Index [<<� | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 25 [ << | >> ]
| Deinde considerandum est de ordine passionum ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | We must now consider the order of the passions to one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: |
| Primo, de ordine passionum irascibilis ad passiones concupiscibilis. | (1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible passions; |
| Secundo, de ordine passionum concupiscibilis ad invicem. | (2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another; |
| Tertio, de ordine passionum irascibilis ad invicem. | (3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another; |
| Quarto, de quatuor principalibus passionibus. | (4) The four principal passions. |
Index [<<� | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 25 [ << | >> ]
Article: 1 [ << | >> ]
| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod passiones irascibilis sint priores passionibus concupiscibilis. Ordo enim passionum est secundum ordinem obiectorum. Sed obiectum irascibilis est bonum arduum, quod videtur esse supremum inter alia bona. Ergo passiones irascibilis videntur praeesse passionibus concupiscibilis. | Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of their objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good, which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the irascible passions seem to precede the concupiscible passions. |
| Praeterea, movens est prius moto. Sed irascibilis comparatur ad concupiscibilem sicut movens ad motum, ad hoc enim datur animalibus, ut tollantur impedimenta quibus concupiscibilis prohibetur frui suo obiecto, ut supra dictum est; removens autem prohibens habet rationem moventis, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Ergo passiones irascibilis sunt priores passionibus concupiscibilis. |
Objection 2: Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to that which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purposed of removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from enjoying its object, as stated above (Question [23], Article [1], ad 1; FP, Question [81], Article [2]). Now "that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover" (Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions. |
| Praeterea, gaudium et tristitia sunt passiones concupiscibilis. Sed gaudium et tristitia consequuntur ad passiones irascibilis, dicit enim philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod punitio quietat impetum irae, delectationem loco tristitiae faciens. Ergo passiones concupiscibilis sunt posteriores passionibus irascibilis. | Objection 3: Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But joy and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that"retaliation causes anger to cease, because it produces pleasure instead of the previous pain." Therefore the concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions. |
| Sed contra, passiones concupiscibilis respiciunt bonum absolutum, passiones autem irascibilis respiciunt bonum contractum, scilicet arduum. Cum igitur bonum simpliciter sit prius quam bonum contractum, videtur quod passiones concupiscibilis sint priores passionibus irascibilis. | On the contrary, The concupiscible passions regard the absolute good, while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult, good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the restricted good, it seems that the concupiscible passions precede the irascible. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod passiones concupiscibilis ad plura se habent quam passiones irascibilis. Nam in passionibus concupiscibilis invenitur aliquid pertinens ad motum, sicut desiderium; et aliquid pertinens ad quietem, sicut gaudium et tristitia. Sed in passionibus irascibilis non invenitur aliquid pertinens ad quietem, sed solum pertinens ad motum. Cuius ratio est quia id in quo iam quiescitur, non habet rationem difficilis seu ardui, quod est obiectum irascibilis. | I answer that, In the concupiscible passions there is more diversity than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the former we find something relating to movement—e.g. desire; and something belonging to repose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as something difficult or arduous; whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty. |
| Quies autem, cum sit finis motus, est prior in intentione, sed posterior in executione. Si ergo comparentur passiones irascibilis ad passiones concupiscibilis quae significant quietem in bono; manifeste passiones irascibilis praecedunt, ordine executionis, huiusmodi passiones concupiscibilis, sicut spes praecedit gaudium, unde et causat ipsum, secundum illud apostoli, Rom. XII, spe gaudentes. Sed passio concupiscibilis importans quietem in malo, scilicet tristitia, media est inter duas passiones irascibilis. Sequitur enim timorem, cum enim occurrerit malum quod timebatur, causatur tristitia. Praecedit autem motum irae, quia cum ex tristitia praecedente aliquis insurgit in vindictam, hoc pertinet ad motum irae. Et quia rependere vicem malis, apprehenditur ut bonum; cum iratus hoc consecutus fuerit, gaudet. Et sic manifestum est quod omnis passio irascibilis terminatur ad passionem concupiscibilis pertinentem ad quietem, scilicet vel ad gaudium vel ad tristitiam. |
Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, we compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good, it is evident that in the order of execution, the irascible passions take precedence of such like passions of the concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes joy, and hence causes it, according to the Apostle (Rm. 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope." But the concupiscible passion which denotes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes between two irascible passions: because it follows fear; since we become sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared: while it precedes the movement of anger; since the movement of self-vindication, that results from sadness, is the movement of anger. And because it is looked upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the angry man has achieved this he rejoices. Thus it is evident that every passion of the irascible faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion denoting rest, viz. either in joy or in sadness. |
| Sed si comparentur passiones irascibilis ad passiones concupiscibilis quae important motum, sic manifeste passiones concupiscibilis sunt priores, eo quod passiones irascibilis addunt supra passiones concupiscibilis; sicut et obiectum irascibilis addit supra obiectum concupiscibilis arduitatem sive difficultatem. Spes enim supra desiderium addit quendam conatum, et quandam elevationem animi ad consequendum bonum arduum. Et similiter timor addit supra fugam seu abominationem, quandam depressionem animi, propter difficultatem mali. | But if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible passions that denote movement, then it is clear that the latter take precedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty add something to those of the concupiscible faculty; just as the object of the irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of the concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a certain effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization of the arduous good. In like manner fear adds to aversion or detestation a certain lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty in shunning the evil. |
| Sic ergo passiones irascibilis mediae sunt inter passiones concupiscibilis quae important motum in bonum vel in malum; et inter passiones concupiscibilis quae important quietem in bono vel in malo. Et sic patet quod passiones irascibilis et principium habent a passionibus concupiscibilis, et in passiones concupiscibilis terminantur. | Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it is therefore evident that the irascible passions both arise from and terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa ratio procederet, si de ratione obiecti concupiscibilis esset aliquid oppositum arduo, sicut de ratione obiecti irascibilis est quod sit arduum. Sed quia obiectum concupiscibilis est bonum absolute, prius naturaliter est quam obiectum irascibilis, sicut commune proprio. | Reply to Objection 1: This argument would prove, if the formal object of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous, just as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the common precedes the proper. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod removens prohibens non est movens per se, sed per accidens. Nunc autem loquimur de ordine passionum per se. Et praeterea irascibilis removet prohibens quietem concupiscibilis in suo obiecto. Unde ex hoc non sequitur nisi quod passiones irascibilis praecedunt passiones concupiscibilis ad quietem pertinentes. | Reply to Objection 2: The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly related to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object. Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those concupiscible passions that connote rest. |
| De quibus etiam tertia ratio procedit. | Objection 3: The third object leads to the same conclusion. |
Index [<<� | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 25 [ << | >> ]
Article: 2 [ << | >> ]
| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit prima passionum concupiscibilis. Vis enim concupiscibilis a concupiscentia denominatur, quae est eadem passio cum desiderio. Sed denominatio fit a potiori, ut dicitur in II de anima. Ergo concupiscentia est potior amore. | Objection 1: It would seem that love is not the first of the concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from concupiscence, which is the same passion as desire. But "things are named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore desire takes precedence of love. |
| Praeterea, amor unionem quandam importat, est enim vis unitiva et concretiva, ut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed concupiscentia vel desiderium est motus ad unionem rei concupitae vel desideratae. Ergo concupiscentia est prior amore. | Objection 2: Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a "uniting and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But concupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the thing coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love. |
| Praeterea, causa est prior effectu. Sed delectatio est quandoque causa amoris, quidam enim propter delectationem amant, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Ergo delectatio est prior amore. Non ergo prima inter passiones concupiscibilis est amor. | Objection 3: Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure (Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently love is not the first of the concupiscible passions. |
| Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod omnes passiones ex amore causantur, amor enim inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est; id autem habens, eoque fruens, laetitia est. Amor ergo est prima passionum concupiscibilis. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy." Therefore love is the first of the concupiscible passions. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod obiectum concupiscibilis sunt bonum et malum. Naturaliter autem est prius bonum malo, eo quod malum est privatio boni. Unde et omnes passiones quarum obiectum est bonum, naturaliter sunt priores passionibus quarum obiectum est malum, unaquaeque scilicet sua opposita, quia enim bonum quaeritur, ideo refutatur oppositum malum. | I answer that, Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of good. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the object of which is evil—that is to say, each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is the reason for shunning the opposite evil. |
| Bonum autem habet rationem finis, qui quidem est prior in intentione, sed est posterior in consecutione. Potest ergo ordo passionum concupiscibilis attendi vel secundum intentionem, vel secundum consecutionem. Secundum quidem consecutionem, illud est prius quod primo fit in eo quod tendit ad finem. Manifestum est autem quod omne quod tendit ad finem aliquem, primo quidem habet aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem, nihil enim tendit in finem non proportionatum; secundo, movetur ad finem; tertio, quiescit in fine post eius consecutionem. Ipsa autem aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor, qui nihil aliud est quam complacentia boni; motus autem ad bonum est desiderium vel concupiscentia; quies autem in bono est gaudium vel delectatio. Et ideo secundum hunc ordinem, amor praecedit desiderium, et desiderium praecedit delectationem. Sed secundum ordinem intentionis, est e converso, nam delectatio intenta causat desiderium et amorem. Delectatio enim est fruitio boni, quae quodammodo est finis sicut et ipsum bonum, ut supra dictum est. |
Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as stated above (Question [11], Article [3], ad 3). |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc modo nominatur aliquid, secundum quod nobis innotescit, voces enim sunt signa intellectuum, secundum philosophum. Nos autem, ut plurimum, per effectum cognoscimus causam. Effectus autem amoris, quando quidem habetur ipsum amatum, est delectatio, quando vero non habetur, est desiderium vel concupiscentia. Ut autem Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., amor magis sentitur, cum eum prodit indigentia. Unde inter omnes passiones concupiscibilis, magis sensibilis est concupiscentia. Et propter hoc, ab ea denominatur potentia. | Reply to Objection 1: We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which we love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est unio amati ad amantem. Una quidem realis, secundum scilicet coniunctionem ad rem ipsam. Et talis unio pertinet ad gaudium vel delectationem, quae sequitur desiderium. Alia autem est unio affectiva, quae est secundum aptitudinem vel proportionem, prout scilicet ex hoc quod aliquid habet aptitudinem ad alterum et inclinationem, iam participat aliquid eius. Et sic amor unionem importat. Quae quidem unio praecedit motum desiderii. | Reply to Objection 2: The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other. This union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such a union. This union precedes the movement of desire. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod delectatio causat amorem, secundum quod est prior in intentione. | Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in the order of intention. |
Index [<<� | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 25 [ << | >> ]
Article: 3 [ << | >> ]
| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes non sit prima inter passiones irascibilis. Vis enim irascibilis ab ira denominatur. Cum ergo denominatio fiat a potiori, videtur quod ira sit potior et prior quam spes. | Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not the first of the irascible passions. Because the irascible faculty is denominated from anger. Since, therefore, "things are names from their chief characteristic" (cf. Article [2], Objection [1]), it seems that anger precedes and surpasses hope. |
| Praeterea, arduum est obiectum irascibilis. Sed magis videtur esse arduum quod aliquis conetur superare malum contrarium quod imminet ut futurum, quod pertinet ad audaciam; vel quod iniacet iam ut praesens, quod pertinet ad iram; quam quod conetur acquirere simpliciter aliquod bonum. Et similiter magis videtur esse arduum quod conetur vincere malum praesens, quam malum futurum. Ergo ira videtur esse potior passio quam audacia, et audacia quam spes. Et sic spes non videtur esse prior. | Objection 2: Further, the object of the irascible faculty is something arduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a contrary evil that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to daring; or an evil actually present, which pertains to anger; than to strive simply to obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a present evil, than a future evil. Therefore anger seems to be a stronger passion than daring, and daring, than hope. And consequently it seems that hope does not precede them. |
| Praeterea, prius occurrit, in motu ad finem, recessus a termino, quam accessus ad terminum. Sed timor et desperatio important recessum ab aliquo, audacia autem et spes important accessum ad aliquid. Ergo timor et desperatio praecedunt spem et audaciam. | Objection 3: Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the movement of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach. But fear and despair imply withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply approach towards something. Therefore fear and despair precede hope and daring. |
| Sed contra, quanto aliquid est propinquius primo, tanto est prius. Sed spes est propinquior amori, qui est prima passionum. Ergo spes est prior inter omnes passiones irascibilis. | On the contrary, The nearer a thing is to the first, the more it precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is the first of the passions. Therefore hope is the first of the passions in the irascible faculty. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, omnes passiones irascibilis important motum in aliquid. Motus autem ad aliquid in irascibili potest causari ex duobus, uno modo, ex sola aptitudine seu proportione ad finem, quae pertinet ad amorem vel odium; alio modo, ex praesentia ipsius boni vel mali, quae pertinet ad tristitiam vel gaudium. Et quidem ex praesentia boni non causatur aliqua passio in irascibili, ut dictum est, sed ex praesentia mali causatur passio irae. |
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]) all irascible passions imply movement towards something. Now this movement of the irascible faculty towards something may be due to two causes: one is the mere aptitude or proportion to the end; and this pertains to love or hatred, those whose object is good, or evil; and this belongs to sadness or joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good produces no passion in the irascible, as stated above (Question [23], Articles [3],4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger. |
| Quia igitur in via generationis seu consecutionis, proportio vel aptitudo ad finem praecedit consecutionem finis; inde est quod ira, inter omnes passiones irascibilis, est ultima, ordine generationis. Inter alias autem passiones irascibilis, quae important motum consequentem amorem vel odium boni vel mali, oportet quod passiones quarum obiectum est bonum, scilicet spes et desperatio, sint naturaliter priores passionibus quarum obiectum est malum, scilicet audacia et timore. Ita tamen quod spes est prior desperatione, quia spes est motus in bonum secundum rationem boni quod de sua ratione est attractivum, et ideo est motus in bonum per se; desperatio autem est recessus a bono, qui non competit bono secundum quod est bonum, sed secundum aliquid aliud, unde est quasi per accidens. Et eadem ratione, timor, cum sit recessus a malo, est prior quam audacia. Quod autem spes et desperatio sint naturaliter priores quam timor et audacia, ex hoc manifestum est, quod, sicut appetitus boni est ratio quare vitetur malum, ita etiam spes et desperatio sunt ratio timoris et audaciae, nam audacia consequitur spem victoriae, et timor consequitur desperationem vincendi. Ira autem consequitur audaciam, nullus enim irascitur vindictam appetens, nisi audeat vindicare, secundum quod Avicenna dicit, in sexto de naturalibus. Sic ergo patet quod spes est prima inter omnes passiones irascibilis. | Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation. And among the other passions of the irascible faculty, which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope precedes despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such, which is essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good directly; whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were. In like manner fear, through being a movement from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this—that as the desire of good is the reason for avoiding evil, so hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring: because daring arises from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one is angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself, as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his Physics. Accordingly, it is evident that hope is the first of all the irascible passions. |
| Et si ordinem omnium passionum secundum viam generationis, scire velimus, primo occurrunt amor et odium; secundo, desiderium et fuga; tertio, spes et desperatio; quarto, timor et audacia; quinto, ira; sexto et ultimo, gaudium et tristitia, quae consequuntur ad omnes passiones, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ita tamen quod amor est prior odio, et desiderium fuga, et spes desperatione, et timor audacia, et gaudium quam tristitia, ut ex praedictis colligi potest. | And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, second; hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth and last, joy and sadness, which follow from all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire precedes aversion; hope precedes despair; fear precedes daring; and joy precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated above. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia ira causatur ex aliis passionibus sicut effectus a causis praecedentibus, ideo ab ea, tanquam a manifestiori, denominatur potentia. | Reply to Objection 1: Because anger arises from the other passions, as an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being more manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod arduum non est ratio accedendi vel appetendi, sed potius bonum. Et ideo spes, quae directius respicit bonum, est prior, quamvis audacia aliquando sit in magis arduum, vel etiam ira. | Reply to Objection 2: It is not the arduousness but the good that is the reason for approach or desire. Consequently hope, which regards good more directly, takes precedence: although at times daring or even anger regards something more arduous. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod appetitus primo et per se movetur in bonum, sicut in proprium obiectum; et ex hoc causatur quod recedat a malo. Proportionatur enim motus appetitivae partis, non quidem motui naturali, sed intentioni naturae; quae per prius intendit finem quam remotionem contrarii, quae non quaeritur nisi propter adeptionem finis. | Reply to Objection 3: The movement of the appetite is essentially and directly towards the good as towards its proper object; its movement from evil results from this. For the movement of the appetitive part is in proportion, not to natural movement, but to the intention of nature, which intends the end before intending the removal of a contrary, which removal is desired only for the sake of obtaining the end. |
Index [<<� | >>]
First Part of the Second Part [ << | >> ]
Question: 25 [ << | >> ]
Article: 4 [ << | >> ]
| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint istae quatuor principales passiones, gaudium et tristitia, spes et timor. Augustinus enim, in XIV de Civ. Dei, non ponit spem, sed cupiditatem loco eius. | Objection 1: It would seem that joy, sadness, hope and fear are not the four principal passions. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,[7] sqq.) omits hope and puts desire in its place. |
| Praeterea, in passionibus animae est duplex ordo, scilicet intentionis, et consecutionis seu generationis. Aut ergo principales passiones accipiuntur secundum ordinem intentionis, et sic tantum gaudium et tristitia, quae sunt finales, erunt principales passiones. Aut secundum ordinem consecutionis seu generationis, et sic amor erit principalis passio. Nullo ergo modo debent dici quatuor principales passiones istae quatuor, gaudium et tristitia, spes et timor. | Objection 2: Further, there is a twofold order in the passions of the soul: the order of intention, and the order of execution or generation. The principal passions should therefore be taken, either in the order of intention; and thus joy and sadness, which are the final passions, will be the principal passions; or in the order of execution or generation, and thus love will be the principal passion. Therefore joy and sadness, hope and fear should in no way be called the four principal passions. |
| Praeterea, sicut audacia causatur ex spe, ita timor ex desperatione. Aut ergo spes et desperatio debent poni principales passiones, tanquam causae, aut spes et audacia, tanquam sibi ipsis affines. | Objection 3: Further, just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is caused by despair. Either, therefore, hope and despair should be reckoned as principal passions, since they cause others: or hope and daring, from being akin to one another. |
Sed contra est illud quod Boetius, in libro de Consol., enumerans quatuor principales passiones, dicit,
|
On the contrary, Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumerating the four principal passions, says:
|
| Respondeo dicendum quod hae quatuor passiones communiter principales esse dicuntur. Quarum duae, scilicet gaudium et tristitia, principales dicuntur, quia sunt completivae et finales simpliciter respectu omnium passionum, unde ad omnes passiones consequuntur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Timor autem et spes sunt principales, non quidem quasi completivae simpliciter, sed quia sunt completivae in genere motus appetitivi ad aliquid, nam respectu boni, incipit motus in amore, et procedit in desiderium, et terminatur in spe; respectu vero mali, incipit in odio, et procedit ad fugam, et terminatur in timore. Et ideo solet harum quatuor passionum numerus accipi secundum differentiam praesentis et futuri, motus enim respicit futurum, sed quies est in aliquo praesenti. De bono igitur praesenti est gaudium; de malo praesenti est tristitia; de bono vero futuro est spes; de malo futuro est timor. | I answer that, These four are commonly called the principal passions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because in them all the other passions have their completion and end; wherefore they arise from all the other passions, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Fear and hope are principal passions, not because they complete the others simply, but because they complete them as regards the movement of the appetite towards something: for in respect of good, movement begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on to aversion, and ends in fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions in relation to the present and the future: for movement regards the future, while rest is in something present: so that joy relates to present good, sadness relates to present evil; hope regards future good, and fear, future evil. |
| Omnes autem aliae passiones, quae sunt de bono vel de malo praesenti vel futuro, ad has completive reducuntur. Unde etiam a quibusdam dicuntur principales hae praedictae quatuor passiones, quia sunt generales. Quod quidem verum est, si spes et timor designant motum appetitus communiter tendentem in aliquid appetendum vel fugiendum. | As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present or future, they all culminate in these four. For this reason some have said that these four are the principal passions, because they are general passions; and this is true, provided that by hope and fear we understand the appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ponit desiderium vel cupiditatem loco spei, inquantum ad idem pertinere videntur, scilicet ad bonum futurum. | Reply to Objection 1: Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, in so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future good. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod passiones istae dicuntur principales, secundum ordinem intentionis et complementi. Et quamvis timor et spes non sint ultimae passiones simpliciter, tamen sunt ultimae in genere passionum tendentium in aliud quasi in futurum. Nec potest esse instantia nisi de ira. Quae tamen non potest poni principalis passio, quia est quidam effectus audaciae, quae non potest esse passio principalis, ut infra dicetur. | Reply to Objection 2: These are called principal passions, in the order of intention and completion. And though fear and hope are not the last passions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that tend towards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed any further except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be reckoned a principal passion, because it is an effect of daring, which cannot be a principal passion, as we shall state further on (Reply OBJ 3). |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod desperatio importat recessum a bono, quod est quasi per accidens, et audacia importat accessum ad malum, quod etiam est per accidens. Et ideo hae passiones non possunt esse principales, quia quod est per accidens, non potest dici principale. Et sic etiam nec ira potest dici passio principalis, quae consequitur audaciam. | Reply to Objection 3: Despair implies movement away from good; and this is, as it were, accidental: and daring implies movement towards evil; and this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal passions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to be principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from daring. |