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| Deinde considerandum est de bono et malo circa passiones animae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum bonum et malum morale possit in passionibus animae inveniri. | (1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul? |
| Secundo, utrum omnis passio animae sit mala moraliter. | (2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil? |
| Tertio, utrum omnis passio addat, vel diminuat, ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus. |
(3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice of an act? |
| Quarto, utrum aliqua passio sit bona vel mala ex sua specie. | (4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla passio animae sit bona vel mala moraliter. Bonum enim et malum morale est proprium hominis, mores enim proprie dicuntur humani, ut Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam. Sed passiones non sunt propriae hominum, sed sunt etiam aliis animalibus communes. Ergo nulla passio animae est bona vel mala moraliter. | Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since "morals are properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog.). But passions are not proper to man, for he has them in common with other animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil. |
| Praeterea, bonum vel malum hominis est secundum rationem esse, vel praeter rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed passiones animae non sunt in ratione, sed in appetitu sensitivo, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non pertinent ad bonum vel malum hominis, quod est bonum morale |
Objection 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being in accord, or in disaccord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the sensitive appetite, as stated above (Question [22], Article [3]). Therefore they have no connection with human, i.e. moral, good or evil. |
| Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod passionibus neque laudamur neque vituperamur. Sed secundum bona et mala moralia, laudamur et vituperamur. Ergo passiones non sunt bonae vel malae moraliter. | Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions." But we are praised and blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally good or evil. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, de passionibus animae loquens mala sunt ista, si malus est amor; bona, si bonus. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good if our love is good." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod passiones animae dupliciter possunt considerari, uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, secundum quod subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis. Si igitur secundum se considerentur, prout scilicet sunt motus quidam irrationalis appetitus, sic non est in eis bonum vel malum morale, quod dependet a ratione, ut supra dictum est. Si autem considerentur secundum quod subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis, sic est in eis bonum et malum morale. Propinquior enim est appetitus sensitivus ipsi rationi et voluntati, quam membra exteriora; quorum tamen motus et actus sunt boni vel mali moraliter, secundum quod sunt voluntarii. Unde multo magis et ipsae passiones, secundum quod sunt voluntariae, possunt dici bonae vel malae moraliter. Dicuntur autem voluntariae vel ex eo quod a voluntate imperantur, vel ex eo quod a voluntate non prohibentur. |
I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above (Question [18], Article [5]). If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod istae passiones secundum se consideratae, sunt communes hominibus et aliis animalibus, sed secundum quod a ratione imperantur, sunt propriae hominum. | Reply to Objection 1: These passions, considered in themselves, are common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they are proper to man. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam inferiores vires appetitivae dicuntur rationales, secundum quod participant aliqualiter rationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. | Reply to Objection 2: Even the lower appetitive powers are called rational, in so far as "they partake of reason in some sort" (Ethic. i, 13). |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod philosophus dicit quod non laudamur aut vituperamur secundum passiones absolute consideratas, sed non removet quin possint fieri laudabiles vel vituperabiles secundum quod a ratione ordinantur. Unde subdit, non enim laudatur aut vituperatur qui timet aut irascitur, sed qui aliqualiter, idest secundum rationem vel praeter rationem. | Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher says that we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: "For the man who fears or is angry, is not praised... or blamed, but the man who is angry in a certain way, i.e. according to, or against reason." |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes passiones animae sint malae moraliter. Dicit enim Augustinus, IX de Civ. Dei, quod passiones animae quidam vocant morbos vel perturbationes animae. Sed omnis morbus vel perturbatio animae est aliquid malum moraliter. Ergo omnis passio animae moraliter mala est. | Objection 1: It would seem that all the passions of the soul are morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call the soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Those things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)]. But every disease or disturbance of the soul is morally evil. Therefore every passion of the soul is evil morally. |
| Praeterea, Damascenus dicit quod operatio quidem qui secundum naturam motus est, passio vero qui praeter naturam. Sed quod est praeter naturam in motibus animae, habet rationem peccati et mali moralis, unde ipse alibi dicit quod Diabolus versus est ex eo quod est secundum naturam, in id quod est praeter naturam. Ergo huiusmodi passiones sunt malae moraliter. | Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to nature is passion." But in movements of the soul, what is against nature is sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "the devil turned from that which is in accord with nature to that which is against nature." Therefore these passions are morally evil. |
| Praeterea, omne quod inducit ad peccatum, habet rationem mali. Sed huiusmodi passiones inducunt ad peccatum, unde Rom. VII dicuntur passiones peccatorum. Ergo videtur quod sint malae moraliter. |
Objection 3: Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the passions of sins" (Rm. 7:5). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod rectus amor omnes istas affectiones rectas habet. Metuunt enim peccare, cupiunt perseverare, dolent in peccatis, gaudent in operibus bonis. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "all these emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed... For they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, they rejoice in good works." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod circa hanc quaestionem diversa fuit sententia Stoicorum et Peripateticorum, nam Stoici dixerunt omnes passiones esse malas; Peripatetici vero dixerunt passiones moderatas esse bonas. Quae quidem differentia, licet magna videatur secundum vocem, tamen secundum rem vel nulla est, vel parva, si quis utrorumque intentiones consideret. Stoici enim non discernebant inter sensum et intellectum; et per consequens nec inter intellectivum appetitum et sensitivum. Unde non discernebant passiones animae a motibus voluntatis secundum hoc quod passiones animae sunt in appetitu sensitivo, simplices autem motus voluntatis sunt in intellectivo; sed omnem rationabilem motum appetitivae partis vocabant voluntatem, passionem autem dicebant motum progredientem extra limites rationis. Et ideo, eorum sententiam sequens, Tullius, in III libro de Tusculanis quaestionibus, omnes passiones vocat animae morbos. Ex quo argumentatur quod qui morbosi sunt, sani non sunt; et qui sani non sunt, insipientes sunt. Unde et insipientes insanos dicimus. | I answer that, On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions are evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are good. This difference, although it appears great in words, is nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider the intent of either school. For the Stoics did not discern between sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the intellectual and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discriminate the passions of the soul from the movements of the will, in so far as the passions of the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the simple movements of the will are in the intellectual appetite: but every rational movement of the appetitive part they call will, while they called passion, a movement that exceeds the limits of reason. Wherefore Cicero, following their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) calls all passions "diseases of the soul": whence he argues that "those who are diseased are unsound; and those who are unsound are wanting in sense." Hence we speak of those who are wanting in sense of being "unsound." |
| Peripatetici vero omnes motus appetitus sensitivi passiones vocant. Unde eas bonas aestimant, cum sunt a ratione moderatae; malas autem, cum sunt praeter moderationem rationis. Ex quo patet quod Tullius, in eodem libro, Peripateticorum sententiam, qui approbabant mediocritatem passionum, inconvenienter improbat, dicens quod omne malum, etiam mediocre, vitandum est, nam sicut corpus, etiamsi mediocriter aegrum est, sanum non est; sic ista mediocritas morborum vel passionum animae, sana non est. Non enim passiones dicuntur morbi vel perturbationes animae, nisi cum carent moderatione rationis. | On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of "passions" to all the movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore they esteem them good, when they are controlled by reason; and evil when they are not controlled by reason. Hence it is evident that Cicero was wrong in disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory of a mean in the passions, when he says that "every evil, though moderate, should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be moderately ailing, is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul, is not sound." For passions are not called "diseases" or "disturbances" of the soul, save when they are not controlled by reason. |
| Unde patet responsio ad primum. | Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod in omni passione animae additur aliquid, vel diminuitur a naturali motu cordis, inquantum cor intensius vel remissius movetur, secundum systolen aut diastolen, et secundum hoc habet passionis rationem. Non tamen oportet quod passio semper declinet ab ordine naturalis rationis. | Reply to Objection 2: In every passion there is an increase or decrease in the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved more or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it derives the character of passion. But there is no need for passion to deviate always from the order of natural reason. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod passiones animae, inquantum sunt praeter ordinem rationis, inclinant ad peccatum, inquantum autem sunt ordinatae a ratione, pertinent ad virtutem. | Reply to Objection 3: The passions of the soul, in so far as they are contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio quaecumque semper diminuat de bonitate actus moralis. Omne enim quod impedit iudicium rationis, ex quo dependet bonitas actus moralis, diminuit per consequens bonitatem actus moralis. Sed omnis passio impedit iudicium rationis, dicit enim Sallustius, in Catilinario, omnes homines qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab odio, ira, amicitia atque misericordia vacuos esse decet. Ergo omnis passio diminuit bonitatem moralis actus. | Objection 1: It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness of a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason, on which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases the goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders the judgment of reason: for Sallust says (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free from hatred, anger, friendship and pity." Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a moral act. |
| Praeterea, actus hominis, quanto est Deo similior, tanto est melior, unde dicit apostolus, Ephes. V, estote imitatores Dei, sicut filii carissimi. Sed Deus et sancti Angeli sine ira puniunt, sine miseriae compassione subveniunt ut Augustinus dicit, in IX de Civ. Dei. Ergo est melius huiusmodi opera bona agere sine passione animae, quam cum passione. |
Objection 2: Further, the more a man's action is like to God, the better it is: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:1): "Be ye followers of God, as most dear children." But "God and the holy angels feel no anger when they punish... no fellow-feeling with misery when they relieve the unhappy," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is better to do such like deeds without than with a passion of the soul. |
| Praeterea, sicut malum morale attenditur per ordinem ad rationem, ita et bonum morale. Sed malum morale diminuitur per passionem, minus enim peccat qui peccat ex passione, quam qui peccat ex industria. Ergo maius bonum operatur qui operatur bonum sine passione, quam qui operatur cum passione. | Objection 3: Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by passion: for he sins less, who sins from passion, than he who sins deliberately. Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without passion, than he who does with passion. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei, quod passio misericordiae rationi deservit, quando ita praebetur misericordia, ut iustitia conservetur, sive cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum ignoscitur poenitenti. Sed nihil quod deservit rationi, diminuit bonum morale. Ergo passio animae non diminuit bonum moris. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "the passion of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven." But nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral good. Therefore a passion of the soul does not lessen moral good. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod Stoici, sicut ponebant omnem passionem animae esse malam, ita ponebant consequenter omnem passionem animae diminuere actus bonitatem, omne enim bonum ex permixtione mali vel totaliter tollitur, vel fit minus bonum. Et hoc quidem verum est, si dicamus passiones animae solum inordinatos motus sensitivi appetitus, prout sunt perturbationes seu aegritudines. Sed si passiones simpliciter nominemus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic ad perfectionem humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones sint moderatae per rationem. Cum enim bonum hominis consistat in ratione sicut in radice, tanto istud bonum erit perfectius, quanto ad plura quae homini conveniunt, derivari potest. Unde nullus dubitat quin ad perfectionem moralis boni pertineat quod actus exteriorum membrorum per rationis regulam dirigantur. Unde, cum appetitus sensitivus possit obedire rationi, ut supra dictum est, ad perfectionem moralis sive humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones animae sint regulatae per rationem. |
I answer that, As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens the goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true indeed, if by passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or ailments. But if we give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his passions be moderated by reason. For since man's good is founded on reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, according as it extends to more things pertaining to man. Wherefore no one questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral good, that the actions of the outward members be controlled by the law of reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as stated above (Question [17], Article [7]), it belongs to the perfection of moral or human good, that the passions themselves also should be controlled by reason. |
| Sicut igitur melius est quod homo et velit bonum, et faciat exteriori actu; ita etiam ad perfectionem boni moralis pertinet quod homo ad bonum moveatur non solum secundum voluntatem, sed etiam secundum appetitum sensitivum; secundum illud quod in Psalmo LXXXIII, dicitur, cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum, ut cor accipiamus pro appetitu intellectivo, carnem autem pro appetitu sensitivo. | Accordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and do it in his external act; so also does it belong to the perfection of moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of his will, but also in respect of his sensitive appetite; according to Ps. 83:3: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God": where by "heart" we are to understand the intellectual appetite, and by "flesh" the sensitive appetite. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod passiones animae dupliciter se possunt habere ad iudicium rationis. Uno modo, antecedenter. Et sic, cum obnubilent iudicium rationis, ex quo dependet bonitas moralis actus, diminuunt actus bonitatem, laudabilius enim est quod ex iudicio rationis aliquis faciat opus caritatis, quam ex sola passione misericordiae. Alio modo se habent consequenter. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum redundantiae, quia scilicet, cum superior pars animae intense movetur in aliquid, sequitur motum eius etiam pars inferior. Et sic passio existens consequenter in appetitu sensitivo, est signum intensionis voluntatis. Et sic indicat bonitatem moralem maiorem. Alio modo, per modum electionis, quando scilicet homo ex iudicio rationis eligit affici aliqua passione, ut promptius operetur, cooperante appetitu sensitivo. Et sic passio animae addit ad bonitatem actionis. | Reply to Objection 1: The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus, since they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for it is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from the mere passion of pity. In the second place, consequently: and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance: because, to wit, when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the lower part also follows that movement: and thus the passion that results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral goodness. Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected by a passion in order to work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite. And thus a passion of the soul increases the goodness of an action. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod in Deo et in Angelis non est appetitus sensitivus, neque etiam membra corporea, et ideo bonum in eis non attenditur secundum ordinationem passionum aut corporeorum actuum, sicut in nobis. | Reply to Objection 2: In God and the angels there is no sensitive appetite, nor again bodily members: and so in them good does not depend on the right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod passio tendens in malum, praecedens iudicium rationis, diminuit peccatum, sed consequens aliquo praedictorum modorum, auget ipsum, vel significat augmentum eius. | Reply to Objection 3: A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either of the ways mentioned above (Reply OBJ 1), it aggravates the sin, or else it is a sign of its being more grievous. |
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Article: 4 [ << | >> ]
| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla passio animae, secundum speciem suam, sit bona vel mala moraliter. Bonum enim et malum morale attenditur secundum rationem. Sed passiones sunt in appetitu sensitivo, et ita id quod est secundum rationem, accidit eis. Cum ergo nihil quod est per accidens, pertineat ad speciem rei; videtur quod nulla passio secundum suam speciem sit bona vel mala. | Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or evil morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil depend on reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so that accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore, nothing accidental belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no passion is good or evil according to its species. |
| Praeterea, actus et passiones habent speciem ex obiecto. Si ergo aliqua passio secundum suam speciem esset bona vel mala, oporteret quod passiones quarum obiectum est bonum, bonae essent secundum suam speciem, ut amor, desiderium et gaudium; et passiones quarum obiectum est malum essent malae secundum suam speciem, ut odium, timor et tristitia. Sed hoc patet esse falsum. Non ergo aliqua passio est bona vel mala ex sua specie. | Objection 2: Further, acts and passions take their species from their object. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according to its species, it would follow that those passions the object of which is good, are specifically good, such as love, desire and joy: and that those passions, the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as hatred, fear and sadness. But this is clearly false. Therefore no passion is good or evil according to its species. |
| Praeterea, nulla species passionum est quae non inveniatur in aliis animalibus. Sed bonum morale non invenitur nisi in homine. Ergo nulla passio animae bona est vel mala ex sua specie. | Objection 3: Further, there is no species of passion that is not to be found in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore no passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei, quod misericordia pertinet ad virtutem. Philosophus etiam dicit, in II Ethic., quod verecundia est passio laudabilis. Ergo aliquae passiones sunt bonae vel malae secundum suam speciem. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good or evil according to their species. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod sicut de actibus dictum est, ita et de passionibus dicendum videtur, quod scilicet species actus vel passionis dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est in genere naturae, et sic bonum vel malum morale non pertinet ad speciem actus vel passionis. Alio modo, secundum quod pertinent ad genus moris, prout scilicet participant aliquid de voluntario et de iudicio rationis. Et hoc modo bonum et malum morale possunt pertinere ad speciem passionis, secundum quod accipitur ut obiectum passionis aliquid de se conveniens rationi, vel dissonum a ratione, sicut patet de verecundia, quae est timor turpis; et de invidia, quae est tristitia de bono alterius. Sic enim pertinent ad speciem exterioris actus. |
I answer that, We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been said in regard to acts (Question [18], Articles [5],6; Question [20], Article [1])—viz. that the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view. First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion. Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason: as is clear in the case of "shame" which is base fear; and of "envy" which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions belong to the same species as the external act. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de passionibus secundum quod pertinent ad speciem naturae, prout scilicet appetitus sensitivus in se consideratur. Secundum vero quod appetitus sensitivus obedit rationi, iam bonum et malum rationis non est in passionibus eius per accidens, sed per se. | Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the passions in their natural species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in itself. But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and evil of reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of the appetite, but essentially. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod passiones quae in bonum tendunt, si sit verum bonum, sunt bonae, et similiter quae a vero malo recedunt. E converso vero passiones quae sunt per recessum a bono, et per accessum ad malum, sunt malae. | Reply to Objection 2: Passions having a tendency to good, are themselves good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like manner, if they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other hand, those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a tendency to evil, are themselves evil. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod in brutis animalibus appetitus sensitivus non obedit rationi. Et tamen inquantum ducitur quadam aestimativa naturali, quae subiicitur rationi superiori, scilicet divinae, est in eis quaedam similitudo moralis boni, quantum ad animae passiones. | Reply to Objection 3: In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of estimative power, which is subject to a higher, i.e. the Divine reason, there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the soul's passions. |