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Quote from: Luc on February 23, 2024, 07:33:43 PMI immediately wondered whether it could possibly be a coincidence that the same man who is known for denying that we can know the essences of things by abstracting their intelligible species from their sensual 'vicars' was also, apparently, the first to deny the validity of the putative Vicar of Christ. If his nominalism was indeed intended as a philosophical justification of his sedevcantism, then it surely is no coincidence.Thomist semiotician John N. Deely's shows the relation between Ockham's nominalism and papal politics in Four Ages of Understanding pp. 385-402:
QuoteWilliam of Ockham (c.1285–1349)
The Second Florescence of Nominalism
Ockham's Problem with a Doctrine of Signs: There Are No "Generals"
"The Only Difficulty There Is in Understanding Ockham"
A Terminological Advance Marred by Conceptual Incoherence
How Politics Lent to Nominalism a Factitious Following
The Thicket (i.1349/1529)
A Thicket within the Thicket, 1309–1417: the Papacy, First at Avignon and Then in Schism
The Papacy at Avignon, 1309–1377
The Papacy in Schism, 1378–1417
Quote from: CoomaraswamyThe error — it is one shared by virtually all modern "philosophers" and psychologists — is that nominalists confound the individualized image of the imagination [phantasm?] with the concept or idea which resides in the Intellect.CP 1.19:
Quote from: C. S. Peirce19. In short, there was a tidal wave of nominalism. Descartes was a nominalist. Locke and all his following, Berkeley, Hartley, Hume, and even Reid, were nominalists. Leibniz was an extreme nominalist, and Rémusat [C. F. M.?] who has lately made an attempt to repair the edifice of Leibnizian monadology, does so by cutting away every part which leans at all toward realism. Kant was a nominalist; although his philosophy would have been rendered compacter, more consistent, and stronger if its author had taken up realism, as he certainly would have done if he had read Scotus. Hegel was a nominalist of realistic yearnings. I might continue the list much further. Thus, in one word, all modern philosophy of every sect has been nominalistic.
Quote from: CoomaraswamyBorn in 1290, Ockham is one of the earliest of those who misunderstood the nature of the soul. He not only denied free will, he also denied that the Intellect was capable of forming universal concepts. He and his followers — usually labeled "nominalists" — claimed that all ideas were really images, that is, impressions on the imagination originating in sensual perception. The error — it is one shared by virtually all modern "philosophers" and psychologists — is that nominalists confound the individualized image of the imagination with the concept or idea which resides in the Intellect. According to St. Thomas, the difference between images and ideas consists in the fact that images are representations of things in their singularity, particularity and concreteness, whereas ideas are representations of things in their universality. Despite his denial of "universals", Ockham continued to believe in God. But he held such belief to have no objective character and the nature of his faith was "blind". I would ask you to remember that Faith requires our assent to what the intellect tells us is Truth, and it is the nature of this faculty to "see". The acceptance of nominalism precludes such "vision" and inevitably results in a bifurcation between what can be observed and measured, and what is believed. It is but a short step to envisioning the measurable as the totality of reality, and the relegating of concepts such as the "good" and the "beautiful" — to say nothing of Revelation — concepts beyond measurement and hence seen as having no objective measurable reality — to the realm of private and subjective convictions where they become whatever we feel or want them to be. It is not surprising that Ockham lived his life in rebellion against the Church and died, as far as we know, without the consolation of her sacraments.If Coomaraswamy disapproved of Ockham's "rebellion against the Church", it is presumably because he thought that Ockham was wrong about John XXII, even though a heretic pope was always possible and is now actually the case with the Vatican II popes.
Quote from: Geremia on February 23, 2024, 03:46:11 PMFormal signs certainly do signify of themselves ("immediately signify"), but the fundament or signified of an instrumental sign needn't be itself a sign, does it?No, I suppose it needn't. What is signified by the footprint of an ox, for example, is not another sign of an ox, formal or otherwise, but the ox itself. What I should have said, perhaps, is not that instrumental signs "directly signify only other signs", but that they lack the intrinsic certitude of formal signs. The 'footprint of an ox', after all, might not be the footprint of an ox: it could have been left by a man using a simulated ox hoof. Smoke, similarly, can be produced without fire. It seems that insofar as a sign is merely instrumental, there is a gap between it and what it signifies which can only be bridged by conjecture. To mistake formal signs for instrumental ones, then, is to erroneously ascribe the inherently conjectural and probable nature of the latter to the former.
Quote from: Luc on February 23, 2024, 03:05:30 PMIf there is a relevant difference between the ox example and the fire exampleNo. He simply gives a natural instrumental sign as an example elucidating instrumental sign.
Quote from: Luc on February 23, 2024, 03:05:30 PMbetween signs which immediately signify things and those which signify other signsFormal signs certainly do signify of themselves ("immediately signify"), but the fundament or signified of an instrumental sign needn't be itself a sign, does it?
Quote from: Luc on February 23, 2024, 03:05:30 PMif there are no natural, formal signs, then the connection between a sign and what it signifies is probable at best.John of St. Thomas, in his Tractatus de Signis (pp. 80 "Whether There Exist on the Side of Mind-Independent Being Intrinsic Forms Which Are Relations" ff.) does an excellent job refuting those who deny that there are real relations in the extra-mental universe.
Quote from: Deely's Rediscovery, p. 105[...]both natural and stipulated signs, formally speaking belong to the same species; both represent something other than themselves to a cognitive power. They lead the intellect to a knowledge of something other, whether this awareness is based on natural relation or stipulation is inconsequential.So, according to John of St. Thomas, all stipulated signs are instrumental signs, but not all instrumental signs are stipulated signs and, in particular, ox-footprints and smoke are instrumental and non-stipulative (natural) signs of an ox and a fire respectively. Is this correct? If there is a relevant difference between the ox example and the fire example, I don't see it.
Quote from: Luc on February 23, 2024, 09:41:00 AMformal signs, which immediately signify actual things, and instrumental signs, which directly signify only other signs.Tractatus de Signis, Summulæ ch. 2, p. 27 (Deely's transl., my reformatting/rearranging):
Quote from: John of St. ThomasHence arises the twofold division of the sign [divisio signi]. For insofar as signs are orderedSee Teixeira, 21st Century Realism: John Deely's Recovery of Poinsot's Doctrine of Signs (2018) pp. 94-105.
- to a power [ad potentiam], they are divided into
- formal signs
- the formal awareness [notitia] which represents of itself, not by means of another.
- instrumental signs;
- represents something other than itself from a preexisting cognition of itself as an object, as the footprint of an ox represents an ox. And this definition is usually given for signs generally.
- to something signified [ad signatum], they are divided according to the cause of that ordering into
- natural [naturale]
- represents from the nature of a thing, independently of any stipulation and custom whatever, and so it represents the same for all, as smoke signifies a fire burning.
- stipulative [ad placitum]
- represents something owing to an imposition by the will of a community [ex impositione voluntatis per publicam auctoritatem], like the linguistic expression "man."
- customary [ex consuetudine].
- represents from use alone without any public imposition, as napkins upon the table signify a meal.
Quote from: Geremia on February 23, 2024, 11:57:24 AMThat seems to be too simplistic a difference between formal and instrumental signs. Upon what are you basing this distinction?
Quote from: Luc on February 23, 2024, 09:41:00 AMA few weeks ago I read a comment in the library on Fr. Warkulwiz's cosmological essay, Universe Without Space and Time, which says some very interesting things about analogy, symbolism, and intellection, making reference to Brian Kemple's PhD dissertation on Ens Primum Cognitum in Thomas Aquinas and the Tradition; and a quick search of the forum shows that you have mentioned this same dissertation in another place. I have long suspected that notion of analogy is the key to a sound metaphysic, and wish to understand it better (Erich Przywara of Analogia Entis fame(?)Jacobus M. Ramírez, O.P. is the Thomistic expert in analogy.
Quote from: Luc on February 23, 2024, 09:41:00 AMis my principal philosophic influence). I am particularly interested in the nexus of this concept with the history and philosophy of science and how the medieval "analogical understanding of the world", ruined by the Fall and restored, at least in potency, by the Incarnation, seems to have gradually dimmed since the thirteenth century,* resulting in a general failure to distinguish between symbols and signs, or, in Thomistic terms, between formal signs, which immediately signify actual things, and instrumental signs, which directly signify only other signs.That seems to be too simplistic a difference between formal and instrumental signs. Upon what are you basing this distinction?
Quote from: Luc on February 23, 2024, 09:41:00 AMThis confusion seems to be behind the prevalence of what Baudrillard called simulacra, signs which have no, or are not taken to have any, ultimate referent but are, so to speak, opaque or, as youIt was actually my Scripture scholar and Thomist friend, Sébastien "SR", who wrote that. My comments to what my friend wrote are indented (like the one where I cite Dr. Kemple's dissertation).
Quote from: Luc on February 23, 2024, 09:41:00 AMsay, "just there as a meaningless terminus ad quem". This modern opacity of signs, in clouding the distinction between truth and falsehood and between sincerity and hypocrisy, clears the way for the pragmatistic, communistic subordination of contemplation (theoria) to action (praxis), language as an instrument of social control, Orwellian doublespeak, bull**** in the sense defined by the analytic philosopher Harry Frankfurt, so this is far from being a merely theoretical interest—on the contrary, such tacit quasi-Nestorian divorcing of the true from the good is precisely what is characteristic of this peculiarly modern deviation! "But he that doth truth, cometh to the light, that his works may be made manifest, because they are done in God" (John 3:21); for charity "Rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth" (1 Corinthians 13:6), but "the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and injustice of those men that detain the truth of God in injustice" (Romans 1:18).It's my comments on my Scripture scholar friend's answers to my questions.
(* Non-modernist Catholics are, of course, inclined to think of the thirteenth century and the Pontificate of Innocent III in particular as the zenith of Christendom, but no sooner does the sun reach its zenith in the sky than it starts to decline. Our Lady's teaching St. Dominic the Rosary in 1214, the definition of transubstantiation by the Fourth Lateran Council, and Gregory IX's establishment of the Roman Inquisition are all indicators that there were were dark clouds on the horizon even before St. Thomas came of age.)
Is this your comment?
Quote from: Luc on February 23, 2024, 09:41:00 AMand are there any sources which you would recommend for a better understanding of analogy and the history of science, besides Kemple's dissertation?The Duhemian Mary Hesse is an expert in analogy and the modern sciences.
Quote from: Fr. JenkinsMinisters of state came from other nations of Europe to visit his [St. John Bosco's] schools to ask how he did what he did, and he would simply tell them you cannot do what we do here because your governments will not let you. He said we base our educational system on the pillars of reason, religion, and kindness, and you are not allowed to do that. You are forced to use the repressive system, you cannot teach the children about God, and you are condemned to breed a kind of tribe of, well, monsters.
Quote from: Fr. SanbornLittle children who are are respectful and obedient are a delight. Everybody loves a little humble child. This is the great attraction of the little baby of Bethlehem, but when a child grows up to be something that is completely unbridled, 'fresh', and disrespectful to adults and does anything he wants and then wears his hair in weird ways and does a lot of strange and ugly things, of course who wants to live with that? Who wants to have that around the house? An obnoxious child is like a curse upon the family.
Quote from: kerrysky on February 01, 2024, 01:52:44 AMOpen EPUB files with Skoob EPUB readerI prefer KOReader.
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