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| Deinde considerandum est de accidentibus remanentibus in hoc sacramento. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. | We must now consider the accidents which remain in this sacrament; under which head there are eight points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum accidentia quae remanent, sint sine subiecto. | (1) Whether the accidents which remain are without a subject? |
| Secundo, utrum quantitas dimensiva sit subiectum aliorum accidentium. | (2) Whether dimensive quantity is the subject of the other accidents? |
| Tertio, utrum huiusmodi accidentia possint immutare aliquod corpus extrinsecum. | (3) Whether such accidents can affect an extrinsic body? |
| Quarto, utrum possint corrumpi. | (4) Whether they can be corrupted? |
| Quinto, utrum ex eis possit aliquid generari. | (5) Whether anything can be generated from them? |
| Sexto, utrum possint nutrire. | (6) Whether they can nourish? |
| Septimo, de fractione panis consecrati. | (7) Of the breaking of the consecrated bread? |
| Octavo, utrum vino consecrato possit aliquid admisceri. | (8) Whether anything can be mixed with the consecrated wine? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod accidentia non remaneant in hoc sacramento sine subiecto. Nihil enim inordinatum aut fallax debet esse in hoc sacramento veritatis. Sed accidentia esse sine subiecto est contra rerum ordinem, quem Deus naturae indidit. Videtur etiam ad quandam fallaciam pertinere, cum accidentia sint signa naturae subiecti. Ergo in hoc sacramento non sunt accidentia sine subiecto. | Objection 1: It seems that the accidents do not remain in this sacrament without a subject, because there ought not to be anything disorderly or deceitful in this sacrament of truth. But for accidents to be without a subject is contrary to the order which God established in nature; and furthermore it seems to savor of deceit, since accidents are naturally the signs of the nature of the subject. Therefore the accidents are not without a subject in this sacrament. |
| Praeterea, fieri non potest, etiam miraculose, quod definitio rei ab ea separetur; vel quod uni rei conveniat definitio alterius, puta quod homo, manens homo, sit animal irrationale. Ad hoc enim sequeretur contradictoria esse simul, hoc enim quod significat nomen rei, est definitio, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys. Sed ad definitionem accidentis pertinet quod sit in subiecto, ad definitionem vero substantiae, quod per se subsistat non in subiecto. Non potest ergo miraculose fieri quod in hoc sacramento sint accidentia sine subiecto. | Objection 2: Further, not even by miracle can the definition of a thing be severed from it, or the definition of another thing be applied to it; for instance, that, while man remains a man, he can be an irrational animal. For it would follow that contradictories can exist at the one time: for the "definition of a thing is what its name expresses," as is said in Metaph. iv. But it belongs to the definition of an accident for it to be in a subject, while the definition of substance is that it must subsist of itself, and not in another. Therefore it cannot come to pass, even by miracle, that the accidents exist without a subject in this sacrament. |
| Praeterea, accidens individuatur ex subiecto. Si ergo accidentia remanent in hoc sacramento sine subiecto, non erunt individua, sed universalia. Quod patet esse falsum, quia sic non essent sensibilia, sed intelligibilia tantum. | Objection 3: Further, an accident is individuated by its subject. If therefore the accidents remain in this sacrament without a subject, they will not be individual, but general, which is clearly false, because thus they would not be sensible, but merely intelligible. |
| Praeterea, accidentia per consecrationem huius sacramenti non adipiscuntur aliquam compositionem. Sed ante consecrationem non erant composita neque ex materia et forma, neque ex quo est et quod est. Ergo etiam post consecrationem non sunt composita altero horum modorum. Quod est inconveniens, quia sic essent simpliciora quam Angeli; cum tamen haec accidentia sint sensibilia. Non ergo accidentia remanent in hoc sacramento sine subiecto. | Objection 4: Further, the accidents after the consecration of this sacrament do not obtain any composition. But before the consecration they were not composed either of matter and form, nor of existence [quo est] and essence [quod est]. Therefore, even after consecration they are not composite in either of these ways. But this is unreasonable, for thus they would be simpler than angels, whereas at the same time these accidents are perceptible to the senses. Therefore, in this sacrament the accidents do not remain without a subject. |
| Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in homilia paschali, quod species sacramentales sunt illarum rerum vocabula quae ante fuerunt, scilicet panis et vini. Et ita, cum non remaneat substantia panis et vini, videtur quod huiusmodi species sint sine subiecto. | On the contrary, Gregory says in an Easter Homily (Lanfranc, De Corp. et Sang. Dom. xx) that "the sacramental species are the names of those things which were there before, namely, of the bread and wine." Therefore since the substance of the bread and the wine does not remain, it seems that these species remain without a subject. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod accidentia panis et vini, quae sensu deprehenduntur in hoc sacramento remanere post consecrationem, non sunt sicut in subiecto in substantia panis et vini, quae non remanet, ut supra habitum est. Neque etiam in forma substantiali, quae non manet; et, si remaneret, subiectum esse non posset, ut patet per Boetium, in libro de Trin. Manifestum est etiam quod huiusmodi accidentia non sunt in substantia corporis et sanguinis Christi sicut in subiecto, quia substantia humani corporis nullo modo potest his accidentibus affici; neque etiam est possibile quod corpus Christi, gloriosum et impassibile existens, alteretur ad suscipiendas huiusmodi qualitates. |
I answer that, The species of the bread and wine, which are perceived by our senses to remain in this sacrament after consecration, are not subjected in the substance of the bread and wine, for that does not remain, as stated above (Question [75], Article [2]); nor in the substantial form, for that does not remain (Question [75], Article [6]), and if it did remain, "it could not be a subject," as Boethius declares (De Trin. i). Furthermore it is manifest that these accidents are not subjected in the substance of Christ's body and blood, because the substance of the human body cannot in any way be affected by such accidents; nor is it possible for Christ's glorious and impassible body to be altered so as to receive these qualities. |
| Dicunt autem quidam quod sunt, sicut in subiecto, in aere circumstante. Sed nec hoc esse potest. Primo quidem, quia aer non est huiusmodi accidentium susceptivus. Secundo, quia huiusmodi accidentia non sunt ubi est aer. Quinimmo ad motum harum specierum aer depellitur. Tertio, quia accidentia non transeunt de subiecto in subiectum, ut scilicet idem accidens numero quod primo fuit in uno subiecto, postmodum fiat in alio. Accidens enim numerum accipit a subiecto. Unde non potest esse quod, idem numero manens, sit quandoque in hoc, quandoque in alio subiecto. Quarto quia, cum aer non spolietur accidentibus propriis, simul haberet accidentia propria et aliena. Nec potest dici quod hoc fiat miraculose virtute consecrationis, quia verba consecrationis hoc non significant; quae tamen non efficiunt nisi significatum. | Now there are some who say that they are in the surrounding atmosphere as in a subject. But even this cannot be: in the first place, because atmosphere is not susceptive of such accidents. Secondly, because these accidents are not where the atmosphere is, nay more, the atmosphere is displaced by the motion of these species. Thirdly, because accidents do not pass from subject to subject, so that the same identical accident which was first in one subject be afterwards in another; because an accident is individuated by the subject; hence it cannot come to pass for an accident remaining identically the same to be at one time in one subject, and at another time in another. Fourthly, since the atmosphere is not deprived of its own accidents, it would have at the one time its own accidents and others foreign to it. Nor can it be maintained that this is done miraculously in virtue of the consecration, because the words of consecration do not signify this, and they effect only what they signify. |
| Et ideo relinquitur quod accidentia in hoc sacramento manent sine subiecto. Quod quidem virtute divina fieri potest. Cum enim effectus magis dependeat a causa prima quam a causa secunda, potest Deus, qui est prima causa substantiae et accidentis, per suam infinitam virtutem conservare in esse accidens subtracta substantia, per quam conservabatur in esse sicut per propriam causam, sicut etiam alios effectus naturalium causarum potest producere sine naturalibus causis; sicut corpus humanum formavit in utero virginis sine virili semine. | Therefore it follows that the accidents continue in this sacrament without a subject. This can be done by Divine power: for since an effect depends more upon the first cause than on the second, God Who is the first cause both of substance and accident, can by His unlimited power preserve an accident in existence when the substance is withdrawn whereby it was preserved in existence as by its proper cause, just as without natural causes He can produce other effects of natural causes, even as He formed a human body in the Virgin's womb, "without the seed of man" (Hymn for Christmas, First Vespers). |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse ordinatum secundum communem legem naturae, cuius tamen contrarium est ordinatum secundum speciale privilegium gratiae, ut patet in resuscitatione mortuorum, et in illuminatione caecorum, prout etiam in rebus humanis quaedam aliquibus conceduntur ex speciali privilegio praeter communem legem. Et ita, licet sit secundum communem naturae ordinem quod accidens sit in subiecto, ex speciali tamen ratione, secundum ordinem gratiae, accidentia sunt in hoc sacramento sine subiecto, propter rationes supra inductas. | Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing to hinder the common law of nature from ordaining a thing, the contrary of which is nevertheless ordained by a special privilege of grace, as is evident in the raising of the dead, and in the restoring of sight to the blind: even thus in human affairs, to some individuals some things are granted by special privilege which are outside the common law. And so, even though it be according to the common law of nature for an accident to be in a subject, still for a special reason, according to the order of grace, the accidents exist in this sacrament without a subject, on account of the reasons given above (Question [75], Article [5]). |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum ens non sit genus, hoc ipsum quod est esse, non potest esse essentia vel substantiae vel accidentis. Non ergo definitio substantiae est ens per se sine subiecto, nec definitio accidentis ens in subiecto sed quidditati seu essentiae substantiae competit habere esse non in subiecto; quidditati autem sive essentiae accidentis competit habere esse in subiecto. In hoc autem sacramento non datur accidentibus quod ex vi suae essentiae sint sine subiecto, sed ex divina virtute sustentante. Et ideo non desinunt esse accidentia, quia nec separatur ab eis definitio accidentis, nec competit eis definitio substantiae. | Reply to Objection 2: Since being is not a genus, then being cannot be of itself the essence of either substance or accident. Consequently, the definition of substance is not---"a being of itself without a subject," nor is the definition of accident---"a being in a subject"; but it belongs to the quiddity or essence of substance "to have existence not in a subject"; while it belongs to the quiddity or essence of accident "to have existence in a subject." But in this sacrament it is not in virtue of their essence that accidents are not in a subject, but through the Divine power sustaining them; and consequently they do not cease to be accidents, because neither is the definition of accident withdrawn from them, nor does the definition of substance apply to them. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod huiusmodi accidentia acquisierunt esse individuum in substantia panis et vini, qua conversa in corpus et sanguinem Christi, remanent virtute divina accidentia in illo esse individuato quod prius habebant. Unde sunt singularia et sensibilia. | Reply to Objection 3: These accidents acquired individual being in the substance of the bread and wine; and when this substance is changed into the body and blood of Christ, they remain in that individuated being which they possessed before, hence they are individual and sensible. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod accidentia huiusmodi, manente substantia panis et vini, non habebant ipsa esse nec alia accidentia, sed substantia eorum habebat huiusmodi esse per ea; sicut nix est alba per albedinem. Sed post consecrationem ipsa accidentia quae remanent, habent esse. Unde sunt composita ex esse et quod est, sicut in prima parte de Angelis dictum est. Et cum hoc, habent compositionem partium quantitativarum. | Reply to Objection 4: These accidents had no being of their own nor other accidents, so long as the substance of the bread and wine remained; but their subjects had "such" being through them, just as snow is "white" through whiteness. But after the consecration the accidents which remain have being; hence they are compounded of existence and essence, as was said of the angels, in the FP, Question [50], Article [2], ad 3; and besides they have composition of quantitative parts. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in hoc sacramento quantitas dimensiva panis vel vini non sit aliorum accidentium subiectum. Accidentis enim non est accidens, nulla enim forma potest esse subiectum, cum subiici pertineat ad proprietatem materiae. Sed quantitas dimensiva est quoddam accidens. Ergo quantitas dimensiva non potest esse subiectum aliorum accidentium. | Objection 1: It seems that in this sacrament the dimensive quantity of the bread or wine is not the subject of the other accidents. For accident is not the subject of accident; because no form can be a subject, since to be a subject is a property of matter. But dimensive quantity is an accident. Therefore dimensive quantity cannot be the subject of the other accidents. |
| Praeterea, sicut quantitas individuatur ex substantia, ita etiam et alia accidentia. Si ergo quantitas dimensiva panis aut vini remanet individuata secundum esse prius habitum, in quo conservatur, pari ratione et alia accidentia remanent individuata secundum esse quod prius habebant in substantia. Non ergo sunt in quantitate dimensiva sicut in subiecto, cum omne accidens individuetur per suum subiectum. | Objection 2: Further, just as quantity is individuated by substance, so also are the other accidents. If, then, the dimensive quantity of the bread or wine remains individuated according to the being it had before, in which it is preserved, for like reason the other accidents remain individuated according to the existence which they had before in the substance. Therefore they are not in dimensive quantity as in a subject, since every accident is individuated by its own subject. |
| Praeterea, inter alia accidentia panis et vini quae remanent, deprehenduntur etiam sensu rarum et densum. Quae non possunt esse in quantitate dimensiva praeter materiam existente, quia rarum est quod habet parum de materia sub dimensionibus magnis; densum autem quod habet multum de materia sub dimensionibus parvis, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Ergo videtur quod quantitas dimensiva non possit esse subiectum accidentium quae remanent in hoc sacramento. | Objection 3: Further, among the other accidents that remain, of the bread and wine, the senses perceive also rarity and density, which cannot be in dimensive quantity existing outside matter; because a thing is rare which has little matter under great dimensions. while a thing is dense which has much matter under small dimensions, as is said in Phys. iv. It does not seem, then, that dimensive quantity can be the subject of the accidents which remain in this sacrament. |
| Praeterea, quantitas a subiecto separata videtur esse quantitas mathematica, quae non est subiectum qualitatum sensibilium. Cum ergo accidentia quae remanent in hoc sacramento sint sensibilia, videtur quod non possint esse in hoc sacramento sicut in subiecto in quantitate panis et vini remanente post consecrationem. | Objection 4: Further, quantity abstract from matter seems to be mathematical quantity, which is not the subject of sensible qualities. Since, then, the remaining accidents in this sacrament are sensible, it seems that in this sacrament they cannot be subjected in the dimensive quantity of the bread and wine that remains after consecration. |
| Sed contra est quod qualitates non sunt divisibiles nisi per accidens, scilicet ratione subiecti. Dividuntur autem qualitates remanentes in hoc sacramento per divisionem quantitatis dimensivae, sicut patet ad sensum. Ergo quantitas dimensiva est subiectum accidentium quae remanent in hoc sacramento. | On the contrary, Qualities are divisible only accidentally, that is, by reason of the subject. But the qualities remaining in this sacrament are divided by the division of dimensive quantity, as is evident through our senses. Therefore, dimensive quantity is the subject of the accidents which remain in this sacrament. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere accidentia alia quae remanent in hoc sacramento, esse sicut in subiecto in quantitate dimensiva panis vel vini remanente. Primo quidem, per hoc quod ad sensum apparet aliquod quantum esse ibi coloratum et aliis accidentibus affectum, nec in talibus sensus decipitur. Secundo, quia prima dispositio materiae est quantitas dimensiva, unde et Plato posuit primas differentias materiae magnum et parvum. Et quia primum subiectum est materia, consequens est quod omnia alia accidentia referantur ad subiectum mediante quantitate dimensiva, sicut et primum subiectum coloris dicitur superficies esse, ratione cuius quidam posuerunt dimensiones esse substantias corporum, ut dicitur in III Metaphys. Et quia, subtracto subiecto, remanent accidentia secundum esse quod prius habebant, consequens est quod omnia accidentia remanent fundata super quantitatem dimensivam. | I answer that, It is necessary to say that the other accidents which remain in this sacrament are subjected in the dimensive quantity of the bread and wine that remains: first of all, because something having quantity and color and affected by other accidents is perceived by the senses; nor is sense deceived in such. Secondly, because the first disposition of matter is dimensive quantity, hence Plato also assigned "great" and "small" as the first differences of matter (Aristotle, Metaph. iv). And because the first subject is matter, the consequence is that all other accidents are related to their subject through the medium of dimensive quantity; just as the first subject of color is said to be the surface, on which account some have maintained that dimensions are the substances of bodies, as is said in Metaph. iii. And since, when the subject is withdrawn, the accidents remain according to the being which they had before, it follows that all accidents remain founded upon dimensive quantity. |
| Tertio quia, cum subiectum sit principium individuationis accidentium, oportet id quod ponitur aliquorum accidentium subiectum esse, aliquo modo esse individuationis principium. Est enim de ratione individui quod non possit in pluribus esse. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quia non est natum in aliquo esse, et hoc modo formae immateriales separatae, per se subsistentes, sunt etiam per seipsas individuae. Alio modo, ex eo quod forma substantialis vel accidentalis est quidem nata in aliquo esse, non tamen in pluribus, sicut haec albedo, quae est in hoc corpore. Quantum igitur ad primum, materia est individuationis principium omnibus formis inhaerentibus, quia, cum huiusmodi formae, quantum est de se, sint natae in aliquo esse sicut in subiecto, ex quo aliqua earum recipitur in materia, quae non est in alio, iam nec ipsa forma sic existens potest in alio esse. Quantum autem ad secundum, dicendum est quod individuationis principium est quantitas dimensiva. Ex hoc enim aliquid est natum esse in uno solo, quod illud est in se indivisum et divisum ab omnibus aliis. Divisio autem accidit substantiae ratione quantitatis, ut dicitur in I Physic. Et ideo ipsa quantitas dimensiva est quoddam individuationis principium huiusmodi formis, inquantum scilicet diversae formae numero sunt in diversis partibus materiae. Unde ipsa quantitas dimensiva secundum se habet quandam individuationem, ita quod possumus imaginari plures lineas eiusdem speciei differentes positione, quae cadit in ratione quantitatis huius; convenit enim dimensioni quod sit quantitas positionem habens. Et ideo potius quantitas dimensiva potest esse subiectum aliorum accidentium quam e converso. | Thirdly, because, since the subject is the principle of individuation of the accidents, it is necessary for what is admitted as the subject of some accidents to be somehow the principle of individuation: for it is of the very notion of an individual that it cannot be in several; and this happens in two ways. First, because it is not natural to it to be in any one; and in this way immaterial separated forms, subsisting of themselves, are also individuals of themselves. Secondly, because a form, be it substantial or accidental, is naturally in someone indeed, not in several, as this whiteness, which is in this body. As to the first, matter is the principle of individuation of all inherent forms, because, since these forms, considered in themselves, are naturally in something as in a subject, from the very fact that one of them is received in matter, which is not in another, it follows that neither can the form itself thus existing be in another. As to the second, it must be maintained that the principle of individuation is dimensive quantity. For that something is naturally in another one solely, is due to the fact that that other is undivided in itself, and distinct from all others. But it is on account of quantity that substance can be divided, as is said in Phys. i. And therefore dimensive quantity itself is a particular principle of individuation in forms of this kind, namely, inasmuch as forms numerically distinct are in different parts of the matter. Hence also dimensive quantity has of itself a kind of individuation, so that we can imagine several lines of the same species, differing in position, which is included in the notion of this quantity; for it belongs to dimension for it to be "quantity having position" (Aristotle, Categor. iv), and therefore dimensive quantity can be the subject of the other accidents, rather than the other way about. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod accidens per se non potest esse subiectum alterius accidentis, quia non per se est. Secundum vero quod est in alio, unum accidens dicitur esse subiectum alterius, inquantum unum accidens recipitur in subiecto alio mediante, sicut superficies dicitur esse subiectum coloris. Unde, quando accidenti datur divinitus ut per se sit, potest etiam per se alterius accidentis esse subiectum. | Reply to Objection 1: One accident cannot of itself be the subject of another, because it does not exist of itself. But inasmuch as an accident is received in another thing, one is said to be the subject of the other, inasmuch as one is received in a subject through another, as the surface is said to be the subject of color. Hence when God makes an accident to exist of itself, it can also be of itself the subject of another. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod alia accidentia, etiam secundum quod erant in substantia panis, individuabantur mediante quantitate dimensiva, sicut dictum est. Et ideo potius quantitas dimensiva est subiectum aliorum accidentium remanentium in hoc sacramento quam e converso. | Reply to Objection 2: The other accidents, even as they were in the substance of the bread, were individuated by means of dimensive quantity, as stated above. And therefore dimensive quantity is the subject of the other accidents remaining in this sacrament, rather than conversely. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod rarum et densum sunt quaedam qualitates consequentes corpora ex hoc quod habent multum vel parum de materia sub dimensionibus, sicut etiam omnia alia accidentia consequuntur ex principiis substantiae. Et sicut, subtracta substantia, divina virtute conservantur alia accidentia; ita, subtracta materia, divina virtute conservantur qualitates materiam consequentes, sicut rarum et densum. | Reply to Objection 3: Rarity and density are particular qualities accompanying bodies, by reason of their having much or little matter under dimensions; just as all other accidents likewise follow from the principles of substance. And consequently, as the accidents are preserved by Divine power when the substance is withdrawn, so, when matter is withdrawn, the qualities which go with matter, such as rarity and density, are preserved by Divine power. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod quantitas mathematica non abstrahit a materia intelligibili, sed a materia sensibili, ut dicitur VII Metaphys. Dicitur autem materia sensibilis ex hoc quod subiicitur sensibilibus qualitatibus. Et ideo manifestum est quod quantitas dimensiva quae remanet in hoc sacramento sine subiecto, non est quantitas mathematica. | Reply to Objection 4: Mathematical quantity abstracts not from intelligible matter, but from sensible matter, as is said in Metaph. vii. But matter is termed sensible because it underlies sensible qualities. And therefore it is manifest that the dimensive quantity, which remains in this sacrament without a subject, is not mathematical quantity. |
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Article: 3 [ << | >> ]
| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod species quae remanent in hoc sacramento, non possint immutare aliquod extrinsecum. Probatur enim in VII Metaphysic. quod formae quae sunt in materia, fiunt a formis quae sunt in materia, non autem a formis quae sunt sine materia, eo quod simile agit sibi simile. Sed species sacramentales sunt species sine materia, quia remanent sine subiecto, ut ex dictis patet. Non ergo possunt immutare materiam exteriorem, inducendo aliquam formam. |
Objection 1: It seems that the species which remain in this sacrament cannot affect external objects. For it is proved in Phys. vii, that forms which are in matter are produced by forms that are in matter, but not from forms which are without matter, because like makes like. But the sacramental species are species without matter, since they remain without a subject, as is evident from what was said above (Article [1]). Therefore they cannot affect other matter by producing any form in it. |
| Praeterea, cessante actione primi agentis, necesse est quod cesset actio instrumenti, sicut, quiescente fabro, non movetur martellus. Sed omnes formae accidentales agunt instrumentaliter in virtute formae substantialis tanquam principalis agentis. Cum ergo in hoc sacramento non remaneat forma substantialis panis et vini, sicut supra habitum est, videtur quod formae accidentales remanentes agere non possunt ad immutationem exterioris materiae. |
Objection 2: Further, when the action of the principal agent ceases, then the action of the instrument must cease, as when the carpenter rests, the hammer is moved no longer. But all accidental forms act instrumentally in virtue of the substantial form as the principal agent. Therefore, since the substantial form of the bread and wine does not remain in this sacrament, as was shown above (Question [75], Article [6]), it seems that the accidental forms which remain cannot act so as to change external matter. |
| Praeterea, nihil agit extra suam speciem, quia effectus non potest esse potior causa. Sed species sacramentales omnes sunt accidentia. Non ergo possunt exteriorem materiam immutare, ad minus ad formam substantialem. | Objection 3: Further, nothing acts outside its species, because an effect cannot surpass its cause. But all the sacramental species are accidents. Therefore they cannot change external matter, at least as to a substantial form. |
| Sed contra est quod, si non possent immutare exteriora corpora, non possent sentiri, sentitur enim aliquid per hoc quod immutatur sensus a sensibili, ut dicitur II de anima. | On the contrary, If they could not change external bodies, they could not be felt; for a thing is felt from the senses being changed by a sensible thing, as is said in De Anima ii. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, quia unumquodque agit inquantum est ens actu, consequens est quod unumquodque, sicut se habet ad esse, ita se habet ad agere. Quia igitur, secundum praedicta, speciebus sacramentalibus datum est divina virtute ut remaneant in suo esse quod habebant substantia panis et vini existente, consequens est quod etiam remaneant in suo agere. Et ideo omnem actionem quam poterant agere substantia panis et vini existente, possunt etiam agere substantia panis et vini transeunte in corpus et sanguinem Christi. Unde non est dubium quod possunt immutare exteriora corpora. |
I answer that, Because everything acts in so far as it is an actual being, the consequence is that everything stands in the same relation to action as it does to being. Therefore, because, according to what was said above (Article [1]), it is an effect of the Divine power that the sacramental species continue in the being which they had when the substance of the bread and wine was present, it follows that they continue in their action. Consequently they retain every action which they had while the substance of the bread and wine remained, now that the substance of the bread and wine has passed into the body and blood of Christ. Hence there is no doubt but that they can change external bodies. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod species sacramentales, licet sint formae sine materia existentes, retinent tamen idem esse quod habebant prius in materia. Et ideo secundum suum esse assimilantur formis quae sunt in materia. | Reply to Objection 1: The sacramental species, although they are forms existing without matter, still retain the same being which they had before in matter, and therefore as to their being they are like forms which are in matter. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ita actio formae accidentalis dependet ab actione formae substantialis, sicut esse accidentis dependet ab esse substantiae. Et ideo, sicut divina virtute datur speciebus sacramentalibus ut possint esse sine substantia, ita datur eis ut possint agere sine forma substantiali, virtute Dei, a quo sicut a primo agente dependet omnis actio formae et substantialis et accidentalis. | Reply to Objection 2: The action of an accidental form depends upon the action of a substantial form in the same way as the being of accident depends upon the being of substance; and therefore, as it is an effect of Divine power that the sacramental species exist without substance, so is it an effect of Divine power that they can act without a substantial form, because every action of a substantial or accidental form depends upon God as the first agent. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod immutatio quae est ad formam substantialem, non fit a forma substantiali immediate, sed mediantibus qualitatibus activis et passivis, quae agunt in virtute formae substantialis. Haec autem virtus instrumentalis conservatur in speciebus sacramentalibus divina virtute sicut et prius erat. Et ideo possunt agere ad formam substantialem instrumentaliter, per quem modum aliquid potest agere ultra suam speciem, non quasi virtute propria, sed virtute principalis agentis. | Reply to Objection 3: The change which terminates in a substantial form is not effected by a substantial form directly, but by means of the active and passive qualities, which act in virtue of the substantial form. But by Divine power this instrumental energy is retained in the sacramental species, just as it was before: and consequently their action can be directed to a substantial form instrumentally, just in the same way as anything can act outside its species, not as by its own power, but by the power of the chief agent. |
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| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod species sacramentales corrumpi non possunt. Corruptio enim accidit per separationem formae a materia. Sed materia panis non remanet in hoc sacramento, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo huiusmodi species non possunt corrumpi. |
Objection 1: It seems that the sacramental species cannot be corrupted, because corruption comes of the separation of the form from the matter. But the matter of the bread does not remain in this sacrament, as is clear from what was said above (Question [75], Article [2]). Therefore these species cannot be corrupted. |
| Praeterea, nulla forma corrumpitur nisi per accidens, corrupto subiecto, unde formae per se subsistentes incorruptibiles sunt, sicut patet in substantiis spiritualibus. Sed species sacramentales sunt formae sine subiecto. Ergo corrumpi non possunt. | Objection 2: Further, no form is corrupted except accidentally, that is, when its subject is corrupted; hence self-subsisting forms are incorruptible, as is seen in spiritual substances. But the sacramental species are forms without a subject. Therefore they cannot be corrupted. |
| Praeterea, si corrumpuntur, aut hoc erit naturaliter, aut miraculose. Sed non naturaliter, quia non est ibi assignare aliquod corruptionis subiectum, quod maneat corruptione terminata. Similiter etiam nec miraculose, quia miracula quae sunt in hoc sacramento, fiunt virtute consecrationis, per quam species sacramentales conservantur; non est autem idem causa conservationis et corruptionis. Ergo nullo modo species sacramentales corrumpi possunt. | Objection 3: Further, if they be corrupted, it will either be naturally or miraculously. But they cannot be corrupted naturally, because no subject of corruption can be assigned as remaining after the corruption has taken place. Neither can they be corrupted miraculously, because the miracles which occur in this sacrament take place in virtue of the consecration, whereby the sacramental species are preserved: and the same thing is not the cause of preservation and of corruption. Therefore, in no way can the sacramental species be corrupted. |
| Sed contra est quod sensu deprehenditur hostias consecratas putrefieri et corrumpi. | On the contrary, We perceive by our senses that the consecrated hosts become putrefied and corrupted. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod corruptio est motus ex esse in non esse. Dictum est autem supra quod species sacramentales retinent idem esse quod prius habebant substantia panis et vini existente. Et ideo, sicut esse horum accidentium poterat corrumpi substantia panis et vini existente, ita etiam potest corrumpi illa substantia abeunte. |
I answer that, Corruption is "movement from being into non-being" (Aristotle, Phys. v). Now it has been stated (Article [3]) that the sacramental species retain the same being as they had before when the substance of the bread was present. Consequently, as the being of those accidents could be corrupted while the substance of the bread and wine was present, so likewise they can be corrupted now that the substance has passed away. |
| Poterant autem huiusmodi accidentia primo corrumpi dupliciter, uno modo, per se; alio modo, per accidens. Per se quidem, sicut per alterationem qualitatum, et augmentum vel diminutionem quantitatis, non quidem per modum augmenti vel diminutionis, qui invenitur in solis corporibus animatis, qualia non sunt substantia panis et vini, sed per additionem vel divisionem; nam, sicut dicitur in III Metaphys., per divisionem una dimensio corrumpitur et fiunt duae, per additionem autem e converso ex duabus fit una. Et per hunc modum manifeste possunt corrumpi huiusmodi accidentia post consecrationem, quia et ipsa quantitas dimensiva remanens potest divisionem et additionem recipere; et, cum sit subiectum qualitatum sensibilium, sicut dictum est, potest etiam esse subiectum alterationis eorum, puta si alteretur color aut sapor panis aut vini. |
But such accidents could have been previously corrupted in two ways: in one way, of themselves; in another way, accidentally. They could be corrupted of themselves, as by alteration of the qualities, and increase or decrease of the quantity, not in the way in which increase or decrease is found only in animated bodies, such as the substances of the bread and wine are not, but by addition or division; for, as is said in Metaph. iii, one dimension is dissolved by division, and two dimensions result; while on the contrary, by addition, two dimensions become one. And in this way such accidents can be corrupted manifestly after consecration, because the dimensive quantity which remains can receive division and addition; and since it is the subject of sensible qualities, as stated above (Article [1]), it can likewise be the subject of their alteration, for instance, if the color or the savor of the bread or wine be altered. |
| Alio modo poterant corrumpi per accidens, per corruptionem subiecti. Et hoc modo possunt corrumpi etiam post consecrationem. Quamvis enim subiectum non remaneat, remanet tamen esse quod habebant huiusmodi accidentia in subiecto, quod quidem est proprium et conforme subiecto. Et ideo huiusmodi esse potest corrumpi a contrario agente, sicut corrumpebatur substantia panis vel vini, quae etiam non corrumpebatur nisi praecedente alteratione circa accidentia. | An accident can be corrupted in another way, through the corruption of its subject, and in this way also they can be corrupted after consecration; for although the subject does not remain, still the being which they had in the subject does remain, which being is proper, and suited to the subject. And therefore such being can be corrupted by a contrary agent, as the substance of the bread or wine was subject to corruption, and, moreover, was not corrupted except by a preceding alteration regarding the accidents. |
| Distinguendum tamen est inter utramque praedictarum corruptionum. Quia, cum corpus Christi et sanguis succedant in hoc sacramento substantiae panis et vini, si fiat talis immutatio ex parte accidentium quae non suffecisset ad corruptionem panis et vini, propter talem immutationem non desinit corpus et sanguis Christi esse sub hoc sacramento, sive fiat immutatio ex parte qualitatis, puta cum modicum immutatur color aut sapor vini aut panis; sive ex parte quantitatis, sicut cum dividitur panis aut vinum in tales partes quod adhuc in eis possit salvari natura panis aut vini. Si vero fiat tanta immutatio quod fuisset corrupta substantia panis aut vini, non remanent corpus et sanguis Christi sub hoc sacramento. Et hoc tam ex parte qualitatum, sicut cum ita immutatur color et sapor et aliae qualitates panis aut vini quod nullo modo posset compati natura panis aut vini, sive etiam ex parte quantitatis, puta si pulverizetur panis, vel vinum in minimas partes dividatur, ut iam non remaneant species panis vel vini. | Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between each of the aforesaid corruptions; because, when the body and the blood of Christ succeed in this sacrament to the substance of the bread and wine, if there be such change on the part of the accidents as would not have sufficed for the corruption of the bread and wine, then the body and blood of Christ do not cease to be under this sacrament on account of such change, whether the change be on the part of the quality, as for instance, when the color or the savor of the bread or wine is slightly modified; or on the part of the quantity, as when the bread or the wine is divided into such parts as to keep in them the nature of bread or of wine. But if the change be so great that the substance of the bread or wine would have been corrupted, then Christ's body and blood do not remain under this sacrament; and this either on the part of the qualities, as when the color, savor, and other qualities of the bread and wine are so altered as to be incompatible with the nature of bread or of wine; or else on the part of the quantity, as, for instance, if the bread be reduced to fine particles, or the wine divided into such tiny drops that the species of bread or wine no longer remain. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia ad corruptionem per se pertinet quod auferatur esse rei inquantum esse alicuius formae est in materia, consequens est quod per corruptionem separetur forma a materia. Si vero huiusmodi esse non esset in materia, simile tamen ei quod est in materia, posset per corruptionem auferri etiam materia non existente, sicut accidit in hoc sacramento, ut ex dictis patet. | Reply to Objection 1: Since it belongs essentially to corruption to take away the being of a thing, in so far as the being of some form is in matter, it results that by corruption the form is separated from the matter. But if such being were not in matter, yet like such being as is in matter, it could be taken away by corruption, even where there is no matter; as takes place in this sacrament, as is evident from what was said above. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod species sacramentales, licet sint formae non in materia, habent tamen esse quod prius in materia habebant. | Reply to Objection 2: Although the sacramental species are forms not in matter, yet they have the being which they had in matter. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod corruptio illa specierum non est miraculosa, sed naturalis, praesupponit tamen miraculum quod est factum in consecratione, scilicet quod illae species sacramentales retineant esse sine subiecto quod prius habebant in subiecto; sicut et caecus miraculose illuminatus naturaliter videt. | Reply to Objection 3: This corruption of species is not miraculous, but natural; nevertheless, it presupposes the miracle which is wrought in the consecration, namely, that those sacramental species retain without a subject, the same being as they had in a subject; just as a blind man, to whom sight is given miraculously, sees naturally. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ex speciebus sacramentalibus nihil possit generari. Omne enim quod generatur, ex aliqua materia generatur, ex nihilo enim nihil generatur, quamvis ex nihilo fiat aliquid per creationem. Sed speciebus sacramentalibus non subest aliqua materia nisi corporis Christi, quod est incorruptibile. Ergo videtur quod ex speciebus sacramentalibus nihil possit generari. | Objection 1: It seems that nothing can be generated from the sacramental species: because, whatever is generated, is generated out of some matter: for nothing is generated out of nothing, although by creation something is made out of nothing. But there is no matter underlying the sacramental species except that of Christ's body, and that body is incorruptible. Therefore it seems that nothing can be generated from the sacramental species. |
| Praeterea, ea quae non sunt unius generis, non possunt ex invicem fieri, non enim ex albedine fit linea. Sed accidens et substantia differunt genere. Cum ergo species sacramentales sint accidentia, videtur quod ex eis non possit aliqua substantia generari. | Objection 2: Further, things which are not of the same genus cannot spring from one another: thus a line is not made of whiteness. But accident and substance differ generically. Therefore, since the sacramental species are accidents, it seems that no substance can be generated from them. |
| Praeterea, si ex eis generatur aliqua substantia corporea, non erit sine accidente. Si ergo ex speciebus sacramentalibus generatur aliqua substantia corporea, oportet quod ex accidente generetur substantia et accidens, duo scilicet ex uno, quod est impossibile. Ergo impossibile est quod ex speciebus sacramentalibus aliqua substantia corporea generetur. | Objection 3: Further, if any corporeal substance be generated from them, such substance will not be without accident. Therefore, if any corporeal substance be generated from the sacramental species, then substance and accident would be generated from accident, namely, two things from one, which is impossible. Consequently, it is impossible for any corporeal substance to be generated out of the sacramental species. |
| Sed contra est quod ad sensum videri potest ex speciebus sacramentalibus aliquid generari, vel cinerem, si comburantur; vel vermes, si putrefiant; vel pulverem, si conterantur. | On the contrary, The senses are witness that something is generated out of the sacramental species, either ashes, if they be burned, worms if they putrefy, or dust if they be crushed. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, cum corruptio unius sit generatio alterius, ut dicitur in I de Generat., necesse est quod ex speciebus sacramentalibus aliquid generetur, cum corrumpantur, ut dictum est. Non enim sic corrumpuntur ut omnino dispareant, quasi in nihilum redigantur, sed manifeste aliquid sensibile eis succedit. |
I answer that, Since "the corruption of one thing is the generation of another" (De Gener. i), something must be generated necessarily from the sacramental species if they be corrupted, as stated above (Article [4]); for they are not corrupted in such a way that they disappear altogether, as if reduced to nothing; on the contrary, something sensible manifestly succeeds to them. |
| Quomodo autem ex eis aliquid generari possit, difficile est videre. Manifestum est enim quod ex corpore et sanguine Christi, quae ibi veraciter sunt, non generatur aliquid, cum sint incorruptibilia. Si autem substantia panis aut vini remaneret in hoc sacramento, vel eorum materia, facile esset assignare quod ex eis generatur illud sensibile quod succedit, ut quidam posuerunt. Sed hoc est falsum, ut supra habitum est. |
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how anything can be generated from them. For it is quite evident that nothing is generated out of the body and blood of Christ which are truly there, because these are incorruptible. But if the substance, or even the matter, of the bread and wine were to remain in this sacrament, then, as some have maintained, it would be easy to account for this sensible object which succeeds to them. But that supposition is false, as was stated above (Question [75], Articles [2],4,8). |
| Et ideo quidam dixerunt quod ea quae generantur, non fiunt ex speciebus sacramentalibus, sed ex aere circumstante. Quod quidem multipliciter apparet esse impossibile. Primo quidem, quia ex eo generatur aliquid quod prius alteratum et corruptum apparet. Nulla autem alteratio et corruptio prius apparuit in aere circumstante. Unde ex eo vermes aut cineres non generantur. Secundo, quia natura aeris non est talis quod ex eo per tales alterationes talia generentur. Tertio, quia potest contingere in magna quantitate hostias consecratas comburi vel putrefieri, nec esset possibile tantum de corpore terreo ex aere generari, nisi magna et etiam valde sensibili inspissatione aeris facta. Quarto, quia idem potest accidere corporibus solidis circumstantibus, puta ferro aut lapidibus, quae integra remanent post praedictorum generationem. Unde haec positio stare non potest, quia contrariatur ei quod ad sensum apparet. | Hence it is that others have said that the things generated have not sprung from the sacramental species, but from the surrounding atmosphere. But this can be shown in many ways to be impossible. In the first place, because when a thing is generated from another, the latter at first appears changed and corrupted; whereas no alteration or corruption appeared previously in the adjacent atmosphere; hence the worms or ashes are not generated therefrom. Secondly, because the nature of the atmosphere is not such as to permit of such things being generated by such alterations. Thirdly, because it is possible for many consecrated hosts to be burned or putrefied; nor would it be possible for an earthen body, large enough to be generated from the atmosphere, unless a great and, in fact, exceedingly sensible condensation of the atmosphere took place. Fourthly, because the same thing can happen to the solid bodies surrounding them, such as iron or stone, which remain entire after the generation of the aforesaid things. Hence this opinion cannot stand, because it is opposed to what is manifest to our senses. |
| Et ideo alii dixerunt quod redit substantia panis et vini in ipsa corruptione specierum, et sic ex substantia panis et vini redeunte generantur cineres aut vermes aut aliquid huiusmodi. Sed haec positio non videtur esse possibilis. Primo quidem quia, si substantia panis et vini conversa est in corpus et sanguinem, ut supra habitum est, non potest substantia panis vel vini redire nisi corpore aut sanguine Christi iterum converso in substantiam panis et vini, quod est impossibile, sicut, si aer sit conversus in ignem, non potest aer redire nisi iterum ignis convertatur in aerem. Si vero substantia panis aut vini sit annihilata, non potest iterum redire, quia quod in nihilum decidit, non redit idem numero, nisi forte dicatur redire praedicta substantia, quia Deus de novo creat novam substantiam loco primae. Secundo videtur hoc esse impossibile, quia non est dare quando substantia panis redeat. Manifestum est enim ex supra dictis quod, manentibus speciebus panis et vini, manet corpus et sanguis Christi, quae non sunt simul cum substantia panis et vini in hoc sacramento, secundum praehabita. Unde substantia panis et vini non potest redire, speciebus sacramentalibus manentibus. Similiter etiam nec eis cessantibus, quia iam substantia panis et vini esset sine propriis accidentibus, quod est impossibile. Nisi forte dicatur quod in ipso ultimo instanti corruptionis specierum redit, non quidem substantia panis et vini, quia illud idem instans est in quo primo habent esse substantiae generatae ex speciebus, sed materia panis et vini magis quasi de novo creata diceretur quam rediens, proprie loquendo. Et secundum hoc, posset sustineri praedicta positio. |
And therefore others have said that the substance of the bread and wine returns during the corruption of the species, and so from the returning substance of the bread and wine, ashes or worms or something of the kind are generated. But this explanation seems an impossible one. First of all, because if the substance of the bread and wine be converted into the body and blood of Christ, as was shown above (Question [75], Articles [2],4), the substance of the bread and wine cannot return, except the body and blood of Christ be again changed back into the substance of bread and wine, which is impossible: thus if air be turned into fire, the air cannot return without the fire being again changed into air. But if the substance of bread or wine be annihilated, it cannot return again, because what lapses into nothing does not return numerically the same. Unless perchance it be said that the said substance returns, because God creates anew another new substance to replace the first. Secondly, this seems to be impossible, because no time can be assigned when the substance of the bread returns. For, from what was said above (Article [4]; Question [76], Article [6], ad 3), it is evident that while the species of the bread and wine remain, there remain also the body and blood of Christ, which are not present together with the substance of the bread and wine in this sacrament, according to what was stated above (Question [75], Article [2]). Hence the substance of the bread and wine cannot return while the sacramental species remain; nor, again, when these species pass away; because then the substance of the bread and wine would be without their proper accidents, which is impossible. Unless perchance it be said that in the last instant of the corruption of the species there returns (not, indeed, the substance of bread and wine, because it is in that very instant that they have the being of the substance generated from the species, but) the matter of the bread and wine; which, matter, properly speaking, would be more correctly described as created anew, than as returning. And in this sense the aforesaid position might be held. |
| Verum, quia non rationabiliter videtur dici quod miraculose aliquid accidit in hoc sacramento nisi ex ipsa consecratione, ex qua non est quod materia creetur vel redeat; melius videtur dicendum quod in ipsa consecratione miraculose datur quantitati dimensivae panis et vini quod sit primum subiectum subsequentium formarum. Hoc autem est proprium materiae. Et ideo ex consequenti datur praedictae quantitati dimensivae omne id quod ad materiam pertinet. Et ideo quidquid posset generari ex materia panis si esset, totum potest generari ex praedicta quantitate dimensiva panis vel vini, non quidem novo miraculo, sed ex vi miraculi prius facti. | However, since it does not seem reasonable to say that anything takes place miraculously in this sacrament, except in virtue of the consecration itself, which does not imply either creation or return of matter, it seems better to say that in the actual consecration it is miraculously bestowed on the dimensive quantity of the bread and wine to be the subject of subsequent forms. Now this is proper to matter; and therefore as a consequence everything which goes with matter is bestowed on dimensive quantity; and therefore everything which could be generated from the matter of bread or wine, if it were present, can be generated from the aforesaid dimensive quantity of the bread or wine, not, indeed, by a new miracle, but by virtue of the miracle which has already taken place. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis non sit ibi materia ex qua aliquid generetur, quantitas tamen dimensiva supplet vicem materiae, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1: Although no matter is there out of which a thing may be generated, nevertheless dimensive quantity supplies the place of matter, as stated above. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod illae species sacramentales sunt quidem accidentia, habent tamen actum et vim substantiae, ut dictum est. |
Reply to Objection 2: Those sacramental species are indeed accidents, yet they have the act and power of substance, as stated above (Article [3]). |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod quantitas dimensiva panis et vini et retinet naturam propriam, et accipit miraculose vim et proprietatem substantiae. Et ideo potest transire in utrumque, idest in substantiam et dimensionem. | Reply to Objection 3: The dimensive quantity of the bread and wine retains its own nature, and receives miraculously the power and property of substance; and therefore it can pass to both, that is, into substance and dimension. |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod species sacramentales non possint nutrire. Dicit enim Ambrosius, in libro de sacramentis, non iste panis est qui vadit in corpus, sed panis vitae aeternae, qui animae nostrae substantiam fulcit. Sed omne quod nutrit, vadit in corpus. Ergo panis iste non nutrit. Et eadem ratio est de vino. | Objection 1: It seems that the sacramental species cannot nourish, because, as Ambrose says (De Sacram. v), "it is not this bread that enters into our body, but the bread of everlasting life, which supports the substance of our soul." But whatever nourishes enters into the body. Therefore this bread does not nourish: and the same reason holds good of the wine. |
| Praeterea, sicut dicitur in libro de Generat., ex eisdem nutrimur ex quibus sumus. Species autem sacramentales sunt accidentia, ex quibus homo non constat, non enim accidens est pars substantiae. Ergo videtur quod species sacramentales nutrire non possunt. | Objection 2: Further, as is said in De Gener. ii, "We are nourished by the very things of which we are made." But the sacramental species are accidents, whereas man is not made of accidents, because accident is not a part of substance. Therefore it seems that the sacramental species cannot nourish. |
| Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II de anima, quod alimentum nutrit prout est quaedam substantia, auget autem prout est aliquid quantum. Sed species sacramentales non sunt substantia. Ergo non possunt nutrire. | Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii) that "food nourishes according as it is a substance, but it gives increase by reason of its quantity." But the sacramental species are not a substance. Consequently they cannot nourish. |
| Sed contra est quod apostolus, I Cor. XI, loquens de hoc sacramento, dicit, alius quidem esurit, alius autem ebrius est, ubi dicit Glossa quod notat illos qui, post celebrationem sacri mysterii et consecrationem panis et vini, suas oblationes vindicabant, et, aliis non communicantes, sibi solis sumebant, ita ut inde etiam inebriarentur. Quod quidem non potest contingere si sacramentales species non nutrirent. Ergo species sacramentales nutriunt. |
On the contrary, The Apostle speaking of this sacrament says (1 Cor. 11:21): "One, indeed, is hungry, and another is drunk": upon which the gloss observes that "he alludes to those who after the celebration of the sacred mystery, and after the consecration of the bread and wine, claimed their oblations, and not sharing them with others, took the whole, so as even to become intoxicated thereby." But this could not happen if the sacramental species did not nourish. Therefore the sacramental species do nourish. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod haec quaestio difficultatem non habet, praecedenti quaestione soluta. Ex hoc enim, ut dicitur in II de anima, cibus nutrit, quod convertitur in substantiam nutriti. Dictum est autem quod species sacramentales possunt converti in substantiam aliquam quae ex eis generatur. Per eandem autem rationem possunt converti in corpus humanum, per quam possunt converti in cineres vel in vermes. Et ideo manifestum est quod nutriunt. |
I answer that, This question presents no difficulty, now that we have solved the preceding question. Because, as stated in De Anima ii, food nourishes by being converted into the substance of the individual nourished. Now it has been stated (Article [5]) that the sacramental species can be converted into a substance generated from them. And they can be converted into the human body for the same reason as they can into ashes or worms. Consequently, it is evident that they nourish. |
| Quod autem quidam dicunt, quod non vere nutriunt, quasi in corpus humanum convertantur, sed reficiunt et confortant quadam sensuum immutatione, sicut homo confortatur ex odore cibi et inebriatur ex odore vini, ad sensum patet esse falsum. Talis enim refectio non diu sufficit homini, cuius corpus, propter continuam deperditionem, restauratione indiget. Et tamen homo diu sustentari posset, si hostias et vinum consecratum sumeret in magna quantitate. | But the senses witness to the untruth of what some maintain; viz. that the species do not nourish as though they were changed into the human body, but merely refresh and hearten by acting upon the senses (as a man is heartened by the odor of meat, and intoxicated by the fumes of wine). Because such refreshment does not suffice long for a man, whose body needs repair owing to constant waste: and yet a man could be supported for long if he were to take hosts and consecrated wine in great quantity. |
| Similiter etiam non potest stare quod quidam dicunt, quod species sacramentales nutriunt per formam substantialem panis et vini, quae remanet. Tum quia non remanet, ut supra habitum est. Tum quia non est actus formae nutrire, sed magis materiae, quae accipit formam nutriti, recedente forma nutrimenti. Unde dicitur in II de anima, quod nutrimentum in principio est dissimile, in fine autem simile. |
In like manner the statement advanced by others cannot stand, who hold that the sacramental species nourish owing to the remaining substantial form of the bread and wine: both because the form does not remain, as stated above (Question [75], Article [6]): and because to nourish is the act not of a form but rather of matter, which takes the form of the one nourished, while the form of the nourishment passes away: hence it is said in De Anima ii that nourishment is at first unlike, but at the end is like. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, facta consecratione, dupliciter potest dici panis in hoc sacramento. Uno modo, ipsae species panis, quae retinent nomen prioris substantiae, ut Gregorius dicit, in homilia paschali. Alio modo, potest dici panis ipsum corpus Christi, quod est panis mysticus de caelo descendens. Ambrosius ergo, cum dicit quod iste panis non transit in corpus, accipit panem secundo modo, quia scilicet corpus Christi non convertitur in corpus hominis, sed reficit mentem eius. Non autem loquitur de pane primo modo dicto. | Reply to Objection 1: After the consecration bread can be said to be in this sacrament in two ways. First, as to the species, which retain the name of the previous substance, as Gregory says in an Easter Homily (Lanfranc, De Corp. et Sang. Dom. xx). Secondly, Christ's very body can be called bread, since it is the mystical bread "coming down from heaven." Consequently, Ambrose uses the word "bread" in this second meaning, when he says that "this bread does not pass into the body," because, to wit, Christ's body is not changed into man's body, but nourishes his soul. But he is not speaking of bread taken in the first acceptation. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod species sacramentales, etsi non sint ea ex quibus corpus hominis constat, tamen in ea convertuntur, sicut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: Although the sacramental species are not those things out of which the human body is made, yet they are changed into those things stated above. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod species sacramentales, quamvis non sint substantia, habent tamen virtutem substantiae, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 3: Although the sacramental species are not a substance, still they have the virtue of a substance, as stated above. |
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| Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod species sacramentales non frangantur in hoc sacramento. Dicit enim philosophus, in IV Meteor., quod corpora dicuntur frangibilia propter determinatam dispositionem pororum. Quod non potest attribui sacramentalibus speciebus. Ergo sacramentales species non possunt frangi. | Objection 1: It seems that the sacramental species are not broken in this sacrament, because the Philosopher says in Meteor. iv that bodies are breakable owing to a certain disposition of the pores; a thing which cannot be attributed to the sacramental species. Therefore the sacramental species cannot be broken. |
| Praeterea, fractionem sequitur sonus. Sed species sacramentales non sunt sonabiles, dicit enim philosophus, II de anima, quod sonabile est corpus durum habens superficiem levem. Ergo species sacramentales non franguntur. | Objection 2: Further, breaking is followed by sound. But the sacramental species emit no sound: because the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), that what emits sound is a hard body, having a smooth surface. Therefore the sacramental species are not broken. |
| Praeterea, eiusdem videtur esse frangi et masticari. Sed verum corpus Christi est quod manducatur, secundum illud Ioan. VI, qui manducat meam carnem et bibit meum sanguinem. Ergo corpus Christi est quod frangitur et masticatur. Unde et in confessione Berengarii dicitur, consentio sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae, et corde et ore profiteor panem et vinum quae in altari ponuntur, post consecrationem verum corpus et sanguinem Christi esse, et in veritate manibus sacerdotum tractari, frangi et fidelium dentibus atteri. Non ergo fractio debet attribui sacramentalibus speciebus. | Objection 3: Further, breaking and mastication are seemingly of the same object. But it is Christ's true body that is eaten, according to Jn. 6:57: "He that eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood." Therefore it is Christ's body that is broken and masticated: and hence it is said in the confession of Berengarius: "I agree with the Holy Catholic Church, and with heart and lips I profess, that the bread and wine which are placed on the altar, are the true body and blood of Christ after consecration, and are truly handled and broken by the priest's hands, broken and crushed by the teeth of believers." Consequently, the breaking ought not to be ascribed to the sacramental species. |
| Sed contra est quod fractio fit per divisionem quanti. Sed nullum quantum ibi dividitur nisi species sacramentales, quia neque corpus Christi, quod est incorruptibile; neque substantia panis, quae non manet. Ergo species sacramentales franguntur. | On the contrary, Breaking arises from the division of that which has quantity. But nothing having quantity except the sacramental species is broken here, because neither Christ's body is broken, as being incorruptible, nor is the substance of the bread, because it no longer remains. Therefore the sacramental species are broken. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod apud antiquos circa hoc multiplex fuit opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt quod non erat in hoc sacramento fractio secundum rei veritatem, sed solum secundum aspectum intuentium. Sed hoc non potest stare. Quia in hoc sacramento veritatis sensus non decipitur circa ea quorum iudicium ad ipsum pertinet, inter quae est fractio, per quam ex uno fiunt multa, quae quidem sunt sensibilia communia, ut patet in libro de anima. | I answer that, Many opinions prevailed of old on this matter. Some held that in this sacrament there was no breaking at all in reality, but merely in the eyes of the beholders. But this contention cannot stand, because in this sacrament of truth the sense is not deceived with regard to its proper object of judgment, and one of these objects is breaking, whereby from one thing arise many: and these are common sensibles, as is stated in De Anima ii. |
| Unde alii dixerunt quod erat ibi vera fractio sine substantia existente. Sed hoc etiam sensui contradicit. Apparet enim in hoc sacramento aliquod quantum, prius unum existens, postea in multa partitum, quod quidem oportet esse subiectum fractionis. | Others accordingly have said that there was indeed a genuine breaking, but without any subject. But this again contradicts our senses; because a quantitative body is seen in this sacrament, which formerly was one, and is now divided into many, and this must be the subject of the breaking. |
| Non autem potest dici quod ipsum corpus Christi verum frangatur. Primo quidem, quia est incorruptibile et impassibile. Secundo, quia est totum sub qualibet parte, ut supra habitum est, quod est quidem contra rationem eius quod frangitur. |
But it cannot be said that Christ's true body is broken. First of all, because it is incorruptible and impassible: secondly, because it is entire under every part, as was shown above (Question [76], Article [3]), which is contrary to the nature of a thing broken. |
| Unde relinquitur quod fractio sit sicut in subiecto in quantitate dimensiva panis, sicut et alia accidentia. Et sicut species sacramentales sunt sacramentum corporis Christi veri, ita fractio huiusmodi specierum est sacramentum dominicae passionis, quae fuit in corpore Christi vero. | It remains, then, that the breaking is in the dimensive quantity of the bread, as in a subject, just as the other accidents. And as the sacramental species are the sacrament of Christ's true body, so is the breaking of these species the sacrament of our Lord's Passion, which was in Christ's true body. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut in speciebus sacramentalibus remanet rarum et densum, ut supra dictum est, ita etiam remanet ibi porositas, et per consequens frangibilitas. |
Reply to Objection 1: As rarity and density remain under the sacramental species, as stated above (Article [2], ad 3), so likewise porousness remains, and in consequence breakableness. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod densitatem sequitur duritia. Et ideo, ex quo in speciebus sacramentalibus remanet densitas, consequens est quod remaneat ibi duritia, et per consequens sonabilitas. | Reply to Objection 2: Hardness results from density; therefore, as density remains under the sacramental species, hardness remains there too, and the capability of sound as a consequence. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod illud quod manducatur in propria specie, ipsummet frangitur et masticatur in sua specie. Corpus autem Christi non manducatur in sua specie, sed in specie sacramentali. Unde super illud Ioannis VI, caro non prodest quidquam, dicit Augustinus, hoc est intelligendum secundum illos qui carnaliter intelligebant carnem quippe sic intellexerunt quo modo in cadavere dilaniatur, aut in macello venditur. Et ideo ipsum corpus Christi non frangitur, nisi secundum speciem sacramentalem. Et hoc modo intelligenda est confessio Berengarii, ut fractio et contritio dentium referatur ad speciem sacramentalem, sub qua vere est corpus Christi. | Reply to Objection 3: What is eaten under its own species, is also broken and masticated under its own species; but Christ's body is eaten not under its proper, but under the sacramental species. Hence in explaining Jn. 6:64, "The flesh profiteth nothing," Augustine (Tract. xxvii in Joan.) says that this is to be taken as referring to those who understood carnally: "for they understood the flesh, thus, as it is divided piecemeal, in a dead body, or as sold in the shambles." Consequently, Christ's very body is not broken, except according to its sacramental species. And the confession made by Berengarius is to be understood in this sense, that the breaking and the crushing with the teeth is to be referred to the sacramental species, under which the body of Christ truly is. |
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| Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vino consecrato non possit aliquis liquor misceri. Omne enim quod miscetur alicui, recipit qualitatem ipsius. Sed nullus liquor potest recipere qualitatem sacramentalium specierum, quia accidentia illa sunt sine subiecto, ut dictum est. Ergo videtur quod nullus liquor possit permisceri speciebus sacramentalibus vini. |
Objection 1: It seems that no liquid can be mingled with the consecrated wine, because everything mingled with another partakes of its quality. But no liquid can share in the quality of the sacramental species, because those accidents are without a subject, as stated above (Article [1]). Therefore it seems that no liquid can be mingled with the sacramental species of the wine. |
| Praeterea, si aliquis liquor permisceatur illis speciebus, oportet quod ex his fiat aliquod unum. Sed non potest fieri aliquod unum neque ex liquore, qui est substantia, et speciebus sacramentalibus, quae sunt accidentia; neque ex liquore et sanguine Christi, qui, ratione suae incorruptibilitatis, neque additionem recipit neque diminutionem. Ergo nullus liquor potest admisceri vino consecrato. | Objection 2: Further, if any kind of liquid be mixed with those species, then some one thing must be the result. But no one thing can result from the liquid, which is a substance, and the sacramental species, which are accidents; nor from the liquid and Christ's blood, which owing to its incorruptibility suffers neither increase nor decrease. Therefore no liquid can be mixed with the consecrated wine. |
| Praeterea, si aliquis liquor admisceatur vino consecrato, videtur quod etiam ipsum efficiatur consecratum, sicut aqua quae admiscetur aquae benedictae, efficitur etiam benedicta. Sed vinum consecratum est vere sanguis Christi. Ergo etiam liquor permixtus esset sanguis Christi. Et ita aliquid fieret sanguis Christi aliter quam per consecrationem, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo vino consecrato potest aliquis liquor permisceri. | Objection 3: Further, if any liquid be mixed with the consecrated wine, then that also would appear to be consecrated; just as water added to holy-water becomes holy. But the consecrated wine is truly Christ's blood. Therefore the liquid added would likewise be Christ's blood otherwise than by consecration, which is unbecoming. Therefore no liquid can be mingled with the consecrated wine. |
| Praeterea, si duorum unum totaliter corrumpatur, non erit mixtio, ut dicitur in I de Generat. Sed ad permixtionem cuiuscumque liquoris videtur corrumpi species sacramentalis vini, ita quod sub ea desinat esse sanguis Christi. Tum quia magnum et parvum sunt differentiae quantitatis et diversificant ipsam, sicut album et nigrum colorem. Tum etiam quia liquor permixtus, cum non habeat obstaculum, videtur undique diffundi per totum, et ita desinit ibi esse sanguis Christi, qui non est ibi simul cum alia substantia. Non ergo aliquis liquor potest permisceri vino consecrato. | Objection 4: Further, if one of two things be entirely corrupted, there is no mixture (De Gener. i). But if we mix any liquid, it seems that the entire species of the sacramental wine is corrupted, so that the blood of Christ ceases to be beneath it; both because great and little are difference of quantity, and alter it, as white and black cause a difference of color; and because the liquid mixed, as having no obstacle, seems to permeate the whole, and so Christ's blood ceases to be there, since it is not there with any other substance. Consequently, no liquid can be mixed with the consecrated wine. |
| Sed contra est quod ad sensum patet alium liquorem vino permisceri posse post consecrationem, sicut et ante. | On the contrary, It is evident to our senses that another liquid can be mixed with the wine after it is consecrated, just as before. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod istius quaestionis veritas manifesta est ex praemissis. Dictum est enim supra quod species in hoc sacramento permanentes, sicut adipiscuntur virtute consecrationis modum essendi substantiae, ita etiam adipiscuntur modum agendi et patiendi, ut scilicet agere et pati possint quidquid ageret vel pateretur substantia si ibi praesens existeret. Manifestum est autem quod, si esset ibi substantia vini, liquor aliquis posset ei permisceri. |
I answer that, The truth of this question is evident from what has been said already. For it was said above (Article [3]; Article [5], ad 2) that the species remaining in this sacrament, as they acquire the manner of being of substance in virtue of the consecration, so likewise do they obtain the mode of acting and of being acted upon, so that they can do or receive whatever their substance could do or receive, were it there present. But it is evident that if the substance of wine were there present, then some other liquid could be mingled with it. |
| Huius tamen permixtionis diversus esset effectus et secundum formam liquoris, et secundum quantitatem. Si enim permisceretur aliquis liquor in tanta quantitate quod posset diffundi per totum vinum, totum fieret permixtum. Quod autem est commixtum ex duobus, neutrum miscibilium est, sed utrumque transit in quoddam tertium ex his compositum. Unde sequeretur quod vinum prius existens non remaneret, si liquor permixtus esset alterius speciei. Si autem esset eiusdem speciei liquor adiunctus, puta si vinum permisceretur vino, remaneret quidem eadem species, sed non remaneret idem numero vinum. Quod declarat diversitas accidentium, puta si unum vinum esset album, et aliud rubeum. | Nevertheless there would be a different effect of such mixing both according to the form and according to the quantity of the liquid. For if sufficient liquid were mixed so as to spread itself all through the wine, then the whole would be a mixed substance. Now what is made up of things mixed is neither of them, but each passes into a third resulting from both: hence it would result that the former wine would remain no longer. But if the liquid added were of another species, for instance, if water were mixed, the species of the wine would be dissolved, and there would be a liquid of another species. But if liquid of the same species were added, of instance, wine with wine, the same species would remain, but the wine would not be the same numerically, as the diversity of the accidents shows: for instance, if one wine were white and the other red. |
| Si vero liquor adiunctus esset tam parvae quantitatis quod non posset perfundi per totum, non fieret totum vinum permixtum, sed aliqua pars eius. Quae quidem non remaneret eadem numero, propter permixtionem extraneae materiae. Remaneret tamen eadem specie, non solum si parvus liquor permixtus esset eiusdem speciei, sed etiam si esset alterius speciei, quia gutta aquae multo vino permixta transit in speciem vini, ut dicitur in I de generatione. | But if the liquid added were of such minute quantity that it could not permeate the whole, the entire wine would not be mixed, but only part of it, which would not remain the same numerically owing to the blending of extraneous matter: still it would remain the same specifically, not only if a little liquid of the same species were mixed with it, but even if it were of another species, since a drop of water blended with much wine passes into the species of wine (De Gener. i). |
| Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod corpus et sanguis Christi remanent in hoc sacramento quandiu illae species manent eaedem in numero, consecratur enim hic panis et hoc vinum. Unde si fiat tanta permixtio liquoris cuiuscumque quod pertingat ad totum vinum consecratum et fiat permixtum, et erit aliud numero, et non remanebit ibi sanguis Christi. Si vero fiat tam parva alicuius liquoris adiunctio quod non possit diffundi per totum, sed usque ad aliquam partem specierum, desinet esse sanguis Christi sub illa parte vini consecrati, remanebit tamen sub alia. |
Now it is evident that the body and blood of Christ abide in this sacrament so long as the species remain numerically the same, as stated above (Article [4]; Question [76], Article [6], ad 3); because it is this bread and this wine which is consecrated. Hence, if the liquid of any kind whatsoever added be so much in quantity as to permeate the whole of the consecrated wine, and be mixed with it throughout, the result would be something numerically distinct, and the blood of Christ will remain there no longer. But if the quantity of the liquid added be so slight as not to permeate throughout, but to reach only a part of the species, Christ's blood will cease to be under that part of the consecrated wine, yet will remain under the rest. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Innocentius III dicit, in quadam decretali, quod ipsa accidentia vinum appositum videntur afficere, quia, si aqua fuerit apposita, vini saporem assumeret. Contingit igitur accidentia mutare subiectum, sicut et subiectum contingit accidentia permutare. Cedit quippe natura miraculo, et virtus supra consuetudinem operatur. Hoc tamen non est sic intelligendum quasi idem numero accidens quod prius fuit in vino ante consecrationem, postmodum fiat in vino apposito, sed talis permutatio fit per actionem. Nam accidentia vini remanentia retinent actionem substantiae, secundum praedicta, et ita immutando afficiunt liquorem appositum. | Reply to Objection 1: Pope Innocent III in a Decretal writes thus: "The very accidents appear to affect the wine that is added, because, if water is added, it takes the savor of the wine. The result is, then, that the accidents change the subject, just as subject changes accidents; for nature yields to miracle, and power works beyond custom." But this must not be understood as if the same identical accident, which was in the wine previous to consecration, is afterwards in the wine that is added; but such change is the result of action; because the remaining accidents of the wine retain the action of substance, as stated above, and so they act upon the liquid added, by changing it. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod liquor appositus vino consecrato nullo modo miscetur substantiae sanguinis Christi. Miscetur tamen speciebus sacramentalibus, ita tamen quod, permixtione facta, corrumpuntur praedictae species, vel in toto vel in parte, secundum modum quo supra dictum est quod ex speciebus illis potest aliquid generari. Et si quidem corrumpantur in toto, nulla iam remanet quaestio, quia iam totum erit uniforme. Si autem corrumpantur in parte, erit quidem una dimensio secundum continuitatem quantitatis, non tamen una secundum modum essendi, quia una pars eius est sine subiecto, alia erit in subiecto; sicut, si aliquod corpus constituatur ex duobus metallis, erit unum corpus secundum rationem quantitatis, non tamen unum secundum speciem naturae. |
Reply to Objection 2: The liquid added to the consecrated wine is in no way mixed with the substance of Christ's blood. Nevertheless it is mixed with the sacramental species, yet so that after such mixing the aforesaid species are corrupted entirely or in part, after the way mentioned above (Article [5]), whereby something can be generated from those species. And if they be entirely corrupted, there remains no further question, because the whole will be uniform. But if they be corrupted in part, there will be one dimension according to the continuity of quantity, but not one according to the mode of being, because one part thereof will be without a subject while the other is in a subject; as in a body that is made up of two metals, there will be one body quantitatively, but not one as to the species of the matter. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Innocentius III dicit, in decretali praedicta, si post calicis consecrationem aliud vinum mittatur in calicem, illud quidem non transit in sanguinem, neque sanguini commiscetur, sed, accidentibus prioris vini commixtum, corpori quod sub eis latet undique circumfunditur, non madidans circumfusum. Quod quidem intelligendum est quando non fit tanta permixtio liquoris extranei quod sanguis Christi desinat esse sub toto. Tunc enim undique dicitur circumfundi, non quia tangat sanguinem Christi secundum eius proprias dimensiones, sed secundum dimensiones sacramentales, sub quibus continetur. Nec est simile de aqua benedicta, quia illa benedictio nullam immutationem facit circa substantiam aquae, sicut facit consecratio vini. | Reply to Objection 3: As Pope Innocent says in the aforesaid Decretal, "if after the consecration other wine be put in the chalice, it is not changed into the blood, nor is it mingled with the blood, but, mixed with the accidents of the previous wine, it is diffused throughout the body which underlies them, yet without wetting what surrounds it." Now this is to be understood when there is not sufficient mixing of extraneous liquid to cause the blood of Christ to cease to be under the whole; because a thing is said to be "diffused throughout," not because it touches the body of Christ according to its proper dimensions, but according to the sacramental dimensions, under which it is contained. Now it is not the same with holy water, because the blessing works no change in the substance of the water, as the consecration of the wine does. |
| Ad quartum dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod, quantumcumque parva fiat extranei liquoris permixtio, substantia sanguinis Christi desinet esse sub toto. Et hoc ratione inducta. Quae tamen non cogit. Quia magnum et parvum diversificant quantitatem dimensivam non quantum ad eius essentiam, sed quantum ad determinationem mensurae. Similiter etiam liquor appositus adeo potest esse parvus quod sua parvitate impeditur ne diffundatur per totum, et non solum dimensionibus, quae, licet sint sine subiecto, tamen obstant alteri liquori sicut et substantia si ibi esset, secundum ea quae praemissa sunt. | Reply to Objection 4: Some have held that however slight be the mixing of extraneous liquid, the substance of Christ's blood ceases to be under the whole, and for the reason given above (Objection [4]); which, however, is not a cogent one; because "more" or "less" diversify dimensive quantity, not as to its essence, but as to the determination of its measure. In like manner the liquid added can be so small as on that account to be hindered from permeating the whole, and not simply by the dimensions; which, although they are present without a subject, still they are opposed to another liquid, just as substance would be if it were present, according to what was said at the beginning of the article. |