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| Deinde considerandum est de odio. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. | We must now consider hatred: concerning which there are six points of inquiry: |
| Primo, utrum causa et obiectum odii sit malum. | (1) Whether evil is the cause and the object of hatred? |
| Secundo, utrum odium causetur ex amore. | (2) Whether love is the cause of hatred? |
| Tertio, utrum odium sit fortius quam amor. | (3) Whether hatred is stronger than love? |
| Quarto, utrum aliquis possit habere odio seipsum. | (4) Whether a man can hate himself? |
| Quinto, utrum aliquis possit habere odio veritatem. | (5) Whether a man can hate the truth? |
| Sexto, utrum aliquid possit haberi odio in universali. | (6) Whether a thing can be the object of universal hatred? |
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| Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod obiectum et causa odii non sit malum. Omne enim quod est, inquantum huiusmodi bonum est. Si igitur obiectum odii sit malum, sequitur quod nulla res odio habeatur, sed solum defectus alicuius rei. Quod patet esse falsum. | Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not the object and cause of hatred. For everything that exists, as such, is good. If therefore evil be the object of hatred, it follows that nothing but the lack of something can be the object of hatred: which is clearly untrue. |
| Praeterea, odire malum est laudabile, unde in laudem quorundam dicitur II Machab. III, quod leges optime custodiebantur, propter Oniae pontificis pietatem, et animos odio habentes mala. Si igitur nihil oditur nisi malum, sequitur quod omne odium sit laudabile. Quod patet esse falsum. | Objection 2: Further, hatred of evil is praise-worthy; hence (2 Macc 3:1) some are praised for that "the laws were very well kept, because of the godliness of Onias the high-priest, and the hatred of their souls [Douay: 'his soul'] had no evil." If, therefore, nothing but evil be the object of hatred, it would follow that all hatred is commendable: and this is clearly false. |
| Praeterea, idem non est simul bonum et malum. Sed idem diversis est odibile et amabile. Ergo odium non solum est mali, sed etiam boni. | Objection 3: Further, the same thing is not at the same time both good and evil. But the same thing is lovable and hateful to different subjects. Therefore hatred is not only of evil, but also of good. |
| Sed contra, odium contrariatur amori. Sed obiectum amoris est bonum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo obiectum odii est malum. | On the contrary, Hatred is the opposite of love. But the object of love is good, as stated above (Question [26], Article [1]; Question [27], Article [1]). Therefore the object of hatred is evil. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, cum appetitus naturalis derivetur ab aliqua apprehensione, licet non coniuncta; eadem ratio videtur esse de inclinatione appetitus naturalis, et appetitus animalis, qui sequitur apprehensionem coniunctam, sicut supra dictum est. In appetitu autem naturali hoc manifeste apparet, quod sicut unumquodque habet naturalem consonantiam vel aptitudinem ad id quod sibi convenit, quae est amor naturalis; ita ad id quod est ei repugnans et corruptivum, habet dissonantiam naturalem, quae est odium naturale. Sic igitur et in appetitu animali, seu in intellectivo, amor est consonantia quaedam appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut conveniens, odium vero est dissonantia quaedam appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut repugnans et nocivum. Sicut autem omne conveniens, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem boni; ita omne repugnans, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem mali. Et ideo, sicut bonum est obiectum amoris, ita malum est obiectum odii. |
I answer that, Since the natural appetite is the result of apprehension (though this apprehension is not in the same subject as the natural appetite), it seems that what applies to the inclination of the natural appetite, applies also to the animal appetite, which does result from an apprehension in the same subject, as stated above (Question [26], Article [1]). Now, with regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned and adapted to that which is suitable to it, wherein consists natural love; so has it a natural dissonance from that which opposes and destroys it; and this is natural hatred. So, therefore, in the animal appetite, or in the intellectual appetite, love is a certain harmony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as suitable; while hatred is dissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable, as such, bears the aspect of good; so whatever is repugnant, as such, bears the aspect of evil. And therefore, just as good is the object of love, so evil is the object of hatred. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ens, inquantum ens, non habet rationem repugnantis, sed magis convenientis, quia omnia conveniunt in ente. Sed ens inquantum est hoc ens determinatum, habet rationem repugnantis ad aliquod ens determinatum. Et secundum hoc, unum ens est odibile alteri, et est malum, etsi non in se, tamen per comparationem ad alterum. | Reply to Objection 1: Being, as such, has not the aspect of repugnance but only of fittingness; because being is common to all things. But being, inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has an aspect of repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being is hateful to another, and is evil; though not in itself, but by comparison with something else. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut aliquid apprehenditur ut bonum, quod non est vere bonum; ita aliquid apprehenditur ut malum, quod non est vere malum. Unde contingit quandoque nec odium mali, nec amorem boni esse bonum. | Reply to Objection 2: Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when it is not truly good; so a thing may be apprehended as evil, whereas it is not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil nor love of good is good. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod contingit idem esse amabile et odibile diversis, secundum appetitum quidem naturalem, ex hoc quod unum et idem est conveniens uni secundum suam naturam, et repugnans alteri, sicut calor convenit igni, et repugnat aquae. Secundum appetitum vero animalem, ex hoc quod unum et idem apprehenditur ab uno sub ratione boni, et ab alio sub ratione mali. | Reply to Objection 3: To different things the same thing may be lovable or hateful: in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one and the same thing being naturally suitable to one thing, and naturally unsuitable to another: thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming to water: and in respect of the animal appetite, owing to one and the same thing being apprehended by one as good, by another as bad. |
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| Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit causa odii. Ea enim quae ex opposito dividuntur, naturaliter sunt simul, ut dicitur in praedicamentis. Sed amor et odium, cum sint contraria, ex opposito dividuntur. Ergo naturaliter sunt simul. Non ergo amor est causa odii. | Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a cause of hatred. For "the opposite members of a division are naturally simultaneous" (Praedic. x). But love and hatred are opposite members of a division, since they are contrary to one another. Therefore they are naturally simultaneous. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred. |
| Praeterea, unum contrariorum non est causa alterius. Sed amor et odium sunt contraria. Ergo amor non est causa odii. | Objection 2: Further, of two contraries, one is not the cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred. |
| Praeterea, posterius non est causa prioris. Sed odium est prius amore, ut videtur, nam odium importat recessum a malo, amor vero accessum ad bonum. Ergo amor non est causa odii. | Objection 3: Further, that which follows is not the cause of that which precedes. But hatred precedes love, seemingly: since hatred implies a turning away from evil, whereas love implies a turning towards good. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred. |
| Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod omnes affectiones causantur ex amore. Ergo et odium, cum sit quaedam affectio animae, causatur ex amore. | On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all emotions are caused by love. Therefore hatred also, since it is an emotion of the soul, is caused by love. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, amor consistit in quadam convenientia amantis ad amatum, odium vero consistit in quadam repugnantia vel dissonantia. Oportet autem in quolibet prius considerare quid ei conveniat, quam quid ei repugnet, per hoc enim aliquid est repugnans alteri, quia est corruptivum vel impeditivum eius quod est conveniens. Unde necesse est quod amor sit prior odio; et quod nihil odio habeatur, nisi per hoc quod contrariatur convenienti quod amatur. Et secundum hoc, omne odium ex amore causatur. |
I answer that, As stated above (Article [1]), love consists in a certain agreement of the lover with the object loved, while hatred consists in a certain disagreement or dissonance. Now we should consider in each thing, what agrees with it, before that which disagrees: since a thing disagrees with another, through destroying or hindering that which agrees with it. Consequently love must needs precede hatred; and nothing is hated, save through being contrary to a suitable thing which is loved. And hence it is that every hatred is caused by love. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in his quae ex opposito dividuntur, quaedam inveniuntur quae sunt naturaliter simul et secundum rem, et secundum rationem, sicut duae species animalis, vel duae species coloris. Quaedam vero sunt simul secundum rationem, sed unum realiter est prius altero et causa eius, sicut patet in speciebus numerorum, figurarum et motuum. Quaedam vero non sunt simul nec secundum rem, nec secundum rationem, sicut substantia et accidens, nam substantia realiter est causa accidentis; et ens secundum rationem prius attribuitur substantiae quam accidenti, quia accidenti non attribuitur nisi inquantum est in substantia. Amor autem et odium naturaliter quidem sunt simul secundum rationem, sed non realiter. Unde nihil prohibet amorem esse causam odii. | Reply to Objection 1: The opposite members of a division are sometimes naturally simultaneous, both really and logically; e.g. two species of animal, or two species of color. Sometimes they are simultaneous logically, while, in reality, one precedes, and causes the other; e.g. the species of numbers, figures and movements. Sometimes they are not simultaneous either really or logically; e.g. substance and accident; for substance is in reality the cause of accident; and being is predicated of substance before it is predicated of accident, by a priority of reason, because it is not predicated of accident except inasmuch as the latter is in substance. Now love and hatred are naturally simultaneous, logically but not really. Wherefore nothing hinders love from being the cause of hatred. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod amor et odium sunt contraria, quando accipiuntur circa idem. Sed quando sunt de contrariis, non sunt contraria, sed se invicem consequentia, eiusdem enim rationis est quod ametur aliquid, et odiatur eius contrarium. Et sic amor unius rei est causa quod eius contrarium odiatur. | Reply to Objection 2: Love and hatred are contraries if considered in respect of the same thing. But if taken in respect of contraries, they are not themselves contrary, but consequent to one another: for it amounts to the same that one love a certain thing, or that one hate its contrary. Thus love of one thing is the cause of one's hating its contrary. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod in executione prius est recedere ab uno termino, quam accedere ad alterum terminum. Sed in intentione est e converso, propter hoc enim receditur ab uno termino, ut accedatur ad alterum. Motus autem appetitivus magis pertinet ad intentionem quam ad executionem. Et ideo amor est prior odio, cum utrumque sit motus appetitivus. | Reply to Objection 3: In the order of execution, the turning away from one term precedes the turning towards the other. But the reverse is the case in the order of intention: since approach to one term is the reason for turning away from the other. Now the appetitive movement belongs rather to the order of intention than to that of execution. Wherefore love precedes hatred: because each is an appetitive movement. |
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| Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod odium sit fortius amore. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., nemo est qui non magis dolorem fugiat, quam appetat voluptatem. Sed fugere dolorem pertinet ad odium, appetitus autem voluptatis pertinet ad amorem. Ergo odium est fortius amore. | Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is stronger than love. For Augustine says (Questions. 83, qu. 36): "There is no one who does not flee from pain, more than he desires pleasure." But flight from pain pertains to hatred; while desire for pleasure belongs to love. Therefore hatred is stronger than love. |
| Praeterea, debilius vincitur a fortiori. Sed amor vincitur ab odio, quando scilicet amor convertitur in odium. Ergo odium est fortius amore. | Objection 2: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. But love is overcome by hatred: when, that is to say, love is turned into hatred. Therefore hatred is stronger than love. |
| Praeterea, affectio animae per effectum manifestatur. Sed fortius insistit homo ad repellendum odiosum, quam ad prosequendum amatum, sicut etiam bestiae abstinent a delectabilibus propter verbera, ut Augustinus introducit in libro octoginta trium quaest. Ergo odium est fortius amore. | Objection 3: Further, the emotions of the soul are shown by their effects. But man insists more on repelling what is hateful, than on seeking what is pleasant: thus also irrational animals refrain from pleasure for fear of the whip, as Augustine instances (Questions. 83, qu. 36). Therefore hatred is stronger than love. |
| Sed contra, bonum est fortius quam malum, quia malum non agit nisi virtute boni, ut Dionysius dicit, cap. IV de Div. Nom. Sed odium et amor differunt secundum differentiam boni et mali. Ergo amor est fortior odio. | On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil; because "evil does nothing except in virtue of good," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But hatred and love differ according to the difference of good and evil. Therefore love is stronger than hatred. |
| Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est effectum sua causa esse fortiorem. Omne autem odium procedit ex aliquo amore sicut ex causa, ut supra dictum est. Unde impossibile est quod odium sit fortius amore simpliciter. |
I answer that, It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its cause. Now every hatred arises from some love as its cause, as above stated (Article [2]). Therefore it is impossible for hatred to be stronger than love absolutely. |
| Sed oportet ulterius quod amor, simpliciter loquendo, sit odio fortior. Fortius enim movetur aliquid in finem, quam in ea quae sunt ad finem. Recessus autem a malo ordinatur ad consecutionem boni, sicut ad finem. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, fortior est motus animae in bonum quam in malum. | But furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely speaking, stronger than hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more strongly than to the means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to the gaining of good. Wherefore, absolutely speaking, the soul's movement in respect of good is stronger than its movement in respect of evil. |
| Sed tamen aliquando videtur odium fortius amore, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia odium est magis sensibile quam amor. Cum enim sensus perceptio sit in quadam immutatione, ex quo aliquid iam immutatum est, non ita sentitur sicut quando est in ipso immutari. Unde calor febris hecticae, quamvis sit maior, non tamen ita sentitur sicut calor tertianae, quia calor hecticae iam versus est quasi in habitum et naturam. Propter hoc etiam, amor magis sentitur in absentia amati, sicut Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., quod amor non ita sentitur, cum non prodit eum indigentia. Et propter hoc etiam, repugnantia eius quod oditur, sensibilius percipitur quam convenientia eius quod amatur. Secundo, quia non comparatur odium ad amorem sibi correspondentem. Secundum enim diversitatem bonorum, est diversitas amorum in magnitudine et parvitate, quibus proportionantur opposita odia. Unde odium quod correspondet maiori amori, magis movet quam minor amor. | Nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger than love, for two reasons. First, because hatred is more keenly felt than love. For, since the sensitive perception is accompanied by a certain impression; when once the impression has been received it is not felt so keenly as in the moment of receiving it. Hence the heat of a hectic fever, though greater, is nevertheless not felt so much as the heat of tertian fever; because the heat of the hectic fever is habitual and like a second nature. For this reason, love is felt more keenly in the absence of the object loved; thus Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12) that "love is felt more keenly when we lack what we love." And for the same reason, the unbecomingness of that which is hated is felt more keenly than the becomingness of that which is loved. Secondly, because comparison is made between a hatred and a love which are not mutually corresponding. Because, according to different degrees of good there are different degrees of love to which correspond different degrees of hatred. Wherefore a hatred that corresponds to a greater love, moves us more than a lesser love. |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. Nam amor voluptatis est minor quam amor conservationis sui ipsius, cui respondet fuga doloris. Et ideo magis fugitur dolor, quam ametur voluptas. | Hence it is clear how to reply to the First Objection. For the love of pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation, to which corresponds flight from pain. Wherefore we flee from pain more than we love pleasure. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod odium nunquam vinceret amorem, nisi propter maiorem amorem cui odium correspondet. Sicut homo magis diligit se quam amicum, et propter hoc quod diligit se, habet odio etiam amicum, si sibi contrarietur. | Reply to Objection 2: Hatred would never overcome love, were it not for the greater love to which that hatred coresponds. Thus man loves himself more than he loves his friend: and because he loves himself, his friend is hateful to him, if he oppose him. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod ideo intensius aliquid operatur ad repellendum odiosa, quia odium est magis sensibile. | Reply to Objection 3: The reason why we act with greater insistence in repelling what is hateful, is because we feel hatred more keenly. |
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Article: 4 [ << | >> ]
| Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis possit seipsum odio habere. Dicitur enim in Psalmo X, qui diligit iniquitatem, odit animam suam. Sed multi diligunt iniquitatem. Ergo multi odiunt seipsos. |
Objection 1: It would seem that a man can hate himself. For it is written (Ps. 10:6): "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul." But many love iniquity. Therefore many hate themselves. |
| Praeterea, illum odimus, cui volumus et operamur malum. Sed quandoque aliquis vult et operatur sibi ipsi malum, puta qui interimunt seipsos. Ergo aliqui seipsos habent odio. | Objection 2: Further, him we hate, to whom we wish and work evil. But sometimes a man wishes and works evil to himself, e.g. a man who kills himself. Therefore some men hate themselves. |
| Praeterea, Boetius dicit, in II de Consol., quod avaritia facit homines odiosos, ex quo potest accipi quod omnis homo odit avarum. Sed aliqui sunt avari. Ergo illi odiunt seipsos. | Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "avarice makes a man hateful"; whence we may conclude that everyone hates a miser. But some men are misers. Therefore they hate themselves. |
| Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, quod nemo unquam carnem suam odio habuit. |
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:29) that "no man ever hated his own flesh." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est quod aliquis, per se loquendo, odiat seipsum. Naturaliter enim unumquodque appetit bonum, nec potest aliquis aliquid sibi appetere nisi sub ratione boni, nam malum est praeter voluntatem, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Amare autem aliquem est velle ei bonum, ut supra dictum est. Unde necesse est quod aliquis amet seipsum; et impossibile est quod aliquis odiat seipsum, per se loquendo. |
I answer that, Properly speaking, it is impossible for a man to hate himself. For everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone desire anything for himself, save under the aspect of good: for "evil is outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Now to love a man is to will good to him, as stated above (Question [26], Article [4]). Consequently, a man must, of necessity, love himself; and it is impossible for a man to hate himself, properly speaking. |
| Per accidens tamen contingit quod aliquis seipsum odio habeat. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte boni quod sibi aliquis vult. Accidit enim quandoque illud quod appetitur ut secundum quid bonum, esse simpliciter malum, et secundum hoc, aliquis per accidens vult sibi malum, quod est odire. Alio modo, ex parte sui ipsius, cui vult bonum. Unumquodque enim maxime est id quod est principalius in ipso, unde civitas dicitur facere quod rex facit, quasi rex sit tota civitas. Manifestum est ergo quod homo maxime est mens hominis. Contingit autem quod aliqui aestimant se esse maxime illud quod sunt secundum naturam corporalem et sensitivam. Unde amant se secundum id quod aestimant se esse, sed odiunt id quod vere sunt, dum volunt contraria rationi. Et utroque modo, ille qui diligit iniquitatem, odit non solum animam suam, sed etiam seipsum. | But accidentally it happens that a man hates himself: and this in two ways. First, on the part of the good which a man wills to himself. For it happens sometimes that what is desired as good in some particular respect, is simply evil; and in this way, a man accidentally wills evil to himself; and thus hates himself. Secondly, in regard to himself, to whom he wills good. For each thing is that which is predominant in it; wherefore the state is said to do what the king does, as if the king were the whole state. Now it is clear that man is principally the mind of man. And it happens that some men account themselves as being principally that which they are in their material and sensitive nature. Wherefore they love themselves according to what they take themselves to be, while they hate that which they really are, by desiring what is contrary to reason. And in both these ways, "he that loveth iniquity hateth" not only "his own soul," but also himself. |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. | Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod nullus sibi vult et facit malum, nisi inquantum apprehendit illud sub ratione boni. Nam et illi qui interimunt seipsos, hoc ipsum quod est mori, apprehendunt sub ratione boni, inquantum est terminativum alicuius miseriae vel doloris. | Reply to Objection 2: No man wills and works evil to himself, except he apprehend it under the aspect of good. For even they who kill themselves, apprehend death itself as a good, considered as putting an end to some unhappiness or pain. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod avarus odit aliquod accidens suum, non tamen propter hoc odit seipsum, sicut aeger odit suam aegritudinem, ex hoc ipso quod se amat. Vel dicendum quod avaritia odiosos facit aliis, non autem sibi ipsi. Quinimmo causatur ex inordinato sui amore, secundum quem de bonis temporalibus plus sibi aliquis vult quam debeat. | Reply to Objection 3: The miser hates something accidental to himself, but not for that reason does he hate himself: thus a sick man hates his sickness for the very reason that he loves himself. Or we may say that avarice makes man hateful to others, but not to himself. In fact, it is caused by inordinate self-love, in respect of which, man desires temporal goods for himself more than he should. |
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Article: 5 [ << | >> ]
| Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis non possit habere odio veritatem. Bonum enim et ens et verum convertuntur. Sed aliquis non potest habere odio bonitatem. Ergo nec veritatem. | Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot hate the truth. For good, true, and being are convertible. But a man cannot hate good. Neither, therefore, can he hate the truth. |
| Praeterea, omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Sed scientia non est nisi verorum. Ergo veritas naturaliter desideratur et amatur. Sed quod naturaliter inest, semper inest. Nullus ergo potest habere odio veritatem. | Objection 2: Further, "All men have a natural desire for knowledge," as stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics i, 1. But knowledge is only of truth. Therefore truth is naturally desired and loved. But that which is in a thing naturally, is always in it. Therefore no man can hate the truth. |
| Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod homines amant non fictos. Sed non nisi propter veritatem. Ergo homo naturaliter amat veritatem. Non potest ergo eam odio habere. | Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "men love those who are straightforward." But there can be no other motive for this save truth. Therefore man loves the truth naturally. Therefore he cannot hate it. |
| Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Galat. IV, factus sum vobis inimicus, verum dicens vobis. |
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 4:16): "Am I become your enemy because I tell you the truth?" [*St. Thomas quotes the passage, probably from memory, as though it were an assertion: "I am become," etc.] |
| Respondeo dicendum quod bonum et verum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt ratione. Bonum enim habet rationem appetibilis, non autem ens vel verum, quia bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Et ideo bonum, sub ratione boni, non potest odio haberi, nec in universali nec in particulari. Ens autem et verum in universali quidem odio haberi non possunt, quia dissonantia est causa odii, et convenientia causa amoris; ens autem et verum sunt communia omnibus. Sed in particulari nihil prohibet quoddam ens et quoddam verum odio haberi, inquantum habet rationem contrarii et repugnantis, contrarietas enim et repugnantia non adversatur rationi entis et veri, sicut adversatur rationi boni. | I answer that, Good, true and being are the same in reality, but differ as considered by reason. For good is considered in the light of something desirable, while being and true are not so considered: because good is "what all things seek." Wherefore good, as such, cannot be the object of hatred, neither in general nor in particular. Being and truth in general cannot be the object of hatred: because disagreement is the cause of hatred, and agreement is the cause of love; while being and truth are common to all things. But nothing hinders some particular being or some particular truth being an object of hatred, in so far as it is considered as hurtful and repugnant; since hurtfulness and repugnance are not incompatible with the notion of being and truth, as they are with the notion of good. |
| Contingit autem verum aliquod particulare tripliciter repugnare vel contrariari bono amato. Uno modo, secundum quod veritas est causaliter et originaliter in ipsis rebus. Et sic homo quandoque odit aliquam veritatem, dum vellet non esse verum quod est verum. Alio modo, secundum quod veritas est in cognitione ipsius hominis, quae impedit ipsum a prosecutione amati. Sicut si aliqui vellent non cognoscere veritatem fidei, ut libere peccarent, ex quorum persona dicitur Iob XXI, scientiam viarum tuarum nolumus. Tertio modo habetur odio veritas particularis, tanquam repugnans, prout est in intellectu alterius. Puta, cum aliquis vult latere in peccato, odit quod aliquis veritatem circa peccatum suum cognoscat. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus, in X Confess., quod homines amant veritatem lucentem, oderunt eam redarguentem. | Now it may happen in three ways that some particular truth is repugnant or hurtful to the good we love. First, according as truth is in things as in its cause and origin. And thus man sometimes hates a particular truth, when he wishes that what is true were not true. Secondly, according as truth is in man's knowledge, which hinders him from gaining the object loved: such is the case of those who wish not to know the truth of faith, that they may sin freely; in whose person it is said (Job 21:14): "We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways." Thirdly, a particular truth is hated, as being repugnant, inasmuch as it is in the intellect of another man: as, for instance, when a man wishes to remain hidden in his sin, he hates that anyone should know the truth about his sin. In this respect, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that men "love truth when it enlightens, they hate it when it reproves." |
| Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. | Objection 1: This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod cognoscere veritatem secundum se est amabile, propter quod dicit Augustinus quod amant eam lucentem. Sed per accidens cognitio veritatis potest esse odibilis, inquantum impedit ab aliquo desiderato. | Reply to Objection 2: The knowledge of truth is lovable in itself: hence Augustine says that men love it when it enlightens. But accidentally, the knowledge of truth may become hateful, in so far as it hinders one from accomplishing one's desire. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod ex hoc procedit quod non ficti amantur, quod homo amat secundum se cognoscere veritatem, quam homines non ficti manifestant | Reply to Objection 3: The reason why we love those who are straightforward is that they make known the truth, and the knowledge of the truth, considered in itself, is a desirable thing. |
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| Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod odium non possit esse alicuius in universali. Odium enim est passio appetitus sensitivi, qui movetur ex sensibili apprehensione. Sed sensus non potest apprehendere universale. Ergo odium non potest esse alicuius in universali. | Objection 1: It would seem that a thing cannot be an object of universal hatred. Because hatred is a passion of the sensitive appetite, which is moved by an apprehension in the senses. But the senses cannot apprehend the universal. Therefore a thing cannot be an object of universal hatred. |
| Praeterea, odium causatur ex aliqua dissonantia; quae communitati repugnat. Sed communitas est de ratione universalis. Ergo odium non potest esse alicuius in universali. | Objection 2: Further, hatred is caused by disagreement; and where there is disagreement, there is nothing in common. But the notion of universality implies something in common. Therefore nothing can be the object of universal hatred. |
| Praeterea, obiectum odii est malum. Malum autem est in rebus, et non in mente, ut dicitur in VI Metaphys. Cum ergo universale sit solum in mente, quae abstrahit universale a particulari, videtur quod odium non possit esse alicuius universalis. | Objection 3: Further, the object of hatred is evil. But "evil is in things, and not in the mind" (Metaph. vi, 4). Since therefore the universal is in the mind only, which abstracts the universal from the particular, it would seem that hatred cannot have a universal object. |
| Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod ira semper fit inter singularia odium autem etiam ad genera, furem enim odit et calumniatorem unusquisque. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is directed to something singular, whereas hatred is also directed to a thing in general; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter." |
| Respondeo dicendum quod de universali dupliciter contingit loqui, uno modo, secundum quod subest intentioni universalitatis; alio autem modo, de natura cui talis intentio attribuitur, alia est enim consideratio hominis universalis, et alia hominis in eo quod homo. Si igitur universale accipiatur primo modo, sic nulla potentia sensitivae partis, neque apprehensiva neque appetitiva, ferri potest in universale, quia universale fit per abstractionem a materia individuali, in qua radicatur omnis virtus sensitiva. | I answer that, There are two ways of speaking of the universal: first, as considered under the aspect of universality; secondly, as considered in the nature to which it is ascribed: for it is one thing to consider the universal man, and another to consider a man as man. If, therefore, we take the universal, in the first way, no sensitive power, whether of apprehension or of appetite, can attain the universal: because the universal is obtained by abstraction from individual matter, on which every sensitive power is based. |
| Potest tamen aliqua potentia sensitiva, et apprehensiva et appetitiva, ferri in aliquid universaliter. Sicut dicimus quod obiectum visus est color secundum genus, non quia visus cognoscat colorem universalem; sed quia quod color sit cognoscibilis a visu, non convenit colori inquantum est hic color, sed inquantum est color simpliciter. Sic ergo odium etiam sensitivae partis, potest respicere aliquid in universali, quia ex natura communi aliquid adversatur animali, et non solum ex eo quod est particularis, sicut lupus ovi. Unde ovis odit lupum generaliter. Sed ira semper causatur ex aliquo particulari, quia ex aliquo actu laedentis; actus autem particularium sunt. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit quod ira semper est ad aliquid singulare; odium vero potest esse ad aliquid in genere. | Nevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that the object of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight is cognizant of universal color, but because the fact that color is cognizant by the sight, is attributed to color, not as being this particular color, but simply because it is color. Accordingly hatred in the sensitive faculty can regard something universally: because this thing, by reason of its common nature, and not merely as an individual, is hostile to the animal—for instance, a wolf in regard to a sheep. Hence a sheep hates the wolf universally. On the other hand, anger is always caused by something in particular: because it is caused by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions proceed from individuals. For this reason the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is always directed to something singular, whereas hatred can be directed to a thing in general." |
| Sed odium secundum quod est in parte intellectiva, cum consequatur apprehensionem universalem intellectus, potest utroque modo esse respectu universalis. | But according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since it arises from the universal apprehension of the intellect, it can regard the universal in both ways. |
| Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sensus non apprehendit universale, prout est universale, apprehendit tamen aliquid cui per abstractionem accidit universalitas. | Reply to Objection 1: The senses do not apprehend the universal, as such: but they apprehend something to which the character of universality is given by abstraction. |
| Ad secundum dicendum quod id quod commune est omnibus, non potest esse ratio odii. Sed nihil prohibet aliquid esse commune multis, quod tamen dissonat ab aliis, et sic est eis odiosum | Reply to Objection 2: That which is common to all cannot be a reason of hatred. But nothing hinders a thing from being common to many, and at variance with others, so as to be hateful to them. |
| Ad tertium dicendum quod illa obiectio procedit de universali secundum quod substat intentioni universalitatis, sic enim non cadit sub apprehensione vel appetitu sensitivo. | Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the universal under the aspect of universality: and thus it does not come under the sensitive apprehension or appetite. |