life-giving energy, and therefore, while it is present, and united formally, the body must necessarily be a living one, whereas the Godhead has not the life-giving energy formally, but effectively; because It cannot be the form of the body: and therefore it is not necessary for the flesh to be living while the union of the Godhead with the flesh remains, since God does not act of necessity, but of His own will.

Index [<<� | >>]
Third Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 50 [ << | >> ]
Article: 3  [ << | >> ]

Whether in Christ's death there was a severance between His Godhead and His soul?

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in morte Christi fuerit separatio divinitatis ab anima. Dicit enim dominus, Ioan. X, nemo tollit animam meam a me, sed ego pono eam, et iterum sumo eam. Non autem videtur quod corpus animam ponere possit, eam a se separando, quia anima non subiicitur potestati corporis, sed potius e converso. Et sic videtur quod Christo secundum quod est verbum Dei, conveniat animam suam ponere. Hoc autem est eam a se separare. Ergo per mortem anima eius fuit a divinitate separata. Objection 1: It would seem that there was a severance in death between Christ's Godhead and His soul, because our Lord said (Jn. 10:18): "No man taketh away My soul from Me: but I lay it down of Myself, and I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it up again." But it does not appear that the body can set the soul aside, by separating the soul from itself, because the soul is not subject to the power of the body, but rather conversely: and so it appears that it belongs to Christ, as the Word of God, to lay down His soul: but this is to separate it from Himself. Consequently, by death His soul was severed from the Godhead.
Praeterea, Athanasius dicit maledictum qui totum hominem quem assumpsit Dei filius, denuo assumptum vel liberatum, tertia die a mortuis resurrexisse non confitetur. Sed non potuit totus homo denuo assumi, nisi aliquando fuerit totus homo a Dei verbo separatus. Totus autem homo componitur ex anima et corpore. Ergo aliquando fuit facta separatio divinitatis et a corpore et ab anima. Objection 2: Further, Athanasius [*Vigilius Tapsensis, De Trin. vi; Bardenhewer assigns it to St. Athanasius: 45, iii. The full title is De Trinitate et Spiritu Sancto] says that he "is accursed who does not confess that the entire man, whom the Son of God took to Himself, after being assumed once more or delivered by Him, rose again from the dead on the third day." But the entire man could not be assumed again, unless the entire man was at one time separated from the Word of God: and the entire man is made of soul and body. Therefore there was a separation made at one time of the Godhead from both the body and the soul.
Praeterea, propter unionem ad totum hominem filius Dei vere dicitur homo. Si igitur, soluta unione animae et corporis per mortem, verbum Dei remansit unitum animae, sequeretur quod vere dici potuisset filium Dei esse animam. Hoc autem est falsum, quia, cum anima sit forma corporis, sequeretur quod verbum Dei fuerit corporis forma, quod est impossibile. Ergo in morte Christi anima fuit a verbo Dei separata. Objection 3: Further, the Son of God is truly styled a man because of the union with the entire man. If then, when the union of the soul with the body was dissolved by death, the Word of God continued united with the soul, it would follow that the Son of God could be truly called a soul. But this is false, because since the soul is the form of the body, it would result in the Word of God being the form of the body; which is impossible. Therefore, in death the soul of Christ was separated from the Word of God.
Praeterea, anima et corpus, ab invicem separata, non sunt una hypostasis, sed duae. Si igitur verbum Dei remansit unitum tam animae quam corpori Christi, separatis eis ab invicem per mortem Christi, videtur sequi quod verbum Dei, durante morte Christi, fuerit duae hypostases. Quod est inconveniens. Non ergo post mortem Christi remansit anima verbo unita. Objection 4: Further, the separated soul and body are not one hypostasis, but two. Therefore, if the Word of God remained united with Christ's soul and body, then, when they were severed by Christ's death, it seems to follow that the Word of God was two hypostases during such time as Christ was dead; which cannot be admitted. Therefore after Christ's death His soul did not continue to be united with the Word.
Sed contra est quod dicit Damascenus, in III libro, etsi Christus mortuus est ut homo, et sancta eius anima ab incontaminato divisa est corpore; sed divinitas inseparabilis ab utrisque permansit, ab anima dico et corpore. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "Although Christ died as man, and His holy soul was separated from His spotless body, nevertheless His Godhead remained unseparated from both---from the soul, I mean, and from the body."
Respondeo dicendum quod anima unita est verbo Dei immediatius et per prius quam corpus, cum corpus unitum sit verbo Dei mediante anima, ut supra dictum est. Cum igitur verbum Dei non sit separatum in morte a corpore, multo minus separatum est ab anima. Unde, sicut de filio Dei praedicatur id quod convenit corpori ab anima separato, scilicet esse sepultum; ita de eo in symbolo dicitur quod descendit ad Inferos, quia anima eius, a corpore separata, descendit ad Inferos. I answer that, The soul is united with the Word of God more immediately and more primarily than the body is, because it is through the soul that the body is united with the Word of God, as stated above (Question [6], Article [1]). Since, then, the Word of God was not separated from the body at Christ's death, much less was He separated from the soul. Accordingly, since what regards the body severed from the soul is affirmed of the Son of God---namely, that "it was buried"---so is it said of Him in the Creed that "He descended into hell," because His soul when separated from the body did go down into hell.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus, exponens illud verbum Ioannis, inquirit, cum Christus sit verbum et anima et caro, utrum ex eo quod est verbum, ponat animam; an ex eo quod est anima; an iterum ex eo quod est caro. Et dicit quod, si dixerimus quod verbum Dei animam posuit, sequeretur quod aliquando anima illa separata est a verbo. Quod est falsum. Mors enim corpus ab anima separavit, a verbo autem animam separatam non dico. Si vero dixerimus quod anima ipsa se ponat, sequitur quod ipsa a se separatur. Quod est absurdissimum. Relinquitur ergo quod ipsa caro animam suam ponit et iterum eam sumit, non potestate sua, sed potestate verbi inhabitantis carnem, quia, sicut supra dictum est, per mortem non est separata divinitas verbi a carne. Reply to Objection 1: Augustine (Tract. xlvii in Joan.), in commenting on the text of John, asks, since Christ is Word and soul and body, "whether He putteth down His soul, for that He is the Word? Or, for that He is a soul?" Or, again, "for that He is flesh?" And he says that, "should we say that the Word of God laid down His soul"... it would follow that "there was a time when that soul was severed from the Word"---which is untrue. "For death severed the body and soul... but that the soul was severed from the Word I do not affirm... But should we say that the soul laid itself down," it follows "that it is severed from itself: which is most absurd." It remains, therefore, that "the flesh itself layeth down its soul and taketh it again, not by its own power, but by the power of the Word dwelling in the flesh": because, as stated above (Article [2]), the Godhead of the Word was not severed from the flesh in death.
Ad secundum dicendum quod in verbis illis Athanasius non intellexit quod totus homo denuo sit assumptus, idest, omnes partes eius, quasi verbum Dei partes humanae naturae deposuerit per mortem. Sed quod iterato totalitas naturae assumptae sit in resurrectione redintegrata per iteratam unionem animae et corporis. Reply to Objection 2: In those words Athanasius never meant to say that the whole man was reassumed---that is, as to all his parts---as if the Word of God had laid aside the parts of human nature by His death; but that the totality of the assumed nature was restored once more in the resurrection by the resumed union of soul and body.
Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum Dei, propter unionem humanae naturae, non dicitur humana natura, sed dicitur homo, quod est habens humanam naturam. Anima autem et corpus sunt partes essentiales humanae naturae. Unde propter unionem verbi ad utrumque eorum non sequitur quod verbum Dei sit anima vel corpus, sed quod est habens animam vel corpus. Reply to Objection 3: Through being united to human nature, the Word of God is not on that account called human nature: but He is called a man---that is, one having human nature. Now the soul and the body are essential parts of human nature. Hence it does not follow that the Word is a soul or a body through being united with both, but that He is one possessing a soul or a body.
Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod in morte Christi est separata anima a carne, non est una hypostasis in duas hypostases divisa. Et corpus enim et anima secundum idem ex principio in verbi hypostasi habuerunt existentiam, et in morte, invicem divisa, singula eorum manserunt unam hypostasim verbi habens. Quare una verbi hypostasis verbi et animae et corporis exstitit hypostasis. Nunquam enim neque anima neque corpus propriam habuerunt hypostasim, praeter verbi hypostasim. Una enim semper verbi hypostasis, et nunquam duae. Reply to Objection 4: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "In Christ's death the soul was separated from the flesh: not one hypostasis divided into two: because both soul and body in the same respect had their existence from the beginning in the hypostasis of the Word; and in death, though severed from one another, each one continued to have the one same hypostasis of the Word. Wherefore the one hypostasis of the Word was the hypostasis of the Word, of the soul, and of the body. For neither soul nor body ever had an hypostasis of its own, besides the hypostasis of the Word: for there was always one hypostasis of the Word, and never two."

Index [<<� | >>]
Third Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 50 [ << | >> ]
Article: 4  [ << | >> ]

Whether Christ was a man during the three days of His death?

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus in triduo mortis fuerit homo. Dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Trin., talis erat illa susceptio, quae Deum hominem faceret et hominem Deum. Sed illa susceptio non cessavit per mortem. Ergo videtur quod per mortem non desiit esse homo. Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was a man during the three days of His death, because Augustine says (De Trin. iii): "Such was the assuming [of nature] as to make God to be man, and man to be God." But this assuming [of nature] did not cease at Christ's death. Therefore it seems that He did not cease to be a man in consequence of death.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., quod unusquisque homo est suus intellectus. Unde et, post mortem animam Petri alloquentes, dicimus, sancte Petre, ora pro nobis. Sed post mortem filius Dei non fuit separatus ab anima intellectuali. Ergo in illo triduo filius Dei fuit homo. Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix) that "each man is his intellect"; consequently, when we address the soul of Peter after his death we say: "Saint Peter, pray for us." But the Son of God after death was not separated from His intellectual soul. Therefore, during those three days the Son of God was a man.
Praeterea, omnis sacerdos est homo. Sed in illo triduo mortis Christus fuit sacerdos, aliter enim non verum esset quod dicitur in Psalmo, tu es sacerdos in aeternum. Ergo Christus in illo triduo fuit homo. Objection 3: Further, every priest is a man. But during those three days of death Christ was a priest: otherwise what is said in Ps. 109:4 would not be true: "Thou art a priest for ever." Therefore Christ was a man during those three days.
Sed contra, remoto superiori, removetur inferius. Sed vivum, sive animatum, est superius ad animal et ad hominem, nam animal est substantia animata sensibilis. Sed in illo triduo mortis corpus Christi non fuit vivum neque animatum. Ergo non fuit homo. On the contrary, When the higher [species] is removed, so is the lower. But the living or animated being is a higher species than animal and man, because an animal is a sensible animated substance. Now during those three days of death Christ's body was not living or animated. Therefore He was not a man.
Respondeo dicendum quod Christum vere fuisse mortuum est articulus fidei. Unde asserere omne id per quod tollitur veritas mortis Christi, est error contra fidem. Propter quod in epistola synodali Cyrilli dicitur, si quis non confitetur Dei verbum passum carne, et crucifixum carne, et quod mortem gustavit carne, anathema sit. Pertinet autem ad veritatem mortis hominis vel animalis quod per mortem desinat esse homo vel animal, mors enim hominis vel animalis provenit ex separatione animae, quae complet rationem animalis vel hominis. Et ideo dicere Christum in triduo mortis hominem fuisse, simpliciter et absolute loquendo, erroneum est. Potest tamen dici quod Christus in triduo fuit homo mortuus. I answer that, It is an article of faith that Christ was truly dead: hence it is an error against faith to assert anything whereby the truth of Christ's death is destroyed. Accordingly it is said in the Synodal epistle of Cyril [*Act. Conc. Ephes. P. I, cap. xxvi]: "If any man does not acknowledge that the Word of God suffered in the flesh, and was crucified in the flesh and tasted death in the flesh, let him be anathema." Now it belongs to the truth of the death of man or animal that by death the subject ceases to be man or animal; because the death of the man or animal results from the separation of the soul, which is the formal complement of the man or animal. Consequently, to say that Christ was a man during the three days of His death simply and without qualification, is erroneous. Yet it can be said that He was "a dead man" during those three days.
Quidam tamen confessi sunt Christum in triduo hominem fuisse, dicentes quidem verba erronea, sed sensum erroris non habentes in fide, sicut Hugo de sancto Victore, qui ea ratione dixit Christum in triduo mortis fuisse hominem, quia dicebat animam esse hominem. Quod tamen est falsum, ut in prima parte ostensum est. Magister etiam sententiarum, in XXII distinctione III libri, posuit quod Christus in triduo mortis fuit homo, alia ratione, quia credidit quod unio animae et carnis non esset de ratione hominis, sed sufficit ad hoc quod aliquid sit homo, quod habeat animam humanam et corpus, sive coniuncta sive non coniuncta. Quod etiam patet esse falsum ex his quae dicta sunt in prima parte, et ex his quae dicta sunt circa modum unionis. However, some writers have contended that Christ was a man during those three days, uttering words which are indeed erroneous, yet without intent of error in faith: as Hugh of Saint Victor, who (De Sacram. ii) contended that Christ, during the three days that followed His death, was a man, because he held that the soul is a man: but this is false, as was shown in the FP, Question [75], Article [4]. Likewise the Master of the Sentences (iii, D, 22) held Christ to be a man during the three days of His death for quite another reason. For he believed the union of soul and flesh not to be essential to a man, and that for anything to be a man it suffices if it have a soul and body, whether united or separated: and that this is likewise false is clear both from what has been said in the FP, Question [75], Article [4], and from what has been said above regarding the mode of union (Question [2], Article [5]).
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Dei suscepit animam et carnem unitam, et ideo illa susceptio fecit Deum hominem et hominem Deum. Non autem cessavit illa susceptio per separationem verbi ab anima vel a carne, cessavit tamen unio carnis et animae. Reply to Objection 1: The Word of God assumed a united soul and body: and the result of this assumption was that God is man, and man is God. But this assumption did not cease by the separation of the Word from the soul or from the flesh; yet the union of soul and flesh ceased.
Ad secundum dicendum quod homo dicitur esse suus intellectus, non quia intellectus sit totus homo, sed quia intellectus est principalior pars hominis, in quo virtualiter existit tota dispositio hominis, sicut si rector civitatis dicatur tota civitas, quia in eo consistit tota dispositio civitatis. Reply to Objection 2: Man is said to be his own intellect, not because the intellect is the entire man, but because the intellect is the chief part of man, in which man's whole disposition lies virtually; just as the ruler of the city may be called the whole city, since its entire disposal is vested in him.
Ad tertium dicendum quod esse sacerdotem convenit homini ratione animae, in qua est ordinis character. Unde per mortem homo non perdit ordinem sacerdotalem. Et multo minus Christus, qui est totius sacerdotii origo. Reply to Objection 3: That a man is competent to be a priest is by reason of the soul, which is the subject of the character of order: hence a man does not lose his priestly order by death, and much less does Christ, who is the fount of the entire priesthood.

Index [<<� | >>]
Third Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 50 [ << | >> ]
Article: 5  [ << | >> ]

Whether Christ's was identically the same body living and dead?

Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non fuit idem numero corpus Christi viventis et mortui. Christus enim vere mortuus fuit, sicut et alii homines moriuntur. Sed corpus cuiuscumque alterius hominis non est simpliciter idem numero mortuum et vivum quia differunt essentiali differentia. Ergo neque corpus Christi est idem numero mortuum et vivum simpliciter. Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's was not identically the same body living and dead. For Christ truly died just as other men do. But the body of everyone else is not simply identically the same, dead and living, because there is an essential difference between them. Therefore neither is the body of Christ identically the same, dead and living.
Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in V Metaphys., quaecumque sunt diversa specie, sunt diversa etiam numero. Sed corpus Christi vivum et mortuum fuit diversum specie, quia non dicitur oculus aut caro mortui nisi aequivoce, ut patet per philosophum, et in II de anima et VII Metaphys. Ergo corpus Christi non fuit simpliciter idem numero vivum et mortuum. Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 12), things specifically diverse are also numerically diverse. But Christ's body, living and dead, was specifically diverse: because the eye or flesh of the dead is only called so equivocally, as is evident from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text. 9; Metaph. vii). Therefore Christ's body was not simply identically the same, living and dead.
Praeterea, mors est corruptio quaedam. Sed illud quod corrumpitur corruptione substantiali, postquam corruptum est, iam non est, quia corruptio est mutatio de esse in non esse. Corpus igitur Christi, postquam mortuum fuit, non remansit idem numero, cum mors sit substantialis corruptio. Objection 3: Further, death is a kind of corruption. But what is corrupted by substantial corruption after being corrupted, exists no longer, since corruption is change from being to non-being. Therefore, Christ's body, after it was dead, did not remain identically the same, because death is a substantial corruption.
Sed contra est quod Athanasius dicit, in epistola ad Epictetum, circumciso corpore, et potato et manducante et laborante, et in ligno affixo, erat impassibile et incorporeum Dei verbum, hoc erat in sepulcro positum. Sed corpus Christi vivum fuit circumcisum et in ligno affixum, corpus autem Christi mortuum fuit positum in sepulcro. Ergo hoc idem corpus quod fuit vivum, fuit et mortuum. On the contrary, Athanasius says (Epist. ad Epict.): "In that body which was circumcised and carried, which ate, and toiled, and was nailed on the tree, there was the impassible and incorporeal Word of God: the same was laid in the tomb." But Christ's living body was circumcised and nailed on the tree; and Christ's dead body was laid in the tomb. Therefore it was the same body living and dead.
Respondeo dicendum quod hoc quod dico simpliciter, potest dupliciter accipi. Uno modo, quod simpliciter idem est quod absolute, sicut simpliciter dicitur quod nullo addito dicitur, ut philosophus dicit. Et hoc modo corpus Christi mortuum et vivum simpliciter fuit idem numero. Dicitur enim aliquid esse idem numero simpliciter, quia est supposito idem. Corpus autem Christi vivum et mortuum fuit supposito idem, quia non habuit aliam hypostasim vivum et mortuum, praeter hypostasim Dei verbi, ut supra dictum est. Et hoc modo loquitur Athanasius in auctoritate inducta. I answer that, The expression "simply" can be taken in two senses. In the first instance by taking "simply" to be the same as "absolutely"; thus "that is said simply which is said without addition," as the Philosopher put it (Topic. ii): and in this way the dead and living body of Christ was simply identically the same: since a thing is said to be "simply" identically the same from the identity of the subject. But Christ's body living and dead was identical in its suppositum because alive and dead it had none other besides the Word of God, as was stated above (Article [2]). And it is in this sense that Athanasius is speaking in the passage quoted.
Alio modo, simpliciter idem est quod omnino vel totaliter. Et sic corpus Christi mortuum et vivum non fuit simpliciter idem numero. Quia non fuit totaliter idem, cum vita sit aliquid de essentia corporis viventis, est enim praedicatum essentiale, non accidentale; unde consequens est quod corpus quod desinit esse vivum, non totaliter idem remaneat. Si autem diceretur quod corpus Christi mortuum totaliter idem remaneret, sequeretur quod non esset corruptum, corruptione dico mortis. Quod est haeresis Gaianitarum, ut Isidorus dicit, et habetur in decretis, XXIV, qu. III. Et Damascenus dicit, in III libro quod corruptionis nomen duo significat, uno modo, separationem animae a corpore, et alia huiusmodi; alio modo, perfectam dissolutionem in elementa. Ergo incorruptibile dicere corpus domini, secundum Iulianum et Gaianum, secundum primum corruptionis modum, ante resurrectionem, est impium, quia corpus Christi non esset consubstantiale nobis; nec in veritate mortuum esset; nec secundum veritatem salvati essemus. Secundo autem modo, corpus Christi fuit incorruptum. In another way "simply" is the same as "altogether" or "totally": in which sense the body of Christ, dead and alive, was not "simply" the same identically, because it was not "totally" the same, since life is of the essence of a living body; for it is an essential and not an accidental predicate: hence it follows that a body which ceases to be living does not remain totally the same. Moreover, if it were to be said that Christ's dead body did continue "totally" the same, it would follow that it was not corrupted---I mean, by the corruption of death: which is the heresy of the Gaianites, as Isidore says (Etym. viii), and is to be found in the Decretals (xxiv, qu. iii). And Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that "the term 'corruption' denotes two things: in one way it is the separation of the soul from the body and other things of the sort; in another way, the complete dissolving into elements. Consequently it is impious to say with Julian and Gaian that the Lord's body was incorruptible after the first manner of corruption before the resurrection: because Christ's body would not be consubstantial with us, nor truly dead, nor would we have been saved in very truth. But in the second way Christ's body was incorrupt."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod corpus mortuum cuiuscumque alterius hominis non remanet unitum alicui hypostasi permanenti, sicut corpus mortuum Christi. Et ideo corpus mortuum cuiuscumque alterius hominis non est idem simpliciter, sed secundum quid, quia est idem secundum materiam, non autem idem secundum formam. Corpus autem Christi remanet idem simpliciter, propter identitatem suppositi, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1: The dead body of everyone else does not continue united to an abiding hypostasis, as Christ's dead body did; consequently the dead body of everyone else is not the same "simply," but only in some respect: because it is the same as to its matter, but not the same as to its form. But Christ's body remains the same simply, on account of the identity of the suppositum, as stated above.
Ad secundum dicendum quod, quia idem numero dicitur aliquid secundum suppositum, idem autem specie est idem secundum formam, ubicumque suppositum subsistit in una sola natura, oportet quod, sublata unitate speciei, auferatur unitas numeralis. Sed hypostasis verbi Dei subsistit in duabus naturis. Et ideo, quamvis in aliis non remaneat corpus idem secundum speciem humanae naturae, remanet tamen in Christo idem numero secundum suppositum verbi Dei. Reply to Objection 2: Since a thing is said to be the same identically according to suppositum, but the same specifically according to form: wherever the suppositum subsists in only one nature, it follows of necessity that when the unity of species is taken away the unity of identity is also taken away. But the hypostasis of the Word of God subsists in two natures; and consequently, although in others the body does not remain the same according to the species of human nature, still it continues identically the same in Christ according to the suppositum of the Word of God.
Ad tertium dicendum quod corruptio et mors non competit Christo ratione suppositi, secundum quod suppositum attenditur unitas numeralis, sed ratione naturae humanae, secundum quam invenitur in corpore Christi differentia mortis et vitae. Reply to Objection 3: Corruption and death do not belong to Christ by reason of the suppositum, from which suppositum follows the unity of identity; but by reason of the human nature, according to which is found the difference of death and of life in Christ's body.

Index [<<� | >>]
Third Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 50 [ << | >> ]
Article: 6  [ << | >> ]

Whether Christ's death conduced in any way to our salvation?

Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mors Christi nihil operata fuerit ad nostram salutem. Mors enim est privatio quaedam, est enim privatio vitae. Sed privatio, cum non sit res aliqua, non habet aliquam virtutem agendi. Ergo non potuit aliquid operari ad nostram salutem. Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's death did not conduce in any way to our salvation. For death is a sort of privation, since it is the privation of life. But privation has not any power of activity, because it is nothing positive. Therefore it could not work anything for our salvation.
Praeterea, passio Christi operata est ad nostram salutem per modum meriti. Sic autem non potuit operari mors Christi, nam in morte separatur anima a corpore, quae est merendi principium. Ergo mors Christi non est operata aliquid ad nostram salutem. Objection 2: Further, Christ's Passion wrought our salvation by way of merit. But Christ's death could not operate in this way, because in death the body is separated from the soul, which is the principle of meriting. Consequently, Christ's death did not accomplish anything towards our salvation.
Praeterea, corporale non est causa spiritualis. Sed mors Christi fuit corporalis. Non ergo potuit esse causa spiritualis nostrae salutis. Objection 3: Further, what is corporeal is not the cause of what is spiritual. But Christ's death was corporeal. Therefore it could not be the cause of our salvation, which is something spiritual.
Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in IV de Trin., una mors nostri salvatoris, scilicet corporalis, duabus mortibus nostris, idest animae et corporis, saluti fuit. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv): "The one death of our Saviour," namely, that of the body, "saved us from our two deaths," that is, of the soul and the body.
Respondeo dicendum quod de morte Christi dupliciter loqui possumus, uno modo, secundum quod est in fieri; alio modo, secundum quod est in facto esse. Dicitur autem mors esse in fieri, quando aliquis per aliquam passionem, vel naturalem vel violentam, tendit in mortem. Et hoc modo, idem est loqui de morte Christi et de passione ipsius. Et ita, secundum hunc modum, mors Christi est causa salutis nostrae, secundum illud quod de passione supra dictum est. Sed in facto esse mors consideratur secundum quod iam facta est separatio corporis et animae. Et sic nunc loquimur de morte Christi. Hoc autem modo mors Christi non potest esse causa salutis nostrae per modum meriti, sed solum per modum efficientiae, inquantum scilicet nec per mortem divinitas separata est a carne Christi, et ideo quidquid contigit circa carnem Christi, etiam anima separata, fuit nobis salutiferum virtute divinitatis unitae. Consideratur autem proprie alicuius causae effectus secundum similitudinem causae. Unde, quia mors est quaedam privatio vitae propriae, effectus mortis Christi attenditur circa remotionem eorum quae contrariantur nostrae saluti, quae quidem sunt mors animae et mors corporis. Et ideo per mortem Christi dicitur esse destructa in nobis et mors animae, quae est per peccatum, secundum illud Rom. IV, traditus est, scilicet in mortem, propter delicta nostra; et mors corporis, quae consistit in separatione animae, secundum illud I Cor. XV, absorpta est mors in victoria. I answer that, We may speak of Christ's death in two ways, "in becoming" and "in fact." Death is said to be "in becoming" when anyone from natural or enforced suffering is tending towards death: and in this way it is the same thing to speak of Christ's death as of His Passion: so that in this sense Christ's death is the cause of our salvation, according to what has been already said of the Passion (Question [48]). But death is considered in fact, inasmuch as the separation of soul and body has already taken place: and it is in this sense that we are now speaking of Christ's death. In this way Christ's death cannot be the cause of our salvation by way of merit, but only by way of causality, that is to say, inasmuch as the Godhead was not separated from Christ's flesh by death; and therefore, whatever befell Christ's flesh, even when the soul was departed, was conducive to salvation in virtue of the Godhead united. But the effect of any cause is properly estimated according to its resemblance to the cause. Consequently, since death is a kind of privation of one's own life, the effect of Christ's death is considered in relation to the removal of the obstacles to our salvation: and these are the death of the soul and of the body. Hence Christ's death is said to have destroyed in us both the death of the soul, caused by sin, according to Rm. 4:25: "He was delivered up [namely unto death] for our sins": and the death of the body, consisting in the separation of the soul, according to 1 Cor. 15:54: "Death is swallowed up in victory."
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mors Christi est operata salutem nostram ex virtute divinitatis unitae, et non ex sola ratione mortis. Reply to Objection 1: Christ's death wrought our salvation from the power of the Godhead united, and not consisted merely as His death.
Ad secundum dicendum quod mors Christi, secundum quod consideratur in facto esse, etsi non fuerit ad nostram salutem operata per modum meriti, fuit tamen operata per modum efficientiae, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 2: Though Christ's death, considered "in fact" did not effect our salvation by way of merit, yet it did so by way of causality, as stated above.
Ad tertium dicendum quod mors Christi fuit quidem corporalis, sed corpus illud fuit instrumentum divinitatis sibi unitae, operans in virtute eius etiam mortuum. Reply to Objection 3: Christ's death was indeed corporeal; but the body was the instrument of the Godhead united to Him, working by Its power, although dead.

This document converted to HTML on Fri Jan 02 19:10:43 1998.