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| Deinde considerandum est de voluntate. Circa quam quaeruntur quinque. | We next consider the will. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum voluntas aliquid ex necessitate appetat. | (1) Whether the will desires something of necessity? |
| Secundo, utrum omnia ex necessitate appetat. | (2) Whether it desires anything of necessity? |
| Tertio, utrum sit eminentior potentia quam intellectus. | (3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect? |
| Quarto, utrum voluntas moveat intellectum. | (4) Whether the will moves the intellect? |
| Quinto, utrum voluntas distinguatur per irascibilem et concupiscibilem. | (5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscible? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas nihil ex necessitate appetat. Dicit enim Augustinus, in V de Civ. Dei, quod si aliquid est necessarium, non est voluntarium. Sed omne quod voluntas appetit, est voluntarium. Ergo nihil quod voluntas appetit, est necessario desideratum. | Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires nothing. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it anything is necessary, it is not voluntary. But whatever the will desires is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of necessity. |
| Praeterea, potestates rationales, secundum philosophum, se habent ad opposita. Sed voluntas est potestas rationalis, quia, ut dicitur in III de anima, voluntas in ratione est. Ergo voluntas se habet ad opposita. Ad nihil ergo de necessitate determinatur. | Objection 2: Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite things. But the will is a rational power, because, as he says (De Anima iii, 9), "the will is in the reason." Therefore the will extends to opposite things, and therefore it is determined to nothing of necessity. |
| Praeterea, secundum voluntatem sumus domini nostrorum actuum. Sed eius quod ex necessitate est, non sumus domini. Ergo actus voluntatis non potest de necessitate esse. | Objection 3: Further, by the will we are masters of our own actions. But we are not masters of that which is of necessity. Therefore the act of the will cannot be necessitated. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., quod beatitudinem omnes una voluntate appetunt. Si autem non esset necessarium sed contingens, deficeret ad minus in paucioribus. Ergo voluntas ex necessitate aliquid vult. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4) that "all desire happiness with one will." Now if this were not necessary, but contingent, there would at least be a few exceptions. Therefore the will desires something of necessity. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod necessitas dicitur multipliciter. Necesse est enim quod non potest non esse. Quod quidem convenit alicui, uno modo ex principio intrinseco, sive materiali, sicut cum dicimus quod omne compositum ex contrariis necesse est corrumpi; sive formali, sicut cum dicimus quod necesse est triangulum habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis. Et haec est necessitas naturalis et absoluta. Alio modo convenit alicui quod non possit non esse, ex aliquo extrinseco, vel fine vel agente. Fine quidem, sicut cum aliquis non potest sine hoc consequi, aut bene consequi finem aliquem, ut cibus dicitur necessarius ad vitam, et equus ad iter. Et haec vocatur necessitas finis; quae interdum etiam utilitas dicitur. Ex agente autem hoc alicui convenit, sicut cum aliquis cogitur ab aliquo agente, ita quod non possit contrarium agere. Et haec vocatur necessitas coactionis. | I answer that, The word "necessity" is employed in many ways. For that which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong to it by an intrinsic principle—either material, as when we say that everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible—or formal, as when we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. And this is "natural" and "absolute necessity." In another way, that a thing must be, belongs to it by reason of something extrinsic, which is either the end or the agent. On the part of the end, as when without it the end is not to be attained or so well attained: for instance, food is said to be necessary for life, and a horse is necessary for a journey. This is called "necessity of end," and sometimes also "utility." On the part of the agent, a thing must be, when someone is forced by some agent, so that he is not able to do the contrary. This is called "necessity of coercion." |
| Haec igitur coactionis necessitas omnino repugnat voluntati. Nam hoc dicimus esse violentum, quod est contra inclinationem rei. Ipse autem motus voluntatis est inclinatio quaedam in aliquid. Et ideo sicut dicitur aliquid naturale quia est secundum inclinationem naturae, ita dicitur aliquid voluntarium quia est secundum inclinationem voluntatis. Sicut ergo impossibile est quod aliquid simul sit violentum et naturale; ita impossibile est quod aliquid simpliciter sit coactum sive violentum, et voluntarium. | Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will. For we call that violent which is against the inclination of a thing. But the very movement of the will is an inclination to something. Therefore, as a thing is called natural because it is according to the inclination of nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is according to the inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, so it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and voluntary. |
| Necessitas autem finis non repugnat voluntati, quando ad finem non potest perveniri nisi uno modo, sicut ex voluntate transeundi mare, fit necessitas in voluntate ut velit navem. | But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot be attained except in one way: thus from the will to cross the sea, arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship. |
| Similiter etiam nec necessitas naturalis repugnat voluntati. Quinimmo necesse est quod, sicut intellectus ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo, finis enim se habet in operativis sicut principium in speculativis, ut dicitur in II Physic. Oportet enim quod illud quod naturaliter alicui convenit et immobiliter, sit fundamentum et principium omnium aliorum, quia natura rei est primum in unoquoque, et omnis motus procedit ab aliquo immobili. | In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will. Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect of necessity adheres to the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters what the principle is in speculative matters. For what befits a thing naturally and immovably must be the root and principle of all else appertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in everything, and every movement arises from something immovable. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Augustini est intelligendum de necessario necessitate coactionis. Necessitas autem naturalis non aufert libertatem voluntatis, ut ipsemet in eodem libro dicit. | Reply to Objection 1: The words of Augustine are to be understood of the necessity of coercion. But natural necessity "does not take away the liberty of the will," as he says himself (De Civ. Dei v, 10). |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod voluntas secundum quod aliquid naturaliter vult, magis respondet intellectui naturalium principiorum, quam rationi, quae ad opposita se habet. Unde secundum hoc, magis est intellectualis quam rationalis potestas. | Reply to Objection 2: The will, so far as it desires a thing naturally, corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles than to the reason, which extends to opposite things. Wherefore in this respect it is rather an intellectual than a rational power. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod sumus domini nostrorum actuum secundum quod possumus hoc vel illud eligere. Electio autem non est de fine, sed de his quae sunt ad finem, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Unde appetitus ultimi finis non est de his quorum domini sumus. | Reply to Objection 3: We are masters of our own actions by reason of our being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end, but "the means to the end," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9). Wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard those actions of which we are masters. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas ex necessitate omnia velit quaecumque vult. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV de Div. Nom., quod malum est praeter voluntatem. Ex necessitate ergo voluntas tendit in bonum sibi propositum. | Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires all things of necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the scope of the will." Therefore the will tends of necessity to the good which is proposed to it. |
| Praeterea, obiectum voluntatis comparatur ad ipsam sicut movens ad mobile. Sed motus mobilis necessario consequitur ex movente. Ergo videtur quod obiectum voluntatis ex necessitate moveat ipsam. | Objection 2: Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as the mover to the thing movable. But the movement of the movable necessarily follows the mover. Therefore it seems that the will's object moves it of necessity. |
| Praeterea, sicut apprehensum secundum sensum est obiectum appetitus sensitivi, ita apprehensum secundum intellectum est obiectum intellectivi appetitus, qui dicitur voluntas. Sed apprehensum secundum sensum ex necessitate movet appetitum sensitivum, dicit enim Augustinus, super Gen. ad Litt., quod animalia moventur visis. Ergo videtur quod apprehensum secundum intellectum ex necessitate moveat voluntatem. | Objection 3: Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is the object of the sensitive appetite, so the thing apprehended by the intellect is the object of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. But what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive appetite of necessity: for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals are moved by things seen." Therefore it seems that whatever is apprehended by the intellect moves the will of necessity. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, quod voluntas est qua peccatur et recte vivitur, et sic se habet ad opposita. Non ergo ex necessitate vult quaecumque vult. | On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is the will by which we sin and live well," and so the will extends to opposite things. Therefore it does not desire of necessity all things whatsoever it desires. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod voluntas non ex necessitate vult quaecumque vult. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod sicut intellectus naturaliter et ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ultimo fini, ut iam dictum est. Sunt autem quaedam intelligibilia quae non habent necessariam connexionem ad prima principia; sicut contingentes propositiones, ad quarum remotionem non sequitur remotio primorum principiorum. Et talibus non ex necessitate assentit intellectus. Quaedam autem propositiones sunt necessariae, quae habent connexionem necessariam cum primis principiis; sicut conclusiones demonstrabiles, ad quarum remotionem sequitur remotio primorum principiorum. Et his intellectus ex necessitate assentit, cognita connexione necessaria conclusionum ad principia per demonstrationis deductionem, non autem ex necessitate assentit antequam huiusmodi necessitatem connexionis per demonstrationem cognoscat. Similiter etiam est ex parte voluntatis. Sunt enim quaedam particularia bona, quae non habent necessariam connexionem ad beatitudinem, quia sine his potest aliquis esse beatus, et huiusmodi voluntas non de necessitate inhaeret. Sunt autem quaedam habentia necessariam connexionem ad beatitudinem, quibus scilicet homo Deo inhaeret, in quo solo vera beatitudo consistit. Sed tamen antequam per certitudinem divinae visionis necessitas huiusmodi connexionis demonstretur, voluntas non ex necessitate Deo inhaeret, nec his quae Dei sunt. Sed voluntas videntis Deum per essentiam, de necessitate inhaeret Deo, sicut nunc ex necessitate volumus esse beati. Patet ergo quod voluntas non ex necessitate vult quaecumque vult. |
I answer that, The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the intellect naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles, so the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already (Article [1]). Now there are some things intelligible which have not a necessary connection with the first principles; such as contingent propositions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of the first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent of necessity. But there are some propositions which have a necessary connection with the first principles: such as demonstrable conclusions, a denial of which involves a denial of the first principles. And to these the intellect assents of necessity, when once it is aware of the necessary connection of these conclusions with the principles; but it does not assent of necessity until through the demonstration it recognizes the necessity of such connection. It is the same with the will. For there are certain individual goods which have not a necessary connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some things which have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of which things man adheres to God, in Whom alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will of the man who sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God, just as now we desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore clear that the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntas in nihil potest tendere nisi sub ratione boni. Sed quia bonum est multiplex, propter hoc non ex necessitate determinatur ad unum. | Reply to Objection 1: The will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of good. But because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will is not of necessity determined to one. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod movens tunc ex necessitate causat motum in mobili, quando potestas moventis excedit mobile, ita quod tota eius possibilitas moventi subdatur. Cum autem possibilitas voluntatis sit respectu boni universalis et perfecti, non subiicitur eius possibilitas tota alicui particulari bono. Et ideo non ex necessitate movetur ab illo. | Reply to Objection 2: The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in the thing movable, when the power of the mover exceeds the thing movable, so that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, its capacity is not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is not of necessity moved by it. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod vis sensitiva non est vis collativa diversorum, sicut ratio, sed simpliciter aliquid unum apprehendit. Et ideo secundum illud unum determinate movet appetitum sensitivum. Sed ratio est collativa plurium, et ideo ex pluribus moveri potest appetitus intellectivus, scilicet voluntas, et non ex uno ex necessitate. | Reply to Objection 3: The sensitive power does not compare different things with each other, as reason does: but it simply apprehends some one thing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive appetite in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that compares several things together: therefore from several things the intellectual appetite—that is, the will—may be moved; but not of necessity from one thing. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas sit altior potentia quam intellectus. Bonum enim et finis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed finis est prima et altissima causarum. Ergo voluntas est prima et altissima potentiarum. | Objection 1: It would seem that the will is a higher power than the intellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the end is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first and highest power. |
| Praeterea, res naturales inveniuntur procedere de imperfectis ad perfecta. Et hoc etiam in potentiis animae apparet, proceditur enim de sensu ad intellectum, qui est nobilior. Sed naturalis processus est de actu intellectus in actum voluntatis. Ergo voluntas est perfectior et nobilior potentia quam intellectus. | Objection 2: Further, in the order of natural things we observe a progress from imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in the powers of the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is more noble. Now the act of the will, in the natural order, follows the act of the intellect. Therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power than the intellect. |
| Praeterea, habitus sunt proportionati potentiis, sicut perfectiones perfectibilibus. Sed habitus quo perficitur voluntas, scilicet caritas, est nobilior habitibus quibus perficitur intellectus, dicitur enim I ad Cor. XIII, si noverim mysteria omnia, et si habuero omnem fidem, caritatem autem non habeam, nihil sum. Ergo voluntas est altior potentia quam intellectus. |
Objection 3: Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects the will—namely, charity—is more noble than the habits which perfect the intellect: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:2): "If I should know all mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and have not charity, I am nothing." Therefore the will is a higher power than the intellect. |
| Sed contra est quod philosophus, in X Ethic., ponit altissimam potentiam animae esse intellectum. | On the contrary, The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the higher power than the intellect. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod eminentia alicuius ad alterum potest attendi dupliciter, uno modo, simpliciter; alio modo, secundum quid. Consideratur autem aliquid tale simpliciter, prout est secundum seipsum tale, secundum quid autem, prout dicitur tale secundum respectum ad alterum. Si ergo intellectus et voluntas considerentur secundum se, sic intellectus eminentior invenitur. Et hoc apparet ex comparatione obiectorum ad invicem. Obiectum enim intellectus est simplicius et magis absolutum quam obiectum voluntatis, nam obiectum intellectus est ipsa ratio boni appetibilis; bonum autem appetibile, cuius ratio est in intellectu, est obiectum voluntatis. Quanto autem aliquid est simplicius et abstractius, tanto secundum se est nobilius et altius. Et ideo obiectum intellectus est altius quam obiectum voluntatis. Cum ergo propria ratio potentiae sit secundum ordinem ad obiectum, sequitur quod secundum se et simpliciter intellectus sit altior et nobilior voluntate. Secundum quid autem, et per comparationem ad alterum, voluntas invenitur interdum altior intellectu; ex eo scilicet quod obiectum voluntatis in altiori re invenitur quam obiectum intellectus. Sicut si dicerem auditum esse secundum quid nobiliorem visu, inquantum res aliqua cuius est sonus, nobilior est aliqua re cuius est color, quamvis color sit nobilior et simplicior sono. Ut enim supra dictum est, actio intellectus consistit in hoc quod ratio rei intellectae est in intelligente; actus vero voluntatis perficitur in hoc quod voluntas inclinatur ad ipsam rem prout in se est. Et ideo philosophus dicit, in VI Metaphys., quod bonum et malum, quae sunt obiecta voluntatis, sunt in rebus; verum et falsum, quae sunt obiecta intellectus, sunt in mente. Quando igitur res in qua est bonum, est nobilior ipsa anima, in qua est ratio intellecta; per comparationem ad talem rem, voluntas est altior intellectu. Quando vero res in qua est bonum, est infra animam; tunc etiam per comparationem ad talem rem, intellectus est altior voluntate. Unde melior est amor Dei quam cognitio, e contrario autem melior est cognitio rerum corporalium quam amor. Simpliciter tamen intellectus est nobilior quam voluntas. |
I answer that, The superiority of one thing over another can be considered in two ways: "absolutely" and "relatively." Now a thing is considered to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself: but relatively as it is such with regard to something else. If therefore the intellect and will be considered with regard to themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea of appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the more abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of the will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object, it follows that the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will. But relatively and by comparison with something else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect, from the fact that the object of the will occurs in something higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect. Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is relatively nobler than sight, inasmuch as something in which there is sound is nobler than something in which there is color, though color is nobler and simpler than sound. For as we have said above (Question [16], Article [1]; Question [27], Article [4]), the action of the intellect consists in this—that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands; while the act of the will consists in this—that the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself. And therefore the Philosopher says in Metaph. vi (Did. v, 2) that "good and evil," which are objects of the will, "are in things," but "truth and error," which are objects of the intellect, "are in the mind." When, therefore, the thing in which there is good is nobler than the soul itself, in which is the idea understood; by comparison with such a thing, the will is higher than the intellect. But when the thing which is good is less noble than the soul, then even in comparison with that thing the intellect is higher than the will. Wherefore the love of God is better than the knowledge of God; but, on the contrary, the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler than the will. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio causae accipitur secundum comparationem unius ad alterum, et in tali comparatione ratio boni principalior invenitur, sed verum dicitur magis absolute, et ipsius boni rationem significat. Unde et bonum quoddam verum est. Sed rursus et ipsum verum est quoddam bonum; secundum quod intellectus res quaedam est, et verum finis ipsius. Et inter alios fines iste finis est excellentior; sicut intellectus inter alias potentias. | Reply to Objection 1: The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing one thing to another, and in such a comparison the idea of good is found to be nobler: but truth signifies something more absolute, and extends to the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is something true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as the intellect is a thing, and truth its end. And among other ends this is the most excellent: as also is the intellect among the other powers. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod est prius generatione et tempore, est imperfectius, quia in uno et eodem potentia tempore praecedit actum, et imperfectio perfectionem. Sed illud quod est prius simpliciter et secundum naturae ordinem, est perfectius, sic enim actus est prior potentia. Et hoc modo intellectus est prior voluntate, sicut motivum mobili, et activum passivo, bonum enim intellectum movet voluntatem. | Reply to Objection 2: What precedes in order of generation and time is less perfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes act, and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes potentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the motive power precedes the thing movable, and as the active precedes the passive; for good which is understood moves the will. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de voluntate secundum comparationem ad id quod supra animam est. Virtus enim caritatis est qua Deum amamus. | Reply to Objection 3: This reason is verified of the will as compared with what is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by which we love God. |
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Article: 4 [ << | >> ]
| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveat intellectum. Movens enim est nobilius et prius moto, quia movens est agens; agens autem est nobilius patiente, ut Augustinus dicit XII super Gen. ad Litt., et philosophus in III de anima. Sed intellectus est prior et nobilior voluntate, ut supra dictum est. Ergo voluntas non movet intellectum. |
Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move the intellect. For what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves is an agent, and "the agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5). But the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above (Article [3]). Therefore the will does not move the intellect. |
| Praeterea, movens non movetur a moto, nisi forte per accidens. Sed intellectus movet voluntatem, quia appetibile apprehensum per intellectum est movens non motum; appetitus autem movens motum. Ergo intellectus non movetur a voluntate. | Objection 2: Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except perhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because the good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas the appetite moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect is not moved by the will. |
| Praeterea, nihil velle possumus nisi sit intellectum. Si igitur ad intelligendum movet voluntas volendo intelligere, oportebit quod etiam illud velle praecedat aliud intelligere, et illud intelligere aliud velle, et sic in infinitum, quod est impossibile. Non ergo voluntas movet intellectum. | Objection 3: Further, we can will nothing but what we understand. If, therefore, in order to understand, the will moves by willing to understand, that act of the will must be preceded by another act of the intellect, and this act of the intellect by another act of the will, and so on indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will does not move the intellect. |
| Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, quod in nobis est percipere quamcumque volumus artem, et non percipere. In nobis autem est aliquid per voluntatem; percipimus autem artes per intellectum. Voluntas ergo movet intellectum. | On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 26): "It is in our power to learn an art or not, as we list." But a thing is in our power by the will, and we learn art by the intellect. Therefore the will moves the intellect. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur movere dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum finis; sicut dicitur quod finis movet efficientem. Et hoc modo intellectus movet voluntatem, quia bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis, et movet ipsam ut finis. Alio modo dicitur aliquid movere per modum agentis; sicut alterans movet alteratum, et impellens movet impulsum. Et hoc modo voluntas movet intellectum, et omnes animae vires; ut Anselmus dicit in libro de similitudinibus. Cuius ratio est, quia in omnibus potentiis activis ordinatis, illa potentia quae respicit finem universalem, movet potentias quae respiciunt fines particulares. Et hoc apparet tam in naturalibus quam in politicis. Caelum enim, quod agit ad universalem conservationem generabilium et corruptibilium, movet omnia inferiora corpora, quorum unumquodque agit ad conservationem propriae speciei, vel etiam individui. Rex etiam, qui intendit bonum commune totius regni, movet per suum imperium singulos praepositos civitatum, qui singulis civitatibus curam regiminis impendunt. Obiectum autem voluntatis est bonum et finis in communi. Quaelibet autem potentia comparatur ad aliquod bonum proprium sibi conveniens; sicut visus ad perceptionem coloris, intellectus ad cognitionem veri. Et ideo voluntas per modum agentis movet omnes animae potentias ad suos actus, praeter vires naturales vegetativae partis, quae nostro arbitrio non subduntur. | I answer that, A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudinibus). The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe this both in nature and in things politic. For the heaven, which aims at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and corruption, moves all inferior bodies, each of which aims at the preservation of its own species or of the individual. The king also, who aims at the common good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves all the governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own particular city. Now the object of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum quod intellectus est apprehensivus entis et veri universalis; alio modo, secundum quod est quaedam res, et particularis potentia habens determinatum actum. Et similiter voluntas dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum communitatem sui obiecti, prout scilicet est appetitiva boni communis; alio modo, secundum quod est quaedam determinata animae potentia habens determinatum actum. Si ergo comparentur intellectus et voluntas secundum rationem communitatis obiectorum utriusque, sic dictum est supra quod intellectus est simpliciter altior et nobilior voluntate. Si autem consideretur intellectus secundum communitatem sui obiecti, et voluntas secundum quod est quaedam determinata potentia, sic iterum intellectus est altior et prior voluntate, quia sub ratione entis et veri, quam apprehendit intellectus, continetur voluntas ipsa, et actus eius, et obiectum ipsius. Unde intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et actum eius, et obiectum ipsius, sicut et alia specialia intellecta, ut lapidem aut lignum, quae continentur sub communi ratione entis et veri. Si vero consideretur voluntas secundum communem rationem sui obiecti, quod est bonum, intellectus autem secundum quod est quaedam res et potentia specialis; sic sub communi ratione boni continetur, velut quoddam speciale, et intellectus ipse, et ipsum intelligere, et obiectum eius, quod est verum, quorum quodlibet est quoddam speciale bonum. Et secundum hoc voluntas est altior intellectu, et potest ipsum movere. Ex his ergo apparet ratio quare hae potentiae suis actibus invicem se includunt, quia intellectus intelligit voluntatem velle, et voluntas vult intellectum intelligere. Et simili ratione bonum continetur sub vero, inquantum est quoddam verum intellectum; et verum continetur sub bono, inquantum est quoddam bonum desideratum. |
Reply to Objection 1: The intellect may be considered in two ways: as apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a particular power having a determinate act. In like manner also the will may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature of its object—that is to say, as appetitive of universal good—and as a determinate power of the soul having a determinate act. If, therefore, the intellect and the will be compared with one another according to the universality of their respective objects, then, as we have said above (Article [3]), the intellect is simply higher and nobler than the will. If, however, we take the intellect as regards the common nature of its object and the will as a determinate power, then again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and its act, and its object. Wherefore the intellect understands the will, and its act, and its object, just as it understands other species of things, as stone or wood, which are contained in the common notion of being and truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common nature of its object, which is good, and the intellect as a thing and a special power; then the intellect itself, and its act, and its object, which is truth, each of which is some species of good, are contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is higher than the intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily understand why these powers include one another in their acts, because the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand. In the same way good is contained in truth, inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it is a desired good. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus alio modo movet voluntatem, quam voluntas intellectum, ut iam dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2: The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will moves the intellect in another, as we have said above. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod non oportet procedere in infinitum, sed statur in intellectu sicut in primo. Omnem enim voluntatis motum necesse est quod praecedat apprehensio, sed non omnem apprehensionem praecedit motus voluntatis; sed principium consiliandi et intelligendi est aliquod intellectivum principium altius intellectu nostro, quod est Deus, ut etiam Aristoteles dicit in VII Ethicae Eudemicae, et per hunc modum ostendit quod non est procedere in infinitum. | Reply to Objection 3: There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect —namely, God—as also Aristotle says (Eth. Eudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need to proceed indefinitely. |
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| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis distingui debeant in appetitu superiori, qui est voluntas. Vis enim concupiscibilis dicitur a concupiscendo; et irascibilis ab irascendo. Sed aliqua concupiscentia est quae non potest pertinere ad appetitum sensitivum, sed solum ad intellectivum, qui est voluntas; sicut concupiscentia sapientiae, de qua dicitur Sap. VI, concupiscentia sapientiae perducit ad regnum perpetuum. Est etiam quaedam ira quae non potest pertinere ad appetitum sensitivum, sed intellectivum tantum; sicut cum irascimur contra vitia. Unde et Hieronymus, super Matth., monet ut odium vitiorum possideamus in irascibili. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis distingui debent in appetitu intellectivo, sicut et in sensitivo. | Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite, which is the will. For the concupiscible power is so called from "concupiscere" [to desire], and the irascible part from "irasci" [to be angry]. But there is a concupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual, which is the will; as the concupiscence of wisdom, of which it is said (Ws. 6:21): "The concupiscence of wisdom bringeth to the eternal kingdom." There is also a certain anger which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual; as when our anger is directed against vice. Wherefore Jerome commenting on Mt. 13:33 warns us "to have the hatred of vice in the irascible part." Therefore we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts of the intellectual soul as well as in the sensitive. |
| Praeterea, secundum quod communiter dicitur, caritas est in concupiscibili, spes autem in irascibili. Non autem possunt esse in appetitu sensitivo, quia non sunt sensibilium obiectorum, sed intelligibilium. Ergo concupiscibilis et irascibilis sunt ponenda in parte intellectiva. | Objection 2: Further, as is commonly said, charity is in the concupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But they cannot be in the sensitive appetite, because their objects are not sensible, but intellectual. Therefore we must assign an irascible and concupiscible power to the intellectual part. |
| Praeterea, in libro de spiritu et anima dicitur quod has potentias (scilicet irascibilem et concupiscibilem, et rationalem) habet anima antequam corpori misceatur. Sed nulla potentia sensitivae partis est animae tantum, sed coniuncti, ut supra dictum est. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt in voluntate, quae est appetitus intellectivus. |
Objection 3: Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Anima) that "the soul has these powers"—namely, the irascible, concupiscible, and rational—"before it is united to the body." But no power of the sensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to the soul and body united, as we have said above (Question [78], Articles [5],8). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible powers are in the will, which is the intellectual appetite. |
| Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyssenus, dicit, quod irrationalis pars animae dividitur in desiderativum et irascitivum; et idem dicit Damascenus, in libro II. Et philosophus dicit, in III de anima quod voluntas in ratione est, in irrationali autem parte animae concupiscentia et ira, vel desiderium et animus. | On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) says "that the irrational" part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and irascible, and Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9) "that the will is in reason, while in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger," or "desire and animus." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis non sunt partes intellectivi appetitus, qui dicitur voluntas. Quia, sicut supra dictum est, potentia quae ordinatur ad aliquod obiectum secundum communem rationem, non diversificatur per differentias speciales sub illa ratione communi contentas. Sicut quia visus respicit visibile secundum rationem colorati, non multiplicantur visivae potentiae secundum diversas species colorum, si autem esset aliqua potentia quae esset albi inquantum est album, et non inquantum est coloratum, diversificaretur a potentia quae esset nigri inquantum est nigrum. |
I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. Because, as was said above (Question [59], Article [4]; Question [79], Article [7]), a power which is directed to an object according to some common notion is not differentiated by special differences which are contained under that common notion. For instance, because sight regards the visible thing under the common notion of something colored, the visual power is not multiplied according to the different kinds of color: but if there were a power regarding white as white, and not as something colored, it would be distinct from a power regarding black as black. |
| Appetitus autem sensitivus non respicit communem rationem boni, quia nec sensus apprehendit universale. Et ideo secundum diversas rationes particularium bonorum, diversificantur partes appetitus sensitivi, nam concupiscibilis respicit propriam rationem boni, inquantum est delectabile secundum sensum, et conveniens naturae; irascibilis autem respicit rationem boni, secundum quod est repulsivum et impugnativum eius quod infert nocumentum. Sed voluntas respicit bonum sub communi ratione boni. Et ideo non diversificantur in ipsa, quae est appetitus intellectivus, aliquae potentiae appetitivae, ut sit in appetitu intellectivo alia potentia irascibilis, et alia concupiscibilis, sicut etiam ex parte intellectus non multiplicantur vires apprehensivae, licet multiplicentur ex parte sensus. | Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different notions of particular good: for the concupiscible regards as proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable to nature: whereas the irascible regards the notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is hurtful. But the will regards good according to the common notion of good, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite, there is no differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from a concupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehensive powers multiplied, although they are on the part of the senses. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod amor, concupiscentia, et huiusmodi, dupliciter accipiuntur. Quandoque quidem secundum quod sunt quaedam passiones, cum quadam scilicet concitatione animi provenientes. Et sic communiter accipiuntur, et hoc modo sunt solum in appetitu sensitivo. Alio modo significant simplicem affectum, absque passione vel animi concitatione. Et sic sunt actus voluntatis. Et hoc etiam modo attribuuntur Angelis et Deo. Sed prout sic accipiuntur, non pertinent ad diversas potentias, sed ad unam tantum potentiam, quae dicitur voluntas. | Reply to Objection 1: Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions—arising, that is, with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive appetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they are simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they do not belong to different powers, but only to one power, which is called the will. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod ipsa voluntas potest dici irascibilis, prout vult impugnare malum, non ex impetu passionis, sed ex iudicio rationis. Et eodem modo potest dici concupiscibilis, propter desiderium boni. Et sic in irascibili et concupiscibili sunt caritas et spes; idest in voluntate secundum quod habet ordinem ad huiusmodi actus. Sic etiam potest intelligi quod dicitur in libro de spiritu et anima, quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt animae antequam uniatur corpori (ut tamen intelligatur ordo naturae, et non temporis), licet non sit necessarium verbis illius libri fidem adhibere. | Reply to Objection 2: The will itself may be said to irascible, as far as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion, but from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. And thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope—that is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this way, too, we may understand the words quoted (De Spiritu et Anima); that the irascible and concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the body (as long as we understand priority of nature, and not of time), although there is no need to have faith in what that book says. |
| Unde patet solutio ad tertium | Whence the answer to the third objection is clear. |