Index [<<� | >>]
First Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 81 [ << | >> ]
| Deinde considerandum est de sensualitate. Circa quam quaeruntur tria. | Next we have to consider the power of sensuality, concerning which there are three points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum sensualitas sit vis appetitiva tantum. | (1) Whether sensuality is only an appetitive power? |
| Secundo, utrum dividatur sensualitas in irascibilem et concupiscibilem, sicut in diversas potentias. |
(2) Whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers? |
| Tertio, utrum irascibilis et concupiscibilis obediant rationi. | (3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason? |
Index [<<� | >>]
First Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 81 [ << | >> ]
Article: 1 [ << | >> ]
| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sensualitas non solum sit appetitiva, sed etiam cognitiva. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Trin., quod sensualis animae motus, qui in corporis sensus intenditur, nobis pecoribusque communis est. Sed corporis sensus sub vi cognitiva continentur. Ergo sensualitas est vis cognitiva. | Objection 1: It would seem that sensuality is not only appetitive, but also cognitive. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "the sensual movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses is common to us and beasts." But the bodily senses belong to the apprehensive powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power. |
| Praeterea, quae cadunt sub una divisione, videntur esse unius generis. Sed Augustinus, in XII de Trin., dividit sensualitatem contra rationem superiorem et inferiorem; quae ad cognitionem pertinent. Ergo sensualitas etiam est vis cognitiva. | Objection 2: Further, things which come under one division seem to be of one genus. But Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) divides sensuality against the higher and lower reason, which belong to knowledge. Therefore sensuality also is apprehensive. |
| Praeterea, sensualitas in tentatione hominis tenet locum serpentis. Sed serpens in tentatione primorum parentum se habuit ut nuntians et proponens peccatum; quod est vis cognitivae. Ergo sensualitas est vis cognitiva. | Objection 3: Further, in man's temptations sensuality stands in the place of the "serpent." But in the temptation of our first parents, the serpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing sin, which belong to the cognitive power. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power. |
| Sed contra est quod sensualitas definitur esse appetitus rerum ad corpus pertinentium. | On the contrary, Sensuality is defined as "the appetite of things belonging to the body." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod nomen sensualitatis sumptum videtur a sensuali motu, de quo Augustinus loquitur XII de Trin., sicut ab actu sumitur nomen potentiae, ut a visione visus. Motus autem sensualis est appetitus apprehensionem sensitivam consequens. Actus enim apprehensivae virtutis non ita proprie dicitur motus, sicut actio appetitus, nam operatio virtutis apprehensivae perficitur in hoc, quod res apprehensae sunt in apprehendente; operatio autem virtutis appetitivae perficitur in hoc, quod appetens inclinatur in rem appetibilem. Et ideo operatio apprehensivae virtutis assimilatur quieti, operatio autem virtutis appetitivae magis assimilatur motui. Unde per sensualem motum intelligitur operatio appetitivae virtutis. Et sic sensualitas est nomen appetitus sensitivi. | I answer that, The name sensuality seems to be taken from the sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii, 12, 13), just as the name of a power is taken from its act; for instance, sight from seeing. Now the sensual movement is an appetite following sensitive apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly called a movement as the act of the appetite: since the operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact that the thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that he who desires is borne towards the thing desirable. Therefore the operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest: whereas the operation of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement. Wherefore by sensual movement we understand the operation of the appetitive power: so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive appetite. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per hoc quod dicit Augustinus quod sensualis animae motus intenditur in corporis sensus, non datur intelligi quod corporis sensus sub sensualitate comprehendantur, sed magis quod motus sensualitatis sit inclinatio quaedam ad sensus corporis, dum scilicet appetimus ea quae per corporis sensus apprehenduntur. Et sic corporis sensus pertinent ad sensualitatem quasi praeambuli. | Reply to Objection 1: By saying that the sensual movement of the soul is directed to the bodily senses, Augustine does not give us to understand that the bodily senses are included in sensuality, but rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to the bodily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended through the bodily senses. And thus the bodily senses appertain to sensuality as a preamble. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod sensualitas dividitur contra rationem superiorem et inferiorem, inquantum communicant in actu motionis, vis enim cognitiva, ad quam pertinet ratio superior et inferior, est motiva, sicut et appetitiva, ad quam pertinet sensualitas. | Reply to Objection 2: Sensuality is divided against higher and lower reason, as having in common with them the act of movement: for the apprehensive power, to which belong the higher and lower reason, is a motive power; as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod serpens non solum ostendit et proposuit peccatum, sed etiam, inclinavit in effectum peccati. Et quantum ad hoc, sensualitas per serpentem significatur. | Reply to Objection 3: The serpent not only showed and proposed sin, but also incited to the commission of sin. And in this, sensuality is signified by the serpent. |
Index [<<� | >>]
First Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 81 [ << | >> ]
Article: 2 [ << | >> ]
| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod appetitus sensitivus non distinguatur in irascibilem et concupiscibilem, sicut in potentias diversas. Eadem enim potentia animae est unius contrarietatis, ut visus albi et nigri, ut dicitur in II de anima. Sed conveniens et nocivum sunt contraria. Cum ergo concupiscibilis respiciat conveniens, irascibilis vero nocivum, videtur quod eadem potentia animae sit irascibilis et concupiscibilis. | Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. For the same power of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety, as sight regards both black and white, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 11). But suitable and harmful are contraries. Since, then, the concupiscible power regards what is suitable, while the irascible is concerned with what is harmful, it seems that irascible and concupiscible are the same power in the soul. |
| Praeterea, appetitus sensitivus non est nisi convenientium secundum sensum. Sed conveniens secundum sensum est obiectum concupiscibilis. Ergo nullus appetitus sensitivus est a concupiscibili differens. | Objection 2: Further, the sensitive appetite regards only what is suitable according to the senses. But such is the object of the concupiscible power. Therefore there is no sensitive appetite differing from the concupiscible. |
| Praeterea, odium est in irascibili, dicit enim Hieronymus, super Matth., possideamus in irascibili odium vitiorum. Sed odium, cum contrarietur amori, est in concupiscibili. Ergo eadem vis est concupiscibilis et irascibilis. | Objection 3: Further, hatred is in the irascible part: for Jerome says on Mt. 13:33: "We ought to have the hatred of vice in the irascible power." But hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible part. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers. |
| Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyssenus et Damascenus ponunt duas vires, irascibilem et concupiscibilem, partes appetitus sensitivi. | On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Natura Hominis) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) assign two parts to the sensitive appetite, the irascible and the concupiscible. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod appetitus sensitivus est una vis in genere, quae sensualitas dicitur; sed dividitur in duas potentias, quae sunt species appetitus sensitivi, scilicet in irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerari oportet quod in rebus naturalibus corruptibilibus, non solum oportet esse inclinationem ad consequendum convenientia et refugiendum nociva; sed etiam ad resistendum corrumpentibus et contrariis, quae convenientibus impedimentum praebent et ingerunt nocumenta. Sicut ignis habet naturalem inclinationem non solum ut recedat ab inferiori loco, qui sibi non convenit, et tendat in locum superiorem sibi convenientem; sed etiam quod resistat corrumpentibus et impedientibus. Quia igitur appetitus sensitivus est inclinatio consequens apprehensionem sensitivam, sicut appetitus naturalis est inclinatio consequens formam naturalem; necesse est quod in parte sensitiva sint duae appetitivae potentiae. Una, per quam anima simpliciter inclinatur ad prosequendum ea quae sunt convenientia secundum sensum, et ad refugiendum nociva, et haec dicitur concupiscibilis. Alia vero, per quam animal resistit impugnantibus, quae convenientia impugnant et nocumenta inferunt, et haec vis vocatur irascibilis. Unde dicitur quod eius obiectum est arduum, quia scilicet tendit ad hoc quod superet contraria, et superemineat eis. Hae autem duae inclinationes non reducuntur in unum principium, quia interdum anima tristibus se ingerit, contra inclinationem concupiscibilis, ut secundum inclinationem irascibilis impugnet contraria. Unde etiam passiones irascibilis repugnare videntur passionibus concupiscibilis, nam concupiscentia accensa minuit iram, et ira accensa minuit concupiscentiam, ut in pluribus. Patet etiam ex hoc, quod irascibilis est quasi propugnatrix et defensatrix concupiscibilis, dum insurgit contra ea quae impediunt convenientia, quae concupiscibilis appetit, et ingerunt nociva, quae concupiscibilis refugit. Et propter hoc, omnes passiones irascibilis incipiunt a passionibus concupiscibilis, et in eas terminantur; sicut ira nascitur ex illata tristitia, et vindictam inferens, in laetitiam terminatur. Propter hoc etiam pugnae animalium sunt de concupiscibilibus, scilicet de cibis et venereis, ut dicitur in VIII de animalibus. | I answer that, The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and is called sensuality; but it is divided into two powers, which are species of the sensitive appetite—the irascible and the concupiscible. In order to make this clear, we must observe that in natural corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what is harmful, but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary agencies which are a hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable, and are productive of harm. For example, fire has a natural inclination, not only to rise from a lower position, which is unsuitable to it, towards a higher position which is suitable, but also to resist whatever destroys or hinders its action. Therefore, since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following the natural form, there must needs be in the sensitive part two appetitive powers—one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible: and another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, and this is called the irascible. Whence we say that its object is something arduous, because its tendency is to overcome and rise above obstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced to one principle: for sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things, against the inclination of the concupiscible appetite, in order that, following the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles. Wherefore also the passions of the irascible appetite counteract the passions of the concupiscible appetite: since the concupiscence, on being aroused, diminishes anger; and anger being roused, diminishes concupiscence in many cases. This is clear also from the fact that the irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender of the concupiscible when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of the suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies. And for this reason all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy. For this reason also the quarrels of animals are about things concupiscible—namely, food and sex, as the Philosopher says [*De Animal. Histor. viii.]. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vis concupiscibilis est et convenientis et inconvenientis. Sed irascibilis est ad resistendum inconvenienti quod impugnat. | Reply to Objection 1: The concupiscible power regards both what is suitable and what is unsuitable. But the object of the irascible power is to resist the onslaught of the unsuitable. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut in apprehensivis virtutibus in parte sensitiva est aliqua vis aestimativa, scilicet quae est perceptiva eorum quae sensum non immutant, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam in appetitu sensitivo est aliqua vis appetens aliquid quod non est conveniens secundum delectationem sensus, sed secundum quod est utile animali ad suam defensionem. Et haec est vis irascibilis. |
Reply to Objection 2: As in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part there is an estimative power, which perceives those things which do not impress the senses, as we have said above (Question [78], Article [2]); so also in the sensitive appetite there is a certain appetitive power which regards something as suitable, not because it pleases the senses, but because it is useful to the animal for self-defense: and this is the irascible power. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod odium simpliciter pertinet ad concupiscibilem; sed ratione impugnationis quae ex odio causatur, potest ad irascibilem pertinere. | Reply to Objection 3: Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible appetite: but by reason of the strife which arises from hatred, it may belong to the irascible appetite. |
Index [<<� | >>]
First Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 81 [ << | >> ]
Article: 3 [ << | >> ]
| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis non obediant rationi. Irascibilis enim et concupiscibilis sunt partes sensualitatis. Sed sensualitas non obedit rationi, unde per serpentem significatur, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Trin. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis non obediunt rationi. | Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and concupiscible are parts of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, wherefore it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. |
| Praeterea, quod obedit alicui, non repugnat ei. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis repugnant rationi; secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. VII, video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis non obediunt rationi. |
Objection 2: Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it. But the irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason: according to the Apostle (Rm. 7:23): "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. |
| Praeterea, sicut rationali parte animae inferior est vis appetitiva, ita etiam et vis sensitiva. Sed sensitiva pars animae non obedit rationi, non enim audimus nec videmus quando volumus. Ergo similiter neque vires sensitivi appetitus, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscibilis, obediunt rationi. | Objection 3: Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the rational part of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But the sensitive part of the soul does not obey reason: for we neither hear nor see just when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do the powers of the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupscible, obey reason. |
| Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, quod obediens et persuasibile rationi dividitur in concupiscentiam et iram. | On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the part of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided into concupiscence and anger." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis obediunt superiori parti, in qua est intellectus sive ratio et voluntas, dupliciter, uno modo quidem, quantum ad rationem; alio vero modo, quantum ad voluntatem. Rationi quidem obediunt quantum ad ipsos suos actus. Cuius ratio est, quia appetitus sensitivus in aliis quidem animalibus natus est moveri ab aestimativa virtute; sicut ovis aestimans lupum inimicum, timet. Loco autem aestimativae virtutis est in homine, sicut supra dictum est, vis cogitativa; quae dicitur a quibusdam ratio particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium. Unde ab ea natus est moveri in homine appetitus sensitivus. Ipsa autem ratio particularis nata est moveri et dirigi secundum rationem universalem, unde in syllogisticis ex universalibus propositionibus concluduntur conclusiones singulares. Et ideo patet quod ratio universalis imperat appetitui sensitivo, qui distinguitur per concupiscibilem et irascibilem, et hic appetitus ei obedit. Et quia deducere universalia principia in conclusiones singulares, non est opus simplicis intellectus, sed rationis; ideo irascibilis et concupiscibilis magis dicuntur obedire rationi, quam intellectui. Hoc etiam quilibet experiri potest in seipso, applicando enim aliquas universales considerationes, mitigatur ira aut timor aut aliquid huiusmodi, vel etiam instigatur. |
I answer that, In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the will; first, as to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance, a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the estimative power, as we have said above (Question [78], Article [4]), is replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some 'the particular reason,' because it compares individual intentions. Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason. But this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved according to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions. Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible; and this appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from universal principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but of the reason: hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible are said to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone can experience this in himself: for by applying certain universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited. |
| Voluntati etiam subiacet appetitus sensitivus, quantum ad executionem, quae fit per vim motivam. In aliis enim animalibus statim ad appetitum concupiscibilis et irascibilis sequitur motus sicut ovis, timens lupum statim fugit, quia non est in eis aliquis superior appetitus qui repugnet. Sed homo non statim movetur secundum appetitum irascibilis et concupiscibilis; sed expectatur imperium voluntatis, quod est appetitus superior. In omnibus enim potentiis motivis ordinatis, secundum movens non movet nisi virtute primi moventis, unde appetitus inferior non sufficit movere, nisi appetitus superior consentiat. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod appetitus superior movet appetitum inferiorem, sicut sphaera superior inferiorem. Hoc ergo modo irascibilis et concupiscibilis rationi subduntur. | To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution, which is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites: for instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it has no superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not moved at once, according to the irascible and concupiscible appetites: but he awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appetite. For wherever there is order among a number of motive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first: wherefore the lower appetite is not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher appetite consents. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), that "the higher appetite moves the lower appetite, as the higher sphere moves the lower." In this way, therefore, the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensualitas significatur per serpentem, quantum ad id quod est proprium sibi ex parte sensitivae partis. Irascibilis autem et concupiscibilis magis nominant sensitivum appetitum ex parte actus, ad quem inducuntur ex ratione, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1: Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in what is proper to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible and concupiscible powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the part of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as we have said. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I politicorum, est quidem in animali contemplari et despoticum principatum, et politicum, anima quidem enim corpori dominatur despotico principatu; intellectus autem appetitui, politico et regali. Dicitur enim despoticus principatus, quo aliquis principatur servis, qui non habent facultatem in aliquo resistendi imperio praecipientis, quia nihil sui habent. Principatus autem politicus et regalis dicitur, quo aliquis principatur liberis, qui, etsi subdantur regimini praesidentis, tamen habent aliquid proprium, ex quo possunt reniti praecipientis imperio. Sic igitur anima dicitur dominari corpori despotico principatu, quia corporis membra in nullo resistere possunt imperio animae, sed statim ad appetitum animae movetur manus et pes, et quodlibet membrum quod natum est moveri voluntario motu. Intellectus autem, seu ratio, dicitur principari irascibili et concupiscibili politico principatu, quia appetitus sensibilis habet aliquid proprium, unde potest reniti imperio rationis. Natus est enim moveri appetitus sensitivus, non solum ab aestimativa in aliis animalibus, et cogitativa in homine, quam dirigit universalis ratio; sed etiam ab imaginativa et sensu. Unde experimur irascibilem vel concupiscibilem rationi repugnare, per hoc quod sentimus vel imaginamur aliquod delectabile quod ratio vetat, vel triste quod ratio praecipit. Et sic per hoc quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis in aliquo rationi repugnant, non excluditur quin ei obediant. | Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): "We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power." For a power is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic power, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul's command both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not conclude that they do not obey. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod sensus exteriores indigent ad suos actus exterioribus sensibilibus, quibus immutentur, quorum praesentia non est in potestate rationis. Sed vires interiores, tam appetitivae quam apprehensivae, non indigent exterioribus rebus. Et ideo subduntur imperio rationis, quae potest non solum instigare vel mitigare affectus appetitivae virtutis, sed etiam formare imaginativae virtutis phantasmata. | Reply to Objection 3: The exterior senses require for action exterior sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which is not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do not require exterior things. Therefore they are subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or modify the affections of the appetitive power, but can also form the phantasms of the imagination. |